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Monday, February 10, 2020

Cout can grant compensation more than claimed when the claimant is a minor In view of the above, we award a sum of Rs.62,27,000/­ to the claimant under the following heads : S.No Heads Amount (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation and transportation Rs. 2,50,000/­ (ii) Loss of earnings (family members) Rs. 51,000/­ (iii) Loss of future earnings Rs.14,66,000/ (iv) Attendant charges Rs.21,60,000/­ (v) Pain, suffering, loss of amenities Rs.15,00,000/­ (vi) Loss of Marriage prospects Rs. 3,00,000/­ (vii) Future medical treatment Rs. 5,00,000/­ This amount shall carry an interest @7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment/deposit of the amount. Obviously, the insurance company shall be entitled to adjust the amount already paid. Further, the insurance company shall also be entitled to recover the amount from the owner in terms of the award of the MACT, which has not been challenged either before the High Court or us. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.

Cout can grant compensation more than claimed when the claimant is a minor 
In view of the above, we award a sum of Rs.62,27,000/­ to the claimant under the following heads :
S.No Heads Amount (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation   and transportation
Rs. 2,50,000/­
(ii) Loss   of   earnings   (family members)
Rs.    51,000/­
(iii) Loss of future earnings Rs.14,66,000/

(iv) Attendant charges Rs.21,60,000/­
(v) Pain, suffering, loss of amenities Rs.15,00,000/­
(vi) Loss of Marriage prospects Rs.  3,00,000/­
(vii) Future medical treatment Rs.  5,00,000/­
This amount shall carry an interest @7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment/deposit of the amount.
Obviously, the insurance company shall be entitled to adjust the amount already paid.   Further, the insurance company shall also be entitled to recover the amount from the owner in terms of
the award of the MACT, which has not been challenged either
before the High Court or us.
 We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed.   However, it is well settled law that in motor   accident   claim   petitions,   the   Court   must   award   just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 735 OF 2020
(Arising out of  Special Leave Petition (C) No.15504 OF 2019)
KAJAL                                     …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
JAGDISH CHAND & ORS.                             …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta, J.
1. Kajal was a bright young girl. She used to attend school,
play with her friends and lead a normal life like any other child.
Unfortunately, on 18th October, 2007, while Kajal was travelling
on a tractor with her parents, the tractor was hit by a truck
which was driven rashly.   In the said accident, Kajal suffered
serious injuries resulting in damage to her brain.  This has had
very serious consequences on her. She was examined at the Post
Graduate   Institute   of   Medical   Education   and   Research,
1
Chandigarh (PGI, Chandigarh for short), for assessment of her
disability.  According to the said report, because of head injury
Kajal is left with a very low I.Q. and severe weakness in all her
four   limbs,   suffers   from   severe   hysteria   and   severe   urinary
incontinence.  Her disability has been assessed as 100%.
2. Dr. Chhabra (PW­4), who was one of the members of the
Board which issued the disability certificate (Ex.P6) stated that
as per the assessment her I.Q. is less than 20% of a child of her
age and her social age is only of a 9 month old child.  This means
that Kajal while lying on the bed will grow up to be an adult with
all the physical and biological attributes which a woman would
get on attaining adulthood, including menstruation etc., but her
mind will remain of a 9 month old child. Basically, she will not
understand what is happening all around her.
3. How does one assess compensation in such a case?   No
amount   of   money   can   compensate   this   child   for   the   injuries
suffered by her.  She can never be put back in the same position.
However, compensation has to be determined in terms of the
provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act).   The
Act requires determination of payment of just compensation and
2
it is the duty of the court to ensure that she is paid compensation
which is just.
4. Kajal through her father filed a claim petition, under the
Act.   The   Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal   (MACT   for   short)
awarded Rs.11,08,501/­ and held that since there was violation
of the terms of policy the insurance company would pay the
amount   but   would   be   entitled   to   recover   the   same   from   the
owner.     The   High   Court   enhanced   the   award   amount   to
Rs.25,78,501/­ under the following heads:
Heads High Court
Age 12
Multiplier ­
Income (taken to be) Rs.   15,000/­
Disability 100%
Loss   of   income   and   permanent
disability compensation
Rs. 2,70,000/­
Pain, suffering loss of amenities Rs. 3,00,000/­
Attendant charges Rs. 3,20,000/­
(Rs.2500   for   44
years)
Future medical expenses Rs. 2,00,000/­
Loss of marriage prospects Rs. 3,00,000/­
Medical
Treatment
Rs. 1,38,501/­
Transportation details / special diet Rs.    50,000/­
Total Rs.25,78,501/­
Aggrieved by the award the claimant is before this Court.
5. The   principles   with   regard   to   determination   of   just
compensation   contemplated   under   the   Act   are   well   settled.
3
Injuries cause deprivation to the body which entitles the claimant
to claim damages. The damages may vary according to the gravity
of the injuries sustained by the claimant in an accident. On
account of the injuries, the claimant may suffer consequential
losses such as (i) loss of earning; (ii) expenses on treatment which
may   include   medical   expenses,   transportation,   special   diet,
attendant charges etc., (iii) loss or diminution to the pleasures of
life by loss of a particular part of the body, and (iv) loss of future
earning capacity. Damages can be pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary, but all have to be assessed in Rupees and Paise.
6. It is impossible to equate human suffering and personal
deprivation with money. However, this is what the Act enjoins
upon the courts to do. The court has to make a judicious attempt
to award damages, so as to compensate the claimant for the loss
suffered   by   the   victim.   On   the   one   hand,   the   compensation
should not  be  assessed very conservatively,  but on  the  other
hand, compensation should also not be assessed in so liberal a
fashion so as to make it a bounty to the claimant. The court while
assessing the compensation should have regard to the degree of
deprivation   and   the   loss   caused   by   such   deprivation.   Such
compensation   is   what   is   termed   as   just   compensation.     The
4
compensation or damages assessed for personal injuries should
be   substantial   to   compensate   the   injured   for   the   deprivation
suffered by the injured throughout his/her life. They should not
be just token damages.
7. There are numerous cases where the principles for grant of
compensation   have   been   enunciated.   It   would   be   relevant   to
quote pertinent observations from a few.
8. In  Phillips  v.  Western   Railway   Co.
1
,   Field,   J.,   while
emphasizing that damages must be full and adequate, held thus:
"You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original
position, but you must bring your reasonable common
sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is
the only occasion on which compensation can be given.
The   plaintiff   can   never   sue   again   for   it.   You   have,
therefore, now to give him compensation once and for all.
He has done no wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the
hands of the defendants and you must take care to give
him   full   fair   compensation   for   that   which   he   has
suffered."   Besides,   the   Tribunals   should   always
remember   that   the   measures   of   damages   in   all  these
cases "should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to
say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure".
9. In the case of Mediana2
, Lord Halsbury held:
"Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is
one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay
down any principle upon which you can give damages;
nevertheless,   it   is   remitted   to   the   jury,   or   those   who
stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation
in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take
the most familiar and ordinary case: how is anybody to
measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody
1 (1874) 4 QBD 406
2 [1900] AC 113
5
can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation
establish   what   is   the   exact   amount   of   money   which
would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering
which a person has undergone by reason of an accident.
In truth, I think it would be very arguable to say that a
person would be entitled to no damages for such thing.
What manly mind cares about pain and suffering that is
past?   But,   nevertheless,   the   law   recognizes   that   as   a
topic upon which damages may be given."
10. The following observations of Lord Morris in his speech in H.
West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard3
, are very pertinent:
"Money may be awarded so that something tangible may
be procured to replace something else of the like nature
which   has   been  destroyed   or   lost.   But   money   cannot
renew   a   physical   frame   that   has   been   battered   and
shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is to award
sums   which   must   be   regarded   as   giving   reasonable
compensation.   In   the   process   there   must   be   the
endeavour   to   secure   some   uniformity   in   the   general
method of approach. By common assent awards must be
reasonable   and   must   be   assessed   with   moderation.
Furthermore,   it   is   eminently   desirable   that   so   far   as
possible comparable injuries should be compensated by
comparable awards."
In the same case Lord Devlin observed that the proper approach
to the problem was to adopt a test as to what contemporary
society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the
wrongdoer to "hold up his head among his neighbours and say
with   their   approval   that   he   has   done   the   fair   thing",   which
should   be   kept   in   mind   by   the   court   in   determining
compensation in personal injury cases.
3 1963 2 WLR 1359
6
11. Lord Denning while speaking for the Court of Appeal in the
case of  Ward  v.  James4
, laid down the following three basic
principles to be followed in such like cases:
"Firstly, accessibility: In cases of grave injury, where the
body is wrecked or brain destroyed, it is very difficult to
assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the
award must basically be a conventional figure, derived
from  experience  or  from  awards  in   comparable  cases.
Secondly, uniformity: There should be some measure of
uniformity in awards so that similar decisions may be
given   in   similar   cases;   otherwise   there   will   be   great
dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of
the   administration   of   justice.   Thirdly,   predictability:
Parties should be able to predict with some measure of
accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a
particular case, for by this means cases can be settled
peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to
the public good."
12. The assessment of damages in personal injury cases raises
great   difficulties.   It   is   not   easy   to   convert   the   physical   and
mental loss into monetary terms. There has to be a measure of
calculated guess work and conjecture. An assessment, as best
as can, in the circumstances, should be made.
13. In McGregor’s Treatise on Damages, 14th Edn., para 1157,
referring to heads of damages in personal injury actions states:
"The person physically injured may recover both for his
pecuniary losses and his non­pecuniary losses. Of these
the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate
items, viz., the loss of earnings and other gains which the
plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and
the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a
4 (1965) 1 All ER 563
7
result of the injury, and the courts have sub­divided the
non­pecuniary losses into three categories, viz., pain and
suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation
of life."
14. In M/s Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala
Devi and others5
, this Court held:
"2….The determination of the quantum must be liberal,
not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free
country in generous scales."
15.   In  R.D.  Hattangadi   v.  Pest   Control   (India)   Pvt.   Ltd.6
,
dealing with the different heads of compensation in injury cases
this Court held thus:
"9.   Broadly   speaking,   while   fixing   the   amount   of
compensation   payable   to   a   victim   of   an   accident,   the
damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary
damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are
those which the victim has actually incurred and which
are   capable   of   being   calculated   in   terms   of   money;
whereas   non­pecuniary   damages   are   those   which   are
incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations.
In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages
may   include   expenses   incurred   by   the   claimant:   (i)
medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the
date   of   trial;   (iii)   other   material   loss.   So   far   as   nonpecuniary damages are concerned, they may include:
(i)   damages   for   mental   and   physical   shock,
pain and suffering already suffered or likely to
be   suffered   in   the   future;   (ii)   damages   to
compensate   for  the   loss  of  amenities   of   life
which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on
account of injury the claimant may not be able
to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for loss of
expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the
normal longevity of the person concerned is
shortened;   (iv)   inconvenience,   hardship,
5 1980 ACJ 55 (SC)
6 (1995) 1 SCC 551
8
discomfort,   disappointment,   frustration   and
mental stress in life."
16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Others7
, this Court laid
down the heads under which compensation is to be awarded for
personal injuries.
"6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in
personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i)Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization,
medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and
miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the
injured   would   have   made   had   he   not   been
injured, comprising:
(a)   Loss   of   earning   during   the   period   of
treatment;
(b)   Loss   of   future   earnings   on   account   of 
permanent  disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non­pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a
consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of
marriage).
(vi)   Loss   of   expectation   of   life   (shortening   of
normal longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be
awarded only under heads (i), (ii) (a) and (iv). It is only in
serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical
evidence   corroborating   the   evidence   of   the   claimant,
that   compensation   will   be   granted   under   any   of   the
heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future
earnings   on   account   of   permanent   disability,   future
medical   expenses,   loss   of   amenities   (and/or   loss   of
prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.”
7 (2011) 1 SCC 343
9
17. In  K.  Suresh   v.   New   India  Assurance  Company  Ltd.
and Ors.
8
, this Court held as follows :
“2...There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of
the   heart   or   for   mental   tribulations.     The
quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation of the
loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic
approximation.     Therefore,   Section   168   of   the   Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the Act’) stipulates that
there should be grant of “just compensation”.   Thus, it
becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine “just
compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall,
and simultaneously, should not be a pittance.”
18. Applying the aforesaid principles, we now proceed to assess
the compensation. 
Expenses   relating   to   treatment,  hospitalization,  medicines,
transportation etc.
19. The High Court under the two heads of medical treatment
and   transport   has   awarded   Rs.1,88,501/­.     Out   of   this   an
amount of Rs.1,38,501/­ is the actual expense incurred on the
treatment of Kajal.   One must remember that amongst people
who are not Government employees and belong to the poorer
strata of society, bills are not retained.  Some of the bills have
been excluded by the courts below only on the ground that the
name of the patient is not written on the bill.   There is no
dispute   with   regard   to   the   long   period   of   treatment   and
8 (2012) 12 SCC 274
10
hospitalisation of this young girl.  Immediately after the accident
on 18.10.2007, she was admitted at a hospital in Karnal.  From
there,   she   was   referred   to   the   PGI,   Chandigarh,   where   she
remained   admitted   from   21.10.2007   till   12.11.2007   and,
thereafter,   she   was   again   admitted   in   the   hospital   from
12.11.2007 till 08.12.2007.  She was in the hospital for almost
51 days, and both Dr. Sameer Aggarwal (PW­3) from the hospital
at   Karnal   and   Dr.   Rajesh   Chhabra   (PW­4),   from   PGI,
Chandigarh, have supported this.  Limiting the amount only to
the bills which have been paid in the name of the claimant only,
would not be reasonable.   Therefore, the amount payable for
actual   medical   expenses   is   increased   from   Rs.1,38,501/­   to
Rs.2,00,000/­.     The   amount   awarded   for   transportation   at
Rs.50,000/­ is reasonable.  Therefore, under this head we award
Rs.2,50,000/­.
Loss of earnings
20. Both the courts below have held that since the girl was a
young child of 12 years only notional income of Rs.15,000/­ per
annum can be taken into consideration.  We do not think this is
a proper way of assessing the future loss of income.  This young
girl after studying could have worked and would have earned
11
much more than Rs.15,000/­ per annum.  Each case has to be
decided on its own evidence but taking notional income to be
Rs.15,000/­ per annum is not at all justified. The appellant has
placed  before  us  material  to  show  that   the  minimum  wages
payable to a skilled workman is Rs.4846/­ per month.  In our
opinion this would be the minimum amount which she would
have earned on becoming a major.  Adding 40% for the future
prospects,   it   works   to   be   Rs.6784.40/­   per   month,   i.e.,
81,412.80 per annum.  Applying the multiplier of 18 it works out
to Rs.14,65,430.40, which is rounded off to Rs.14,66,000/­
21. Though the claimant would have been entitled to separate
attendant   charges   for   the   period   during   which   she   was
hospitalised, we are refraining from awarding the same because
we are going to award her attendant charges for life.   At the
same time, we are clearly of the view that the tortfeasor cannot
take benefit of the gratuitous service rendered by the family
members.  When this small girl was taken to PGI, Chandigarh,
or   was   in   her   village,   2­3   family   members   must   have
accompanied her.  Even if we are not paying them the attendant
charges   they   must   be   paid   for   loss   of   their   wages   and   the
amount they would have spent in hospital for food etc.  These
12
family members left their work in the village to attend to this
little girl in the hospital at Karnal or Chandigarh. In the hospital
the claimant would have had at least two attendants, and taking
the cost of each at Rs.500/­ per day for 51 days, we award her
Rs.51,000/­. 
Attendant charges
22. The   attendant   charges   have   been   awarded   by   the   High
Court @ Rs.2,500/­ per month for 44 years, which works out to
Rs.13,20,000/­.     Unfortunately,   this   system   is   not   a   proper
system.  Multiplier system is used to balance out various factors.
When compensation is awarded in lump sum, various factors are
taken into consideration.  When compensation is paid in lump
sum, this Court has always followed the multiplier system.  The
multiplier system should be followed not only for determining
the compensation on account of loss of income but also for
determining   the   attendant   charges   etc.     This   system   was
recognised  by  this  Court  in  Gobald   Motor   Service   Ltd.     v.
R.M.K.   Veluswami9
.   The   multiplier   system factors   in   the
inflation rate, the rate of interest payable on the lump sum
9 AIR 1962 SC 1
13
award, the longevity of the claimant, and also other issues such
as the uncertainties of life.   Out of all the various alternative
methods, the multiplier method has been recognised as the most
realistic   and   reasonable   method.     It   ensures   better   justice
between   the   parties   and   thus   results   in   award   of   ‘just
compensation’ within the meaning of the Act.
23. It would be apposite at this stage to refer to the observation
of Lord Reid in Taylor  v.  O’Connor10:
"Damages to make good the loss of dependency over a
period of years must be awarded as a lump sum and that
sum is generally calculated by applying a multiplier to
the amount of one year's dependency. That is a perfectly
good method in the ordinary case but it conceals the fact
that there are two quite separate matters involved, the
present value of the series of future payments, and the
discounting of that present value to allow for the fact that
for   one   reason   or   another   the   person   receiving   the
damages   might   never   have   enjoyed   the   whole   of   the
benefit of the dependency. It is quite unnecessary in the
ordinary   case   to   deal   with   these   matters   separately.
Judges and counsel have a wealth of experience which is
an adequate guide to the selection of the multiplier and
any expert evidence is rightly discouraged. But in a case
where the facts are special, I think, that these matters
must have separate consideration if even rough justice is
to be done and expert evidence may be valuable or even
almost essential. The special factor in the present case is
the incidence of Income Tax and, it may be, surtax."
24. This Court has reaffirmed the multiplier method in various
cases like  Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi   v.  Subhagwati
10 1971 AC 115
14
and Ors.
11
, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.
v.  Trilok  Chandra  and  Ors.
12
,  Sandeep  Khanduja    v.  Atul
Dande   and   Ors.13
.    This   Court   has   also   recognised   that
Schedule II of the Act can be used as a guide for the multiplier to
be applied in each case.  Keeping the claimant’s age in mind, the
multiplier in this case should be 18 as opposed to 44 taken by
the High Court.
25. Having held so, we are clearly of the view that the basic
amount taken for determining attendant charges is very much
on the lower side.   We must remember that this little girl is
severely suffering from incontinence meaning that she does not
have control over her bodily functions like passing urine and
faeces.  As she grows older, she will not be able to handle her
periods.   She requires an attendant virtually 24 hours a day.
She requires an attendant who though may not be medically
trained but must be capable of handling a child who is bed
ridden.  She would require an attendant who would ensure that
she does not suffer from bed sores.   The claimant has placed
before us a notification of the State of Haryana of the year 2010,
11 1966 ACJ 57
12  (1996) 4 SCC 362
13 (2017) 3 SCC 351
15
wherein the wages for skilled labourer is Rs.4846/­ per month.
We, therefore, assess the cost of one attendant at Rs.5,000/­
and   she   will   require   two   attendants   which   works   out   to
Rs.10,000/­   per   month,   which   comes   to   Rs.1,20,000/­   per
annum,   and   using   the   multiplier   of   18   it   works   out   to
Rs.21,60,000/­ for attendant charges for her entire life.   This
takes care of all the pecuniary damages.
Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenities
26. Coming to the non­pecuniary damages under the head of
pain, suffering, loss of amenities, the High Court has awarded
this girl only Rs.3,00,000/­. In  Mallikarjun   v.   Divisional
Manager,   The   National   Insurance   Company   Limited   and
Ors.
14, this Court while dealing with the issue of award under
this head held that it should be at least Rs.6,00,000/­, if the
disability is more than 90%.   As far as the present case is
concerned, in addition to the 100% physical disability the young
girl is suffering from severe incontinence, she is suffering from
severe hysteria and above all she is left with a brain of a nine
month old child.  This is a case where departure has to be made
14 2013 (10) SCALE 668
16
from the normal rule and the pain and suffering suffered by this
child is such that no amount of compensation can compensate. 
27. One factor which must be kept in mind while assessing the
compensation in a case like the present one is that the claim can
be awarded only once.  The claimant cannot come back to court
for   enhancement   of   award   at   a   later   stage   praying   that
something extra has been spent.   Therefore, the courts or the
tribunals   assessing   the   compensation   in   a   case   of   100%
disability, especially where there is mental disability also, should
take a liberal view of the matter when awarding compensation.
While awarding this amount we are not only taking the physical
disability   but   also   the   mental   disability   and   various   other
factors.  This child will remain bed­ridden for life.  Her mental
age will be that of a nine month old child.  Effectively, while her
body grows, she will remain a small baby.  We are dealing with a
girl   who   will   physically   become   a   woman   but   will   mentally
remain a 9 month old child. This girl will miss out playing with
her friends.   She cannot communicate; she cannot enjoy the
pleasures   of   life;   she   cannot   even   be   amused   by   watching
cartoons or films; she will miss out the fun of childhood, the
excitement of youth; the pleasures of a marital life; she cannot
17
have children who she can love let alone grandchildren.  She will
have no pleasure. Her’s is a vegetable existence.  Therefore, we
feel in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case even
after taking a very conservative view of the matter an amount
payable for the pain and suffering of this child should be at least
Rs.15,00,000/­.
Loss of marriage prospects
28. The   Tribunal   has   awarded   Rs.3,00,000/­   for   loss   of
marriage prospects.   We see no reason to interfere with this
finding.
Future medical treatment
29. The claimant has been awarded only Rs.2,00,000/­ under
this head.   This amount is a pittance.   Keeping in view the
nature of her injuries and the fact that she is bed­ridden this
child is bound to suffer from a lot of medical problems.  True it
is that there is no evidence in this regard but there can hardly
be such evidence.  She may require special mattress which will
have to be changed frequently.  In future as this girl grows, she
may face many other medical issues because of the injuries
suffered in the accident.   Keeping in view her young age and
18
assuming she would live another 50­60 years, it would not be
unjust to award her Rs.5,00,000/­ for future medical expenses.
How the compensation should be invested?
30. The tribunal while awarding the compensation had stated
that the amount payable to the share of Kajal would be kept in a
Fixed Deposit till she attains the age of 18 years.   The High
Court while enhancing the amount of compensation has directed
that the enhanced amount be paid to the appellant within 45
days.  This is totally contrary to the guidelines laid down by this
Court  in  General   Manager,   Kerala   State   Road   Transport
Corporation,   Trivandrum  v.  Susamma   Thomas  and  Ors.
15
,
wherein it has been held clearly that the amount payable to the
minors should not be normally released.  The guidelines in this
case were as follows :
 “17….(i) The Claims Tribunal should, in the case of minors,
invariably order the amount of compensation awarded to
the minor be invested in long term fixed deposits at least
till the date of the minor attaining majority. The expenses
incurred by the guardian or next friend may, however, be
allowed to be withdrawn;
(ii) In the case of illiterate claimants also the Claims Tribunal
should follow the procedure set out in (i) above, but if
lump sum payment is required for effecting purchases of
any movable or immovable property such as, agricultural
implements, rickshaw, etc., to earn a living, the Tribunal
may consider such a request after making sure that the
15 (1994) 2 SCC 176
19
amount is actually spent for the purpose and the demand
is not a ruse to withdraw money;
(iii) In the case of semi­literate persons the Tribunal should
ordinarily   resort   to  the   procedure   set   out   at   (i)   above
unless it is satisfied, for reasons to be stated in writing,
that   the   whole   or   part   of   the   amount   is   required   for
expanding and existing business or for purchasing some
property   as   mentioned   in   (ii)   above   for   earning   his
livelihood, in which case the Tribunal will ensure that the
amount   is   invested   for   the   purpose   for   which   it   is
demanded and paid;
(iv) In the case of literate persons also the Tribunal may
resort to the procedure indicated in (i) above, subject to
the relaxation set out in (ii) and (iii) above, if having regard
to  the   age,   fiscal   background   and   strata   of   society  to
which   the   claimant   belongs   and   such   other
considerations, the Tribunal in the larger interest of the
claimant and with a view to ensuring the safety of the
compensation awarded to him thinks it necessary to do
order;
(v)   In   the   case   of   widows   the   Claims   Tribunal   should
invariably follow the procedure set out in (i) above;
(vi) In personal injury cases if further treatment is necessary
the Claims Tribunal on being satisfied about the same,
which shall be recorded in writing, permit withdrawal of
such amount as is necessary for incurring the expenses
for such treatment;
(vii)   In   all   cases   in   which   investment   in   long   term   fixed
deposits is made it should be on condition that the Bank
will not permit any loan or advance on the fixed deposit
and   interest   on   the   amount   invested   is   paid   monthly
directly to the claimant or his guardian, as the case may
be;
(viii)  In   all   cases   Tribunal   should   grant   to  the   claimants
liberty to apply for withdrawal in case of an emergency. To
meet with such a contingency, if the amount awarded is
substantial, the Claims Tribunal may invest it in more
than one Fixed Deposit so that if need be one such F.D.R.
can be liquidated….”
These guidelines protect the rights of the minors, claimants who
are under some disability and also widows and illiterate person
who may be deprived of the compensation paid to them in lump
20
sum by unscrupulous elements.  These victims may not be able
to invest their monies properly and in such cases the MACT as
well the High courts must ensure that investments are made in
nationalised banks to get a high rate of interest.  The interest in
most   cases   is   sufficient   to   cover   the   monthly   expenses.   In
special cases, for reasons to be given in writing, the MACT or the
trial court may release such amount as is required.  We reiterate
these guidelines and direct that they should be followed by all
the tribunals and High Courts to ensure that the money of the
victims is not frittered away.
Interest
31. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation by
Rs.14,70,000/­ and awarded interest @ 7.5% per annum but
directed that the interest of 7.5% shall be paid only from the
date of filing of the appeal.   This is also incorrect.   We are
constrained to observe that the High Court was not right in
awarding interest on the enhanced amount only from the date of
filing of the appeal.  Section 171 of the Act reads as follows :
“171.  Award of interest where any claim is allowed.—
Where   any   Claims   Tribunal   allows   a   claim   for
compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may
direct that in addition to the amount of compensation
21
simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from
such date not earlier than the date of making the claim
as it may specify in this behalf.”
Normally interest should be granted from the date of filing of the
petition   and   if   in   appeal   enhancement   is   made   the   interest
should again be from the date of filing of the petition.  It is only if
the appeal is filed after an inordinate delay by the claimants, or
the   decision   of   the   case   has   been   delayed   on   account   of
negligence of the claimant, in such exceptional cases the interest
may be awarded from a later date.  However, while doing so, the
tribunals/High Courts must give reasons why interest is not
being paid from the date of filing of the petition. Therefore, we
direct  that the  entire amount  of compensation  including the
amount enhanced by us shall carry an interest of 7.5% per
annum   from   the   date   of   filing   of   the   claim   petition   till
payment/deposit of the amount.
Relief
32. In view of the above, we award a sum of Rs.62,27,000/­
to the claimant under the following heads :
S.No
.
Heads Amount
22
(i) Expenses relating to treatment,
hospitalisation   and
transportation
Rs. 2,50,000/­
(ii) Loss   of   earnings   (family
members)
Rs.    51,000/­
(iii) Loss of future earnings Rs.14,66,000/
­
(iv) Attendant charges Rs.21,60,000/­
(v) Pain, suffering, loss of amenities Rs.15,00,000/­
(vi) Loss of Marriage prospects Rs.  3,00,000/­
(vii) Future medical treatment Rs.  5,00,000/­
This amount shall carry an interest @7.5% p.a. from the date of
filing of the claim petition till payment/deposit of the amount.
Obviously, the insurance company shall be entitled to adjust the
amount already paid.   Further, the insurance company shall
also be entitled to recover the amount from the owner in terms of
the award of the MACT, which has not been challenged either
before the High Court or us.
33.  We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than
the amount claimed.   However, it is well settled law that in
motor   accident   claim   petitions,   the   Court   must   award   just
compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than
23
the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the
claimant is a minor.
34.  The insurance company shall deposit the enhanced amount
before the MACT in terms of the judgment after deducting the
amount already paid by the insurance company within a period
of   3   months   from   today.     The   MACT   shall   keep   the   entire
amount in a fixed deposit in a nationalised bank, for a period of
5 years, giving highest rate of interest.  The interest payable on
this amount shall be released on quarterly basis to the father of
the child.  This amount shall be spent for paying the attendants
and for the care of the child alone.  Even after 5 years since this
child for all intents and purpose shall remain a person under a
disability, the MACT shall keep renewing the amount on these
terms.  We, however, further direct that in case the parents or
the guardian moves an application for release of some amount to
meet some special medical expenses, then MACT may consider
release of the same.
35. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.  No order
as   to   costs.     Pending   application(s),   if   any,   also   stand(s)
disposed of.
24
...................................J.
(L. Nageswara Rao)
...................................J.
(Deepak Gupta)
New Delhi
February 05, 2020
25

No Person could have been tried for the same offence twice at the behest of the the complainant who himself a complainant in both the FIRs. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from 7 the one made against him might have been made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub­Section (2) thereof.” 13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is allowed.

No Person  could have been tried for the same offence twice at   the   behest   of   the   the   complainant  who himself a complainant  in both the FIRs.

Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.  (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent   jurisdiction   for   an   offence   and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from 7 the one made against him might have been made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub­Section (2) thereof.” 13. In view of the conclusion that the  substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion  that  the  subsequent prosecution  of  the appellant   in   FIR   No.   114   of   2008   dated   09.10.2008   is completely   unsustainable.     In   the   result,   the   FIR   dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.  The appeal is allowed.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  237 OF 2020
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4592 of 2017)
PREM CHAND SINGH ..........APPELLANT(s)
Versus
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER         ......RESPONDENT(s)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted. 
2. The appellant has challenged the order dated 18.12.2015
rejecting his application for discharge and the affirmation of
the same on 31.05.2016 in Criminal Revision No. 70 of 2016
by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gonda (U.P.).
1
3. The respondent no.2 is stated to have given a general
power of attorney to the appellant on 02.05.1985 and on the
basis of which the appellant sold certain lands belonging to
the respondent.  The respondent lodged FIR No. 160 of 1989
on 14.09.1989 that he had never executed any general power
of attorney in favour of the appellant and that the appellant
has forged general power of attorney to sell his lands illegally.
The appellant was acquitted in the trial as the charge could
not   be   established.     Though   no   records   are   available,   the
acquittal   is   not   disputed   by   counsel   for   respondent.     The
respondent then filed Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 to cancel the
general power of attorney.   On 09.10.2008, the respondent
filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the
court which was forwarded to the police leading to registration
of   FIR   No.   114   of   2008   on   09.10.2008   alleging   that   the
appellant had forged general power of attorney and on the
basis of the same had sold certain lands of the respondent.
2
That   earlier   also   the   appellant   had   sold   lands   of   the
respondent in like manner.
4. The appellant filed an application for discharge referring
to his acquittal dated 07.08.1998 under Section 419 or 420
Cr.P.C.   pleading   that   he   could   not   be   tried   for   the   same
offence twice and that the FIR was based on concealment of
facts   with   regard   to   the   earlier   acquittal.     The   Judicial
Magistrate Class II Gonda rejected the discharge application
simplicitor on the ground that the order of acquittal dated
07.08.1998 had not been brought on record.  Revision against
the same was dismissed holding that the grounds urged on
behalf of the appellant can more appropriately be urged at the
time of framing of the charges.
5. Mr. Pradeep Kant, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   appellant,   submitted   that   the   order   of   acquittal   dated
07.08.1998   and   the   subsequent   institution   of   Civil   Suit
No.353 of 2007 for the cancellation of the general power of
attorney executed by the respondent is not in dispute.   The
3
subsequent   FIR   on   09.10.2008   itself   refers   to   the   general
power of attorney which was the subject matter of FIR No. 160
of 1989 but conceals the order of acquittal of the appellant.  It
is submitted that in the facts of the case, the institution of the
FIR on 09.10.2008 long years after execution of general power
of attorney dated 02.05.1985 is, therefore, a complete abuse of
the process of law and the proceedings are fit to be quashed.
Referring   to   Section   300   Cr.P.C.   it   is   submitted   that   the
appellant could not have been tried for the same offence twice
at   the   behest   of   the   respondent   who   is   the   complainant
himself in both the FIRs.
6.     Mr.   Amit   Yadav,   learned   Counsel   for   the   respondentcomplainant,   submits   that   the   High   Court   has   declined
interference   since   the   ingredients   of   the   two   FIRs   were
different.  While the FIR No. 160 of 1989 was under Section
419 or 420 IPC the second FIR was under Sections 467, 468
and   471   also.     Furthermore,   the   second   FIR   contains
allegations that the appellant put up an imposter in place of
4
the   respondent   before   the   registration   authorities   and
collusively executed sale deed in respect of his lands along
with   Sushil   Kumar   Singh   and   Arvind   in   pursuance   of   a
general   power   of   attorney   which   respondent   had   never
executed.   The discharge application was, therefore, rightly
rejected and interference declined in revision.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. The FIR No. 160 of 1989 alleges that the respondent on
account of his job invariably stayed outside.   The appellant
had   created   a   forged   general   power   of   attorney   from   the
respondent in his name with regard to his lands bearing Gata
no. 77/0.87 decimal and sold it on the basis of the forged
general power of attorney which the respondent became aware
of   on   25.07.1989.     The   respondent   denied   having   ever
executed   any   general   power   of   attorney   in   favour   of   the
appellant. The respondent does not dispute that the appellant
was acquitted of the charge by judgment dated 07.08.1998.
5
The fact that the judgement may not have been made available
is therefore inconsequential.
9. The   institution   of   Civil   Suit   No.   353   of   2007   by   the
respondent for cancellation of the general power of attorney,
after   the   acquittal   of   the   appellant,   is   nothing   but   an
acknowledgment of the genuineness of the general power of
attorney executed by the respondents which he now wished to
revoke.
10. The respondent then filed an application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the
police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008.   The
allegations are similar that the appellant put up an imposter
in place of the respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar
Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney,
which the respondent had never executed, sold his lands.  The
FIR itself recites that earlier also the appellant had sold the
lands of the respondent on the basis of same general power of
6
attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998,
and   also   the   institution   of   Civil   Suit   No.   353   of   2007   for
annulment of the same.
11. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both
the   FIRs   is   the   same   general   power   of   attorney   dated
02.05.1985 and the sales made by the appellant in pursuance
of the same.  If the substratum of the two FIRs are common,
the   mere   addition   of   Sections   467,   468   and   471   in   the
subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients
to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials,
allegations and grounds.
12. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows:
“300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be
tried for same offence.
(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of
competent   jurisdiction   for   an   offence   and
convicted or acquitted of such offence shall,
while such conviction or acquittal remains in
force, not be liable to be tried again for the
same offence, nor on the same facts for any
other offence for which a different charge from
7
the one made against him might have been
made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or
for which he might have been convicted under
sub­Section (2) thereof.”
13. In view of the conclusion that the  substratum of the two
FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood
acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging
any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the
considered opinion  that  the  subsequent prosecution  of  the
appellant   in   FIR   No.   114   of   2008   dated   09.10.2008   is
completely   unsustainable.     In   the   result,   the   FIR   dated
09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the
impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.  The appeal is
allowed.
……….………………………..J.
   (Navin Sinha)                       
………………………………….J.
 (Krishna Murari)                 
New Delhi,
February 07, 2020
8

whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS).

 whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS). 

(Non-Reportable)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8153 OF 2009
M/s. S.K.J. Coke Industries Ltd.& Anr. ..….Appellants
Versus
Coal India Ltd. & Ors. …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The core dispute in this appeal involves the question as to
whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal
consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known
in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised
Sales Scheme (LSS). The latter pricing mechanism is similar to open
market price of coal. The predecessor in title of the first appellant
were a firm under the trade name Mahabir Coke Industries. At the
material time, they were engaged in production of low ash
metallurgical coal at a location close to Guwahati. They wanted to be
under the preferential pricing regime on the strength of an
Page 1 of 19
arrangement with the respondent coal companies agreed upon in the
year 1989. Under such arrangement Mahabir Coke Industries were
permitted to lift 4000 metric tonnes of coal per month. Traditionally,
the coal industry has been deeply regulated by the Government of
India. The Colliery Control Order, 1945 was one of such regulating
instruments. This Control Order has been replaced by Colliery
Control Order, 2000 with effect from 1st January, 2000 but that factor
is not of much significance so far as the present appeal is concerned.
The basic coal mining industry is nationalised and largely controlled
by the Coal India Ltd., a public sector undertaking. The appellants
were approved linkage of said 4000 metric tonnes of low ash coal
from Tirup and Tikak mines of North Eastern Coalfields (NEC). The
said coal company is a subsidiary of Coal India Limited (CIL). The
linking order was issued on 20th September, 1989. The respondent
coal companies in course of hearing before us have sought to
distinguish between “linkage” and “allocation”. Their stand is that in
the case of the appellants, there was monthly allocation of the said
quantity of coal only for which they cannot claim preferential price.
As cokeries, they were allocated coal suitable for use in steel plants
Page 2 of 19
subject to availability. The respondents’ case is that linkage at
preferential price is given to the industries or thermal plants out of
coal not suitable for use in steel plants. For that reason, according to
the respondent coal companies, appellants were not given linkage but
allocated specified quantity. Clause 3 of the 1945 Control Order
empowered categorisation and gradation of coal by the Central
Government. Clause 4 thereof authorised the Central Government to
fix different prices of coal for different classes, grades, sizes of coal as
also prices of different collieries.
2. On 16th June 1994, a notification was issued by the Central
Government in pursuance of the aforesaid two Clauses of the 1945
Control Order stipulating the classes and grades in which coal and
coke were to be categorised. That notification also stipulated the sale
prices for such coal, at which they could be sold by the colliery owner
at pitheads. Table I thereof provided gradation with grade
specifications of different types of coal. There was no such grading in
respect of coal produced in the State of Assam and certain other states
in the North Eastern Region in that Table. We shall henceforth refer to
Page 3 of 19
coal lifted by the appellants as “Assam coal”. The second Table (Table
II) to this notification dealt with sale prices of different types of coal
mainly on the basis of “Useful heat value in kilo calories per
kilogram”. For coal from Assam and that region, price for ungraded
coal with ash content not exceeding 25% was specified to be “not
exceeding Rs.741.00 p.” NEC made provisional declaration of grade
of Assam coal under Clause 3A(1) of the 1945 Control Order on 11th
June 1997. By a further notification dated 26th August 1997 the
revised prices thereof were notified. Thereafter, by another
notification dated 24th February 1999, the gradation formalities for
coal produced in Assam and other States in the said region was
completed by effecting suitable amendments to the notification dated
16th June 1994. In Clause 9 (ii) of the 1994 notification, there was
stipulation to the following effect for computing the price of coal
depending upon their ash content:-
“9. (i)…………………..
(ii) In case of coal produced in the State of
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya
and Nagaland the price payable shall be
increased at the rate of Rs.1/- per tonne for
each percentage of ash by which the ash
Page 4 of 19
content falls below 22 per cent. Similarly
when ash content exceeds 25 per cent, the
price shall be reduced at the same rate of
Rs. 11 per tonne per cent of ash by which
the ash content exceeds 25 per cent.”
3. The first appellant, whose predecessors were the petitioners
before the First Court continued with receiving coal in terms of the
notification dated 16th June, 1994 at the price stipulated therein till
18th January 1996. Admitted position is that coal lifted by the
appellants had ash content below 25%. From 19th January 1996, the
price NEC was charging the appellants stood substantially enhanced.
The reason for this, according to the respondent companies, was that a
Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS) was implemented by the CIL under
authorisation of the Central Government to that effect. The LSS
under which price was enhanced was on the basis of a notification
dated 9th January, 1996. That notification was followed by another
notification dated 11th March, 1996. On the latter date, a Liberalised
Sales Scheme (Modified) was introduced. The notification of 9th
January, 1996 reads:-
“S.O. 21(E). In pursuance of the provisions of
clause 18 of the Colliery Control Order, 1945,
as continued in force by section 16 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1995 (10 of 1955),
Page 5 of 19
the Central Government, having regard to the
stock position of coal, hereby exempts the Coal
India Ltd., Subsidiaries of Coal India Limited
and the Singareni Collieries Company Limited
in respect of coal sold by them under any
Liberalized sale Scheme (LSS) of the
Government of India from the provisions of
clauses 4, 4A and 4B of the said order.
This notification shall remain in force on
and from the date of its publication in the
official Gazette and until the 31st day of March,
1996.”
4. As pleaded in paragraph 22 of the appellant’s writ petition,
clause 2.3 of that Scheme specified that the declaration of source
under “LSS” was not to affect rail loading for linked/sponsored
consumers or coal supplies to road linked/sponsored consumers. The
appellants continued to lift coal under protest on payment of such
higher price. Subsequently on 16th November 1996, the linkage
committee of the Coal India Limited in its 85th meeting took the
following decision under agenda item nos. 23 and 24:
“23. ‘Linkage’ of coal to SSF units & cokery
units –
The Committee deliberated on the agenda
items and decided that SSF units and cokery
units which have been allocated coal by Coal
India Ltd., should be treated as ‘linked unit’, in
Page 6 of 19
the same manner as other linked industrial units
in the non-core sector. The committee also
decided that-
(a) Coal Clearance Letter/Coal Allocation
Letters issued to SSF units and Cokery units
should be treated as ‘Linkage Advice Letters’
which are issued to other non-core sector units;
(b) The present system of capacity
assessment for SSF units by CMPOI and cokery
units by a joint team of officers from Coal
Co/CMPOI/CIL, should continue;
(c) All cokery units should be required to
obtain sponsorship/recommendation letters from
the concerned State Govts., in the same manner
as sponsorship/recommendation is required for
other non-core sector units.
24. Case of M/s Mahabir Coke Industries,
Guwahati, AssamThe agenda item was discussed by the
Committee. As already decided in the previous
agenda item (i.e. item No.23), all cokery units
and SSF units who have been allocated coal by
CIL, should be treated as ‘linked’ units.
 Regarding the ‘price’ to be charged for supply
of low ash coal to M/s. Mahabir Coke
Industries, Guwahati, this matter should be
decided by NEC-Assam as prevalent at any
point of time.”
5. On 12th March, 1997, a notification was issued by the Central
Government in substance deleting clause 4 of the Control Order of
Page 7 of 19
1945 from the notification dated 16th June 1994. The relevant
portion of the notification dated 12th March 1997 stipulated:-
“S.O. 190 (E). – In pursuance of clauses 3 and 4
of the Colliery Control Order, 1945, as
continued in force by Section 16 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), the
Central Government hereby makes the
following further amendments to the
notification of the Government of India in the
Ministry of Coal No.S.O.- -453(E) dated the 16th
June, 1994 on and from the date of publication
of this notification in the Official Gazette,
namely:-
In the said Notification:-
(a) in the preamble:-
(i) for the words and figures “clauses 3
and 4”, the word and figure “clause 3”
shall be substituted,
(ii) the words and figures “and fixes in
Tables II, V and VI below the sale price
at which coal or coke may be sold by
the colliery owners at pit-heads” shall
be omitted.
(b) Table II relating to non-cooking coal, Table
V relating to hard coke, Table VI relating to soft
coke and the Notes and the Annexure thereunder
shall be omitted.”
6. The appellants founded their writ petition projecting them as
“linked consumer” and contended that they were to pay the price of
Page 8 of 19
coal not beyond that notified on 16th June 1994. The reliefs asked for
in their petition included a prayer for writ in the nature of mandamus
commanding CIL and NEC to charge the appellants notified price as
applicable to linked or sponsored units. Prayer was also made for
refund of excess sum realised from them as LSS price.
7. Before the First Court, the respondents had run a case that till
12th March, 1997, price for NEC coal was fixed by the Government of
India for linked consumers. It has been submitted before us on behalf
of the coal companies that till 18th January 1996, prices for the linked
consumers and for the consumers lifting coal on allocation had
remained the same. For those other than linked consumers, price was
fixed by the CIL with effect from 19th January, 1996 in accordance
with the LSS as from that point of time, these coal companies were
exempted from Clause 4 of the 1945 Control Order.
8. The main point argued on behalf of the appellants before the
First Court was that in not charging the appellants coal price as
applicable to a linked unit, the authorities had ignored the resolution
adopted in the 85th meeting of the Linkage Committee for non-core
sector consumers. As a corollary, the appellants contended that they
Page 9 of 19
were not obliged to pay the LSS price as enhanced from 19th January,
1996. The First Court, however, rejected such plea referring to the
second part of the aforesaid resolution of the Linkage Committee.
Under that part, the appellants were required to pay the “price
prevalent at any point of time”. The case of the appellants that “price”
referred to in that part was “linkage price” was not accepted by the
First Court. The reasoning of the First Court would appear from the
following passage of the judgment:-
 “After taking into consideration all relevant
facts and circumstances and having regard to the
submission made by learned counsel for the
parties, this Court, however, finds it difficult to
appreciate the grievance raised herein on behalf
of the writ petitioner. The very basis of the
claim of the writ petitioner, as referred to earlier,
is the resolution adopted in the 85th meeting. It
was specifically mentioned that while the
petitioner could be treated as a linked unit, the
price was to be charged as decided by the NEC,
Assam as prevalent at any point of time.”
9. The stand of the appellants before the Division Bench was that
since Assam coal remained ungraded under the 16th June 1994
notification and the relevant entry in the Table I was removed only on
24th February 1999, the coal companies did not have authority to
Page 10 of 19
grade the coal prior to that date. Before the Division Bench,
appellants’ case was that since there was no specification as regards
gradation under Clause 3 by the Central Government, the coal
companies could not have had exercised their power for such
gradation as also price specification in terms of Clause 3A thereof.
The authority cited before the Division Bench of the High Court was
the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of
India [(2007) 2 SCC 640]. This judgment has been referred to before
us also in support of the argument of the appellants that there could be
no pricing discrimination in respect of two sets of non-core
consumers. This was a case where constitutionality of e-auction
system was challenged and that was the focus of that decision.
Paragraph 161 of the said report was relied upon before us in which it
has been held and observed:
“161. The effect is that today, while the core
sector (92%) on its own and non-core nonlinked SSI/tiny units (through NCCF/other
agencies) (1%) are being supplied coal at a fixed
price, on the other hand, the non-core linked
SSI/tiny units (4%) are being subjected to
differential treatment, without any rational
classification, by supplying the coal to the latter
on the price to be ascertained by the traderPage 11 of 19
controlled process of e-auction and thereby
putting the petitioner units on a par with the
trader. The scheme of e-auction is, therefore,
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.”
10. The Division Bench of the High Court in appeal instituted by
the appellants found that the said decision did not have any impact so
far as appellant’s claim was concerned once the dual system of pricing
was found to be acceptable. This is the judgment which is under
appeal before us. We also confirm this view of the Appellate Bench as
we find such view to be the correct view so far as applicability of the
ratio of the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (supra) is
concerned.
11. It has also been urged before us on behalf of the appellants that
in the Resolution of 16th November 1996, the appellants had been
specifically referred to as “linked consumer” and in that context the
expression “price” as contained in the second part of the Resolution
ought to imply the price for linked consumers only. The case of CCT,
Ranchi and Another Vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd.
and Others [(2004) 6 SCC 689] was relied upon by the learned
Page 12 of 19
counsel for the appellants mainly for interpretation of the aforesaid
Resolution (agenda item no.24). The appellants seek to contend that
while interpreting a provision by which a legal fiction is created, the
Court must ascertain the purpose for which the fiction was created
and having done so, Court should assume those facts and
consequences exist, which are incidental to and inevitable corollaries
for giving effect to such fiction. The rationale behind the appellants’
citing this decision is the wording of the aforesaid Resolution of 16th
November 1996. It has been specified in agenda items 23 and 24 of
that Resolution that all cokery units which have been allocated coal
by CIL ought to be treated as linked units. The appellants have argued
that once they were treated as a linked unit, the price benefit attached
to a linked unit should automatically follow. From the said
Resolution, however, we find a specific agenda item concerning the
first appellant, and the Resolution as adopted specifically stipulates
that the price to be charged from the appellants was to be decided by
the NEC Assam as prevalent at any point of time. In view of this
specific treatment of pricing along with reference to the first appellant
as a linked unit, in our opinion, said Resolution has to be construed to
Page 13 of 19
mean that treatment of the appellant as a linked unit was for the
purpose of regular supply of coal and the pricing factor was separated
from such deemed linking. This would be apparent from the decision
taken against agenda item no.23, in which reference has been made to
SSF units and cokery units which had been allocated (emphasis
supplied) coal, and it was these units which were to be treated as
linked units. The distinction between “allocation” and “linking”
clearly emerges from the said decision of the linking committee. It is
a fact that the first appellant’s treatment as a linked unit was a fiction.
But such fiction was replaced by reality on the basis of a specific
provision in the Resolution (agenda item no.24) so far as pricing is
concerned. As the Resolution dealt with “linking” and “pricing”
separately, the fictional linking could not be extended to actual
pricing. The respondents have taken consistent plea that the
expression “linked” has been loosely used and for non-core sector
units, it meant allocation of specified quantity of coal only. In
paragraphs 16 and 17 of NEC’s affidavit-in-opposition to the writ
petition, it has been stated:-
Page 14 of 19
“16. At the said meeting, the decision was
taken to treat SSF and cokery units including
Mahabir Coke as a “linked units”. Such
treatment as a linked unit do not mean grant of
actual linkage. So, Mahabir Coke cannot claim
to be a linked unit. The advantage of being
treated as a linked unit was that Mahabir Coke
will be assured for monthly supply of 4000 MT
coal per month by NEC. The said
resolution/decision also provides that the price
to be charged for supply of low ash coal to
Mahabir Coke will be decided by NEC on the
basis of price prevalent at any point of time i.e.
current price prevailing at the time of supply.
17. There are nearly 200 Cokery units, in India
out of them only three cokery unit, including
cokery unit of Mahabir Coke, are located at
Assam. Mahabir Coke, along with other two
cokery units have been getting low ash Assam
coal which is of superior grade than what the
other cookeries of all over India have been
getting from their respective coal companies.
Normally all other cookeries are getting the
higher ash content coal. The other cookeries
located outside Assam get coal having ash
content of 25 – 30%, whereas the cookeries
located in Assam are getting low ash coal of
NEC having ash content of only 7%. The other
cookeries located outside Assam take supply of
low ash coal from NEC, under LSS for blending
the same with higher ash content coal which
they have been getting from other coal
companies. All other cookeries including three
cookeries of Assam, who are buying the same
low ash coal as supplied to Mahabir Coke, have
been paying the LSS price as notified from time
to time.”
Page 15 of 19
12. Learned counsel for the appellants has brought to our notice the
following observations of the Division Bench in different parts of the
judgment:-
“At the time the Linkage Committee stipulated
that the price payable by the appellant company
would be as per the prevailing rate to be decided
by the fifth Respondent, no coal company had
any authority to supersede the price fixed by the
Central Government by a notification issued
under the Colliery Control Order, 1945. At the
highest, such conditional treatment of the
appellant company as a linked unit, could come
into play only if the price of coal was
deregulated by the Central Government; ipso
facto by reason of the Linkage Committee
decision of November 16, 1995 the appellant
company could not be charged at a rate in
derogation of what the Central Government
notified.”
xx xx xx xx xx xx
“The price of Assam coal at Rs. 741/- per MT
(subject to the variation on account of ash
content) became inoperative upon the
notification of March 12, 1997.”
xx xx xx xx xx xx
“The appellants remain liable to pay the
difference in price on the basis of price fixed by
the respondents subsequent to the notification of
March 12, 1997.”
Page 16 of 19
13. In our opinion, the exemption granted by the Central
Government by the notification dated 9th January, 1996 to Coal India
and their subsidiaries from the provisions of Clauses 4, 4A and 4B of
the 1945 Control Order in respect of sale of coal under LSS, the fetter
imposed by the aforesaid notification of June 1994 got effectively
removed. Specific stand taken by the respondents is that the linking
of the first appellant was only in respect of the quantum of coal to be
obtained by them and they were not entitled to price benefits of linked
consumers. For the appellants, it was only a case of allocation. Thus,
the point of time from when the appellants became liable to pay LSS
rate would be the time when LSS price was raised after 9th January
1996. Prior to that date, we have already reproduced the coal
companies’ submission that the linked price and non-linked price had
remained the same. So far as the aforesaid observations in the
impugned judgment is concerned, such reasoning does not appear to
us to be correct. But our views on this point would not advance the
case of the appellants. That is so because in our opinion, it was within
the power of the NEC to enhance the price for LSS consumers upon
Page 17 of 19
CIL and their subsidiaries being exempted from Clause 4 of the 1945
Control Order on and from 9th January 1996.
14. It appears that a liberalised pricing system has been prevailing
since the year 1993. We find no reason to disbelieve the coal
companies when they assert that there was only allocation of coal in
favour of the first appellant. Thus the appellants did not have vested
legal right to preferential pricing as linked consumers. The 9th
January 1996 notification empowered Coal India Ltd. and their
subsidiaries to charge price to consumers beyond that notified on 16th
June 1994 in respect of Assam coal. The appellants were in the noncore sector. Around that point of time only parity between LSS price
and linked price was broken and the first appellant was required to
pay the LSS price. So far as allocation is concerned, the agenda 24 of
the 85th meeting of the linkage committee retained the supply volume.
But that Resolution is in tune with the NEC’s stand taken before us
that LSS price ought to be charged to the appellants. The factual
argument of the appellants that the two other cokery units in Assam
were not linked, are of no relevance. The appellants have not been
able to sustain a case before us that their linking agreement covered
Page 18 of 19
both allocation and pricing as is the case of other linked consumers.
So far as the other cokery units are concerned, it has been clarified by
the learned counsel for the coal companies that they lift coal of high
ash content between 25-30% which would automatically take them
out of the price advantage specified in Table II of the 1994
notification. We accordingly do not find any reason to set aside the
judgment of the Division Bench.
15. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. The
interim orders, if any, shall stand dissolved.
…………….………..…..J.
(Deepak Gupta)
 ………………………….J.
 (Aniruddha Bose)
New Delhi,
Dated: 7th February, 2020.
Page 19 of 19

The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. whether the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.?The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of 1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.

The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff.
whether the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.?The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of 1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8425 OF 2009
C.S. VENKATESH … APPELLANT
VERSUS
A.S.C. MURTHY (D) BY
LRS. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in RFA No.626 of
2001 dated 21.08.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore,
whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and
decree in O.S. No. 3308 of 1988 passed by the Civil Judge, Bangalore City.
2. A.S.C. Murthy was the plaintiff in the suit. He died during the pendency
of the suit. Therefore, his wife Smt. Jayashree was brought on record as his
legal representative. She is the first respondent in this appeal. C.S. Venkatesh,
the appellant herein, was defendant No.2 in the suit. C. Sethurama Rao, was the
defendant No.1 in the suit. He also died during the pendency of the suit,
1
therefore, his wife Smt. C.S. Lalithamma was brought on record as his legal
representative. She is arrayed as respondent No. 2A in this appeal. Defendant
Nos. 3 and 4 are respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in this appeal. The parties are
hereinafter referred to in their respective capacities before the trial court.
3. The subject matter of the suit was the property situated at Site No. 522,
17th Main Banashankari, I Stage, First Block, Srinagar, Bangalore – 560 050
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the schedule property’).
4. A.S.C. Murthy had filed the above suit against defendants for specific
performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975 in respect of
the schedule property and alternatively to declare that the sale deed dated
23.04.1975 executed by him in favour of the defendants is null and void. It was
alleged in the plaint that the City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore (for
short ‘CITB’) had allotted the site in question in favour of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, he commenced construction of the building on the said site. Since
he did not have sufficient funds, he approached the defendants for certain
financial assistance. Accordingly, the defendants advanced a sum of Rs.2,000/-
as loan. Subsequently, a further sum of Rs.10,000/- was advanced on the
condition of payment of interest at the rate of 18% p.a. However, the plaintiff
failed to pay the interest on the said sum as agreed, except for a period of two
months. Since the defendants were in need of accommodation, the plaintiff put
them in possession of the schedule property by executing a deed of mortgage
dated 11.10.1973. According to the plaintiff, the defendants have advanced, in
all, a sum of Rs.29,000/-. As the plaintiff could not pay the interest regularly,
2
the defendants asked the plaintiff to execute a nominal sale deed in order to
ensure prompt payment of interest. Accordingly, the plaintiff executed a deed
of sale dated 23.04.1975 in favour of the defendants for a sale consideration of
Rs.35,000/- by receiving Rs.6000/-, the difference in the sale price. It was
alleged that the sale deed was executed as a security for the amount advanced
by the defendants. It was contended that the defendants executed an agreement
of reconveyance in respect of the schedule property dated 23.04.1975 in favour
of the plaintiff. It was also agreed that the defendants were put in possession of
the schedule property on the understanding that they need not pay rent and the
plaintiff need not pay interest on the amount advanced by them to the plaintiff.
After the expiry of five years and the defendants having received the sum of
Rs.35,000/- advanced by them, the plaintiff demanded that the defendants
execute a reconveyance deed in terms of the agreement of reconveyance dated
23.04.1975. However, the defendants have failed to execute sale deed.
5. The second defendant filed the written statement admitting the execution
of the mortgage deed dated 11.10.1973 and borrowing of a sum of Rs.29,000/-
by the plaintiff. It was contended that the defendants agreed to reconvey the
property and executed the reconveyance agreement prior to the execution of the
sale deed. However, the plaintiff did not agree for reconveyance. The plaintiff
gave up his demand for reconveyance and executed the sale deed. It was
contended that even otherwise the reconveyance agreement was not to be acted
upon. It was further contended that the plaintiff had borrowed the loan from the
3
bank on different occasions by mortgaging the title deeds of the property. As the
plaintiff failed to discharge his debt to the bank, the defendants paid the said
dues in order to save the schedule property from auction. It was also contended
that there was no plea or proof regarding readiness and willingness to perform
the plaintiff’s part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’). It was denied that the sale deed dated
23.04.1975 was nominal and was executed for the purpose of security for the
loan advanced by the defendants.
6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the
relevant issues. In support of the suit claim, wife of the deceased plaintiff was
examined as PW-1 and exhibited documents P-1 to P-19 in her evidence. The
second defendant was examined as DW-1 and exhibits D-1 to D-15 were marked
in his evidence. On consideration of the evidence of the parties and materials on
record, the trial court came to a conclusion that the plaintiff has established the
execution of agreement of reconveyance. The Court also came to a conclusion
that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was not a nominal one, as contended by the
plaintiff. The Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff has averred in the plaint
that there was sufficient plea in relation to readiness and willingness of the
plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. However, it was held that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the
contract. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the suit.
7. The plaintiff filed R.F.A. No. 626 of 2001, challenging the judgment and
decree of trial court. The High Court on consideration of the rival contentions
4
of the parties held that the sale deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the
defendants was security for the loan advanced by the defendants. Consequently,
the High Court allowed the appeal. The defendants were directed to execute a
deed of reconveyance in respect of the schedule property in favour of the
plaintiff.
8. Appearing for the appellant/defendant No.2, Shri S.N. Bhat, learned
counsel submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance
of an agreement to reconvey. Therefore, he has to plead and prove his readiness
and willingness to pay the consideration amount to the defendants. In this case,
the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove his readiness and willingness. He had
no financial capacity to pay the consideration amount. He did not discharge the
earlier debt owed by him to Sri Thyagaraja Co-operative Bank and the
defendants had to pay off the debt in order to save the property. He had no
capacity to pay the consideration amount. It is further argued that the sale deed
dated 23.04.1975 was not a nominal sale deed, as contended. The High Court
instead of upholding the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court has set aside
the said judgment and decreed the suit.
9. On the other hand, Ms. Sanya Kumar, learned advocate appearing for the
respondent-plaintiff has sought to justify the impugned judgment and decree of
the High Court.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
made at the Bar.
11. The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the
agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought
5
for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not
binding on the plaintiff. On appreciation of the materials on record, the trial
court has held that the plaintiff has proved the existence and execution of
agreement of reconveyance. It has negatived the plaintiff’s claim that the sale
deed was a nominal one. However, the High Court has held that the plaintiff
had executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants as security for the loan
advanced by the defendants and that it cannot be considered a sale. Further, the
High Court has directed specific performance of the agreement of
reconveyance. Therefore, the first question for consideration is whether the sale
deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a
nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.
12. Execution of the sale deed and the deed of reconveyance are not in
dispute. According to the plaintiff, he could not pay the interest except for two
months after the execution of the sale deed and that the understanding between
the parties was that the defendants need not pay any rent and plaintiff need not
pay the interest on the amount advanced by them to the plaintiff. It was
contended that sale deed was executed to ensure prompt payment of the
amounts. But a reading of the sale deed marked at Exhibit P-8, along with
other surrounding circumstances, would clearly indicate that it is an outright
sale.
13. It is settled that the real character of the transaction has to be ascertained
from the provisions of the documents viewed in the light of surrounding
circumstances. Since two documents were executed on the same day, the
6
transaction cannot be a mortgage by way of conditional sale in view of the
express provisions contained in Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. A perusal of the recitals contained in the sale deed at Exhibit P-8 shows
that the property was agreed to be sold absolutely for a total consideration of
Rs.35,000/-. The plaintiff has also stated that since possession has already been
delivered earlier under a deed of mortgage, delivery of possession under this
document does not arise. It was further stated that henceforth neither himself
nor his heirs have any right, title or interest in the property and that the plaintiff
is entitled to water, air, right of easement, etc. concerning the property together
with all rights, title and interest and right of disposal of the property. The
defendant, his son and grandson, etc. unto posterity are entitled to enjoy the
property without any obstruction or trouble either by the plaintiff or from
anyone claiming under him. He has delivered the possession certificate issued
by the CITB and Khata certificate for transfer of Khata from Bangalore City
Corporation. Thus, the language employed in this document is plain and
unambiguous and the intention of the parties is also very clear from its recitals.
Even the evidence led by the parties does not indicate to the contrary. Thus, a
careful perusal of all the clauses of the sale deed and the evidence on record
would clearly show that the intention of the parties was to make the transaction
a sale. We are also of the view that since the execution of the reconveyance
deed has already been established, question of holding the sale deed to be
nominal cannot be accepted.
7
14. The next question for consideration is in relation to compliance of
Section 16(c) of the Act by the plaintiff. Though a question was raised before
the trial court that there are no pleadings as regards the plaintiff’s readiness and
willingness to perform the contract, the trial court has rightly held that there is
sufficient compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act to the extent of pleadings.
Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the plaintiff was ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract.
15. The words ‘ready and willing’ imply that the plaintiff was prepared to
carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend
upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of
the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the
plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether
the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must
take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the
filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which
he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available.
Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he
must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The
court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was
ready and was always ready to perform his contract.
8
16. In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and
Others1
, it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the
plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance.
This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by
the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to
either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into
consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of
the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration
which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available.
17. In Pushparani S. Sundaram and Others v. Pauline Manomani James
(deceased) and Others2
, this Court has held that inference of readiness and
willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of
circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus:
“So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing
to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading,
we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not
sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing
in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This
requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now
examining the first of the two circumstances, how could
mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a
circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff.
This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have
this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed
raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes
it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.”
1 1995 (5) SCC 115
2 2002 (9) SCC 582
9

18. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Manjunath Anandappa
URF Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa and Others3
and Pukhraj D. Jain and
Others v. G. Gopalakrishna4
.
19. The judgment of this Court in Umabai and Anr. v. Nilkanth Dhondiba
Chavan (Dead) by LRs. and Anr.,
5
 is almost similar to the case at hand where
the plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to reconvey property. The plea of the plaintiff was that the transaction was one of
mortgage and the sale stood redeemed and the plaintiff was discharged from the
debt and he was ready to pay the defendant the amount for the property only in
the alternative that the plea of mortgage was not accepted by the Court, would
show that his readiness was conditional. The plaintiff did not have any income
and could not raise the amount required for re-purchase of the property. In the
totality of the circumstances, it was held that the plaintiff was not ready and
willing to perform the contract. The conditions laid for the specific performance
of the contract are in para 30, which is as under:
“30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties,
with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiffrespondents were all along and still are ready and willing to
perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required
under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be
determined having regard to the entire attending
circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement
made in the examination-in-chief would not suffice. The
conduct of the plaintiff-respondents must be judged having
3 2003 (10) SCC 390
4 2004 (7) SCC 251
5
(2005) 6 SCC 243
10
regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidences
brought on records”.
20. In the instant case, the plaintiff has alleged that he was ready to pay
Rs.35,000/- to the defendants and called upon them to execute the reconveyance deed. However, in para 11 of the plaint it is pleaded that the
plaintiff was running contract business wherein he suffered heavy loss and as
such he gave up the business. It is also pleaded that at present the plaintiff has
no business or profession and has no source of income. He has no property,
either movable or immovable. Mere plea that he is ready to pay the
consideration, without any material to substantiate this plea, cannot be accepted.
It is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce ready money, but it is mandatory
on his part to prove that he has the means to generate the consideration amount.
Except the statement of PW-1, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the
plaintiff has the means to make arrangements for payment of consideration
under the reconveyance agreement.
21. It is relevant to state here that before filing the suit, the plaintiff had filed
an application before the competent authority under the Karnataka Debt Relief
Act seeking extinguishment of the debt and delivery of the property back to him.
No doubt, the application was dismissed by the authority. But the fact remains
that the intention of the plaintiff was not to pay the amount as per the reconveyance agreement.
22. The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on
the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that
11
there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not
ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the
plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an
award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the
defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff
under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.
23. Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that
the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The
High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned
judgment of the trial court.
24. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The
judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set
aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of
1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.
25. There will be no order as to costs.

 …………………………J.
 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
 .…………………………J.
 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
New Delhi;
February 07, 2020.                                12             13