LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Friday, April 12, 2019

ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Whether, the entire trial should be declared vitiated; or that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for recording the statements of these witnesses afresh by exercising powers under Section 391 Cr.P.C. or that the impugned judgment should be set aside and the denovo trial directed by exercising powers under Section 386(b) Cr.P.C. - as the recording of evidence was taken place in the absence of accused ? 
[High court observed that despite of protest by the counsel of Accused , the trial court proceeded to record the evidence in the absence of Accused.]
The High Court, therefore, quashed and set aside the judgment dated 03.11.2017 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No.14/2014 and directed as under:-
“… …It is hereby directed that trial court shall
summon and record the statements of the witnesses
P.W.1 Chandu Ram, P.W.2 Chandrakala, P.W.3
Surendra Singh, P.W.4 Dharam Pal, P.W.12 Vikrant
Sharma, P.W.13 Prahlad, P.W. 14 Ram Kumar, P.W.15
Sushila, P.W.17 Dr. Arun Tungariya, P.W. 18 Ram
Pratap, P.W.20 Sahab Singh and P.W.23 Ramesh
Kumar afresh after securing presence of the accused
in the court. Upon remand, the trial court shall
conduct the proceedings on a day to day basis and
shall, after recording the statements of the witnesses
afresh in the above terms, re-examine the accused
under Section 313 Cr.P.C.; provide them a
justifiable/proper opportunity of leading defence and
decide the case afresh and as per law within four
months from the date of receipt of copy of this
judgment.”

Apex court held that
We must also consider the matter from the stand point and perspective of the victims as suggested by the learned Amicus Curiae. Four persons of a family were done to death. It is certainly in the societal interest that the guilty must be punished and at the same time the procedural requirements which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered to. If there was an infraction, which otherwise does not vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to remedy the situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the accused as well as societal interest are adequately safeguarded. The very same witnesses were directed to be de novo examined which would ensure that the interest of the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the accused will have every right and opportunity to watch the witnesses deposing against them, watch their demeanor and instruct their counsel properly so that said witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the process, the interest of the accused would also stand protected.  On the other hand, if we were to accept the submission that the proceedings stood vitiated and, therefore, the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination of the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage of justice.
The persons who are accused of committing four murders would not effectively be tried. The evidence against them would not be read for a technical infraction resulting in great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order and directions passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses, after due distillation from their cross-examination can be read in evidence. 26. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order passed and the directions issued by the High Court in the present matter. We affirm the view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals.


CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 1
Reportable
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.656-657 OF 2019
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.809-810 of 2019)
ATMA RAM AND ORS. …Appellants
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals challenge the decision dated 03.12.2018 passed by the
High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Death
Reference No.2 of 2017 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018.
3. FIR No.493 was registered with Police Station Bhadara, District
Hanumangarh on 13.10.2013 in respect of offences punishable under Sections
302, 307, 452, 447, 323, 147, 148 and 149 IPC pursuant to reporting by one
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 2
Kailash. It was stated that seven named persons including present four
appellants and some other unknown persons had come to the agricultural field
of the informant while harvesting operations were going on and had opened
an assault. As a result, father of the informant named Bhanwarlal and brother
of the informant named Pankaj died on the spot while the informant suffered
injuries. It was further alleged that the same assembly, thereafter, went to the
village and assaulted inmates of the house in which his grandfather named
Momanram died. Later, the informant Kailash also succumbed to his injuries.
4. After due investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants
namely Atmaram, Omprakash, Leeladhar and Shravan Kumar while others
were reported to be absconding. The trial was conducted in the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Bhadara, District Hanumangarh. It appears that at
the stage of recording of evidence, the appellants who were then in judicial
custody were not produced in court. The order dated 28.10.2014 passed by
the Trial Court recorded the objection of the Advocate for the appellants. The
examination-in-chief of PW1-Chanduram and PW2-Chandrakala was
undertaken without the appellants being present in Court and the crossexamination was deferred. The order recorded:-
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 3
“In Evidence PW1 Chanduram & PW2
Chandrakala, Chief Examination was recorded.
Advocate for accused sought time for Cross
Examination. Therefore, statements of witnesses were
kept reserved. Witnesses PW1 & PW2 are to be
present for Cross Examination on 28.11.2014 and
Witness no. 12, 13 and 143 are to be issued summons
to remain present on 29.11.2014. For recording
evidence be present on 28.11.2014, till then Judicial
Custody of Accused Atmaram, Om Prakash,
Leeladhar and Shravan is extended.”
5. Similarly, following 10 witnesses were also examined in Court on
dates mentioned against their names, without ensuring the presence of the
appellants in Court.
PW3 Surendra Singh 13.2.2015
PW4 Dharam Pal 13.2.2015
PW 12 Vikrant Sharma 13.8.2015
PW 13 Prahlad 3.9.2015
PW 14 Ram Kumar 9.10.2015
PW 15 Sushila 9.10.2015, 5.11.2015
PW 17 Dr. Arun Tungariya 8.3.2016
PW 18 Ram Pratap 12.5.2016, 20.6.2016, 14.2.2017
PW 20 Sahab Singh 22.11.2016
PW 23 Ramesh Kumar 14.2.2017
6. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 03.11.2017 found that
the prosecution had proved the case against the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt and convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections
147, 148, 452, 447, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 323 read with
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 4
Section 149 IPC. The matter was then heard on sentence. After hearing the
Public Prosecutor and Advocates for the complainant, as well as the
appellants, the Trial Court imposed death sentence upon the appellants,
subject to confirmation by the High Court. Consequently, the matter stood
referred to the High Court in D.B. Criminal Death Reference No.2 of 2017.
The appellants also filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No.33 of 2018, which was
heard along with the Death Reference case.
7. It was submitted inter alia on behalf of the appellants that the entire
trial was vitiated because the Trial Court had recorded statements of as many
as twelve witnesses without ensuring presence of the appellants in Court.
Relying on Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’,
for short), it was submitted that the procedure adopted by the Trial Court of
recording statements of the witnesses, without ensuring the presence of the
appellants, amounted to an incurable illegality and as such the trial ought to be
declared to be vitiated and the appellants be acquitted of the charges levelled
against them. While opposing these submissions, the Prosecutor contended
that not only did the Advocate for the appellants conduct extensive crossexamination of the witnesses but no objection was raised at any time during
such cross examination. Further, no plea was raised before the Trial Court
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 5
during final arguments that the appellants were, in any way, prejudiced on
account of their absence in the proceedings.
8. The High Court observed that despite “pertinent objection of the
defence counsel (albeit raised at the initial stages)”, the Trial Court had
proceeded to record the statements of twelve witnesses in the absence of the
appellants. In the light of the facts on record, the question which arose for
consideration was then framed by the High Court as under:-
“… …the significant question which arises for the
Court’s consideration is as to whether, the entire trial
should be declared vitiated; or that the matter should
be remanded to the trial court for recording the
statements of these witnesses afresh by exercising
powers under Section 391 Cr.P.C. or that the
impugned judgment should be set aside and the denovo trial directed by exercising powers under Section
386(b) Cr.P.C.”
9. After hearing both sides, the High Court considered cases of State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhooraji1
, Pandit Ukha Kolhe vs. The State of
Maharashtra2
and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and
Anr3
. The High Court then concluded:-
“In the case of Pandit Ukha Kolhe, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by majority view held that the
prosecution should be given opportunity to lead
1
 (2001) 7 SCC 679
2
 (1964) 1 SCR 926
3
 (2009) 7 SCC 104
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 6
evidence on the matters indicated in the course of the
judgment; the accused be examined afresh under
Section 342 Cr.P.C. and the appeal be decided afresh.
Thus, in this case as well, the Supreme Court directed
that fresh evidence should be taken on matters of
significance even at the appellate stage.
Thus, none of the precedents cited by the defence
counsel lays down a straightjacket formula that a denovo trial cannot be directed in any condition. As a
matter of fact, if any such view is taken, then the
scope and operation of Section 386(b) Cr.P.C. would
be rendered redundant.
In view of the discussion made hereinabove and
looking to the glaring facts of the case at hand, we feel
that in order to do complete justice to the accused as
well as to the victims, the entire case cannot be
thrown out by holding the proceedings to be vitiated
on account of the mistakes committed by the trial
Judge or the prison authorities concerned. A fresh
trial/de-novo has to be ordered by directing the trial
court to lawfully re-record statements of the witnesses
indicated above whose evidence was recorded in the
first round without ensuring presence of the accused
in the court.
During the course of arguments, Shri Moti Singh,
Advocate representing the appellants agreed that in
case, the matter is remanded for fresh trial, no
direction is required to be given to record the
statements of the remaining witnesses afresh because
when their testimony was recorded, the accused were
kept present in the course proceedings.”
10. The High Court, therefore, quashed and set aside the judgment dated
03.11.2017 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No.14/2014 and
directed as under:-
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 7
“… …It is hereby directed that trial court shall
summon and record the statements of the witnesses
P.W.1 Chandu Ram, P.W.2 Chandrakala, P.W.3
Surendra Singh, P.W.4 Dharam Pal, P.W.12 Vikrant
Sharma, P.W.13 Prahlad, P.W. 14 Ram Kumar, P.W.15
Sushila, P.W.17 Dr. Arun Tungariya, P.W. 18 Ram
Pratap, P.W.20 Sahab Singh and P.W.23 Ramesh
Kumar afresh after securing presence of the accused
in the court. Upon remand, the trial court shall
conduct the proceedings on a day to day basis and
shall, after recording the statements of the witnesses
afresh in the above terms, re-examine the accused
under Section 313 Cr.P.C.; provide them a
justifiable/proper opportunity of leading defence and
decide the case afresh and as per law within four
months from the date of receipt of copy of this
judgment.”
11. The decision of the High Court is presently under challenge.
Considering the nature of controversy involved and the questions raised in the
matter, this Court appointed Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate as
Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. In the meantime, as a result of the order
passed by the High Court, the Trial Court had proceeded with de novo trial as
directed and those twelve witnesses were re-examined. After hearing both
sides the matter was reserved for judgment. Therefore, on 07.03.2019 this
Court directed the Trial Court not to pronounce the judgment till further
orders. The matter was, thereafter, heard by this Court. Mr. Sanjay Hegde,
learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the appellants, Dr. Manish
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 8
Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the State and Mr.
Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae at the
request of the Court. After the oral submissions, the parties also filed their
written submissions.
12. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants
submitted:-
A) Section 273 of the Code opens with expression, “Except
as otherwise expressly provided… …” and the only exceptions
to the application of Section 273 are those expressly provided
i.e. in Sections 299 and 317 of the Code. Subject to these
exceptions, Section 273 Cr.P.C. is absolutely mandatory.
B) The right of an accused to watch the prosecution
witnesses deposing before a Court is a valuable right and
infringement of such a right is gravely prejudicial.
C) A re-trial wipes out from the record the earlier
proceedings and affords the Prosecutor an opportunity to rectify
the infirmities in the earlier proceedings. Therefore, it can be
ordered in very rare circumstances and certainly not to take
away the advantage ensuing to the accused.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 9
D) In any case, no partial re-trial can be ordered.
13. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the State
submitted:-
A) The conclusion of the High Court that Section 273 is
mandatory was accepted by the State and no appeal was
preferred. Proceeding on such premise, the question was
whether the trial was vitiated or the error could be rectified.
Relying on Section 279 of the Code under which evidence has
to be given in a language understood by the accused and
infraction thereof was not found to be of such magnitude so as
to vitiate the proceedings4
, he submitted that infraction of
Section 273 would also not vitiate the trial.
B) Sections 460 to 465 of the Code stipulate remedies with
respect to breaches of provisions of the Code and resultant
effect. Contravention of Section 273 is not considered to be
breach of such magnitude which ought to result in vitiation of
proceedings.
4
 Shiv Narayan Kabira vs. State of Madras 1967 (1) SCR 138
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 10
C) Relying on articles from Harvard Law Review5
 and
Columbia Law Review6
 it was submitted that theory of
Harmless Error in criminal matters is firmly embedded in
criminal jurisprudence and error in the present matter is one
which comes within such category.
D) The contravention of Section 273 was remedied by the
order of re-trial so that there should not be any prejudice to the
accused. The order directing de novo examination of twelve
witnesses and re-trial to that extent was just and proper.
14. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate and Amicus Curiae relied
upon decisions of this Court in State of Maharashtra and another vs.
Praful B. Desai7
, Sakshi and others vs. Union of India8
, Mahendra
Chawla vs. Union of India9
 and various provisions of the Code to submit:-
A) The provisions of Section 273 are mandatory in nature only
to the extent that the evidence taken in the course of the trial
ought to be in the presence of the accused or when his personal
5 Harvard Law Review Vol. 131:2117
6 Columbia Law Review Online – Vol.118 October 4, 2018 Pages 118-34
7
(2003) 4 SCC 601
8
(2004) 5 SCC 518
9
(2018) 15 SCALE 497
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 11
attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader; and
that the physical presence of the accused is not mandatory.
B) Elaborating further, it was submitted that non-compliance of
the provisions of Section 273 is not an irregularity which would
vitiate the criminal trial completely, as the irregularity was
curable.
C) Under Sections 366 to 371 of the Code dealing with
“Submission of Death Sentences for Confirmation” and
Sections 372 to 394 dealing with “Appeals”, the High Court
was empowered to direct re-trial and record additional evidence
or direct further enquiry.
D) The provisions of Chapter XXVIII dealing with Death
References are wider/larger in import as compared to the
powers under Chapter XXIX dealing with appeals and the view
taken by the High Court was supported more strongly by the
provisions of Chapter XXVIII of the Code.
E) The criminal jurisprudence also recognizes rights of
victims in a criminal trial. In the present case, four male
members of the family were killed, and the view taken by the
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 12
High Court was an extremely balanced view which ensured that
there was no failure or miscarriage of justice for the victims as
well as the accused.
15. The cases cited by the learned Amicus Curiae dealt with issues
whether recording of evidence by video conferencing satisfied the mandate
of Section 273 of the Code.
A) In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai10 it was observed:
“9. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents, that
the procedure governing a criminal trial is crucial to
the basic right of the accused under Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the
procedure for trial of a criminal case is expressly laid
down, in India, in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It
was submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure
lays down specific and express provisions governing
the procedure to be followed in a criminal trial. It was
submitted that the procedure laid down in the Code of
Criminal Procedure was the “procedure established by
law”. It was submitted that the legislature alone had
the power to change the procedure by enacting a law
amending it, and that when the procedure was so
changed, that became “the procedure established by
law”. It was submitted that any departure from the
procedure laid down by law would be contrary to
Article 21. In support of this submission reliance was
placed on the cases of A.K. Gopalan v. State of
Madras11
, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor12 and Siva
Kumar Chadda v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi13. There
10 (2003) 4 SCC 601
11 AIR 1950 SC 27
12 AIR 1936 PC 253 (2): 37 Cri LJ 897
13 AIR 1995 SC 915 (sic)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 13
can be no dispute with these propositions. However, if
the existing provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code permit recording of evidence by videoconferencing then it could not be said that “procedure
established by law” has not been followed.
20. Recording of evidence by video-conferencing also
satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that
evidence be recorded in the presence of the accused.
The accused and his pleader can see the witness as
clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before
them. In fact the accused may be able to see the
witness better than he may have been able to if he was
sitting in the dock in a crowded courtroom. They can
observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to
playback would enable better observation of
demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition
of the witness. The accused would be able to instruct
his pleader immediately and thus cross-examination of
the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of
playback would give an added advantage whilst crossexamining the witness. The witness can be confronted
with documents or other material or statement in the
same manner as if he/she was in court. All these
objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded
by video-conferencing. Thus no prejudice, of
whatsoever nature, is caused to the accused. Of
course, as set out hereinafter, evidence by videoconferencing has to be on some conditions.”
B) In Sakshi vs. Union of India14 the observations of this Court
were:-
“27. The other aspect which has been
highlighted and needs consideration relates to
providing protection to a victim of sexual abuse at the
time of recording his statement in court. The main
14 (2004) 5 SCC 518
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 14
suggestions made by the petitioner are for
incorporating special provisions in child sexual abuse
cases to the following effect:
(i) Permitting use of a videotaped interview of
the child’s statement by the judge (in the presence of a
child-support person).
(ii) Allow a child to testify via closed-circuit
television or from behind a screen to obtain a full and
candid account of the acts complained of.
(iii) The cross-examination of a minor should only be
carried out by the judge based on written questions
submitted by the defence upon perusal of the testimony
of the minor.
(iv) Whenever a child is required to give testimony,
sufficient breaks should be given as and when required
by the child.
C) Recently in Mahender Chawla and Ors. vs. Union of India
(UOI) and Ors.15
, this Court stated:-
“29. As pointed out above, in Sakshi's case, the
Court had insisted about the need to come up with a
legislation for the protection of witnesses. It had even
requested the Law Commission to examine certain aspects,
which resulted to 172nd review of rape laws by the Law
Commission. However, the Court specifically rejected the
suggestion of the Law Commission regarding examination
of vulnerable witnesses in the absence of Accused. Having
regard to the provisions of Section 273 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which is based on the tenets of
principle of natural justice, that the witness must be
examined in the presence of the Accused, such a principle
cannot be sacrificed in trials and in inquiries regarding
sexual offences. In such a scenario examination of these
witnesses through video conferencing provides the
solution which balances the interest of the Accused as well
as vulnerable witnesses.”
15
 2018 (15) SCALE 497
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 15
30. We will briefly refer to the statutory provisions
governing the situation. Section 273 Cr.P.C. lays down
that:
“273. Except as otherwise expressly provided,
all evidence taken in the course of the trial or other
proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the
accused, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed
with, in the presence of his pleader.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 327 CrPC lays down
that any criminal court enquiring into or trying any
offence shall be deemed to be open court, to which the
public generally may have access, so far as the same
can conveniently contain them. Sub-section (2) of the
same section says that:
“327. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1) the inquiry into and trial of rape or an
offence under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section
376-B, Section 376-C or Section 376-D of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be conducted incamera.”
Under the proviso to this sub-section
“the Presiding Judge may, if he thinks fit, or on
an application made by either of the parties, allow any
particular person to have access to, or be or remain in,
the room or building used by the court”.
It is rather surprising that the legislature while
incorporating sub-section (2) to Section 327 by
amending Act 43 of 1983 failed to take note of
offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC and omitted
to mention the aforesaid provisions. Deposition of the
victims of offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC
can at times be very embarrassing to them.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 16
31. The whole inquiry before a court being to
elicit the truth, it is absolutely necessary that the
victim or the witnesses are able to depose about the
entire incident in a free atmosphere without any
embarrassment. Section 273 CrPC merely requires the
evidence to be taken in the presence of the accused.
The section, however, does not say that the evidence
should be recorded in such a manner that the accused
should have full view of the victim or the witnesses.
Recording of evidence by way of video-conferencing
vis-à-vis Section 273 CrPC has been held to be
permissible in a recent decision of this Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai1. There is
major difference between substantive provisions
defining crimes and providing punishment for the
same and procedural enactment laying down the
procedure of trial of such offences. Rules of procedure
are handmaiden of justice and are meant to advance
and not to obstruct the cause of justice. It is, therefore,
permissible for the court to expand or enlarge the
meanings of such provisions in order to elicit the truth
and do justice with the parties.”
16. We must also note certain observations of this Court in Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur vs State of Maharashtra3 on which Mr. Hegde, learned
Senior Advocate placed heavy reliance.
18. The right of an accused to watch the
prosecution witnesses deposing before a court of law
indisputably is a valuable right. The Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution explicitly provides
therefor, which reads as under:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 17
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.”
We may, however, notice that such a right has not yet
been accepted as a fundamental right within the
meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by
the Indian courts. In the absence of such an express
provision in our constitution, we have to proceed on a
premise that such a right is only a statutory one.
22. We may, however, notice that even in the
United States of America, the accused’s right under
the Sixth Amendment is not absolute. The right of
confrontment of an accused is subject to just
exceptions, including an orderly behaviour in the
courtroom. In case of disruptive behaviour an accused
can be asked to go outside the courtroom so long he
does not undertake to behave in an orderly manner. It
was so held in Illinois v. Allen16
.
17. Shri Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Advocate also relied upon the
statutory exceptions to the ambit of Section 273 of the Code. We may
therefore consider the provisions of Section 273, 299 and 317 of the Code at
the outset. Said provisions are:-
“273. Evidence to be taken in presence of accused.
– Except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence
taken in the course of the trial or other proceeding
shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or, when
his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the
presence of his pleader:
[Provided that where the evidence of a woman below
the age of eighteen years who is alleged to have been
16 397 US 337 (1970)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 18
subjected to rape or any other sexual offence, is to be
recorded, the court may take appropriate measures to
ensure that such woman is not confronted by the
accused while at the same time ensuring the right of
cross-examination of the accused.]
299. Record of evidence in absence of accused – (1)
If it is proved that an accused person has absconded,
and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting
him, the Court competent to try 1
[, or commit for trial]
such person for the offence complained of may, in his
absence, examine the witnesses (if any) produced on
behalf of the prosecution, and record their depositions
and any such deposition may, on the arrest of such
person, be given in evidence against him on the
inquiry into, or trial for, the offence with which he is
charged, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving
evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be
procured without an amount of delay, expenses or
inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the
case, would be unreasonable.
(2) If it appears that an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life has been committed by some
person or persons unknown, the High Court or the
Sessions Judge may direct that any Magistrate of the
first class shall hold an inquiry and examine any
witnesses who can give evidence concerning the
offence and any depositions so taken may be given in
evidence against any person who is subsequently
accused of the offence, if the deponent is dead or
incapable of giving evidence or beyond the limits of
India.”
317. Provision for inquiries and trial being held in
the absence of accused in certain cases. – (1) At any
stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the
Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be
recorded that the personal attendance of the accused
before the Court is not necessary in the interests of
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 19
justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the
proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if
the accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with
his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial
in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of
the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such
accused.
(2) If the accused in any such case is not represented
by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers
his personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks
fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either
adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of
such accused be taken up or tried separately.”
18. Section 273 opens with the expression “Except as otherwise expressly
provided…” By its very nature, the exceptions to the application of Section
273 must be those which are expressly provided in the Code. Shri Hegde is
right in his submission in that behalf. Sections 299 and 317 are such express
exceptions provided in the Code. In the circumstances mentioned in said
Sections 299 and 317, the contents of which need no further elaboration, the
Courts would be justified in recording evidence in the absence of the
accused. Under its latter part, Section 273 also provides for a situation in
which evidence could be recorded in the absence of the accused, when it
says “when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his
pleader”. There was a debate during the course of hearing in the present
matter whether such dispensation by the Court has to be express or could it
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 20
be implied from the circumstances. We need not go into these questions as
the record clearly indicates that an objection was raised by the Advocate
appearing for the appellants right at the initial stage that the evidence was
being recorded without ensuring the presence of the appellants in Court.
There was neither any willingness on the part of the appellants nor any order
or direction by the trial Court that the evidence be recorded in the absence of
the appellants. The matter, therefore, would not come within the scope of
the latter part of Section 273 and it cannot be said that there was any
dispensation as contemplated by the said Section. We will, therefore,
proceed on the footing that there was no dispensation and yet the evidence
was recorded without ensuring the presence of the accused. The High Court
was, therefore, absolutely right in concluding that Section 273 stood violated
in the present matter and that there was an infringement of the salutary
principle under Section 273. The submissions advanced by Shri Sanjay
Hegde, learned Senior Advocate, relying upon paragraphs in Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra and others17 as quoted above,
that the right of the accused to watch the prosecution witness is a valuable
right, also need not detain us. We accept that such a right is a valuable one
and there was an infringement in the present case. What is material to
17 (2009) 7 SCC 104
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 21
consider is the effect of such infringement? Would it vitiate the trial or such
an infringement is a curable one?
19. The emphasis was laid by Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior
Advocate for the State on the articles relied upon by him to submit that the
theory of “harmless error” which has been recognized in criminal
jurisprudence and that there must be a remedial approach. Again, we need
not go into these broader concepts as the provisions of the Code, in our
considered view, are clearly indicative and lay down with clarity as to which
infringements per se, would result in vitiation of proceedings. Chapter
XXXV of the Code deals with “Irregular Proceedings”, and Section 461
stipulates certain infringements or irregularities which vitiate proceedings.
Barring those stipulated in Section 461, the thrust of the Chapter is that any
infringement or irregularity would not vitiate the proceedings unless, as a
result of such infringement or irregularity, great prejudice had occasioned to
the accused. Shri Hegde, learned Senior Advocate was quick to rely on the
passages in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur10 to submit that the prejudice in such
cases would be inherent or per se. Paragraphs 57 and 58 of said decision
were as under:-
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 22
 “57. Mr. Naphade would submit that the appellant did
not suffer any prejudice. We do not agree.
Infringement of such a valuable right itself causes
prejudice. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan18 this Court
clearly held: (SCC p. 395, para 24)
“24. … In our view the principles of natural justice
know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it
would have made any difference if natural justice had
been observed. The non-observance of natural justice
is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice
independently of proof of denial of natural justice is
unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has
denied justice that the person who has been denied
justice is not prejudiced.”
58. In A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak19 a seven-Judge
Bench of this Court has also held that when an order
has been passed in violation of a fundamental right or
in breach of the principles of natural justice, the same
would be a nullity. (See also State of Haryana vs.
State of Punjab20 and Rajasthan SRTC vs. Zakir
Hussain21.”
20. The aforementioned observations in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur10 must
be read in the peculiar factual context of the matter. The accused Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur was tried in respect of certain offences in a Court in Delhi
and at the same time he was also an accused in a trial under the provisions of
TADA Act22 in a Court in Pune. The trial in the Court in Pune proceeded on
18 (1980) 4 SCC 379
19 (1988) 2 SCC 602
20 (2004) 12 SCC 673
21 (2005) 7 SCC 447
22 Terrorists and Anti Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 23
the basis that Jayendra Vishnu Thakur was an absconding accused. The
evidence was thus led in the trial in Pune in his absence when he was not
sent up for trial, at the end of which all the accused were acquitted.
However, in an appeal arising therefrom, this Court convicted some of the
accused for offences with which they were tried. In the meantime, Jayendra
Vishnu Thakur was convicted by the Court in Delhi and was undergoing
sentence imposed upon him. Later, he was produced before the Court in
Pune with a supplementary charge-sheet and charges were framed against
him along with certain other accused. A request was made by the Public
Prosecutor that the evidence of some of the witnesses, which was led in the
earlier trial be read in evidence in the fresh trial against Jayendra Vishnu
Thakur as those witnesses were either dead or not available to be
examined23. The request was allowed which order of the Court in Pune was
under challenge before this Court. It was found by this Court that the basic
premise for application of Section 299 of the Code was completely absent.
The Accused had not absconded. He was very much in confinement and
could have been produced in the earlier trial before the Court in Pune. Since
the requirements of Section 299 were not satisfied, the evidence led on the
earlier occasion could not be taken as evidence in the subsequent
23 Paras 8 & 9 of Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra (supra)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 24
proceedings. The witnesses were not alive and could not be re-examined in
the fresh trial nor could there be cross-examination on behalf of the accused.
If the evidence in the earlier trial was to be read in the subsequent trial, the
accused would be denied the opportunity of cross-examination of the
concerned witnesses. Thus, the prejudice was inherent. It is in this factual
context that the observations of this Court have to be considered. Same is
not the situation in the present matter. It is not the direction of the High
Court to read the entire evidence on the earlier occasion as evidence in the
de novo trial. The direction is to re-examine those witnesses who were not
examined in the presence of the appellants. The direction now ensures the
presence of the appellants in the Court, so that they have every opportunity
to watch the witnesses deposing in the trial and cross-examine said
witnesses. Since these basic requirements would be scrupulously observed
and complied with, there is no prejudice at all.
21. The learned Amicus Curiae was right in relying upon the provisions of
Chapter XXVIII (Sections 366 to 371 of The Code) and Chapter XXIX
(Sections 372 to 394 of The Code). He was also right in saying that the
Chapter XXVIII was more relevant in the present matter and the judgment of
the High Court was supported more strongly by provisions of Chapter
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 25
XXVIII. The provisions of Sections 366 to 368 and Sections 386 and 391
are quoted here for ready reference:-
“366. Sentence of death to be submitted by Court
of Session for confirmation – (1) When the Court of
Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings
shall be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence
shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the
High Court.
(2) The Court passing the sentence shall commit the
convicted person to jail custody under a warrant.
367. Power to direct further inquiry to be made or
additional evidence to be taken – (1) If, when such
proceedings are submitted, the High Court thinks that
a further inquiry should be made into or additional
evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt
or innocence of the convicted person, it may make
such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to
be made or taken by the Court of Session.
(2) Unless the High Court otherwise directs, the
presence of the convicted person may be dispensed
with when such inquiry is made or such evidence is
taken.
(3) When the inquiry or evidence (if any) is not made
or taken by the High Court the result of such inquiry
or evidence shall be certified to such Court.
368. Power of High Court to confirm sentence or
annual conviction – In any case submitted under
section 366, the High Court –
(a) may confirm the sentence, or pass any other
sentence warranted by law, or
(b) may annul the conviction, and convict the
accused of any offence of which the Court of
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 26
Session might have convicted him, or order of a
a new trial on the same or an amended charge, or
(c) may acquit the accused person:
Provided that no order of confirmation shall be
made under this section until the period allowed
for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an
appeal is presented within such period, until
such appeal is disposed of.
386. Powers of the Appellate Court. – After
perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his
pleader, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under
section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears,
the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or
may –
(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse
such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or
that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as
the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence
on him according to law;
(b) in an appeal from a conviction –
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or
discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a
Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such
Appellate Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the
nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the
sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;
(c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence –
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 27
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit
or discharge the accused or order him to be
re-tried by a Court competent to try the
offence, or
(ii) Alter the finding maintaining the sentence,
or
(iii) With or without altering the finding alter
the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or
reduce the same;
(d) in an appeal from any other order alter or reverse
such order;
(e) Make any amendment or any consequential or
incidental order that may be just or proper:
Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced
unless the accused has had an opportunity of
showing cause against such enhancement:
Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not
inflict greater punishment for the offence which is
in its opinion the accused has committed, than
might have been inflicted for that offence by the
Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.
391. Appellate Court may take further evidence or
direct it to be taken – (1) In dealing with any appeal
under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks
additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its
reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or
direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the
Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of
Session or a Magistrate.
(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the
Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall
certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such
Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the
appeal.
(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to
be present when the additional evidence is taken.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 28
(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be
subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it
were an inquiry.”
22. According to Section 366 when a Court of Sessions passes a sentence
of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the High Court and the
sentence of death is not to be executed unless it is confirmed by the High
Court. Section 367 then proceeds to lay down the power of the High Court
to direct further enquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken.
Section 368, thereafter, lays down the power of the High Court to confirm
the sentence so imposed or annul the conviction. One of the powers which
the High Court can exercise is one under Section 368 (c) of the Code and
that is to “acquit the accused person”. Pertinently, the power to acquit the
person can be exercised by the High Court even without there being any
substantive appeal on the part of the accused challenging his conviction. To
that extent the proceedings under Chapter XXVIII which deals with
“submission of death sentences for confirmation” is a proceeding in
continuation of the trial. These provisions thus entitle the High Court to
direct further enquiry or to take additional evidence and the High Court may,
in a given case, even acquit the accused person. The scope of the chapter is
wider. Chapter XXIX of the Code deals with “Appeals”. Section 391 also
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 29
entitles the Appellate Court to take further evidence or direct such further
evidence to be taken. Section 386 then enumerates powers of the Appellate
Court which inter alia includes the power to “reverse the finding and
sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a
Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or
committed for trial”. The powers of Appellate Court are equally wide. The
High Court in the present case was exercising powers both under Chapters
XXVIII and XXIX of the Code. If the power can go to the extent of
ordering a complete re-trial, the exercise of power to a lesser extent namely
ordering de novo examination of twelve witnesses with further directions as
the High Court has imposed in the present matter, was certainly within the
powers of the High Court. There is, thus, no infraction or jurisdictional error
on the part of the High Court.
23. It is true that as consistently laid down by this Court, an order of
retrial of a criminal case is not to be taken resort to easily and must be made
in exceptional cases. For example, it was observed by this Court in Pandit
Ukha Kolhe vs State of Maharashtra2
, as under:-
“15. An order for retrial of a criminal case is made in
exceptional cases, and not unless the appellate Court
is satisfied that the Court trying the proceeding had no
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 30
jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by
serious illegalities or irregularities or on account of
misconception of the nature of the proceedings and on
that account in substance there had been no real trial
or that the Prosecutor or an accused was, for reasons
over which he had no control, prevented from leading
or tendering evidence material to the charge, and in
the interests of justice the appellate Court deems it
appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the
case, that the accused should be put on his trial again.
An order of re-trial wipes out from the record the
earlier proceeding, and exposes the person accused to
another trial which affords the prosecutor an
opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the
earlier trial, and will not ordinarily be countenanced
when it is made merely to enable the prosecutor to
lead evidence which he could but has not cared to lead
either on account of insufficient appreciation of the
nature of the case or for other reasons. Harries, C.J., in
Ramanlal Rathi v. The State24
"If at the end of a criminal prosecution the
evidence leaves the Court in doubt as to the guilt of
the accused the latter is entitled to a verdict of not
guilty. A retrial may be ordered when the original trial
has not been satisfactory for particular reasons, for
example, if evidence had been wrongly rejected which
should have been admitted, or admitted when it
should have been rejected, or the Court had refused to
hear certain witness who should have been heard. But
retrial cannot be ordered on the ground that the
prosecution did not produce the proper evidence and
did not know how to prove their case."
24. The order passed by the High Court in the present matter was not to
enable the Prosecutor to rectify the defects or infirmities in the evidence or
to enable him to lead evidence which he had not cared to lead on the earlier
24 AIR (1951) Cal.305
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 31
occasion. The evidence in the form of testimony of those twelve witnesses
was led and those witnesses were cross-examined. There was no infirmity
except the one that the evidence was not led in the presence of the
appellants. The remedy proposed was only to rectify such infirmity, and not
to enable the Prosecutor to rectify defects in the evidence.
25. We must also consider the matter from the stand point and perspective
of the victims as suggested by the learned Amicus Curiae. Four persons of a
family were done to death. It is certainly in the societal interest that the
guilty must be punished and at the same time the procedural requirements
which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered to. If there was an infraction,
which otherwise does not vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to
remedy the situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the
accused as well as societal interest are adequately safeguarded. The very
same witnesses were directed to be de novo examined which would ensure
that the interest of the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the
accused will have every right and opportunity to watch the witnesses
deposing against them, watch their demeanor and instruct their counsel
properly so that said witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the
process, the interest of the accused would also stand protected. On the other
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 32
hand, if we were to accept the submission that the proceedings stood vitiated
and, therefore, the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination
of the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage of justice.
The persons who are accused of committing four murders would not
effectively be tried. The evidence against them would not be read for a
technical infraction resulting in great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order
and directions passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair
procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses, after due
distillation from their cross-examination can be read in evidence.
26. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order passed and the
directions issued by the High Court in the present matter. We affirm the
view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals. The restraint which
we had placed on the Trial Court not to pronounce the judgment hereby
stands vacated. The Trial Court is now free to take the matter to its logical
conclusion. Let a copy of this Order be immediately transmitted to the
concerned Trial Court.
27. We must say that we have not, and shall not be taken to have
expressed any opinion on the merits or demerits of the case of the
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.656-657 of 2019 (@SLP (CRL) Nos.809-810 of 2019
ATMA RAM & ORS. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
 33
prosecution, and the matter shall be gone into on its own merits at every
stage of the proceedings.
28. In the end, we must express our appreciation and gratitude to the
learned Amicus Curiae for rendering very effective and able assistance in the
matter. We are indeed grateful to him.
………..…..……..……J.
 (Uday Umesh Lalit)
..………….……………J.
 (Indu Malhotra)
New Delhi,

April 11, 2019

Thursday, April 11, 2019

M/S. ROYAL SUNDARAM ALLIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. ... APPELLANT VS. MANDALA YADAGARI GOUD & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS



whether the age of the a bachelor deceased or the age of the dependents would be taken into account for calculating the multiplier in the case of a motor accident  claims ?  .

the insurance company, whose counsel submits that it is the age of the dependents which has to be taken into account and thus the High Court has fallen into an error by taking the multiplier
on the basis of the age of the deceased.
To support his contention, learned counsel, for reference purposes, filed two compilations of judgments one against him and one in his favour. We put a specific query to the learned counsel as to whether there are any three Judge Bench decisions dealing with the issue, as there was no purpose in looking at multiplicity of judgments, and what  was the last view adopted by this Court in this behalf.
Learned counsel conceded that a three Judge bench of this Court in Sube Singh & Anr. Vs. Shaym Singh (Dead) & Ors.1, looked into this issue and has opined that it is the age of the deceased which should be the basis of the multiplier. 
However, his contention is that a reading of this judgment would show that reliance has been placed on the earlier judgment in Munna Lal Jain & Anr. Vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma & Ors.2, to come to this conclusion. Munna Lal Jain (supra) in turn relied upon the judgment in Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. which view is stated to have been affirmed by the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors.4 
It was submitted that a sequential error has taken place as Sarla Verma (supra) did not deal
with the case of a deceased bachelor and thus, the imprimatur given in Pranay Sethi case could be of no avail.
Thus, a mere affirmation of the views in Sube Singh (supra) also does not settle this legal position. On the other hand, there are two Judge Bench judgments taking a contra view that the age of the dependents is what has to be the basis for multiplier and not the age of the deceased in the case of death of a bachelor.
He also made a reference to one order of a three Judge Bench in New India Assurance
Company Ltd. Vs. Shanti Pathak (Smt.) & Ors. but that one is indisputably an adjudication on given facts.
The concept of insurance for a motor vehicle is to cover risk in case of an accident. The insurance policy covers personal risk of injury or death, including for third parties. The premium charged in this behalf is uniform.

The judicial pronouncements of this Court have endeavoured to devise a standard formula, so far as
possible, in respect of the calculation of the amount of compensation qua various components. 

The amount of compensation determined is to be paid to the claimants who are dependents in case of a death of a person based on what the deceased would have contributed to their support. 
The amount thus received by the dependents in turn becomes a part of the estate as they may live longer or may be younger than the age limits taken into account for calculation of a
multiplier to be applied in such a situation. 
In the context of liability to pay compensation on the principle of no fault, as enunciated under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, thus, it was observed by this Court that
even if there is no loss of dependency, the quantification cannot be below that amount and to that extent the amount would form a part of the estate of the deceased
The focus for determination of such claim is the deceased and what would be his contribution towards the dependents would he to be alive, for the benefits of the dependents.
It is trite to say, and in fact conceded by the learned counsel for the insurance company, that in case the deceased is a married person, it is the age of the deceased which is to be taken into account. The question is whether in case the deceased is a bachelor, a different principle for calculation of the multiplier should be applied by shifting the focus to the age of the claimants? 

We are of the view that the answer to this question should be in the negative.

We may also note the importance of applying uniform settled principle to such cases. Certainty of law is important. Once the law is settled, it should not be repeatedly changed as that itself causes confusion and litigation. It is with this objection that this Court has endeavoured to settle legal principles in respect of the matter in question.

A reading of the judgment in Sube Singh (supra) shows that where a three Judge Bench has categorically taken the view that it is the age of the deceased and not the age of
the parents that would be the factor for the purposes of taking the multiplier to be applied.
This judgment undoubtedly relied upon the case of Munna Lal Jain (supra) which is also a three Judge Bench judgment in this behalf.

The relevant portion of the judgment has also been extracted. Once again the extracted portion in turn refers to the judgment of a three Judge Bench in Reshma Kumari & Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Anr.
The relevant portion of
Reshma Kumari in turn has referred to Sarla Verma (supra)
case and given its imprimatur to the same. The loss of
dependency is thus stated to be based on : (i)
additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deductions to be made towards the personal living
expenses of the deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be
applied with reference to the age of the deceased. It is
the third aspect which is of significance and Reshma Kumari
categorically states that it does not want to revisit the
law settled in Sarla Verma case in this behalf.
Not only this, the subsequent judgment of the Constitution bench in Pranay Sethi (supra) has also been referred to in Sube Singh for the purpose of calculation of the multiplier.

We are convinced that there is no need to once again take up this issue settled by the aforesaid judgments of three Judge Bench and also relying upon the Constitution Bench that it is the age of the deceased which has to be taken into account and not the age of the dependents.

1
Reportable
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6600 OF 2015
M/S. ROYAL SUNDARAM ALLIANCE
INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. ... APPELLANT
 VS.
MANDALA YADAGARI GOUD & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS
WITH
C.A.No. 1954/2019 @ SLP(C)NO.5603/2019 @ CC No. 11685/2016,
C.A.NO.178/2017 &
C.A.No.1953/2019 @ SLP(C)NO.19797/2015
 J U D G M E N T
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
 C.A.No.6600/2015 & C.A. NO. 1954/ 2019 @ SLP(C) 5603/2019 @ CC
No.11685/2016
1. The only legal issue canvassed before us in these
matters, which are in the nature of cross appeals, is that
in the case of a motor accident where there is death of a
person, who is a bachelor, whether the age of the deceased
or the age of the dependents would be taken into account for
calculating the multiplier.
2
2. The appellant in C.A.No.6600/2015 is the insurance
company, whose counsel submits that it is the age of the
dependents which has to be taken into account and thus the
High Court has fallen into an error by taking the multiplier
on the basis of the age of the deceased.
3. To support his contention, learned counsel, for
reference purposes, filed two compilations of judgments one
against him and one in his favour. We put a specific query
to the learned counsel as to whether there are any three
Judge Bench decisions dealing with the issue, as there was
no purpose in looking at multiplicity of judgments, and what
was the last view adopted by this Court in this behalf.
4. Learned counsel conceded that a three Judge bench of
this Court in Sube Singh & Anr. Vs. Shaym Singh (Dead) &
Ors.1, looked into this issue and has opined that it is the
age of the deceased which should be the basis of the
multiplier. However, his contention is that a reading of
this judgment would show that reliance has been placed on
the earlier judgment in Munna Lal Jain & Anr. Vs. Vipin
Kumar Sharma & Ors.2, to come to this conclusion. Munna Lal
Jain (supra) in turn relied upon the judgment in Sarla
Verma (Smt.) & Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr.
3,
which view is stated to have been affirmed by the
1 (2018) 3 SCC 18
2 (2015) 6 SCC 347
3 (2009) 6 SCC 121
3
Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Pranay Sethi & Ors.4 It was submitted that a sequential
error has taken place as Sarla Verma (supra) did not deal
with the case of a deceased bachelor and thus, the
imprimatur given in Pranay Sethi case could be of no avail.
Thus, a mere affirmation of the views in Sube Singh (supra)
also does not settle this legal position. On the other
hand, there are two Judge Bench judgments taking a contra
view that the age of the dependents is what has to be the
basis for multiplier and not the age of the deceased in the
case of death of a bachelor. He also made a reference to
one order of a three Judge Bench in New India Assurance
Company Ltd. Vs. Shanti Pathak (Smt.) & Ors.
5, but that one
is indisputably an adjudication on given facts.
5. Insofar as the appeal filed by the claimants are
concerned, it is not in dispute that 50% has been granted
for future prospects, and that is the only aspect before us
seeking an enhancement of the same. In this behalf it is
pointed out to us that actually 40% ought to have been
awarded in terms of Pranay Sethi case (supra).
6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
matters in issue.
4 (2017) 16 SCC 680
5 (2007) 10 SCC 1
4
7. The concept of insurance for a motor vehicle is to
cover risk in case of an accident. The insurance policy
covers personal risk of injury or death, including for
third parties. The premium charged in this behalf is
uniform.
8. The judicial pronouncements of this Court have
endeavoured to devise a standard formula, so far as
possible, in respect of the calculation of the amount of
compensation qua various components. The amount of
compensation determined is to be paid to the claimants who
are dependents in case of a death of a person based on what
the deceased would have contributed to their support. The
amount thus received by the dependents in turn becomes a
part of the estate as they may live longer or may be younger
than the age limits taken into account for calculation of a
multiplier to be applied in such a situation. In the
context of liability to pay compensation on the principle of
no fault, as enunciated under Section 140 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, thus, it was observed by this Court that
even if there is no loss of dependency, the quantification
cannot be below that amount and to that extent the amount
would form a part of the estate of the deceased6.
9. The focus for determination of such claim is the
deceased and what would be his contribution towards the
6 See Manjuri Bera (Smt) v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. And Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 643
5
dependents would he to be alive, for the benefits of the
dependents. It is trite to say, and in fact conceded by the
learned counsel for the insurance company, that in case the
deceased is a married person, it is the age of the deceased
which is to be taken into account. The question is whether
in case the deceased is a bachelor, a different principle
for calculation of the multiplier should be applied by
shifting the focus to the age of the claimants? We are of
the view that the answer to this question should be in the
negative.
10. We may also note the importance of applying uniform
settled principle to such cases. Certainty of law is
important. Once the law is settled, it should not be
repeatedly changed as that itself causes confusion and
litigation. It is with this objection that this Court has
endeavoured to settle legal principles in respect of the
matter in question.
11. A reading of the judgment in Sube Singh (supra) shows
that where a three Judge Bench has categorically taken the
view that it is the age of the deceased and not the age of
the parents that would be the factor for the purposes of
taking the multiplier to be applied. This judgment
undoubtedly relied upon the case of Munna Lal Jain (supra)
which is also a three Judge Bench judgment in this behalf.
6
The relevant portion of the judgment has also been
extracted. Once again the extracted portion in turn refers
to the judgment of a three Judge Bench in Reshma Kumari &
Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Anr.
7. The relevant portion of
Reshma Kumari in turn has referred to Sarla Verma (supra)
case and given its imprimatur to the same. The loss of
dependency is thus stated to be based on : (i)
additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deductions to be made towards the personal living
expenses of the deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be
applied with reference to the age of the deceased. It is
the third aspect which is of significance and Reshma Kumari
categorically states that it does not want to revisit the
law settled in Sarla Verma case in this behalf.
12. Not only this, the subsequent judgment of the
Constitution bench in Pranay Sethi (supra) has also been
referred to in Sube Singh for the purpose of calculation of
the multiplier.
13. We are convinced that there is no need to once again
take up this issue settled by the aforesaid judgments of
three Judge Bench and also relying upon the Constitution
Bench that it is the age of the deceased which has to be
taken into account and not the age of the dependents.
7 (2013) 9 SCC 65
7
14. The aforesaid being the only issue which has been
raised by the insurance company, we find the appeal filed by
the insurance company without merit.
15. We have already noticed that insofar as the claimants
are concerned, they have already been granted more than a
reasonable amount for future prospects and on that account
also no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
16. The result is that both the appeals are dismissed
leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending
application, if any, stands disposed of.
C.A.No.1953/2019 @ SLP(C)NO.19797/2015 :
17. In view of the judgment delivered today in Civil Appeal
No.6600/2015 titled as M/s. Royal Sundaram Alliance
Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mandala Yadagari Gold & Ors.,
opining that it is the age of the deceased and not such of
the dependents in case of the death of a bachelor which is
to be the basis for the multiplier, this appeal is also
liable to be dismissed as this is the only plea urged.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
8
C.A.No.178/2017
18. In view of the judgment delivered today in Civil Appeal
No.6600/2015 titled as M/s. Royal Sundaram Alliance
Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mandala Yadagari Gold & Ors., the
multiplier in the present case will be 16, and not as per
the impugned order, based on the age of the deceased. The
amount now payable in view thereof would be as under :
Sl.No. Particulars MACT High Court Payable
1. Salary Rs.7242/- Rs.7242/- Rs.7242/-
2. Annual
Income
86,904 (7242x12) 86,904 (7242x12) 86,904 (7242x12)
3. Add Future
Prospects
Nil Nil 50% = 1,30,356/-
4. Less : 1/3 50% 50% = 65,178
5. Multiplier 8
(on the basis of
average age of the
parents = 57 1/2
years
11
(Average age of
parents 54 & 53
years)
16
(Age of the
deceased)
(65,178X16 =
10,42,848)
6. Loss of
companionship
2000/- 2000/- 30,000/-
7. Total 4,65,488/- 4,79,972/- 10,72,848/-
8. Difference Nil Nil 5,92,876/-
9. Interest 9% 9% 9%
19. We may note that learned counsel appearing for the
respondent also sought to canvas that the only change being
on account of the multiplier, that plea was not even raised
in the appeal. We, however, find that ground (4) of the
special leave petition is wide enough to cover that issue.
The appeal is thus allowed to the aforesaid extent.
9
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
...........................J.
[S.A. BOBDE]
...........................J.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
...........................J.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]
New Delhi;
April 09, 2019.


M/s D.J. Malpani ... Appellant(s) Versus Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik … Respondent(s)


Whether Dharmada is a part and parcel of sale price - liable for assessment ?

While selling goods, the appellant-assessee charged the customers invoices for the price of
goods plus Dharmada, a charitable donation. 
According to the appellant, the Dharmada was paid voluntarily by customers and was meant for charity.
It was accordingly credited to charity.
However, the Superintendent, Central Excise, Nashik issued show cause notices and raised a demand of duty in respect of Dharmada, claiming it was part of the price for the sale of manufactured goods and included it for computing assessable value.

DHARMADA
This takes us to the nature of the “Dharmada” when given
along with the sale price of goods. Dharmada is well known in
India to be a donation or an offering made for the purpose of
charity as distinct from a commercial transaction.

The reliance placed on Tata Iron & Steel (supra) and Panchmukhi (supra) which was a case of Dharmada, is misplaced. Panchmukhi (supra) cannot be said to be good law.
 when an amount is paid as Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not
made in consideration of the transfer of goods. Such payment is meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller. If such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form
part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value of the goods.
Thus, the answer to the question referred by the Division
Bench is as follows: -
“The Dharmada collected by the appellant which is clearly an optional payment made by the buyer cannot be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No.5282 OF 2005
M/s D.J. Malpani ... Appellant(s)
Versus
Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
S.A. BOBDE, J.
The appellant-assessee manufacture goods falling under
Chapter 24 of the Schedule of The Central Excise Act, 1944
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). While selling goods, the
appellant-assessee charged the customers invoices for the price of
goods plus Dharmada, a charitable donation. According to the
appellant, the Dharmada was paid voluntarily by customers and
was meant for charity. It was accordingly credited
to charity.
2. However, the Superintendent, Central Excise, Nashik issued
show cause notices and raised a demand of duty in respect of
Dharmada, claiming it was part of the price for the sale of
manufactured goods and included it for computing assessable
value.
Page 1 of 18
3. Initially, the Adjudicating Authority held that the Dharmada
component was not part of the trading receipts and could not be
included in the assessable value and dropped the demand for
excise duty and the penalty.
4. However, another show cause notice dated 3.8.2001 was
issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad under
Section 4 of the Act calling upon the appellant to show cause as to
why penalty under Section 173Q and interest under Section 11AA
should not be levied. After hearing the appellant, the Deputy
Commissioner held vide order dated 26.02.2002 that Dharmada
cannot be considered as trading receipts and was not part of the
assessable value. Therefore, no duty was payable on the
component of Dharmada.
5. Thereafter, in an appeal filed by Revenue, the Commissioner
(Appeals), however, held that the Dharmada was liable to be
included as a part of the assessable value and therefore the goods
were liable to be assessed on the basis of their price plus
Dharmada.
The Central Excise and Service Tax Appellant Tribunal (for
short “CESTAT”), in an appeal filed by the appellant, by judgment
dated 6.1.2005 partly allowed the appeal and held that the duty
amount needs to be recalculated. The CESTAT however rejected
the appellant’s contention that Dharmada was not part of the
transaction value. The CESTAT purported to follow the judgment of
Page 2 of 18
this Court in Collector vs. Panchmukhi Engineering Works1
, whereby
this Court held that Dharmada charged by the assessee is liable to
be included in the assessable value.
6. In the appeal filed by the appellant before a Division Bench of
this Court, it was contended that the decision in Panchmukhi
(supra) followed an earlier decision of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs.
Collector of Central Excise, Jamshedpur2
 which did not apply to the
present case at all. The Tata Iron & Steel case was a case where
steel plants added a surcharge to the ex-works price at the
instance of a committee under the Iron and Steel (Control) Order,
1956. This surcharge was added to generate money for a steel
development fund to implement schemes entrusted to the
committee by the Central Government. The surcharge went to the
committee for use in its various schemes and for the expenditure
incurred towards discharge of the committee’s functions. Thus, the
question before this Court was if surcharge being a charge that was
compulsorily payable by the customers could be considered as a
part of the price i.e. the assessable value.
This Court held that the surcharge was a part of the price fixed
by the committee under the statutory provisions. The appellant’s
contention was that the decision in Panchmukhi (supra) which
merely followed the decision in Tata Iron & Steel (supra) was no
authority for the proposition that Dharmada being a donation for
1 2003 (158) ELT 550 (SC)
2 2002 (146) ELT 3 (SC)
Page 3 of 18
charitable purposes was liable to be included in the assessable
value.
7. In addition, the appellant contended that this Court has clearly
held in the case of The Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)
Delhi, New Delhi vs. Bijli Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. Hathras, District
Aligarh3
 that amounts received for Dharmada and earmarked for
charitable purposes are amounts received by the assessee under
an obligation to spend the same for charitable purposes.
Therefore, these receipts cannot be regarded as income of the
assessee.
8. On noticing the above contentions, a Division Bench of this
Court vide order dated 29.7.2015 has referred the following
question to this larger Bench: -
Whether the Dharmada collected by the appellant which is
clearly an optional payment made by the buyer can be regarded as
part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.
9. An important fact that needs to be noted at the outset is that
there is no dispute before us that though paid along with the sale
price, the payment for Dharmada was made voluntarily by the
purchasers and that upon receipt was made over to charity. There
is no challenge that it is in fact not voluntary. There are certificates
on record by the chartered accountant that shows the Dharmada
collection was credited to a separate account and donated to a
3 (1979) 1 SCC 496
Page 4 of 18
trust during the period of the show cause notices.
10. The only question that arises for decision is whether the
amount included as Dharmada by a manufacturer and credited for
charitable purposes is liable to be included in the assessable value
of manufactured goods; the seller having merely acted as conduit
between the purchaser and charity.
11. It is necessary to enquire into the nature of the transaction i.e.
what was sold, the price that was paid and the transaction value
for the purpose of arriving at the assessable value.
WHAT WAS SOLD
12. The appellant manufactured and sold chewing tobacco to their
customers. A price was paid by the customers as ‘consideration’
for these goods i.e. transfer of property of the goods to the
customers. This is clear from the invoices.
THE ‘TRANSACTION VALUE’ FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARIVING AT
ASSESSABLE VALUE
Sale and purchase have been defined vide Section 2 (h) to
mean any transfer of the possession of goods for payment or other
valuable consideration. A contract of sale under The Sale of Goods
Act, 1930 means a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees
to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price vide
Section 44
. The transaction in this case was the sale of chewing
4 Section 4 of The Sale of Goods Act, 1930
4. Sale and agreement to sell.— (1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby
the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price. There may
be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another.
Page 5 of 18
tobacco.
13. Under the Act, excise duty is chargeable with reference to
their value on removal of the goods. In case of sale of goods where
price is the sole consideration for the sale, duty is charged on the
transaction value vide Section 45
. Additional consideration if any is
also included in the duty payable on such goods vide explanation.
“Transaction value” is defined vide Section 4(3)(d) of the Act to
mean “the price actually paid or payable for the goods, when sold,
and includes in addition to the amount charged as price, any
amount that the buyer is liable to pay to, or on behalf of the
(2) A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
(3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller
to the buyer, the contract is called a sale, but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to
take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is
called an agreement to sell.
(4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the conditions are
fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred.
5 Section 4 of The Central Excise Act, 1944
4. Valuation of excisable goods for purposes of charging of duty of excise. -
(1) Where under this Act, the duty of excise is chargeable on any excisable goods with
reference to their value, then, on each removal of the goods, such value shall -
(a) in a case where the goods are sold by the assessee, for delivery at the time and place
of the removal, the assessee and the buyer of the goods are not related and the price is the sole
consideration for the sale, be the transaction value;
(b) in any other case, including the case where the goods are not sold, be the value
determined in such manner as may be prescribed.
Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the price-cum-duty of
the excisable goods sold by the assessee shall be the price actually paid to him for the goods sold
and the money value of the additional consideration, if any, flowing directly or indirectly from the
buyer to the assessee in connection with the sale of such goods, and such price-cum-duty,
excluding sales tax and other taxes, if any, actually paid, shall be deemed to include the duty
payable on such goods.
 (2) ……….
 (3) (a)……….
 (b)……….
 (c) ……….
 (d) “transaction value” means the price actually paid or payable for the goods, when
sold, and includes in addition to the amount charged as price, any amount that the buyer is liable
to pay to, or on behalf of, the assessee, by reason of, or in connection with the sale, whether
payable at the time of the sale or at any other time, including, but not limited to, any amount
charged for, or to make provision for, advertising or publicity, marketing and selling organization
expenses, storage, outward handling, servicing, warranty, commission or any other matter; but
does not include the amount of duty of excise, sales tax and other taxes, if any, actually paid or
actually payable on such goods.]
Page 6 of 18
assessee by reason of or in connection with the sale……., but does
not include the amount of duty of excise, sales tax and other taxes,
if any, actually paid or actually payable on such goods”.
14. In case of a sale of goods, excise duty is chargeable where
price is the sole consideration of a sale on `Transaction value’.
`Transaction value’ means the price actually paid or payable for
the goods and any additional amount the buyer is liable to pay to
the assessee or anyone on his behalf in connection with the sale
vide Section 4(3)(d) supra. Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation
(Determination of Price and Excisable Goods), Rules 20006
 provides
that in case of a sale, the value of such goods shall be deemed to
be the transaction value and the amount of money value of any
considerations following directly or indirectly from the buyer to the
assessee. Thus, duty is chargeable on the “price actually paid for
the goods”, in other words, the price paid as consideration for
transfer of property in the goods. The test for determining whether
in a transaction of sale any amount has been paid as price so that
it can be treated as transaction value is only whether, the money
was paid for the goods as consideration or the money value on any
additional consideration paid in connection with the sale of goods.
No amount not paid as consideration for the goods can go to make
transaction value.
6 Rule 6 - Where the excisable goods are sold in the circumstances specified in clause (a) of sub
section (1) of section 4 of the Act except the circumstance where the price is not the sole
consideration for sale, the value of such goods shall be deemed to be the aggregate of such
transaction value and the amount of money value of any additional consideration flowing directly
or indirectly from the buyer to the assessee.
Page 7 of 18
`Consideration’ means, vide Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, 3rd
Edition: `the act, forbearance or promise by which one party to the
contract keep the promise of another’. The term valuable
consideration refers to an act, forbearance or promise having an
economic value. In this case, it is clear that only the money paid
for the promise of transferring goods was the valuable
consideration contemplated by the Excise Act and the Rules. The
transaction value was the sale of goods and the consideration was
the price or value paid for the goods. The transaction value must
be construed accordingly.
This fairly clears up the character of any other amount paid at
the time of the transaction of sale of goods. Thus, if an amount is
paid at the time of the sale transaction for a purpose other than
the price of the goods, it cannot form part of the transaction value;
also for the reason that such payment is not for the transaction of
sale i.e. for the transfer of possession of goods. Any payment
made along side such a transaction cannot be treated as
consideration for the goods.

DHARMADA
15. This takes us to the nature of the “Dharmada” when given
along with the sale price of goods. Dharmada is well known in
India to be a donation or an offering made for the purpose of
charity as distinct from a commercial transaction. This Court
Page 8 of 18
considered the nature and character of Dharmada in Bijli Cotton
Mills (supra). That case arose under the Income Tax Act. The
assessee used to realise certain amounts on account of Dharmada
from his customers on sales of yarn and bales of cotton. The rate
was one anna per bundle of ten pounds of yarn and two annas per
bale of cotton. The receipts of Dharmada were not credited to the
trading account but the assessee maintained a separate account
known as the Dharmada account. The authorities under the Act
held that the amounts held by the assessee could not be regarded
as having been held under trust for charitable purposes.
16. The High Court, however, held that the impugned amounts
paid as Dharmada were never the income of the assessee and
assessee was merely acting as a conduit for passing on the
amounts to the objects of charity. These amounts were never
treated as trading receipts or as surcharge on the sale price which
was evident from the fact that such realisations were never
credited to the trading account nor shown in the profit and loss
statement for any year.
This Court considered the question in great detail and after
referring to Professor Wilson’s Glossary and Molesworth’s
Dictionary observed that Dharmada means “an alms or a gift in
charity”. This Court observed that though there might be some
vagueness as a matter of law, in the word Dharma, there was none
in relation to Dharmada or Dharmadaya and such a payment would
Page 9 of 18
not be invalid for vagueness or uncertainty. This Court accepted
the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Thakur Das Shyam
Sunder vs. Additional CIT7
 and observed that “it cannot be disputed
that among the trading or commercial community in various parts
of the country, a gift or payment for Dharmada is by custom
invariably regarded as a gift for charitable purposes”. This Court
observed that the answer to the question depended on the nature
of the obligation created by the customer and approved the finding
of the Allahabad High Court to the effect that merely because
under the law relating to trust legal ownership over the trust fund
and the power to control and dispose of always vest in the
trustees, the discretion vested in the trustee to spend the amount
over charities will not affect character of the deposit.
17. This Court also relied on CIT, West Bengal, Calcutta vs.
Tollygunge Club Ltd., Calcutta8
. In that case, the Court considered
the nature of a surcharge of eight annas over and above the
admission fees into the enclosure of the club at the time of the
races. The proceeds of this surcharge were to go to the Red Cross
Fund and other local charities. This Court approved the decision of
the Calcutta High Court and held that the “surcharge was not part
of the price for admission but made for the specific purpose of
being applied to local charities”. It observed “the admission to the
enclosure is the occasion and not the consideration for the
7 93 ITR 27
8 (1977) 2 SCC 790 : (1977) 107 ITR 776
Page 10 of 18
surcharge taken from the race-goer. It rejected the contention that
the payment was involuntary, observing “that does not render the
payment of the surcharge involuntary, because it is out of his own
volition that he seeks admittance to the enclosure”.
Applying the above decisions to the case before it, this Court
held in Bijli Cotton Mills (supra) that Dharmada amounts cannot be
said to have been paid involuntarily by the customers and in any
case the compulsory nature of the payments, if there be any,
cannot impress the receipts with the character of being trading
receipts.
18. We find from the facts of the case before us that the receipts
on account of Dharmada were voluntary, earmarked for charity and
in fact credited as such. Though the payment as Dharmada has
been found to be voluntary, it would make no difference to the true
character and nature of the receipts even if there were found to be
paid compulsorily because the purchaser, purchased the goods out
of their own volition. The purchase of the goods is the occasion
and not consideration for the Dharmada paid by the customer as
held in Bijli Cotton Mills (supra) vide para 15: -
“15. …… It is true that without payment of
“Dharmada” amount the customer may not be able
to purchase the goods from the assessee but that
would not make the payment of “Dharmada” amount
involuntary inasmuch as it is out of his own volition
that he purchases yarn and cotton from the assessee.
The “Dharmada” amount is, therefore, clearly not a
part of the price, but a payment for the specific
purpose of being spent on charitable purposes.
Page 11 of 18
……...”
19. In this case, the CESTAT decided against the assessee relaying
on Panchmukhi (supra). The case of Panchmukhi (supra) was
apparently decided not after a discussion on facts and law but
because the counsel for the revenue submitted that the matter is
covered by the decision in Tata Iron & Steel (supra) and the counsel
for the assessee “was not in a position to dispute this legal
position”. The judgment in Panchmukhi (supra) has little
precedential value. The point whether Dharmada involved in
Panchmukhi (supra) and the surcharge held as price in Tata Iron &
Steel (supra) were identical and liable to be included in the
transaction value passed sub-silentio. Salmond on Jurisprudence
Twelfth Edition p.15h states that a decision held is not binding
since it was decided “without argument, without reference to the
crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of authority”,
therefore, would not be followed. The author also states that
precedents sub-silentio and without arguments are of no moment.
This is enough reason for not treating the decision in Panchmukhi
(supra) as a binding precedent.
It is, therefore, necessary to take a look at Tata Iron & Steel
(supra). That was a case where the customer paid a surcharge on
the price of steel. This surcharge was added to generate money
for a steel development fund to implement schemes entrusted to
the committee by the Central Government. The surcharge went to
Page 12 of 18
the committee for use in its various schemes and for the
expenditure incurred towards discharge of the committee’s
function.
20. Nonetheless, the surcharge was part of the consideration paid
by the customer for the price of steel. The notifications under
which the surcharge was added clearly stated as follows: -
(i) “The Committee may add an element to the exworks prices determined ……..”
and
(ii) “The Committee may require members steel plants
to add the elements listed below to their ex-works………”
The purpose of this addition was to constitute a steel development
fund for modernisation, research & development, diversification
etc. for improving the quantum of technology and efficiency of
production of iron and steel and their quality.
21. The other objects of the fund, were to implement specific
schemes entrusted to the Committee by the Central Government
and towards the Engineering Goods Export Assistance Fund. This
Court considered the question whether the addition would fall
under the meaning of the term “other taxes” within the meaning of
Section 4 (ii) which excluded the amount of other taxes payable on
such goods from value. It was contended on behalf of the assessee
that they were compelled by law to collect this charge over and
above the price without the right to appropriate it for themselves
Page 13 of 18
and with a duty of making it over to a third party and therefore the
charges could not be regarded as part of the consideration of the
sale price of goods.
This Court held that the charges were clearly added as an
element of price and observed, “thus what was being added was to
the price”. Another aspect to be kept in mind is that the ultimate
beneficiaries of these amounts are the steel plants themselves.
22. We find that the decision in Tata Iron & Steel (supra) is
completely inapposite to the circumstances of the case before us.
The reliance placed on Tata Iron & Steel (supra) and Panchmukhi
(supra) which was a case of Dharmada, is misplaced. Panchmukhi
(supra) cannot be said to be good law.
23. In the circumstances we hold that when an amount is paid as
Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not
made in consideration of the transfer of goods. Such payment is
meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller. If
such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form
part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the
transaction value or assessable value of the goods.
24. Thus, the answer to the question referred by the Division
Bench is as follows: -
“The Dharmada collected by the appellant which is clearly an
optional payment made by the buyer cannot be regarded as part of
Page 14 of 18
the transaction value for the sale of goods.”
25. The judgment of the CESTAT is accordingly set aside.
The appeal is allowed.
….………………………………..J.
 [S.A. BOBDE]
….………………………………..J.
 [DEEPAK GUPTA]
….………………………………..J.
 [VINEET SARAN]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 9, 2019
Page 15 of 18
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No.531 OF 2008
Commissioner of Central Excise and
Customs, Bangalore ... Appellant(s)
Versus
M/s JSW Steel Ltd.
(formerly known as Jindal Vijayanagar Steel Ltd.) … Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
S.A. BOBDE, J.
The Revenue-Appellant has come in appeal against the
order of the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellant Tribunal (for
short “CESTAT”) dated 04.04.2007. The Respondent manufactured
goods falling under Chapter 72 of The Central Excise Tariff Act,
1985. The Respondent manufactured Pig Iron and HR Coil Sheets.
While selling the goods they raised invoices on the price of goods
plus ‘Dharmada’ a charitable donation from customers. According
to the Respondent, the Dharmada was meant for charity and was
accordingly credited to charity.
2. However, show cause notice dated 19.03.2004 was issued by
the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and
Customs, Bellary under Section 4 of the Act calling upon the
Page 16 of 18
Respondent to show cause as to why penalty under Rule 25 of
Central Excise Rules, 2002 and interest under Section 11AB of the
Central Excise Act, 1944 should not be levied. After hearing the
Respondent, the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated
10.09.2004 held that the Dharmada is to be added to the
assessable value for the payment of central excise duty.
3. Thereafter, in an appeal filed by the Respondent, the
Commissioner (Appeals), confirmed the decision of the Deputy
Commissioner and rejected the appeal and held that Dharmada
should be added to the assessable value. Therefore, the goods
were liable to be assessed on the basis of their price plus
Dharmada.
The CESTAT in an appeal filed by the Respondent, by judgement
dated 04.04.2007, allowed the appeal and set aside the order
passed by Commissioner (Appeals) dated 29.03.2005. The CESTAT
purported to follow its judgment in the case of Mohan and Co.,
Madras vs. CCE Madras, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in appeal, whereby this Court held that Dharmada was not liable to
be added in the assessable value.
4. Thereafter, in Civil Appeal No.531 of 2008 before this Court, it
was contended by the Appellant before a Division Bench of this
Court, that the decision in Collector vs. Panchmukhi Engineering
Works9
 was to be followed. Thus, contending that Dharmada should
9 2003 (158) ELT 550 (SC)
Page 17 of 18
be a part of the assessable value.
5. The present case has been tagged with the case of M/s D.J.
Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik which has been
referred to this Bench vide order dated 29.07.2015. We have held
that the amount of Dharmada cannot be included in the
transaction value for the purposes of assessments.
6. In view of the judgment in the case of Civil Appeal No. 5282 of
2005, M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik,
we hereby dismiss the present appeal.
….………………………………..J.
 [S.A. BOBDE]
….………………………………..J.
 [DEEPAK GUPTA]
….………………………………..J.
 [VINEET SARAN]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 9, 2019
Page 18 of 18




PEER SINGH …APPELLANT(S) Versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)

whether the three appellants were present at the spot or not?

“Dehati   Nalishi” can  be termed to  be the  first information given to the police.

The first information which is in the nature of “Dehati Nalishi” was recorded at the
instance of Motisingh (PW­1), the father of the deceased.  

The “Dehati Nalishi” was recorded on the spot itself soon after the occurrence.  
The names of the three appellants are absent even in the statement of Motisingh as recorded in court.  Mansingh and the three appellants belong to the same area and Mansingh is known to all the three accused, and when he could name four of the assailants, we see no reason as to why he could not name the other assailants if he had actually identified them at the place of occurrence.   There is no plausible explanation given from the side of prosecution as to why the names of these three accused­appellants were missing both in the “Dehati Nalishi” as well as in the statement of Mansingh recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Exh.D­1).  
Further, as pointed above, Motisingh again in court does not say that Mansingh (PW­5) had identified the three accused ­appellants as the assailants.   
Therefore,  a grave doubt  is raised with  regard to  the presence of these three accused at the place of incidence.  The benefit of doubt obviously has to go to the accused­appellants.


1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 743 OF 2012
PEER SINGH                         …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH        …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 746 OF 2012
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 744 OF 2012
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta, J.
1.      All the three appeals are being disposed of by a common
judgment since they arise out of one incident and one judgment
delivered by the trial court. 
2
2.         The facts necessary for deciding this case are that 15
persons were tried for the murder of Babusingh on the night
intervening 13/14th September 1992 near Village Kalma, Dewas
District, Madhya Pradesh.  The trial court acquitted 8 persons
and   convicted   7   persons.     Gajrajsingh,   Harisingh,
Bhagwansingh @ Bhaggu, Peer Singh, Gulabsingh, Shobharam
and Thakursingh were convicted by the trial court for having
committed the offence punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 149 and 148 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and all the 7
accused were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.
3.       Harisingh died when the appeal was pending before the
High Court, and Shobharam died during the pendency of the
appeal in this Court, therefore, the appeal stands abated against
them.     We   are   informed   at   the   Bar   that   Gulabsingh   and
Thakursingh   did   not   file   any   appeal   and   they   have   already
undergone the sentence imposed upon them.  Thus, we are left
only with the appeals of Gajrajsingh, Bhagwansingh and Peer
Singh.
3
4.       These appeals can be disposed of on a short point and
therefore it is not necessary to deal with the entire evidence.
The case of the prosecution is that at about 11.30 p.m. on the
night   intervening   13/14th  September,   1992,   Babusingh   was
returning to his Village Kalma from Dewas on a motorcycle.  He
was accompanied by Gattu (PW­8) and Vasu (not examined) who
were pillion riders.  When they were nearing Kalma Village they
were attacked by a large number of persons who were armed
with  dharia,  swords   etc..     After   the   attack   took   place,   the
motorcycle fell down and the assailants, which according to the
prosecution included all the 15 accused, attacked Babusingh
and some of them gave blows to Babusingh with sharp edged
weapons and as a result of the injuries Babusingh died.  It is not
disputed before us that Babusingh was, in fact, murdered.  The
only issue is whether the three appellants were present at the
spot or not?
5.     The prosecution case is that the pillion rider Gattu (PW­8)
went to the Village, found the house of father of Babusingh i.e.
Motisingh   (PW­1)   and   informed   him   that   his   son   had   been
4
attacked by a large number of persons.   Thereafter, Motisingh
(PW­1),   along   with   his   son   Antar   Singh   (PW­6),   his   nephew
Uttamsingh,   Gattu   (PW­8)   and   Vasu   proceeded   towards   the
place of occurrence.   On the way near the Panchayat Bhawan
they met Mansingh (PW­5) who also informed them that he had
seen the occurrence and he identified four of the assailants viz.
Gulabsingh,   Thakursingh,   Harisingh   and   Shobharam.
Thereafter, all these persons reached the spot.  It is not disputed
that   the   police   came   to   the   spot   and   “Dehati   Nalishi”   was
recorded at the spot and at the instance of Motisingh, the father
(PW­1).   This “Dehati   Nalishi” can  be termed to  be the  first
information given to the police.
6.         Thereafter, the police lodged a formal First Information
Report (FIR), investigated the matter and recorded evidence of
the   witnesses.     The   body   of   the   deceased   was   sent   for
postmortem and after completion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed against 15 persons who were tried and some
were convicted as detailed hereinabove.
5
7. The main argument raised before us is that there is no
evidence   against   the   three   appellants   namely   Gajrajsingh,
Bhagwansingh @ Bhaggu, and Peer Singh.  The first information
which is in the nature of “Dehati Nalishi” was recorded at the
instance of Motisingh (PW­1), the father of the deceased.  This
“Dehati Nalishi”  was recorded on 14th  September 1992 and he
states that at night two boys came to his house, woke him up
and then informed him that they along with his son Babusingh
were coming to Kalma on a motorcycle which was driven by
Babusingh.   Some persons who were armed with  dharia  and
sword attacked Babusingh just before they entered the Village.
All the three persons who were riding the motorcycle fell down.
All the assailants surrounded Babusingh and started raining
blows of  dharia and swords on him.  Babusingh shouted “Oh!
Shobha,   Oh   Thakur,   do   not   beat”.     The   two   pillion   riders
managed   to   escape   and   informed   Motisingh.     Thereafter,   he
along   with   Antar   Singh   and   two   informants   went   on   the
motorcycle towards the place of occurrence and on the way they
met Mansingh who stopped them and he (Mansingh) informed
6
Motisingh that he had seen Sobhagsingh (A­7), Thakursingh (A15), Harisingh (A­5), Gulabsingh (A­12), all residents of Tonk
and   other   persons   assaulting   Babusingh   with  dharia  and
swords.   Thereafter, they went to the place of occurrence and
saw that Babusingh was lying dead.     It was also stated by
Motisingh that he and his son Babusingh had a longstanding
enmity   with   Sobhagsingh   and,   therefore,   his   son   had   been
murdered.  It would be pertinent to mention that in this “Dehati
Nalishi” none of the three appellants have been named. 
8. According to us the sequence of events is such that Gattu
(PW­8) would be the most crucial witness because he was seated
on the motorcycle with the deceased.  However, he states that he
does not belong to the Village and could not identify any of the
persons.  In fact, when the statement was recorded in court he
did   not   even   say   that   Babusingh   shouted   “Oh!   Shobha,   Oh
Thakur, do not beat”.  As such his evidence is of no use to the
prosecution.
7
9.     The next important witness is PW­5.  To be fair to Mr. U.R.
Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, we
must record that he had raised a plea that PW­5 was not even
present and is a procured witness.  We are not going into that
question, since according to us even if the presence of Mansingh
(PW­5) is accepted, that evidence cannot be used to convict the
three appellants before us.  In his statement recorded in court
he   mentions   the   names   of   the   accused   as   Gajrajsingh,
Harisingh, Bhagwansingh @ Bhaggu, Peer Singh, Gulabsingh,
Shobharam and Thakursingh.   He also states that he knows
these persons since they are distantly related and belong to the
same   area.     He   admits   that   the   police   had   recorded   his
statement   under  Section  161  of   Code   of  Criminal   Procedure
(Cr.P.C.).     This   statement   (Ex.D1)   has   been   proved   in   the
evidence of the investigating officer (PW­20).   PW­5 had been
confronted with the fact that the names of Peer Singh, Bhaggu
and Gajrajsingh are not mentioned in his statement recorded by
the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C..   He states, he does not
know why their names are not mentioned.   We are unable to
accept this explanation.
8
10. The “Dehati Nalishi” was recorded on the spot itself soon
after the occurrence.  As per the evidence on record Mansingh
(PW­5) was present at the spot till 4.00 A.M.  During this time,
the police was there.   It would have been much better if the
“Dehati Nalishi” had been recorded at the instance of PW­5 who
was not only an eye­witness but could even identify some of the
accused.  Even if we overlook this aspect, the fact remains that
when the statement of PW­5 was recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C on the morning of 14th September, he did not name the
three appellants.  When the statement was recorded in court he
stated that when Babusingh was being attacked he (Babusingh)
told the pillion riders to go to his house and inform that persons
of Sobhagsingh are beating him.   This fact is totally different
from what is recorded in the “Dehati Nalishi” wherein it is stated
that   Babusingh   took   the   names   of   Sobhagsingh   and
Thakursingh.  As pointed out earlier Gattu (PW­8) does not say
anything in his statement.
9
11. When  we compare  the statements  of PW­1  and PW­5
there is another discrepancy viz. in court, the father Motisingh
reiterates   that   Mansingh   (PW­5)   told   him   that   Sobhagsingh,
Thakursingh,   Harisingh   and   Gulabsingh   were   beating
Babusingh.  The names of the three appellants are absent even
in the statement of Motisingh as recorded in court.  Mansingh
and the three appellants belong to the same area and Mansingh
is known to all the three accused, and when he could name four
of the assailants, we see no reason as to why he could not name
the other assailants if he had actually identified them at the
place of occurrence.   There is no plausible explanation given
from the side of prosecution as to why the names of these three
accused­appellants were missing both in the “Dehati Nalishi” as
well as in the statement of Mansingh recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. (Exh.D­1).   Further, as pointed above, Motisingh
again in court does not say that Mansingh (PW­5) had identified
the three accused­appellants as the assailants. 
12. Therefore,  a grave doubt  is raised with  regard to  the
presence of these three accused at the place of incidence.  The
10
benefit of doubt obviously has to go to the accused­appellants.
In view of the above discussion, we allow the appeals and set
aside the judgment of the trial court dated 19th November, 2001
in Sessions Case No.57 of 1993 and of the High Court dated 27th
June, 2011 in Criminal Appeal No.1354 of 2001 so far as the
conviction   of   the   appellants;   Peer   Singh,   Bhagwansingh   and
Gajrajsingh is concerned.  They are acquitted and directed to be
set free forthwith if not required in any other case.  All pending
applications are accordingly disposed of.
.………………………..J.
(S.A. Bobde)
…………………………J.
(Sanjay Kishan Kaul)
…………………………J.
(Deepak Gupta)
New Delhi
April 09, 2019