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Monday, September 2, 2019

writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India have prayed for directing the University Grants Commission, (hereinafter referred to as ‘UGC’) to issue a clarification that the degrees of Bachelor of Technology (hereinafter referred to as ‘B.Tech.’) acquired by them through open and distance learning mode from the Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology, Patiala, (hereinafter referred to as ‘TIET, Patiala’) are valid, recognised and should be treated at par Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 2 of 35 with degrees granted to regular students who have undertaken such courses in TIET, Patiala and other recognised universities.= Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, this Court, took note of the order dated 29th December, 2012 issued by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India in view of the recommendations suggested in the Madhava Menon Committee report for regulating the standards of education being imparted through distance mode to hold that the unilateral approvals of the DEC were invalid. It was observed: “55. Para 3 of the notification dated 22.11.1991 which constituted DEC shows that there was no representation for any Member or representative of AICTE. The provisions of IGNOU Act show that the Study Centres as defined in the IGNOU Act are that of IGNOU and not of any other University or Institution. The concept of distance education under sub-clause (v) of Section 5 is also in relation to the academic programmes of IGNOU. It undoubtedly has powers under Clauses (vii), (xiii) Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 34 of 35 and (xxiii) to cooperate with other Universities but the IGNOU Act nowhere entitles IGNOU to be the Controlling Authority of the entire field of distance education of learning across the Country and in relation to programmes of other Universities or Institutions as well. The Order dated 29.12.2012 issued by MHRD therefore correctly appreciated that DEC created under statute 28 of IGNOU Act could not act as a regulator for other Universities. In any event of the matter, the policy Guidelines issued from time to time made it abundantly clear that DEC alone was not entitled to grant permission for open distance learning and appropriate permissions from the requisite authorities were always required and insisted upon. Despite such policy statements, DEC went on granting permissions without even consulting AICTE. Such exercise on part of DEC was completely without jurisdiction. The said order, the Court noted, had definitively vested the UGC and AICTE, among other statutory regulators, with powers to regulate technical courses imparted through distance learning mode and made it mandatory for institutions intending to impart such courses to seek their approval and recognition, observing as under: “[T]he Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 1 of section 20 of the UGC 1956 and the AICTE Act, 1987 hereby directs: - The UGC and AICTE as already empowered under their respective Acts, would also act as a regulator for Higher Education (excluding Technical Education) and Technical Education through open & Distance Learning (ODL) mode respectively Universities are empowered under their respective Act to offer any programme course including in Technical Education in the conventional mode. However, if they offer any Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 35 of 35 programme/course in ODL mode they would require recognition from the UGC, AICTE, NCTE and other such regulators of the conventional mode of education in those areas of study.” 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the present Writ Petition and the same is dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there would be no order as to costs.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 1 of 35
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1510 OF 2018
VINIT GARG AND OTHERS ….. PETITIONERS(S)
VERSUS
UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION
AND OTHERS ….. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
The petitioners, 92 in number, in this writ petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India have prayed for directing the
University Grants Commission, (hereinafter referred to as ‘UGC’)
to issue a clarification that the degrees of Bachelor of Technology
(hereinafter referred to as ‘B.Tech.’) acquired by them through
open and distance learning mode from the Thapar Institute of
Engineering and Technology, Patiala, (hereinafter referred to as
‘TIET, Patiala’) are valid, recognised and should be treated at par 
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 2 of 35
with degrees granted to regular students who have undertaken
such courses in TIET, Patiala and other recognised universities.
2. UGC is refusing to treat the technical degrees issued by TIET,
Patiala under distance learning mode as valid, primarily for the
reason that the B.Tech. courses conducted by TIET, Patiala were
without their approval and approval of the All India Council for
Technical Education (hereinafter referred to as ‘AICTE’).
3. The petitioners who are diploma holders in Civil/ Computer
Science/ Electrical/ Mechanical Engineering and working in the
Government of Punjab have stated that they were selected for the
B.Tech. degree course through the distance mode programme on
the basis of competitive examination conducted by TIET, Patiala,
which is deemed to be a university under Section 3 of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘UGC Act’). The petitioners highlight that TIET, Patiala, rated as
one of the premier engineering universities/colleges by the
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India,
was set up in 1956 for promoting the study of technical education
and has a 250 acre campus located in Patiala with teaching
faculty strength of 391, including 301 Ph.D. holders, and
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 3 of 35
undertakes 11 undergraduate courses and 23 postgraduate
courses. The total strength of students is more than 8000 with
nearly 700 research students doing Ph.D. The National
Assessment and Accreditation Council, an autonomous body
established by the Ministry of Human Resource Development,
Government of India, has accredited the said institution/deemed to
be university Grade ‘A’ status besides placing the institution in
Tier-I accreditation. Distance Education Council (hereinafter
referred to as ‘DEC’) vide its letter dated 3
rd September, 2007 had
granted provisional recognition to TIET, Patiala for offering
programmes through distance mode for a period of one year on
the basis of which TIET, Patiala had offered B.Tech. degree in
Civil / Computer Science / Electrical / Mechanical Engineering to
working professionals who already had a diploma and had at least
two years’ experience in the respective branches in engineering in
the academic years 2007-08 and 2008-09. No admissions were
made after 29
th July, 2009. The petitioners had taken admission
in the prestigious deemed to be university verily believing that all
approvals were in place. The petitioners, relying on the judgment
of this Court in Bharathidasan University and Another v. All
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 4 of 35
India Council for Technical Education and Others,
1 have
argued that a deemed to be university is not required to seek prior
approval of the AICTE to start a department for imparting a course
or a programme in technical education. Reference was made to
paragraph 49 of the judgment of this Court in Orissa Lift
Irrigation Corporation Limited v. Rabi Sankar Patro and
Others2
(hereinafter referred to as Orissa Lift Irrigation
Corporation Limited-I) to assert that TIET, Patiala, being a
premier institution authorised to undertake courses and issue
degrees in the aforesaid technical fields, was not required to take
any approval of the AICTE. Reliance was also placed on the
order and judgment dated 10th April, 2018 in Civil Appeal Nos.
3697-3698 of 2018 in Jawaharlal Nehru Technological
University v. The Chairman and Managing Director,
Transmission Corporation of Telangana Limited. There were
no off-campus centres or study centres and all instruction,
practicals and examinations were conducted on the campus of
TIET, Patiala using the same faculty and infrastructure as used in
the traditional B.Tech. courses. The studies were of high standard
as the students had to pass 42 subjects with practicals to earn the
1
(2001) 8 SCC 676
2
(2018) 1 SCC 468
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 5 of 35
degree. Out of 1168 students admitted to the B.Tech. courses
through distance learning mode, only 822 students were awarded
degree.
4. We may at the outset record that the petitioners have given up
and not raised the contention that the decision authored by one of
us (Uday Umesh Lalit, J.) in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-I is per incuriam for the ratio is contrary to the decision in
Bharathidasan University (supra). Indeed, such contention
cannot be accepted as the latter decision has been considered in
Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I.
5. We record our inability to accept the contentions raised by the
petitioners, for they are misconstruing the judgment of this Court
in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I which settles the
controversy beyond any doubt and debate.
6. The UGC Act was legislated for coordination and determination of
standards of higher education in India with commandment to the
UGC to take such steps as may be necessary for promotion and
coordination of higher education in universities and institutions.
The UGC, therefore, fixes and ensures maintenance of standards
in teaching, examination and research in higher education. To fix
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 6 of 35
and enforce these standards, the UGC has framed rules and
regulations, and issues guidelines under the UGC Act.
7. Referring to the UGC Act in Annamalai University Represented
by Registrar v. Secretary to Government, Information and
Tourism Department and Others,
3
this Court had observed that
no relaxation can be granted with regard to the basic things
necessary for conferment of a degree and if the mandatory
provisions are not complied with by an administering authority, the
action would be void. Decision of this Court in Annamalai
University (supra) has some relevance for it had examined the
interplay between the provisions of the UGC Act and Indira
Gandhi National Open University Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘Open University Act’) and the purported repugnance between
the two. The UGC Act, it was observed, was enacted to make
provisions for coordination and determination of standards in
universities and for this purpose, the UGC was established by the
Central Government in terms of Section 4 of the UGC Act with its
powers and functions laid down in Chapter III. Section 12 of the
UGC Act provides for functions of the UGC, relevant provisions of
which are reproduced as under:
3
(2009) 4 SCC 590
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 7 of 35
“12. Functions of the Commission.⎯It shall be the
general duty of the Commission to take, in
consultation with the Universities or other bodies
concerned, all such steps as it may think fit for the
promotion and co-ordination of University
education and for the determination and
maintenance of standards of teaching,
examination and research in Universities, and for
the purpose of performing its functions under this
Act, the Commission may⎯
x x x
(d) recommend to any University the measures
necessary for the improvement of University
education and advise the University upon the
action to be taken for the purpose of implementing
such recommendation;
x x x
(i) require a University to furnish it with such
information as may be needed relating to the
financial position of the University or the studies in
the various branches of learning undertaken in
that University, together with all the rules and
regulations relating to the standards of teaching
and examination in that University respecting each
of such branches of learning;”
Section 22 of the UGC Act relates to the rights of a
university/deemed university/institution to confer degrees and subsection (1) thereof reads as under:
“22. Right to confer degrees.⎯(1) The right of
conferring or granting degrees shall be exercised
only by a University established or incorporated by
or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State
Act or an institution deemed to be a University
under Section 3 or an institution specially
empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer or
grant degrees.”
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 8 of 35
In Annamalai University (supra), the Open University Act, it
was held, was enacted to establish and incorporate an open
university at the national level for the introduction and promotion
of open university and distance education systems in the
educational pattern of the country and for coordination and
determination of standards in such system. Recording the
contention that the distance education programme attenuates the
rigidity of the traditional system requiring attendance in class
rooms that disincentivises many learners, this Court in Annamalai
University (supra), referring to the UGC Act and the role of the
UGC, had observed as under:
“40. The UGC Act was enacted by Parliament in
exercise of its power under Entry 66 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India
whereas the Open University Act was enacted by
Parliament in exercise of its power under Entry 25
of List III thereof. The question of repugnancy of
the provisions of the said two Acts, therefore, does
not arise. It is true that the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of Open University Act shows that
the formal system of education had not been able
to provide an effective means to equalise
educational opportunities. The system is rigid inter
alia in respect of attendance in classrooms.
Combinations of subjects are also inflexible.
41. Was the alternative system envisaged under the
Open University Act in substitution of the formal
system is the question. In our opinion, in the
matter of ensuring the standard of education, it is
not. The distinction between a formal system and
informal system is in the mode and manner in
which education is imparted. The UGC Act was
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 9 of 35
enacted for effectuating co- ordination and
determination of standards in universities. The
purport and object for which it was enacted must
be given full effect.
42. The provisions of the UGC Act are binding on all
universities whether conventional or open. Its
powers are very broad. The Regulations framed
by it in terms of clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of subsection (1) of Section 26 are of wide amplitude.
They apply equally to open universities as also to
formal conventional universities. In the matter of
higher education, it is necessary to maintain
minimum standards of instructions. Such minimum
standards of instructions are required to be
defined by UGC. The standards and the coordination of work or facilities in universities must
be maintained and for that purpose required to be
regulated. The powers of UGC under Sections
26(1) (f) and 26(1) (g) are very broad in nature.
[...]”
8. Annamalai University (supra) makes a reference to an earlier
judgment in State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Adhiyaman
Educational and Research Institute and Others4
in which this
Court had, with regard the enactment of the UGC Act by
Parliament in exercise of power under Entry 66 of List-I, observed
as under:
“41. What emerges from the above discussion is as
follows:
(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry 66 of
the Union List of Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It
means harmonisation with a view to forge a
uniform pattern for a concerted action according to
4
(1995) 4 SCC 104
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 10 of 35
a certain design, scheme or plan of development.
It, therefore, includes action not only for removal
of disparities in standards but also for preventing
the occurrence of such disparities. It would,
therefore, also include power to do all things which
are necessary to prevent what would make
‘coordination’ either impossible or difficult. This
power is absolute and unconditional and in the
absence of any valid compelling reasons, it must
be given its full effect according to its plain and
express intention.”
Reference was also made to Osmania University
Teachers’ Association v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
Another5 wherein, with regard to the responsibility entrusted upon
the UGC under the UGC Act, it was held as under:
“30. The Constitution of India vests Parliament with
exclusive authority in regard to coordination and
determination of standards in institutions for higher
education. The Parliament has enacted the UGC
Act for that purpose. The University Grants
Commission has, therefore, a greater role to play
in shaping the academic life of the country. It shall
not falter or fail in its duty to maintain a high
standard in the universities. Democracy depends
for its very life on a high standard or general,
vocational and professional education.
Dissemination of learning with search for new
knowledge with discipline all round must be
maintained at all costs. It is hoped that University
Grants Commission will duly discharge its
responsibility to the nation and play an increasing
role to bring about the needed transformation in
the academic life of the Universities.”
5
(1987) 4 SCC 671
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 11 of 35
9. Accordingly, in Annamalai University (supra) it was held that the
UGC Act would prevail over the Open University Act, observing:
“59. The provisions of the UGC Act are not in conflict
with the provisions of the Open University Act. It
is beyond any cavil of doubt that the UGC Act
shall prevail over the Open University Act. It has,
however, been argued that the Open University
Act is a later Act. But we have noticed
hereinbefore that the nodal Ministry knew of the
provisions of both the Acts. The Regulations were
framed almost at the same time after passing of
the Open University Act. The Regulations were
framed at a later point of time. Indisputably, the
Regulations embrace within its fold the matters
covered under the Open University Act also.”
10. In Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, reference was
made to All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1989
(hereinafter referred to as ‘AICTE Act’) and distinction was drawn
between ‘technical education’ and ‘technical institution’ as defined
in Section 2(g) and 2(h) respectively to observe that functions of
the AICTE stipulated under sub-clauses (a), (d), (e), (f), (l) and (n)
of Section 10 of the AICTE Act are concerned with the broader
facets of ‘technical education’, while functions enumerated under
sub-clauses (k), (m), (p) and (q) deal with matters concerning
‘technical institutions’ and the functions as set out in sub-clauses
(g) and (o) apply to both ‘technical institutions’ and universities
imparting ‘technical education’. Sub-clauses (b), (d) and (f) of
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 12 of 35
Section 10 deal with, inter alia, coordination of the technical
education in the country at all levels; promoting innovation,
research and development, establishment of new technologies,
generation, adoption and adaptation of new technologies to meet
the development requirements; and promoting effecting link
between technical education and systems and other relevant
systems. Drawing on the distinction between ‘technical education’
and ‘technical institution’ and multifarious functions of the AICTE
prescribed by Section 10 of the AICTE Act, it was held that the
AICTE is the sole repository of power to lay down parameters or
qualitative norms for ‘technical education’ and it would, therefore,
not matter whether the term ‘technical institution’ would exclude a
university/deemed to be university. What should be course
content, what subjects should be taught and what should be the
length and duration of the courses as well as the manner in which
those courses be conducted is a part of the larger concept of
‘technical education’. Any idea or innovation in that field is also a
part of the concept of ‘technical education’ and must, as a matter
of principle, be in the exclusive domain of the AICTE.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 13 of 35
11. Accordingly, the Court in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-I distinguished the decision in Bharathidasan University
(supra), which had, relying upon the definition in clause 2(h) on
the meaning of the term ‘technical institution’, held that a deemed
to be university established under a state law was entitled to start
courses in ‘technical education’ without any approval of the
AICTE. This was done by limiting Bharathidasan University’s
(supra) application to courses/programmes integrally
adjunct/connected to the sanctioned and permitted courses and
programmes, and not to new and different courses/programmes
like award of B.Tech. degrees through distance learning mode.
On role of the AICTE and distance learning as a mode for
acquiring B. Tech degrees, it was held in Orissa Lift Irrigation
Corporation Limited-I that:
“48. Technical education leading to the award of
degrees in Engineering consists of imparting of
lessons in theory as well as practicals. The
practicals form the backbone of such education
which is hands-on approach involving actual
application of principles taught in theory under the
watchful eyes of demonstrators or lecturers. Face
to face imparting of knowledge in theory classes is
to be reinforced in practical classes. The practicals,
thus, constitute an integral part of the technical
education system. If this established concept of
imparting technical education as a qualitative norm
is to be modified or altered and in a given case to
be substituted by distance education learning, then
as a concept AICTE ought to have accepted it in
clear terms. What parameters ought to be satisfied
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 14 of 35
if the regular course of imparting technical
education is in any way to be modified or altered, is
for AICTE alone to decide. The decision must be
specific and unequivocal and cannot be inferred
merely because of absence of any guidelines in
the matter. No such decision was ever expressed
by AICTE. On the other hand, it has always
maintained that courses leading to degrees in
Engineering cannot be undertaken through
distance education mode. Whether that approach
is correct or not is not the point in issue. For the
present purposes, if according to AICTE such
courses ought not to be taught in distance
education mode, that is the final word and is
binding—unless rectified in a manner known to
law. Even National Policy on Education while
emphasising the need to have a flexible, pattern
and programmes through distance education
learning in technical and managerial education,
laid down in Para 6.19 that AICTE will be
responsible for planning, formulation and
maintenance of norms and standards including
maintenance of parity of certification and ensuring
coordinated and integrated development of
technical and management education. In our view,
whether subjects leading to degrees in
Engineering could be taught in distance education
mode or not is within the exclusive domain
of AICTE. The answer to the first limb of the first
question posed by us is therefore clear that without
the guidelines having been issued in that behalf
by AICTE expressly permitting degree courses in
Engineering through distance education mode, the
deemed to be universities were not justified in
introducing such courses.”
From the dictum laid down above, it is plainly clear that
approval of the AICTE was mandatory for starting the aforesaid
courses. Admittedly, approval of the AICTE was not obtained by
TIET, Patiala.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 15 of 35
12. We would now revert to the question of approval of the UGC. In
Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, reference was
made to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ‘Guidelines for Establishing
New Departments Within the Campus, Setting Up of Off-Campus
Centre(s)/Institution(s)/Off-Shore Campus and Starting Distance
Education Programmes by the Deemed Universities’ (hereinafter
referred to as ‘2004 Guidelines’), issued by the UGC which dealt
with the procedure to be followed by deemed to be universities
offering distance education programmes, which read as under:
“4. Distance education.—The deemed to be
university could offer the distance education
programmes only with the specific approval of the
Distance Education Council (DEC) and the
University Grants Commission (UGC). As such,
any study centre(s) can be opened only with the
specific approval of Distance Education Council
and UGC.
5. Ex post facto approval.—The deemed
universities shall obtain the ex post facto approval
of the GOI/UGC/DEC, whichever applicable within
a period of six months in the following cases:
I. Continuation of all the departments opened in the
campus of the deemed universities and off-campus
study centre(s)/institutions/off-shore campus
started without the prior approval of the UGC.
II. Distance education programme(s)/study centre(s)
started without the specific approval of the
DEC/UGC.”
Paragraph 4 makes it crystal clear that post the 2004
Guidelines, every deemed to be university would require
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 16 of 35
approvals of the UGC and DEC, for starting any degree course
through open and distance learning mode. The condition of
approval was mandatory. It is not the case of the petitioners or
TIET, Patiala that the latter had taken prior approval of the UGC
for the B.Tech. degrees obtained through distance learning mode.
Paragraph 5 relates to ex-post facto approval of the UGC/DEC for
continuation of distance education programmes/study centres
started without specific approval of the UGC/DEC. Paragraph 5 is
not applicable in the present case as the degree courses were
started post enactment of the 2004 Guidelines.
13. Faced and conscious of the clear violation of paragraph 4 of the
2004 Guidelines and absence of the AICTE’s approval, learned
senior counsel for the petitioners had relied on paragraph 49 of
Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, which reads as
under:
“49. We now move to the second limb of the first
question. Under the 1994 AICTE Regulations, “no
courses or programmes shall be introduced by any
technical institution, university including a deemed
university or university department or college
except with the approval of the Council”.
Bharathidasan declared the said Regulation to the
extent it required a university to have approval for
introducing any courses or programmes in
technical education, to be bad. Same thought was
amplified in Assn. of Management of Private
Colleges to say that affiliated colleges of the
University were entitled to the same protection.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 17 of 35
The question is, whether a deemed to be university
is also entitled to the same protection. The matter
can be considered under two categories:
(a) The first category could be of a deemed to be
university, which was conferred such status for its
excellence in a field of technological subject, is now
desirous of introducing courses or programmes
integrally connected with the area in respect of
which it was conferred deemed to be university
status. For example, an Engineering college which
because of its excellence in the field was conferred
deemed university status, now wishes to introduce
courses in subjects like Robotics or Nano
Technology which are Engineering subjects and
integrally connected with its own field of excellence.
(b) The second category could be of a deemed to be
university which was conferred such status for its
excellence in subjects which are completely
unrelated to the field in which new courses are
sought to be introduced. For example, an
institution engaged in teaching Fine Arts and
Music, for its excellence in that chosen field—or for
that matter an institution engaged in teaching Law
had been conferred such status. Can such a
deemed to be university claim immunity from
regulatory control of AICTE and say that it is
entitled, as a matter of right, to introduce courses
in Engineering on the strength of the decision of
this Court in Bharathidasan?”
In our opinion, the petitioners and TIET, Patiala are
misconstruing paragraph 49 of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-I. The aforesaid paragraph refers to the 1994
Regulations issued by the AICTE under which no courses or
programmes could be introduced by any technical institution/
university, including a deemed university or a university
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 18 of 35
department or college, except with approval of the AICTE. In
Bharathidasan University (supra) this mandate of the 1994
Regulations was declared to be bad to the extent that it had
required the university to take approval for introducing any course
or programme in technical education. Same opinion was
expressed in Association of Management of Private Colleges
v. All India Council for Technical Education and Others
6
to
state that affiliated colleges of the university are entitled to the
same protection. Thereupon, in Orissa Lift Irrigation
Corporation Limited-I a distinction was made by creating two
categories of deemed to be universities – Category-I, i.e. such
deemed to be universities that have been conferred status of
‘excellence’ in the field of technical subjects and desire to
introduce courses or programmes ‘integrally connected’ with the
area of subjects for which they had been conferred deemed to be
university status. Clarifying this, the Court had cited an example of
an engineering college of excellence that has been conferred
deemed to be university status and now wish to introduce courses
in new or specialised subjects like robotics and nanotechnology,
which subjects were integrally connected to the university’s own
6
(2013) 8 SCC 271
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 19 of 35
field of excellence. Category-II would be of those universities that
have been conferred deemed to be university status for
excellence in subjects, but want to introduce new courses
unrelated to the field for which they were conferred status of
excellence. In the latter category, the deemed to be university
cannot claim immunity from regulatory control of the AICTE and
must take approval of the AICTE. Paragraph 49, we would like to
clarify, deals with universities including deemed to be universities
imparting higher education for degree courses/programmes
through regular mode. This paragraph does not specifically deal
with or confer any right upon the deemed to be universities to start
distance education courses, even if integrally connected with the
approved regular courses.
14. The foregoing analysis becomes clear when we read Orissa Lift
Irrigation Corporation Limited-I in its entirety, particularly the
immediately preceding paragraph, i.e. paragraph 48 as quoted
above, wherein it has been specifically stipulated and mandated
that whether subjects leading to degrees in engineering would be
taught in distance education mode or not is within the exclusive
domain of the AICTE.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 20 of 35
15. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions and lack of prior
approval of the UGC or AICTE, we do not think that TIET, Patiala
was competent to award graduation degrees in technical courses
via distance mode.
16. In Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, the Court also
made a distinction between students who had taken admission in
deemed to be universities offering technical degrees through
distance learning in the academic years 2001 to 2005 and 2005-
2006 onwards. The reason for distinction was paragraph 5 of the
2004 Guidelines and ex-post facto approvals granted by the UGC
and DEC to deemed to be universities that had offered technical
degrees in the academic years 2001-2005. It was held that the
said exercise of grant of ex-post facto approvals was completely
uncalled for and contrary to law and illegal. Accordingly, the ex
post facto approvals were set aside with the consequential
directions to recall all the engineering degrees granted pursuant to
the said approvals. However, conscious that the ex post facto
approvals were in terms of paragraph 5 of the 2004 Guidelines,
while suspending the degrees awarded to students who had been
enrolled during the academic years 2001 to 2005, the Court had
given these students an opportunity to appear and clear such
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 21 of 35
examination under joint supervision of the AICTE-UGC. It was
observed:
“57. [T]he matter is required to be considered with
some sympathy so that interest of those students
who were enrolled during the academic sessions
2001-2005 is protected. Though we cannot wish
away the fact that the concerned Deemed to be
Universities flagrantly violated and entered into
areas where they had no experience and started
conducting courses through distance education
system illegally, the over bearing interest of the
concerned students persuades us not to resort to
recall of all the degrees in Engineering granted in
pursuance of said ex-post-facto approval.
However, the fact remains that the facilities
available at the concerned Study Centres were
never checked nor any inspections were
conducted. It is not possible at this length of time
to order any inspection. But there must be
confidence and assurance about the worthiness of
the concerned students. We, therefore, deem it
appropriate to grant some chance to the
concerned students to have their ability tested by
authorities competent in that behalf. We,
therefore, direct that all the degrees in
Engineering granted to students who were
enrolled during the academic years 2001 to 2005
shall stand suspended till they pass such
examination under the joint supervision of AICTEUGC in the manner indicated hereinafter. Further,
every single advantage on the basis of that
degree shall also stand suspended.”
The aforesaid directions were not in respect of any
engineering degree granted by deemed to be universities to
candidates admitted/enrolled post the academic year 2004-2005.
Grant of any degree for students enrolled post the academic year
2004-2005 was held as contrary to law and illegal, and could not
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 22 of 35
be treated as regular and at par with the regular degrees.
Therefore, paragraph 49 would not be of any avail to the
petitioners.
17. We would also refer to the second round of litigation as
applications were filed seeking clarification and modification of the
directions in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I. The
decision dated 22
nd January, 2018 in Orissa Lift Irrigation
Corporation Limited v. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others7
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-II’) had decided several applications of diploma holders
who had enrolled for engineering or B.Tech. degree in deemed to
be universities through distance learning mode. One of the
contentions raised in the applications was that the deemed to be
universities awarding engineering degrees through distance
learning mode in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I
were not institutes of excellence in the field of engineering and,
thus, there would be a distinction between engineering degrees
awarded through distance education mode by deemed to be
universities declared as institutions of excellence and the degrees
awarded by other deemed to be universities. This contention was
7
(2018) 2 SCC 298
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 23 of 35
squarely rejected by referring to the fact that engineering degrees
through distance education mode awarded by Vinayaka Mission’s
Research Foundation in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-I had been also declared to be invalid, though the said
institution in its field of activity and excellence included the subject
of engineering. Dealing with other contentions raised by the
applicants, the Court in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-II held as under:
“25. We now turn to the general submission advanced
by all the learned counsel that the candidates after
securing the degrees in Engineering through
distance education mode, have advanced in career
and that their ability was tested at various levels
and as such requirement of passing the
examination in terms of the judgment be dispensed
within their case. We cannot make any such
exception. The infirmity in their degrees is basis
and fundamental and cannot be wished away. At
the same time, we find some force in their
submission that if the suspension of their degrees
and all advantages were to apply as indicated in
the judgment, the candidates concerned may lose
their jobs and even if they were to successfully
pass the test, restoration of their jobs and present
position would pose some difficulty.
The Court, therefore, granting a one-time relaxation to the
candidates who had enrolled themselves during the academic
years 2001-2005, held that candidates would, in terms of the
judgment in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited I, be
eligible to appear for the test conducted by the AICTE.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 24 of 35
18. Given the aforesaid ratio, we reject the plea that the petitioners
are entitled to relief as was granted to the petitioners in Orissa
Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited I and II. This contention is
unacceptable for the reason that in Orissa Lift Irrigation
Corporation Limited I and II, no relief was granted to the
candidates who had taken admission in 2005 or thereafter. Relief
in the form of one-time relaxation vide examination to be
conducted by the AICTE was granted to those
candidates/students who had taken admission in academic years
beginning from 2001 and till 2004-2005.
19. TIET, Patiala in their additional affidavit have referred to the
correspondence with the DEC expressing their desire to start
B.Tech. courses in Civil Engineering/ Computer Sciences and
Engineering/ Electrical Engineering/ Mechanical Engineering
through distance learning programme, vide their letter dated 17th
May, 2006 and reply of the DEC vide its letter dated 16th June,
2006 that such approvals can only be granted after evaluation of
the course material by an expert committee and for which TIET,
Patiala should apply in the prescribed format with requisite fee.
Thereupon, TIET, Patiala had submitted an application in the
required format and an expert committee constituted by the
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 25 of 35
Chairman of the DEC had evaluated infrastructure and other
services etc., provided by TIET, Patiala. The expert committee,
which included the Director, School of Engineering and
Technology, IGNOU, gave a favourable report subsequent to
which the letter of provisional recognition dated 31st August, 2007
was issued by the DEC permitting TIET, Patiala to start the
course. Reference was also made to the press note dated 23rd
May, 2007 released by Press Information Bureau, Government of
India, which had published a list of universities including deemed
to be universities offering distance education. This list also
included TIET, Patiala.
20. As already stated, the petitioners have also relied upon letter
dated 3
rd September, 2007 written to TIET, Patiala by the DEC
providing them provisional recognition for one year in programmes
offered through distance mode. The said letter reads as under:
“INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY
Maindan Garhi, New Delhi – 110068, India
Phone: (O) 91-11-29535923-32, 29533340 (O)
Telefax: 91-11-295536668
Email: basuswaraj@hotmail.com
Website: www.ignou.ac.in/www.dec.ac.in
DISTANCE EDUCATION COUNCIL
F.No. DEC/Univ/State/07/5580
Dated: 03.09.2007
Prof. Swaraj Basu
Director
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 26 of 35
Sub: Provisional Recognition
Dear Sir,
This has reference to your application to the
Distance Education Council requesting for recognition of
programmes offered through distance mode by your
University.
We would like to inform you that your university has
been granted provisional recognition for offering
programmes (approved by the statutory bodies of your
university) through distance mode for a period of oneyear w.e.f. the date of issue of this letter.
However, for recognition of your institution for
offering programmes through distance mode in the next
academic year, i.e. from June-July, 2008, you are
requested to submit a fresh application in the prescribed
format developed by the DEC which may be
downloaded from the DEC website: www.dec.ac.in.
We would also like to inform you that that DEC has
decided not to insist on territorial jurisdiction to be
allowed by institutions in offering programmes through
distance mode and on that matter, universities should
be governed by their own Acts and Statutes.
With regards,
Yours sincerely
Sd/-
(Swaraj Basu)
The Vice Chancellor
Thapar University
Patiala – 147004, Punjab”
The aforesaid letter states that TIET, Patiala had made an
application to the DEC requesting for recognition of programmes
offered through distance mode and that they had been granted
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 27 of 35
provisional recognition for offering such programmes. The letter
records that an application was submitted by TIET, Patiala but no
specific reference was made to the programmes or courses
offered nor the date when the application was filed is indicated.
The letter also does not refer to approval by the AICTE or UGC. It
had further required TIET, Patiala to submit a fresh application for
the next academic year from June-July 2008.
21. We have already referred to the 2004 Guidelines issued by the
UGC and the AICTE Act to hold that TIET, Patiala had failed to
take their prior approval before starting B. Tech. degree courses
through distance education mode. Provisional recognition by the
DEC being contrary to the law would not matter for at best the
DEC would be equally guilty for violating the law in terms of 2004
Guidelines issued by the UGC and the AICTE Act. The legal
issue stands foreclosed and cannot be argued in view of the clear
dictum and ratio enunciated in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited-I. We would also refer to the notification issued by the
Government of India on 1st March 1995 quoted in Orissa Lift
Irrigation Corporation Limited-I on distance education
programme by deemed to be universities etc., which was to the
following effect:
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 28 of 35
“On the recommendation of the Board of Assessment
for Education Qualifications, the Government of India
has decided that all the qualifications awarded through
Distance Education by the Universities established by
an Act of Parliament or State Legislature, Institutions
Deemed to be Universities under Section 3 of the UGC
Act, 1956 and Institutions of National importance
declared under an Act of Parliament stand automatically
recognized for the purpose of employment to posts and
services under the Central Government, provided it has
been approved by Distance Education Council, Indira
Gandhi Nation Open University, K 76, Hauz Khas, New
Delhi-110016 and wherever necessary by All India
Council for Technical Education, I.G. Sports Complex,
I.P. Estate, New Delhi.”
Clearly, therefore, in terms of the said notification also
approval of the AICTE was required.
22. TIET, Patiala accepts that no approval, provisional or otherwise,
was granted for the next academic year, i.e. June-July 2008, yet
B.Tech. degree programmes through distance mode for the
academic year June-July 2008 were offered by TIET, Patiala
contrary to the statutes and law.
23. TIET, Patiala, to justify admissions in the academic year 2008-
2009 in their additional affidavit, have referred to correspondence
and submission of application to the UGC for offering B. Tech.
degree courses through distance education programme for the
academic session i.e. 2008-2009. This is surprising as TIET,
Patiala had not applied to the UGC for the previous academic
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 29 of 35
session i.e. 2007-2008. Thereafter, the additional affidavit refers
to correspondence exchanged between the DEC and TIET,
Patiala pursuant to which a Joint Expert Committee was
constituted comprising of members of the UGC, DEC and AICTE
to assess the administration and management of distance learning
programmes offered by TIET, Patiala, which panel had visited
their premises on 2nd June, 2009 and had recommended the
recognition of as many as seven programmes for a period of five
years. However, the Central Government had, in exercise of
powers under Section 20 of the UGC Act and in terms of a policy
decision, issued a notification on 29
th July, 2009 that the B.Tech.
degrees would not be offered through open distance learning
programme. In view of this policy decision, the DEC had to
immediately withdraw the permission to various institutions to
conduct B.Tech. degree courses through distance education
mode and no further student was admitted in the current year and
thereafter. However, the notification states that those who had
already been admitted would have to pass practicals and written
examination as may be prescribed so as to obtain the B.Tech.
degrees through distance education.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 30 of 35
24. The submission/contention of the petitioners and TIET, Patiala
completely overlooks several developments, correspondence and
policy decisions taken which have been noticed in Orissa Lift
Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, particularly the notification
issued by the AICTE on 28th November, 2005 clearly stating that
no technical institution of the Government/ Government aided/
private institution, whether affiliated or not to any University, shall
start new courses or increase the intake for the same without
approval of the AICTE. Notification issued by the Ministry of
Human Resource Development, Government of India on 5th April,
2006 in exercise of powers vested in the Central Government
under Section 20(1) of the UGC Act and Section 20(1) of the
AICTE Act had clarified the role of the UGC and AICTE for
maintaining standards of education and that the deemed to be
universities are required to maintain minimum standards
prescribed by the AICTE for various courses within the jurisdiction
of the said Council. This was followed by a joint public notice
issued by the AICTE, UGC and DEC on 4th February, 2007 to the
following effect:
“It has come to the notice of the University Grants
Commission (UGC), the All India Council for Technical
Education (AICTE) and the Distance Education Council
(DEC), that some Universities, Institutions Deemed to
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 31 of 35
be Universities and other institutions are offering
technical education programmes in the ‘distance mode’
without the approval of the concerned Statutory Council.
All Universities, Institutions, Deemed to be
Universities and other institutions are hereby cautioned
that running such programmes and giving misleading
advertisements regarding unapproved ‘distance mode
courses and programmes of study, shall attract severe
action under the provisions of applicable laws, including
that of de-recognition and withdrawal of institutional
approval;
It is hereby clarified, in the public interest that there
are a number of courses or programmes of study
leading to Degree/Diploma or other awards in
Engineering & Technology, Management, Computer
Applications, Architecture & Town Planning, Pharmacy,
Hotel Management & Catering Technology, Applied Arts
and Crafts, etc. which have not been approved by the
appropriate Statutory Council for being conducted in the
‘distance mode’. It is also reiterated that all courses or
programmes of study in the ‘distance mode’ require the
approval of DEC.”
The public notice had cautioned that the universities/
institutions/deemed to be universities offering technical education
programme through distance education mode without approval of
concerned statutory authorities were doing so in contravention of
the law and would be treated severely. The last sentence of the
notification had made it clear that in addition to the concerned
statutory councils, all courses and the programmes offered for
study in distance mode would require approval of the DEC. A
memorandum of understanding was arrived at on 10
th May, 2007
among the UGC, AICTE and DEC to work in close co-operation in
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 32 of 35
pursuit of excellence in technical and general education being
imparted through distance and mixed mode in the country.
25. In any case these aspects and contentions were fully considered
in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I and it has been
held that B.Tech. degrees could not have been awarded through
distance learning mode without the approval of the DEC and
without any specific approval of the AICTE and UGC and award of
such degrees without approval of the three were invalid and
cannot be recognised.
26. Functioning of the DEC has come in for rather strong criticism in
several quarters. Till 2006, the DEC had approved about 45
programmes of 23 universities out of applications for
approximately 200 programmes. In 2007, the DEC repealed the
programme approval process and the system of institutional
recognition was started. As per this decision, all programmes
approved by respective authorities of the institution were deemed
to have recognition of the DEC. As a result of this decision, within
a short span, the number of approved programmes increased to
over 3000 in 2010. The provisional recognition letter of the DEC
would uniformly state that before starting such programmes, the
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 33 of 35
required approvals from other regulatory bodies have to be
obtained but the said stipulation was not followed in most cases
and provisional recognition was granted by the DEC to technical
programmes through distance mode without recognition/approval
of the AICTE or UGC. This had paved way for commercialisation
and was a retrograde step which had resulted in deterioration of
the quality of open learning programmes/degrees. After burning
its fingers, the DEC switched back to programme recognition. The
DEC itself was finally wound up in 2013.
27. In Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited-I, this Court, took
note of the order dated 29th December, 2012 issued by the
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India
in view of the recommendations suggested in the Madhava Menon
Committee report for regulating the standards of education being
imparted through distance mode to hold that the unilateral
approvals of the DEC were invalid. It was observed:
“55. Para 3 of the notification dated 22.11.1991 which
constituted DEC shows that there was no
representation for any Member or representative
of AICTE. The provisions of IGNOU Act show that
the Study Centres as defined in the IGNOU Act
are that of IGNOU and not of any other University
or Institution. The concept of distance education
under sub-clause (v) of Section 5 is also in relation
to the academic programmes of IGNOU. It
undoubtedly has powers under Clauses (vii), (xiii) 
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 34 of 35
and (xxiii) to cooperate with other Universities but
the IGNOU Act nowhere entitles IGNOU to be the
Controlling Authority of the entire field of distance
education of learning across the Country and in
relation to programmes of other Universities or
Institutions as well. The Order dated 29.12.2012
issued by MHRD therefore correctly appreciated
that DEC created under statute 28 of IGNOU Act
could not act as a regulator for other Universities.
In any event of the matter, the policy Guidelines
issued from time to time made it abundantly clear
that DEC alone was not entitled to grant
permission for open distance learning and
appropriate permissions from the requisite
authorities were always required and insisted
upon. Despite such policy statements, DEC went
on granting permissions without even consulting
AICTE. Such exercise on part of DEC was
completely without jurisdiction.
The said order, the Court noted, had definitively vested the
UGC and AICTE, among other statutory regulators, with powers to
regulate technical courses imparted through distance learning
mode and made it mandatory for institutions intending to impart
such courses to seek their approval and recognition, observing as
under:
“[T]he Central Government in exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section 1 of section 20 of the UGC
1956 and the AICTE Act, 1987 hereby directs: -
The UGC and AICTE as already empowered under
their respective Acts, would also act as a regulator for
Higher Education (excluding Technical Education) and
Technical Education through open & Distance Learning
(ODL) mode respectively Universities are empowered
under their respective Act to offer any programme
course including in Technical Education in the
conventional mode. However, if they offer any 
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1510 of 2018 Page 35 of 35
programme/course in ODL mode they would require
recognition from the UGC, AICTE, NCTE and other
such regulators of the conventional mode of education
in those areas of study.”
28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the
present Writ Petition and the same is dismissed. However, in the
facts of the case, there would be no order as to costs.
.....................................J.
(UDAY U. LALIT)
......................................J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 29, 2019.

Friday, August 30, 2019

whether, within the parameters required for reversal of an order of acquittal, the needful is met in the present case. The reason to treat the same with some caution has already been set out by us hereinbefore. The testimony of PW-6, that he saw the gun being fired, but could not make out whether a bullet hit the deceased or not has been taken into account, but, in the context of the overall testimony of the eyewitnesses, the story set forth by the prosecution and the witnesses was found to be believable by the High Court. However, this story does not deal with the aforesaid aspects noted by the trial court, i.e., no bullet injury, the weapon not being recovered, no bullets or bullet marks being found at the place of occurrence and the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses. The trial court rightly observed that it was accused No.1 who was the main accused, who was subsequently murdered. We may, however, note that insofar as the statement of accused No.2, under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, the testimonies of PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 all have been put to him but the said accused claimed absence from the place of the occurrence. As far as accused No.3 is concerned, once again, the testimonies of all the three eyewitnesses have been put to him, but the role sought to be assigned to him is stated to be a hit with the dagger, and not the role of firing at the accused as set out in the FIR.The subsequent testimonies, however, sought to assign a different role than the one assigned in the FIR, bringing about an inconsistency. The view taken by the trial court is, at least, a plausible view though that may not be the only plausible view or if one may say even the less probable one. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt against these two accused, and they must get the benefit of doubt and consequently have to be acquitted.

 whether, within the parameters required for reversal of an order of acquittal, the needful is met in the present case.

 The reason to treat the same with some caution has already been set out by us hereinbefore. 
The testimony of PW-6, that he saw the gun being fired, but could not make out whether a bullet hit the deceased or not has been taken into account, but, in the context of the overall testimony of the eyewitnesses, the story set forth by the prosecution and the witnesses was found to be believable by the High Court. However, this story does not deal with the aforesaid aspects noted by the trial court, i.e., no bullet injury, the weapon not being recovered, no bullets or bullet marks being found at the place of occurrence and the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses. The trial court rightly observed that it was accused No.1 who was the main accused, who was subsequently murdered. We may, however, note that insofar as the statement of accused No.2, under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, the testimonies of PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 all have been put to him but the said accused claimed absence from the place of the occurrence. As far as accused No.3 is concerned, once again, the testimonies of all the three eyewitnesses have been put to him, but the role sought to be assigned to him is stated to be a hit with the dagger, and not the role of firing at the accused as set out in the FIR.The subsequent testimonies, however, sought to assign a different role than the one assigned in the FIR, bringing about an inconsistency. The view taken by the trial court is, at least, a plausible view though that may not be the only plausible view or if one may say even the less probable one. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt against these two accused, and they must get the benefit of doubt and consequently have to be acquitted.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1905 OF 2009
SAMSUL HAQUE ….Appellant
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM ….Respondent
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 246 OF 2011
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The incident is of 17.3.1997 at 7:00 a.m. in the morning. Keramat
Ali Maral (the deceased) was having tea at the tea stall known as Kalia
Hotel. It is alleged that Abdul Hai, Abdul Rashid, Imdadul Islam, Rahul
Amin, Mofizuddin Islam and Abdul Rahim Faruki, being the first six
accused entered the stall and all of a sudden accused Nos.2 & 3 fired at
1
Keramat Ali with a pistol, while the other accused injured him by
stabbing and hacking with daggers, swords, etc. Keramat Ali is stated to
have died on the spot. The son of Keramat Ali, Nazrul Islam (PW-3)
lodged the FIR, stating that he was present at the site along with other
witnesses, but when they offered resistance, they were threatened with
pistols. To save their life, they ran away from the site. Insofar as accused
Nos.7, 8 & 9 are concerned, it is stated that “further it may be mentioned
that the incident took place at the instance and instigation of accused
Nos.7, 8 and 9.”
2. On the investigation being completed, a charge-sheet was filed and
charges were framed by the Sessions Judge under Sections 147, 148,
302/149 and 302 of the IPC against all. Accused Nos.7 to 9 faced
charges under Sections 302/109 of the IPC. In the course of trial,
accused No.4, Rahul Amin, absconded. Accused No.1, Abdul Hai, died/
was allegedly murdered during the course of trial. On completion of trial
the Sessions Judge, Morigaon found that accused No.1 was the main
culprit who had killed the deceased, Keramat Ali. The trial court also
found that the guilt of accused Nos.5 & 6 was also established beyond
reasonable doubt.
2
3. The convicted accused filed an appeal before the Gauhati High
Court and so did the State of Assam qua the accused who had been
acquitted. The appeal of the convicted accused was dismissed by the
High Court and the Special Leave Petition (‘SLP’) filed against the same
was also dismissed and, thus, that matter attained finality.
4. The impugned judgment dated 12.2.2009 deals with the appeal of
the State and has reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting the
five accused.
5. Accused No.9, Samsul Haque has filed Crl. Appeal No.1905/2009,
while Abdul Rashid (accused No.2) and Imdadul Islam (accused No.3)
filed Crl. Appeal No.246/2011. It is these three accused who are before
us.
6. We have heard Mr. R.K. Dash, learned Senior Counsel for accused
No.9, Mr. Bijan Ghosh, learned counsel for accused Nos.2 & 3 and
learned counsel for the State, Mr. Debojit Borkakati who took us through
the record before us. We have also perused the trial court record.
3
7. We would first deal with the witnesses produced by the
prosecution to prove their case. Four witnesses were projected as eyewitnesses to the occurrence, viz., Taher Ali (PW-1); Nazrul Islam (PW-3),
who is the son of the deceased and the informant; Sorhab Ali (PW-4),
brother of the deceased; Mozammil Hussain (PW-6), son of the elder
brother of the deceased. While three of the witnesses are relatives, PW-1
is an independent witness. It may be noted that Mr. Dilip Modak, owner
of the hotel, or any other independent witness present at the place of
occurrence was not examined. Mr. Somnath Bora, the IO was produced
as PW-7. It may also be noted that the defence examined only one
witness, i.e. Siraj Ali (DW-1), who was at the place of the occurrence as
recognised by the prosecution.
8. Learned Senior Counsel for accused No.9 contended that the
complainant in the complaint itself made a very vague statement that “the
incident took place at the instance and instigation of” the said accused
and two others. Nothing more was said as to how it was at the instance
and instigation of these three accused.
4
9. The second limb of his submission was that three of the witnesses,
PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 were interested and inimical witnesses inasmuch
as PW-3, the son of PW-4 and PW-6 were accused in the murder case of
the main accused, accused No.1, Abdul Hai. The testimony of these three
witnesses was stated to be full of exaggerations, embellishments and
inconsistencies. An important aspect emphasised in this behalf is that the
version given by PW-3 in the complaint, as recorded in the FIR, is at
variance with the narration of the incident when the said witness entered
the witness box. Thus, while on the one hand in the complaint it was
alleged that the incident happened at the instance and instigation of the
appellant and two other accused, in the testimony before the court it has
been stated that these three persons ordered the other accused to catch
hold of his father, the deceased, whereafter accused Abdul Rashid, who is
accused No.2 shot at the deceased with a pistol while accused No.1 hit
him in the chest, hands and legs with a sword. The testimony of PW-4
and PW-6 states that accused No.9 and two others asked other
accomplices to hit and kill the deceased.
5
10. The aforesaid testimony, it was submitted before us, has to be read
in the context of the testimony of the only independent witness, i.e., PW1, who did not implicate the appellant in the crime. In fact, in his
testimony he has specifically stated that he did not see accused No.8 and
accused No.9 either inside or outside the hotel. Learned Senior Counsel
also submitted that a reading of the complaint, resulting in the FIR would
show that the appellant had not come to the place of occurrence along
with the others. DW-1, who was present at the place of occurrence,
according to the prosecution, stated that accused No.1 and two others
committed the crime, but he had not seen any one of the family members
of the deceased at the place of the occurrence. In fact, the suggestion in
the cross-examination of the said witness by the prosecution was that
accused No.7 had given orders to assault the deceased, but that
suggestion had been denied by the witness.
11. The third limb of the submission of the learned Senior Counsel is
based on the statement of accused No.9, recorded under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C. It was argued that the questions asked did not really put the
case of the prosecution to the accused as was mandatory. Only two
6
questions were put in the said statement, which are as under:
“Question: PW4 Sohrab Ali has averred in evidence that at about
7 a.m. 17.3.97, you said, “Kill Keramat Ali.” What is your reply?
Ans: I was not there in the place of occurrence. My house
is at a distance of 4 or 5 kilometers from there.
Question: PW6 has stated that you asked the other accused to
kill Keramat. What do you say?
Ans: No I was not present at the place of occurrence. A
civil suit is pending over the complainant’s purchasing a plot of
land. I was one witness to (the execution of) the sale deed. Out of
that grudge they filed a false case against me.”
12. The case of PW-3 was, thus, not even put to the accused.
13. In the aforesaid context learned Senior Counsel has referred to the
judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra1
 to contend that if the circumstances are not put to the
accused in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., they must be
completely excluded from consideration because the accused did not
have any chance to explain them. This is stated to be the consistent view
of this Court starting from 1953 in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh
1 (1984) 4 SCC 116
7
v. State of Madhya Bharat2
. Learned Senior Counsel also referred to the
judgment in Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam3
 for the proposition that the
very purpose of examining the accused persons under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice, i.e.,
audi alteram partem. The accused, thus, must be given an opportunity to
explain the incriminating material that has surfaced against him and the
circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and must be
excluded from consideration.
14. The fourth limb of the submission of the learned Senior Counsel
arose from the acquittal of accused No.9 by the trial court and the
conviction on reversal of acquittal in appeal. Thus, the plea was that the
principles of such reversal require that the view of the trial court should
be respected unless and until the views are such as were perverse or
otherwise unsustainable. Ordinarily, the judgment of acquittal, where
two views are possible, should not be set aside even if the view formed
2AIR 1953 SC 468
3 (2013) 12 SCC 406
8
by the appellate court may be a more probable one.4
15. The last submission of the learned Senior Counsel, possibly
because it is the weakest one, was that the ingredients of common
intention under Section 34 of the IPC and abetment under Section 107 of
the IPC are distinct and separate. The principle of constructive liability,
enunciated in Section 34 of the IPC does not create a substantive offence,
unlike Section 107 of the IPC, which is an independent offence. It was,
thus, submitted that a person charged with Section 109 of the IPC (the
punishment provision for Section 107 of the IPC) cannot be convicted for
the main offence under Section 34 of the IPC. To advance this plea,
reliance was placed on Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu5
. However, in the
factual matrix of that case the person was charged under Section 34 of the
IPC and not under Section 109 of the IPC. The observations made in that
judgment, thus, have to be read in that context since substantive offence
as per Section 107 with punishment under Section 109 of the IPC was not
an aspect which the accused was charged with. The factual matrix in the
4 Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 13
SCC 657
5 (2013) 8 SCC 60
9
present case is the opposite where the plea is that there is no charge under
Section 34 of the IPC but charge of abetment has been laid under Section
109.
16. The aforesaid last plea can be dealt with at this stage itself as the
issue is no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in
State of Orissa v. Arjun Das Agarwal & Anr.6
 opining that the settled
position of law is that Section 34 of the IPC does not create a distinct
offence and it is with the participation of the accused that the intention of
committing the crime is established when Section 34 of the IPC is
attracted. To rope in a person with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC, the
prosecution has to prove that the criminal act was done by the actual
participation of more than one person and that act was done in
furtherance of a common intention of all engaged in prior concert.
17. In view of the aforesaid, the last plea of the learned counsel is only
stated to be rejected.
18. On examination of the earlier pleas advanced by learned Senior
6 AIR 1999 SC 3229
10
Counsel on behalf of accused No.9, we find merit in the same.
19. PW-3 in his complaint did state that the incident took place at the
instance and instigation of accused No.9 along with accused Nos.7 & 8.
20. However, in his deposition it has been stated that these persons
asked the other accused to catch hold of the deceased. This by itself, in
our view, would not be fatal for the case of the prosecution. Similarly,
there is some variation between what exactly these three persons stated,
as available from the testimonies of even PW-4 and PW-6. However, the
crucial aspect is that PW-1, the only independent witness, does not even
implicate accused No.9, much less assign any role to him. He has stated
that he had not even seen accused No.9, even though he was the person
who was at the place of occurrence. DW-1, who was not produced as a
witness by the prosecution, though was stated to be present at the place of
occurrence, was examined by the defence and deposed against the main
accused (accused No.1) and others, while not assigning even the factum
of presence to accused No.9. Interestingly, even when the prosecution
sought to cross-examine the said witness, the case of the prosecution was
put as if only accused No.7 ordered the other accused persons to assault
11
the deceased. Had accused No.9 played a role, that would logically have
been put to DW-1 by the prosecution.
21. The most vital aspect, in our view, and what drives the nail in the
coffin in the case of the prosecution is the manner in which the court put
the case to accused No.9, and the statement recorded under Section 313
of the Cr.P.C. To say the least it is perfunctory.
22. It is trite to say that, in view of the judgments referred to by the
learned Senior Counsel, aforesaid, the incriminating material is to be put
to the accused so that the accused gets a fair chance to defend himself.
This is in recognition of the principles of audi alteram partem. Apart
from the judgments referred to aforesaid by the learned Senior Counsel,
we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in Asraf Ali v. State
of Assam7
. The relevant observations are in the following paragraphs:
“21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the Court to put in an
enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the
evidence against him. It follows as necessary corollary therefrom
7 (2008) 16 SCC 328
12
that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against
the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and
separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity
vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced.
22. The object of Section 313 of the Code is to establish a direct
dialogue between the Court and the accused. If a point in the
evidence is important against the accused, and the conviction is
intended to be based upon it, it is right and proper that the accused
should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity
of explaining it. Where no specific question has been put by the
trial Court on an inculpatory material in the prosecution evidence,
it would vitiate the trial. Of course, all these are subject to rider
whether they have caused miscarriage of justice or prejudice. This
Court also expressed similar view in S. Harnam Singh v. The State
(AIR 1976 SC 2140), while dealing with Section 342 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (corresponding to Section 313 of
the Code). Non- indication of inculpatory material in its relevant
facets by the trial Court to the accused adds to vulnerability of the
prosecution case. Recording of a statement of the accused under
Section 313 is not a purposeless exercise.”
23. While making the aforesaid observations, this Court also referred
to its earlier judgment of the three Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra8
, which considered the fall out of the
omission to put to the accused a question on a vital circumstance
appearing against him in the prosecution evidence, and the requirement
8 (1973) 2 SCC 793
13
that the accused’s attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material
so as to enable him to explain it. Ordinarily, in such a situation, such
material as not put to the accused must be eschewed. No doubt, it is
recognised, that where there is a perfunctory examination under Section
313 of the Cr.P.C., the matter is capable of being remitted to the trial
court, with the direction to retry from the stage at which the prosecution
was closed9
.
24. We are, however, not inclined to follow that course in the given
circumstances of this case as the inconsistencies in the testimonies also
create a doubt in the case of the prosecution qua any role of accused
No.9. The aforesaid being the factual matrix, the appellate court could
hardly have overturned the acquittal of the trial court into one of
conviction. The trial court took note of the close relationship of PW-3,
PW-4 & PW-6 to the deceased, as also the array of the accused and the
murder of accused No.1, to come to the conclusion that the abetment of
accused No.9, as alleged, had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In fact, it is opined that there is no evidence that the said accused was
inside or outside Kalia Hotel at the time of the occurrence. Given the
9 Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (supra)
14
circumstances, while not disagreeing with the legal proposition stated in
the impugned judgment, that there is no law that the evidence of relatives
cannot be acted upon, but, with extra care and caution, the presence of
disinterested witnesses as PW-1 and DW-1 relate another story. The
finding in the impugned order, that in the FIR filed by PW-3 as the
complainant, on the very date of the occurrence, setting out the
involvement of all the accused as clearly stated, again cannot be
sustained for the reason of the improvements and embellishments
between what was stated in the FIR and what came from the mouth of
PW-3 as his testimony in the court.
25. We are, thus, of the view that the prosecution has not been able to
establish a case against accused No.9, much less beyond reasonable
doubt.
26. Now, turning to the case of accused Nos.2 & 3, who are still in
custody, unlike accused No.9, who has since been enlarged on bail by this
Court.
27. Learned counsel sought to adopt the arguments advanced on behalf
15
of accused No.9, but then the same would not be of much use as the case
of accused No.9 is quite different from the case against accused Nos.2 &
3.
28. A perusal of the order of the trial court would show that what has
weighed in acquitting these two accused was the fact that in the
testimony of the Doctor (PW-5), who performed the post-mortem
examination on the body of the deceased, a number of injuries were
found, caused by sharp pointed objects. In the cross-examination PW-5
has specifically stated that none of the injuries is a gun-shot injury. Thus,
the medical evidence suggests the use of daggers and a sword. The plea
of the Public Prosecutor was that the gun used by these two accused (as
according to the role assigned to them) may have been used only to scare
away the persons. However, there has been no seizure of arms. Accused
No.1, the main culprit, was subsequently murdered, and the related
witnesses in the present case are the accused. PW-6 also did not see the
firing of the gun, though he claims to have heard the gun-shots though
PW-3 and PW-4 state that they saw the firing. The anomaly is that all the
accused were standing together.
16
29. On a question put by the court, whether any bullets or bullet marks
were found at the site, learned counsel for the State fairly stated in the
negative.
30. The question, which, thus, arises is that whether, within the
parameters required for reversal of an order of acquittal, the needful is
met in the present case.
31. The impugned judgment is, once again, predicated on a reasoning
placing reliance on the testimony of the related witnesses. The reason to
treat the same with some caution has already been set out by us
hereinbefore. The testimony of PW-6, that he saw the gun being fired,
but could not make out whether a bullet hit the deceased or not has been
taken into account, but, in the context of the overall testimony of the eyewitnesses, the story set forth by the prosecution and the witnesses was
found to be believable by the High Court. However, this story does not
deal with the aforesaid aspects noted by the trial court, i.e., no bullet
injury, the weapon not being recovered, no bullets or bullet marks being
found at the place of occurrence and the inconsistencies in the
17
testimonies of the witnesses. The trial court rightly observed that it was
accused No.1 who was the main accused, who was subsequently
murdered.
32. We may, however, note that insofar as the statement of accused
No.2, under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, the testimonies of
PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 all have been put to him but the said accused
claimed absence from the place of the occurrence. As far as accused
No.3 is concerned, once again, the testimonies of all the three eyewitnesses have been put to him, but the role sought to be assigned to him
is stated to be a hit with the dagger, and not the role of firing at the
accused as set out in the FIR.
33. The subsequent testimonies, however, sought to assign a different
role than the one assigned in the FIR, bringing about an inconsistency.
The view taken by the trial court is, at least, a plausible view though that
may not be the only plausible view or if one may say even the less
probable one.
18
34. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not
been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt against these two
accused, and they must get the benefit of doubt and consequently have to
be acquitted.
35. The result of the aforesaid findings is that Samsul Haque, accused
No.9 is entitled to a clean acquittal. He is already on bail and thus, the
bail bonds stand discharged. Abdul Rashid & Imdadul Islam, accused
Nos.2 & 3 respectively, are entitled to the benefit of doubt and are
consequently acquitted. The said accused may be released forthwith.
36. The appeals are accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear
their own costs.
...……………………………J.
[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]
...……………………………J.
[K.M. Joseph]
New Delhi.
August 26, 2019.

19

Saturday, August 24, 2019

rejecting the challenge to their prosecution for lack of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 = It is therefore, held that the question of sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. with regard to appellants nos.3 and 4 treating them to be ‘public servant’ simply does not arise because of their absorption in the Corporation. With regard to appellant no.2, considering his status as on deputation to the appellant Corporation at the relevant point of time and in absence of necessary evidence with regard to his status in the appellant Corporation throughout the litigation being ambiguous, we leave that question open for consideration in the trial after necessary evidence is available.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 503 OF 2010
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED
AND OTHERS ..........APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
PRAMOD V. SAWANT
AND ANOTHER ......RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The   appellants  are  aggrieved   by   the  dismissal   of
their   writ   application,   rejecting   the   challenge   to   their
prosecution for lack of sanction under Section 197 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as “Cr.P.C.”).
2. A criminal complaint case no.14/S/2003 was filed by
respondent   no.1   before   the   Additional   Chief   Metropolitan
Magistrate under clauses 26(2)(3) and 39 read with clause 27
1
of the Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and
Welfare) Scheme, 1981 read with Section 3(3) of Maharashtra
Private   Security   Guards   (Regulation   of   Employment   and
Welfare)   Act,   1981   (hereinafter   called   as   “the   Act”).     The
complaint   stated   that   the   appellant   –   Corporation   was
registered with the respondent ­ Security Guards Board. The
Corporation was under obligation to engage security guards
registered with respondent no.1 only.  An inspection revealed
engagement  of  unregistered  guards.   The  Magistrate issued
process against the appellants in 2003.  The appellants prayed
for recall of the process, which was rejected on 06.04.2004. A
criminal revision preferred against the rejection was allowed on
07.09.2004.   The matter was remanded for reconsideration,
which was again rejected by the Magistrate on 07.06.2005. The
writ petition preferred by the appellants against the issuance of
process was also rejected on 22.12.2006.   The fresh revision
against order dated 07.06.2005 assailed the prosecution on
grounds of being barred by limitation, that the Act was not
applicable   to   the   appellants’   establishment,   and   that   the
2
issuance of process was bad in absence of sanction under
Section   197,   Cr.P.C.,   appellants   nos.2   to   4   being   ‘public
servants’.   The revision application was again dismissed on
05.09.2007   leading   to   the   impugned   order   assailed   in   the
present appeal.   In the writ petition, the appellants gave up
their challenge on grounds of limitation and inapplicability of
the Act which has therefore attained finality. The challenge in
the writ petition is confined to the question of sanction only.
3. The High Court relying on Mohd. Hadi Raja vs. State of
Bihar and another, (1998) 5 SCC 91, held that the protection
of sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was not available to
officers of Government companies or public undertakings even
if it fell within the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the
Constitution.
4. Shri R.D. Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, submitted that appellants nos.2 to 4
fell   within   the   definition   of   ‘public   servant’   as   they   were
discharging   public   duty   in   pursuance   of   the   policy   of   the
Central Government.   Appellants nos.2 to 4, belonged to the
3
Central   Civil   Service   –   Class­I,   having   been   appointed   by
Hon’ble the President of India to the Indian Telecommunication
Service, were removable by orders of the President only. The
fact   that   they   may   have   been   sent   on   deputation   to   the
appellant Corporation is inconsequential mandating sanction
under Section 197, Cr.P.C. before their prosecution.  The High
Court   erred   in   distinguishing  Dr.   Lakshmansingh
Himatsingh  Vaghela   vs.  Naresh  Kumar  Chandrashanker
Jah   and   another, (1990) 4 SCC 169, considering that the
appellants nos.2 to 4 were removable by orders of the President
of India only.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents acknowledged the
original appointment of appellants nos.2 to 4 in Central Civil
Services Class­1. It was however submitted that the appellant
Corporation was established on 01.10.2000.   The appellants
nos.2 to 4 were sent on deputation initially.  Option was given
for absorption in the appellant Corporation. Appellants nos.3
and 4 opted for absorption and thus became employees of the
appellant Corporation with effect from 01.10.2000 and ceased
4
to be government employees in the Central Civil Services Class1.  Appellant no.2 appears to have retired from the appellant
Corporation while on deputation, but his status is not clear.
6. The appeal raises a short and pure question of law for
consideration with regard to the protection under Section 197,
Cr.P.C.   available   to   employees   of   public   sector   corporation
claiming the status of a ‘public servant’.  The relevant extract of
Section 197, Cr.P.C., reads as follows:
“197.   Prosecution   of   Judges   and   public
servants.
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of
the   Government   is   accused   of   any   offence
alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance
of   such   offence   except   with   the   previous
sanction­
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or,
as   the   case   may   be,   was   at   the   time   of
commission of the alleged offence employed, in
connection with the affairs of the Union, of the
Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or,
as   the   case   may   be,   was   at   the   time   of
commission of the alleged offence employed, in
connection with the affairs of a State, of the
State Government.”
                               
5
The term ‘public servant’ has been defined in Section 21
of the Indian Penal Code, the relevant portion for the present
case reads as follows:
“21.   “Public   servant”.—The   words   “public
servant” denote a person falling under any of
the descriptions hereinafter following; namely:

xxxxxxx
Twelfth —Every person—
(a) in the service or pay of the Government or
remunerated   by   fees   or   commission   for   the
performance   of   any   public   duty   by   the
Government;
(b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a
corporation established by or under a Central,
Provincial   or   State   Act   or   a   Government
company   as   defined   in   section   617   of   the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).”
7. At the very outset, we are of the opinion that the question for
grant of sanction for prosecution under Section 197, Cr.P.C. on the
ground of being a ‘public servant’ is not available to appellants
nos.3 and 4 on account of their ceasing to be employees of the
Indian   Telecommunication   Service   after   their   absorption   in   the
appellant Corporation on 01.10.2000, prior to the complaint.  The
fact that their past service may count for purposes of pension in
6
case   of   removal   or   dismissal   by   the   Corporation   or   that
administrative approval of the concerned ministry may be formally
required before any punitive action will not confer on them the
status of ‘public servant’ under the Cr.P.C.
8. The necessary facts with regard to status of appellant no.2 are
not very clear from the pleadings.  It appears that at the relevant
point of time before superannuation he was on deputation to the
Corporation. The allegations related to discharge of his duties in the
appellant   Corporation.   We   are   therefore   required   to   consider   if
sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was a prerequisite with regard
to him in a status as a ‘public servant’.  The question is no more
res   integra  and   stands   authoritatively  settled   that   employees   of
public sector corporations are not entitled to the protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. as ‘public servant’.
9. In  Mohd.  Hadi  Raja  (supra), the court was considering the
need   for   sanction   for   prosecuting   officers   of   public   sector
undertakings or government companies falling within the definition
of   ‘State’   under   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   and   who   were
removable from office save by sanction of the Government.  Holding
7
that protection under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was not available to
such persons, it was held as follows:
“27.  Therefore,  in   our   considered  opinion,   the
protection by way of sanction under Section 197
of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   is   not
applicable   to   the   officers   of   government
companies or the public undertakings even when
such public undertakings are “State” within the
meaning   of   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   on
account   of   deep   and   pervasive   control   of   the
Government….”
10. In  N.K.   Sharma   vs.   Abhimanyu,   (2005)   13   SCC   213,
rejecting the challenge for requirement of sanction under Section
197, Cr.P.C., it was observed as follows:
“13. Admittedly the salary of the appellant is not
paid by the Government. He at the relevant time
was not in the service of the State. Prosecution
against an officer of a government company or a
public   undertaking   would   not   require   any
sanction under Section 197 CrPC.”
11.  The question again fell for consideration in Chandan Kumar
Basu vs. State of Bihar, (2014) 13 SCC 70, involving an officer of
an   Indian   Administrative   Service   serving   on   deputation   as
Administrator­cum­Managing   Director   of   Bihar   State   Housing
8
Cooperative Federation Ltd.   Elucidating the requirements to be
fulfilled for the applicability of the protection under Section 197,
Cr.P.C., it was observed as follows:
“8. A reading of the provisions of Section 197(1) of
the Code reveals that there are three mandatory
requirements   under   Section   197(1)   of   the   Code,
namely:
(a) that the accused is a public servant;
(b) that the public servant can be removed from
the post by or with the sanction either of the
Central or the State Government, as the case
may be;
(c) the act(s) giving rise to the alleged offence had
been committed by the public servant in the
actual or purported discharge of his official
duties.”
12. We are of the opinion that sufficient evidence is not available
on record at this stage with regard to the status of appellant no.2 in
all aspects for us to unhesitatingly hold that the protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C shall be available to him. These are matters to
be considered by the Magistrate on basis of the evidence that may
be placed before him during the course of trial.
9
13. Mohd. Hadi Raja  (supra) has been noticed more recently in
Punjab State Warehousing  Corporation vs. Bhushan Chander
and another, (2016) 13 SCC 44, holding that the High Court erred
in   providing   the   protection   under   Section   197,   Cr.P.C.   to   an
employee of the appellant Corporation which was fully government
owned   and   financed   by   the   State   Government,   and   therefore,
respondent fell within the definition of a ‘public servant’.   Setting
aside the orders of the High Court, this Court observed as follows:
“23.  In  Mohd.   Hadi   Raja  v.  State   of   Bihar  the
question   arose   whether   Section   197   CrPC   was
applicable   for   prosecuting   officers   of   the   public
sector undertakings or the government companies
which can be treated as State within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court
referred   to   Section   197   CrPC,   noted   the
submissions   and   eventually   held   that   the
protection by way of sanction under Section 197
CrPC is not applicable to the officers of government
companies or the public undertakings even when
such   public   undertakings   are   “State”   within   the
meaning   of   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   on
account   of   deep   and   pervasive   control   of   the
Government.
24.  The   High   Court   has   not   accepted   the
submission of the Corporation in this regard. We
are constrained to note that the decision in Mohd.
Hadi Raja  has been referred to in the grounds in
this appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest
10
that the said decision was cited before the High
Court…”
14. Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela (supra), on which
the appellants have placed reliance, is completely distinguishable
on its own facts. The appellant was employed in the Municipal
Corporation as a Laboratory Officer.   He was only entrusted with
discharge of duties as a public analyst. His remuneration was not
paid by the Government, but by the Corporation.  The observations
in Paragraph 5 have to be understood in that context:
“5. Section 197, CrPC clearly intends to draw a
line between public servants and to provide that
only in the case of the higher ranks should the
sanction of the government to their prosecution
be necessary. While a public servant holding an
office of the kind mentioned in the section is as
such public servant appointed to another office,
his   official   acts   in   connection   with   the   latter
office will also relate to the former office. The
words   “removable   from   office”   occurring   in
Section 197 signify removal from the office he is
holding. The authority mentioned in the section
is the authority under which the officer is serving
and competent to terminate his services. If the
accused is under the service and pay of the local
authority,   the   appointment   to   an   office   for
exercising functions under a particular statute
will not alter his status as an employee of the
local authority.”
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15. It   is   therefore,   held   that   the   question   of   sanction   under
Section 197, Cr.P.C. with regard to appellants nos.3 and 4 treating
them to be ‘public servant’ simply does not arise because of their
absorption   in   the   Corporation.   With   regard   to   appellant   no.2,
considering   his   status   as   on   deputation   to   the   appellant
Corporation   at   the   relevant   point   of   time   and   in   absence   of
necessary   evidence   with   regard   to   his   status   in   the   appellant
Corporation throughout the litigation being ambiguous, we leave
that question open for consideration in the trial after necessary
evidence is available.
16. The trial has turned out to be stillborn since 2003, with the
appellants   filing   one   application   after   another.     We   are   of   the
considered   opinion   that   the   trial   needs   to   be   expedited   and
concluded at an early date. It is ordered accordingly. The Magistrate
shall endeavour to conclude the trial within a period of one year.
The parties are directed to cooperate for its early disposal.
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17.  The appeal is dismissed.
………………………………….J.
(NAVIN SINHA)
……….………………………..J.
     (A.S. BOPANNA) 
New Delhi,
August 19, 2019.
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