Sec. 216 appears in Chapter XVII of the CrPC. Under the provisions of Section 216, the court is authorised to alter or add to the charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. Whenever such an alteration or addition is made, it is to be read out and explained to the accused. The phrase “add to any charge” in Sub-Section (1) includes addition of a new charge. The provision enables the alteration or addition of a charge based on materials brought on record during the course of trial. Section 216 provides that the addition or alteration has to be done “at any time before judgment is pronounced”. SubSection (3) provides that if the alteration or addition to a charge does not cause prejudice to the accused in his defence, or the persecutor in the conduct of the case, the court may proceed with the trial as if the additional or alternative charge is the original charge. Sub-Section (4) contemplates a situation where the addition or alteration of charge will prejudice the accused and empowers the court to either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary to mitigate the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused. Section 217 of the CrPC deals with recalling of witnesses when the charge is altered or added by the court after commencement of the trial. Apex court held that The test adopted by the High Court is correct and in accordance with decisions of this Court. In the counter affidavit filed by the fourth respondent before this Court, depositions of PW 1 (LW 1), PW 5 (LW 12) and PW 6 (LW 13) and their cross-examination have been annexed. The material on record supports the possibility that in April 2006, the appellant demanded Rs 5,00,000/- from PW 1, who is the complainant, in order to secure a doctor’s job for the complainant’s daughter in the United Kingdom. According to PW 1, he borrowed the amount from PW 5 (brother-in-law of PW 1) and paid it to the appellant in the presence of PW 5 and PW 6 (friend of PW 1). Without pronouncing on the probative value of such evidence, there exists sufficient material on record that shows a connection or link with the ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, and the charges sought to be added. The veracity of the depositions made by the witnesses is a question of trial and need not be determined at the time of framing of charge. Appreciation of evidence on merit is to be done by the court only after the charges have been framed and the trial has commenced. However, for the purpose of framing of charge the court needs to prima facie determine that there exists sufficient material for the commencement of trial. The High Court has relied upon the materials on record and concluded that the ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are attracted. The High Court has spelt out the reasons that have necessitated the addition of the charge and hence, the impugned order does not warrant any interference.

Section 216 appears in Chapter XVII of the CrPC. Under the provisions of Section 216, the court is authorised to alter or add to the charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. Whenever such an alteration or addition is made, it is to be read out and explained to the accused. 
The phrase “add to any charge” in Sub-Section (1) includes addition of a new charge. The provision enables the alteration or addition of a charge based on materials brought on record during the course of trial. Section 216 provides that the addition or alteration has to be done “at any time before judgment is pronounced”. SubSection (3) provides that if the alteration or addition to a charge does not cause prejudice to the accused in his defence, or the persecutor in the conduct of the case, the court may proceed with the trial as if the additional or alternative charge is the original charge. Sub-Section (4) contemplates a situation where the addition or alteration of charge will prejudice the accused and empowers the court to either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary to mitigate the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused. Section 217 of the CrPC deals with recalling of witnesses when the charge is altered or added by the court after commencement of the trial.

Apex court held that
The test adopted by the High Court is correct and in accordance with
decisions of this Court. In the counter affidavit filed by the fourth respondent before this Court, depositions of PW 1 (LW 1), PW 5 (LW 12) and PW 6 (LW 13) and their cross-examination have been annexed. The material on record supports the possibility that in April 2006, the appellant demanded Rs 5,00,000/- from PW 1, who is the complainant, in order to secure a doctor’s job for the complainant’s daughter in the United Kingdom. According to PW 1, he borrowed the amount from PW 5 (brother-in-law of PW 1) and paid it to the appellant in the presence of PW 5 and PW 6 (friend of PW 1). Without pronouncing on the probative value of such evidence, there exists sufficient material on record that shows a connection or link with the ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, and the charges sought to be added. The veracity of the depositions made by the witnesses is a question of trial and need not be determined at the time of framing of charge. Appreciation of evidence on merit is to be done by the court only after the charges have been framed and the trial has commenced. However, for the purpose of framing of
charge the court needs to prima facie determine that there exists sufficient
material for the commencement of trial. The High Court has relied upon the
materials on record and concluded that the ingredients of the offences under
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are attracted. The High Court has spelt out the reasons that have necessitated the addition of the charge and hence, the impugned order does not warrant any interference.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 Criminal Appeal No. 1934 of 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3884 of 2019)
Dr Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy …Appellant
Versus
The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 This appeal arises from the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh dated 6 March 2019. A revision petition1
 filed by the fourth respondent against an order of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli was
allowed and directions were issued for the framing of charges against the
appellant under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code 18602
.
2 On 10 March 2011, a First Information Report3
 was lodged by the fourth
respondent, who is the father-in-law of the appellant, alleging that the appellant
and the members of his family had harassed his daughter with demands for
1 Criminal Revision Case no 2712 of 2017
2 “IPC”
3 “FIR”
1
money and transfer of land in their names. The FIR recites that the appellant and
the daughter of the fourth respondent got married in 2003. Allegedly, in 2006 the
appellant and his family refused to take the complainant’s daughter to the United
Kingdom where her husband was staying unless her Stridhana property was
transferred in their names.
3 On 30 June 2012, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and his
parents for offences under Section 498A of the IPC along with Sections 3 and 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act 19614
. The investigating officer, upon receipt of
additional information about the commission of other offences by the appellant,
obtained permission from the Trial Court for further investigation. Based on the
statements of various witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 19735
 with respect to the appellant raising a demand of Rs 5,00,000/-
for securing a job for the complainant’s daughter as a doctor in the United
Kingdom, an additional charge-sheet was filed on 12 April 2013 in respect of the
alleged commission of offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. The Trial
Court framed charges against the appellant only for offences mentioned in the
original charge-sheet dated 30 June 2012 under Section 498A of the IPC along
with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The trial commenced and
after the recording of evidence and conclusion of arguments, the case was
reserved for judgment on 13 February 2017.
4 On 13 February 2017, an application was filed by the Public Prosecutor
under Section 216 of CrPC for alteration of charge stating that even though an
4 “Dowry Prohibition Act”
5 “CrPC”
2
additional charge-sheet had been filed by the investigating officer on 12 April
2013 implicating the appellant for crimes under Sections 406 and 420, charges
were not framed by the trial judge under those provisions. On 21 February 2017,
the Trial Court allowed the application and charges under Sections 406 and 420
were framed against the appellant. The Trial Court observed that the court only
had the opportunity of going through the original charge-sheet dated 30 June
2012 and not the additional charge-sheet dated 12 April 2013 that was kept in a
separate bundle. Aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, the appellant instituted
revisional proceedings before the High Court.
5 On 1 June 2017, a Single Judge of the High Court allowed the revision
petition6
 and set aside the order of the Trial Court framing additional charges on
the ground of procedural irregularity but left it open to the Trial Court to frame, if
at all necessary, any additional charges after providing both the sides with an
opportunity of hearing and recalling witnesses.
6 The Trial Court after hearing arguments on behalf of both the sides and
perusing the material available on record concluded that the ingredients for
offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC were not made out and by an order
dated 11 October 2017 rejected the application for framing additional charges.
The fourth respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court against the
above order of the Trial Court.
7 On 6 March 2019, a Single Judge of the High Court allowed the revision
petition7
 and set aside the Trial Court’s order. The High Court held that the Trial
6 Criminal Revision Case no 661 of 2017
7 Criminal Revision Case no 2712 of 2017
3
Court while rejecting the application under Section 216 did not disclose the
reasons for concluding that the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 were not
attracted and only touched upon the lapses of the prosecution in not seeking an
alteration of charges during the course of the trial. The High Court while directing
the framing of additional charges under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC evaluated
the witness statements brought on record during the course of investigation and
referred to the additional charge-sheet filed on 12 April 2013.
8 Aggrieved by the order dated 6 March 2019 of the High Court, the
appellant moved this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
9 Ms Anitha Shenoy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant has urged the following submissions:
(a) An application for alteration of charge under Section 216 was
intentionally filed on the date of the pronouncement of judgment to
unnecessarily delay the proceedings;
(b) The FIR dated 10 March 2011, filed by the fourth respondent, has no
mention of any demand or payment of Rs 5,00,000/- to the appellant for
securing a job for the complainant’s daughter. The FIR only refers to
facts with respect to alleged offences under Section 498A of the IPC
and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act;
(c) Both the fourth respondent and his daughter being doctors are aware
that a doctor’s job cannot be secured in the United Kingdom without
clearing an entrance test. Accordingly, the question of paying Rs
5,00,000/- to the appellant for securing a job does not arise;
4
(d) PW 6, who is a friend of the fourth respondent is an interested witness
as they have been friends for the past twenty-five years;
(e) PW 5, who is the brother-in-law of the fourth respondent, is an
interested witness and during the cross-examination he was unable to
mention the date, month and year on which the alleged amount was
paid to the fourth respondent for payment to the appellant. There exists
no documentary material to indicate that the fourth respondent
borrowed money from PW 5; and
(f) The ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 have not been fulfilled. At the
stage of framing of charge, the court is not expected to go deep into the
probative value of the material on record. The court only needs to
consider whether there is ground for presuming that the offence has
been committed (Onkar Nath Mishra v The State8
). There exists a fine
distinction between cheating and a mere breach of contract. It depends
upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may
be judged by his subsequent conduct. To hold a person guilty of
cheating, it is necessary to show existence of fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise. (Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v State of Bihar9
).
10 On the other hand, Mr A T M Ranga Ramanujam, learned Senior Counsel,
appearing on behalf of the fourth respondent submitted thus:
(a) The fourth respondent did not intend to delay the pronouncement of the
decision. The additional charge sheet and the cognizance order had
been in place before the Trial Court since 2013. The additional charge8 (2008) 2 SCC 561
9 (2000) 4 SCC 168
5
sheet missed the attention of the Magistrate because it was kept in a
separate docket;
(b) The charge can be altered by the court at any time before the
pronouncement of the judgment based on the materials available or
subsequently brought on record during the course of the trial (Anant
Prakash Sinha v State of Haryana10). In the present case, the
investigating officer filed the additional charge-sheet only after he
received additional information during the course of investigation in
relation to offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. Though,
the appellant was initially charged in pursuance of the original chargesheet dated 30 June 2012, subsequent evidence brought on record
does not restrict the court from altering the charge; and
(c) At the time of framing of charge, it is sufficient if the court is able to form
a presumption regarding the existence of ingredients constituting the
offence found upon the material placed before it. It is not necessary for
the court to undertake an analysis of the credibility, veracity or
evidentiary value of the materials placed before it (Sajjan Kumar v
Central Bureau of Investigation11).
11 The rival submissions fall for our consideration.
12 In the present case, the investigating officer upon receipt of additional
information about the alleged commission of offences under Sections 406 and
420 by the appellant, obtained permission for further investigation. Statements of
witnesses recorded under Section 161 of CrPC indicated that the appellant had
raised a demand of Rs 5,00,000/- for securing a doctor’s job for the complainant’s
10 (2016) 6 SCC 105
11 (2010) 9 SCC 368
6
daughter in the United Kingdom. After investigation, an additional charge-sheet
was filed on 12 April 2013 against the appellant for offences under Sections 406
and 420 of the IPC. This is evident from the counter affidavit filed by the fourth
respondent before this Court which contains the docket order of the Additional
Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli. In an order dated 16 August 2013 it was stated:
 “... Additional charge sheet filed by investigating officer
through learned APP. This case was taken on file u/s 498 -A
of IPC and Sec. 4 of D.P. Act against A.1 to A.3 on
28.09.2012. Perused the Addl. Charge Sheet and other
available material on record. Heard learned APP. It is a fit
case to take on file Section 406 and 420 of IPC also
against A.1. Call on 16.09.2013.” (Emphasis supplied)
The order dated 13 February 2017 stated thus:
“... In the case on hand, initially charge sheet was filed for the
offence u/s 498-A IPC, Sec. 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
and the cognizance was taken for those offences by my
predecessor. Later an additional charge sheet was filed by
the investigation officer in this case and my predecessor
was please to take cognizance of offences punishable u/s
406, 420 IPC also on 16.08.2013. But the fact of filing of
additional charge sheet was not brought to the notice of
this Court and the additional charge sheet was kept as a
separate bundle in the record. So, charges were framed
against the accused only for the offence punishable u/s
498-A IPC and Sec. 3, 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and
Sect. 406 and 420 of IPC were ignored. This fact came out
to the notice of this Court while this Court has gone through
the entire record after hearing arguments for disposal of the
case. On 13.02.2017 the learned Asst. Public Prosecutor has
also filed a petition u/s 216 of CrPC, with a prayer to add
Section 406, 420 of IPC and to frame charges for those
offences also...” (Emphasis supplied)
13 It is evident from the record that the earlier Additional Junior Civil Judge
perused the additional charge-sheet and took cognizance of offences under
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. However, at the time of framing charges, the
7
additional charge-sheet was not brought to the notice of the court and the framing
of charges against the appellant under Sections 406 and 420 was not
considered. Therefore, the appellant was charged only for offences under Section
498A of the IPC along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It was
when an application under Section 216 of CrPC was filed by the public
prosecutor on 13 February 2017 that it was brought to the notice of the Trial
Judge that charges under Sections 406 and 420 were not framed.
14 In order to adjudicate upon the dispute, it is necessary to refer to Section
216 of CrPC:
“216. Court may alter charge.—(1) Any court may alter or add
to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced.
(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and
explained to the accused.
(3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that
proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the
opinion of the court, to prejudice the accused in his defence
or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the court may, in
its discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made,
proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had
been the original charge.
(4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding
immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the court,
to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the
court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such
period as may be necessary.
(5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one
for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary,
the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is
obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a
prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered
or added charge is founded.”
15 Section 216 appears in Chapter XVII of the CrPC. Under the provisions of
Section 216, the court is authorised to alter or add to the charge at any time
8
before the judgment is pronounced. Whenever such an alteration or addition is
made, it is to be read out and explained to the accused. The phrase “add to any
charge” in Sub-Section (1) includes addition of a new charge. The provision
enables the alteration or addition of a charge based on materials brought on
record during the course of trial. Section 216 provides that the addition or
alteration has to be done “at any time before judgment is pronounced”. SubSection (3) provides that if the alteration or addition to a charge does not cause
prejudice to the accused in his defence, or the persecutor in the conduct of the
case, the court may proceed with the trial as if the additional or alternative charge
is the original charge. Sub-Section (4) contemplates a situation where the
addition or alteration of charge will prejudice the accused and empowers the
court to either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be
necessary to mitigate the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused. Section
217 of the CrPC deals with recalling of witnesses when the charge is altered or
added by the court after commencement of the trial.
16 The decision of a two-judge Bench of this Court in P Kartikalakshmi v Sri
Ganesh12, dealt with a case where during the course of a trial for an offence
under Section 376 of the IPC, an application under Section 216 was filed to frame
an additional charge for an offence under Section 417 of the IPC. Justice F M
Ibrahim Kalifulla, while dealing with the power of the court to alter or add any
charge, held:
“6. ... Section 216 CrPC empowers the Court to alter or add
any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It
is now well settled that the power vested in the Court is
12 (2017) 3 SCC 347
9
exclusive to the Court and there is no right in any party to
seek for such addition or alteration by filing any application as
a matter of right. It may be that if there was an omission in
the framing of the charge and if it comes to the
knowledge of the Court trying the offence, the power is
always vested in the Court, as provided under Section
216 CrPC to either alter or add the charge and that such
power is available with the Court at any time before the
judgment is pronounced. It is an enabling provision for
the Court to exercise its power under certain
contingencies which comes to its notice or brought to its
notice. In such a situation, if it comes to the knowledge of
the Court that a necessity has arisen for the charge to be
altered or added, it may do so on its own and no order
need to be passed for that purpose. After such alteration or
addition when the final decision is rendered, it will be open for
the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law.”
 (Emphasis supplied)
17 In Anant Prakash Sinha v State of Haryana13, a two judge Bench of this
Court dealt with a situation where for commission of offences under Sections
498A and 323 of the IPC, an application was filed for framing an additional
charge under Section 406 of the IPC against the husband and the mother-in law.
After referring to various decisions of this Court that dealt with the power of the
court to alter a charge, Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then
was), held:
“18. ... the court can change or alter the charge if there is defect
or something is left out. The test is, it must be founded on the
material available on record. It can be on the basis of the
complaint or the FIR or accompanying documents or the
material brought on record during the course of trial. It can
also be done at any time before pronouncement of
judgment. It is not necessary to advert to each and every
circumstance. Suffice it to say, if the court has not framed a
charge despite the material on record, it has the jurisdiction
to add a charge. Similarly, it has the authority to alter the
charge. The principle that has to be kept in mind is that the
charge so framed by the Magistrate is in accord with the
materials produced before him or if subsequent evidence
13 (2016) 6 SCC 105
10
comes on record. It is not to be understood that unless
evidence has been let in, charges already framed cannot be
altered, for that is not the purport of Section 216 CrPC.
19. In addition to what we have stated hereinabove, another
aspect also has to be kept in mind. It is obligatory on the part of
the court to see that no prejudice is caused to the accused and
he is allowed to have a fair trial. There are in-built safeguards in
Section 216 CrPC. It is the duty of the trial court to bear in mind
that no prejudice is caused to the accused as that has the
potentiality to affect a fair trial...” (Emphasis supplied)
18 In CBI v Karimullah Osan Khan14
, this Court dealt with a case where an
application was filed under Section 216 of CrPC during the course of trial for
addition of charges against the appellant under various provisions of the IPC, the
Explosives Act 1884 and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
1987. Justice K S P Radhakrishnan, speaking for the Court, held thus:
“17. Section 216 CrPC gives considerable power to the
trial court, that is, even after the completion of evidence,
arguments heard and the judgment reserved, it can alter
and add to any charge, subject to the conditions
mentioned therein. The expressions “at any time” and
before the “judgment is pronounced” would indicate that
the power is very wide and can be exercised, in
appropriate cases, in the interest of justice, but at the same
time, the courts should also see that its orders would not
cause any prejudice to the accused.
18. Section 216 CrPC confers jurisdiction on all courts,
including the Designated Courts, to alter or add to any charge
framed earlier, at any time before the judgment is pronounced
and sub-sections (2) to (5) prescribe the procedure which has
to be followed after that addition or alteration. Needless to
say, the courts can exercise the power of addition or
modification of charges under Section 216 CrPC, only
when there exists some material before the court, which
has some connection or link with the charges sought to
be amended, added or modified. In other words,
alteration or addition of a charge must be for an offence
made out by the evidence recorded during the course of
trial before the court.”
14 (2014) 11 SCC 538
11
 (Emphasis supplied)
19 In Jasvinder Saini v State (Govt of NCT of Delhi)15, this Court dealt with
the question whether the Trial Court was justified in adding a charge under
Section 302 of the IPC against the accused persons who were charged under
Section 304B of the IPC. Justice T S Thakur (as he then was) speaking for the
Court, held thus:
“11. A plain reading of the above would show that the
court's power to alter or add any charge is unrestrained
provided such addition and/or alteration is made before
the judgment is pronounced. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of
Section 216 deal with the procedure to be followed once the
court decides to alter or add any charge. Section 217 of the
Code deals with the recall of witnesses when the charge is
altered or added by the court after commencement of the trial.
There can, in the light of the above, be no doubt about the
competence of the court to add or alter a charge at any time
before the judgment. The circumstances in which such
addition or alteration may be made are not, however,
stipulated in Section 216. It is all the same trite that the
question of any such addition or alternation would
generally arise either because the court finds the charge
already framed to be defective for any reason or because
such addition is considered necessary after the
commencement of the trial having regard to the evidence
that may come before the court.”
 (Emphasis supplied)
20 From the above line of precedents, it is clear that Section 216 provides the
court an exclusive and wide-ranging power to change or alter any charge. The
use of the words “at any time before judgment is pronounced” in Sub-Section (1)
empowers the court to exercise its powers of altering or adding charges even
after the completion of evidence, arguments and reserving of the judgment. The
alteration or addition of a charge may be done if in the opinion of the court there
15 (2013) 7 SCC 256
12
was an omission in the framing of charge or if upon prima facie examination of
the material brought on record, it leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as
to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The
test to be adopted by the court while deciding upon an addition or alteration of a
charge is that the material brought on record needs to have a direct link or nexus
with the ingredients of the alleged offence. Addition of a charge merely
commences the trial for the additional charges, whereupon, based on the
evidence, it is to be determined whether the accused may be convicted for the
additional charges. The court must exercise its powers under Section 216
judiciously and ensure that no prejudice is caused to the accused and that he is
allowed to have a fair trial. The only constraint on the court’s power is the
prejudice likely to be caused to the accused by the addition or alteration of
charges. Sub-Section (4) accordingly prescribes the approach to be adopted by
the courts where prejudice may be caused.
21 The appellant has relied upon a two-judge Bench decision of this Court in
Onkar Nath Mishra v The State16 to substantiate the point that the ingredients of
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC have not been established. This Court while
dealing with the nature of evaluation by a court at the stage of framing of charge,
held thus:
“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the
court is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep
into the probative value of the material on record. What
needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed and not
16 (2008) 2 SCC 561
13
a ground for convicting the accused has been made out.
At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material
which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the
existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence
alleged would justify the framing of charge against the
accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”
 (Emphasis supplied)

22 In the present case, the High Court while directing the framing the
additional charges has evaluated the material and evidence brought on record
after investigation and held:
“LW1 is the father of the de facto complainant, who states that
his son in law i.e., the first accused promised that he would
look after his daughter at United Kingdom (UK) and promised
to provide Doctor job at UK and claimed Rs.5 lakhs for the
said purpose and received the same and he took his daughter
to the UK. He states that his son-in-law made him believe and
received Rs.5 lakhs in the presence of elders. He states that
he could not mention about the cheating done by his son-inlaw, when he was examined earlier. LW13, who is an
independent witness, also supports the version of LW1 and
states that Rs.5 lakhs were received by A1 with a promise
that he would secure doctor job to the complainant’s
daughter. He states that A1 cheated LW1, stating that he
would provide job and received Rs.5 lakhs. LW14, also is an
independent witness and he supported the version of LW13.
He further states that A1 left his wife and child in India and
went away after receiving Rs.5 lakhs.
Hence, from the above facts, stated by LWs. 13 and 14, prima
facie, the version of LW1 that he gave Rs.5 lakhs to A1 on a
promise that he would provide a job to his daughter and that
A1 did not provide any job and cheated him, receives support
from LWs. 13 and 14. When the amount is entrusted to A1,
with a promise to provide a job and when he fails to
provide the job and does not return the amount, it can be
made out that A1 did not have any intention to provide
job to his wife and that he utilised the amount for a
purpose other than the purpose for which he collected
the amount from LW1, which would suffice to attract the
offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC. Whether there
is truth in the improved version of LW.1 and what have
been the reasons for his lapse in not stating the same in
his earlier statement, can be adjudicated at the time of
trial.
14
It is also evidence from the record that the additional charge
sheet filed by the investigating officer, missed the attention of
the lower court due to which the additional charges could not
be framed.”
 (Emphasis supplied)
23 The test adopted by the High Court is correct and in accordance with
decisions of this Court. In the counter affidavit filed by the fourth respondent
before this Court, depositions of PW 1 (LW 1), PW 5 (LW 12) and PW 6 (LW 13)
and their cross-examination have been annexed. The material on record
supports the possibility that in April 2006, the appellant demanded Rs 5,00,000/-
from PW 1, who is the complainant, in order to secure a doctor’s job for the
complainant’s daughter in the United Kingdom. According to PW 1, he borrowed
the amount from PW 5 (brother-in-law of PW 1) and paid it to the appellant in the
presence of PW 5 and PW 6 (friend of PW 1). Without pronouncing on the
probative value of such evidence, there exists sufficient material on record that
shows a connection or link with the ingredients of the offences under Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC, and the charges sought to be added.
24 The veracity of the depositions made by the witnesses is a question of trial
and need not be determined at the time of framing of charge. Appreciation of
evidence on merit is to be done by the court only after the charges have been
framed and the trial has commenced. However, for the purpose of framing of
charge the court needs to prima facie determine that there exists sufficient
material for the commencement of trial. The High Court has relied upon the
materials on record and concluded that the ingredients of the offences under
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are attracted. The High Court has spelt out the
15
reasons that have necessitated the addition of the charge and hence, the
impugned order does not warrant any interference.
25 We accordingly dismiss the appeal. The trial proceedings pending before
the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli shall continue.
26 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…..............................................................J.
 [Dr DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD]
…..............................................................J.
 [HRISHIKESH ROY]
New Delhi;
January 21, 2020.
16

Sec.482 Cr.P.C.= When the very same issue is seized up before the civil court, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue criminal proceedings against the appellant for alleged offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and is liable to quashed. At the outset it is to be noted that the appellant has purchased the plot in question by sale deed dated 29th December,1993 which was registered on 5th January, 1994. The father of the 2nd respondent died on 3rd December, 1997. Though the registered sale deed is of 1994, the 2nd respondent filed suit which is pending in O.S. No.160 of 2008, only in the year 2008 seeking cancellation of sale deed alleging that the aforesaid sale deed was got executed by the appellant and his brother, by making use of the acquaintance with his father, in a false and fraudulent manner. There is no allegation of impersonation or forgery of signatures in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. It is the case of the appellant that even the 2nd respondent is a signatory to the sale deed as a witness. Though the suit was filed in the year 2008, the 2nd respondent has chosen to file the criminal complaint only in the year 2012 alleging forgery and impersonation. With regard to the validity of the sale deed, matter is seized up before the competent civil court and it is for the civil court to decide whether any fraud is played or not by the appellant, on the late father of the 2nd respondent for obtaining the sale deed. When the very same issue is seized up before the civil court, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue criminal proceedings against the appellant for alleged offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. Although, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that complaint filed is not barred by limitation but at the same time it appears, there is no reason for lodging private complaint in the year 2012. The sale deed on which basis the title and possession is claimed by the appellant was registered on 5th January, 1994, suit itself is filed nearly after 14 years. Even after filing of the suit on 24th August, 2008 there is further about 4 years’ delay in filing the criminal complaint against the appellant herein. Allowing the proceedings to go on against the appellant who is stated to be about 87 years, in the above set of facts, is nothing but abuse of the process. It is to be noted that there is no allegation of impersonation and forgery of the signatures in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. In any event, when the suit filed by the 2nd respondent for cancellation of sale deed, is pending consideration before the competent court of law, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings by improving his case. Having regard to serious factual disputes which are of civil nature, for which civil suits are pending, allowing the 2 nd respondent to pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of the process of law.

Sec.482 Cr.P.C.= 
When the very same issue is seized up before the civil court, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue criminal proceedings against the appellant for alleged offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and is liable to quashed.

At the outset it is to be noted that the appellant has purchased the plot in question by sale deed dated 29th December,1993 which was registered on 5th January, 1994. The father of the 2nd respondent died on 3rd December, 1997. Though the registered sale deed is of 1994, the 2nd respondent filed suit which is pending in O.S. No.160 of 2008, only in the year 2008 seeking cancellation of sale deed alleging that the aforesaid sale deed was got executed by the appellant and his brother, by making use of the acquaintance with his father, in a false and fraudulent manner. There is no allegation of impersonation or forgery of signatures in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. It is the case of the appellant that even the 2nd respondent is a signatory to the sale deed as a witness. Though the suit was filed in the year 2008, the 2nd respondent has chosen to file the criminal complaint only in the year 2012 alleging forgery and impersonation. With regard to the validity of the sale deed, matter is seized up before the competent civil court and it is for the civil court to decide whether any fraud is
played or not by the appellant, on the late father of the 2nd respondent for obtaining the sale deed. When the very same issue is seized up before the civil court, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue criminal proceedings against the appellant for alleged offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. Although, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that complaint filed is not barred by limitation but at the same time it appears, there is no reason for lodging private complaint in the year 2012.
The sale deed on which basis the title and possession is claimed by the appellant was registered on 5th January, 1994, suit itself is filed nearly after 14 years. Even after filing of the suit on 24th August, 2008 there is further about 4 years’ delay in filing the criminal complaint against the appellant herein.
Allowing the proceedings to go on against the appellant who is stated to be about 87 years, in the above set of facts, is nothing but abuse of the process. It is to be noted that there is no allegation of impersonation and forgery of the signatures in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. In any event, when the suit filed by the 2nd respondent for cancellation of sale deed, is pending consideration before the competent court of law, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings by improving his case. Having regard to serious factual disputes which are of civil nature, for which civil suits are pending, allowing the 2 nd respondent to pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of the process of law.

1
 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.161 OF 2020
 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.3627 of 2018)
Sardar Ali Khan …Appellant
vs
The State of Uttar Pradesh
through Principal Secretary
Home Department & Anr. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R.Subhash Reddy,J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This Criminal Appeal is filed by the accused in
Complaint Case No.708 of 2012, registered in Police
Station, Kaimganj, District Farrukhabad, Uttar Pradesh,
for alleged offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467,
468 and 471 IPC, aggrieved by an order dated 12th March,
2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.5684
of 2016. By the aforesaid impugned order, application
2
filed by the appellant herein under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
is dismissed by the High Court.
3. We have heard Sri Prashant Bhushan learned counsel
assisted by Sri Omanakuttan K.K. and Sri Cheryl
D’Souza, Advocates, for the appellant and Sri Sudarshan
Rajan, learned counsel for the 2nd
respondent/complainant.
4. The dispute relates to plot No.102 (measuring
0.101 hectare) which has been renumbered as plot
No.102/2 situated in Yahiyapur, Post Kaimganj, Pargana
Kampil, Tehsil Kaimganj, District Farrukhabad, U.P.
Originally, the aforesaid plot was owned by the father
of the 2nd respondent late Faheem Ali Khan and the
appellant claims purchase of such plot by sale deed
dated 29th December, 1993, registered on 5th January,
1994. Faheem Ali Khan died on 3rd December, 1997 and
the 2nd respondent is one of the heirs of late Faheem
Ali Khan. For the properties which were inherited upon
2
nd respondent on the death of Faheem Ali Khan, mutation
was effected on 16th November, 1998.
5. The 2nd respondent herein has filed Original Suit
No.160 of 2008 which is pending on the file of Judicial
Magistrate, Kayamganj in Farrukhabad district in case
3
No.160 of 2008. In the above said suit the 2nd
respondent has claimed the following relief:-
“(A) That the suit of the applicant should
be declare by granting the permanent
injunction against the defendant with the
directions that the defendant is
restrained from illegally and forcibly
everything the applicant from the disputed
property or any of its part and should not
interfere with the peaceful ownership and
possession of the applicant.
(AA) The decree of cancellation of the
sale deed dated 29/12/1993, which was
presented for registration on 25/01/1994
and the photocopy of which was entered on
page number 65 of the book at people 111-
252 at serial number 22 in the office of
the sub registrar Kayamganj in the letter
number 1, cover number 1156 at page number
85/93 at serial number 22 on 20/01/1994,
Chile ordered against the defendant and in
favour of the applicant and the sub
registrar office should be directed to
make the entries accordingly.
(B) That the defendant should pay the suit
expenses to the applicant.
(C) That any other relief which is deemed
appropriate may be granted to the
applicant.”
6. With regard to very same plot, the appellant
herein also filed a suit in Original Suit No. 474 of
2008 for permanent injunction restraining the 2nd
respondent from demolishing the constructions made by
the appellant on the aforesaid plot. The said suit is
also pending in Case No.474 of 2008 on the file of
4
Judicial Magistrate, Kayamganj in Farrukhabad district.
The aforesaid suits were clubbed and in interlocutory
applications filed by the parties, a common order to
maintain status quo in respect of land in dispute was
passed. Against the interim order, matters were
carried in Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 30 and 27 of 2009
filed by the appellant whereas the respondent no.2 had
filed Misc Appeal Nos. 28 and 29 of 2009. It is stated
that all the said appeals were decided by a common
order by the Additional District Judge and application
for injunction filed by the appellant was allowed and
application filed by the 2nd respondent was dismissed,
against which matters were carried further by way of
Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petitions which are stated to
be pending before the High Court and no interim order
is passed therein.
7. On 10th April, 2012, brother of the appellant,
Wasim Ali Khan filed a complaint under Section 200
Cr.P.C. against the 2nd respondent herein alleging that
he had stolen the original sale deed from the mutation
file. On 20th September, 2012, the 2nd respondent has
filed a complaint against the appellant and Wasim Ali
Khan. On such complaint, a case was registered against
the appellant and another for alleged offence under
5
Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.
Initially, the appellant filed an application for
discharge which was rejected. Subsequently, he has
filed application under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing
of the above said proceedings and the summoning order
issued by the Magistrate. On such application filed,
the impugned order is passed by High Court rejecting
the same.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we
have perused the impugned order and other material
placed on record.
9. At the outset it is to be noted that the appellant
has purchased the plot in question by sale deed dated
29th December,1993 which was registered on 5th January,
1994. The father of the 2nd respondent died on 3rd
December, 1997. Though the registered sale deed is of
1994, the 2nd respondent filed suit which is pending in
O.S. No.160 of 2008, only in the year 2008 seeking
cancellation of sale deed alleging that the aforesaid
sale deed was got executed by the appellant and his
brother, by making use of the acquaintance with his
father, in a false and fraudulent manner. There is no
allegation of impersonation or forgery of signatures in
the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. It is the case of
6
the appellant that even the 2nd respondent is a
signatory to the sale deed as a witness. Though the
suit was filed in the year 2008, the 2nd respondent
has chosen to file the criminal complaint only in the
year 2012 alleging forgery and impersonation. With
regard to the validity of the sale deed, matter is
seized up before the competent civil court and it is
for the civil court to decide whether any fraud is
played or not by the appellant, on the late father of
the 2nd respondent for obtaining the sale deed. When
the very same issue is seized up before the civil
court, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue criminal
proceedings against the appellant for alleged offence
under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.
Although, it is contended by the learned counsel for
the 2nd respondent that complaint filed is not barred by
limitation but at the same time it appears, there is no
reason for lodging private complaint in the year 2012.
The sale deed on which basis the title and possession
is claimed by the appellant was registered on 5th
January, 1994, suit itself is filed nearly after 14
years. Even after filing of the suit on 24th August,
2008 there is further about 4 years’ delay in filing
the criminal complaint against the appellant herein.
7
Allowing the proceedings to go on against the appellant
who is stated to be about 87 years, in the above set of
facts, is nothing but abuse of the process. It is to
be noted that there is no allegation of impersonation
and forgery of the signatures in the suit filed by the
2
nd respondent. In any event, when the suit filed by
the 2nd respondent for cancellation of sale deed, is
pending consideration before the competent court of
law, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue his complaint in
criminal proceedings by improving his case. Having
regard to serious factual disputes which are of civil
nature, for which civil suits are pending, allowing the
2
nd respondent to pursue his complaint in criminal
proceedings is nothing but abuse of the process of law.
For the aforesaid reasons we are of the considered view
that the criminal proceedings are fit to be quashed by
allowing this appeal.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, this criminal appeal is
allowed and the impugned order dated 12th March, 2018
passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.5684 of
2016 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is
set aside, consequently, the application filed by the
appellant under Section 482, Cr.P.C. stands allowed by
quashing the proceedings in Complaint Case No.708 of
8
2012 for offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468
and 471 IPC on the file of Police Station Kaimganj,
District Farrukhabad, Uttar Pradesh and consequential
orders passed by the Magistrate also stand quashed.
11. It is made clear that the observations and
findings recorded in this order are only for the
purpose of disposal of this appeal arising out of
application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is open
for the civil court to decide the various issues in the
pending suits on their own merits, uninfluenced by this
order.

 ...........................J.
 (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
 ...........................J.
 (R. SUBHASH REDDY)
NEW DELHI;
January 24,2020 

Legal Representatives - determinaed by courts pending the suit/EP etc., on the death of party - is only for limited purpose and not operate as resjudicate in full fledged disputes like Probate etc., proceedings. Umadevi filed a suit for partition claiming half share in the suit property against Manicka Naicker. This suit was decreed on 7th April, 1989 and such decree had attained finality. It was in 1999 that Umadevi sought execution of the decree passed but she died on 22nd July, 1999. The appellant who is the son of Umadevi’s younger sister filed an application to execute the decree as her legal representative on the basis of a Will dated 16th July, 1999 (Ex.P/1). The said application was allowed by the Executing Court on 29th March, 2004. The appellant filed an application under Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code for eviction of the respondent and to deliver vacant possession of the premises. In response to such petition, the respondent asserted that the Will is forged and that the son of a sister is not a legal heir as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The learned Executing Court decided the application on 19th September, 2005. It found that the Will was attested by PW-2 Ayeeyappa who had signed it as one of the attesting witnesses and PW-3 Mohan had scribed the Will. The respondent examined Senthilnathan as RW-1 and Krishnan as RW-2. The learned Executing Court held that the appellant as legal representative of the deceased Umadevi is entitled to execute the decree. The Executing Court held as under: “11. …Further in OS No. 30 of 1982 a judgment and decree was granted in favour of Umadevi on 7.4.1989. Either the deceased Munusamy or his son the said Senthilnathan had not filed any appeal as against the decree. But the said Umadevi had filed an Execution petition duly signed by her. Further, the said Umadevi, before her death, i.e. 6 days earlier to her death, she had executed the Ex.P-1 Will. This court finds that her actions in filing the execution petition and the Will are accepted to be correct, even by the respondents. Further this court finds that since the said Munusamy, who is the son of the first wife of her husband, did not give her food, cloth and shelter and did not take care on her, the deceased Umadevi had gone to the house of her younger sister and stayed along with her and since her health condition got deteriorated, she had executed a Will in favour of the son of her younger sister namely Varadarajan and these facts are found to be true. Apex court held that who is the legal representative under Order XXII Rule 5 of the Code is for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the deceased and for adjudication of that case. Only when the question of legal representative is determined by the court and such legal representative is brought on record, can it be said that the estate of the deceased is represented. The determination as to who is the legal representative under Order 22 Rule 5 will of course be for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the deceased, for adjudication of that case. Such determination for such limited purpose will not confer on the person held to be the legal representative, any right to the property which is the subject-matter of the suit, vis-à-vis other rival claimants to the estate of the deceased.” It is now well settled that determination of the question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff or defendant under Order 22 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only for the purpose of bringing legal representatives on record for the conducting of those legal proceedings only and does not operate as res judicata and the inter se dispute between the rival legal representatives has to be independently tried and decided in probate proceedings.

Legal Representatives - determinaed by courts  pending the suit/EP etc., on the death of party - is only for limited purpose and not operate as resjudicate in full fledged disputes like Probate etc., proceedings.

Umadevi filed a suit for partition claiming half share in the suit property against Manicka
Naicker. This suit was decreed on 7th April, 1989 and such decree had attained finality. It was in 1999 that Umadevi sought execution of the decree passed but she died on 22nd July, 1999. The
appellant who is the son of Umadevi’s younger sister filed an application to execute the decree as her legal representative on the basis of a Will dated 16th July, 1999 (Ex.P/1). The said application was allowed by the Executing Court on 29th March, 2004.

The appellant filed an application under Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code for eviction of the respondent and to deliver vacant possession of the premises. In response to such petition, the
respondent asserted that the Will is forged and that the son of a sister is not a legal heir as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
The learned Executing Court decided the application on 19th September, 2005. It found that the Will was attested by PW-2 Ayeeyappa who had signed it as one of the attesting witnesses and
PW-3 Mohan had scribed the Will. The respondent examined Senthilnathan as RW-1 and Krishnan as RW-2. The learned Executing Court held that the appellant as legal representative of the deceased Umadevi is entitled to execute the decree. 
The Executing Court held as under:
“11. …Further in OS No. 30 of 1982 a judgment and decree was granted in favour of Umadevi on 7.4.1989. Either the deceased Munusamy or his son the said Senthilnathan had not filed any appeal as against the decree. But the said Umadevi had filed an Execution petition duly signed by her. Further, the said Umadevi, before her death, i.e. 6 days earlier to her death, she had executed the Ex.P-1 Will. This court finds that her actions in filing the execution petition and the Will are accepted to be correct, even by the respondents. Further this court finds that since the said Munusamy, who is the son of the first wife of her husband, did not give her food, cloth and shelter and did not take care on
her, the deceased Umadevi had gone to the house of her younger sister and stayed along with her and since her health condition got deteriorated, she had executed a Will in favour of the son of her younger sister namely Varadarajan and these facts are found to be true.

Apex court held that 

who is the legal representative under Order XXII Rule 5 of the Code is for the limited purpose of
representation of the estate of the deceased and for adjudication of that case. 
Only when the question of legal representative is determined by the court and such legal
representative is brought on record, can it be said that the estate of the deceased is represented. The determination as to who is the legal representative under Order 22 Rule 5 will of course be for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the
deceased, for adjudication of that case. Such determination for such limited purpose will not confer on the person held to be the legal representative, any right to the property which is the subject-matter of the suit, vis-à-vis other rival claimants to the estate of the deceased.”
 It is now well settled that determination of the question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff or defendant under Order 22 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only for the purpose of bringing legal representatives on record for the conducting of those legal proceedings only and does not operate as res judicata and the inter se dispute between the rival legal representatives has to be independently tried and decided in probate proceedings.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5673 OF 2009
VARADARAJAN .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
KANAKAVALLI & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The order dated 27th November, 2007 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in revision petition under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 19081
 is the subject matter of challenge in
the present appeal.
2. The revision petition is directed against an order passed by the
Executing Court on 19th September, 2005 wherein the possession
of the suit property in pursuance of a decree passed in favour of
one Umadevi was ordered to be given to the present appellant as
the legal representative of Umadevi.
3. Umadevi filed a suit for partition and separate possession in
1 for short, ‘Code’
1
respect of the suit property as the successor-in-interest of one
Manicka Naicker, her husband. Prior to Umadevi, he had earlier
married one Valliammal and had a child one Munisamy Naicker.
Manicka Naicker died in the year 1971. Umadevi filed a suit for
partition claiming half share in the suit property against Manicka
Naicker. This suit was decreed on 7th April, 1989 and such decree
had attained finality. It was in 1999 that Umadevi sought execution
of the decree passed but she died on 22nd July, 1999. The
appellant who is the son of Umadevi’s younger sister filed an
application to execute the decree as her legal representative on
the basis of a Will dated 16th July, 1999 (Ex.P/1). The said
application was allowed by the Executing Court on 29th March,
2004.
4. The appellant filed an application under Order XXI Rule 35 of the
Code for eviction of the respondent and to deliver vacant
possession of the premises. In response to such petition, the
respondent asserted that the Will is forged and that the son of a
sister is not a legal heir as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956. The learned Executing Court decided the application on
19th September, 2005. It found that the Will was attested by PW-2
Ayeeyappa who had signed it as one of the attesting witnesses and
PW-3 Mohan had scribed the Will. The respondent examined
Senthilnathan as RW-1 and Krishnan as RW-2. The learned
Executing Court held that the appellant as legal representative of
the deceased Umadevi is entitled to execute the decree. The
2
Executing Court held as under:
“11. …Further in OS No. 30 of 1982 a judgment and
decree was granted in favour of Umadevi on 7.4.1989.
Either the deceased Munusamy or his son the said
Senthilnathan had not filed any appeal as against the
decree. But the said Umadevi had filed an Execution
petition duly signed by her. Further, the said Umadevi,
before her death, i.e. 6 days earlier to her death, she
had executed the Ex.P-1 Will. This court finds that her
actions in filing the execution petition and the Will are
accepted to be correct, even by the respondents.
Further this court finds that since the said Munusamy,
who is the son of the first wife of her husband, did not
give her food, cloth and shelter and did not take care on
her, the deceased Umadevi had gone to the house of
her younger sister and stayed along with her and since
her health condition got deteriorated, she had executed
a Will in favour of the son of her younger sister namely
Varadarajan and these facts are found to be true.”
5. The said order was challenged by the judgment debtor by way of a
revision under Section 115 of the Code. It may be noticed that no
one else other than the appellant had come forward to continue the
execution of the decree as the legal representative of Umadevi.
6. The High Court held that the Executing Court is the competent and
proper Court to determine the validity of the Will as well as the
legatee under a Will can be construed as a legal representative and
come on record to seek execution of the decree. However, the
High Court found that the execution of the Will was surrounded by
suspicious circumstances. It may be noticed that the High Court in
revisional jurisdiction has interfered with the findings of fact
recorded by the Executing Court in respect of execution of Will
arrived at after considering the evidence led by the parties. The
3
High Court found that as per the appellant, the decree holder,
Umadevi, was driven out of her house by her step son Munisamy
Naicker and was staying with her sister for nearly 20 years but the
execution of the Will at the last moment is a suspicious
circumstance. The High Court returned the following findings:
“19. In view of all the above facts which were
established by way of evidence, this Court is of the view
that the propounder on whom the allegation casts upon
to dispel the suspicious circumstances surrounded the
execution of the will. Further, the Court below has not
given satisfactory reasons while coming to the
conclusion that the will was proved. In the absence of
satisfactory evidence, I am unable to ascertain as to
whether the will was executed by the testatrix.
Therefore, when once it is held that the very execution
of the will has not been proved and it is not genuine,
consequently, the legatee under the said will cannot
become a legal representative to come on record in
order to maintain the execution petition in the place of
the decree holder, i.e. the testatrix.”
7. We find that the order of the High Court is not sustainable in law.
The appellant claims to be the legal representative of Umadevi on
the basis of the Will executed by her. He has produced an attesting
witness and the scribe of the Will. The witnesses have deposed the
execution of the Will by Umadevi in favour of the appellant who is
the son of her sister. No one else has come forward to seek
execution of decree as the legal representative of the deceased
decree holder. It is Umadevi who has filed the execution petition
but after her death, the appellant has filed an application to
continue with the execution. In the absence of any rival claimant
claiming to be the legal representative of the deceased decree
4
holder, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of
the Executing Court, when in terms of Order XXII Rule 5 of the
Code, the jurisdiction to determine who is a legal heir is summary
in nature.
8. We may state that Order XXII of the Code is applicable to the
pending proceedings in a suit. But the conflicting claims of legal
representatives can be decided in execution proceedings in view of
the principles of Rule 5 of Order XXII. This Court in a judgment
reported as V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab & Ors.
2
 held that the
normal principle arising in a suit — before the decree is passed —
that the legal representatives are to be brought on record within a
particular period is not applicable to cases of death of the decreeholder or the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings. This Court
held as under:-
“11. Order 22 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads as follows:
“Order 22 Rule 12: Application of order to
proceedings.—Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall
apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or
order.”
12. In other words, the normal principle arising in a suit
— before the decree is passed — that the legal
representatives are to be brought on record within a
particular period and if not, the suit could abate, — is
not applicable to cases of death of the decree-holder or
the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings.
13. In Venkatachalam Chetti v. Ramaswami Servai [ILR
(1932) 55 Mad 352 : AIR 1932 Mad 73 (FB)] a Full Bench
of the Madras High Court has held that this rule enacts
that the penalty of abatement shall not attach to
2 (1998) 3 SCC 148
5
execution proceedings. Mulla's Commentary on
CPC [(Vol. 3) p. 2085 (15th Edn., 1997)] refers to a large
number of judgments of the High Courts and says:
“Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which provides
that where a party to an execution proceedings
dies during its pendency, provisions as to
abatement do not apply. The Rule is, therefore,
for the benefit of the decree-holder, for his heirs
need not take steps for substitution under Rule
2 but may apply immediately or at any time
while the proceeding is pending, to carry on the
proceeding or they may file a fresh
execution application.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In our opinion, the above statement of law
in Mulla's Commentary on CPC, correctly represents the
legal position relating to the procedure to be adopted
by the parties in execution proceedings and as to the
powers of the civil court.”
9. The legal representatives are impleaded for the purpose of a suit
alone as held by this Court in Daya Ram & Ors. v. Shyam
Sundari & Ors.
3
 wherein it was held that impleaded legal
representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased
and the decision obtained with them on record will bind not merely
those impleaded but the entire estate, including those not brought
on record. This Court approved the judgment of the Madras High
Court in Kadir v. Muthukrishna Ayyar
4
.
10. The Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in a judgment
reported as Mohinder Kaur & Anr. v. Piara Singh & Ors.
5
examined the question as to whether a decision under Order XXII
Rule 5 of the Code would act as res judicata in a subsequent suit
3 AIR 1965 SC 1049
4 ILR 26 MAD. 230
5 AIR 1981 P&H 130
6
between the same parties or persons claiming through them. The
Court held as under:
“5. So far as the first argument of Mr. Bindra, noticed
above is concerned, we find that in addition to the
judgments of the Lahore High Court and of this Court,
referred to in the earlier part of this judgment, he is
supported by a string of judgments of other High Courts
as well wherein it has repeatedly been held on varied
reasons, that, a decision under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil
Procedure Code, would not operate as res judicata in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or persons
claiming through them wherein the question of
succession or heirship to the deceased party in the
earlier proceedings is directly raised. Some of these
reasons are as follows:—
(i) Such a decision is not on an issue arising in the suit
itself, but is really a matter collateral to the suit and has
to be decided before the suit itself can be proceeded
with. The decision does not lead to the determination of
any issue in the suit.
(ii) The legal representative is appointed for orderly
conduct of the suit only. Such a decision could not take
away, for all times to come, the rights of a rightful heir
of the deceased in all matters.
(iii) The decision is the result of a summary enquiry
against which no appeal has been provided for.
(iv) The concepts of legal representative and heirship of
a deceased party are entirely different. In order to
constitute one as a legal representative, it is
unnecessary that he should have a beneficial interest in
the estate. The executors and administrators are legal
representatives though they may have no beneficial
interest. Trespasser into the property of the deceased
claiming title in himself independently of the deceased
will not be a legal representative. On the other hand the
heirs on whom beneficial interest devolved under the
law whether statute or other, governing the parties will
be legal representatives.
xx xx xx
9. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in essence a
7
decision under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code, is
only directed to answers an orderly conduct of the
proceedings with a view to avoid the delay in the final
decision of the suit till the persons claiming to be the
representatives of the deceased party get the question
of succession settled through a different suit and such a
decision does not put an end to the litigation in that
regard. It also does not determine any of the issues in
controversy in the suit. Besides this it is obvious that
such a proceeding is of a very summary nature against
the result of which no appeal is provided for. The grant
of an opportunity to lead some sort of evidence in
support of the claim of being a legal representative of
the deceased party would not in any manner change
the nature of the proceedings. In the instant case the
brevity of the order (reproduced above) with which the
report submitted by the trial Court after enquiry into the
matter was accepted, is a clear pointer to the fact that
the proceedings resorted to were treated to be of a very
summary nature. It is thus manifest that the Civil
Procedure Code proceeds upon the view of not
imparting any finality to the determination of the
question of succession or heirship of the deceased
party.”
11. The judgment in Mohinder Kaur was referred to and approved by
this Court in a judgment reported as Dashrath Rao Kate v. Brij
Mohan Srivastava
6
. In the said case, the High Court came to the
conclusion that since the inquiry under Order XXII Rule 5 of the
Code was of a summary nature, it was limited only to the
determination of the right of the appellant therein to be impleaded
as the legal representative. This Court in the said case held as
under:
“21. As a legal position, it cannot be disputed that
normally, an enquiry under Order 22 Rule 5 CPC is of a
summary nature and findings therein cannot amount to
res judicata, however, that legal position is true only in
respect of those parties, who set up a rival claim
6 (2010) 1 SCC 277
8
against the legatee. For example, here, there were two
other persons, they being Ramesh and Arun Kate, who
were joined in the civil revision as the legal
representatives of Sukhiabai. The finding on the will in
the order dated 9-9-1997 passed by the trial court could
not become final as against them or for that matter,
anybody else, claiming a rival title to the property vis-àvis the appellant herein, and therefore, to that extent
the observations of the High Court are correct.
However, it could not be expected that when the
question regarding the will was gone into in a detailed
enquiry, where the evidence was recorded not only of
the appellant, but also of the attesting witness of the
will and where these witnesses were thoroughly crossexamined and where the defendant also examined
himself and tried to prove that the will was a false
document and it was held that he had utterly failed in
proving that the document was false, particularly
because the document was fully proved by the
appellant and his attesting witness, it would be futile to
expect the witness to lead that evidence again in the
main suit.
xx xx xx
25. Dr. Kailash Chand, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent, also relied on ruling in Vijayalakshmi
Jayaram v. M.R. Parasuram [AIR 1995 AP 351] . It is
correctly held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that
Order 22 Rule 5 is only for the purpose of bringing legal
representatives on record for conducting of proceedings
in which they are to be brought on record and it does
not operate as res judicata. However, the High Court
further correctly reiterated the legal position that the
inter se dispute between the rival legal representatives
has to be independently tried and decided in separate
proceedings. Here, there was no question of any rivalry
between the legal representatives or anybody claiming
any rival title against the appellant-plaintiff. Therefore,
there was no question of the appellant-plaintiff proving
the will all over again in the same suit.
26. The other judgment relied upon is the Full Bench
judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in Mohinder Kaur v. Piara Singh [AIR 1931 P&H 130] .
The same view was reiterated. As we have already
pointed out, there is no question of finding fault with
the view expressed. However, in the peculiar facts and
9
circumstances of this case, there will be no question of
non-suiting the appellant-plaintiff, particularly because
in the same suit, there would be no question of
repeating the evidence, particularly when he had
asserted that he had become owner on the basis of the
will (Ext. P-1).”
12. In another judgment reported as Jaladi Suguna (Deceased)
through LRs. v. Satya Sai Central Trust & Ors.
7
, this Court held
that the determination as to who is the legal representative under
Order XXII Rule 5 of the Code is for the limited purpose of
representation of the estate of the deceased and for adjudication of
that case. This Court held as under:
“15. Filing an application to bring the legal
representatives on record, does not amount to bringing
the legal representatives on record. When an LR
application is filed, the court should consider it and
decide whether the persons named therein as the legal
representatives, should be brought on record to
represent the estate of the deceased. Until such
decision by the court, the persons claiming to be the
legal representatives have no right to represent the
estate of the deceased, nor prosecute or defend the
case. If there is a dispute as to who is the legal
representative, a decision should be rendered on such
dispute. Only when the question of legal representative
is determined by the court and such legal
representative is brought on record, can it be said that
the estate of the deceased is represented. The
determination as to who is the legal representative
under Order 22 Rule 5 will of course be for the limited
purpose of representation of the estate of the
deceased, for adjudication of that case. Such
determination for such limited purpose will not confer
on the person held to be the legal representative, any
right to the property which is the subject-matter of the
suit, vis-à-vis other rival claimants to the estate of the
deceased.”
(emphasis supplied)
7 (2008) 8 SCC 521
10
13. In another judgment reported as Suresh Kumar Bansal v.
Krishna Bansal & Anr.
8
, this Court held as under:
“20. It is now well settled that determination of the
question as to who is the legal representative of the
deceased plaintiff or defendant under Order 22 Rule 5
of the Code of Civil Procedure is only for the purpose of
bringing legal representatives on record for the
conducting of those legal proceedings only and does
not operate as res judicata and the inter se dispute
between the rival legal representatives has to be
independently tried and decided in probate
proceedings. If this is allowed to be carried on for a
decision of an eviction suit or other allied suits, the suits
would be delayed, by which only the tenants will be
benefited.”
14. In view of the aforesaid judgments, we find that the appellant is the
sole claimant to the estate of the deceased on the basis of Will.
The Executing Court has found that the appellant is the legal
representative of the deceased competent to execute the decree.
In view of the said fact, the appellant as the legal representative is
entitled to execute the decree and to take it to its logical end.
15. In addition to the nature of proceedings to implead the legal
representative to execute the decree, we find that none of the tests
laid down in Section 115 of the Code were satisfied by the High
Court so as to set aside the order passed by the Executing Court.
The High Court in exercise of revision jurisdiction has interfered
with the order passed by the Executing Court as if it was acting as
the first court of appeal. An order passed by a subordinate court
can be interfered with only if it exercises its jurisdiction, not vested
in it by law or has failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested or has
8 (2010) 2 SCC 162
11
acted in exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
The mere fact that the High Court had a different view on the same
facts would not confer jurisdiction to interfere with an order passed
by the Executing Court. Consequently, the order passed by the
High Court is set aside and that of the Executing Court is restored.
The appeal is allowed.
.............................................J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 22, 2020.
12

Whether money decree be passed basing on cheques , when the defendant admitted his debt paid by the plaintiff and when the defendant failed to discharge his burden of repayment on the same day to the plaintiff by raising unconnected issues to the loan transactions ? The written statement also did not deny that Sanjay requested Surendra for a loan of 80,000/- which was given to him. However, in the defense, Sanjay alleged that Surendra asked him to return the amount on the same day i.e. 30.01.1990, which he did. The written statement then alleged that Sanjay repeatedly asked for the return of the three cheques but being the maternal uncle, the plaintiff insisted on keeping the three instruments, and prevailed upon him as the elder relative. It was also alleged in the written statement that Sanjay was assured that the cheques would be returned on the next day; however they were never returned. The trial court dismissed this suit. The trial court was of the opinion that the evidence clearly showed that a sum of ₹ 80,000/- had been deposited by Surendra in his bank account and that this circumstance, supported Sanjay’s plea that the amount was returned immediately. The trial court was also of the opinion, that the discrepancy in the amount received towards the sale consideration, casts doubt regarding the veracity of the plaintiff’s claim. The High Court then concluded and held as follows:- “15. Since it is not disputed by the respondents that the loan amount of Rs 80,000/- was given by the appellant on 30/01/90 and the dispute is only whether the amount was returned by the respondent no. 2 to the appellant on that very day on not, the important documents are Ex. P/1 to P/3, the cheques and the receipt of Rs 60,000/- Ex. P/9, which was issued by the respondent no. 2 in favour of appellant. When the amount was given back by the respondent no. 2 to the appellant on that very day then it is surprising why the receipt Ex. P/9 and the cheques Ex. P/1 to P/3 were not taken back by the respondent no. 2 from the appellant and why the receipt of refund of the amount was not taken. Apart from this there is nothing on record to show that why the cheque of Rs. 30,000/- Ex. P/8 was given by the respondent no. 2 to the appellant. These all documents goes to show beyond doubt that the appellant who is maternal-uncle of the respondent no. 1 lent a sum of Rs 80,000 to the Respondent no. 2, in lieu of which the cheques EX. P/1 to P/3 were not taken back by the respondent no. 2 as proprietor of respondent no. 1 and the amount was returned by the respondents to the appellant. In view of this appeal stands allowed. Apex court held that there is no dispute that Sanjay wanted 80,000/- and was given it, by his uncle, the plaintiff, Surendra, for the purpose of expansion of his business. This is where the version of the two parties diverges: Sanjay alleged that the amount was returned the next day and that Surendra did not return the post dated cheques issued by him; Surendra alleges that Sanjay in fact never returned the amount. The trial court was persuaded by arguments on behalf of Sanjay and the circumstance that the sum of 80,000/- was deposited in Surendra’s account on the same day. The High Court, however, took note of the plaintiff’s stand, with respect to the real consideration, which was 2,30,000/- as against what was shown in the document, to say that the amount deposited in Surendra’s account had nothing to do with the money lent to Sanjay. Whether a photocopy which was therefore, inadmissible can be considered ? this court notices that the plaintiff had put the matter, during the course of cross examination, to the appellant/defendant. The latter, unsurprisingly, admitted the document, despite the fact that it was a photocopy. The plaintiff had argued that the original of that document was with the purchaser: this was not denied.

Whether money decree be passed basing on cheques , when the defendant admitted his debt paid by the plaintiff and  when the defendant failed to discharge his burden of repayment on the same day to the plaintiff by raising unconnected issues to the loan transactions ?

The written statement also did not deny that Sanjay requested Surendra for a loan of 80,000/- which was given to him. 
However, in the defense, Sanjay alleged that Surendra asked him to return the amount on the same day i.e. 30.01.1990, which he did. The written statement then alleged that Sanjay
repeatedly asked for the return of the three cheques but being the maternal uncle, the plaintiff insisted on keeping the three instruments, and prevailed upon him as the elder relative. It was also alleged in the written statement that Sanjay was assured that the cheques would be returned on the next day; however they were never returned.

The trial court dismissed this suit.
The trial court was of the opinion that the evidence clearly showed that a sum of ₹ 80,000/- had been deposited by Surendra in his bank account and that this circumstance, supported Sanjay’s plea that the amount was returned immediately. The trial court was
also of the opinion, that the discrepancy in the amount received towards the sale consideration, casts doubt regarding the veracity of the plaintiff’s claim.

The High Court then concluded and held as follows:-
“15. Since it is not disputed by the respondents that the loan amount of Rs 80,000/- was given by the appellant on 30/01/90 and the dispute is only whether the amount was returned by the
respondent no. 2 to the appellant on that very day on not, the important documents are Ex. P/1 to P/3, the cheques and the receipt of Rs 60,000/- Ex. P/9, which was issued by the respondent no. 2 in favour of appellant. When the amount was given back by the respondent no. 2 to the appellant on that very day then it is surprising why the receipt Ex. P/9 and the cheques Ex. P/1 to P/3 were not taken back by the respondent no. 2 from the appellant and why the receipt of refund of the amount was not taken. Apart from this there is nothing on record to show that why the cheque of Rs. 30,000/- Ex. P/8 was given by the respondent no. 2 to the appellant. These all documents goes to show beyond doubt that the appellant who is maternal-uncle of the respondent no. 1 lent a sum of Rs 80,000 to the Respondent no. 2, in lieu of which the cheques EX. P/1 to P/3 were not taken back by the respondent no. 2 as proprietor of respondent no. 1 and the amount was returned by the respondents to the appellant. In view of this appeal stands allowed.

Apex court held that

 there is no dispute that Sanjay wanted 80,000/- and was given it, by his uncle, the plaintiff, Surendra, for the purpose of expansion of his business. 
This is where the version of the two parties diverges: 
Sanjay alleged that the amount was returned the next day and that Surendra did not return the post dated cheques issued by him; 
Surendra alleges that Sanjay in fact never returned the amount. The trial court was persuaded by arguments on behalf of Sanjay and the circumstance that the sum of 80,000/- was deposited in Surendra’s account on the same day. 
The High Court, however, took note of the plaintiff’s stand, with respect to the real consideration, which was 2,30,000/- as against what was shown in the document, to say that the amount deposited in Surendra’s account had nothing to do with the money lent to Sanjay.

Whether a photocopy which was therefore, inadmissible can be considered ?

 this court notices that the plaintiff had put the matter, during the course of cross examination, to the appellant/defendant. The latter, unsurprisingly, admitted the document, despite the fact that it was a photocopy. The plaintiff had argued that the original of that document was with the purchaser: this was not denied.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106 OF 2010
M/S FAIR COMMUNICATION AND
CONSULTANTS & ANR. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SURENDRA KERDILE ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This appeal by Special Leave challenges a decision of the Madhya Pradesh, High
Court, by which a suit for recovery of 80,000/- was decreed in appeal. The impugned ₹
judgment set aside the judgment and decree of the XIII Additional District Judge, Indore
(hereafter “trial court”).
2. The plaintiff (respondent in the present case, referred to hereafter as “Surendra”)
is the maternal uncle of the defendant-second appellant (hereafter referred to by his
name as “Sanjay”). Sanjay is also the sole proprietor of first appellant/defendant (M/s
Fair Communication & Consultants). Surendra filed a suit for claiming recovery of ₹
1,08,000/- alleging that Sanjay and his proprietorship firm owed money lent. Surendra
apparently was a resident of Nashik, but had completed his education at Indore. He was
an Engineer employed at Nashik and owned some land and a flat (MIG Scheme No. 54,
Indore). As Surendra wished to settle eventually in Nashik, he appointed Sanjay who
used to reside in Indore as Power of Attorney and executed a deed of General Power of
Attorney (GPA) in favour of Sanjay on 30.09.1989 for that purpose. Sanjay entered into
an agreement to sell the property to one Niranjan Singh Nagra (“buyer”) on 30.11.1989
and received a sum of 50,000/- as earnest money. Surendra alleged that Sanjay called ₹
him to Indore on 29.01.1990 and requested that the agreement to sell ought to be
executed in favour of the buyer directly and that at the time of executing the agreement,
2
the buyer had paid 80,000/-. This amount was returned by Sanjay. Surendra also ₹
alleged that the buyer requested for cancellation of the Power of Attorney which was
given to Sanjay. Sanjay requested Surendra for an advance in the sum of 80,000/- for ₹
the expansion of his business, which he was carrying on under the style of the first
respondent proprietorship concern. Sanjay assured the plaintiff that he would return the
amount shortly. Accordingly, 80,000/- was given by the plaintiff (Surendra) to Sanjay. ₹
3. Sanjay issued three post-dated cheques for the sum of 16,500/-, 3,500/- and ₹ ₹
₹ 60,000/- all dated 16.02.1990, drawn on the State Bank of India, Indore Branch.
Before the due date, Sanjay requested the plaintiff (Surendra) not to present the cheques
for collection for a few months; this request was complied with. The cheques, when
presented, were returned by the banker to the plaintiff (Surendra). In these
circumstances, the suit for recovery of a sum of 80,000/- (together with interest @ ₹
12% till the date of the filing of the suit and for future interest, consequently, was
instituted.
4. Sanjay, in his written statement denied the suit allegations. However, the written
statement did not dispute the execution of the GPA or that he had entered - on behalf of
the plaintiff, into the agreement to sell with Niranjan Singh Nagra and obtained ₹
50,000/- as earnest money. The written statement also did not deny that Sanjay
requested Surendra for a loan of 80,000/- which was given to him. However, in the ₹
defense, Sanjay alleged that Surendra asked him to return the amount on the same day
i.e. 30.01.1990, which he did. The written statement then alleged that Sanjay
repeatedly asked for the return of the three cheques but being the maternal uncle, the
plaintiff insisted on keeping the three instruments, and prevailed upon him as the elder
relative. It was also alleged in the written statement that Sanjay was assured that the
cheques would be returned on the next day; however they were never returned.
5. After framing issues and recording evidence, the trial court dismissed this suit.
The trial court was of the opinion that the evidence clearly showed that a sum of ₹
3
80,000/- had been deposited by Surendra in his bank account and that this circumstance,
supported Sanjay’s plea that the amount was returned immediately. The trial court was
also of the opinion, that the discrepancy in the amount received towards the sale
consideration, casts doubt regarding the veracity of the plaintiff’s claim. Aggrieved by
the dismissal of the suit, Surendra appealed to the High Court. During the course of
appeal, two applications seeking to amend the pleading and relief clause in the plaint
were sought.
6. The High Court after an overall reading of the evidence framed three points for
consideration, while dealing first with the applications, and then the merits: they were
firstly, the consideration of the sale of the suit property – if it was for 2,30,000/- and ₹
not 1,30,000/- ; secondly, whether such fact had to be pleaded by the plaintiff in the ₹
suit and lastly, whether in the absence of such pleading, it was necessary to allow the
application for amendment. The High Court after analyzing the nature of evidence led,
concluded that since Sanjay had admitted the signature on the agreement to sell, as well
as the plaintiff’s GPA, even though the document was a photocopy, it could not be
ignored.
7. The impugned judgment also reasoned that there was no dispute that another
agreement to sell was executed on 30.01.1990 by the plaintiff (Surendra) in favour of
Niranjan Singh Nagra, where the sale consideration was showed to be 1,30,000/-. The ₹
sale was also undisputedly completed on 31.01.1990. It was held that in these
circumstances, the plaintiff had 1,80,000/- as on 30.01.1990, which clearly showed ₹
that the real consideration for the transaction was 2,30,000/-, though the document ₹
subsequently executed showed a lesser value as 1,30,000/-. The court noted that ₹
Surendra had not relied upon these circumstances to seek relief on the basis of the
contract (for sale). The High Court then reasoned that these documents were needed
only to consider their impact vis-a-vis the defendants’ claim for return of 80,000/-. ₹
4
8. The High Court in its impugned judgment upheld the plaintiff’s contention that he
possessed sufficient amount to advance 80,000/- to Sanjay. He also had sufficient ₹
funds to deposit amounts in the bank account, for which statement of account, Ex. D/1
was on the record. Given that the real consideration for the transaction was ₹
2,30,000/-, the fact that some amount was deposited in the bank account, did not in any
way detract from the suit claim. The court, therefore, held that the deposit by itself
could not be relied on, that the amount was paid to Sanjay who issued three cheques.
The High Court then concluded and held as follows:-
“15. Since it is not disputed by the respondents that the loan
amount of Rs 80,000/- was given by the appellant on 30/01/90 and
the dispute is only whether the amount was returned by the
respondent no. 2 to the appellant on that very day on not, the
important documents are Ex. P/1 to P/3, the cheques and the
receipt of Rs 60,000/- Ex. P/9, which was issued by the respondent
no. 2 in favour of appellant. When the amount was given back by
the respondent no. 2 to the appellant on that very day then it is
surprising why the receipt Ex. P/9 and the cheques Ex. P/1 to P/3
were not taken back by the respondent no. 2 from the appellant and
why the receipt of refund of the amount was not taken. Apart from
this there is nothing on record to show that why the cheque of Rs.
30,000/- Ex. P/8 was given by the respondent no. 2 to the appellant.
These all documents goes to show beyond doubt that the appellant
who is maternal-uncle of the respondent no. 1 lent a sum of Rs
80,000 to the Respondent no. 2, in lieu of which the cheques EX.
P/1 to P/3 were not taken back by the respondent no. 2 as
proprietor of respondent no. 1 and the amount was returned by the
respondents to the appellant.
16. In view of this appeal stands allowed. The judgment and
decree dated 22/07/95 passed by learned XIIIth Additional District
Judge, Indore in Civil Suit No. 98-B/93 is set aside. Respondents
are directed to pay Rs 80,000/- alongwith interest @ 6% p.a w.e.f.
16/02/90 with a period of two months, failing which the
respondents shall be liable to pay the interest on the aforesaid
amount @ 12% per annum. Respondents shall also be liable for the
costs through out.”
5
9. It is argued by Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant that the high
court committed an error in appreciation of the evidence and that the plaintiff had come
forward with an entirely new case, in the cross-examination which was not backed by
the pleadings. He further submitted that the impugned judgment was in error because it
placed reliance on inadmissible documents and rendered findings exclusively based
upon their appreciation. It was highlighted, that the impugned judgment was conjectural
inasmuch as the court connected the receipt issued by Sanjay with the agreement,
showing the sale consideration to be 2,30,000/-. It was emphasized that the original ₹
agreement was never produced or made part of the record.
10. Mr. Santosh Kumar next submitted that being a prohibited transaction, the story
put forward by the plaintiff that the real value of the sale of 2,30,000/- as against the ₹
declared value of 1,30,000/- could not be countenanced by the court as it was contrary ₹
to the public policy. He also relied on the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
(hereafter “the Benami Act”) to submit that any plea based on benami transactions could
not be canvassed in courts. It was argued that as on 30.01.1990 or soon thereafter, the
plaintiff did not have any amount in his bank account. Counsel lastly argued that
consistent position of the defendant, Sanjay was that the three cheques were issued to
the plaintiff at the latter’s insistence and that despite repeated requests, they were not
returned. This was clearly stated in the written statement and was consistently reiterated
during the course of the oral deposition. The high court, it was urged, fell into error in
completely overlooking this aspect.
11. It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent that the basis for dismissal of
the suit by the trial court was that the amount in question was part of the sale
consideration of a sum of 1,30,000/- for the plot belonging to the respondent which ₹
has been sold and from which 50,000/- had been received earlier, and the remaining ₹ ₹
80,000/- was received on the day when the loan had been given to the appellants. The
6
trial court observed that the sum of 80,000/- was received by the plaintiff and was ₹
deposited in the bank account on the next day, i.e. 31.1.1990. It is further argued that
when this question was put to the plaintiff, it was explained that the entire transaction
was for a consideration of 2,30,000/- and not 1,30,000/- and therefore, the amount ₹ ₹
deposited in the bank account had nothing to do with the loan advanced to the
appellants.
12. It is argued that the first agreement dated 03.7.1989 was executed for a sum of ₹
2,30,000/- by the first appellant himself on behalf of the plaintiff, and in fact that
agreement was put to the first appellant/defendant in cross-examination where he stated
that:
“…..it is corrected that my signature appears below at page
no. 3 of stamp papers purchased on 3rd July. Witness himself stated
that no any such agreement had been executed. Stamp paper only
had been purchased in the name of fair communication. My
signature appears for A to A on the page no. two and three annexed
with the stamp paper dated 3rd July 1989’ (Copy of the said
agreement dated 3.7.1989 is Annexed herewith and marked as
Annexure R-2)
13. It is urged that the first appellant admitted his signature on the said document in
his cross-examination; thus, clearly, the fact was established. The original of the
document was with the buyer of the property and this fact was admitted by the appellant
in his statement; therefore, its photocopy was produced. The document was relevant
only to show that the plaintiff had the funds to advance to Sanjay and when extension of
the loan to the appellant was admitted, the document is of no consequence.
14. What can be gleaned from the above narrative and submissions is that the plaintiff
wished to dispose of his property at Indore, where the second defendant, nephew resided
and carried on business. Since the parties were related, the plaintiff relied on the
defendant and constituted him as his attorney. An agreement to sell was entered into for
7
the sale of the said property (a flat) on 03.07.1989: this fact is not disputed; equally, it is
undisputed that the consideration for the flat in terms of this agreement was ₹
2,30,000/-. This was admitted by Sanjay, the defendant in his deposition. It is also not
disputed that the original agreement with the purchaser (who ultimately finalized the
transaction), is dated i.e. 03.07.1989. A second agreement was entered into on
30.11.1989. However, this showed a lesser consideration of 1,30,000/-. It is also not ₹
disputed that Sanjay, the second appellant received 50,000/- from the buyer and ₹
handed over that amount to Surendra. Furthermore, on 29.01.1990, Surendra went to
Indore at Sanjay’s behest to conclude the transaction directly with the purchaser,
Niranjan Singh Nagra. He also received the amount agreed. Also, there is no dispute that
Sanjay wanted 80,000/- and was given it, by his uncle, the plaintiff, Surendra, for the ₹
purpose of expansion of his business. This is where the version of the two parties
diverges: Sanjay alleged that the amount was returned the next day and that Surendra did
not return the post dated cheques issued by him; Surendra alleges that Sanjay in fact
never returned the amount. The trial court was persuaded by arguments on behalf of
Sanjay and the circumstance that the sum of 80,000/- was deposited in Surendra’s ₹
account on the same day. The High Court, however, took note of the plaintiff’s stand,
with respect to the real consideration, which was 2,30,000/- as against what was ₹
shown in the document, to say that the amount deposited in Surendra’s account had
nothing to do with the money lent to Sanjay.
15. The defendant/appellants arguments are two-fold: one, that the document on
which the High Court returned its findings was a photocopy and was therefore,
inadmissible; and two, that the question whether the sale consideration was ₹ 2,30,000/-
or 1,30,000/- could not have been gone into, since that argument was based on a ₹
prohibited transaction, outlawed by the Benami Act.
16. As far as the first question goes, this court notices that the plaintiff had put the
matter, during the course of cross examination, to the appellant/defendant. The latter,
8
unsurprisingly, admitted the document, despite the fact that it was a photocopy. The
plaintiff had argued that the original of that document was with the purchaser: this was
not denied. Once these were admitted, the plaintiff could not be faulted for seeking a
consequential amendment, that was purely formal, to back his argument that there was
sufficient money, after lending 80,000/- to the defendant, which was deposited in his ₹
account. The appellant’s argument, in the opinion of this court, is insubstantial: the
impugned judgment cannot be faulted on this aspect.
17. Now as to the second argument by the appellant, which is that the plaintiff’s plea
that the real consideration for the sale was 2,30,000/- entails returning findings that ₹
would uphold a plea based on a benami transaction, this court is of the opinion that the
argument is unmerited. Benami is defined by the Act as a transaction where
(a) where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the consideration for
such property has been provided, or paid by, another person; and
(b) the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of the
person who has provided the consideration.
Benami transactions are forbidden by reason of Section 3; no action lies, nor can any
defense in a suit be taken, based on any benami transaction: in terms of Section 4 of the
Act.
18. In the opinion of this court, the argument that the plaintiff’s plea regarding the real
consideration being barred, has no merit. The plaintiff did not claim return of any
amount from the buyer; the suit is not based on any plea involving examination of a
benami transaction. Besides, the plaintiff is not asserting any claim as benami owner, nor
urging a defense that any property or the amount claimed by him is a benami
transaction. Therefore, the defendant appellant’s argument is clearly insubstantial.
19. The relevant provisions of law, i.e. Sections 3 and 4 of the Benami Act, read as
follows:
“Prohibition of benami transactions.
9
3. (1) No person shall enter into any benami transaction.
 (2)Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or
with fine or with both.
(3) Whoever enters into any benami transaction on and after the
date of commencement of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)
Amendment Act, 2016, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (2), be punishable in accordance with the provisions
contained in Chapter VII.]
(4) [***]
Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami.
4. (1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any
property held benami against the person in whose name the
property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on
behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.
(2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held
benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is
held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit,
claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real
owner of such property…”
20. In Valliammal (D.) by L.Rs v Subramaniam & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 233, this Court
held that the onus of establishing that a transaction is benami is upon one who asserts it:
 “13. This Court in a number of judgments has held that it is well
established that burden of proving that a particular sale is benami
lies on the person who alleges the transaction to be a benami. The
essence of a benami transaction is the intention of the party or
parties concerned and often, such intention is shrouded in a thick
veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do
not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any
part of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance
of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. Refer to
Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra, Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of
M. P., Thakur Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh, Pratap Singh v.
Sarojini Devi and Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra v. Heirs of
Parshottam S. Shah. It has been held in the judgments referred to
above that the question whether a particular sale is a benami or
10
not, is largely one of fact, and for determining the question no
absolute formulas or acid test, uniformly applicable in all
situations can be laid. After saying so, this Court spelt out the
following six circumstances which can be taken as a guide to
determine the nature of the transaction :
(1) the source from which the purchase money came ;
(2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase ;
(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour ;
(4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between
the claimant and the alleged benamidar ;
(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale ; and
(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property
after the sale. (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra1, SCC p 7, para 6).
14. The above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies
according to the facts of each case. Nevertheless, the source from
where the purchase money came and the motive why the property
was purchased benami are by far the most important tests for
determining whether the sale standing in the name of one person, is
in reality for the benefit of another. We would examine the present
transaction on the touchstone of the above two indicia.
*** *** ***
18. It is well-settled that intention of the parties is the essence of the
benami transaction and the money must have been provided by the
party invoking the doctrine of benami. The evidence shows clearly
that the original Plaintiff did not have any justification for
purchasing the property in the name of Ramayee Ammal. The reason
given by him is not at all acceptable. The source of money is not at
all traceable to the Plaintiff. No person named in the plaint or
anyone else was examined as a witness. The failure of the Plaintiff
to examine the relevant witnesses completely demolishes his case.”
11
These observations were reiterated in Binapani Paul vs. Pratima Ghosh & Ors.
2007 (6) SCC 100.
21. In the present case, the appellants did not prove that the transaction (to which they
were not parties) was benami; on the contrary, the appellant’s argument was merely that
the transaction could not be said to be for a consideration in excess of 1,30,000/-: ₹ in
the context of a defense in a suit for money decree. The defendant/appellants never said
that the plaintiff or someone other than the purchaser was the real owner; nor was the
interest in the property, the subject matter of the recovery suit. Therefore, in the opinion
of this court, the conclusions and the findings in the impugned judgment are justified.
22. For the foregoing reasons, this court is of opinion that there is no merit in the
appeal; it is accordingly dismissed, without order on costs.
.…....................…….....................J.
 [INDIRA BANERJEE]
………….......................................J.
 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]
New Delhi,
January 20, 2020.

Section 7A of the JJ Act stipulates that an application can be filed before any court at any stage including the stage after the final disposal of the petition. However, once a convict has chosen to take the plea of juvenility before the learned Magistrate, High Court and also before the Supreme Court and the said plea has been rejected up to the Supreme Court, the petitioner cannot be allowed to reagitate the plea of juvenility by filing fresh application under Section 7A of the JJ Act. Considering the earlier orders passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 10.01.2013 and the judgment of the High Court dated 13.03.2014 and the order passed by the Supreme Court dated 09.07.2018, in our view, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court rightly dismissed the revision petition. We do not find any ground warranting interference with the impugned order.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 547 OF 2020
[Arising out of SLP(Crl.) D No.2122 of 2020]
PAWAN KUMAR GUPTA ...Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI …Respondent
O R D E R
Accused Pawan Kumar Gupta has filed this SLP
challenging the order dated 19.12.2019 passed by the High Court
of Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No.1301 of 2019 dismissing
the claim of the petitioner of juvenility.
2. Contention of the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta is that he
was a juvenile at the time of commission of the offence and that
the same is apparent from the School Leaving Certificate issued
in his favour by Gayatri Bal Sanskar Shala, Narayan Pur, Tanda,
District Ambedkar Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. According to the
petitioner, as per the said certificate, his date of birth is
08.10.1996 and therefore, on the date of alleged incident i.e.
16.12.2012, the petitioner was aged only 16 years 02 months and
1
08 days and that he was a juvenile on the date of the alleged
commission of the offence. Contention of the petitioner is that the
certificate has been found to be genuine by the investigating
officials and therefore, prayed for holding an enquiry in terms of
Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 (for short “JJ Act”). According to the petitioner
Pawan Kumar Gupta, as per Section 21 of the Act, no child in
conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for
life. The said petition was dismissed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, FTC Court No.7 by order dated 21.12.2018. In the said
order dated 21.12.2018, the learned Sessions Judge referred to
the order dated 10.01.2013 passed by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge also referred to the
order of the Supreme Court dated 09.07.2018 in and by which the
Supreme Court had inter alia rejected the plea of juvenility taken
by the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta while dismissing the review
petition. The learned Sessions Judge held that the Supreme
Court has held that the petitioner is not a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence and in view of the order passed by the
Supreme Court dated 09.07.2018, the Sessions Judge would
2
have no jurisdiction to determine the age of the petitioner Pawan
Kumar Gupta in terms of Section 7A of the JJ Act.
3. By the impugned order, the High Court also referred to the
order of the Supreme Court dated 09.07.2018 and pointed out
that the Supreme Court had taken note that the investigating
officials have verified the School Leaving Certificate from the
concerned school authorities and the order passed by the
Metropolitan Magistrate dated 10.01.2013 and after consideration
of all the documents, the Supreme Court negatived the plea of
juvenility taken by the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta by its order
dated 09.07.2018. In the impugned order, the High Court in detail
referred to the order passed by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate dated 10.01.2013 and the order of the Supreme Court
dated 09.07.2018 and rejected the plea of juvenility raised by the
petitioner. While dismissing the plea of juvenility, the High Court
had noted that the petitioner had earlier raised the plea of
juvenility in the review petition filed before the Supreme Court
against the death penalty awarded to him and that the same was
dismissed by the Supreme Court on 09.07.2018.
4. We have heard Mr. A.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner and Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General
3
and Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior counsel appearing for
the NCT of Delhi and perused the impugned order and other
materials on record.
5. Mr. A.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that the High Court has passed the order without
hearing him. In that view, we have taken note of the grievance of
the petitioner on merits. We have heard Mr. A.P. Singh at length
and considered his submissions on merits and the grounds raised
in the SLP.
6. Contending that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any
stage, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon
Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 17 SCC 699 and
Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa (2015) 11 SCC 124. The
learned counsel also placed reliance upon Ashwani Kumar
Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 9 SCC 750 wherein
para (32) of the said judgment lays down the procedure to be
followed to determine the age of the accused claiming to be
juvenile. It has been held that once the procedure as stipulated
under the Act has been followed, that order shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards the child in conflict with
law.
4
7. As held in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 17
SCC 699, claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even
after final disposal of the case. It may also be raised for the first
time even after final disposal of the matter. However, once the
accused has chosen to take the plea of juvenility before the trial
court, before the High Court and also before the Supreme Court
and the said plea has been rejected, it is not open to the accused
to reagitate the plea of juvenility by filing the fresh application
under Section 7A of the JJ Act.
8. In the present case, this is not the first time that the
petitioner has raised the plea of juvenility. When the matter was
pending before the trial court, plea of juvenility was raised by the
petitioner at the first instance. The learned trial court vide order
dated 07.01.2013 directed the Investigating Officer to file a report
regarding the documents he has relied upon to determine the age
of the accused. Upon consideration of the report of the
Investigating Officer, vide order dated 10.01.2013, the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate has held that the age verification report of
the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta was received and that the
accused did not dispute the age verification report filed by the
Investigating Officer and further, he did not dispute the age to be
5
above 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. When
the matter was pending before the lower courts, earlier the
petitioner has raised the plea of juvenility and by order dated
10.01.2013, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has rejected the
plea of juvenility. In the said order, the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate pointed out that the prosecution has placed certified
copies of the admission register of the petitioner when he first
attended the school and the same has been filed on record. It is
stated that age verification report of the petitioner Pawan Kumar
Gupta had been received and also certified copies had been filed
before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. It is stated that the
said report referred to the statement of the parents of both the
petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta and co-accused Vinay Sharma
where they (parents) have confirmed the age of their sons.
Pointing out that the parents of the petitioner or the counsel then
appearing for Pawan Kumar Gupta have not raised any objection
as to the age verification report filed by the IO and have not
disputed the age of the petitioner to be above 18 years on the
date and time of commission of the offence, the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate has negatived the plea of juvenility. This
6
order dated 10.01.2013 has not been challenged by the
petitioner.
9. When the criminal appeal was pending before the High
Court in Crl.App. No.1398 of 2013, the petitioner and co-accused
Vinay have raised the plea of juvenility that they were juvenile on
the date of the alleged commission of the offence. Upon
consideration of the submissions, by the reasons stated in paras
(150) to (153), by its judgment dated 13.03.2014, the High Court
rejected the plea of juvenility raised by the petitioner. The High
Court has also pointed out that the order passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate dated 10.01.2013 has not been
challenged. In para (150), the High Court pointed out that by the
order dated 10.01.2013, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has
held that the parents of the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta had
confirmed his age as set out in the report which was included in
the statement of the parents of the petitioner. In para (150), the
High Court observed as under:-
“150. ……It may be noted that the learned M.M. in her order has clearly
recorded the fact that the parents of Vinay Sharma and Pawan Kumar
had confirmed the age of their respective wards as set out in the Report
which included the written statement of the parents of both the accused
persons. Learned M.M. further noted that the counsel for accused Vinay
Sharma and Pawan Kumar along with the said accused had not raised
7
any objection to the Age Verification Report filed by the I.O. and the
accused did not dispute their age to be above 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offence.”
10. The plea of juvenility was then raised by the petitioner in the
review petition before the Supreme Court. After referring to the
submissions of the learned counsel for the NCT of Delhi and the
order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dated 10.01.2013,
the Supreme Court by its order dated 09.07.2018 has rejected the
plea of juvenility taken by the petitioner and the co-accused Vinay
Sharma and that order has attained finality. The relevant portion
of the order dated 09.07.2018 passed by the Supreme Court
reads as under:-
“18. …..On the claim that Pawan was a juvenile, Shri Luthra referred to
the order dated 10-1-2013 where age verification report of Pawan has
been received and also certified copies had been filed on record. The
report had referred to the written statement of the parents of both these
accused where they have confirmed the age of their wards. There was
no infirmity in the trial court taking decision that both were major and the
trial court proceeded accordingly. There is no substance in the
submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
……..
45. Now, coming to the submission of the learned counsel for Petitioner
2 that he was juvenile at the time of occurrence. The said issue was also
considered by the trial court and rejected. The trial court on the basis of
the material placed before it had rightly concluded that Petitioner 2 was
not a juvenile. The learned counsel for the respondent has rightly
referred to the proceedings of the trial court dated 10-9-2013. In this
8
respect this submission also does not furnish any ground for review of
the judgment.”
11. Section 7A of the JJ Act stipulates that an application can
be filed before any court at any stage including the stage after the
final disposal of the petition. However, once a convict has chosen
to take the plea of juvenility before the learned Magistrate, High
Court and also before the Supreme Court and the said plea has
been rejected up to the Supreme Court, the petitioner cannot be
allowed to reagitate the plea of juvenility by filing fresh application
under Section 7A of the JJ Act. Considering the earlier orders
passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 10.01.2013 and the
judgment of the High Court dated 13.03.2014 and the order
passed by the Supreme Court dated 09.07.2018, in our view, the
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court rightly dismissed the
revision petition. We do not find any ground warranting
interference with the impugned order.
12. Mr. A.P. Singh has submitted that the High Court has made
certain observations against him which is prejudicial to his rights.
He further submitted that he was not present at the time of
passing of the order by the High Court and as such the
observations are not justified. We have considered the above
9
submission raised by learned counsel for the petitioner but do not
express any opinion as it is not germane to the present issue. We
however reserve liberty to Mr. Singh to take appropriate
proceedings separately against the observations made by the
High Court against him.
13. In the result, the SLP is dismissed.
………………………..J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
..………………………..J.
 [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
.………………………..J.
 [A.S. BOPANNA]
New Delhi;
January 20, 2020.
10