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Thursday, March 12, 2020

RTI Act not applies to the courts When there is an effective machinery for having access to the information or obtaining certified copies which, in our view, is a very simple procedure i.e.filing of an application/affidavit with requisite court fee and stating the reasons for which the certified copies are required, we do not find any justification for invoking Section 11 of the RTI Act and adopt a cumbersome procedure. This would involve wastage of both time and fiscal resources which the preamble of the RTI Act itself intends to avoid. We summarise our conclusion:- (i) Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules stipulating a third party to have access to the information/obtaining the certified copies of the documents or orders requires to file an application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking the information, is not inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act; but merely lays down a different procedure as the practice or payment of fees, etc. for obtaining information. In the absence of inherent inconsistency between the provisions of the RTI Act and other law, overriding effect of RTI Act would not apply. (ii) The information to be accessed/certified copies on the judicial side to be obtained through the mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, the provisions of the RTI Act shall not be resorted to. In the light of aforesaid reasonings, the impugned order dated 13.03.2014 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No.1348 of 2013 is confirmed and these appeals are dismissed.

RTI Act not applies to the courts
When there is an effective machinery for having access to the information or obtaining
certified copies which, in our view, is a very simple procedure i.e.filing of an application/affidavit with requisite court fee and stating the reasons for which the certified copies are required, we do not
find any justification for invoking Section 11 of the RTI Act and adopt a cumbersome procedure. This would involve wastage of both time and fiscal resources which the preamble of the RTI Act itself intends to avoid.
We summarise our conclusion:-
(i) Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules stipulating a third party to have access to the
information/obtaining the certified copies of the documents or orders requires to file an
application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking the information, is not inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act; but merely lays down a different procedure as the practice or payment of fees, etc. for obtaining information. In the absence of inherent inconsistency between the provisions of the RTI Act and other law, overriding effect of RTI Act would not apply.
(ii) The information to be accessed/certified copies on the judicial side to be obtained through the
mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, the provisions of the RTI Act shall not be resorted to.
In the light of aforesaid reasonings, the impugned order dated 13.03.2014 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No.1348 of 2013 is confirmed and these
appeals are dismissed. 
.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).1966-1967 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.5840 of 2015)
CHIEF INFORMATION COMMISSIONER …..Appellant
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AND
ANOTHER …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Leave granted.
2. The point falling for determination in this appeal is as regards
the right of a third party to apply for certified copies to be obtained
from the High Court by invoking the provisions of Right to
Information Act without resorting to Gujarat High Court Rules
prescribed by the High Court.
3. Brief facts which led to filing of this appeal are as follows:-
An RTI application dated 05.04.2010 was filed by respondent
No.2 seeking information pertaining to the following cases – Civil
Application No.5517 of 2003 and Civil Application No.8072 of 1989
1
along with all relevant documents and certified copies. In reply, by
letter dated 29.04.2010, Public Information Officer, Gujarat High
Court informed respondent No.2 that for obtaining required copies,
he should make an application personally or through his advocate
on affixing court fees stamp of Rs.3/- with requisite fee to the
“Deputy Registrar”. It was further stated that as respondent No.2 is
not a party to the said proceedings, as per Rule 151 of the Gujarat
High Court Rules, 1993, his application should be accompanied by
an affidavit stating the grounds for which the certified copies are
required and on making such application, he will be supplied the
certified copies of the documents as per Rules 149 to 154 of the
Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993.
4. Being aggrieved, respondent No.2 preferred Appeal No.84 of
2010 before the Appellate Authority-Registrar Administration under
Section 19 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short “RTI Act”).
The appeal was dismissed vide order dated 04.08.2010 on the
ground that for obtaining certified copies, the alternative efficacious
remedy is already available under the Gujarat High Court Rules,
1993 and that under the provisions of RTI Act, no certified copies
can be provided.
5. Respondent No.2 then filed Second Appeal No.1437 of 2010-
11 before the Appellant-Chief Information Commissioner and notice
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was sent to respondent No.1. Respondent No.1-High Court filed its
response reiterating the position that there are provisions under
Rules 149 to 154 of the Gujarat High Court Rules for anybody who
wants to obtain the certified copies as per which,
application/affidavit should be filed stating the grounds for which the
documents are required and with requisite court fee stamps.
Respondent No.1 stated that despite the letter dated 02.07.2010 by
the Deputy Registrar (CC Section), Decree Department, Gujarat
High Court to respondent No.2 informing him of the procedure for
getting certified copies, respondent No.2 has not made application
as per the rules of the High Court and that the Public Information
Officer cannot be compelled to breach the High Court Rules and
hence, the appeal filed before the Chief Information Commissioner
(CIC) is liable to be dismissed. Relying upon Sections 6(2) and 22
of the RTI Act, the appellant-Chief Information Commissioner vide
its order dated 04.04.2013 directed Public Information Officer of the
Gujarat High Court to provide the information sought by respondent
No.2 within twenty days.
6. Challenging the order of Chief Information Commissioner,
respondent No.1 filed Special Civil Application No.7880 of 2013
before the High Court. The learned Single Judge, while admitting
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the petition, passed an interim order dated 11.10.2013 directing
respondent No.1 to provide the information sought by respondent
No.2 within four weeks. The learned Single Judge held that the
legality and validity of the direction given by the appellant and the
right of respondent No.2 to receive the copies under RTI Act will be
considered at the stage of final hearing. It was however clarified that
supply of information by respondent No.1 shall not be construed as
acceptance of applicability of RTI Act to the High Court.
7. Being aggrieved by the interim order, respondent No.1-High
Court preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.1348 of 2013 before the
Division Bench contending that the party who seeks certified copies
has to make an application along with the copying charges and
requisite court fees stamp as per Rules 149 to 154 of the Gujarat
High Court Rules. As per the Rules, if the certified copy is sought by
a person who is not a party to the litigation, his application has to be
accompanied by an affidavit stating therein the purpose for which he
requires the certified copies. Vide impugned order, the High Court
allowed the Letters Patent Appeal holding that when a particular
field is governed by the rules which are not declared ultra-vires,
then there is no question of applying the fresh rules and make the
situation confusing. The High Court held that in the light of the High
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Court Rules, certified copies may be given on payment of charges
as per the Rules and also the applicant (respondent No.2) has to
file an affidavit disclosing the purpose for which the certified copies
are required and there is no question of making an application
under the RTI Act. The Division Bench set aside the order of the
Chief Information Commissioner by observing that when a copy is
demanded by any person, the same has to be in accordance with
the Rules of the High Court on the subject.
8. As the question involved is concerned with all the High Courts
and having regard to the importance of the matter, we have
requested Mr. Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni, learned Additional Solicitor
General (ASG) to appear as amicus curiae to assist the Court which
the learned ASG readily agreed. Mr. Nadkarni collected information
from all the High Courts and filed a compilation of the information
obtained by him about the Rules framed by various High Courts in
exercise of their power under Article 225 of the Constitution of India
and under Section 28 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.
9. Mr. Preetesh Kapoor, learned Senior counsel for the appellant
has contended that Section 6(2) of the RTI Act specifically provides
that an applicant making a request for information shall not be
required to give reasons for requesting the information sought and
5
whereas under the Gujarat High Court Rules, applications made by
third parties seeking copies of the documents shall be accompanied
by an affidavit stating the grounds on which they are required and
there is direct inconsistency between the provisions of the RTI Act
and the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993. It was submitted that in
view of the inconsistency between the provisions of the RTI Act and
the Gujarat High Court Rules, harmonious construction between the
two is not possible and in the event of conflict between the
provisions of RTI Act and any other law made by the Parliament or
State Legislature or any other authority, the former must prevail. It
was submitted that Section 22 of the RTI Act specifically provides
that the provisions of the RTI Act will have an overriding effect over
any other laws for the time being in force. The learned Senior
counsel submitted that the High Court Rules have been framed in
exercise of the powers under Article 225 of the Constitution of India
which would be subject to any other law and the non-obstante
clause in Section 22 of the RTI Act shows that the provisions of the
RTI Act would override the High Court Rules. The learned Senior
counsel inter alia relied upon the recent judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal 2019 (16) SCALE 40.
6
10. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the
intervenors submitted that there can be no apprehension that
allowing an applicant to seek information from the High Court under
RTI Act can prejudicially affect the privacy/rights of other parties or
the administration of justice. Reiterating the submission of Senior
counsel, Mr. Preetesh Kapoor, Mr. Prashant Bhushan submitted that
Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules is not in consonance with
Section 6(2) of the RTI Act and the provisions of RTI Act prevails
over the relevant Rules of Public Authorities/Gujarat High Court
Rules. Taking us through Section 22 of the RTI Act, learned
counsel submitted that RTI Act is a general law made by the
Parliament with the avowed object of dissemination of information
and ensuring transparency in the functioning of the Public
Authorities and in view of non obstante clause of Section 22 of the
RTI Act, in case of any conflict regarding “access to information
from public authorities”, the provisions of RTI Act will prevail over
any other law. In support of his contention, the learned counsel
placed reliance upon Institute of Companies Secretaries of India v.
Paras Jain 2019 SCC Online SC 764 and the Constitution Bench
judgment in Subhash Chandra Agrawal.
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11. Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1-High Court of Gujarat submitted that the Gujarat
High Court Rules 149 to 154 do not stipulate anything contra to
Section 22 of the RTI Act and the Gujarat High Court Rule 151 is in
consonance with the RTI Act. The learned counsel submitted that
respondent No.2 was only informed to make an application as per
the procedure stipulated under the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993
and since respondent No.2 was not a party to the proceedings, he
was informed that his application shall be accompanied with an
affidavit stating the grounds for which the certified copies are
required. The learned counsel submitted that when an efficacious
remedy is available under Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules
which is in consonance with the provisions of RTI Act, the provisions
of the RTI Act cannot be invoked and the High Court rightly held that
there is no question of making an application under the RTI Act and
rightly quashed the order of the appellant-Chief Information
Commissioner.
12. Mr. Nadkarni, learned amicus has taken us through the
information received from the various High Courts and submitted
that in exercise of power under Article 225 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court Rules are framed and the Rules provide for a
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mode for furnishing of information by way of certified copies to
persons who are party to the litigation after making payment of
requisite fees. It was submitted that insofar as third parties i.e.
persons who are not party to the litigation are concerned, the same
is also provided under the Rules, if the third party files an affidavit
stating the reasonable grounds to receive such information/certified
copies. The learned amicus submitted that there is no inconsistency
between the RTI Act and the Rules framed by the High Court so as
to furnish information. It was also submitted that although Section
22 of the RTI Act has an overriding effect over any other laws, in
case there are inconsistencies, Section 22 of the RTI Act does not
contemplate to override those legislations which also aim to ensure
access to information. The learned amicus submitted that so far as
the information on the judicial side of the High Court, the Rules
framed by the High Court provide for dissemination of information to
third party as per the High Court Rules by filing an application with
requisite fee and filing an affidavit stating the grounds. Insofar as
the information on the administrative side of the High Court, the
learned amicus submitted that access to such information could be
had through the Rules framed by the various High Courts and the
Rules framed under the RTI Act by the High Courts. Drawing our
attention to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in The Registrar,
9
Supreme Court of India v. RS Misra (2017) 244 DLT 179 and
judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Information
Commissioner v. State Public Information Officer and another
WP(C) No.9418 of 2008, the learned amicus submitted that the
High Courts have taken a consistent view that the information can
be accessed through the mechanism provided under the Supreme
Court Rules, 2013 and the High Court Rules and once any
information can be accessed through the mechanism provided
under the Statute or the Rules framed, the provisions of the RTI Act
cannot be resorted to.
13. We have carefully considered the contentions and perused
the impugned judgment and materials on record. The following
points arise for consideration in this appeal:-
(i) Whether Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993
stipulating that for providing copy of documents to the third
parties, they are required to file an affidavit stating the
reasons for seeking certified copies, suffers from any
inconsistency with the provisions of RTI Act?
(ii) When there are two machineries to provide
information/certified copies – one under the High Court
Rules and another under the RTI Act, in the absence of
any inconsistency in the High Court Rules, whether the
provisions of RTI Act can be resorted to for obtaining
certified copy/information?
10
14. Section 2(f) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 explains the
meaning of the term “information” which reads as under:-
2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless, the context otherwise requires,-
………
(f) "information" means any material in any form, including
records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press
releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers,
samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and
information relating to any private body which can be accessed by
a public authority under any other law for the time being in force;
15. Section 2(h) of the RTI Act defines “public authority”. The
term “public authority” has been given very wide meaning in the
RTI Act. Section 2(h) of the RTI Act reads as under:-
2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless, the context otherwise requires,-
………
(h) "public authority" means any authority or body or institution
of self-government established or constituted,—
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate
Government, and includes any—
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government Organisation substantially
financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by
the appropriate Government;
16. Section 2(i) of the RTI Act defines “record” which is an
inclusive definition. Section 2(j) explains “right to information”.
Sections 2(i) and 2(j) of the RTI Act read as under:-
2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless, the context otherwise requires,-
………
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(i) "record" includes—
(i) any document, manuscript and file;
(ii) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a
document;
(iii)any reproduction of image or images embodied in such
microfilm (whether enlarged or not); and
(iv) any other material produced by a computer or any other
device;
(j) "right to information" means the right to information accessible
under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public
authority and includes the right to—
(i) inspection of work, documents, records;
(ii)taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or
records;
(iii) taking certified samples of material;
(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies,
tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or
through printouts where such information is stored in a
computer or in any other device;
17. Section 8(1) of the RTI Act provides for exemption from
disclosure of information. Right to information is subject to
exceptions or exemptions stated in Section 8(1)(a) to 8(1)(j) of the
RTI Act. There are ten clauses of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.
Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 deals with information that
would compromise the sovereignty or integrity of the country and
like matter; clause (b) covers any information which has been
expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal
or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court; clause
(c) covers such matters which would cause a breach of privilege of
the Parliament or the State Legislatures; clause (d) protects
information of commercial nature and trade secrets and intellectual
12
property; clause (e) exempts the disclosure of any information
available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the
competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest
warrants the disclosure of such information; clause (f) prevents
information being disseminated, if it is received in confidence from
any foreign Government; clause (g) exempts the disclosure of any
information which endanger the life or physical safety of any person
or identify the source of information or assistance given in
confidence for law enforcement or security purposes; clause (h)
bars access to such information which would impede the process of
investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders; clause (i)
forbids records and papers relating to deliberations of ministers and
officers of the executive being made available, subject to a proviso;
and, clause (j) prohibits disclosure of personal information unless
there is an element of public interest involved.
18. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India
v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal 2019 (16) SCALE 40, the Supreme
Court upheld the order passed by the Central Information
Commissioner directing the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to furnish
information as to the assets declared by the Hon’ble Judges of the
Supreme Court. The Constitution Bench held that such disclosure
would not, in any way, impinge upon the personal information and
13
right to privacy of the Judges. The fiduciary relationship rule in
terms of Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act was held inapplicable.
Learned counsel appearing for the parties extensively relied upon
the observations of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra
Agarwal. Since the issue before us is the High Court Rules vis-avis., the RTI Act, we do not propose to refer the various
observations copiously relied upon by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties.
19. Article 124 relates to the establishment and constitution of the
Supreme Court. Article 124 states that the Supreme Court of India
consist of Chief Justice of India and other Judges. Under Article 145
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may, from time to time, with
the approval of the President, make Rules for regulating generally
the Practice and Procedure of the Court. In exercise of the powers
under Article 145 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has framed
“Supreme Court Rules”. Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules lays
down the procedure in respect of grant of certified copies of
pleadings, judgments, documents, decrees or orders, deposition of
the witnesses, etc. to the parties to the litigation and also to the third
parties. The parties to a proceeding in the Supreme Court shall be
entitled to obtain certified copies by making appropriate application
14
and the court fees payable as per the “Supreme Court Rules”. So
far as the third parties are concerned, as per Order XIII Rule 2 of
the Supreme Court Rules, the court on the application of a person
who is not a party to the case, appeal or matter, pending or
disposed of, may on good cause shown, allow such person to
receive such copies as is or are mentioned in the Order XIII Rule 1
of the Supreme Court Rules. Thus, as per the Supreme Court
Rules also, the third party is required to show good cause for
obtaining certified copies of the documents or orders.
20. Article 216 relates to the constitution of High Courts. Every
High Court consists of a Chief Justice and other Judges as the
President of India may from time to time appoint. The High Court
Rules are framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The
procedure followed for furnishing of copies/certified copies of
orders/documents etc., being information on the judicial side, are
governed by the Rules framed by the High Court under Article 225
of the Constitution of India. Insofar as the RTI Act is concerned, in
exercise of the powers under Section 28 of the RTI Act, various
High Courts have framed the Rules under RTI Act and the
information on the administrative side of the High Court can be
15
accessed as per the Rules framed by the High Courts under RTI
Act.
21. In the present case, we are concerned with Gujarat High
Court Rules. Grant of certified copies to parties to the litigation and
third parties are governed by Rules 149 to 154 of Gujarat High
Court Rules. As per the Rules, on filing of application with
prescribed court fees stamp, litigants/parties to the proceedings are
entitled to receive the copies of documents/orders/judgments etc.
The third parties who are not parties in any of the proceedings, shall
not be given the copies of judgments and other documents without
the order of the Assistant Registrar. As per Rule 151 of the Gujarat
High Court Rules, the applications requesting for copies of
documents/judgments made by third parties, shall be accompanied
by an affidavit stating the grounds for which they are required. Rule
151 reads as under:-
“151. Parties to proceedings entitled to copies; application by
third parties to be accompanied by affidavits. Copies of
documents in any Civil or Criminal Proceedings and copies of
judgment of the High Court shall not be given to persons other
than the parties thereto without the order of the Assistant
Registrar. Applications for copies of documents or judgment
made by third parties shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating
the grounds on which they are required, provided that such
affidavit shall be dispensed with in case of applications made by
or on behalf of the Government of the Union, the Government of
any State or the Government of any foreign State.”
16
22. The learned amicus has obtained information from various
High Courts as to the procedure followed by the High Courts for
furnishing certified copies of orders/judgments/documents. As per
the Rules framed by various High Courts, parties to the proceedings
are entitled to obtain certified copies of orders/judgments/documents
on filing of application along with prescribed court fees stamp.
Insofar as furnishing of certified copies to third parties, the Rules
framed by the High Courts stipulate that the certified copies of
documents/orders or judgments or copies of proceedings would be
furnished to the third parties only on the orders passed by the court
or the Registrar, on being satisfied about the reasonable cause and
bona fide of the reasons seeking the information/certified copies of
the documents. We may refer to the Rules framed by the High
Courts of Bombay, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madras
and various other High Courts which stipulate similar provisions for
furnishing information/certified copies to third parties. The Rules
stipulate that for the third parties to have access to the information
on the judicial side or obtaining certified copies of
documents/judgments/orders, the third parties will have to make an
application stating the reasons for which they are required and on
payment of necessary court fees stamp. As pointed out earlier,
Supreme Court Rules also stipulate that certified copies of
17
documents or orders could be supplied to the third parties only on
being satisfied about the reasonable cause. Be it noted, the access
to the information or certified copies of the
documents/judgments/orders/court proceedings are not denied to
the third parties. The Rules of the High Court only stipulate that the
third parties will have to file an application/affidavit stating the
reasons for which the information/certified copies are required. The
Rules framed by the Gujarat High Court are in consonance with the
provisions of the RTI Act. There is no inconsistency between the
provisions of the RTI Act with the Rules framed by the High Court in
exercise of the powers under Article 225 of the Constitution of India.
23. Mr. Preetesh Kapoor, learned Senior counsel for the appellant
has submitted that Section 6(2) of the RTI Act grants a substantive
right and the person who is seeking information/copies is not
required to give any reason and this right cannot be curtailed or
whittled down by procedural laws framed by the High Court under
Article 225 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention
that the rules framed by the High Court in exercise of powers under
Article 225 cannot make or curtail any substantive law, reliance was
placed upon Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth and
Others (2005) 3 SCC 601. Learned Senior counsel further
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submitted that Section 22 of the RTI Act specifically provides that
the provisions of the RTI Act will have an overriding effect over other
laws for the time being in force. It was therefore, submitted that in
the event of any conflict between the provisions of the RTI Act and
any other laws made by the Parliament or a State Legislature or any
other authority, the provisions of the RTI Act must prevail and
therefore, the RTI Act would prevail over the rules framed by the
High Court. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for the
intervention applicants also reiterated the same submission.
24. In order to consider the contentions urged by the learned
Senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Prashant Bhushan, let us
briefly refer to the various categories of information held by the High
Court, which are broadly as under:-
(a) information held by the High Court relating to the
parties to the litigation/proceedings – pleadings,
documents and other materials and memo of grounds
raised by the parties;
(b) orders and judgments passed by the High Court,
notes of proceedings, etc.;
(c) In exercise of power of superintendence over the
other courts and tribunals, information received in the
records submitted/called for by those courts and
tribunals like subordinate judiciary, various tribunals
like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Customs Excise
19
and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal and other
tribunals;
(d) information on the administrative side of the High
Court viz. appointments, transfers and postings of the
judicial officers, staff members of the High Court and
the district judiciary, disciplinary action taken against
the judicial officers and the staff members and such
other information relating to the administrative work.
(e) Correspondence by the High Court with the Supreme
Court, Government and with the district judiciary, etc.;
and
(f) information on the administrative side as to the
decision taken by the collegium of the High Court in
making recommendations of the Judges to be
appointed to the High Court; information as to the
assets of the sitting Judges held by the Chief Justice
of the High Court.
25. Information under the categories (a), (b) and (c) and other
information on the judicial side can be accessed/certified copies of
documents and orders could be obtained by the parties to the
proceedings in terms of the High Court Rules and the parties to the
proceedings are entitled to the same. So far as the third parties are
concerned, as of right, they are not entitled to access the
information/obtain the certified copies of documents, orders and
other proceedings. As per rules framed by the High Court, a third
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party can obtain the certified copies of the documents, orders or
judgments or can have access to the information only by filing an
application/affidavit and by stating the reason for which the
information/copies of documents or orders are required. Insofar as
on the administrative side i.e. categories (d), (e) and (f), one can
have access to the information or copies of the documents could be
obtained under the rules framed by the various High Courts or
under the rules framed by the High Court under the RTI Act. Insofar
as the disclosure of information as to the assets of the Judges held
by the Chief Justice of the High Court, the same is now covered by
the judgment of the Constitution Bench reported in Central Public
Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Agrawal 2019 (16) SCALE 40.
26. The preamble to the RTI Act suggests that the Act was
enacted “to promote transparency and accountability in the working
of every public authority…….”. The Act was enacted by keeping in
view the right of “an informed citizenry and transparency of
information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain
corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities
accountable to the governed…..”. The preamble opens with a
reference to the Constitution having established a democratic
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republic and the need therefore, for an informed citizenry. The
preamble reveals that legislature was conscious of the likely conflict
with other public interest including efficient operations of the
Governments and optimum use of limited fiscal resources and the
preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information and the
necessity to harmonise these conflicting interests. A citizen of India
has every right to ask for any information subject to the limitation
prescribed under the Act. The right to seek information is only to
fulfill the objectives of the Act laid down in the preamble, that is, to
promote transparency of information.
27. Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 requires a
third party applicant seeking copies of documents in any civil or
criminal proceedings to file an application/affidavit stating the
reasons for which those documents are required. As such, the High
Court Rules do not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of
documents in any court proceedings or any document on the judicial
side. It is not as if the information is denied or refused to the
applicant. All that is required to be done is to apply for the certified
copies with application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking the
information. The reason insisting upon the third party for stating the
grounds for obtaining certified copies is to satisfy the court that the
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information is sought for bona fide reasons or to effectuate public
interest. The information is held by the High Court as a trustee for
the litigants in order to adjudicate upon the matter and administer
justice. The same cannot be permitted by the third party to have
access to such personal information of the parties or information
given by the Government in the proceedings. Lest, there would be
misuse of process of court and the information and it would reach
unmanageable levels. If the High Court Rules framed under
Article 225 provide a mechanism for invoking the said right in a
particular manner, the said mechanism should be preserved and
followed. The said mechanism cannot be abandoned or
discontinued merely because the general law – RTI Act has been
enacted.
28. As discussed earlier, the object of the RTI Act itself recognizes
the need to protect the institutional interest and also to make
optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of
confidentiality of sensitive information. The procedure to obtain
certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and
the procedure is very simple – filing of an application/affidavit along
with the requisite court fee stating the reasons for seeking the
information. The information held by the High Court on the judicial
23
side are the “personal information” of the litigants like title cases and
family court matters, etc. Under the guise of seeking information
under the RTI Act, the process of the court is not to be abused and
information not to be misused.
29. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, if the records are received by the High Court
from tribunals like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, it may contain the
details disclosed by an assessee in his Income Tax Return. As held
in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information
Commissioner and Others (2013) 1 SSC 212, the details disclosed
by a person in his Income Tax Return are personal information
which stands exempted from disclosure unless it involves a larger
public interest and the larger public interest justifies the disclosure
of such information. While seeking information or certified copies of
the documents, the High Court Rules which require the third party to
a proceeding to file an affidavit stating the reasons for seeking the
information, the same cannot be said to be inconsistent with the
provisions of the RTI Act in as much as the rejection if any, made
thereafter will be for the very reasons as stipulated in Section 8 of
the RTI Act.
24
30. Considering the implementation of RTI Act and observing that
the existing mechanism for invoking the said right should be
preserved and operated, in Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India v. Shaunak H. Satya and Others (2011) 8 SCC 781, the
Supreme Court held as under:-
“24. One of the objects of democracy is to bring about
transparency of information to contain corruption and bring about
accountability. But achieving this object does not mean that other
equally important public interests including efficient functioning of
the governments and public authorities, optimum use of limited
fiscal resources, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive
information, etc. are to be ignored or sacrificed. The object of the
RTI Act is to harmonise the conflicting public interests, that is,
ensuring transparency to bring in accountability and containing
corruption on the one hand, and at the same time ensure that the
revelation of information, in actual practice, does not harm or
adversely affect other public interests which include efficient
functioning of the governments, optimum use of limited fiscal
resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive
information, on the other hand. While Sections 3 and 4 seek to
achieve the first objective, Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve
the second objective.
25. Therefore, when Section 8 exempts certain information from
being disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the
right to information, but as an equally important provision protecting
other public interests essential for the fulfilment and preservation of
democratic ideals. Therefore, in dealing with information not falling
under Sections 4(1)(b) and (c), the competent authorities under the
RTI Act will not read the exemptions in Section 8 in a restrictive
manner but in a practical manner so that the other public interests
are preserved and the RTI Act attains a fine balance between its
goal of attaining transparency of information and safeguarding the
other public interests.”
31. While examining the issue of where two mechanisms exist for
obtaining the information i.e. the Supreme Court Rules and the RTI
25
Act, in The Registrar Supreme Court of India v. R S Misra (2017)
244 DLT 179, the Delhi High Court held that “once any information
can be accessed through the mechanism provided under another
statute, then the provisions of the RTI Act cannot be resorted to.” In
(2017) 244 DLT 179, the Delhi High Court held as under:-
“53. The preamble shows that the RTI Act has been enacted only to
make accessible to the citizens the information with the public
authorities which W.P.(C) 3530/2011 Page 22 of 36 hitherto was not
available. Neither the Preamble of the RTI Act nor does any other
provision of the Act disclose the purport of the RTI Act to provide
additional mode for accessing information with the public authorities
which has already formulated rules and schemes for making the
said information available. Certainly if the said rules, regulations
and schemes do not provide for accessing information which has
been made accessible under the RTI Act, resort can be had to the
provision of the RTI Act but not to duplicate or to multiply the modes
of accessing information.
54. This Court is further of the opinion that if any information can be
accessed through the mechanism provided under another statute,
then the provisions of the RTI Act cannot be resorted to as there is
absence of the very basis for invoking the provisions of RTI Act,
namely, lack of transparency. In other words, the provisions of RTI
Act are not to be resorted to if the same are not actuated to achieve
transparency.
55. Section 2(j) of the RTI Act reveals that the said Act is concerned
only with that information, which is under the exclusive control of
the 'public authority'. Providing copies/certified copies is not
separate from providing information. The SCR not only deal with
providing 'certified copies' of judicial records but also deal with
providing 'not a certified copy' or simply a 'copy' of the document.
26
The certification of the records is done by the Assistant
Registrar/Branch Officer or any officer on behalf of the Registrar. In
the opinion of this Court, in case of a statute which contemplates
dissemination of information as provided for by the Explanation to
Section 4 of the RTI Act then in such situation, public will have
minimum resort to the use of the RTI Act to obtain such information.
56. There are other provisions of the RTI Act which support the said
position, namely, Sections 4(2), (3) and (4) which contemplate that
if an information is disseminated then the public will have minimum
resort to the use of the RTI Act to obtain information. In the present
case, the dissemination of information under the provisions of the
SCR squarely fits into the definition of “disseminated” as provided
in the aforesaid Explanation to Section 7(9) and the Preamble
contemplate a bar for providing information if it „disproportionally
diverts the resources of the public authority”.
57. Section 4(2) also provides that it shall be constant endeavour of
every public authority to take steps in accordance with the
requirements of subSection (1) thereof and to provide as much
information suo-motu to the public at regular intervals through
various means of communications including intervals so that the
public has minimum resort to the use of the RTI Act to obtain
information.” [Underlining added]
The same view was taken up by the Karnataka High Court in State
Public Information Officer and Deputy Registrar (Establishment) v.
Karnataka Information Commission and Another WP No.26763 of
2013 dated 09.01.2019.
32. We fully endorse above views of the Delhi High Court. When
the High Court Rules provide for a mechanism that the
information/certified copies can be obtained by filing an
27
application/affidavit, the provisions of the RTI Act are not to be
resorted.
33. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the RTI Act provides that every
public authority to take steps to provide as much information suo
motu to the public at regular intervals through various means of
communications including internet, so that the public have minimum
resort to the use of the RTI Act to obtain information. Suo motu
disclosure of information on important aspects of working of a public
authority is therefore, an essential component of information regime.
The judgments and orders passed by the High Courts are all
available in the website of the respective High Courts and any
person can have access to these judgments and orders. Likewise,
the status of the pending cases and the orders passed by the High
Courts in exercise of its power under Section 235 of the Constitution
of India i.e. control over the subordinate courts like transfers,
postings and promotions are also made available in the website. In
order to maintain the confidentiality of the documents and other
information pertaining to the litigants to the proceedings and to
maintain proper balance, Rules of the High Court insist upon the
third party to file an application/affidavit to obtain
information/certified copies of the documents, lest such application
28
would reach unmanageable proportions apart from the misuse of
such information.
34. Section 22 of the RTI Act lays down that the provisions of the
RTI Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, and any other
law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by
virtue of any law other than RTI Act. Learned Senior counsel for the
appellant has submitted that since the requirement under Rule 151
of the Gujarat High Court Rules of filing an affidavit stating the
grounds for seeking the information is directly contrary to Section
6(2) of the RTI Act and there is direct inconsistency between the
provisions of the RTI Act and the Gujarat High Court Rules and in
the event of conflict between the provisions of the RTI Act and any
other law made by the Parliament or a State Legislature or any
other authority, the RTI Act must prevail.
35. In the non obstante clause of Section 22 of the RTI Act, three
categories have been mentioned:- (i) the Official Secrets Act, 1923;
and (ii) any other law for the time being in force; or (iii) any
instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. In
case of inconsistency of any law with the provisions of the Right to
Information Act, overriding effect has been given to the provisions of
29
the Right to Information Act. Section 31 of the RTI Act which is a
repealing clause repeals only the Freedom of Information Act, 2002
and not other laws. The Right to Information Act has not repealed
the Official Secrets Act or any of the laws providing confidentiality
which prohibits the authorities to disclose information. Therefore, all
those enactments including Official Secrets Act, 1923 continue to be
in force. This Act however, has an overriding effect to the extent
they are inconsistent.
36. The non-obstante clause of the RTI Act does not mean an
implied repeal of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under
Article 225 of the Constitution of India; but only has an overriding
effect in case of inconsistency. A special enactment or rule cannot
be held to be overridden by a later general enactment simply
because the latter opens up with a non-obstante clause, unless
there is clear inconsistency between the two legislations. In this
regard, we may usefully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court
in R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335 wherein,
the Supreme Court held as under:-
“38. In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 127,
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed thus :
“As mentioned hereinbefore if the scheme was held to be
valid, then the question what is the general law and what is the
special law and which law in case of conflict would prevail
would have arisen and that would have necessitated the
application of the principle “generalia specialibus non
30
derogant”. The general rule to be followed in case of conflict
between the two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier
one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later
general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied:
(i) The two are inconsistent with each other.
 (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the
earlier enactment.
If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law,
even though general, would prevail.”
37. As pointed out earlier, Section 31 of the RTI Act repeals only
the Freedom of Information Act, 2002 and not other laws. If the
intention of the legislature was to repeal any other Acts or laws
which deal with the dissemination of information to an applicant,
then the RTI Act would have clearly specified so. In the absence of
any provision to this effect, the provisions of the RTI Act cannot be
interpreted so as to attribute a meaning to them which was not
intended by the legislature. In the RTI Act, there is no specific
reference to the rules framed by the various High Courts or any
other special law excepting the Freedom of Information Act, 2002.
38. As discussed earlier, Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court
Rules requires a third party to the proceedings to file an affidavit and
state the reasons for seeking access to the information or grant of
certified copies of records and there is no inconsistency of the High
Court Rules with the provisions of the RTI Act. The Gujarat High
Court Rules neither prohibit nor forbid dissemination of information
31
or grant of certified copies of records. The difference is only insofar
as the stipulation of filing an application/affidavit or payment of fees,
etc. is concerned, there is no inconsistency between the two
provisions and therefore, the RTI Act has no overriding effect over
Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules.
39. Ten categories of information are exempted from disclosure
under Section 8(1)(a) to (j) of the RTI Act. Section 8(1)(j) excludes
disclosure of personal information, the disclosure of which:- (i) has
no relationship to any public activity or interest; or (ii) would cause
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual. However, in
both the cases, the Central Public Information Officer or the
appellate authority may order disclosure of such information, if they
are satisfied that larger public interest justifies disclosure. This
would imply that personal information which has some relationship
to any public activity or interest may be liable to be disclosed. An
invasion of privacy may be held to be justified if the larger public
interest so warrants.
40. The information held by the High Court on the judicial side are
the personal information of the parties to the litigation or information
furnished by the Government in relation to a particular case. There
may be information held by the High Court relating to the cases
32
which have been obtained from the various tribunals in exercise of
the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. For instance, the matters arising out of the
orders by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Customs Excise and
Service Tax Appellate Tribunal and other tribunals over which the
High Court exercises the supervisory jurisdiction. The
orders/judgments passed by the High Court though are the
documents which are concerned to the rights and liabilities of the
parties to the litigation. Under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, the
Central Public Information Officer or the appellate authority may
order disclosure of personal information if they are satisfied that the
larger public interest justifies disclosure. Insofar as the High Court
Rules are concerned, if the information or certified copies of the
documents/record of proceedings/orders on the judicial side of the
Court is required, all that the third party is required to do is to file an
application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking such
information. On being satisfied about the reasons for requirement of
the certified copy/disclosure of information, the Court or the
concerned Officer would order for grant of certified copies. As
discussed earlier, Order XIII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules
also stipulate the same procedure insofar as the third party seeking
certified copy of the documents/records.
33
41. Yet another contention advanced is that the information held
by the High Court may be furnished to the applicant by following the
procedure under Section 11 of the RTI Act. Section 11 of the Act
deals with third party information. As per Section 11 of the Act, if
the requisite information or record or part thereof has been supplied
by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third
party, then the Central Public Information Officer or State Public
Information Officer, as the case may be, within five days of receipt of
the request give a written notice to such third party of the request
and of the fact that the Central Public Information Officer or State
Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose
the information or record or part thereof and invite the third party to
make a submission in writing or orally regarding whether such
information should be disclosed and such submission of the third
party shall be kept in view while taking a decision about the
disclosure of the information.
42. We do not find any merit in the above submission and that
such cumbersome procedure has to be adopted for furnishing the
information/certified copies of the documents. When there is an
effective machinery for having access to the information or obtaining
certified copies which, in our view, is a very simple procedure i.e.
34
filing of an application/affidavit with requisite court fee and stating
the reasons for which the certified copies are required, we do not
find any justification for invoking Section 11 of the RTI Act and adopt
a cumbersome procedure. This would involve wastage of both time
and fiscal resources which the preamble of the RTI Act itself intends
to avoid.
43. We summarise our conclusion:-
(i) Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules stipulating
a third party to have access to the
information/obtaining the certified copies of the
documents or orders requires to file an
application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking
the information, is not inconsistent with the provisions
of the RTI Act; but merely lays down a different
procedure as the practice or payment of fees, etc. for
obtaining information. In the absence of inherent
inconsistency between the provisions of the RTI Act
and other law, overriding effect of RTI Act would not
apply.
(ii) The information to be accessed/certified copies on
the judicial side to be obtained through the
mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, the
provisions of the RTI Act shall not be resorted to.
44. In the light of aforesaid reasonings, the impugned order dated
13.03.2014 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
35
Letters Patent Appeal No.1348 of 2013 is confirmed and these
appeals are dismissed. We place on record the valuable assistance
rendered by Mr. Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni as amicus.
..…………………….J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
..…………………….J.
 [A.S. BOPANNA]
..……………………….J.
 [HRISHIKESH ROY]
New Delhi;
March 04, 2020.
36

The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act is void. As discussed earlier, Section 157-B of the Act puts a complete bar on a bhumidhar or asami belonging to Scheduled Tribe to transfer their land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease or otherwise to a person not belonging to Scheduled Tribe. The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act is void. The consequences have to follow as per Section 167 of the Act. In case, if the transfer is void under the provisions of the Act, there is no justification to consider the request of the respondents on the ground that they are running the Hotel by availing loan from the financial institutions. When the transfer has been made in contravention of the provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act, there is no ground for considering the questions of equity. Lest, it would defeat the provisions of the Act. The High Court erred in saying that Section 157-B of the Act does not bar making of exchange by a person of Scheduled Tribe because he is getting a land in exchange. As discussed earlier, there is clear bar under Section 157-B of the Act for transfer of land by a Scheduled Tribe even by way of exchange as the word “or otherwise” indicates. When there is a clear statutory provision barring the transfer, it was not open to the High Court to substitute its view in the place of that provision. Any such interpretation would defeat the benevolent object of the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act and also the constitutional scheme providing for the social and economic empowerment of the Scheduled Tribes. The order of the High Court is contrary to the express provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act and is also against the benevolent provisions of the Act and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

 The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act is void.
As discussed earlier, Section 157-B of the Act puts a complete bar on a bhumidhar or asami belonging to Scheduled Tribe to transfer their land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease or otherwise to a person not belonging to Scheduled Tribe. 
The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act is void. 
The consequences have to follow as per Section 167 of the Act. In case, if the transfer is void under the provisions of the Act, there is no justification to consider the request of the respondents on the ground that they are running the Hotel by availing loan from the financial institutions. 
When the transfer has been made in contravention of the provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act, there is no ground for considering the questions of equity. Lest, it would defeat the provisions of the Act.
The High Court erred in saying that Section 157-B of the Act does not bar making of exchange by a person of Scheduled Tribe because he is getting a land in exchange. As discussed earlier, there is clear bar under Section 157-B of the Act for transfer of land by a Scheduled Tribe even by way of exchange as the word “or otherwise” indicates. When there is a clear statutory provision barring the transfer, it was not open to the High Court to substitute its view in the place of that provision. Any such interpretation would defeat the benevolent object of the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act and also the constitutional scheme providing for the social and economic empowerment of the Scheduled Tribes. The order of the High Court is contrary to the express provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act and is also against the benevolent provisions of the Act and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7346 OF 2010
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER REVENUE
AND OTHERS ...Appellants
VERSUS
AKHALAQ HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated
18.09.2008 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
in Writ Petition No.670 of 2002 in and by which the High Court
has set aside the orders of the Additional Commissioner
(Revenue) dated 02.07.2002 and Additional Judicial
Commissioner dated 30.06.2001 and also earlier order dated
19.07.2000 passed by the Assistant Collector/Pargana
Magistrate.
2. Brief facts which led to filing of this appeal are as under:-
1
Respondents Akhalaq Hussain and Saqir Hussain entered
into an exchange with one Mangal Singh (a member of
Scheduled Tribe) by way of a registered exchange deed dated
16.03.1994 whereby the respondents gave 4 ½ Muthi of land,
one Muthi is equal to 12.5 sq.mtrs. totalling 56.25 sq. mtrs., in
village Khata No.36, Bandobast Khatuni Khata No.91 situated
in village Vim Patti in District Pithoragarh in return for 12 Nali,
one Nali is equal to 200 sq.mtrs. totalling 2400 sq.mtrs. of
agricultural land in Bandobast Khatuni Khata No.43 situated in
village Mall Ghorpatta, Munsiari, District Pithoragarh.
Thereafter, mutation application was moved before the
Tehsildar who vide order dated 25.04.1994 allowed the
mutation on the basis of exchange under Section 161 of U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short “U.P.
ZA & LR Act”). The respondents claim that they have
constructed a hotel on the land obtained in exchange and the
said hotel is being run in the name and style of “Zara Resort”.
3. On 19.07.2000, the Pargana Magistrate/Assistant
Collector issued an order under Section 167 of the U.P. ZA &
LR Act stating that the parties to the aforementioned exchange
2
have violated the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 161 of
U.P. ZA & LR Act while getting the registration done. It was held
that according to the provisions, a bhumidhar can only
exchange his land with another bhumidhar after he obtains
prior permission from the Assistant Collector. But in the instant
case, no prior permission has been obtained from the Assistant
Collector. Exchange deed has been made in contravention of
the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act and hence void.
According to the provisions of sub-section 1 (a) of Section 167
of U.P. ZA & LR Act, the land admeasuring 12 Nali under Khata
No.43 stands vested in the Government of Uttar Pradesh from
the date of its transfer. The respondents were ordered to
remove all their movable/immovable properties existing on the
land within thirty days.
4. On 04.12.2000, Tehsildar, Pithoragarh inspected the
revenue record and found that 4 ½ Muthi land alleged to have
been given to Mangal Singh as per the exchange deed was still
owned by the respondents and there was no noting in the
name of Mangal Singh in village Khata No.36, Bandobast
Khata No.91.
3
5. The respondents appealed against the order dated
19.07.2000 contending that the exchange has been performed
by the mutual consent of both the parties as per rules and the
registration has also been lawfully done on 16.03.1994. The
respondents claimed that the provisions of Sections 161 and
167 of U.P. ZA & LR Act do not apply, but the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act would apply and therefore, the
exchange cannot be declared as illegal transfer under the
provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act. Vide order dated 30.06.2001,
the Additional Commissioner (J) Kumaon Zone, Nainital held
that the lands which have been exchanged by both the parties
is shown under the category of “transferrable lands” which fall
under the definition of “agricultural lands” under Section 3(14)
of U.P. ZA & LR Act and the parties have not obtained prior
permission. Therefore, the exchange cannot be held to be
legal. It was held that Mangal Singh is a person belonging to
Scheduled Tribe whereas, the respondents are non-Scheduled
Tribes. The transfer of lands by persons belonging to
Scheduled Tribe is prohibited under the provisions of Section
157-B of U.P. ZA & LR Act. According to Section 157-B, no
4
bhumidhar or asami, subject to restrictions as mentioned in
Sections 153 to 157 has any right to transfer by way of sale,
gift, mortgage or lease or otherwise any land to any person not
belonging to Scheduled Tribe. The appeal was thus dismissed.
6. The respondents thereafter filed a revision petition before
the Additional Revenue Commissioner who vide order dated
02.07.2002 dismissed the petition as being without merits. The
Additional Revenue Commissioner accepted the contention of
the Government of Uttarakhand that the exchange of lands in
question is in fact not an exchange but a sale; because total
land of 4 ½ Muthi has been exchanged with larger extent of
land i.e. 12 Nali of land which is not in any way justified. It is the
law that the rental value of the land given in exchange and of
land received in exchange calculated at the hereditary rates
cannot be more than 10% of the lower rental value and in this
case, the difference is a considerable one. According to Section
166 of the Act, the said transfer is against the provisions of law
and is therefore, void.
7. A writ petition was filed by the respondents for quashing
of orders dated 19.07.2000, 30.06.2001 and 02.07.2002 and
5
for issuing a direction to the appellants not to interfere with the
peaceful possession of the respondents. Vide impugned
judgment dated 18.09.2008, the High Court accepted the
contention of the respondents that the provision of Section 161
of U.P. ZA & LR Act does not apply when the exchange is being
made by exchange deed. The High Court opined that the
provisions of Sections 161 and 157-B of U.P. ZA & LR Act do
not apply in case of exchange of the land as is made by
executing the document and the stamp duty as has been
provided is paid as per Article 31 of Schedule 1-B of Indian
Stamp Act, which is duly registered. The High Court further held
that the authorities have committed error of law in holding that
the permission under Section 161 of U.P. ZA & LR Act was
necessary to be obtained before making exchange of the land.
It was held that the provision of Section 157-B does not bar
making exchange of the land by Scheduled Tribe persons
because they are also getting land in exchange. The writ
petition was accordingly allowed.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the
High Court erred in holding that the provisions of Sections 161
6
and 157-B of the Act do not apply in case of exchange of the
land whether exchange is made by executing a registered
document where stamp duty is provided under Article 32 of
Schedule 1-B of Indian Stamps Act has been paid. Taking us
through Section 157-B of the Act, the learned counsel
submitted that Section 157-B imposes a complete bar on the
right of a bhumidhar or asami belonging to the Scheduled Tribe
to transfer their land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or otherwise
to a person not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe. It was
submitted that the reasoning of the High Court is contrary to
and in conflict on statutory provisions under Sections 157-B
and 166 of the Act as well as the legislative scheme and
intendment of the U.P. ZA & LR Act. The learned counsel
submitted that the High Court exceeded its power and
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in setting aside
the concurrent findings of the Assistant Collector (dated
19.07.2000) and Additional Judicial Commissioner (dated
30.06.2001) and the Additional Commissioner (Revenue)
(dated 02.07.2002). It was submitted that the High Court did
not appreciate that the provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act and the
7
mere payment of stamp duty will not wipe down the statutory
and mandatory bar under Sections 157-B and 161 of the Act.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents submitted that the land in question does not fall
within the definition of “land” under Section 3(14) of the Act and
therefore, the provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act are not applicable.
Taking us through the exchange deed dated 16.03.1994, the
learned counsel submitted that the fact that the land was not an
“agricultural land” is supported by the fact that the exchange
deed specifically mentions that the land was not an “agricultural
land”. It was further contended that the failure to seek
permission for exchange under Section 161 can never result in
vesting under Section 167 of the Act. It was urged that the
Pargana Adhikari who is of the same level as Tehsildar was not
having the jurisdiction to pass the vesting order and the
Assistant Collector alone is empowered to issue such an order.
It was further urged that the ex-parte order of vesting under
Section 167 of the Act without giving opportunity of hearing to
the respondents is not sustainable. Taking us through
Appendix-III of the U.P. ZA & LR Act, the learned counsel
8
submitted that the limitation for proceedings under Section 161
at Item No. 20 in Appendix-III has been specifically mentioned
as six years from the date of transfer and thus, the proceedings
in the case is barred by limitation; on the contrary, there is no
question whether they are running a hotel/resort from the year
1998 or not and the act of consequent taking over possession
of the State will create great hardship to the respondents who
are already burdened by various loans from the financial
institutions.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions and
perused the impugned judgment and materials on record. The
following points arise for consideration in this appeal:-
(i) Whether the exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 is in
contravention of the provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act in
view of complete bar for the transfer of land by a
member of Scheduled Tribe under Section 157-B of
the U.P. ZA & LR Act?
(ii) Whether the High Court was right in saying that
permission required under Section 161 of the U.P. ZA
& LR Act is not a requisite condition for the exchange
of land?
9
11. By the exchange deed dated 16.03.1994, the respondents
Akhalaq Hussain and Saqir executed a registered exchange
deed with Mangal Singh (a Member of Scheduled Tribe)
whereby the respondents are said to have given 4 ½ Muthi of
land (one Muthi is equal to 12.5 sq.mtrs. totalling 56.25 sq.
mtrs.) in village Khata No.36, Bandobast Khatuni Khata No.91
situated in village Vim Patti in District Pithoragarh in return for
12 Nali (one Nali is equal to 200 sq.mtrs. totalling 2400
sq.mtrs.) of agricultural land in Bandobast Khatauni Khata
No.43 situated in village Mall Ghorpatta, Munsiari, District
Pithoragarh. In this exchange deed, possession of the land
consisting 3½ Muthi of land from Khata No.553 and 1 Muthi of
land from Khata No.554 is said to have been handed over to
Mangal Singh by the respondents. Similarly, Mangal Singh is
said to have handed over possession of the land consisting of
Khatauni Khata Bandobast No.37 and 12 Nali out of
Panchshala Khatauni No.43, the area of which admeasures 12
Nali.
12. Mangal Singh is a member of Scheduled Tribe and this
factum has not been disclosed in the exchange deed. As per
10
Section 157-B of the Act, a bhumidhar or asami belonging to
Scheduled Tribe cannot transfer his land to a person not
belonging to Scheduled Tribe. Section 157-B reads as under:-
157-B. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled
Tribes. – (1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sections
153 to 157, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe shall
have the right to transfer by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease or
otherwise any land to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe.
As per Section 166 of the Act, any transfer made in
contravention of the provisions of the Act shall be void. Since
the exchange deed has been executed in violation of the
provisions of Section 157-B of the Act, the transfer is void and
is liable to be set aside and the land is liable to be vested in the
State Government.
13. As soon as the exchange came to the notice of the
competent authority, cognizance was taken and the SubDivisional Officer/Assistant Collector invoked the provisions of
Section 166 of the Act and declared the exchange deed dated
16.03.1994 void as it was executed in violation of Section 157-
B and Section 161 of the Act. The Assistant Collector by order
dated 19.07.2000 ordered the subject land to vest in the State
11
as per Section 167 of the Act and directed the respondents to
handover possession of the land within thirty days.
14. Re. Contention – Land is not an agricultural land:- On
behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the land in
question is not an “agricultural land” and that it does not fall
within the definition of “land” under Section 3(14) of the Act and
therefore, provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act are not
applicable. The question as to whether a particular land is
“land” as defined under Section 3(14) of the Act to which the
provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act are applicable would require
determination. The question whether such land is held or
occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture
or animal husbandry has to be determined in accordance with
the provisions of Sections 143 and 144 of the Act. Section
3(14) of the Act defines “land” as under:-
3. Definitions.
…….
(14) “Land” except in Sections 109, 143 and 144 and Chapter VIII
means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture,
horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry
farming.
12
15. The respondents have placed reliance upon the recitals in
the exchange deed in which it is mentioned that the land in
question is not an “agricultural land” and also the counter
affidavit of the State filed before the High Court wherein it is
mentioned that the Hotel in the disputed land is situated in the
market area of Munsiari township. In this regard, it is pertinent
to note that for changing the nature of land from “agricultural” to
“abadi”, declaration as stipulated in Sections 143 and 144 is
required. The provisions under Section 143 of the Act are
initiated suo motu or on an application moved by a
bhumidhar with transferable rights and an enquiry is required to
be conducted by the Assistant Collector as prescribed under
the Act. Section 143 of the Act reads as under:-
“143. Use of holding for industrial or residential purposes. - (1)
Where a bhumidhar with transferable rights uses his holding or part
thereof for a purpose not connected with agriculture, horticulture or
animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming, the
Assistant Collector-in-charge of the sub-division may, suo motu or on an
application, after making such enquiry as may be prescribed, make a
declaration to that effect.
………
 (2) Upon the grant of the declaration mentioned in sub-section (1) the
provisions of this chapter (other than this section) shall cease to apply to
the bhumidhar with transferable rights with respect to such land and he
13
shall thereupon be governed in the matter of devolution of the land by
personal law to which he is subject.
(3) Where a bhumidhar with transferable rights has been granted, before
or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1978, any loan by the Uttar Pradesh Financial
Corporation or by any other Corporation owned or controlled by the
State Government, on the security of any land held by such bhumidhar,
the provisions of this Chapter (other than this section) shall cease to
apply to such bhumidhar with respect to such land and he shall
thereupon be governed in the matter of devolution of the land by
personal law to which he is subject.”
Where such a declaration is made under Section 143 of the
Act, the provisions of Chapter-VIII of the U.P. ZA & LR Act
(except Section 143) ceased to apply to the bhumidhar with
transferable rights with respect to such land.
16. It has been held in Chandrika Singh and others v. Raja
Vishwanath Pratap Singh and another (1992) 3 SCC 90 that in
order to exclude the applicability of provisions of U.P. ZA & LR
Act on the ground that the land is abadi land, it is necessary to
determine that it is in accordance with the provisions of
Sections 143 and 144 of the Act and whether such a
declaration under Sections 143 and 144 of the Act has been
made in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In para
Nos. (9) and (15), it was held as under:-
14
“9. The aforesaid provisions show that under Section 331(1) exclusive
jurisdiction in respect of suits, applications and proceedings referred to in
Schedule II of the Act has been conferred on the courts specified in the
said schedule and the said proceedings, suits and applications cannot
be entertained by the civil courts. The proviso to Section 331(1) lifts the
said bar in relation to any holding or part thereof where a declaration has
been made under Section 143. Section 143 empowers the Assistant
Collector after making enquiry as may be prescribed, to make a
declaration that a holding or part thereof is being used or held by a
bhumidar for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture or
animal husbandry. Where such a declaration is made in respect of a part
of the holding, the Assistant Collector is required to demarcate the said
part. The effect of the grant of such a declaration is that the provisions of
Chapter VIII (except Section 143) cease to apply to the bhumidar with
transferable rights with respect to such land.
………
15. ……..In our opinion, the question as to whether a particular land is
“land” under Section 2(14) to which the provisions of the Act are
applicable would require determination of the question whether the land
is held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture
or animal husbandry and that is a matter which has to be determined
either in accordance with the provisions of Sections 143 and 144 and if
such a determination has not been made and such a question arises or
is raised in a suit before a court, the procedure laid down in Section 331-
A must be followed by the court. This would be so even in a case where
a building exists on the land and the land is claimed to be appurtenant to
the building because in such a case it will be necessary to determine the
extent of the land that is appurtenant to the building, i.e. whether the
entire land or only a part of it is so appurtenant to the building and for
that reason is not held or occupied for purposes connected with
agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry. This determination has to
be made in accordance with the provisions of Sections 143 and 144 or
Section 331-A of the Act.”
15
17. In the present case, the respondents have not produced
any such document which shows that declaration required
under Section 143 of the Act has been made much less
registered. In the absence of such declaration, the land is
deemed to be an “agricultural land” as per the provisions of
Section 3(14) of the Act.
18. The respondents placed reliance upon the recitals in the
exchange deed to show that the land is not an “agricultural
land”. The recitals in the exchange deed can be of no help to
the respondents as the said document is a self-serving
document and cannot operate as a document to prove that the
land is an “abadi land”. Likewise, the respondents sought to
place reliance upon the counter affidavit filed by the appellants
where it is averred that the suit property is situated in the
market area of Munsiari township. The averments in the
counter affidavit filed by the State can be of no assistance to
the respondents. For claiming the nature of the land as “abadi
land”, a declaration as stipulated in Section 143 is required and
the said declaration is also required to be registered. As
pointed out earlier, the respondents have not produced any
16
document which shows that the declaration as required under
Section 143 of the Act has been made. In the absence of such
declaration, the land cannot be said to be “abadi land”. Since
the land is an “agricultural land”, the provisions of U.P. ZA & LR
Act are applicable to the land in question.
19. Section 161 of the Act pertains to exchange of land. As
per Section 161 of the Act, a bhumidhar may exchange land
with another bhumidhar or with any Gaon Sabha or local
authority, with the prior permission of an Assistant Collector.
Section 161 reads as under:-
“161. Exchange. – (1) A bhumidhar may exchange with –
(a) any other bhumidhar land held by him; or
(b) any Gaon Sabha or local authority, lands for the time
being vested in it under Section 117:
Provided that no exchange shall be made except with the permission
of an Assistant Collector who shall refuse permission if the difference
between the rental value of land given in exchange and of land
received in exchange calculated at hereditary rates is more than 10
per cent of the lower rental value.
…….”
Insofar as the land belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe,
exchange is not permissible. Under Section 157-B of the Act,
no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, shall
have the right to transfer by way of “sale, gift, mortgage or
17
lease or otherwise any land to a person not belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe”. The language used in Section 157-B of the
Act “or otherwise” emphasizes that the land belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe cannot be transferred in any manner
whatsoever. It is pertinent to note that in Section 157-A of the
Act which deals with restrictions on transfer of land by
members of Scheduled Castes, the language used is “by way
of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a
Scheduled Caste”. Absence of word “or otherwise” in Section
157-A of the Act shows that while exchange may be permissible
of a land belonging to members of Scheduled Caste to a
person belonging to Scheduled Caste, such an exchange is
prohibited under Section 157-B of the Act – Restriction on
transfer of land of a member of a Scheduled Tribe.
20. For the sake of arguments, even assuming that Section
161 of the Act is applicable, according to Section 161 of the Act,
exchange by a bhumidhar with another bhumidhar or with any
Gaon Sabha or local authority is permissible only with the prior
permission of the Assistant Collector. Use of the word “shall” in
the proviso to Section 161 of the Act clearly indicates that for a
18
valid exchange, it is mandatory to obtain permission of the
Assistant Collector. In the instant case, admittedly, no prior
permission was sought from the Assistant Collector as
mandated. In the absence of fulfilling of pre-requisite condition
as laid down in Section 161 of the Act, the exchange has to be
necessarily held to be void.
21. Contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is
that even post-facto approval for the exchange is sufficient and
need not necessarily be prior permission. In this regard,
learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the
Tehsildar, Munsiari effected mutation in the revenue record
which amounts to ex-post facto approval for the exchange. It
was also submitted that the respondents preferred project
report for construction of a Hotel at Munsiari and after obtaining
necessary approval from the concerned authorities and by
taking loan from the financial institutions, the Hotel was
constructed and commissioned in the year 2000 and the
approval from various authorities for construction and running
the Hotel would amount to ex-post facto approval. In support of
his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon Life
19
Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and others (1986)
1 SCC 264.
22. There is no merit in the contention that for exchange of
land prior permission under Section 161 of the Act is not
required. It is to be pointed out by a reading of the provisions
of Section 161 of the Act that the Assistant Collector
shall refuse permission if the difference between the rental
value of the land given in exchange and of the land received in
exchange calculated as hereditary rates is more than 10% of
the lower rental value. In the instant case, the respondents
exchanged 4½ Muthi land (56.25 sq. mtrs. of land) with
Mangal Singh’s 12 Nali land (2400 sq. mtrs. of land), the annual
rental value for 12 Nali is Rs.2.50/- and for 4½ Muthi, it is
Rs.0.05/-. The difference between the value of the two is
clearly more than 10%. Even assuming that Section 161 of the
Act is applicable, on this ground, the Assistant Collector was
bound to refuse the permission even if the respondent had
applied for it.
23. As per proviso to Section 161 of the Act, it is incumbent
upon the Assistant Collector to calculate the rental value of the
20
land given in exchange and of the land received in exchange
and if the difference is more than 10% of the lower rental value
then the Assistant Collector shall refuse the permission. Thus,
the pre-requisite condition for grant of permission is the
calculation of the rental value and if the difference between the
rental value of land given in exchange and of land received in
exchange is more than 10%, then the Assistant Collector shall
refuse the permission. The pre-requisite condition of
calculation of the rental value clearly suggests that the
permission of the Assistant Collector is a pre-requisite condition
for a valid exchange. We have referred to Section 161 of the
Act only for the sake of completion. As pointed out earlier,
Section 157-B of the Act prohibits even exchange of the land to
a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe.
24. The respondents have not explained as to why Mangal
Singh (a member of Scheduled Tribe) wanted to exchange his
large extent of land i.e. 12 Nali (2400 sq. mtrs.) with a much
smaller piece of land i.e. 4½ Muthi (56.25 sq. mtrs.). This
aspect raises doubt about the genuineness of the exchange
deed. This aspect casting doubt upon the validity of the
21
exchange deed is further strengthened by the fact that the
names of the respondents have been mutated in the land of
Mangal Singh in Bandobast Khatuni Khata No.43; whereas the
name of Mangal Singh has not been mutated in village Khata
No.36, Bandobast Khatuni Khata No.91. These circumstances
clearly indicate that the exchange deed relied upon by the
respondents is not a valid exchange and has been executed in
violation of the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act.
25. U.P. ZA & LR Act is a beneficial legislation which has been
enacted to protect the interest of the exploited rural masses.
The Preamble of the U.P. ZA & LR Act shows that it is an Act to
provide for the abolition of zamindari system which involves
intermediaries between tiller of the soil and the State in
U.P. (adopted by the State of Uttarakhand) and for the
acquisition of the rights, title and interest and to reform the law
relating to land tenure consequent upon such abolition and
acquisition and to make provisions for other matters connected
therewith. Observing that agriculture is the only source of
livelihood for Scheduled Tribes apart from the collection and
sale of minor forest produce to supplement their income and
22
that it is a source of economic empowerment, in Samatha v.
State of A.P. and others (1997) 8 SCC 191, it was held as
under:-
“9. Agriculture is the main part of the economy and source of livelihood
to the rural Indians and a source and succour for social status and a
base for dignity of person. Land is a tangible product and sustaining
asset to the agriculturists. In Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC
362 a Constitution Bench had observed that India being a predominantly
agricultural society, there is a “strong linkage between the land and the
person’s status in social system”. The strip of land on which they till and
live assures them equal justice and “dignity of their person by providing
to them a near decent means of livelihood”. Agricultural land is the
foundation for a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured
possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity.
10. Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for Scheduled Tribes,
apart from collection and sale of minor forest produce to supplement
their income. Land is their most important natural and valuable asset and
imperishable endowment from which the tribals derive their sustenance,
social status, economic and social equality, permanent place of abode
and work and living. It is a security and source of economic
empowerment. Therefore, the tribes too have great emotional
attachment to their lands. The land on which they live and till, assures
them equality of status and dignity of person and means to economic
and social justice and is a potent weapon of economic empowerment in
social democracy.”
The U.P. ZA & LR Act being a beneficial legislation, the
provisions need to be interpreted in a manner so as to achieve
the rationale behind the legislation.
23
26. Despite the alleged exchange said to have been effected
in 1994, the land in village Khata No.36, Bandobast Khata
Khatuni No.91 have not been mutated in the name of Mangal
Singh. As per the Report of the Tehsildar dated 04.12.2000,
village Khata No.36, Bandobast Khata Khatuni No.91 continue
to remain in the name of respondents Akhalaq Hussain and
Saqir Hussain and there is no noting in the name of Mangal
Singh.
27. As per Section 166 of the Act, every transfer made in
contravention of the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act shall be
void. Section 167 of the Act refers to the consequences which
shall ensue in respect of every transfer which is void by virtue
of Section 166 of the Act. Taking us through Appendix-III of
U.P. ZA & LR Act, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that under Section 167 of the Act, the limitation
period is six years from the date of illegal transfer. It was
therefore submitted that suo motu action taken by the Assistant
Collector/Pargana Magistrate vide order issued on 19.07.2000
(which is beyond the period of six years) is barred by limitation.
24
Serial No.20 of Appendix-III to U.P. ZA & LR Act reads as
under:-
Serial
No.
Section of the
Act
Description
of suit,
application
and other
proceeding
Period of
limitation
Time from
which period
begins to run
Proper Court
fees
…………
20. 167 Suits for
ejectment of a
sirdar or asami
Six years From the date
of illegal
transfer
As in the Court
Fees Act,
1870, on the
year’s
revenue.
………………
28. Even at the outset, it is to be pointed out that Serial No.20
of Appendix-III relates to suit for ejectment of a sirdar or asami
and is not relevant insofar as void transfers which are made in
contravention of the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act. If the
period of limitation is to be applied for the void transfers which
are made in contravention of the provisions of the Act, the very
object of the U.P. ZA & LR Act would be defeated. There has to
be a harmonious construction of the provisions of the Act. The
instant exchange being void since its inception, the transfer
being void in terms of Section 166 of the Act, the consequences
enshrined in Section 167 of the Act shall automatically follow.
Cognizance of the exchange deed was taken by the Pargana
Magistrate and it cannot be said that the order passed on
19.07.2000 is barred by limitation. There is no merit in the
25
contention that the order passed by the Pargana Magistrate
dated 19.07.2000 is barred by limitation.
29. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that
the respondents have availed loan from financial institutions
and have been running a hotel under the name of “ZARA
Resort” and it is their only source of livelihood. As discussed
earlier, Section 157-B of the Act puts a complete bar on a
bhumidhar or asami belonging to Scheduled Tribe to transfer
their land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease or otherwise to
a person not belonging to Scheduled Tribe. The exchange deed
dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the provisions of the
U.P. ZA & LR Act is void. The consequences have to follow as
per Section 167 of the Act. In case, if the transfer is void under
the provisions of the Act, there is no justification to consider the
request of the respondents on the ground that they are running
the Hotel by availing loan from the financial institutions. When
the transfer has been made in contravention of the provisions
of U.P. ZA & LR Act, there is no ground for considering the
questions of equity. Lest, it would defeat the provisions of the
Act.
26
30. The High Court has ignored the provisions of U.P. ZA &
LR Act and held that the provisions of Sections 161 and 157-B
of the Act do not apply in case of exchange of land which has
been made by executing a document where the stamp duty has
been paid as per Indian Stamp Act and the document duly
registered. The High Court erred in saying that Section 157-B
of the Act does not bar making of exchange by a person of
Scheduled Tribe because he is getting a land in exchange. As
discussed earlier, there is clear bar under Section 157-B of the
Act for transfer of land by a Scheduled Tribe even by way of
exchange as the word “or otherwise” indicates. When there is a
clear statutory provision barring the transfer, it was not open to
the High Court to substitute its view in the place of that
provision. Any such interpretation would defeat the benevolent
object of the provisions of the U.P. ZA & LR Act and also the
constitutional scheme providing for the social and economic
empowerment of the Scheduled Tribes. The order of the High
Court is contrary to the express provisions of U.P. ZA & LR Act
and is also against the benevolent provisions of the Act and the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
27
31. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is
set aside and this appeal is allowed. The appellants are at
liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
..…………………….J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
..……………………….J.
 [S. ABDUL NAZEER]
..……………………….J.
 [A.S. BOPANNA]
New Delhi;
March 03, 2020.

28

whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the charge-sheet is already filed and against whom the trial is in progress, is required to be heard and/or has any locus in the proceedings under Section 173(8) CrPC – further investigation qua one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against whom no charge-sheet has been filed till date? we are of the opinion that as such no error has been committed by the High Court dismissing the application submitted by the appellant herein to implead him in the Special Criminal Application filed by the private respondent herein challenging the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate rejecting his application for further investigation under Section173(8) CrPC with respect to one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against whom no charge-sheet has been filed till date. Therefore, it is not at all appreciable how the appellant against whom no relief is sought for further investigation has any locus and/or any say in the application for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC. How he can be said to be a necessary and a proper party. It is required to be noted that, as such, even the proposed accused Shri Bhaumik shall not have any say at this stage in an application under Section 173(8) CrPC for further investigation. In such a situation the power of the court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only result in encumbering the court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As the law does not require it, we would not burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.” Therefore, when the proposed accused against whom the further investigation is sought, namely Shri Bhaumik is not required to be heard at this stage, there is no question of hearing the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the chargesheet is already filed and the trial against whom is in progress and no relief of further investigation is sought against him.

whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the charge-sheet is already filed and against whom the trial is in progress, is required to be heard and/or has any locus in the proceedings under Section 173(8) CrPC – further investigation qua one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against whom no charge-sheet has been filed till date?
we are of the opinion that as such no error has been committed by the High Court dismissing the application submitted by the appellant herein to implead him in the Special Criminal Application filed by the private respondent herein challenging the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate rejecting his application for further investigation under Section173(8) CrPC with respect to one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against whom no charge-sheet has been filed till date. Therefore, it is not at all appreciable how the appellant against whom no relief is sought for further investigation has any locus and/or any say in the application for further investigation under Section
173(8) CrPC. How he can be said to be a necessary and a proper party. It is required to be noted that, as such, even the proposed accused Shri Bhaumik shall not have any say at this stage in an application under Section 173(8) CrPC for further investigation.
 In such a situation the power of the court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only
result in encumbering the court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As the law does not require it, we would not
burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.”
Therefore, when the proposed accused against whom the further investigation is
sought, namely Shri Bhaumik is not required to be heard at this stage, there is no
question of hearing the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the chargesheet is already filed and the trial against whom is in progress and no relief of
further investigation is sought against him.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 353 OF 2020
Satishkumar Nyalchand Shah .. Appellant
Versus
State of Gujarat & Ors. .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. Shah, J.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order
dated 24.12.2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal
Miscellaneous Application No. 1 of 2018 in Special Criminal Application No. 8704
of 2018, by which the High Court has dismissed the said application preferred by
the appellant herein permitting him to be joined as respondent No. 4 in the said
Special Criminal Application No. 8704 of 2018, which was filed by the private
respondent herein seeking further investigation against other persons (other than
2
the appellant who is one of the accused and is already charge-sheeted), the
appellant has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:
That in an earthquake on 26.01.2001, number of buildings collapsed,
including the building named Shikhar Apartment situated at Village Vejalpur,
Ahmedabad. That due to the collapse of the said Shikhar apartment, 98 persons
died. That the private respondent herein-the victim lodged the FIR, being CR No.
I-58 of 2001 with the Satellite Police Station against the appellant and others for
the offences punishable under Sections 304, 418, 420 and 114 of IPC and Section
3(2)(c)&(d), Section 7(1)(i)(ii)2 and Section 42 of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats
and for contravention of GDCR, Building Bye-laws. That the Police Inspector,
Satellite Police Station filed the charge-sheet against the appellant and others on
02.05.2001 for the aforesaid offences. It appears that after a number of rounds of
litigations, the appellant and some of the other accused came to be charge-sheeted.
However, three accused persons, namely, Yagnesh Vyas, Sanjay Shah and Ronak
Shah were not charge-sheeted. The matter was carried up to this Court by way of
Criminal Appeal No. 1426 of 2017. It appears that during the hearing of the
aforesaid appeal by this Court, there was progress in the investigation and the
charge-sheet was filed against the accused Yagnesh Vyas and Sanjay Shah who
were also arrested. Therefore, while disposing of the aforesaid Criminal Appeal
3
No. 1426 of 2017 vide order dated 16.07.2018, this Court observed that if the
private respondent herein-the Victim has any objection against dropping of one
another accused, he may file objection and can file a protest petition in the Trial
Court. This Court also observed that the private respondent herein-the Victim can
also carry out proceedings in an appropriate Court against one Shri M. N. Bhaumik
for not prosecuting him. That, thereafter the private respondent herein-the Victim
filed an application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad
(Rural) under Sections 173(8) and 156(3) CrPC for further investigation against
Shri Bhaumik. That by order dated 29.08.2018, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Ahmedabad (Rural) dismissed the said application on merits as well as on the
ground that after the charge-sheet is filed, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to
order for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.
2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate dated 29.08.2018 passed in an application below Ex.275(C) in
Criminal Case No. 853 of 2001, the private respondent herein has preferred the
Special Criminal Application No. 8704 of 2018 before the High Court of Gujarat.
In the said Special Criminal Application, the appellant herein, one of the accused
who is already charge-sheeted, submitted an application permitting him to be
joined as party respondent No. 4 in the said Special Criminal Application. By the
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impugned Judgment and Order, Judge of the High Court has dismissed the said
application. Hence, the present appeal.
3. Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the
appellant; the private respondent herein has appeared as a party-in-person and Mr.
Aniruddha P. Mayee, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondentState of Gujarat.
3.1 Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
appellant has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case
the High Court has committed grave error in refusing to implead the appellant-coaccused as a party in the writ petition filed by the victim.
3.2 It is further submitted by Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant that the High Court has not properly
appreciated and considered the fact that, as held by this Court in the case of Athul
Rao v. State of Karnataka (2018) 14 SCC 298 at the behest of a person who is not
complainant seeking direction of further investigation is not maintainable.
3.3 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
the appellant that even as already held by this Court in the case of Amrutbhai
Shambhubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel (2017) 4 SCC 177, the
complainant does not have any right to file an application under Section 173(8)
CrPC once the charge-sheet is framed. It is submitted that in the present case the
5
charge-sheet is already filed and the evidence of the complainant has been recorded
and therefore the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was justified in rejecting the
application for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC preferred by the
private respondent herein. It is submitted that if the opportunity would have been
given to the appellant by permitting the appellant to be impleaded as a party
respondent in the Special Criminal Application, the appellant could have pointed
out the aforesaid aspects and submit the case on merits.
3.4 It is submitted that, even otherwise, looking to the allegations in the writ
petition before the High Court, as the private respondent herein has made
allegations against the investigating agency that the investigation is not carried out
by the investigating officer properly, the appellant being accused is a necessary and
proper party and in his absence, effective adjudication of the subject-matter of the
dispute may not take place.
3.5 Number of other submissions have been made by the learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant on merits of the application
submitted by the private respondent herein for further investigation under Section
173(8) CrPC. However, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, and as the main
Special Criminal Application against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate rejecting an application submitted by the private respondent herein for
further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC is pending consideration by the
6
High Court, we do not propose to go into the merits of the application submitted by
the private respondent herein for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.
3.6 Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
appellant has also heavily relied upon Rule 51 of the Gujarat High Court Rules,
1993 in support of his submissions that as per Rule 51 all parties to the proceedings
from which the appeal or application arises shall be made the parties to the appeal
or application. It is submitted that therefore also and as the appellant herein was a
party to the Criminal Case No. 853 of 2001 in fact the private respondent herein
ought to have impleaded the appellant in the special criminal application.
4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by the private respondent herein
as well Shri Mayee, learned Advocate appearing for the State of Gujarat.
4.1 It is vehemently submitted that in an application under Section 173(8) CrPC
for further investigation with respect to one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik,
the appellant has no locus as the appellant as such is already charge-sheeted and
the trial against him is going on. It is submitted that in the Special Criminal
Application the private respondent herein has challenged the order passed by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate rejecting the application under Section 173(8)
CrPC which was basically made with respect to one another accused Shri Bhaumik
as he was not charge-sheeted, the appellant herein cannot be said to be a necessary
and/or proper party, It is submitted that even the appellant also cannot be said to
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be a affected party even if the Special Criminal Application is allowed and the
application for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC against Shri
Bhaumik is allowed.
4.2 It is further submitted that being a proposed accused even Shri Bhaumik has
no locus and/or say at this stage for further investigation under Section 173(8)
CrPC.
In support of the above, reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in
Dinubhai Baghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat (2014) 4 SCC 626; Narender
G. Goel v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 65 and Union of India v. W. N.
Chadha 1993 Supp (4) SCC 260. It is submitted that therefore when the proposed
accused has no locus and/or say at this stage, the appellant, who as such is already
charge-sheeted, and the trial against him is proceeded further, and against him no
relief is sought while submitting the application under Section 173(8) CrPC shall
not have any locus or say. It is submitted that therefore the High Court has rightly
refused to implead the appellant as a party respondent in the petition filed by the
private respondent herein.
5. Shri Mayee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat
has also opposed the present appeal as well as the application submitted by the
appellant herein before the High Court and vehemently submitted that the appellant
being one of the co-accused who is already charge-sheeted and against whom the
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trial has proceeded further has no locus and/or say in the petition filed by the
private respondent herein as, even otherwise, the appellant cannot be said to even
the affected party as while submitting the application under Section 173(8) CrPC
no relief is sought against the appellant and the relief is sought for one another coaccused namely Shri Bhaumik, who is yet not charge-sheeted.
6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties at length.
6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the present proceedings arise out
of the application submitted by the private respondent herein seeking further
investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC against one Mr. Bhaumik who is yet not
charge-sheeted. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the said application
against which the private respondent herein has approached the High Court by way
Special Criminal Application. In the said petition, the appellant herein- one of the
co-accused who is already charge-sheeted and against whom the trial is in progress
and though in an application under Section 173(8) CrPC no relief is sought against
him, submitted an application to implead him as respondent in the said Special
Criminal Application and the said application has been dismissed by the High
Court by the impugned Judgment and Order. Therefore, the short question which
is posed for consideration of this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the charge-sheet is
already filed and against whom the trial is in progress, is required to be heard
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and/or has any locus in the proceedings under Section 173(8) CrPC – further
investigation qua one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against whom no
charge-sheet has been filed till date?
7. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties
and the private respondent herein, we are of the opinion that as such no error has
been committed by the High Court dismissing the application submitted by the
appellant herein to implead him in the Special Criminal Application filed by the
private respondent herein challenging the order passed by the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate rejecting his application for further investigation under Section
173(8) CrPC with respect to one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against
whom no charge-sheet has been filed till date. Therefore, it is not at all appreciable
how the appellant against whom no relief is sought for further investigation has
any locus and/or any say in the application for further investigation under Section
173(8) CrPC. How he can be said to be a necessary and a proper party. It is
required to be noted that, as such, even the proposed accused Shri Bhaumik shall
not have any say at this stage in an application under Section 173(8) CrPC for
further investigation, as observed by this Court in the case of W.N. Chadha
(supra); Narender G. Goel (supra) and Dinubhai Baghabhai Solanki (supra). In
the case of Dinubhai Baghabhai Solanki (supra) after considering one another
decision of this Court in the case of Sri Bhagwan Samardha v. State of A.P.
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(1999) 5 SCC 740, it is observed and held that there is nothing in Section 173(8)
CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any direction
for further investigation is made. In Sri Bhagwan Samardha (supra), this Court in
paragraph 11 held as under:
“11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct
the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any
inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the
court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is
made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only
result in encumbering the court with the burden of searching for
all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of
being heard. As the law does not require it, we would not
burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.”
Therefore, when the proposed accused against whom the further investigation is
sought, namely Shri Bhaumik is not required to be heard at this stage, there is no
question of hearing the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the chargesheet is already filed and the trial against whom is in progress and no relief of
further investigation is sought against him. Therefore, the High Court is absolutely
justified in rejecting the application submitted by the appellant to implead him as a
party respondent in the Special Criminal Application.
8. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon Rule 51 of the Gujarat High Court
Rules by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant is
concerned, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
Rule 51 shall not have any application for further investigation under Section
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173(8) CrPC. Proceedings arising out of an application under Section 173(8)
CrPC cannot be equated with the appeal or application against the order passed in
criminal case as stated in Rule 51. Therefore Rule 51 of the Gujarat High Court
Rules has no application at all.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, there is no
substance in the present appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed.
……..…………………..J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
…………………………..J.
(M. R. SHAH)
New Delhi;
March 2, 2020.