whether Satish and Dharambir can be convicted for carrying commercial quantity for which minimum punishment is ten years. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the police has recovered 500 grams from each of these accused and on personal search of their body, it was recovered from the pockets of kurta and pant respectively. It is urged that though each of these three accused was separately having charas, no presumption can be drawn that each of them knew that the other was carrying charas. In this case unfortunately the prosecution has failed to lead any evidence in this regard which would even remotely indicate that all the three accused acted together or connived or conspired with each other in the purchase and sale of charas. There is not even a whisper in this behalf.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal  No(s).  205-206/2010
SATISH & ANR. ETC.                                     Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA                                Respondent(s)
  O R D E R
These two appeals arise out of the judgment and order
dated   22.10.2008   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and
Haryana in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1164-SB of 2000 and 1185-
SB of 2000.
Facts necessary for decision of this case are that on
29.08.1999,   Amar   Dass   (PW7)   was   present   at   Sonepat   T-
point,   Gohana   when   Baljeet   Singh   (PW6)   met   him.     He
received  secret  information  that  the  three  accused  Raju,
Dharambir   and   Satish   are   indulging   in   the   sale   of
contraband substance and they would be coming on a motor
cycle   bearing   No.   HR-11-9597.     According   to   secret
information   received   by   him,   all   three   accused   would   be
carrying   charas.     He   accordingly   setup   a   Naka   and
attempted   to   stop   the   motor   cycle.     On   seeing   the   Naka,
the   motor   cycle   did   not   stop   and   drove   towards   Sonepat.
The   accused   were,   however,   apprehended   and   the   motor
cycle was stopped. 
PW7 informed the accused that they were suspected of
1

carrying   contraband   substance   and   therefore   gave   the
option   to   them   that   they   could   be   searched   either   by   a
Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer.  Written notice in this
behalf   was   given   to   the   accused.     However,   Raju   alias
Rajbeer   managed   to   run   away   from   the   spot   after   leaving
his   packet   on   the   motor   cycle.     500   grams   of   charas   was
recovered from the pockets of kurta and pant of the other
two accused - Satish and Dharambir.  After completing all
formalities,   drawing   samples,   getting   them   analysed   the
accused   were   charged   with   commission   of   offence
punishable   under   Section   20C   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.   Both the Trial Court
and   the   High   Court   have   considered   them.     Hence   these
appeals.
As   far   as   Raju   is   concerned,   his   stand   was   that   he
was neither present nor driving the motor cycle.   As far
as this aspect is concerned, the prosecution has examined
Chand Singh (PW8) who stated that Raju is the brother-in-
law   of   brother   Baljeet   Singh   and   Raju   had   come   to   him   a
year   back   along   with   the   accused   Dharambir   and   at   that
time he already had a motor cycle.  The statement of Raju
that he was not on the motor cycle cannot be believed.
After   going   through   the   evidence   on   merits   and   with
regard to recovery of charas from the accused, we do not
find   any   reason   to   disbelieve   the   same.     We   accordingly
hold that all the three accused are guilty of committing
an   offence   under   Section   20   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and
2

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 
However, the issue raised before us is whether Satish
and   Dharambir   can   be   convicted   for   carrying   commercial
quantity   for   which   minimum   punishment   is   ten   years.
Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   submits   that   the
police has recovered 500 grams from each of these accused
and   on   personal   search   of   their   body,   it   was   recovered
from the pockets of kurta and pant respectively.
It   is   urged   that   though   each   of   these   three   accused
was separately having charas, no presumption can be drawn
that   each   of   them   knew   that   the   other   was   carrying
charas.     In   this   case   unfortunately   the   prosecution   has
failed   to   lead   any   evidence   in   this   regard   which   would
even   remotely   indicate   that   all   the   three   accused   acted
together or connived or conspired with each other in the
purchase and sale of charas.  There is not even a whisper
in this behalf.
In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,
we   convert   the   conviction   of   Satish   and   Dharambir   from
Section   20C   to   Section   20B   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic   Substances   Act,   1985.       In   such   an
eventuality,   the   maximum   imprisonment   is   ten   years   and
fine   of   Rs.1,00,000/-   (Rupees   one   lac   only).     We   alter
the   sentence   to   the   period   already   undergone   which   is
about   5   years   and   maintain   fine.     As   far   as   Raju   is
concerned,   the   evidence   on   record   is   sufficient   to   hold
him   guilty   for   carrying   commercial   quantity   and   his
3

appeal is dismissed.
The criminal appeals stand disposed of.
� ....................J.
[DEEPAK GUPTA]
� ....................J.
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE]
NEW DELHI;
August 28, 2019.
4

ITEM NO.103               COURT NO.13               SECTION II-B
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal  No(s).  205-206/2010
SATISH & ANR. ETC.                                     Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA                                Respondent(s)

Date : 28-08-2019  These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE
For Appellant(s) Dr.  Krishan Singh Chauhan, AOR
Mr. Chand Kiran, Adv.
Mr. S.P. Singh, Adv.
Mr. R.S.M. Kalky, Adv.
Mr. Murari Lal, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Gautam Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Tushar Sharma, Adv.
Dr. Monika Gusain, AOR
Mr. Deepak Thukral, Adv.
Ms. Manpreet Kaur, Adv.
                   
         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The   criminal   appeals   are   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the   signed
order.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(MEENAKSHI  KOHLI)                              (R.S. NARAYANAN)
  COURT MASTER                                    COURT MASTER
[Signed order is placed on the file]
5 

wishing you all a Happy and Merry Christmas
God bless you all with Great Health , Wealth and Prospertiy

                                            with regards
                                          advocatemmmohan

Review is a not a rehearing of the appeal over again. In a review petition, it is not for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITION (CRIMINAL) D NO.44603 OF 2019
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.609-610 OF 2017
AKSHAY KUMAR SINGH ...Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
This Review Petition has been preferred by the petitioneraccused Akshay Kumar Singh who was the cleaner of the bus to
review the judgment dated 05.05.2017 passed by this Court in
Criminal Appeal Nos.609-610 of 2017 in and by which this Court
confirmed the conviction and death penalty imposed upon the
petitioner by the trial court as well as by the High Court.
2. In the evening of 16.12.2012, the prosecutrix (since
deceased) had gone for a movie with her friend, PW-1. At about
08:45 pm, both the prosecutrix and PW-1 left the movie theatre and
reached Munirka bus stand and they boarded the bus bearing
1
registration No. DL-1PC-0149. This bus was being driven by
accused Ram Singh (since deceased) and the petitioner-Akshay
Kumar Singh @ Thakur was the helper thereof. The accused
misbehaved with the prosecutrix and have committed gang rape of
the prosecutrix in the moving bus. They also committed unnatural
offence and inserted iron rod in the private parts of the prosecutrix.
The accused persons had beaten up PW-1 with iron rods and his
clothes were torn off. The accused also took away all the
belongings of the prosecutrix and PW-1 and thereafter, threw the
prosecutrix and PW-1 in a naked/semi naked condition from the
moving bus. The prosecutrix was treated at Safdarjung Hospital,
Delhi where her three dying declarations were recorded. Since the
condition of the prosecutrix became critical, she was shifted for
further treatment on 27.12.2012 to Mt. Elizabeth Hospital,
Singapore where, she died on 29.12.2012.
3. The trial court held that the complicity and guilt of the accused
were proved and convicted the petitioner and other accused under
Sections 120-B IPC, 376 (2)(g) read with Section 120-B IPC, 377
read with Section 120-B IPC, 365 and 366 read with Section 120-B
IPC, 395 read with Section 120-B IPC, 397 read with Section 120-B
IPC, 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, 307 read with Section 120-B
2
IPC, 412 and 201 read with Section 120-B IPC and inter alia
imposed death penalty upon them. Death penalty and other
sentence of imprisonment imposed upon them was confirmed by
the High Court. The accused had filed Criminal Appeal Nos.609-610
of 2017 before this Court.
4. Criminal appeal filed by the petitioner had earlier been
dismissed by this Court vide its judgment dated 05.05.2017 in
Mukesh and another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others (2017) 6
SCC 1 on the basis of the following evidence which firmly
established the presence of the petitioner at the scene of the
incident and his involvement in the commission of rape on the
prosecutrix :-
(i) evidence of PW-1/injured eye-witness who spoke about the
occurrence in the bus; PW-1 identified the petitioner in the TIP
conducted on 26.12.2012 as one of the persons who came out of the
driver’s cabin from the bus and started abusing PW-1 and later, took
the prosecutrix to the back side of the bus and raped her;
(ii) three dying declarations of the prosecutrix of which, in the second
dying declaration (ExPW27/A), prosecutrix stated the incident in
detail and that the accused persons were calling “Ram Singh,
Thakur, Raju, Mukesh, Pawan and Vinay and in the third dying
declaration, the prosecutrix wrote the names of the accused “Ram
Singh, Mukesh, Vinay, Akshay, Vipin, Raju” including petitionerAkshay Kumar Singh and other accused;
3
(iii) evidence of PW-81-Dinesh Yadav, owner of the bus in which he has
stated that accused Ram Singh was the driver and petitioner was the
helper in the bus in which the incident occurred;
(iv) Ex.PW71/C, report of PW-71-Dr. Ashith B. Acharaya who opined that
one bite mark found on the prosecutrix could have been possibly
caused by the petitioner; three other bite marks were caused by
accused Ram Singh;
(v) DNA evidence – DNA profile generated from the blood-stained jeans
and banian of the petitioner recovered at the behest of petitioner
matched with the DNA profile of the prosecutrix; another set of DNA
profile generated from jeans pant of the petitioner matched with the
DNA profile of PW-1 and DNA profile generated from breast swab of
the victim which was found consistent with the DNA profile of the
blood of the petitioner;
(vi) recovery of metro card and silver ring of PW-1 recovered at the
behest of the petitioner and identified by PW-1.
5. We have heard Mr. A.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner-accused No.3. We have also heard Mr. Tushar
Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for NCT of Delhi
assisted by Ms. Supriya Juneja, learned counsel.
6. The learned counsel Mr. A.P. Singh had taken us through the
various grounds urged in the review petition and prayed for review
of the judgment. The learned Solicitor General Mr. Tushar Mehta
submitted that the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the
defence plea has been considered threadbare both by the trial
court, High Court and also by this Court. The learned Solicitor
4
General submitted that upon appreciation of evidence, the High
Court and the Supreme Court upheld the findings as to the guilt of
the accused and also the sentence. The learned Solicitor General
also submitted that the very same grounds were raised in the review
petition by the co-accused and the same was dismissed by this
Court vide judgments in Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 8
SCC 149 and Vinay Sharma and another v. State (NCT of Delhi)
and others (2018) 8 SCC 186.
7. In this review petition, the petitioner prays for review of the
judgment dated 05.05.2017. In the review petition before us, the
petitioner has again sought to assail the merits of the prosecution
case and the findings rendered thereon which cannot be permitted.
8. It is no longer res integra that scope of review is limited and
review cannot be entertained except in cases of error apparent on
the face of the record. Article 137 of the Constitution of India
empowers the Supreme Court to review any judgment pronounced
or made, subject, of course, to the provisions of any law made by
the Parliament or any rule made under Article 145 of the
Constitution of India. Order XLVII Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules,
2013 dealing with review reads as follows:-
“1. The Court may review its judgment or order, but no application for
review will be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the ground
5
mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code, and in a criminal
proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of
the record.”
As per the Supreme Court Rules, review in the criminal proceedings
is permissible only on the ground of error apparent on the face of
the record.
9. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 137 of the
Constitution of India has been clearly stated in Sow Chandra Kante
and Another v. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674, wherein this Court
held as under:-
“A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is
proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave
error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through
different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over
ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential
import are obviously insufficient.”
10. Review is a not a rehearing of the appeal over again. In a
review petition, it is not for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and reach a different conclusion. The scope of review jurisdiction
has been elaborately considered by this Court in number of cases
and the well settled principles have been reiterated time and again.
In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others (2013) 8 SCC 320, the
Supreme Court held as under:-
6
“17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the
evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible.
Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in
a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the
face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala
SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 654
held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10)
“10. … In a review petition it is not open to this Court to
reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even
if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best
sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged
between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by
this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted
to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence
on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on
appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding
of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be
assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an
error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin
thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any
error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review
petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence
would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in
disguise.”
11. Considering the scope of review under Article 137 of the
Constitution of India and observing that normally in a criminal
proceeding, review applications cannot be entertained except on
the ground of error apparent on the face of the record, in Vikram
7
Singh alias Vicky Walia and Another v. State of Punjab and Another
(2017) 8 SCC 518, the Supreme Court held as under:-
“23. In view of the above, it is clear that scope, ambit and parameters of
review jurisdiction are well defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding,
review applications cannot be entertained except on the ground of error
apparent on the face of the record. Further, the power given to this Court
under Article 137 is wider and in an appropriate case can be exercised to
mitigate a manifest injustice. By review application an applicant cannot
be allowed to reargue the appeal on the grounds which were urged at
the time of the hearing of the criminal appeal. Even if the applicant
succeeds in establishing that there may be another view possible on the
conviction or sentence of the accused that is not a sufficient ground for
review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review only when a
glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in the earlier decision due
to judicial fallibility. There has to be an error apparent on the face of the
record leading to miscarriage of justice to exercise the review jurisdiction
under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. There has to be a material
error manifest on the face of the record with results in the miscarriage of
justice.”
12. A review of the judgment is permitted only when it is shown
that judgment suffers from error apparent on the face of the
judgment. In P.N Iswara Iyer and Others v. Registrar, Supreme
Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680, while considering Order XL Rule 1
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996, the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court observed that Order XL Rule 1 affords the wider set
of grounds for review of orders in civil proceedings, but limits the
8
grounds vis-à-vis criminal proceedings to errors apparent on the
face of the judgment.
13. Applying the above parameters of the review jurisdiction, it is
to be seen whether the petitioner has made out any ground
indicating error apparent on the face of the record warranting review
of our judgment dated 05.05.2017.
14. Even at the outset, it is to be pointed out that the grounds
raised by the petitioner-accused in this review petition are identical
to that of the grounds raised by the co-accused in their review
petitions. Those grounds urged by the co-accused in their review
petitions were considered and rejected by this Court in Mukesh v.
State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 8 SCC 149 and Vinay Sharma and
another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others (2018) 8 SCC 186.
15. At this juncture, we would like to point out two grounds raised
by the petitioner in this review petition viz., (i) futility of awarding
death sentence in Kalyug, where a person is no better than a dead
body; and (ii) that the level of pollution in Delhi NCR is so great that
life is short anyhow and everyone is aware of what is happening in
Delhi NCR in this regard and while so, there is no reason why death
penalty should be awarded. According to the petitioner, in view of
the above, he should be spared of the death sentence. We find it
9
unfortunate that such grounds have been raised in the matter as
serious as the present case.
16. The petitioner has also raised the plea that death penalty is
the ultimate denial of human rights and that it violates the right to
life; it also goes against the principle of non-violence. In the review
petition, the petitioner has put forth the general case against the
capital punishment by stating that only the poor and downtrodden
are more likely to be sentenced with death sentence. Such general
contentions put forth against the capital punishment cannot be gone
into in this review petition.
17. The petitioner has raised the plea as to the lack of
professional skills of the investigating agency and the need for an
unbiased investigation. In the petition, general allegations have
been made against the investigating agency alleging extortion of
confession and then create evidence to falsely implicate the
accused. The grounds raised in the petition alleging improper
investigation and manipulation of evidence are too general and not
specific. It is to be pointed out that each and every point raised by
the petitioner-accused assailing the course of investigation was well
considered by the trial court which we have gone through at the
10
time of hearing of the criminal appeals. The same points cannot be
urged again and again.
18. So far as the dying declaration is concerned, the petitioner
has raised the same contention which was raised earlier that is,
according to the petitioner, only the first dying declaration
(Ex.PW49/A) recorded by PW-49-Dr. Rashmi Ahuja where the
prosecutrix has neither named nor mentioned the name of any of
the accused persons, has to be relied upon. Contention of the
petitioner is that the second dying declaration (Ex.PW27/A)
recorded by PW-24-Dr. Usha Chaturvedi, SDM on 21.12.2012 could
not have been recorded as the victim was under the life support and
she could not have given four pages of dying declaration. Further
contention of the petitioner is that the third dying declaration
recorded by PW-30-Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate where
the victim has named the petitioner and other accused was a
tutored version and cannot be relied upon.
19. Mr. A.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioneraccused has contended that investigation in the present case is
flawed and unreliable. It was submitted that insofar as the recording
of the statement of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., manner of
arrest of the accused, conduct of test identification parade are
11
doubtful. Various contentions assailing the course of investigation
have been raised both before the trial court as well as before the
High Court and this Court which have been considered threadbare
and were rejected. We do not find any merit in the contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the investigation.
20. The learned counsel submitted that because of the media
pressure, the petitioner and other accused have been falsely
implicated. Taking us through the averments made in para 3(f) of
the review petition, the learned counsel submitted that PW-1-
Awninder Pratap Singh had taken heavy amount as bribe and this
has been highlighted in some of the news channels which affect the
credibility of the evidence of PW-1. It was submitted that in this
regard, Heera Lal Gupta, father of co-accused Pawan Gupta had
filed a complaint vide Diary No.26A on 02.11.2019 before SHO, PS
R.K. Puram, Sector-12, New Delhi and also before Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Vasant Vihar. The averments made in
para 3(f) of the review petition are subsequent events unsupported
by any material. In a criminal case, culpability or otherwise of the
accused are based upon appreciation of evidence adduced by the
prosecution and also the evidence adduced by the defence. The
materials or the news emerging in the media and press as also the
12
news channels cannot be taken note of in arriving at a conclusion
on the culpability of the accused or to test credibility of the witness.
Such events cannot be urged as a ground for review.
21. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused has
taken us through the averments made in para 3(g) of the review
petition and also the clippings of book titled “Black Warrant” written
by Sunil Gupta, a former law officer of Central Jail, Tihar, Delhi who
served long time in Tihar jail. The learned counsel submitted that in
the book written by the above officer, the officer has expressed his
opinion that Ram Singh, accused No.1 was murdered in Tihar jail on
11.03.2013. Here again, the opinion of the said former law officer
Sunil Gupta is only his opinion which is not supported by any
material. If the former law officer had any doubt regarding death of
Ram Singh, the said officer could have offered himself to appear as
a defence witness or he could have filed an affidavit before any of
the courts, either trial court or High Court or before the Supreme
Court. The opinion of the said officer Sunil Gupta which is not
supported by any material, cannot be a ground for reviewing our
judgment.
22. As pointed out in the judgment, there were three dying
declarations recorded from the prosecutrix:-
13
(i) in the first dying declaration (Ex.PW-49/A) recorded by Dr. Rashmi
Ahuja (PW-49) on 16.12.2012 at 11.15 pm, the prosecutrix has
stated that more than two men committed rape on her after which,
she does not remember the sexual intercourse; the prosecutrix also
stated that she was subjected to unnatural sex and she was bitten
over her lips, cheeks and breast;
(ii) in the second dying declaration (Ex.PW-27/A) recorded by PW-27-
Usha Chaturvedi, SDM on 21.12.2012 at 09.00 pm, the prosecutrix
has narrated the entire incident in great detail, specifying the role of
each of the accused, rape committed by number of persons, insertion
of iron rod in her private parts, description of the bus, robbery
committed and throwing of both the victims out of the moving bus in
naked condition. Prosecutrix also stated that the accused were
calling each other “Ram Singh, Thakur, Raju, Mukesh, Pawan and
Vinay”; and
(iii) in the third dying declaration (Ex.PW-30/D) recorded on 25.12.2012
at 1.00 p.m by PW-30-Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate by
putting multiple choice questions to the victim and getting answers by
gestures and writing. While giving third dying declaration, prosecutrix
revealed the names of the accused by writing in her own handwriting
viz. “Ram Singh, Mukesh, Vinay, Akshay, Vipin, Raju”.
This Court considered the three dying declarations in the light of the
well-settled principles and found that the multiple dying declarations
inspire the confidence of the Court and are credible. The above
contentions were earlier raised and were considered by this Court in
paras (148) to (164), (186) to (192) and (395) to (417) of the
judgment and rejected. While so, the petitioner cannot raise the
same plea.
14
23. So far as the plea of alibi, contention of the petitioner is that
he was not present in Delhi on the night of 16.12.2012 and that he
accompanied his sister-in-law Sarita Devi (DW-15) along with her
son Kundan. He boarded Mahabodhi Express on 15.12.2012 and
left for Aurangabad, Bihar from Platform No.9, New Delhi Railway
Station. Contention of the petitioner that the evidence adduced by
the petitioner to prove his presence in the Karmalahang, P.S.
Thandva, District-Aurangabad, that is the evidence of DW-1, local
auto driver, DW-12-Sarju Singh who has spoken about the petitioner
reaching his house in his native village on 16.12.2012 and DW-13-
Rajmohan, father-in-law of petitioner and DW-14-Punita Devi, wife
of petitioner who have deposed that the petitioner came to their
house in the native village Karmalahang along with Sarita Devi
(DW-15), would show that the petitioner was not present in Delhi on
the night of 16.12.2012. It was submitted that though the defence
has showed booked ticket details of Mahabodhi Express from New
Delhi to Aurangabad on 15.12.2012 to prove the departure of the
petitioner, this aspect was not appreciated by the court and the
petitioner’s plea of alibi was erroneously turned down.
24. To substantiate the plea of alibi, the petitioner has examined
DW-11-Chavinder, Auto Driver who has taken the petitioner and his
15
family members from Anugrah Narayan Railway Station, DistrictAurangabad, Bihar to his native village, Karmalahang. DW-12-Sarju
Singh, DW-13-Rajmohan, father-in-law of petitioner and DW-14-wife
of the petitioner have spoken about the presence of petitioner in the
village. DW-15-Sister-in-law of petitioner whom the petitioner claims
had accompanied her on 15.12.2012. Considering the evidence of
DWs 12, 14 and 15 in Para (256), this Court has observed that DWs
12, 14 and 15 are all relatives of accused Akshay Kumar Singh alias
Thakur and that as observed by both the courts, they tried to wriggle
the petitioner out of the messy situation as is the natural instinct of
the family members.
25. The plea of alibi taken by the petitioner-accused and the
evidence adduced by the petitioner has been well-considered by
this Court in Paras (247) to (269). Upon appreciation of evidence,
this Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and the High Court
rejecting the plea of alibi and held that plea of alibi taken by the
petitioner is an afterthought. We do not find any error apparent on
the face of the record in consideration of evidence and rejection of
the plea of alibi. The appreciation of evidence in rejecting the plea of
alibi does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the
record and this cannot be urged as a ground for review.
16
26. The next contention urged by the petitioner is the use of iron
rod and absence of injury to the uterus on the alleged insertion of
the iron rod in the private parts of the victim. Elaborate submissions
were made on the alleged use of iron rod and the same was
rejected by well-considered reasonings in Paras (193) to (209) and
(413) to (422) and the said findings thereon supported by the
opinion of the medical expert do not suffer from any error.
27. The other contentions viz. (i) CCTV footage of Hotel Delhi
Airport was not properly examined; (ii) the bus bearing registration
No.DL-1PC-0149 was falsely implicated; (iii) PW-81-owner of the
bus was in judicial custody for six months before his examination in
the court and he was so detained in custody only to bring pressure
upon him to depose in favour of the prosecution; and (iv) the
petitioner-accused was photographed earlier and the same was
shown to PW-1 to enable him to identify the petitioner-accused in
the test identification parade. These contentions and other
contentions assailing the case of the prosecution were all raised
earlier and upon consideration of evidence, the same were rejected
by this Court. The review petition is not for re-hearing of the appeal
on reappreciation of the evidence over and over again. A party is
17
not entitled to seek review of the judgment merely for the purpose of
rehearing of the appeal and a fresh decision.
28. On the question of award of death sentence, the Court has
considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In Paras
(322) to (368) and (511) to (518) of the judgment, while considering
the question of death sentence, opportunity was granted to the
petitioner accused and also other accused to file their affidavits as
to their family background, criminal antecedents, possibility of
reformation and such other relevant factors. The petitioner accused
through his counsel, Mr. A.P. Singh has filed an affidavit stating his
family background and stating that he has no criminal antecedent
and that his case is not falling under “the rarest of rare cases” to
affirm the death sentence, which contention was considered and
rejected. The aggravating and mitigating circumstance and the
affidavit filed by the petitioner was considered in detail in Para
(324). The contention urged by the counsel for the parties and
learned amicus curiae were considered in paras (327) to (368) and
(511) to (518) of the judgment and the court observed that the
background and family circumstances cannot be taken as the
mitigating circumstances. Considering the manner in which the
offence was committed, in the judgment dated 05.05.2017, this
Court held that the case is falling within “the rarest of rare cases”.
18
We do not find that these findings suffer from any error apparent on
the face of the record. The mitigating circumstances elaborated
upon by the defence by way of highlighting the comparatively young
age of the convicts, their socio-economic background, their
unblemished antecedents and their chances of reformation, fade
into insignificance. In light of the aggravating circumstances and
considering that the case falls within the category of “rarest of rare
cases”, the death penalty is confirmed.
29. Insofar as the submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner-accused that the death penalty has been abolished in UK
and several other Latin American countries and Australian States,
the same contentions were raised by Mr. A.P. Singh in the earlier
review petitions and the same were dismissed. [vide Mukesh v.
State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 8 SCC 149 and Vinay Sharma and
another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others (2018) 8 SCC 186]
30. Dismissal of the review petitions filed by the co-accused:
The review petition filed by the co-accused were dismissed as
having no merit, on 09.07.2018 Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2018) 8 SCC 149. The court observed that the submissions urged
by the other accused were already considered while delivering the
19
judgment and were rejected. The same points were earlier raised in
the review petitions filed by other co-accused. The grounds raised in
the present review petition are almost repetition of the arguments
raised in the earlier review petitions which were rejected and in our
view, cannot be raised repeatedly.
31. We do not find any error apparent on the face of the record in
the appreciation of evidence or the findings of the judgment dated
05.05.2017. None of the grounds raised in the review petition call
for review of the judgment dated 05.05.2017. The review petition is
dismissed.
..……………………..J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
.………………………..J.
 [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
....……………………..J.
 [A. S. BOPANNA]
New Delhi;
December 18, 2019.
20

Government Grants Act 1895= State government formulated a scheme to allow conversion of residential leasehold plots under the GA Department within the area of Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation into freehold land. The policy, inter alia, contained the following condition: “Lessees who have encroached or unauthorisedly occupied government land anywhere within Bhubaneswar municipal corporation limits would not be eligible to be covered under the scheme unless they vacate the unauthorised occupation.=The submission of an application does not confer a vested right for permission. The applicant must comply with the terms of the policy. One of the terms in the policy in question is that the applicant should not have encroached on government land. An applicant who seeks the benefit of the policy must comply with its terms. In the present case, the policy which was formulated by the State government specifically contained a stipulation to the effect that a lessee, who had encroached upon or unauthorisedly occupied government land anywhere within Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation limits would not be eligible to be covered by the scheme unless the unauthorised occupation is vacated.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 9521 of 2019
 (Arising out of SLP(C) No 30220 of 2019)
(D No 45004 of 2018)
State of Odisha & Ors .... Appellant(s)

Versus
Bichitrananda Das ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 Leave granted.
3 This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High
Court of Orissa dated 12 January 2018.
4 On 30 September 1981, a lease of a plot bearing No F/37
admeasuring 75 feet by 100 feet described as Drawing No BS-136 (R)
Mouza-Nayapalli, Bhubaneswar, was granted to the respondent by the
State Government in the General Administration Department1
 for a period
of ninety years under the Government Grants Act 1895. On 18 July 2003,
1 “GA Department”
2
the State government formulated a scheme to allow conversion of
residential leasehold plots under the GA Department within the area of
Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation into freehold land. The policy, inter
alia, contained the following condition:
“Lessees who have encroached or unauthorisedly occupied government
land anywhere within Bhubaneswar municipal corporation limits would
not be eligible to be covered under the scheme unless they vacate the
unauthorised occupation.
5 On 15 September 2003, the respondent applied for conversion of the
leasehold plot to freehold. In response to the application, the Revenue
Inspector in the GA Department recorded on 22 November 2003 that:
“Order on the above file I have visited to the site of Drawing Plot No. N/4-
37/F (75x100). Drawing No.BS-136 (R), Nayapalli, corresponding to the
1991-92 Final Settlement Revenue Plot No. 100/3090 Area ACO. 172
under Khata no.1020 n Unit XVI, MZ – Jayadev Vihar and Board, two
storied building has been constructed as per approval building plan. But
lessee has encroached Govt. land (which was kept as open space) in
front of the plot, 60 x 63, by way of illegible fence and Garden. Lessee
may be asked to vacate the encroachment.” (Emphasis supplied)
6 On 13 May 2004, the respondent was directed by the Land Officer in
the GA Department to vacate the area of unauthorised occupation,
recording thus:
“In inviting a reference to the subject cited above, I am directed to say
that during the field enquiry it has come to the notice that you have
unauthorizedly occupied Govt. Land measuring 60’ x 63’ by covering
barbed wire fencing and using the same for garden purpose.
You are therefore, requested to vacate the above land immediately and
report compliance within 15 days for consideration of your conversion
application.” (Emphasis supplied)
3
7 Four years later, On 6 August 2008, the respondent addressed a
communication to the Land Officer with reference to the letter dated 13
May 2004, stating that he had already sent a reply on 19 April 2006, a copy
of which was enclosed stating that there existed no barbed wire fencing
and “no encroachment now exists”. The letter dated 19 April 2006,
however, contained a statement that:
“But I am told that in a communication (not received by me) I have been
asked to vacate a portion of Government land reportedly occupied by me
unauthorisedly with barbet wire fencing.” (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, though in his letter dated 6 August 2008, the respondent stated
that he had already furnished a reply on 19 April 2006 to the letter dated 13
May 2004, meaning thereby, that the letter dated 13 May 2004 was in
possession of the respondent when he submitted the reply, the purported
letter dated 19 April 2006 suggested that the communication had not been
received. Be that as it may, on 21 December 2009, the respondent wrote
a letter to the Directorate of Estates stating that no barbed wire fencing or
encroachment existed at present around his plot. On 28 December 2009,
proceedings were initiated against the respondent by issuing a notice
under Section 4(1) of the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act 19722
. By the notice, the respondent was called upon to
show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be made.
8 Subsequently, on 30 June 2010, in response to a representation
dated 21 December 2009, the GA Department was directed to re-enquire.
On 30 June 2010, the following position was indicated upon verification:
2 “Act”
4
“Verified the land bearing training Plot No. N-4/F-37 of MT Jayadevihar
Unit No. 16 and on field verification the encroachment reported earlier
has not been vacated now.” (Emphasis supplied)
9 On 11 November 2010, the respondent once again sought a decision
on his application for conversion, stating that:
“I have responded to the above objection clearly indicating that the
reported encroached area is completely outside my pucca compound
wall. This area is not covered with any barbed wire fencing as alleged.
There is no construction whatsoever. The area is covered with some
green plantation. Moreover the vacant area is always available to G.A.
Department” (Emphasis supplied)
10 On 23 February 2011, the Land Officer in the GA Department visited
the site and submitted a report that there was no barbed wire fencing on
the encroached site, but that the respondent had put up a temporary
fencing and a small iron grill gate for access to the encroached area. On 2
August 2013, the respondent once again sought conversion to freehold.
On 2 September 2013, the respondent was directed to file a declaration, in
a communication of the Deputy Secretary to the Government, GA
Department which read as follows:
“In inviting a reference to your application dated 02.08.2013, I am
directed to inform you that, you are required to file a registered
declaration to the effect that, you have not fenced the Govt. land in front
of your lease plot. You should indicate the declaration that, you would
not claim long possession on the said land even after conversion is
allowed. The sketch map of the said land is enclosed herewith for
preparing the declaration. Your request for conversion will be
considered only after submission of the said declaration.”
 (Emphasis supplied)
11 On 22 March 2014, the competent officer in the GA Department
submitted a report indicating the following position at the site:
Lessee Sri B.N. Das has made compound wall over his allotted land and
one, single storied RCC building exist over the said land. Lessee with
5
his family is residing there in residential purposes.
Earlier reported regarding encroachment reveals that there is no barbed
fence now. Only open plantation exists over Government land available
in between road and allottee’s plot. The said plantation may not be
treated as encroachment. Copy of photograph is enclosed herewith for
reference.” (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, the conversion fee was recomputed.
12 Eventually, on 9 April 2014, the Director of Estates called upon the
respondent to submit an affidavit that he had not encroached on
government land nor would he claim possession in future. The respondent
submitted an affidavit on 21 April 2014. Consequently, permission was
granted on 5 May 2014 for conversion of the land from leasehold to
freehold, conditional on a deposit of an amount of Rs 13,25,758.
13 The respondent moved a writ petition3
 before the High Court of Orissa
challenging the communications dated 5 May 2014 and 9 December 2014
(the latter having rejected the plea of the respondent for recomputing the
conversion fees on the basis of the rate prevalent in 2003). A counter
affidavit was filed by the State. The High Court, by its impugned judgment
and order, allowed the writ petition and directed the State to recompute the
conversion fees as on the date of the making of the application on 15
September 2003.
14 Aggrieved by the direction of the High Court, the State is in appeal
before us.
3W P (C) No 8159 of 2015
6
15 Mr V Giri, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants, submitted that the rates chargeable for the conversion from
leasehold to freehold would be those which govern on the date when the
application has been decided. Learned counsel relied on the decision of
this Court in Chennai Metropolitan Developoment Authority v Prestige
Estates Project Ltd4
. Mr Giri submitted that as the record would indicate
in the present case, an encroachment had been made by the respondent
adjacent to his leasehold plot and, in terms of the applicable policy, the
respondent was required to remove the encroachment. It was urged,
relying on the correspondence which has been referred to above, that the
respondent responded to the communication dated 13 May 2004 only on 6
August 2008 and that the purported communication dated 19 April 2006
appears to be an ante-dated document. Be that as it may, it was urged
that as a matter of principle it was not open to the respondent to claim that
the conversion charges be computed on the basis of the rate prevalent on
the date of the application. The application for conversion could be
considered only in terms of the policy frame by the government and one of
its conditions was that the applicant should not be in unauthorized
occupation of government land.
16 On the other hand, it has been urged by Mr Santosh Raut, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that, as a matter of fact, the
case of the respondent was that there was no encroachment whatsoever
on the land, which was clarified in the letters dated 19 April 2006 and 6
August 2008. Learned counsel submitted that, at the highest, only a
4 2019 SCC OnLine SC 931
7
plantation had been made outside the leasehold plot and this could not
have been treated as an encroachment. Hence, it was urged on behalf of
the respondent that where the State had taken an inordinately long time to
consider the application, there was no justification or reason to saddle the
respondent with the increased rates which were payable as on the date on
which the decision was ultimately taken. Hence, it was further urged that
the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that the rate as on
the date of the application must be the governing rate for computing the
conversion charges.
17 In the recent decision of this Court in Chennai Metropolitan
Developoment Authority (supra), this Court relied upon a line of
precedents emanating from the Court, including the decisions in State of
Tamil Nadu v Hind Stone5 and Howrah Municipal Corporation v
Ganges Rope Co Ltd6
. The submission of an application does not confer
a vested right for permission. The applicant must comply with the terms of
the policy. One of the terms in the policy in question is that the applicant
should not have encroached on government land. An applicant who seeks
the benefit of the policy must comply with its terms. In the present case,
the policy which was formulated by the State government specifically
contained a stipulation to the effect that a lessee, who had encroached
upon or unauthorisedly occupied government land anywhere within
Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation limits would not be eligible to be
covered by the scheme unless the unauthorised occupation is vacated.
5 (1981) 2 SCC 205
6 (2004) 1 SCC 663
8
18 The record shows that on 13 May 2004, the Land Officer informed the
respondent that he was unauthorisedly in occupation of land admeasuring
60’ x 63’ which had been covered by barbed wire fencing, which was being
used for the purpose of a garden. The respondent addressed a
communication on 6 August 2008, stating that he had already replied to the
letter dated 13 May 2004 on 19 April 2006. The letter dated 19 April 2006
is carefully worded and states that “no barbed wire fencing and “no
encroachment now exists”. Interestingly, a copy of the earlier letter dated
19 April 2006 was annexed to the communication dated 6 August 2008.
However, the purported letter dated 19 April 2006 contains a statement
that the respondent had been told that in a communication, which had not
been received by him, he had been asked to vacate a portion of the
government land, which had been occupied unauthorisedly with a barbed
wire fencing. The contents of the letter dated 6 August 2008 do not square
up with the purported communication dated 19 April 2006. Be that as it
may, it is evident from the communications that it was his case that no
encroachment existed “at present”. Eventually, a notice to show cause
had to be issued to the respondent under the Act on 28 December 2009.
The State has placed on record a copy of the inspection report of 30 June
2010 which indicates that the encroachment had not been vacated. It was
in this view of the matter that the State called upon the respondent to
furnish a declaration that the encroachment had been removed and that he
would not claim possession of the adjacent land even after conversion was
allowed. Eventually, on 22 March 2014, it was stated that while an open
plantation existed over the land, the plantation may not be treated as an
9
encroachment.
19 In this background, we are of the view that there was no justification
for the High Court to direct that the rate for the computation of conversion
charges should be that which was applicable on the submission of an
application on 15 September 2003. The application for conversion from
leasehold to freehold must necessarily be consistent with and compliant to
the governing provisions of the policy which has been framed by the State
government. Unless compliance is effected, there is no right to claim
conversion of the land to freehold. Consequently, we are of the view that
the High Court was in error in directing the State to recompute the
conversion charges as on 15 September 2003. The respondent would
necessarily have to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final
decision was taken after due verification that there was no encroachment
and after scrutinizing the declaration which was filed by the respondent.
20 A period of nearly twelve years has elapsed in the meantime. It is
significant that the respondent moved the writ proceedings before the High
court only in 2015. If the grievance of the respondent was that the State
had not taken any action on his representations, he ought to have moved
the writ proceedings at an earlier point of time seeking a decision on his
application. Having himself waited until 2015 to seek a declaration from
the High Court, the respondent cannot claim that the conversion charges
should be fixed as on the date of the application, namely, 15 September
2003.
10
20 For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The writ petition filed by
the respondent shall stand dismissed. However, we direct that in the event
that the respondent complies with the directions contained in the
communication of the State government by which the conversion charges
were computed and makes the necessary payment, the application shall
be processed expeditiously so as to facilitate the grant of conversion of the
land from leasehold to freehold. There shall be no order as to costs.
 …………...…...….......………………........J.
 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
 [Hrishikesh Roy]
New Delhi;
December 18, 2019
11
ITEM NO.15 COURT NO.8 SECTION XI-A
 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 45004/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 12-01-2018
in WPC No. 8159/2015 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack)
THE STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. Petitioner(s)
 VERSUS
BICHITRANANDA DAS Respondent(s)
(WITH IA No. 22402/2019 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING, IA No.
22403/2019 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN REFILING / CURING THE
DEFECTS, IA No. 22404/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT)
Date : 18-12-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY
For Petitioner(s) Mr. V. Giri, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Suvendu Suvasis Dash, AOR
Ms. Swati Vaibhav, Adv.
Mr. Nabab Singh, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Santosh Raut, Adv.
 Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR
Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Adv.
Ms. Pallavi, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
 O R D E R
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment. There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
 (SANJAY KUMAR-I) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
 AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

Nirbhaya Fund = (1) whether Courts are recommending the District Legal Service Authority or the State Legal Service Authority for compensation in appropriate cases? (2) whether the amount of interim or final compensation is being provided to the victims in time bound manner? (3) whether the above-mentioned Scheme of 2018 or suitably amended Scheme, has been implemented by the states for rehabilitation of victims of rape? 17 (4) whether the SLSA or NLSA has formulated any scheme for social, medical and economic rehabilitation of the victim? (5) whether any state has prepared a policy with regard to the counselling of the victim and medical, social and in some cases, economic rehabilitation of the victim? (6) whether there are any counselling/rehabilitation centres in existence for the victims of rape?

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
SMW (CRL.) No(s).04 OF 2019
IN RE : ASSESSMENT OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN RESPONSE TO
SEXUAL OFFENCES Petitioner (s)
VERSUS
Respondent (s)
O R D E R
1. Post Nirbhaya incident, which shocked the conscience
of the nation, many amendments were introduced in criminal
law redefining the ambit of offences, providing for
effective and speedy investigation and trial. Still, the
statistics would reveal that desired results could not be
achieved. As per the latest report of National Crime
Records Bureau of Crime in India in the year 2017, total
32,559 cases of rape were registered in India.
2. The delay in such matters has, in recent times,
created agitation, anxiety and unrest in the minds of the
people. The Nirbhaya case is not an isolated case where it
has taken so long to reach finality. In fact, it is said
2
that it has been one of the cases where agencies have acted
swiftly taking into account the public outrage.
3. We are, therefore, of the view that it is necessary to
take stock of the implementation of provisions of criminal
law, including the said amendments, relating to rape cases
and other sexual offences. It is necessary to call for
information with regard to status of affairs at ground
level from various dutyholders like investigation agencies,
prosecution, medico-forensic agencies, rehabilitation,
legal aid agencies and also Courts to get a holistic view
to make criminal justice system responsive in the cases of
this nature.
4. The criminal law is set into motion by registration of
the FIR. Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. provides about the
information in cognizable cases and in effect registration
of First Information Reports. The first Proviso to the subSection (1) of Section 154 inserted by the Amendment Act of
2013 and subsequently amended by the Amendment Act of 2018,
provides for registration of First Information Report in
cases of rape and sexual offences by a woman police officer
or any woman officer. It is further provided that if the
victim is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically
disabled, the first information shall be recorded by a
police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to
report such offence or at a convenient place of such
3
persons choice, in the presence of a special educator or an
interpreter and the recording of such information may be
videographed. It is also provided that the police officer
shall get the statement of such person recorded by a
Judicial Magistrate under Section 164, as soon as possible.
5. As law laid down in the case of Lalita Kumari v.
Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, the police is dutybound
to register the offence based upon the information given by
the victim/informant in case of cognizable offence.
In addition to this, the statements of the victim
under Section 161 are required to be recorded by a woman
police officer or any woman officer.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following: -
(1) whether all the Police Stations have a woman
police officer or woman officer to record the
information of the victim?
(2) In case, an information relating to offence of
rape received at a Police Station, reveals that
the place of commission of the offence is beyond
its territorial jurisdiction, whether in such
cases FIR without crime number are being
recorded?
(3) whether provisions are available for recording of
first information by a woman police officer or a
4
woman officer at the residence of the victim or
any other place of choice of such person in case
the victim is temporarily or permanently mentally
or physically disabled?
(4) whether all the District Police Units have the
details of special educator or an interpreter in
case of a mentally or physically disabled victim?
(5) whether the police department of states or union
territories have issued any circulars to make
provision of videography of the recording of
statements and depository of the same?
(6) whether any state has published guidelines in the
shape of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to be
followed for responding after receipt of the
information relating to case of rape and similar
offences?
6. By the Amendment Act of 2013, a new provision of
Section 166A made the failure of a public servant to record
any information of such offences, as prescribed, under subSection 1 of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., a punishable
offence, prescribing both rigorous imprisonment and fine
for the guilty.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following:-
(1) whether any case has been registered under the
Section 166A of IPC against any public servant?
5
(2) whether there is any mechanism in place to
complain about the non-recording of information
by the officer giving cause to offence under
Section 166A with any other institution/office,
other than the concerned police station?
7. Medical treatment and examination of the victim is a
very important aspect not only for the immediate relief to
the victim but also provides intrinsic evidences for the
trial. Amendments in this regard have been inserted by the
Amendment Acts of 2013 and 2018, whereby the newly
introduced Section 357C of Cr.P.C. has sought to fix
liability on medical institutions, both public or private
to provide medical treatment free of cost to the victims of
such offences as prescribed, together with a duty to inform
the police of such incident. Failure to comply with the
above provision has also been made an offence punishable
under Section 166B of IPC.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following:-
(1) whether any advisory or guidelines have been
issued by the authorities to all the hospitals
and medical centres in this regard?
(2) whether any case has been registered against any
person under Section 166B of IPC?
8. The manner in which the medical report of the victim
is prepared is also a matter of concern. The Amendment Act
6
of 2013 has inserted a new provision, i.e. Section 164A in
this regard, which provides for the manner of medical
examination as well as the guidelines for preparation of
medical report. Other than the above information, many a
times valuable information in consonance with the
definition of rape as amended by the Act of 2013 are not
supplied.
9. Also, vide the Amendment Act of 2013, Section 53A was
inserted in the Evidence Act, 1872. It provides that the
evidence of character of the victim and of such person’s
previous sexual experience with any persons shall not be
relevant on the issue of such consent or the quality of
consent. The effect of above provision is that previous
sexual experience and in effect the habituation to sexual
intercourse is now irrelevant for the purpose medical
examination. Still, we come across the medical opinion
such as “the victim is habitual of sexual intercourse” and
the opinion suggesting possibility of consent on the basis
of her previous sexual exposure.
10. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government
of India had prepared “Guidelines & Protocols: Medicolegal care for survivors/victims of sexual violence”.
11. The Ministry of Women and Child Development has
designed a Medical Kit for examination of the victim and
the accused in cases of rape. The Union Government and the
7
State Government have not provided this medical kit to all
the Primary Health Centers or Community Health Centers.
This Medico Forensic Kit is essential for collection of
Medical/DNA evidence.
12. Further, Per-Vaginum examination commonly referred to
as 'Two-finger test' has been held to be of no consequence
and violative of the dignity of woman. In the case of
Lillu alias Rajesh and Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2013)
14 SCC 643 it was observed as follows:-
“In view of International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
1966; United Nations Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power 1985, rape
survivors are entitled to legal recourse
that does not re-traumatize them or
violate their physical or mental
integrity and dignity. They are also
entitled to medical procedures conducted
in a manner that respects their right to
consent. Medical procedures should not be
carried out in a manner that constitutes
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
and health should be of paramount
consideration while dealing with genderbased violence. The State is under an
obligation to make such services
available to survivors of sexual
violence. Proper measures should be taken
to ensure their safety and there should
be no arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy.
Thus, in view of the above,
undoubtedly, the two-finger test and its
interpretation violates the right of rape
survivors to privacy, physical and mental
integrity and dignity.”
8
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following:-
(1) whether the Medical Opinion in the cases relating
to rape and similar offences is being given in
compliance with the mandate of Section 164A of
Cr.P.C.?
(2) whether the Medical Opinion in the cases relating
to rape and similar offences is being given in
tune with definition of rape under Section 375 of
IPC as it stands today?
(3) whether the states have adopted the Guidelines &
Protocols of The Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, Government of India or have they
prepared their own Guidelines & Protocols?
(4) whether requisite Medico-forensic kit are
available with all the hospitals/health centres
run by the Government or by local authorities?
(5) whether the medical experts have done away with
the Per-Vaginum examination commonly referred to
as 'Two-finger test' and whether any directions
have been issued by the states in this regard?
(6) whether medical experts have done away with the
practice of giving opinion on the previous sexual
experience of the victim or any directions have
been issued by the states in this regard?
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(7) whether lady medical practioners, if mandated,
are available at all district and sub-divisional
headquarters to draw up the medical examination
report of the victim?
13. Forensic examination and report play an important role
during the investigation as well as trial for linking the
culprit with the crime. With the advancement of the DNA
science and its accuracy, the sampling for the purpose of
Forensic examination and expeditious reports after due
examination are vital to the just adjudication of the case.
The sampling for the purpose of DNA test as well other
forensic tests like forensic odontology is essential in
cases relating to rape.
14. In relation to the examination of the accused, Section
53A of Cr.P.C. provides for timely examination and guidance
for preparation of medical report.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following: -
(1) whether there is any Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) or Protocol for taking samples for Forensic
DNA, Forensic odontology and other forensics for
Medical Practitioners?
(2) whether there are adequate number of equipped
Forensic Laboratories at least one at every
10
Division Level to conduct forensic DNA and
Forensic odontology analysis regionally?
(3) subject to availability, whether Central
Government has notified sufficient number of
Government scientific expert other than already
specified under Section 293 of Cr.P.C.?
15. Section 173 (1A) Cr.P.C. provides that the
investigation in relation to an offence under Section 376,
376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376Db or 376 E of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be completed within
two months from the date on which the information was
recorded by the police officer in charge of the Police
Station.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following:-
(1) whether police is completing the investigation and
submitting the final report within a period of two
months from the date of recording of information
of the offence and if no, reasons for delay?
(2) whether sufficient number of women police officers
are available to conduct investigation into the
offences relating to rape and other sexual
offences?
16. Sub-Section (5A) of Section 164, Cr.P.C. provides for
recording of statement of the victim by the Court. Other
11
than recording of statements under Section 164, for the
purpose of recording of statements during the trial,
Section 119 of Evidence Act provides for assistance of an
interpreter or a special educator in recording the
statement of the witness unable to speak but capable to
give evidence in any other manner. It further provides
that such statement shall be video graphed.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following:-
(1) whether the police is taking the victim for
recording of the statements as soon as the
commission of the offence is brought to the
notice of police?
(2) whether the Magistrate Courts or the trial courts
have the availability of the interpreter or
special educator in each Districts?
(3) whether the Magistrate Courts or the trial Courts
have the facility of videography of the
statements and depository of the same in the
Courts?
17. Section 26 clause (a)(iii) of Cr.P.C. provides for
trial of such offences to be conducted by a Court presided
over by a woman judge, as far as practicable. Further,
Second proviso to sub-Section 327(2) of Cr.P.C. also
mandates that in camera trial shall be conducted, as far as
12
practicable, by a woman Judge or Magistrate. It must be
noted that the insertion of the above proviso has a very
important object and the rider of “as far as practicable”
cannot be used to overcome the mandate in ordinary manner.
18. The need for speedy trial of the cases relating to
offence of rape has been emphasized again and again this
Court. The proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 309
mandates that the inquiry of trial shall, as far as
possible, be completed within a period of two months from
the date of filing of the charge-sheet.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following: -
(1) whether trial of cases relating to rape are being
conducted by Courts presided over by a woman?
(2) whether sufficient number of lady judges are
available to preside over the Courts dealing with
sexual offences and rape?
(3) whether all courts holding trial of cases
relating to offence of rape have requisite
infrastructure and are conducting in camera
trial?
(4) whether the trial relating to cases of rape is
being completed within a period of two months
from the date of filing of charge-sheet, if not,
the reasons for the delay? 
13
(5) whether sufficient number of special Courts have
been established to deal exclusively with the
cases of rape and other sexual offences?
19. Under Section 230 of Cr.P.C., a trial program is
generally prepared on the application of the prosecution.
This Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Rasheed, AIR
2019 SC 721 has held as followings:-
“The following practice guidelines should
be followed by trial courts in the
conduct of a criminal trial, as far as
possible:
i. a detailed case-calendar must be
prepared at the commencement of the trial
after framing of charges;
ii. the case-calendar must specify the
dates on which the examination-in-chief
and cross-examination (if required) of
witnesses is to be conducted;
iii. the case-calendar must keep in view
the proposed order of production of
witnesses by parties, expected time
required for examination of witnesses,
availability of witnesses at the relevant
time, and convenience of both the
prosecution as well as the defence, as
far as possible;
iv. testimony of witnesses deposing on
the same subject matter must be
proximately scheduled;
v. the request for deferral under Section
231(2) of the Cr.P.C. must be preferably
made before the preparation of the case
calendar;
vi. the grant for request of deferral
must be premised on sufficient reasons
justifying the deferral of crossexamination of each witness, or set of
witnesses;
vii. while granting a request for
deferral of cross-examination of any
14
witness, the trial courts must specify a
proximate date for the cross-examination
of that witness, after the examinationin-chief of such witness(es) as has been
prayed for;
viii. the case-calendar, prepared in
accordance with the above guidelines,
must be followed strictly, unless
departure from the same becomes
absolutely necessary;
ix. in cases where trial courts have
granted a request for deferral, necessary
steps must be taken to safeguard
witnesses from being subjected to undue
influence, harassment or intimidation.”
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following: -
(1) whether case-calendar as envisaged in the
Rasheed case is being prepared by the Trial
Courts keeping in mind the time line of two
months mandated by Section 309 of Cr.P.C.?
(2) whether the attendance of the witnesses is being
ensured by the Prosecution to ensure the
examination of witnesses on the fixed dates?
(3) whether any guidelines have been issued by Bar
Councils or Associations urging the Advocates to
assist the Court in completion of trial within
the stipulated period?
(4) whether special exclusive permanent trial courts
have been created in the state to deal with cases
relating to rape and sexual assaults?
15
(5) whether any High Court has constituted Special
Bench for expeditious hearing of appeal in these
cases?
20. The protection of witness during the investigation and
trial is essential in cases of this sensitive nature. Many
a times the accused live in proximity of the victim. The
possibility of tampering with evidence and pressurizing the
witness affects fair trial.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following:-
(1) whether any policy of victim/witness protection
in the cases relating to rape is framed and
implemented?
(2) whether police protection is being provided to
the victim during investigation and trial of the
offence?
(3) whether there are special waiting room in the
Court premises for victim/witnesses of cases
relating to offence rape?
(4) whether the trial Courts have taken appropriate
measures to ensure that victim woman is not
confronted by the accused during the trial as
mandated by Section 273 Cr.P.C.?
21. Section 357A(2) Cr.P.C. provides for award of
compensation to the victims. The District Legal Service
16
Authority or the State Legal Service Authority are bound to
decide as to the quantum of compensation to the victim on
the recommendation of the Court. By the order of this Court
in W.P. (C) 565/2012 titled Nipun Saxena v. Union of India,
the National Legal Services Authority, New Delhi had
prepared a Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors
of Sexual Assault/other Crimes – 2018. This scheme has been
circulated among all states for necessary actions. The
Scheme comprehensively provides for the rehabilitation and
compensation for the victims of Rape.
22. As the victim goes through a mental trauma and
requires immediate counselling, legal aid and medical,
social and in some cases, economic rehabilitation.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following: -
(1) whether Courts are recommending the District
Legal Service Authority or the State Legal
Service Authority for compensation in appropriate
cases?
(2) whether the amount of interim or final
compensation is being provided to the victims in
time bound manner?
(3) whether the above-mentioned Scheme of 2018 or
suitably amended Scheme, has been implemented by
the states for rehabilitation of victims of rape?
17
(4) whether the SLSA or NLSA has formulated any
scheme for social, medical and economic
rehabilitation of the victim?
(5) whether any state has prepared a policy with
regard to the counselling of the victim and
medical, social and in some cases, economic
rehabilitation of the victim?
(6) whether there are any counselling/rehabilitation
centres in existence for the victims of rape?
23. In the year 2013, a separate fund namely Nirbhaya Fund
for projects of women safety to support initiatives by
government and NGOs was created, and it is important to
inform ourselves how far has the purpose of setting up the
fund been achieved.
Thus, we consider it appropriate to call for status
report with regard to the following: -
(1) Utilization of the Nirbhaya Fund by Central or
State Government(s) for the purposes envisioned?
24. Let the matter be registered as Suo Motu Writ Petition
Criminal with the caption “Assessment of the Criminal
Justice System in response to Sexual Offences”.
25. In order to collate all the information and status and
provide a holistic view of implementation of provisions of
law and to suggest measures for making the criminal justice
system more efficacious and responsive towards the offence
18
of rape and other sexual offences, we request Shri Sidharth
Luthra, Senior Advocate to assist the Court as Amicus
Curiae in the matter.
26. The learned Solicitor General is requested to extend
all co-operation to the Amicus Curiae in this regard.
27. The Secretary General, Supreme Court of India shall
also extend co-operation in respect of calling for
information and status reports from the Chief Secretary and
the Director General of Police of all the States, the
Registrar General of all the High Courts and other
functionaries, as may be required.
Let the matter be listed on 07.02.2020.
……………………………………CJI
 [ S.A. BOBDE ]
………………………………………J.
 [ B.R. GAVAI ]
………………………………………J.
 [ SURYA KANT ]
New Delhi
December 18, 2019