whether the Authorities and the Courts were justified in holding that the sale deeds in question are null and void because they were executed in contravention of the provisions of the Regulation.= First, the High Court did not examine the case in the context of the definition of the expression “Transfer” as defined in Section 2 (g) of the Regulation; and Second, certain documents filed by the appellants to prove the transactions in question as being legal and not hit by Section 3 of the Regulation as amendedwith effect from 01.01.1970, were not considered. In our opinion, inquiry on the aforementioned two grounds was also necessary while deciding thelegality and validity of the sale deeds in question along with all other issues decided by the Courts below. It is for this reason, we feel that it would be in the interest of justice that the matter be remanded to the High Court (Single Judge­writ court) for deciding the appellants’ writ petition afresh on merits

     NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4658 OF 2008
Bikkina Rama Rao & Ors.              ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Special Deputy Tahsildar
(Tribal Welfare)
Kota Ramachandrapuram  & Ors.        …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 24.08.2007 passed by the High Court
of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ
1
Appeal No.675 of 2007 whereby the Division Bench of
the High Court dismissed the said writ appeal filed by
the appellants herein.
2. A few   facts   need   mention   hereinbelow   for   the
disposal of the appeal, which involves a short point.
3. The dispute relates to the land measuring around
60   acres   comprised   in   survey   Nos.462   and   472
situated   at   Ganaparavaram   village   of   Buttaigudem
Mandal, West Godavari District (hereinafter referred to
as “the suit land”).   This dispute is governed by the
provisions of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land
Transfer Regulation, 1959 as amended by Regulation 1
of 1970 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulation”).
4. The   claim   of   the   appellants   is   that   they   have
purchased the suit land   vide registered sale deeds
dated   29.01.1977   executed   by   several   vendors.
However, the State (Special Deputy Collector ­Tribal
welfare, Kota Ramachandra Puram, West Godavari),
2
questioned   the  bona   fides  of   the   transactions   in
question   and   accordingly   issued   the   notices   to   the
appellants alleging therein that since these sale deeds
were found executed in contravention of Section 3 (1)
(a) of the Regulation by the Vendors and the Vendees
(appellants) and, therefore, they were null and void.
5. It is this issue which was probed by the Revenue
Authorities by holding an inquiry under the Regulation
such as in the first instance, by the Special Deputy
Collector by order dated 24.04.1984, thereafter by the
Agent to Govt. (as an Appellate Authority) by order
dated   27.10.2001   followed   by   the   State   (as   a
Revisionary Authority) by order dated 16.07.2007 and
by  the   High   Court  in   its  writ   jurisdiction   by  order
dated   02.08.2007   and   thereafter   in   its   intra   court
appellate jurisdiction by the impugned order.
6. Though   the   appellants   contested   the   issue   on
facts   and   in   law   but   it   was   consequently   decided
3
against the appellants by all the Authorities and the
Courts, wherein it was held that the sale deeds in
question   were   executed   in   contravention   of   the
provisions   of   Section   3   (1)   of   the   Regulation   and,
therefore, they are declared null and void.
7. The appellants felt aggrieved by the order of the
High Court and have filed the present appeal by way of
special leave in this Court.
8. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the Authorities
and the Courts were justified in holding that the sale
deeds in question are null and void because they were
executed   in   contravention   of   the   provisions   of   the
Regulation.
9. Heard Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel for
the appellants and Mr. B. Adinaryana Rao, learned
senior counsel for the respondents.
4
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   on   perusal   of   the   record   of   the   case,   we   are
inclined to allow this appeal and while setting aside
the   impugned   order   as   also   the   order   dated
02.08.2007 passed by the Single Judge, remand the
case to the Single Judge (writ court) for deciding the
appellants’ writ petition afresh on merits in accordance
with law.
11. The need to remand the case to the High Court
(writ court) has arisen for two reasons.
12. First, the High Court did not examine the case in
the   context   of   the   definition   of   the   expression
“Transfer” as defined in Section 2 (g) of the Regulation;
and Second, certain documents filed by the appellants
to prove the transactions in question as being legal
and  not hit by Section 3 of the Regulation as amended
with effect from 01.01.1970, were not considered.
5
13. In   our   opinion,   inquiry   on   the   aforementioned
two  grounds was also necessary while deciding the
legality and validity of the sale deeds in question along
with all other issues decided by the Courts below.
14. It is for this reason, we feel that it would be in the
interest of justice that the matter be remanded to the
High Court (Single Judge­writ court) for deciding the
appellants’ writ petition afresh on merits in accordance
with law on all the issues arising in the case including
those mentioned above. The subsequent allottees of
the land in question, who made an application seeking
their impleadment in the appeal (I.A. No.2/2008) is
allowed. They are allowed to become parties in the writ
petition.  They will also be heard.
15. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   we   have   not
expressed  any   opinion   on   merits  having   formed  an
opinion to remand the case though learned counsel for
the parties argued several issues arising in the case.
6
Indeed,   we   refrained   ourselves   from   going   into   the
issues urged.
16. The   High   Court   (Single   Judge­writ   court)   will,
therefore, decide the writ petition on merits strictly in
accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations
made by this Court, on the issues arising in the case.
17. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside.
          ………...................................J.
       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   
    …...……..................................J.
                [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
May 03, 2019
7

even if the will is probated by any court mentioned in Section 228 of the Act, right to get the letters of administration is a continuous right which can be exercised any time, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed.

                                Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10482 OF 2013
Sameer Kapoor and another ..Appellants
Versus
The State through Sub­Division Magistrate
South, New Delhi and others ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi in F.A.O(OS) No. 11 of 2009, by which a Division Bench of
the High Court has dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed
the order passed by the learned Single Judge refusing to reject
1
the   plaint   under   Order   VII   Rule   11  of   the   CPC,  the   original
defendants have preferred the present appeal.
2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are, that one Smt.
Kailash Kapoor, a permanent resident of England, executed a will
dated 16.05.1990 bequeathing thereunder all her assets to two of
her grand­children.  That the said Smt. Kailash Kapoor died in
England on 10.09.2001. According to the appellants, they acted
upon the said will and disposed of all the immovable properties of
the aforesaid testatrix, possessed in India between 6.9.2000 to
March, 2001.  That after the death of late Smt. Kailash Kapoor,
the   High   Court   of   Justice,   District   Probate   Registry   of
Birmingham, England and Wales issued a probate in respect of
the   said   will   vide   order   dated   21.11.1997.     It   appears   that
thereafter in the year 2001, respondent no.2 herein, at whose
instance the will was probated in England, applied for letters of
administration   for   property   situated   in   Delhi   by   filing   a
Testamentary Case under Section 228 of the Indian Succession
Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) being Testamentary Case
No. 15 of 2001.
2.1 That the appellant herein filed I.A. No. 13895 of 2006
before the learned Single Judge of the High Court, praying to
2
reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the
ground that the said Testamentary Case under Section 228 of the
Act, considering Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is barred
by   the   law   of   limitation.     It   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the
appellants that though no limitation would apply seeking grant of
probate so long as a person has not approached the court and
will is probated, however, once the court at England and Wales
had   been   approached   and   a   probate   had   been   granted,   no
petition for letters of administration could have been filed after a
lapse   of   a   period   of   three   years.     The   said   application   was
opposed by respondent no.2 herein – the original applicant.   It
was submitted that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would not
apply. 
3. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 24.09.2008
dismissed the said application and refused to reject the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC by observing that Section
228 of the Act is akin to provisions of Section 222 and 276 of the
Act   and,   therefore,   when   there   is   no   period   of   limitation
prescribed   for   submitting   an   application   under   Section   222
and/or Section 276 of the Act, for submitting an application
under Section 228 of the Act, the period of limitation shall not be
3
applicable. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the opinion
that Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall have no application.
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order
passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting the application to
reject   the   plaint   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   CPC,   the
appellants herein approached the Division Bench of the High
Court by way of F.A.O(OS) No. 11 of 2009.   By the impugned
judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High Court has
dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed the order passed by
the learned Single Judge rejecting the application under Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court,   the   appellants   –   applicants­   original   defendants   have
preferred the present appeal.
6. Mr. Divyakant Lahoti, learned Advocate has appeared
for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   M.A.   Krishna   Moorthy,   learned
Advocate has appeared for respondent no.2.
6.1 Mr. Divyakant Lahoti, learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants has vehemently submitted that in the
facts and circumstances of the case, both the Division Bench as
4
well as the learned Single Judge have materially erred in not
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
6.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that Article 137 of the
Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under
any   Act   before  a  Civil   Court.     It   is  submitted   that  it  is   not
confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of
Civil Procedure.  It is submitted that therefore, Article 137 of the
Limitation   Act   shall   be   applicable   to   the   petitions   under   the
provisions of the Indian Succession Act also.
6.3 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that till the will is unprobated, right to apply for probate is a continuous cause of
action, therefore, Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall not be
applicable   on   petitions   for   grant   of   probate   and   letters   of
administration of a will, filed under Section 276 of the Act.  It is
submitted that, however, once the will is probated, Article 137 of
the Limitation Act will apply to any right which arises on account
of probate of will.  It is submitted that in such a case the right
accrues on the date of grant of probate, and therefore, the period
of limitation will commence from such date.   In support of the
5
above submissions, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
appellants has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in
the   case   of  Kunvarjeet   Singh   Khandpur   v.   Kirandeep   Kaur,
reported in (2008) 8 SCC 463 (Paragraphs 15 & 16).
6.4 It is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants that in the present case respondent no.2
had   applied   for   grant   of   probate   of   will   dated   16.05.1990,
executed by late Smt. Kailash Kapoor, before the High Court of
Justice, District Probate Registry, Birmingham (UK), which was
granted by the High Court vide order dated 21.11.1997.   It is
submitted that therefore, the right to apply under Section 228 of
the Act can be said to have accrued in favour of respondent no.2
on 21.11.1997.   It is submitted that whereas respondent no.2
had preferred an application for grant of letters of administration
of the aforesaid will dated 16.05.1990 under Section 228 of the
Act, by a Probate Case No. 15/2001, after a lapse of period of
three years as prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
i.e., on 28.02.2001.   It is submitted therefore the application
submitted by respondent no.2 under Section 228 of the Act is
clearly barred by law of limitation and therefore the same is liable
6
to be rejected considering Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC – the
applicant’s application being barred by limitation.
6.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single
Judge has materially erred in observing that Section 228 of the
Act is akin to provisions of Sections 222 and 276 of the Act.  It is
submitted that while  coming to  the aforesaid conclusion,  the
learned   Single   Judge   has   not   property   construed   and/or
considered the language of the two provisions, i.e., Section 228
and Section 276 of the Act.  It is submitted that Sections 228 and
276 of the Act are totally different and operate under different
circumstances.  It is submitted that an application under Section
228 of the Act would be maintainable only in a case where a will
has been proved/probated and deposited in a court of competent
jurisdiction.   It is submitted that therefore a valid application
under Section 228 has to be necessarily filed on the basis of a
will that has already been proved, authenticated and probated by
a competent court in foreign jurisdiction.  It is submitted that no
such pre­condition or pre­requisite has been prescribed under
Section 276 of the Act.  It is submitted that unlike Section 228 of
the Act, an application under Section 276 of the Act is to be filed
7
on the basis of a will which is un­probated and is being produced
before the court for the first time.
6.6 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that even the learned Single
Judge has also materially erred in observing that the object and
purpose of the two provisions is same, i.e., “to seek recognition in
respect of will in question”.   It is submitted that language of
Section 228 of the Act makes it clear that a will in respect of
which letters of administration is sought to be granted under that
Section is an already recognized, proved or authenticated will,
unless rebutted.  It is submitted that whereas the will in question
in   an   application   under   Section   276   of   the   Act   is   an   unrecognised will which is being produced before the court for the
first time and which is yet to be proved.
6.7 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that even the scope of
enquiry under Sections 228 and 276 of the Act is distinguishable
and different.  It is submitted that will under Section 276 of the
Act is unauthenticated and yet to be proved.  It is submitted that
however the will under Section 228 of the Act is already proved
and authenticated before a foreign court or a competent court
8
mentioned   in   Section   228   of   the   Act.     It   is   submitted   that
therefore the scope of enquiry under Section 228 of the Act is a
limited exercise.
6.8 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the Division Bench of
the High Court has erred in its reasoning that Probate Case No.
15/2001 is not barred by limitation because it is the first Probate
Petition filed in India, as the earlier Probate proceedings were in
the   Court   of   England   and   Wales.     It   is   submitted   that   the
Division Bench has materially erred in not properly appreciating
the fact that the administration of an estate in probate is an in
rem proceedings.  It is submitted therefore the law of limitation is
applicable even if the previous probate proceedings were initiated
in a foreign jurisdiction as the same are in rem.  It is submitted
that   therefore,   both   the   learned   Single   Judge   as   well   as   the
Division   Bench   have   materially   erred   in   dismissing   the
application filed by the appellants herein under Order VII Rule 11
of the CPC.
6.9 In support of his above submissions, learned Advocate
appearing for the appellants has heavily relied upon the decision
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Estate of
9
Late Shri Gurcharan Dass Puri, reported in AIR 1987 P&H 122, as
well as, the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of
Ramanand Thakur v. Parmanand Thakur, reported in AIR 1982
Patna 87.
6.10 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
aforesaid decisions of this Court, Punjab & Haryana High Court
and Patna High Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeal
and quash and set aside the orders passed by the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench and consequently reject the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
7. The   present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   the
learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent no.2.  It is
vehemently submitted by the learned Advocate that in the facts
and circumstances of the case, both the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court have rightly held that
an application under Section 228 of the Act would not be barred
by   limitation,   inasmuch   as   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act
would not be applicable.
7.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 that the decision of this
Court in the case of  Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) shall not
10
be applicable to the facts of the case on hand, as before this
Court   the   petition   was   under   Section   218/278   of   the   Act,
however,   in   the   present   case,   the   petition   is   under   Section
228/276 of the Act.
7.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 that in the present case
as such the probate proceedings before the court in England was
never objected and there was no objection to the grant of probate.
It is submitted that, in fact, the father of the appellants and
respondent no.2 had given ‘No Objection’ to the said probate.  It
is submitted that in law, respondent no.2 is not obligated to
apply for letters of administration in Delhi.  It is submitted that
in the case where the probate is not objected to, respondent no.2
had no reason to seek the same as well.   It is submitted that
therefore ‘right to apply’ under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, if
any, never accrued against respondent no.2.  It is submitted that
both the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have
rightly dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
the CPC and have rightly refused to reject the plaint.
7.3 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss
the present appeal.
11
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective
parties at length.
9. Two questions arise for consideration before this Court
in the present appeal:
i) Whether   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   shall   be
applicable   for   application   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration?;
ii) Whether   the   application   under   Section   228   of   the
Indian Succession Act shall be barred by the period of limitation
prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, and whether
the period of limitation for application under Section 228 of the
Act would start to run from the date of grant of probate by a
court of competent jurisdiction situated beyond the limits of the
State, whether within or beyond the limits of India?
10. Now so far as the first question is concerned, the same
is now not res integra in view of the direct decision of this Court
in the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) and in the case
of  Krishan Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma reported in
(2009) 11 SCC 537.   In both the aforesaid decisions, this Court
has   specifically   observed   and   held   that   Article   137   of   the
Limitation Act shall be applicable to the petitions for grant of
12
probate or letters of administration also.   Therefore, question
no.1 is answered in the affirmative and it is observed and held
that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to
the applications for grant of probate or letters of administration. 
11. Now so far as question no.2 is concerned, it is the
specific  case  on  behalf of  the  appellants  that the  application
submitted by respondent No.2 for letters of administration under
Section  228  of the  Act is  barred  by the law  of limitation  as
provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. As observed and
held   hereinabove,   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   shall   be
applicable to the application for grant of probate or letters of
administration   submitted   under   Section   276   of   the   Act.
Similarly, even the application under Section 228 of the Act shall
also be covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act.  Therefore, it
is observed and held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall
be applicable to the applications under Section 228 of the Act
also.
12. However,   the   next   question   which   is   posed   for
consideration before this Court is, when the ‘right to apply’ can
be said to have accrued?
13
12.1 As per Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the period of
limitation prescribed is three years and the three years begin to
run when the ‘right to apply’ accrues.   The crucial expression
under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is ‘right to apply’.  It is the
case on behalf of the appellants that in the present case the ‘right
to apply’ for letters of administration had accrued in the year
1997, more particularly on 21.11.1997 when the High Court of
Justice, District Probate Registry, Birmingham (UK) passed an
order for grant of probate of will dated 16.05.1990 in favour of
respondent no.2.  It is the case on behalf of the appellants that
therefore   ‘right   to   apply’   under   Section   228   of   the   Act   had
accrued   in   favour   of   respondent   no.2   on   21.11.1997   and,
therefore, respondent no.2 was required to submit an application
for letters of administration within a period of three years from
21.11.1997.     However,   the   application   for   letters   of
administration has been submitted on 28.02.2001, i.e., after a
lapse of limitation of three years as prescribed under Article 137
of the Limitation Act and therefore Probate Case No. 15/2001 is
clearly barred by law of limitation and, therefore, the same was
required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC.  It is also the case on behalf of the appellants that
14
so long as the will is not probated, the period of limitation would
not start running.   However, once the will is probated, in that
case, the period of limitation as provided under Article 137 of the
Limitation Act would begin to run from the date on which the will
is probated.
13. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective
parties.
14. At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the
relevant   provisions   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration with the will would be Section 276 of the Act.
Section 276 of the Act reads as under:
“276.Petition   for  probate  –  (1) Application for probate
or for letters of administration, with the Will annexed,
shall be made by a petition distinctly written in English
or in the language in ordinary use in proceedings before
this Court in which the application is made, with the Will
or, in the cases mentioned in sections 237, 238 and 239,
a   copy,   draft,   or   statement   of   the   contents   thereof,
annexed, and stating—
(a) the time of the testator’s death,
(b)           that the writing annexed is his last Will and
testament,
(c) that it was duly executed,
(d) the amount of assets which are likely to come to
the petitioner’s hands, and
15
(e) when   the   application   is   for   probate,   that   the
petitioner is the executor named in the Will.
(2)   In   addition   to   these   particulars,   the   petition   shall
further state –
(a)  when the application is to the District Judge, that
the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed place of
abode,   or   had   some   property,   situate   within   the
jurisdiction of the Judge; and
(b) when the application is to a District Delegate, that
the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed place of
abode within the jurisdiction of such Delegate.
(3) Where the application is to the District Judge and nay
portion of the assets likely to come to the petitioner’s
hands   is   situate   in   another   State,   the   petition   shall
further state the amount of such assets in each State and
the District Judges within whose jurisdiction such assets
are situate.”
14.1 When an application under Section 276 of the Act is
submitted for probate or for letters of administration with will, if
any objection is raised by any body with respect to execution of
the will, in that case, the applicant is required to prove the will
and thereafter the will shall be probated and the court may pass
an order for letters of administration.  However, in a case where a
will   has   been   proved   or   deposited   in   a   court   of   competent
jurisdiction   situated   beyond   the   limits   of   the   State,   whether
within or beyond the limits of India, in that case, as provided
under Section 228 of the Act, when a properly authenticated copy
16
of   the   will  is  produced,   the   letters  of   administration   may   be
granted in favour of such person.   Meaning thereby, in such a
situation, the will is not required to be proved again and it shall
be conclusive.   Therefore, Section 228 of the Act shall be an
enabling provision and it confers an additional right to apply for
letters of administration on the basis of such authenticated copy
of the will.  Therefore, as rightly observed by the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench that Section 228 is akin to Section
276 of the Act.
15. Now   the   next   question   which   may   arise   for
consideration would be, whether for an application for probate or
letters of administration with will, the period of limitation would
begin to run from which date?
16. While considering the issue involved, the decision of
this Court in the case of  Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur(supra)  is
required to be referred to and considered.  In the said decision,
this Court considered the decision of the Bombay High Court in
the   case   of  Vasudev   Daulatram   Sadarangani   v.   Sajni   Prem
Lalwani reported in AIR 1983 Bom. 268, as well as, the decision of
the Madras High Court in the case of  S. Krishnaswami v. E.
Ramiah, reported in AIR 1991 Mad. 214.  In the said decision, this
17
Court referred to and considered paragraph 17 of the decision of
the Madras High Court in the case of  S. Krishnaswami(supra),
which reads as under:
“17. In a proceeding, or in other words, in an application
filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no
right   is   asserted   or   claimed   by   the   applicant.   The
applicant only seeks recognition of the court to perform a
duty. Probate or letters of administration issued by a
competent court is conclusive proof of the legal character
throughout   the   world.   An   assessment   of   the   relevant
provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not
convey a meaning that by the proceedings filed for grant
of probate or letters of administration, no rights of the
applicant are settled or secured in the legal sense. The
author of the testament has cast the duty with regard to
the administration of his estate, and the applicant for
probate   or   letters   of   administration   only   seeks   the
permission of the court to perform that duty. There is
only a seeking of recognition from the court to perform
the duty. That duty is only moral and it is not legal.
There is no law which compels the applicant to file the
proceedings for probate or letters of administration. With
a view to discharge the moral duty, the applicant seeks
recognition from the court to perform the duty. It will be
legitimate to conclude that the proceedings filed for grant
of probate or letters of administration is not an action in
law. Hence, it is very difficult to and it will not be in order
to construe the proceedings for grant of probate or letters
of   administration   as   applications   coming   within   the
meaning   of   an   ‘application’   under   Article   137   if   the
Limitation Act, 1963.” 
18
16.1 This   Court   approved   the   observations   made   in
paragraph   17   by   the   Madras   High   Court   in   the   case   of  S.
Krishnaswami (supra)  insofar as the nature of the petition for
grant   of   probate   or   letter   of   administration   is   concerned.
However,   this   Court   did   not   agree   with   the   finding   that   the
application for grant of probate or letters of administration is not
covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
16.2 In the aforesaid decision, this Court also considered
and referred to paragraph 16 of the decision of the Bombay High
Court in the case of Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani (supra) in
paragraph 15, which reads as follows:
“16. Rejecting Mr. Dalpatrai’s contention, I summarise
my conclusions thus –
(a) Under the Limitation Act no  period is advisedly
prescribed   within   which   an   application   for   probate,
letters of administration or succession certificate must be
made;
(b) The assumption that under Article 137 the right to
apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the
deceased, is unwarranted;
(c) Such an application is for the court’s permission to
perform a legal duty created by a will or for recognition as
a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which
can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased,
as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the
trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to
be executed;
19
(d) The right to apply would accrue when it becomes
necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3
years from the date of the deceased’s death;
(e) Delay beyond 3 years after the deceased’s death
would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater
would be the suspicion;
(f) Such   delay   must   be   explained,   but   cannot   be
equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and
(g) Once   execution   and   attestation   are   proved,
suspicion of delay no longer operates.”
This Court did not agree with/approve conclusion (b).
However, approved conclusion (c), reproduced hereinabove.
17. Therefore, considering the law laid down by this Court
in the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra), it can be said
that in a proceeding, or in other words, in an application filed for
grant of probate or letters of administration, no right is asserted
or claimed by the applicant.  The applicant only seeks recognition
of   the   court   to   perform   a   duty.   Probate   or   letters   of
administration issued by a competent court is conclusive proof of
the legal character throughout the world.  That the proceedings
filed for grant of probate or letters of administration is not an
action in law but it is an action in rem.  As held by this Court in
the case of  Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra),  an  application
for  grant  of  probate  or   letters  of  administration   is    for  the
20
court’s permission to perform a legal duty created by a will
or   for   recognition   as   a     testamentary   trustee   and   is   a
continuous right which can be exercised any time after the
death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives
and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if
created, remains to be executed. 
         Therefore, even if the will is probated by any court
mentioned in Section 228 of the Act, right to get the letters of
administration is a continuous right which can be exercised any
time, as long as  the right to do so survives and the object of the
trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be
executed.
18. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the
aforesaid decision and the observations made hereinabove, the
submission on behalf of the appellants that Probate Case No.
15/2001 filed by respondent no.2 for letters of administration
under Section 228 of the Act, read with Section 276 of the Act is
barred by law of limitation, cannot be accepted.  At this stage, it
is required to be noted that even in the plaint, it is specifically
pleaded that after passing away of the father of the parties in the
21
year 2000, the appellants started intermeddling with properties
bequeathed to respondent no.2, which were situated in Delhi
and, therefore, left with no option, he was compelled to apply for
letters of administration.  Therefore, even as per the pleadings in
the application, the cause of action started from the date on
which the appellants started intermeddling with the properties
bequeathed to respondent no.2, after passing away of the father
of   the   parties   in   the   year   2000.   Therefore,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, both the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench have rightly refused to reject the application in
exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.  In the
facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   as   observed
hereinabove, it cannot be said that the application for letters of
administration was clearly barred by the law of limitation which
was required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII
rule 11(d) of the CPC.   We are in complete agreement with the
view taken by the High Court.
19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed
and   is   accordingly   dismissed.     However,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
22
……………………………………J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI; …………………………………….J.
APRIL 29, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
23

Other than victim can also file complaint under sec.498 A read with sec.3 and 4 of DPAct = Section 498A provides for an offence when husband or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted above, indicates that the provision does not contemplate that complaint for offence under Section 498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. We, thus, are of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2, the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable on this ground.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018)
RASHMI CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.598 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018)
ANITA GANDHI ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.599 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018)
NAYAN CHOPRA THROUGH POA HOLDER
RAJESH CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
2
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.597 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018)
AMIT CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.596 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8041/2018)
KULDEEP GANDHI ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.595 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039/2018)
RAJESH CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
These appeals have been filed challenging the
judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by
3
which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed
by the appellants praying for quashing the complaint
and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015 have
been dismissed.
2. All the appeals having been filed against the same
judgment, facts of the case are being taken from
Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2019 – Rashmi Chopra & Ors.
Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in which criminal
appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have
been filed. The background facts of the case necessary
to be noted for deciding these appeals are:-
2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and Rajesh
Chopra got married with Vanshika Bobal,
daughter of respondent No.2, Indrajeet Singh
on 15.04.2012. All the appellants are family
members of Nayan Chopra. Rashmi Chopra is
mother, Rajesh Chopra is father, Amit Chopra
is Brother and Anita Gandhi is Mother’s
Sister of Nayan Chopra, whereas Kuldeep
Gandhi is husband of Anita Gandhi. Nayan
4
Chopra with his mother, father and brother
are resident of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police
Station – Begumpet, Hyderabad (Andhra
Pradesh). Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi
are resident of Greater Kailash – I, New
Delhi.
2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and
Vanshika, which was performed at Noida,
District Gautam Buddha Nagar on 15.04.2012,
Vanshika went alongwith her husband at
Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of Vanshika.
On 28.04.2012, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra left
for the U.S.A. On or about November, 2013,
Vanshika and Nayan Chopra separated. On
23.10.2014, an application was filed by Nayan
Chopra in the Circuit Court for the County
of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan, USA,
seeking divorce.
2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by
respondent No.2 through registered post to
the Superintendent of Police, Gautam Buddha
5
Nagar, Noida making allegations against
Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown persons.
An application under Section 156(3) was filed
by respondent No.2. The application of the
respondent No.2 was sent by the Magistrate
to Mediation Centre running under the
District Legal Services Authority for
counselling. After failure of counselling
and mediation, an application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No.2
dated 10.05.2015 making allegations against
all the appellants under Section 498A and
Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been made
on the basis of incident dated 08.11.2014
against Rajesh Chopra and his associates. It
was alleged that Rajesh Chopra call the
respondent No.2 near the Gurudwara at Sector
18, Noida to talk about the problem of Nayan
Chopra and Vanshika and when respondent No.2
went for talks, he met Rajesh Chopra with two
unknown persons. Respondent No.2 further
6
alleges that on his request to accept his
daughter, Rajesh Chopra repeated his demand
of one crore rupees and used filthy words
against Vanshika, which was objected by
respondent No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and
his associates became annoyed and they abused
and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his
gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from
his pocket. The allegations within the
meaning of Sections 323, 324, 504, 506, 392
of I.P.C. were made on the basis of the
aforesaid incident. In the application, it
was also stated that Nayan Chopra has filed
a petition for dissolution of marriage in
America.
2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce
by Nayan Chopra, the Circuit 9th Court for
the County of Kalamazoo Family Division,
Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on
24.02.2016. The order of judgment of divorce
was passed after hearing both Nayan Chopra
and Vanshika Bobal, who were represented
7
through attorneys. The judgment of divorce
made provisions for alimony, pension
benefits and retirement benefits, life
insurance, property settlement and provision
in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims
and other provisions.
2.6 The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
filed by respondent No.2 was treated as a
complaint and registered as Complaint No.
4967 of 2015, on which the learned Judicial
Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued a
summoning order on 17.01.2017 summoning the
appellants under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506
of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act.
2.7 The appellants filed an application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court praying
for quashing the complaint and proceedings
and order dated 17.01.2017 in Complaint Case
No. 4967 of 2015. In the application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., High Court passed an
8
order referring the matter to mediation
centre of Allahabad High Court. The
mediation having failed between the parties,
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was
heard. The prayer of the appellants to quash
the complaint and proceedings have been
refused. The application was disposed of
after directing that the applicants may
surrender in the court below and make an
application for bail within a period of two
months. Aggrieved against the judgment of
the High Court, these appeals have been
filed.
3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in
their application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel
for the appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned
AOR appearing for the respondent No.2. We have also
heard learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
9
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint
proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse
of the process of the court. It is submitted that
Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal had already been
granted divorce by Family Court of Michigan, which fact
was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by
respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed. It
is submitted that a reading of the complaint does not
prima facie discloses any offence under Section 498A
and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the
appellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep
Gandhi separately resides and they have never met
Vanshika, the girl after marriage. The allegations in
the complaint are vague, sweeping and general. The
complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl nor
she got her statement recorded in support of the
complaint. In so far as incident alleged on 08.11.2014
at Sector 18, Noida no such incident took place and
allegations are false and concocted to somehow rope in
Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy Nayan Chopra. The
10
complaint has not been filed by competent person, hence
ought not to have been entertained.
6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing
for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in
summoning of the appellants by the Magistrate by order
dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that Magistrate
is not required to record elaborate reasons for
summoning of an accused. The complaint discloses
several allegations pertaining to offence under Section
498A and other offences mentioned therein. Two courts
having taken one particular view of the matter, this
Court may not exercise its jurisdiction in interfering
with the orders. It is further submitted that Section
498A does not indicate that complaint on behalf of the
women has to be filed by the women herself. The
complain was fully competent and no error has been
committed by Magistrate in taking cognizance of the
complaint.
7. Learned counsel for the parties have placed
reliance on various judgments of this Court in support
11
of their submissions, which shall be referred to while
considering the submissions in detail.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., which has been treated as private complaint
by Magistrate has been brought on the record as
Annexure P-2. The allegations in the complaint are
that marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which
marriage, gifts of Rs.50 lakhs were given to Nayan
Chopra and his family members. It is alleged that
after the marriage, all family members were not
satisfied by the gifts and they started harassing the
daughter of respondent No.2 by demanding further dowry
of one crore rupees. They further pressurised to
solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi rites
and ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was
solemnised on 06.11.2012 in Gurudwara at Sector 37,
Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies. Further
allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra
kept on threatening Vanshika to desert her and on
12
01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra threw Vanshika out of house and
since then Vanshika is residing with respondent No.2.
Another set of allegations are with regard to incident
dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken place at
6.00 PM near the Gurudwara, Sector-18, Noida. It is
alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father of Nayan Chopra
called the respondent No.2 to talk about their problem
on which date Rajesh Chopra again repeated his demand
of one crore rupees and used filthy words against
Vanshika to which respondent No.2 objected, on which
Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed and
they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched
his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his
pocket. The above two sets of allegations have given
rise to summoning order. The summoning order passed
by the Magistrate on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-
“ORDER
The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh
Chopra, Rashi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep
Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the
offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506
of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The
complainant is directed to take steps as per
Rules within one week. Case is fixed for
08.03.2017 for appearance.
Sd/- illegible
13
17.01.2017
(Vikas)
Civil Judge (Jr. Division)
J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”
10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by
learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that
Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are grounds
for proceeding and there is no requirement of giving
any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed
reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports
Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this
Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down
following:-
“9. In determining the question whether any
process is to be issued or not, what the
Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether
there is sufficient ground for proceeding and
not whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate
for supporting the conviction, can be
determined only at the trial and not at the
stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the
process to the accused, the Magistrate is not
required to record reasons. This question was
considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745
and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti
Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC
14
722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,
para 6)
The legislature has stressed the need
to record reasons in certain
situations such as dismissal of a
complaint without issuing process.
There is no such legal requirement
imposed on a Magistrate for passing
detailed order while issuing summons.
The process issued to accused cannot
be quashed merely on the ground that
the Magistrate had not passed a
speaking order.”
12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in
Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &
Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465. There can be no dispute to
the above proposition as laid down by this Court that
while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate is
not required to pass a detailed order, however, in a
case when Magistrate issues process against a person,
who is not even charged with the offence for which he
is summoned, whether in such cases also the summoning
order cannot be assailed?
13. In the present case, there are two sets of
allegations, which are contained in the complaint,
which has also been repeated in the statements recorded
15
by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses – PW1 – Raj
Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 – Deepa, wife
of respondent No.2. One set of allegations of offence
under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act and
second set of allegations are allegations made for
offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.
14. We may first take up the allegations for offences
under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The
allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been
made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. It is
useful to extract the entire allegations pertaining to
incident dated 08.11.2014 from the complaint, which are
to the following effect:-
“…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m. Nayan
Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called the
Applicant near the Gurudwara at Sector 18,
Noida to talk about their problem. When the
Applicant reached there for talk then he met
there Rajesh Chopra alongwith two unknown
persons. When the Applicant requested Rajesh
Chopra to accept his daughter the Rajesh
Chopra again repeated his demand of one core
Rupees and said that if he has arranged for
one crore Rupees then he can send his
daughter at their home, otherwise keep
Vanshika at his house and Rajesh Chopra used
filthy words against Vanshika, then the
Applicant objected for the same, on which
16
Rajesh Chopra and his associates became
annoyed and they abused and beat the
Applicant and snatched his gold chain from
his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket.
The wife of the Applicant and a number of
other people gathered at the spot and saved
the Applicant from them. While leaving these
persons threatened the Applicant that after
arranging for one crore Rupees he can send
his daughter at their house, otherwise keep
her at his house and if he dare to inform the
police then they will kill the Applicant and
his daughter Vanshika…….”
15. In the statement made by the complainant in support
of his submission, complainant repeated the same
allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014 as made
in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2, Deepa, wife
of respondent No.2 has also about the incident dated
08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as narrated in the
complaint. A perusal of the allegations in the
complaint makes it clear that the complaint with regard
to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been
made only against Rajesh Chopra and two unknown
persons. Neither in the complaint nor statements made
by complainant or his witnesses, there is any
allegation with regard to above offences against any
other appellants before us. There being no allegations
17
for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 in the
complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was
no question of summoning the other appellants for
offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. When
the complaint does not allege any offence against other
appellants, we fail to see that how the cognizance of
the complaint can be taken against other appellants
with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and
506. In above view of the matter, the complaint as
well as summoning order are liable to be quashed
against all the appellants except Rajesh Chopra due to
the above reasons in above regard.
16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint
under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Learned
counsel for the respondent in support of his submission
that power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, has
relied on judgment of this Court in Rakhi Mishra Vs.
State of Bihar and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 772. This
Court in the above case has relied on an earlier
judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta,
18
(2015) 3 SCC 424, in which judgment, in paragraph No.8
following proposition was laid down, which has been
referred to and relied on:-
“8. … At the stage of cognizance and
summoning the Magistrate is required to apply
his judicial mind only with a view to take
cognizance of the offence … to find out
whether a prima facie case has been made out
for summoning the accused persons. At this
stage, the learned Magistrate is not required
to consider the defence version or materials
or arguments nor is he required to evaluate
the merits of the materials or evidence of
the complainant, because the Magistrate must
not undertake the exercise to find out at
this stage whether the materials would lead
to conviction or not.”
17. This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid
down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can
exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima
facie case is not made out against the accused.
Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-
“5. The order passed by the trial court
taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R-9
is in conformity with the law laid down in
the above judgment. It is settled law that
the power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised
by the High Court only in exceptional
circumstances only when a prima facie case
is not made out against the accused. The test
applied by this Court for interference at the
initial stage of a prosecution is whether the
19
uncontroverted allegations prima facie
establish a case.”
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied
on various judgments of this Court in support of his
submissions. In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. State of
Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Court laid down
following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-
“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the
supplementary charge-sheet discloses the
fact that the appellants are not the
immediate family members of the third
respondent/husband. They are the maternal
uncles of the third respondent. Except the
bald statement that they supported the third
respondent who was harassing the second
respondent for dowry and that they conspired
with the third respondent for taking away his
child to the U.S.A., nothing else indicating
their involvement in the crime was mentioned.
The appellants approached the High Court when
the investigation was pending. The chargesheet and the supplementary charge-sheet were
filed after disposal of the case by the High
Court.
6. Criminal proceedings are not normally
interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage
unless there is an abuse of the process of a
court. This Court, at the same time, does not
hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of
justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335. The courts should
be careful in proceeding against the distant
relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial
disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of
the husband should not be roped in on the
20
basis of omnibus allegations unless specific
instances of their involvement in the crime
are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
(2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash Chandra Agrawal
v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 551”
19. This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had
occasion to examine the parameters of exercise of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing of
criminal proceeding. One of us (Justice Ashok Bhushan)
speaking for the Bench after examining the scope and
ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down following in
Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the
present case it is necessary to consider the
ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section
482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High
Court to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under this Code,
or to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined
the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several
principles which govern the exercise of
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court
in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977)
2 SCC 699, held that the High Court is
entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes
21
to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of
the process of the court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to
be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the
following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)
“7. … In the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is
entitled to quash a proceeding if it
comes to the conclusion that allowing
the proceeding to continue would be an
abuse of the process of the court or
that the ends of justice require that
the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court’s
inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose
which is that a court proceeding ought
not to be permitted to degenerate into
a weapon of harassment or persecution.
In a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the
structure of the prosecution rests and
the like would justify the High Court
in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of
justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice has got to be
administered according to laws made by
the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose
of the provision which seeks to save
the inherent powers of the High Court
to do justice, between the State and
its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours
of that salient jurisdiction.”
22
24. The judgment of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
has elaborately considered the scope and
ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the
above case this Court was considering the
power of the High Court to quash the entire
criminal proceeding including the FIR, the
case arose out of an FIR registered under
Sections 161, 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This
Court elaborately considered the scope of
Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the
Constitution in the context of quashing the
proceedings in criminal investigation. After
noticing various earlier pronouncements of
this Court, this Court enumerated certain
categories of cases by way of illustration
where power under Section 482 CrPC can be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court or secure the ends of justice.
25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories
of cases where power can be exercised under
Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows:
(Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)
“102. In the backdrop of the
interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we
have extracted and reproduced above,
we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either
to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise,
23
clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in
the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the
first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of
a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
24
(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal
bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code
or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
20. After referring to several other cases, this Court
concluded and made following observations in Paragraph
No. 41:-
“41. Inherent power given to the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose
and object of advancement of justice. In case
solemn process of Court is sought to be
abused by a person with some oblique motive,
the Court has to thwart the attempt at the
25
very threshold. The Court cannot permit a
prosecution to go on if the case falls in one
of the categories as illustratively
enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal. Judicial process is a solemn
proceeding which cannot be allowed to be
converted into an instrument of operation or
harassment. When there are materials to
indicate that a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive, the High Court will not
hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC to quash the
proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to
the following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)
“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal
grudge.”
Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the
facts of the present case. Although, the High
Court has noted the judgment of State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to
the relevant facts of the present case,
materials on which final report was submitted
by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that
the present is a fit case where the High Court
ought to have exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the
criminal proceedings.”
21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed
only when a prima facie offence is disclosed. This
26
Court has observed that judicial process is a solemn
proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into
an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High
Court finds that proceedings deserve to be quashed in
parameters as laid down by this Court in State of
Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, High
court shall not hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.
22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in the
complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.
Act. Few facts have to be noticed before we look into
the allegations made in the complaint in the above
regard. The complaint has been filed by the respondent
No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar on
10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce
has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on 23.10.2014
before the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo
Family Division, Michigan. It is on the record that
at the time of filing of the complaint Vanishka Bobal
was living at Canada whereas Nayan Chopra was living
at U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded
27
in the application for divorce that husband and wife
had separated on or around November, 2013. It is on
the record that on the day criminal complaint was filed
on 10.05.2015 in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar
by respondent No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor
she was in India at the time when statements were
recorded in complaint of complainant as well as his two
witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it has
been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent No.2. In
the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan,
Vanishka Bobal was represented by her attorney. The
divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony,
pension benefits and retirement benefits, life
insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu
of dower, mutual release of claims and other aspects
on 24.02.2016.
23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that
orders of divorce between the parties was brought into
the notice of the Magistrate when he issued process
against the appellants. We, however, are in agreement
with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan that decree
28
of divorce between Nayan Chopra and Vanshika shall not
wipe out any criminal offence, which has been committed
within the meaning of I.P.C. or D.P. Act and the
criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has
to be examined despite the divorce decree having been
granted.
24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint
pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.
A perusal of the complaint indicates that the
allegations against the appellants for offence under
Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general
and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details
of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint.
The complaint having been filed after proceeding for
divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of
Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was
ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the
divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the
Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations
as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts
and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that
the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of
29
D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce
petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan
Chopra.
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any
one of the applicants except common general allegation
against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the
daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry
of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the
husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s
sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped
in clearly indicate that application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the
applicants. Further, prior to filing of the application
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at
any point of time by the girl or her father making
allegation of demand of any dowry by any one of the
applicants. When both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started
living separately since November, 2013, had there been
any dowry demand or harassment the girl would have
given complaint to Police or any other authority.
Further, in the divorce proceedings at Michigan,
30
U.S.A., parties have agreed for dividing their
properties including gifts given at marriage but no
complaint was made in those proceedings regarding
harassment by her husband or his family members. The
judgment of the divorce contains following clauses
regarding “Property Settlement and Provision in Lieu
of Dower”:
“PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND
PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER
1. Each party affirms that he or she fully
and accurately disclosed all the assets owned
by him or her in which he or she has any
interest. By affixing their signatures on
this Judgment, Plaintiff and Defendant affirm
that each has disclosed all assets each owns
or has any interest in, whether held by him
or her individually, by both of them jointly
or with any other person or entity, or by
another person or entity for the benefit of
a party. The property division set forth in
this Judgment of Divorce is intended to be a
distribution and allocation of all the
property of the parties and also is intended
to declare the parties’ property interests
as of entry of this Judgment of Divorce. If
either party has failed, either intentionally
or unintentionally, to disclose any of his
or her assets, the issue of property division
may be reopened on the motion of either party
to determine and resolve the distribution of
any previously undisclosed assets.
2. It appears to the court that the
parties have divided between them to their
mutual satisfaction all articles of personal
property, household furniture and
31
appliances, cash, savings and checking
accounts and vehicles except as provided
below. The personal property as so divided
shall be the sole and absolute property of
the party in whose possession or under whose
control each of the articles of personal
property are now found and each shall defend
and hold the other harmless from liability
thereon.
a.The parties agree to return all jewelry
to the other party that they currently
have in their possession, which was
acquired as a result of their marriage.
Plaintiff testified that he only had
one item of jewelry and provided the
only jewelry he had in his possession
to Defendant-a single gold ring.
Plaintiff testified she does not have
any jewelry in her possession.
b.The parties agree that their respective
parents will return to the other
party’s parents, all jewelry given as
gifts to their parents and are in their
parent’s possession, which was acquired
by them as a result of the parties’
marriage. The parents agree to exchange
at a mutually agreed upon location and
at a mutually agreed upon time.
3. Except as otherwise provided herein,
each party shall be liable for the debts
incurred by him or her after separation
(11/1/2013) and shall defend and hold the
other harmless from all liability thereon.
4. Except as provide herein, each party
shall be liable for the debts in his or her
name and for the debts associated with
property awarded to him/her pursuant to the
Judgment of Divorce and shall defend and hold
32
the other harmless from all liability
therein.
5. Except as otherwise provided herein,
each party shall retain all monies in their
respective names, including but not limited
to checking accounts, savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, IRAs
or 401Ks.
6. There are no joint debts of the parties
except as provided herein.
7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive
the 2013 Honda CRV free and clear from any
claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and
the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the
liability thereon and to defend and hold the
Defendant harmless thereon. Defendant shall
transfer title of such vehicles to the
Plaintiff if transferring is needed.
8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive
the 2005 Toyota Camry free and clear from any
claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and
the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the
liability thereon and to defend and hold the
Defendant harmless thereon.
9. The provisions for each party herein
made for the parties shall be in lieu of the
dower or spousal right in the lands of the
other and each shall hereafter hold their
remaining lands free, clear and discharged
from any such dower, spousal right and claim
and said provision shall be in full
satisfaction of all claims either may have
in any property which the other owns, or may
hereafter own, in which either has or may
hereafter have an interest.
10. The parties warrant that neither has
incurred any debt in the other party’s name,
or on which the other party may be liable,
33
which is not expressly disposed of in this
Judgment.
11. This Judgment of Divorce shall
constitute a termination of all rights of a
surviving spouse including, but not limited
to, homestead allowance, election, exempt
property, settlement and family allowance by
each party in the property of the other, and
a termination of all benefits which would
otherwise pass to one party from the other
by testate and intestate, succession or by
virtue of any provision of any will executed
prior to the entry of this Judgment of
Divorce.”
26. The above judgment in divorce proceedings
indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled
all issues between them including division of
properties at the time when divorce proceedings were
in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not
in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of
IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass and
put pressure on the applicants.
27. One observation also needs to be made with regard
to order passed by the High Court. High Court in its
impugned judgment has not referred to allegations made
in the complaint except noticing the summoning order
34
has been passed and noticing the principles of law.
This Court had occasion to consider a similar order
passed by the High Court rejecting the application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish Prasad and Others
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019) 2 SCC
184. In the said case also under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
proceedings, the challenge was made to summoning order
as well as entire proceedings of complaint case where
allegations under Sections 498A and 323 IPC as well as
Section 3/4 of D.P. Act were made. In paragraph No.3,
the facts giving rise to filing the application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been
noted. This Court made following observations in
paragraph Nos.6 to 9:-
“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the
case we are inclined to set aside the
impugned order and remand the case to the
High Court for deciding the appellants’
application, out of which this appeal arises,
afresh on merits in accordance with law.
7. On perusal of the impugned order, we find
that the Single Judge has quoted the
principles of law laid down by this Court in
several decisions relating to powers of the
High Court on the issue of interference in
cases filed under Section 482 of the Code
from para 2 to the concluding para but has
35
not referred to the facts of the case to
appreciate the controversy of the case. We
are, therefore, unable to know the factual
matrix of the case after reading the impugned
judgment except the legal principles laid
down by this Court in several decisions.
8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to
have first set out the brief facts of the
case with a view to understand the factual
matrix and then examined the challenge made
to the proceedings in the light of the
principles of law laid down by this Court
with a view to record the findings on the
grounds urged by the appellants as to whether
any interference therein is called for or
not. We find that the aforementioned exercise
was not done by the High Court while passing
the impugned order.
9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to
concur with such disposal of the application
by the High Court and feel inclined to set
aside the impugned order and remand the case
to the High Court (Single Judge) with a
request to decide the application afresh on
merits in accordance with law keeping in view
the aforementioned observations. Having
formed an opinion to remand the case in the
light of our reasoning mentioned above, we
do not consider it proper to go into the
merits of the case.”
28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7 and
8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in the
facts of the present case and the order of the High
Court deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
36
29. One of the submissions, which has been made by the
learned counsel for the appellant also needs to be
considered. Learned counsel for the appellant had
submitted that complaint has not been filed by a
competent person. It is submitted that complaint is
not made by Vanshika, but has been filed only by father
of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The above
submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh Krishnan.
He submits that it is not necessary that a complaint
under Section 498A should be filed only by the victim
of offence. He submits that complaint filed by father
of the victim, respondent No.2 was also fully
maintainable. Section 498A provides as follows:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,
“cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such
a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life,
37
limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable
security or is on account of
failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such
demand.”
30. Section 498A provides for an offence when husband
or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty.
There is nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate
that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a complaint
has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected.
A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted above,
indicates that the provision does not contemplate that
complaint for offence under Section 498A should be
filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by
husband or his relative. We, thus, are of the view
that complaint filed by respondent No.2, the father of
Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable on this
ground. We, thus, reject the submission of the counsel
38
for the appellant that complaint filed by respondent
No.2 was not maintainable.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as
the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.
Act is concerned, we are of the view that present is a
case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumerated by
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and the High
Court erred in refusing to exercise under Section 482
Cr.P.C. We, however, observe that in so far as
allegations against Rajesh Chopra pertaining to
Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC is concerned, there
were specific allegations, which were also supported
by the complainant and his two witnesses in the
evidence, at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce
as to whether any incident as alleged by the
complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as
offence by respondent No.2 or offence as alleged was
committed by Rajesh Chopra or not. We, thus, are of
the view that insofar as complaint pertaining to
offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against
Rajesh Chopra is concerned, said complaint shall be
39
proceeded with and the order dated 17.01.2017 is upheld
to the above extent only, i.e., summoning of Rajesh
Chopra under Sections 323, 504 and 506.
32. In result,
(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and
596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.
8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018) are
allowed. The complaint as well as summoning
order dated 17.01.2017 is set aside insofar
as the appellants in the above-mentioned
criminal appeals are concerned.
(ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out
of SLP (Crl.) No. 8039 of 2018 – Rajesh
Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.)
is partly allowed. The complaint as well as
summoning order is set aside insofar as
offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4
of D.P. Act is concerned, however, complaint
shall proceed insofar as offence under 
40
Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. and
summoning order to that extent only is
upheld.

......................J.
 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
 ( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
April 30, 2019.