Violation of the order of injunction is a serious matter and unless there is a clear evidence that the party has wilfully disobeyed the order of the court, the party cannot be punished for disobedience and sent to imprisonment. Though the appellant is said to be the father-in-law of the second respondent, no materials were placed before the court to show that he had the knowledge of the interim order dated 09.12.2004. However, the fact remains that the second respondent and the appellant are the daughter-in-law and the father-in-law. The second respondent-vendor having been found not guilty of contempt of court in the revision (being CRP (NPD) No. 1593 of 2014), the appellant cannot be placed in a worse situation than his vendor.

                                                               1

                                                                                          NON-REPORTABLE

                                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 932 OF 2019
                               [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 3608 OF 2017]



                         RAMASAMY (PURCHASER)                                          Appellant (s)


                                                              VERSUS


                         VENKATACHALAPATHI (DECREE HOLDER)               & ANR.        Respondent(s)



                                                     J U D G M E N T


                         R. BANUMATHI, J.



                         1.    Leave granted.



                         2.    This appeal arises out of the Judgment and order

                         dated     09.11.2016        passed    by      the    High    Court   of

                         Judicature at Madras in CRP (NPD) No. 3727 of 2015,

                         in and by which, the learned Single Judge affirmed

                         the     order   of    the     Executing       Court,     finding     the

                         appellant guilty of Contempt of Court for the wilful

                         disobedience     of     the        order   of       injunction     dated
Signature Not Verified
                         09.12.2004      passed        in     the      suit     for    specific
Digitally signed by
JAYANT KUMAR ARORA
Date: 2019.01.31
10:27:08 IST
Reason:
                         performance, being OS No. 162 of 2004 filed by the

                         first respondent.
                                          2

3.     The   second     respondent,           Deivathal,     had     entered

into an Agreement to Sell dated 08.06.2004 in favour

of the first respondent.              The first respondent filed

the suit for specific performance, being OS No. 162

of 2004 and in the said suit, interim injunction was

granted      on     09.12.2004            restraining        the     second

respondent     �    Deivathal        not      to    alienate    the       suit

property.     The said suit for specific performance was

decreed on 24.08.2006.              Even when the said suit for

specific performance was pending, it is alleged that

in     violation        of    the    interim         injunction       dated

09.12.2004,       the    second     respondent        �     Deivathal      had

executed the sale deed dated 17.06.2005 in favour of

the appellant who is none other than the father-in-

law of the second respondent.                       After the suit for

specific      performance           was        decreed,       the     first

respondent        has    also       got       the    sale     deed    dated

07.12.2006 executed through the process of the Court.

The appellant herein filed the suit for injunction,

being OS No. 29 of 2007, which came to be dismissed.

The first respondent also filed another suit, being

OS No. 61 of 2010 to declare the sale deed dated

17.05.2005 in favour of the appellant as null and

void and the said suit, being OS No. 61 of 2010 was

also    decreed.        The   first       appeal     preferred       by    the

appellant also came to be dismissed on 24.02.2017.

It is stated that the second appeal is pending before
                                       3

the High Court.



4.    In the present appeal, we are concerned only with

the alleged disobedience of the interim order dated

09.12.2004, disobedience of which the appellant was

found guilty.       In the Execution Petition filed by the

first respondent under Order XXI Rule 32(5) and Order

XXXIX Rule 2(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure and

the   Executing     Court       held       that    there      was     willful

disobedience of the order of the interim injunction

dated    09.12.2004       and    found     both,     the      appellant    as

well as the second respondent, guilty of Contempt of

Court.



5.    A Revision was filed by the second respondent,

being    CRP   (NPD)    No.     1593     of   2014       challenging       the

order of the Executing Court and the said revision

was allowed on 11.11.2014.                 While allowing the said

revision filed by the second respondent � vendor, the

learned    Single      Judge     observed         that     the      materials

available before the court did not indicate that the

second respondent (first defendant) is guilty of any

violation,     whereas      in    the       revision       filed      by   the

appellant      in   CRP    (NPD)       No.    3727       of    2015     dated

09.11.2016, the learned Single Judge took a different

view by observing that the sale deed was executed

during the pendency of the order of injunction and,
                                   4

therefore,     the   Executing     Court     rightly         found     the

appellant     guilty     of   Contempt     of        Court     for     the

disobedience of the order dated 09.12.2004.



6.    We have heard the learned counsel for the parties

and    perused     the   impugned       order     and        the     other

materials     on   record.       Violation      of    the     order     of

injunction is a serious matter and unless there is a

clear evidence that the party has wilfully disobeyed

the order of the court, the party cannot be punished

for disobedience and sent to imprisonment.                         Though

the appellant is said to be the father-in-law of the

second respondent, no materials were placed before

the court to show that he had the knowledge of the

interim order dated 09.12.2004.                 However, the fact

remains that the second respondent and the appellant

are the daughter-in-law and the father-in-law.                         The

second respondent-vendor having been found not guilty

of contempt of court in the revision (being CRP (NPD)

No. 1593 of 2014), the appellant cannot be placed in

a    worse   situation    than    his   vendor.         It     is    also

pertinent to point out that the first respondent �

Decreeholder also had got the sale deed executed on

07.12.2006.        The first respondent has also said to

have taken the possession of the property in dispute.
                            5

7.    In the above facts and circumstances of the case

and    considering   that   the    appellant    is   an

octogenarian, the impugned order is set aside and the

appeal is allowed.    We make it clear that the order

in this appeal shall not prejudice the contention of

the respective parties in the second appeal pending

before the High Court and the same shall be decided

on its own merits.

      No costs.

                                .......................J.
                                        [ R. BANUMATHI ]



                                .......................J.
                                    [ R. SUBHASH REDDY ]

New Delhi;
January 22, 2019.
                                      6

                                                                   CORRECTED

ITEM NO.17                    COURT NO.8                  SECTION XII

                S U P R E M E C O U R T O F           I N D I A
                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)          No(s).   3608/2017

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-11-2016
in CRPNP No. 3727/2015 passed by the High Court Of Judicature At
Madras)

RAMASAMY (PURCHASER)                                       Petitioner(s)

                                     VERSUS

VENKATACHALAPATHI (DECREE HOLDER)         & ANR.           Respondent(s)

Date : 22-01-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :   HONBLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
          HONBLE MR. JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY

For Petitioner(s)      Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, AOR

For Respondent(s)      Mr.   A. T. M. Rangaramanujam, Sr. Adv.
                       Mr.   M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR
                       Mr.   C. Rubavathi, Adv.
                       Mr.   P. Raja Ram, Adv.
                       Mr.   V. Senthil Kumar, Adv.
                       Mr.   Pratyush Raj, Adv.

            UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R

      Leave granted.

      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed non-reportable

Judgment.

      Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed

of.



(JAYANT KUMAR ARORA)                               (PARVEEN KUMARI PASRICHA)
  COURT MASTER                                         BRANCH OFFICER

       (Signed non-reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
 

readiness and willingness =The High Court order is not correct in stating that readiness and willingness cannot be inferred because the letters dated 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 had not been sent to defendant. The High Court also erred in holding that despite having the necessary funds, the plaintiff could not be said to be ready and willing. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was also incorrect in putting a short delay in filing the Suit against the plaintiff to state that he was not ready and willing. In India, it is well settled that the rule of equity that exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a Suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the plaintiff

� REPORTABLE�
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
R LAKSHMIKANTHAM                               Appellant(s)
VERSUS
DEVARAJI                                       Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R. F. NARIMAN, J.
In   the   present   appeal,   despite   service   of   notice,
nobody appears for the respondent.   We have heard Dr. (Ms.)
Pooja Jha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
The   High   Court,   in   the   present   appeal,   has,   by   the
impugned judgment dated 03.02.2017, set aside the concurrent
judgments of the Courts below, and allowed the appeal of the
erstwhile   defendant,   who   is   the   respondent   before   us,   and
hence,   set   aside   the   decree   for   specific   performance   that
was passed in the plaintiff�s favour.
By   an   agreement   to   sell   dated   22.09.2002,   the   suit-
property was to be sold for a sum of Rs.3,65,000/-.  Certain
clauses   of   the   agreement   are   important   and   are   set   out
hereinbelow:
�1.   The   sale   price   of   the   property   mentioned   in   the
schedule   hereunder   shall   be   Rs.3,65,000/-(Rupees
Three Lakhs and Sixty Five Thousand only).
1

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
2. The   party   of   the   second   part   has   paid   a   sum   of
Rs.5,000/-(Rupees   Five   Thousand   only)   towards
advance   by   cash   and   the   party   of   the   first   part
hereby   admit   and   acknowledge   the   receipt   of   the
same.
3. The   balance   sale   consideration   shall   be   paid   by
the   party   of   the   second   part   to   the   party   of   the
first   part   within   three   months   from   today.     The
party   of   the   first   part   agrees   to   execute   sale
deed   on   the   day   on   which   the   balance   sale
consideration is paid.
4. The party of the second part agrees to pay part of
the sale consideration of Rs.60,000/-(Rupees Sixty
Thousand   only)   to   the   party   of   the   first   on   or
before 10 th
 day of October.
5. The   party   of   the   first   part   had   handed   over   the
original   title   documents   to   the   mortgagee   and   the
party   of   the   second   part   shall   settle   the   loan,
receive   the   documents   from   the   mortgagee   and   keep
the same in his custody.
��������������������������������
�������������������������������.
8. If   there   is   no   encumbrance   to   the   schedule
property and  when the  party of  the second  part is
willing to pay the balance sale consideration, the
party   of   the   first   shall   execute   sale   deed   in
favour   of   the   party   of   the   second   part   or   her
nominee.     If   the   party   of   the   first   part   refuses
to do so, the party of the second part is entitled
to take legal action.�
It   is   stated   that   at   the   time   of   the   sale   agreement,
the suit property was worth roughly a sum of Rs.6 lakhs, but
the parties finally agreed and the defendant, in particular,
agreed to sell the aforesaid property for Rs.3.65 lakhs.   A
perusal   of   the   agreement   to   sell   would   show   that   though
clause   3   requires   that   the   balance   sale   consideration   will
be   paid   within   three   months   from   the   date   of   the   agreement
2

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
and   that   the   seller   will   execute   the   sale   deed   on   the   date
on which balance sale consideration was paid yet, clauses 5
and   8   clearly   show   that   the   original   title   deeds   which   are
with   the   mortgagee   had   yet   to   be   handed   over   and   the
mortgage   had   yet   to   be   redeemed.     It   is   only   when   this   is
done   that   clause   3   would   kick   in,   showing   that   the   time   of
three months is obviously not of essence.
Soon   after   the   agreement,   the   plaintiff   sent   a
registered letter dated 18.12.2002 to the present address of
the   defendant   reminding   the   defendant   that   Rs.5000/-   had
been   received   on   the   date   of   signing   the   agreement   and
Rs.60,000/-  had been  received on  14.10.2002.    Despite this,
the   original   title   documents   were   not   obtained   from   the
mortgagee   and   hence   the   mortgage   could   not   be   discharged.
The   letter   then   goes   on   to   state   that   repeated   calls   were
made and that the plaintiff is ready with the balance money,
and   that   the   defendant   should   come   forward   immediately   to
discharge   the   mortgage,   get   all   documents   from   the
mortgagee, and register the sale deed.  This registered A.D.
letter was returned to the sender stating that the addressee
did   not   receive   the   same   for   the   past   one   week.     The   same
was the fate of another legal notice on the very next date,
i.e.,     19.12.2002.     Finally,   on   07.07.2003,   the   plaintiff
sent a legal notice referring to the earlier legal notice of
19.12.2002   and   called   upon   the   defendant   to   immediately
comply   with   the   terms   of   the   agreement.     To   this   notice,
3

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
which   was   admittedly   received   by   the   defendant   at   the   very
same   address,   no   reply   was   given.     Thereafter,   the   present
suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff in
February, 2005.
Given   these   facts,   the   trial   Court,   by   its   judgment
dated   12.09.2008,   held   that   the   suit   agreement   was   proved
and   that   three   notices   sent   by   the   plaintiff   were   also
proved, it being clear that the defendant was attempting to
wriggle out of his obligations under the agreement.   Though
the   suit   was   filed   belatedly,   the   trial   Court   felt   that   as
the   defendant   did   not   furnish   the   address   of   his   mortgagee
or   take   steps   to   clear   the   mortgage,   it   was   clear   that   the
defendant   was   attempting   to   wriggle   out   of   the   agreement.
Further,   the   plaintiff�s   readiness   and   willingness   was
proved   by   the   fact   that   he   has   necessary   funds   as   on   the
date of the agreement, and thereafter, as was stated by him
in   his   letter   dated   18.12.2002.     This   being   the   case,   the
Court   ordered   specific   performance   as   the   balance   sale
consideration   had   already   been   deposited   into   the   Court   on
the   date   of   the   filing   of   the   Suit.     The   first   appeal   from
the   aforesaid   judgment   was     dismissed   on   20.12.2010   by   the
Principal   District   Judge.     The   District   Judge   found
concurrently for the plaintiff on all the points argued and
hence dismissed the first appeal.
By   the   impugned   judgment,   the   High   Court   reversed   the
concurrent   judgments   and   held,   on   a   construction   of   the
4

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
agreement,   that   since   only   three   months   were   given   to
complete the sale transaction, time was of essence.  It also
went   on   to   hold   that   the   two   letters   dated   18.12.2002   and
19.12.2002   could   not   have   been   said   to   have   been   served   on
the   defendant   and   hence   were   not   proved.     The   High   court
recorded   the   defendant�s   advocate�s   statement   that   it   was
not   going   into   other   aspects   except   that   plaintiff   was   not
ready  and willing  throughout to  perform the  sale agreement.
Despite this, the High Court held that since the Suit itself
was   filed   belatedly,   it   would   not   be   enough   for   the
plaintiff to show that he had the necessary funds.  It would
also   have   been   necessary   for   him   to   show   that   he   was
otherwise ready and willing throughout, which cannot be said
to   be   correct   considering   that   there   was   a   long   time   gap
between   22.09.2002   and   07.07.2003   inasmuch   as   the
intermediate   letters/notices   were   not   proved.     The   High
Court also further stated that the property value was Rs.10
lakhs on the date of the sale agreement, though this was not
proved   by   the   defendant,   and   then   went   on   to   state   that
since   readiness   and   willingness   had   to   be   held   against   the
Plaintiff,   and   since   the   Suit   itself   was   belated,   specific
performance cannot be granted on the facts of this case and,
as   stated   earlier,   reversed   the   concurrent   findings   of   the
Courts below.
We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 
The   High   Court   has,   in   the   second   appeal,   obviously
5

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
gone wrong on a number of counts.   First, to hold that time
was   of   essence   in   the   agreement,   is   wholly   incorrect.
Clause   3   has   to   be   read   along   with   clauses   5   and   8,   which
clearly show that in the nature of reciprocal promises, the
promise   made   by   the   seller   in   clause   5   has   to   be   performed
first,   viz.,   that   the   title   documents   have   to   be   obtained
from   the   mortgagee   after   the   mortgage   is   cleared.     It   is
only   then   that   the   consideration   above   Rs.70,000/-,   being
the   balance   consideration   for   the   sale,   has   to   be   paid.
Secondly, the High court is wholly incorrect in stating that
the two letters of 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 cannot be said
to   have   been   proved.         Both   the   letters   were   registered
A.D.   letters   sent   to   the   very   address   of   the   defendant,
which   the   defendant   states   is   the   address   on   which   it
received   the   legal   notice   dated   07.07.2003.     Further,   the
moment the registered letter once sent is returned with the
remarks   mentioned   hereinabove,   it   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been   served   on   the   defendant   on   the   address   so   stated,
unless   the   contrary   is   proved.     The   defendant   did   not   come
forward   with   anything   to   show   that   this   was   not   the   proper
address.   In fact, that this is the proper address is shown
by   the   fact   that   he   acknowledged   the   receipt   of   the   legal
notice dated 07.07.2003 on this very address. 
The   High   Court   order   is   not   correct   in   stating   that
readiness   and   willingness   cannot   be   inferred   because   the
letters dated 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 had not been sent to
6

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
the   defendant.     The   High   Court   also   erred   in   holding   that
despite  having the  necessary funds,  the plaintiff  could not
be   said   to   be   ready   and   willing.     In   the   aforesaid
circumstances,  the High  Court was  also incorrect  in putting
a   short   delay   in   filing   the   Suit   against   the   plaintiff   to
state   that   he   was   not   ready   and   willing.     In   India,   it   is
well settled that the rule of equity that exists in England,
does   not   apply,   and   so   long   as   a   Suit   for   specific
performance  is filed  within the  period of  limitation, delay
cannot   be   put   against   the   plaintiff   �   See   Mademsetty
Satyanarayana   v.   G. Yelloji Rao and others   AIR 1965 Supreme
Court 1405 (paragraph 7) which reads as under:
      �(7)   Mr.   Lakshmaiah   cited   a   long   catena   of
English   decisoins   to   define   the   scope   of   a   Court�s
discretion.     Before   referring   to   them,   it   is
necessary to know the fundamental differnece between
the two systems-English and Indian-qua the relief of
specific   performance.     In   England   the   relief   of
specific   performance   pertains   to   the   domain   of
equity;   in   India,   to   that   of   statutory   law.     In
England   there   is   no   period   of   limitation   for
instituting   a   suit   for   the   said   relief   and,
therefore,   mere   delay   �   the   time   lag   depending   upon
circumstances   �   may   itself   be   sufficient   to   refuse
the   relief;   but,   in   India   mere   delay   cannot   be   a
ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute
prescribes the period of limitation.   If the suit is
in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond
time,   the   suit   will   be   dismissed   as   barred   by   time;
in either case, no question of equity arises.�
The   High   Court   also   went   into   error   in   stating   that
the value of the property was Rs.10 lakhs at the time of the
sale agreement.  PW-1 in his cross examination admitted that
it was Rs.10 lakhs on the date when PW1 was cross-examined.
7

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
The value of the property on the date of the sale agreement
was   only   Rs.6   lakhs,   and   it   was   open   for   the   parties   to
negotiate   the   said   price   upwards   or   downwards,   which   was
what   the   parties   did   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case.
Nothing   can,   therefore,   be   derived   from   the   erroneous
assumption   that   a   valuable   property   had   been   sold   at   a
throwaway price. 
For   all   these   reasons,   therefore,   we   allow   the   appeal
and   set   aside   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   and   restore
that of the Courts below. 
�����������������������., J.
[  R. F. NARIMAN ]
�����������������������., J.
[ SURYA KANT ]
New Delhi;
July 10, 2019.
8

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
ITEM NO.3               COURT NO.5               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No. 2420/2018
R LAKSHMIKANTHAM                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
DEVARAJI                                           Respondent(s)
(With IA No.33080/2018-APPLICATION FOR EARLY HEARING)

Date : 10-07-2019 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT
For Appellant(s)
Dr. Pooja Jha, Adv.
Dr. R. Prakash, Adv.
Ms. Nandita Jha, Adv.
Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The   appeal   is   allowed   in   terms   of   the   signed
reportable judgment.
Pending application stands disposed of.
(NIDHI AHUJA)                   (RENU DIWAN)
   COURT MASTER (SH)             ASSISTANT  REGISTRAR
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]
9 

When appeal was dismissed on merits and technical point - while confirming lower appellate court dismissal order , it not necessary to decided the technical point =The suit was filed in the year 1982. The Trial Court has noted that the property was given on rent by defendant to other person with regard to which there was another agreement. The possession was not with the appellant or defendant and was with the third person. The Trial Court, after considering the evidence available on record, has categorically held that plaintiff had failed to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. We are of the view that in the present case it is not necessary for us to consider the issues pertaining to abatement of appeal on the ground that appellant did not bring on the record all the legal heirs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4132 OF 2008
MOHAN LAL                                   APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
RAM KANWAR (D) THR. LRS. & ANR.             RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   the   judgment   of
the High Court dated 11.09.2007 in Civil Revision No.1903
of   1994   by   which   judgment   Civil   Revision   filed   by   the
appellant   has   been   dismissed.   The   appellant   had   filed   a
suit   No.338/1982   for   specific   performance   of   contract
dated 29.09.1982.
The   appellant's   case   was   that   he   entered   into   an
agreement   of   sale   with   Raghubir   Prasad,   the   defendant,
for   a   consideration   of   Rs.6000/-.   An   amount   of   Rs.200/-
was paid, as advance, at the time of agreement. Sale deed
was to be executed within 20 days and when sale deed was
not   executed,   suit   has   been   filed.   In   the   Trial   Court
defendant   appeared   and   filed   a   written   statement.   The
Trial   Court   framed   six   issues   and   while   considering   the
relief   returned   a   finding   that   plaintiff   failed   to   prove
that   he   was   ready   and   willing   to   perform   his   part   of
contract. The suit for relief of specific performance was
1

denied   and   the   suit   was   dismissed.   The   Trial   Court   in
paragraph 18 of the judgment has considered in detail the
evidence   and   came   to   a   finding   that   plaintiff   was   not
ready   and   willing   to   perform   his   part   of   contract.   An
appeal   was   filed   against   the   said   judgment   by   the
appellant  in   which  appeal   the  appellant   did  not   bring  on
record   all   the   heirs   of   deceased   except   two   sons   who
themselves came forward and got impleaded.
The   learned   District   Judge   held   the   appeal   to   be
abated.   The   District   Judge   while   abating   the   appeal   has
noticed that even in the application filed by two sons of
deceased   the   details   of   all   the   heirs   were   mentioned,
still the appellant did not take steps for bringing legal
heirs   on   record.   Against   the   judgment   of   District   Judge,
abating   the   appeal,   civil   revision   was   filed   which   was
also dismissed by the High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that High
Court   as   well   as   the   District   Judge   committed   error   in
dismissing the revision and abating the appeal and matter
ought   to   have   been   heard   on   merits.   Learned   counsel   for
the   appellant   further   submitted   that   the   Trial   Court
committed   error   in   dismissing   the   suit   and   appellant   was
entitled to address the Appellate Court on the merits and
satisfy   the   Court   that   he   was   ready   and   willing   to
perform his part of contract.
We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   learned
counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
2

The suit was filed in the year 1982. The Trial Court
has   noted   that   the   property   was   given   on   rent   by
defendant  to   other  person   with  regard   to  which   there  was
another   agreement.   The   possession   was   not   with   the
appellant or defendant and was with the third person. The
Trial   Court,   after   considering   the   evidence   available   on
record,   has   categorically   held   that   plaintiff   had   failed
to   prove   that   he   was   ready   and   willing   to   perform   his
part   of   contract,   as   required   by   Section   16(c)   of   the
Specific   Relief   Act.   We   are   of   the   view   that   in   the
present   case   it   is   not   necessary   for   us   to   consider   the
issues   pertaining   to   abatement   of   appeal   on   the   ground
that appellant did not bring on the record all the legal
heirs.   The   findings   of   Trial   Court   were   well   considered
and need no interference.
There   is   no   merit   in   the   appeal,   which   is
accordingly dismissed.     
 
...................J.
 (ASHOK BHUSHAN)
...................J.
 (NAVIN SINHA)
New Delhi
July 11, 2019
3

ITEM NO.103               COURT NO.12               SECTION IV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).4132/2008
MOHAN LAL                                          Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
RAM KANWAR (D) THR. LRS. & ANR.                    Respondent(s)
(WITH   IA   NO.   55745/2008   (registered   as   I.A.   No.3/2008   in   CIS)
[APPLICATION   FOR   MODIFICATION   /CLARIFICATION   OF   THE   ORDER   DATED
14.5.2008]

Date : 11-07-2019 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Appellant(s)
Mr. R.K. Kapoor, ADv.
Ms. Shweta Kapoor, Adv.
Mr. Rajat Kapoor, Adv.
Ms. Priya Pandey, Adv.
                    Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Siddharth Mittal, AOR
Mr. Parbhat Kumar, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(ARJUN BISHT)                                   (RENU KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               BRANCH OFFICER
(signed order is placed on the file)
4 

Conditional agreement is not enforceable when it is not out and out sale = stipulation was mentioned in the agreement that Rs.5000/- would be paid after one year of the execution of the sale deed. Such stipulations cannot be said to be for making out and out transaction of sale. Apart from that it would be unfair to enforce such a conditional agreement. The aforesaid stipulations also has the adverse effect on the readiness and willingness which is required to be proved by the plaintiff/respondents to purchase the property and due arrangement of money from the date of agreement till the decree is passed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S).  7533/2008
GAJANAN WAMAN CHIKHALE AND ORS.  APPELLANT(S)
                       
       VERSUS
RAMDAS BAKARAM THOMBRE AND ANR.                  RESPONDENT(S)
        O R D E R
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.  The   appellants   are   the   legal   representatives   of   the
defendant   and   the   respondents   are   the   plaintiffs.     The
original   defendant/Wamanrao,   died   during   the   pendency   of   the
appeal before the Courts below and the respondents herein were
brought   on   record   as   his   legal   heirs.   The
plaintiff(s)/respondents contracted to purchase the suit house
from   the   defendant/Wamanrao   for   a   consideration   of
Rs.25,000/-,   on   25.10.1976.     As   the   defendant//Wamanrao   was
indebted on account of loans of agricultural property etc. he
wanted   to   sell   the   suit   house   in   order   to   pay   off   the   debts.
In   pursuance   of   the   agreement   dated   25.10.1976,   the
1

plaintiffs/respondents   paid   Rs.5,000/-   to   defendant/Wamanrao
as   earnest   money.     As   per   agreement   between   them,   the   amount
of   Rs.15,000/-   was   to   be   paid   at   the   time   of   execution   and
registration   of   the   sale   deed   before   the   Sub   Registrar.     It
was   further   agreed   between   them   that   defendant/Wamanrao   would
receive   the   balance   amount   of   Rs.5,000/-   within   a   year   after
the   date   of   execution   of   the   sale   deed.     It   was   agreed   to   be
executed on 31.03.1977.   It was also agreed between them that
in   case   any   of   the   party   to   the   contract   resiles   from   the
terms of the contract, then the party resiling will be liable
to pay Rs.10,000/- to the other side as penalty for breach of
contract.     Defendant/Wamanrao   had   agreed   to   deliver   the
possession   of   the   suit   house   before   the   sale   deed.     The
agreement   dated   25.10.1976   was   thus   executed   by
defendant/Wamanrao   in   the   presence   of   attesting   witnesses.
The   plaintiffs/respondents   immediately   thereafter   paid
Rs.5,000/-   to   him.     The   plaintiffs/respondents   gave   a   public
notice   in   the   newspaper,   in   order   to   ascertain   any   kind   of
encumbrance.     According   to   the   plaintiffs/respondents,   they
were   always   ready   and   willing   to   perform   their   part   of   the
contract   and   on   30.03.1977   they   contacted   the
defendant/Wamanrao.     The   defendant/Wamanrao   requested   them   to
grant   further   time   in   order   to   find   any   rented   house   or
accommodation for him and to deliver vacant possession of the
2

suit   house.     It   was   then   agreed   between   them   that
defendant/Wamanrao   would   give   vacant   possession   of   the   suit
house and thereafter the sale deed of the suit house was to be
executed.      On  27.04.1977,  the  plaintiffs/respondents  went  to
the   house   of   the   defendant/Wamanrao   but   he   was   not   there   and
they   were   told   by   the   inmates   that   he   had   gone   out.     The
plaintiffs/respondents then served a notice on him on the same
days   i.e.   on   27.04.1977.   On   30.04.1977   defendant/Wamanrao
orally   informed   the   plaintiffs/respondents   that   he   was   not
ready   to   execute   the   sale   deed.   The   plaintiffs/respondents
then filed the suit for specific performance of the contract.
3.  The Trial Court decreed the suit for specific performance
of   the   contract.     Aggrieved   by   the   said   order,   the
defendant(s)/appellants   filed   appeal   before   the   Appellate
Court.     The   appellate   Court   affirmed   the   order   of   the   Trial
Court   and   dismissed   the   appeal.     Against   the   said   order,   the
defendant(s)/appellant(s)   filed   second   appeal   before   the   High
Court, which was also dismissed.   Hence the present appeal is
filed by the defendant/appellants.
4. After   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   we   are   of
the opinion that the Courts below committed grave error of law
while decreeing the suit.  The form in which the agreement was
couched itself indicated that it was intended for securing the
loan.     The   parties   had   agreed   to   obtain   the   amount   of
3

compensation, in case the sale deed was not to be executed at
Rs.10,000/-.   The agreement had been entered into for sale of
5000 sq. ft.  of land for a sum of Rs.25,000/-.  Rs.5,000/- was
paid by way of earnest money and Rs.15,000/- was to be paid at
the   time   of   execution   of   the   sale   deed   and   the   remaining   sum
of   Rs.5000/-   was   agreed   to   be   paid   after   one   year   of   the
execution   of   the   sale   deed.     The   reading   of   the   entire
agreement leaves no doubt that the plaintiffs have prima facie
obtained the loan and as such there was stipulation of payment
of   compensation   of   Rs.10,000/-.       Apart   from   that,   when   we
consider   the   stipulations   in   the   agreement,   it   appears   that
the   plaintiffs/respondents   were   not   having   the   money   to
purchase   the   property   as   such   this   stipulation   was   mentioned
in   the   agreement   that   Rs.5000/-   would   be   paid   after   one   year
of   the   execution   of   the   sale   deed.     Such   stipulations   cannot
be   said   to   be   for   making   out   and   out   transaction   of   sale.
Apart   from   that   it   would   be   unfair   to   enforce   such   a
conditional   agreement.     The   aforesaid   stipulations   also   has
the   adverse   effect   on   the   readiness   and   willingness   which   is
required to be proved by the plaintiff/respondents to purchase
the   property   and   due   arrangement   of   money   from   the   date   of
agreement till the decree is passed.
5. In   the   circumstances,   the   decisions   of   the   Courts   below
of  directing  specific  performance  of  such  an  agreement  cannot
4

be   said   to   be   proper   and   in   accordance   with   law.     The   Courts
below have ignored and overlooked the nature of the agreement
and   the   stipulations   mentioned   therein.     It   would   be   unfair,
unjust,   inequitable   and   not   in   accordance   with   law   to   grant
specific performance of such an agreement.  
6. In   the   circumstances,   we   set   aside   the   judgment   and
decree   passed   by   the   Courts   below   decreeing   the   suit   of   the
plaintiffs and directing specific performance of the agreement
to   sell   the   property   in   question.     However,   at   the   same   time
when we come to the adjustment of the equities, it was fairly
offered   by   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellants that since an amount of Rs.5000/- was paid way back
in the year   1976   and by now 43 years have passed, it would be
appropriate   to   refund   an   amount   of   Rs.1,00,000/-   instead   of
Rs.5,000/- in order to do complete justice between the parties
as a  sum of Rs.5000/- had been received by the appellants from
the   plaintiffs.   We   direct   them   to   make   the   payment   of
Rs.1,00,000/-   to   plaintiffs/respondents,   within   a   period   of
three months from today.
7. The   judgment   and   decree   passed   by   the   Courts   below   are
modified   accordingly.   The   specific   performance   of   the
agreement   is   declined.   The   appeal   is,   accordingly,   disposed
of.
5

8. There shall be no order as to costs.
9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
...........................J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
...........................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 07, 2019.
6

ITEM NO.105               COURT NO.4               SECTION IX
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S).  7533/2008
GAJANAN WAMAN CHIKHALE AND ORS.              APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
RAMDAS BAKARAM THOMBRE AND ANR.                  RESPONDENT(S)

Date : 07-03-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Kishore Lambat,Adv.
                   For M/s. Lambat And Associates
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Satyajit A. Desai,Adv.
Ms. Priyanka Goel,Adv.
                   Ms. Anagha S. Desai, AOR
                 
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.
(NARENDRA PRASAD)                        (JAGDISH CHANDER)
  COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file)
7 

we hold Section 143A to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.

Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1160 OF 2019
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal)No.3342 of 2019)
G.J. RAJA …Appellant
VERSUS
TEJRAJ SURANA …Respondent
J U D G M E N T[
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This Appeal challenges the Final Order dated 08.02.2019 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal O.P.No.3406 of 2019
preferred by the Appellant herein.
3. Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) being C.C.No.7171 of 2018 is
presently pending against the Appellant before the IInd Fast Track Court
-Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai. According to the complaint,
two cheques issued by the Appellant in the sums of Rs.20,00,000/- and
Rs.15,00,000/- in favour of the Respondent-Complainant were dishonoured
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
2
on account of insufficiency of funds. The Complaint was lodged on
04.11.2016.
4. With effect from 01.09.2018, Section 143A was inserted in the Act by
Amendment Act 20 of 2018. Said Section is to the following effect:-
“143A. Power to direct interim compensation. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court
trying an offence under section 138 may order the
drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to
the complainant –
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where
he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in
the complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.
(2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1)
shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the
cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within
sixty days from the date of the order under subsection (1), or within such further period not
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court
on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the
cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court
shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the
amount of interim compensation, with interest at the
bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India,
prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial
years, within sixty days from the date of the order, or
within such further period not exceeding thirty days
as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause
being shown by the complainant.
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
3
(5) The interim compensation payable under this
section may be recovered as if it were a fine under
section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974).
(6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or
the amount of compensation awarded under section
357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or
recovered as interim compensation under this
section.”
5. Soon thereafter, the Trial Court ordered that 20% of the cheque
amount be made over by the Appellant to the Respondent as interim
compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 143A of the
Act. Thus, the Appellant was directed to pay to the Respondent a sum of
Rs.7,00,000/-.
6. The Appellant being aggrieved, filed Criminal O.P.No.3406 of 2019
in the High Court. By its order dated 08.02.2019, the High Court found no
illegality or infirmity in the order awarding interim compensation under
Section 143A of the Act but reduced the percentage from 20% of the
cheque amount to 15% of the cheque amount.
7. The order of the High Court is presently under challenge. While
issuing notice the Appellant was directed to deposit the sum so ordered by
the High Court in the Trial Court. It was further directed that upon deposit,
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
4
the Trial Court should invest the money in Fixed Deposit and that the
money would not be made over to the Respondent till further orders.
Since the Respondent, despite having been served with the notice, had not
entered appearance, this Court by its Order dated 01.07.2019 requested Mr.
Vinay Navare, learned Senior Advocate to assist this Court as Amicus
Curiae.
8. We heard Mr. G. Ananda Selvam, learned Advocate for the
Appellant and the learned Amicus Curiae.
9. A reading of Section 143A shows (i) interim compensation must not
exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque; (ii) it must be paid within the
time stipulated under Sub-Section (3); (iii) if the accused is acquitted, the
complainant shall be directed to pay to the accused the amount of interim
compensation with interest at the bank rate; (iv) the interim compensation
payable under said Section can be recovered as if it were a fine under
Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’, for
short); and (v) if the accused were to be convicted, the amount of fine to be
imposed under Section 138 of the Act or the amount of compensation to be
awarded under Section 357 of the Code would stand reduced by the amount
paid or recovered as interim compensation.
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
5
10. Since Sub-Section (5) of Section 143A stipulates that the interim
compensation could be recovered as if it were a fine under Section 421 of
the Code, said Section 421 also needs to be considered at this stage.
Section 421 appears in Chapter XXXII of the Code which Chapter deals
with ‘Execution, Suspension, Remission and Commutation of Sentences’.
By very context and the language of the provisions contained in the
Chapter, they apply in cases where the guilt of an accused is determined
and he is convicted of an offence punishable with sentence and/or fine.
Part-C of the Chapter deals with ‘Levy of Fine’ and Section 421 appearing
in said Part-C is to the following effect:-
“421. Warrant for levy of fine.- (1) When an
offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court
passing the sentence may take action for the recovery
of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that
is to say, it may –
(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the
amount by attachment and sale of any
movable property belonging to the
offender;
(b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the
district, authorising him to realise the
amount as arrears of land revenue from
the movable or immovable property, or
both, of the defaulter.
Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of
payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned,
and if such offender has undergone the whole of such
imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such
warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in
writing, it considers it necessary so to do, or unless it
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
6
has made an order for the payment of expenses or
compensation out of the fine under section 357.
(2) The State Government may make rules regulating
the manner in which warrants under clause (a) of subsection (1) are to be executed, and for the summary
determination of any claims made by any person other
than the offender in respect of any property attached
in execution of such warrant.
(3) Where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector
under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the Collector shall
realise the amount in accordance with the law relating
to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such
warrant were a certificate issued under such law:
Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by
the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.”
11. According to Section 421 of the Code, fine could be recovered
either by warrant of attachment or sale of movable property belonging to
the offender or by issuance of warrant to the Collector authorising him to
realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or
immovable property or both of the defaulter.
12. It is thus clear that in case an accused, against whom an order to
pay interim compensation under Section 143A of the Act is passed, fails or
is unable to pay the amount of interim compensation, the process under
Section 421 can be taken resort to which may inter alia result in coercive
action of recovery of the amount of interim compensation as if the amount
represented the arrears of land revenue. The extent and rigor of the
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
7
procedure prescribed for such recovery may vary from State to State but
invariably, such procedure may visit the person concerned with coercive
methods.
13. For instance, by virtue of Section 183 of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966, in case there be a default in payment of land revenue,
the person concerned could be arrested and detained in custody for 10 days
in the office of the Collector or of a Tehsildar unless the arrears of revenue
which were due, were paid along with the penalty or interest and the cost of
arrest and of the notice of demand as also the cost of his subsistence during
detention.
14. In the present case, the Complaint was lodged in the year 2016
that is to say, the act constituting an offence had occurred by 2016 whereas,
the concerned provision viz. Section 143A of the Act was inserted in the
statute book with effect from 01.09.2018. The question that arises
therefore is whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation
and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable under Section
138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section
143A. We are concerned in the present case only with the issue regarding
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
8
applicability of said Section 143A to offences under Section 138 of the Act,
committed before the insertion of said Section 143A.
15. While considering general principles concerning ‘retrospectivity
of legislation’ in the context of Section 158-BE inserted in the Income Tax
Act, 1961, it was observed by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central)-I, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township Private Limited1
 as under:-
 “28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to
be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary
intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be
intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind
the rule is that a current law should govern current
activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of
the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in
view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow’s
backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the
law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is
entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law
and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively
upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non
respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed
in Phillips v. Eyre2
, a retrospective legislation is contrary to
the general principle that legislation by which the conduct
of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first
time to deal with future acts ought not to change the
character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of
the then existing law.”
16. Similarly, while considering the effect of modified application of
the provisions of the Code, as a result of Section 20(4)(bb) of the Terrorist
1(2015) 1 SCC 1
2
(1870) LR 6 QB 1
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
9
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, whereunder the period for
filing challan or charge-sheet could get extended, this Court considered the
issue about the retrospective operation of the concerned provisions in
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others vs. State of Maharashtra and
others3
 as under:-
“26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment
would operate retrospectively and would apply to the
pending cases in which investigation was not complete on
the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and
the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From
the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative
though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard
to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its
retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is
presumed to be prospective in operation
unless made retrospective, either expressly or
by necessary intendment, whereas a statute
which merely affects procedure, unless such a
construction is textually impossible, is
presumed to be retrospective in its
application, should not be given an extended
meaning and should be strictly confined to its
clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is
procedural in nature, whereas law relating to
right of action and right of appeal even
though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in
substantive law but no such right exists in
procedural law.
3 (1994) 4 SCC 602
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
10
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally
speaking be applied retrospectively where the
result would be to create new disabilities or
obligations or to impose new duties in respect
of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the
procedure but also creates new rights and
liabilities shall be construed to be prospective
in operation, unless otherwise provided, either
expressly or by necessary implication.”
17. The fourth and the fifth principle as culled out by this Court in
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur3
are apposite to the present fact situation.
18. The provisions contained in Section 143A have two dimensions.
First, the Section creates a liability in that an accused can be ordered to pay
over upto 20% of the cheque amount to the complainant. Such an order can
be passed while the complaint is not yet adjudicated upon and the guilt of
the accused has not yet been determined. Secondly, it makes available the
machinery for recovery, as if the interim compensation were arrears of land
revenue. Thus, it not only creates a new disability or an obligation but also
exposes the accused to coercive methods of recovery of such interim
compensation through the machinery of the State as if the interim
compensation represented arrears of land revenue. The coercive methods
could also, as is evident from provision like Section 183 of the Maharashtra
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
11
Land Revenue Code, in some cases result in arrest and detention of the
accused.
19. We must at this stage, refer to a decision of this Court in
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation vs. Dwarka Nath Bhargwa4
where provisions of Section 45B, which was inserted in Employees State
Insurance Act, 1948 with effect from 28.01.1968 was held to be procedural
and that it could have retrospective application. Said Section 45B is as
under:-
“45B. Recovery of contributions. - Any contribution
payable under this Act may be recovered as an arrear of
land revenue.”
The issue was whether the modality of recovery so prescribed in said
Section 45B could be invoked in respect of amounts which had become
payable on 27.01.1967 and 24.01.1968, i.e. before said Section 45B was
inserted in the statute book. While holding that the arrears could be
recovered as arrears of land revenue, it was observed, “It is not in dispute
and cannot be disputed that the contributions in question had remained
payable all throughout and were not paid by the respondent.”
20. It must be stated that prior to the insertion of Section 143A in the
Act there was no provision on the statute book whereunder even before the
4 (1997) 7 SCC 131
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
12
pronouncement of the guilt of an accused, or even before his conviction for
the offence in question, he could be made to pay or deposit interim
compensation. The imposition and consequential recovery of fine or
compensation either through the modality of Section 421 of the Code or
Section 357 of the code could also arise only after the person was found
guilty of an offence. That was the status of law which was sought to be
changed by the introduction of Section 143A in the Act. It now imposes a
liability that even before the pronouncement of his guilt or order of
conviction, the accused may, with the aid of State machinery for recovery
of the money as arrears of land revenue, be forced to pay interim
compensation. The person would, therefore, be subjected to a new
disability or obligation. The situation is thus completely different from the
one which arose for consideration in Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation4
 case.
21. Though arising in somewhat different context, proviso to Section
142(b) which was inserted in the Act by Amendment Act 55 of 2002, under
which cognizance could now be taken even in respect of a complaint filed
beyond the period prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Act, was held to
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
13
be prospective by this Court in Anil Kumar Goel v. Kishan Chand Kaura5
.
It was observed:-
“10. There is nothing in the amendment made to Section 142(b)
by Act 55 of 2002 that the same was intended to operate
retrospectively. In fact that was not even the stand of the
respondent. Obviously, when the complaint was filed on 28-11-
1998, the respondent could not have foreseen that in future any
amendment providing for extending the period of limitation on
sufficient cause being shown would be enacted.”
22. In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must,
therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined to cases where
offences were committed after the introduction of Section 143A, in order
to force an accused to pay such interim compensation.
23. We must, however, advert to a decision of this Court in Surinder
Singh Deswal and Ors. vs. Virender Gandhi6
 where Section 148 of the
Act which was also introduced by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018
from 01.09.2018 was held by this Court to be retrospective in operation.
As against Section 143A of the Act which applies at the trial stage that is
even before the pronouncement of guilt or order of conviction, Section
148 of the Act applies at the appellate stage where the accused is already
found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. It may be stated
that there is no provision in Section 148 of the Act which is similar to
5 (2007) 13 SCC 492
6 (2019) 8 SCALE 445
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
14
Sub-Section (5) of Section 143A of the Act. However, as a matter of fact,
no such provision akin to sub-section (5) of Section 143A was required as
Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which apply post-conviction, are
adequate to take care of such requirements. In that sense said Section 148
depends upon the existing machinery and principles already in existence
and does not create any fresh disability of the nature similar to that created
by Section 143A of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this Court in
Surinder Singh Deswal5
stands on a different footing.
24. In the ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to be prospective
in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or
invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was
committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.
Consequently, the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the High
Court are required to be set aside. The money deposited by the Appellant,
pursuant to the interim direction passed by this Court, shall be returned to
the Appellant along with interest accrued thereon within two weeks from
the date of this order.
25. The Appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms.
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019
G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
15
26. In the end, we express our sincere gratitude for the assistance
rendered by Mr. Vinay Navare, learned Amicus Curiae.
…………………..J.
[Uday Umesh Lalit]
……………..……..J.
[Vineet Saran]
New Delhi;
 July 30, 2019