Locus Standi = plaintiffs are merely agnates and the question of succession could open only after the death of defendant No.1, hence they had no locus to file the suit. Customary law whether the parties are governed by the custom in matter of alienation and what that custom"? Trial Court returned a finding that there is a custom, as pleaded, but there is one exception to the custom that a person who has rendered service to the alienater and who has some special tie with him or has associated with him in the management of the property, alienation to him is permissible. the Trial Court further returned a finding that defendant No.2 was residing with defendant No.1 and because of that both had special tie with each other, hence exception to the custom was applicable, and the suit was dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4688 OF 2009
BHAGWANTI & ORS.                            APPELLANT(S)
                            VERSUS
ARJAN SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.             RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   the   judgment   of
the   High   Court   dated   29.09.2005   by   which   the   High   Court
has   dismissed   the   R.S.A.   No.2258   of   1999   filed   by   the
appellant's   predecessor-in-interest.   The   predecessor-in-
interest   of   the   appellant   filed   a   Civil   Suit   No.484   of
1984   along   with   his   two   other   brothers   as   plaintiffs
No.1,   2   and   3   against   Banarsi   and   Arjan   Singh,   who   are
arrayed   as   defendant   Nos.1   &   2.   Suit   was   filed   for
declaration   to   the   effect   that   decree   dated   10.05.1984
obtained   by   defendant   No.2   against   defendant   No.1
regarding   the   ancestral   land   is   without   consideration,
legal   necessity   and   is   against   the   reversionary   interest
of   the   appellants/plaintiffs.   The   suit   was   contested   and
the  Trial   Court  framed   11  issues   and  after   answering  the
1

issues   dismissed   the   suit.   The   plaintiffs,   who   were
agnates   to   the   defendant   No.1   had   challenged   the   decree
alleging that it is in nature of alienation which is not
permissible   under   the   custom.   It   was   the   case   of   the
plaintiffs   that   under   customary   law   defendant   No.1   was
not   entitled   to   alienation.   One   of   the   issue   i.e.   issue
No.3   was   framed   by   the   Trial   Court   "as   to   whether   the
parties   are   governed   by   the   custom   in   matter   of
alienation   and   what   that   custom"?   Trial   Court   returned   a
finding that there is a custom, as pleaded, but there is
one   exception   to   the   custom   that   a   person   who   has
rendered   service   to   the   alienater   and   who   has   some
special   tie   with   him   or   has   associated   with   him   in   the
management   of   the   property,   alienation   to   him   is
permissible.
On   the   aforesaid   ground,   the   Trial   Court   further
returned   a   finding   that   defendant   No.2   was   residing   with
defendant   No.1   and   because   of   that   both   had   special   tie
with   each   other,   hence   exception   to   the   custom   was
applicable, and the suit was dismissed.
Against the said order, Civil Appeal was filed, which
was   also   dismissed   by   Additional   District   Judge,   Ambala
reaffirming   the   findings   returned   by   the   Trial   Court.
Aggrieved,   Regular   Second   Appeal   was   filed   by   the
plaintiffs   where   the   High   Court   took   the   view   that
2

plaintiffs   are   merely   agnates   and   the   question   of
succession   could   open   only   after   the   death   of   defendant
No.1, hence they had no locus to file the suit. The High
Court   further   noted   that   when   this   was   put   up   to   the
counsel   for   the   appellant,   an   argument   was   made   that
matter regarding customary law has been referred to five-
Judge Bench, hence the matter be deferred. The High Court
took the view that the present case was not a case where
the   decision   of   the   Full   Bench   be   awaited.   Consequently,
the appeal was dismissed.
Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   challenging   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court   contends   that   High   Court
having   not   considered   the   matter   on   merits   the   matter
need   to   be   reconsidered   by   the   High   Court   on   merits.   He
further   submits   that   under   the   customary   law,   the
alienation   was   not   permissible.   He   has   also   referred   to
five-Judge   Bench   judgment,   which   was   under   reference   at
the  time   when  the   regular  second   appeal  was   decided.  The
judgment   is   reported   in   Mihan   and   another   Vs.   Inder   and
another ,   (2008)   3   R.C.R.(Civil)   124.   Learned   counsel   for
the   appellant   lastly   submitted   that   the   decree   was
collusive.
We have considered the submissions of counsel for the
appellants and perused the record.
3

The plaintiffs suit was based on the custom that sole
proprietor,   who   has   no   son,   has   no   right   of   alienation,
hence   the   decree   in   favour   of   the   defendant   No.2   was
unsustainable.   The   Trial   Court   has   properly   framed   the
issues and has answered the issue on customs, as pleaded,
but   held   that   there   is   an   exception   to   the   custom   that
for   person   who   has   special   tie   and   who   has   rendered
service,   there   can   be   alienation.   Those   findings   are
based on relevant materials and we do not find any ground
to   interfere   with   those   findings.   The   said   findings   were
also concurred by the First Appeal.
As   far   as   submission   of   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant   that   the   High   Court   did   not   enter   into   the
merits   of   the   case   and   decided   only   on   the   locus.   It   is
true  that   the  High   Court  noted   the  aforesaid   ground  that
succession   will   open   after   the   death   of   the   defendant
No.1,   hence   there   is   no   locus   to   the   plaintiffs   to   file
the  suit.   Even,  if   the  submission   of  learned   counsel  for
the   appellants   is   correct   that   the   High   Court   ought   to
have   consider   other   issues   on   the   merits   but   in   view   of
the   fact   that   two   Courts   i.e.   Trial   Court   and   the   First
Appellate   Court   has   concurrently   decided   the   matter   on
merits,   we   do   not   find   any   reason   to   remit   to   the   High
Court   to   reconsider   the   matter.   The   appellants,   who   are
plaintiffs, have to stand on their own legs and they have
to prove their own case. As found, the decree, passed by
4

defendant   No.1   in   favour   of   defendant   No.2,   was
permissible   even   on   custom.   As   far   as   submission
regarding   decree   was   collusive,   the   Trial   Court   did   not
accept   the   said   plea   and   we   also   do   not   find   any   good
ground to accept such plea.
We  do not  find any  ground in  this appeal.  The appeal
is, accordingly, dismissed.   
...................J.
 (ASHOK BHUSHAN)
...................J.
 (NAVIN SINHA)
New Delhi
July 24, 2019
5

ITEM NO.101               COURT NO.12               SECTION IV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).4688/2009
BHAGWANTI & ORS.                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
ARJAN SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.                    Respondent(s)

Date : 24-07-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Appellant(s)
Mr. J.S. Chahal, Adv.
Mr. A. P. Mohanty, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
Mr. P. N. Puri, AOR
Mrs. Reeta Dewan Puri, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Puri, Adv.
Ms. Seema Chettri, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(ARJUN BISHT)                                   (RENU KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               BRANCH OFFICER
(signed order is placed on the file)
6 

Partition suit is barred by limitation filed by erstwhile minor , 12 years after becoming major against the purchaser The suit for partition and separate possession of 1/5 share was filed by the respondent No.1 (plaintiff) in respect of suit Properties. - The present appeal, however, is filed by the purchaser of property at Item No.6 in schedule of properties. -The appellant No.1 (defendant No. 8) had purchased the stated property from defendant Nos.1 and 4, brother and mother respectively of the plaintiff. The sale deed records that the property was sold for legal necessity of the family. Admittedly,respondent No.1 became major in 1981 but the suit came to be filed only in the year 1994.- The Trial Court opined that the suit in reference to property at Item No. 6 in respect of which the present appeal has been filed, was bared by limitation. - Additionally, the Trial Court opined that no relief had been claimed by the plaintiff to declare that the sale deed executed in favour of the appellants as illegal, void or not binding on the plaintiff. On that basis, the relief claimed by the respondent No.1 (plaintiff) came to be rejected by the Trial Court. - The High Court proceeded on the assumption that the property became available for partition by applying Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; and decreed the suit in favour of respondent No.1 by declaring that she was entitled to half share in all the scheduled properties. Apex court held that the High Court and the relevant material on record, we have no hesitation in taking the view that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court at least in respect of the suit property described as Item No.6 in the schedule of properties which was purchased by the appellants on 10.06.1981 by a registered sale deed and which sale deed has not been challenged. The suit came to be filed almost after a gap of 12 years therefrom and more so after 13 years from respondent No.1 (plaintiff) attaining majority in 1981. In such a situation, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff as the property already stood transferred and more so in light of the just finding recorded by the Trial Court that the transfer of the subject property in favour of the appellants was for legal necessity of the family, which fact has been mentioned in the registered sale deed itself and had remained unchallenged.

1
  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9984 OF 2011 
ASHOKA & ANR.                                       Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
M.C. SUJATA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.                   Respondent(s)
    O R D E R 
Heard learned counsel for the appellants.
This   appeal   emanates   from   the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by
the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at   Bangalore   dated   21.04.2006   in   RFA
No. 886 of 2002.
This appeal is filed by the original defendant Nos. 8 and 13.
The   suit   for   partition   and   separate   possession   of   1/5   share   was
filed   by   the   respondent   No.1   (plaintiff)   in   respect   of   suit
properties. The present appeal, however, is filed by the purchaser
of   property   at   Item   No.6   in   schedule   of   properties.     This   appeal,
therefore, is confined to the said property being Survey No. 768/1A
� 0.20 gts. situated at Maddur Kassaba.
The appellant  No.1 (defendant  No. 8)  had purchased  the stated
property   from   defendant   Nos.1   and   4,   brother   and   mother

2
respectively   of   the   plaintiff.     The   sale   deed   records   that   the
property   was   sold   for   legal   necessity   of   the   family.   Admittedly,
respondent No.1 became major in 1981 but the suit came to be filed
only in the year 1994. The assertion made in the suit is that cause
of   action   had   arisen   on   20.12.1993   for   which   the   suit   came   to   be
filed in 1994.  The Trial Court framed 9 issues on the basis of the
pleadings   filed   by   the   parties.     The   Trial   Court   opined   that   the
suit in reference to property at Item No. 6 in respect of which the
present   appeal   has   been   filed,   was   bared   by   limitation.
Additionally,   the   Trial   Court   opined   that   no   relief   had   been
claimed by the plaintiff to declare that the sale deed executed in
favour   of   the   appellants   as   illegal,   void   or   not   binding   on   the
plaintiff.  On that basis, the relief claimed by the respondent No.
1 (plaintiff) came to be rejected by the Trial Court.
 
The   respondent   No.1   carried   the   matter   in   appeal   before   the
High   Court.     The   High   Court   proceeded   on   the   assumption   that   the
property   became   available   for   partition   by   applying   Section   14   of
the   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1956;   and   decreed   the   suit   in   favour   of
respondent No.1 by declaring that she was entitled to half share in
all the scheduled properties.
As   aforesaid,   the   challenge   in   the   present   appeal   to   the
decree passed by the High Court is limited to the suit property at
Item   No.   6   mentioned   hitherto.   During   the   pendency   of   the   present
appeal,   the   respondent   No.1   has   died.   The   appellants   moved   an
application   for   bringing     her   legal   heirs   on   record,   namely,   the

3
respondent   No.5   being   her   mother.   That   application   was   allowed   on
14.03.2011.     From   the   record,   it   appears   that   on   17.08.2011,   some
advocate   by   name   Mr.   N.K.   Verma   appeared   before   the   court   and
undertook to file appearance   on behalf of respondent No.5 who has
been   brought   on   record   also   as   the   legal   heir   of   respondent   No.   1
(plaintiff). However, no appearance has been filed so far.    As   a
result,   we   have   no   option   but   to   proceed   against   the   contesting
respondent exparte.
After having perused the judgment of the Trial Court and also
the   High   Court   and   the   relevant   material   on   record,   we   have   no
hesitation   in   taking   the   view   that   the   High   Court   committed
manifest error in reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court at
least in respect of the suit property described as Item No.6 in the
schedule   of   properties   which   was   purchased   by   the   appellants   on
10.06.1981   by   a   registered   sale   deed   and   which   sale   deed   has   not
been challenged. The suit came to be filed almost after a gap of 12
years   therefrom   and   more   so   after   13   years   from   respondent   No.1
(plaintiff)   attaining   majority   in   1981.   In   such   a     situation,   no
relief   can   be   granted   to   the   plaintiff   as   the   property   already
stood transferred and more so in light of the just finding recorded
by   the   Trial   Court   that   the   transfer   of   the   subject   property   in
favour   of   the   appellants   was   for   legal   necessity   of   the   family,
which   fact   has   been   mentioned   in   the   registered   sale   deed   itself
and had remained unchallenged.

4
Taking   any   view   of   the   matter,   the   impugned   judgment   and
decree   of   the   High   Court   qua   property   at   Item   No.6   of   the   suit
schedule,   cannot   be   sustained   and   the   same   is   set   aside.   Instead,
the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   rejecting   the
suit   for   partition   and   possession   in   respect   of   the   said   property
(at Item No.6) is affirmed. No order as to costs.
The Civil Appeal is allowed accordingly.
�...................J
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
�...................J
(AJAY RASTOGI)
New Delhi
March 12, 2019

5
ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.9               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  9984/2011
ASHOKA & ANR.                                      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
M.C. SUJATA(DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.                   Respondent(s)

Date : 12-03-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY RASTOGI
For Appellant(s)
                    Mr. K. V. Mohan, AOR
Mr. K.V. Balakrishnan, Adv.
Mr. Rahul Kumar Sharma, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s)
                    Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar, AOR
                    Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Parikshit P. Angadi, Adv.
Md. Apzal Ansari, Adv.
Mr. Manendra Pal Gupta, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The Civil Appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(DEEPAK SINGH)                                  (VIDYA NEGI)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               COURT MASTER (NSH)
{Signed order is placed on the file} 

delay in filing the suit for specific performance Suit against the original defendant viz. P. Paramasiva Gounder for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 06.07.1990 and to deliver possession or in the alternative to direct the original defendant - P. Paramasiva Gounder to pay a sum of Rs.2,47,478/- (Rupees two lakhs forty seven thousand and four hundred seventy eight) to the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8.= High court reversed the decree and judgment of trial court and that of appellant court in second appeal= The High Court further observed that if there was a lessee, there would have been a reference of the said lessee even in the original agreement of sale and, therefore, on that ground the High Court did not accept the Exhibit A-11 endorsement as a ground for the appellant in delay in filing the suit for specific performance. The High Court held that the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8 having paid 90% of the amount under the agreement of sale would not have waited for six years in filing the suit for specific performance. Apex court held that Since the agreement is of the year 1990 and keeping in view the escalated price of the land and other facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct respondent nos. 1 to 5 to pay a sum of Rs.17,50,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakhs fifty thousand) which is inclusive of the advance amount of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand) to the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8. On deposit of the amount of Rs.17,50,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakhs fifty thousand), the said sale deed dated 02.03.2007 shall stand cancelled and respondents no. 1 to 5 are at liberty to register the decree and appropriate entry be made in the Registrar office in the Encumbrance Register reversing the entry of sale and also in the Revenue Register to enable respondent nos. 1 to 5 to have clear title.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
     CIVIL APPEAL NO.  11380 OF 2011
L.T.SOMASUNDARAM                                   ...APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
P.SAMPOORNAM AND ORS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. The   appellant   and   the   proforma   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   have
filed   the   suit   against   the   original   defendant   viz.   P.   Paramasiva
Gounder   for   specific   performance   of   agreement   of   sale   dated
06.07.1990   and   to   deliver   possession   or   in   the   alternative   to
direct the original defendant -  P. Paramasiva Gounder to pay a sum
of   Rs.2,47,478/-   (Rupees   two   lakhs   forty   seven   thousand   and   four
hundred seventy eight) to the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8.
2. Based   upon   the   evidence   adduced   by   the   parties,   the   Trial
Court   held   that   the   appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   are
entitled   to   the   decree   for   specific   performance   and,   accordingly,
decreed   the   suit   vide   judgment   dated   16.10.2003.   During   the
pendency of the suit, the original defendant- P. Paramasiva Gounder
died.   Respondent   Nos.   1   to   5   were   brought   on   record   as   the   Legal
representatives   of   deceased-   P.   Paramasiva   Gounder.   The   respondent
nos.   1   to   5   preferred   the   first   appeal   and   the   same   came   to   be
dismissed on 02.09.2005.
3. Being   aggrieved,   the   respondent   nos.   1   to   5   preferred   the

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second   appeal   and   the   High   Court   reversed   the   concurrent   findings
and   allowed   the   second   appeal.   In   the   impugned   judgment,   the   High
Court   held   that   the   price   agreed   under   the   agreement   of   sale   was
Rs.1,50,000/-   (Rupees   one   lakh   fifty   thousand)   and   the   appellant
and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   herein   had   paid   Rs.1,40,000/-   (Rupees
one   lakh   forty   thousand)   and   the   balance   payable   was   only
Rs.10,000/-   (Rupees   ten   thousand)   and   it   is   not   known   why   the
appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   kept   quit   for   such   long   time
without   then   and   there   seeking   for   the   specific   performance.
Insofar as the alleged endorsement, Exhibit A-11 about the eviction
of   lessee   in   the   suit   property,   the   High   Court   did   not   accept   the
endorsement and held that Exhibit A-11 endorsement does not specify
a   particular   time   within   which   the   lessee   shall   be   evicted.   The
High Court further observed that if there was a lessee, there would
have   been   a   reference   of   the   said   lessee   even   in   the   original
agreement of sale and, therefore, on that ground the High Court did
not   accept   the   Exhibit   A-11   endorsement   as   a   ground   for   the
appellant in delay in filing the suit for specific performance. The
High   Court   held   that   the   appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8
having paid 90% of the amount under the agreement of sale would not
have   waited   for   six   years   in   filing   the   suit   for   specific
performance.   On   those   findings,   the   High   Court   reversed   the
concurrent   findings   of   the   Courts   below   and   allowed   the   second
appeal.
4. We   have   heard   Mr.   Senthil   Jagadeesan,   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8 as
well   as   Mr.   Jayanth   Muth   Raj,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on

3
behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 5 and perused the relevant material.
5. The relief  of specific  performance is  a discretionary  one. In
the   present   case,   the   agreement   of   sale   was   executed   way   back   in
the   year   1990.   Learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent   nos.   1   to   5   has   submitted   that   the   respondents   are   in
possession   of   the   property   and   over   the   years   they   spent   lot   of
money in developing the property and at this distant point of time
if   the   suit   for   specific   performance   is   to   be   decreed,   it   will
cause   undue   hardship   to   respondent   nos.   1   to   5   and,   therefore,
submitted that the judgment of the High Court may not be interfered
with.     We   find   force   in   the   submission   of   the   learned   senior
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   respondent   nos.   1   to   5.   Since   the
agreement is of the year 1990 it would cause undue hardship to the
respondents if at this distant point of time, respondents nos. 1 to
5 are directed to execute sale deed in favour of the appellant and
respondent   nos.   6   to   8   at   the   price   which   was   agreed   in   the   year
1990.
6. However,   when   the   High   Court   reversed   the   concurrent   findings
of   the   lower   Courts,   the   High   Court   should   have   considered   the
alternative   prayer   of   the   appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   in
ordering refund of the advance payment of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one
lakh   forty   thousand).   Since   the   agreement   is   of   the   year   1990   and
keeping in view the escalated price of the land and other facts and
circumstances   of   the   case,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   direct
respondent   nos.   1   to   5   to   pay   a   sum   of   Rs.17,50,000/-   (Rupees
seventeen   lakhs   fifty   thousand)   which   is   inclusive   of   the   advance
amount   of   Rs.1,40,000/-   (Rupees   one   lakh   forty   thousand)   to   the

4
appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8.   The   respondent   nos.   1   to   5
shall   deposit   the   amount   of   Rs.17,50,000/-(Rupees   seventeen   lakhs
fifty   thousand)   to   the   credit   of   the   Court   of   Additional
Subordinate Court-II, Erode, Erode District within a period of four
months from today. The Supreme Court Registry is directed to draft
a decree to this effect. On such deposit being made, the amount of
Rs.17,50,000/-(Rupees   seventeen   lakhs   fifty   thousand)   shall   be
equally apportioned amongst the appellant and Respondent nos. 6 to
8.
7.   It   is   stated   that   after   the   dismissal   of   the   appeal   by   the
First Appellate Court, sale deed was executed by the proceedings of
the   Executing   Court   on   02.03.2007   in   favour   of   the   appellant   and
respondent nos. 6 to 8. On deposit of the amount of Rs.17,50,000/-
(Rupees   seventeen   lakhs   fifty   thousand),   the   said   sale   deed   dated
02.03.2007 shall stand cancelled and respondents no. 1 to 5 are at
liberty to register the decree and appropriate entry be made in the
Registrar office in the Encumbrance Register reversing the entry of
sale   and   also   in   the   Revenue   Register   to   enable   respondent   nos.   1
to 5 to have clear title.
8. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.
........................J.
[R.BANUMATHI]
NEW DELHI ........................J.
25TH JULY, 2019 [ A.S. BOPANNA]

5
ITEM NO.101               COURT NO.7               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  11380/2011
L.T.SOMASUNDARAM                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
P.SAMPOORNAM AND ORS                            Respondent(s)

Date : 25-07-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan, AOR
Ms. Sonakshi Malhan,Adv.
Ms. Suriti Chowdhary,Adv.
Ms. Mrinal Kanwar,Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj,Sr.Adv.
Mr. C.K.Sasi,Adv.
Mrs. Malavika Jayanth,Adv.
Mr. Sureshan P., AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any , shall stand disposed of.
(MADHU BALA)                                    (NISHA TRIPATHI)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

whether plaintiff can take the plea of adverse possession in view of the interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6111 OF 2009
KRISHNAMURTHY S. SETLUR (D)
THROUGH LRS.  …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
O.V. NARASIMHA SETTY (D) BY LRS. & ORS …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  12267  OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.2760 OF 2011)
NAGAR COUNCIL SIRHIND …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
BHAGAT RAM & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  10332  OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.10343 OF 2016)
M.E. MUNIRAJEGOWDA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SRI UTHANALLAPPA @ UTHANALLIGA
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS. …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. The   instant   appeals   involve   a   preliminary   issue   as   to   whether
plaintiff   can   take   the   plea   of   adverse   possession   in   view   of   the
interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  A Three­Judge
2
Bench of this Court in  Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur &
Ors.  (Civil Appeal No.7764 of 2014) has decided the similar issue on
7
th August, 2019, by holding as under:
“56. Possession is the root of title and is right like the property.
As ownership is also of different kinds of viz. sole ownership,
contingent ownership, corporeal ownership, and legal equitable
ownership.   Limited ownership or limited right to property may
be enjoyed by a holder.   What can be prescribable against is
limited to the rights of the holder.  Possession confers enforceable
right under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.   It has to be
looked into what kind of possession is enjoyed viz. de facto i.e.,
actual, ‘de jure possession’, constructive possession, concurrent
possession over a small portion of the property.   In case the
owner is in symbolic possession, there is no dispossession, there
can   be   formal,   exclusive   or   joint   possession.     The   joint
possessor/co­owner possession is not presumed to be adverse.
Personal law also plays a role to construe nature of possession.
57. The   adverse   possession   requires   all   the   three   classic
requirements to co­exist at the same time, namely, nec­vi i.e.
adequate in continuity, nec­clam i.e., adequate in publicity and
nec­precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his
knowledge.  Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner
does   not   take   care   to   know   notorious   facts,   knowledge   is
attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would
have known it.  Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title
which is not pleaded.  Animus possidendi under hostile colour of
title is required.   Trespasser’s long possession is not synonym
with adverse possession.  Trespasser’s possession is construed to
be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute
adverse   possession.     The   owner   can   take   possession   from   a
trespasser   at   any   point   in   time.     Possessor   looks   after   the
property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and
the large concept is that actual tiller should own the land who
works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable.
The   legislature   in   various   States   confers   rights   based   on
possession.
58. Adverse possession is heritable and there can be tacking of
adverse   possession   by   two   or   more   persons   as   the   right   is
transmissible one.   In our opinion, it confers a perfected right
which cannot be defeated on reentry except as provided in Article
65   itself.     Tacking   is   based   on   the   fulfillment   of   certain
conditions,   tacking   maybe   by   possession   by   the   purchaser,
legatee   or   assignee,   etc.   so   as   to   constitute   continuity   of
3
possession, that person must be claiming through whom it is
sought to be tacked, and would depend on the identity of the
same property under the same right.   Two distinct trespassers
cannot tack their possession to constitute conferral of right by
adverse possession for the prescribed period.  
59. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by
another person except by due procedure of law and once 12
years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to
eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title
and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case
may   be   against   whom   he   has   prescribed.   In   our   opinion,
consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it
can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the
defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who
has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for
restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of
dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a
possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before
the ripening of title by way of adverse possession.  By perfection
of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be
remediless.  In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after
having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by
the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly,
any   other   person   who   might   have   dispossessed   the   plaintiff
having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be
evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title
against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under
other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a
plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can
sue and maintain a suit.
60. When we consider the law of adverse possession as has
developed vis­à­vis to property dedicated to public use, courts
have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession.  There
are instances when such   properties are encroached upon and
then a plea of adverse possession is raised.  In Such cases, on
the land reserved for public utility, it is desirable that rights
should not accrue.   The law of adverse possession may cause
harsh consequences, hence, we are constrained to observe that it
would be advisable that concerning such properties dedicated to
public cause, it is made clear in the statute of limitation that no
rights can accrue by adverse possession.  
61. Resultantly, we hold that decisions of Gurudwara Sahab v.
Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala (supra) and decision relying on it
in  State of Uttarakhand v. Mandir Shri Lakshmi Siddh Maharaj
(supra) and Dharampal (dead) through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board
(supra) cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly, thus
4
they are hereby overruled. We hold that plea of acquisition of title
by adverse possession can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65
of the Limitation Act and there is no bar under the Limitation
Act, 1963 to sue on aforesaid basis in case of infringement of any
rights of a plaintiff. 
62. Let the matters be placed for consideration on merits before
the appropriate Bench.”
2. The preliminary issue involved in the instant appeals is wholly
covered by the above decision.  In view of the answer, let the matters be
placed for consideration on merits before the appropriate Bench.
……………………..J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi; .…………………….J.
August 08, 2019. (Vineet Saran)

Mere filing of the civil suit cannot come in the way of the execution of the lawful decree in favour of the appellant which is final.= we do not see how execution of the decree for specific performance in favour of the appellant can be injuncted and stayed in view of the subsequent suit filed by Meena Rani Gupta and Nalini Gupta, which suit is still pending and has not yet been decided

CA 3412/2019
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3412 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32846 of 2016)
Veena Mahajan   Appellant(s)
                  Versus
V.N. Verma and Others      Respondent(s)
O R D E R 
Leave granted.
The   appellant,   Veena   Mahajan,   plaintiff   in   Civil   Suit
(OS)   No.   553   of   1988,   sought   specific   performance   of   an
agreement   dated   14 th
  February,   1986,   which   suit   was   decreed   in
the year 1998.  The decree has attained finality upon dismissal
of   appeals   including   the   special   leave   petition   arising
therefrom in the year 2012.
Thereafter,   the   appellant   filed   Execution   Petition   No.
282   of   2012   for   execution   of   decree   for   specific   performance.
The   executing   court   has   halted   and   stayed   the   execution
proceedings on the ground that one Meena Rani Gupta and Nalini
Gupta had claimed to have entered into an agreement of sale in
respect   of   the   same   property   in   the   year   1990   and   had
instituted   Civil   Suit   (OS)   No.   779   of   2001   for   specific

CA 3412/2019
2
performance   of   the   agreement   dated   27 th
  November,   1990.
Aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.
We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant.     There
is   none   to   represent   the   respondents.     We   have   considered   the
matter.
The   impugned   order   stalls   and   halts   execution   of   the
decree for  specific performance  passed in  the year  1998, which
decree has attained finality.  The appellant had filed the said
suit   in   1988   and   has   been   in   litigation   for   the   last   thirty
years.   For the last eighteen years she has been denied fruits
of the decree and judgment in her favour.  Meena Rani Gupta and
Nalini Gupta  rely on  an agreement  to sale  purportedly executed
by   a   power   of   attorney   of   the   original   owner   (the   third
respondent before us), dated 27 th
 November, 1990. This agreement
by the  third respondent  was in  contravention of  the injunction
order   dated   14 th
  March,   1988   passed   in   Civil   Suit   (OS)   No.   553
of   1988   filed   by   the   appellant.     Admittedly,   Meena   Rani   Gupta
and   Nalini   Gupta   have   not   acquired   ownership   and   title   in   the
suit property.
In   these   circumstances,   we   do   not   see   how   execution
of   the   decree   for   specific   performance   in   favour   of   the
appellant can be injuncted and stayed in view of the subsequent
suit filed by Meena Rani Gupta and Nalini Gupta, which suit is
still pending and has not yet been decided.  Mere filing of the
civil   suit   cannot   come   in   the   way   of   the   execution   of   the

CA 3412/2019
3
lawful decree in favour of the appellant which is final.
For   the   aforesaid   reasons,   we   set   aside   the   orders
passed   by   the   Division   Bench   and   the   Single   Judge   in   the
execution   proceedings   and   allow   the   present   appeal.
Proceedings in Execution Petition No. 282 of 2012 will now be
commenced and proceeded with expeditiously.
     

..................CJI.
[Ranjan Gogoi]
....................J.
[Deepak Gupta]
....................J.
[Sanjiv Khanna]
New Delhi
April 05 , 2019.

CA 3412/2019
4
ITEM NO.48               COURT NO.1               SECTION XIV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No.32846/2016
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  31-03-2016
in EFA No. 5/2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi)
SMT. VEENA MAHAJAN                                 Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
SH. V.N. VERMA & ORS.                              Respondent(s)

Date : 05-04-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
          HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
For Petitioner(s) Ms. Shivani Luthra, Adv.
Ms. Anjana Ahluwalia, Adv.
Mr. Karan N., Adv.
                  Mr. Nar Hari Singh, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
                  Mr. Kumar Dushyant Singh, AOR (N/P)
                   
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(Chetan Kumar) (Anand Prakash)
     A.R.-cum-P.S.        Court Master
(Signed order is placed on the file)