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Wednesday, February 20, 2019

contempt petitions are before us, having been filed by Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. [“Ericsson”] against Reliance Communications Ltd. [“RCom”], Reliance Telecom Ltd. [“RTL”], and Reliance Infratel Ltd. [“RITL”] [hereinafter, collectively referred to as the “Reliance Companies” or “Companies”].=we are of the view that the contempt of this Court needs to be purged by payment of the sum of INR 550 crore together with interest till date. As stated by the letter dated 21.01.2019, subject to any calculation error, an amount of INR 453 crore must be paid to Ericsson in addition to the deposit of INR 118 crore made in the Registry of this Court. The Registry of this Court is directed to pay over the sum of INR 118 crore to Ericsson within a period of one week from today. The RCom group is directed to purge the contempt of this Court by payment to Ericsson of the sum of INR 41 453 crore within a period of four weeks from today. In default of such payment, the Chairmen who have given undertakings to this Court will suffer three months’ imprisonment. In addition to the aforesaid sum being paid, a fine amounting to INR 1 crore for each Company must also be paid to the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today. This sum will be paid over to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. In default of payment of such fine, the Chairmen of these Companies will suffer one month’s imprisonment


Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL/INHERENT JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 845 OF 2018
RELIANCE COMMUNICATION LIMITED & ORS. …..PETITIONERS
VERSUS
STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS. …..RESPONDENTS
WITH
CONTEMPT PETN. (C) NO. 1838 OF 2018 IN W.P. (C) NO. 845 OF
2018
CONTEMPT PETN. (C) NO. 55 OF 2019 IN W.P. (C) NO. 845 OF
2018
AND
CONTEMPT PETN. (C) NO. 185 OF 2019 IN W.P. (C) NO. 845 OF
2018
2
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
1. Three contempt petitions are before us, having been filed by
Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. [“Ericsson”] against Reliance Communications
Ltd. [“RCom”], Reliance Telecom Ltd. [“RTL”], and Reliance Infratel
Ltd. [“RITL”] [hereinafter, collectively referred to as the “Reliance
Companies” or “Companies”].
2. The brief facts necessary to appreciate these matters are as
follows:
On 25.01.2013, Ericsson and RCom entered into a Managed
Service Agreement whereby Ericsson agreed to provide RCom
managed services, i.e., operation, maintenance, and management of
RCom’s network. Ericsson raised invoices from time to time in
consideration of services provided, and on receiving no payment,
ultimately issued three notices, each dated 07.05.2017, under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“Insolvency Code”] to the
three Reliance Companies, calling upon them to pay an amount of INR
9.78 crore. These notices were replied to on 19.05.2017, whereby the
three Reliance Companies stated that the performance of Ericsson had
3
been inconsistent. After this date, discussions took place between the
parties, and an understanding was reached for making payment of the
outstanding invoices. However, even this understanding fell through,
and on 07.09.2017, Ericsson issued a letter to the three Reliance
Companies, terminating the agreement between them, and calling
upon them to pay the outstanding amount in full. At this stage, on
08.09.2017, Ericsson filed three applications under Section 9 of the
Code as operational creditors. On 15.05.2018, the National Company
Law Tribunal [“NCLT”] admitted the aforesaid petitions and appointed
three Interim Resolution Professionals on 18.05.2018 to carry out the
corporate insolvency resolution process. At this stage, appeals were
filed against the NCLT order. The National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal [“NCLAT”], by order dated 30.05.2018, stayed the orders
dated 15.05.2018 and 18.05.2018 passed by the NCLT, and recorded
the statement of counsel appearing on behalf of the Reliance
Companies that the matter had been agreed to be settled for a sum of
INR 550 crore, which would be paid within 120 days’ time. The order
recorded that both the Reliance Companies as well as Ericsson were
to file respective affidavits of undertaking in terms of the statements
made before the NCLT. These undertakings were so filed in June,
4
2018. At this stage, the three Reliance Companies filed a writ petition
in this Court on 17.07.2018 in which they asked for quashing/closure of
the corporate insolvency resolution process in view of settlement of
disputes between them and Ericsson. In this writ petition, by an order
dated 03.08.2018, this Court heard learned counsel who appeared on
behalf of RCom and its group companies, and recorded that the
timeline of 120 days shall be strictly adhered to and payment of INR
550 crore is to be made on or before 30.09.2018. Undertakings to this
effect were to be filed before this Court by Chairmen of the Companies
concerned. The undertakings that were given by the Chairmen of these
Companies, pursuant to this order, were dated 09.08.2018 and are a
serious bone of contention between the parties in that these
undertakings stated that the sum of INR 550 crore will be paid “upon
sale of assets of the company”. This being the case, a contempt
petition, being Contempt Petition No. 1838 of 2018 [“first contempt
petition”], dated 01.10.2018, was moved by Ericsson, in which it was
expressly stated that the undertakings were not in terms of this Court’s
order and that the Companies aforestated have no intention of abiding
by their commitment to pay the necessary sum of money within the
time stated. Meanwhile, on 27.09.2018, the Reliance Companies
5
applied for extension of time for payment by 60 days, expressly stating
that since sale of other spectrum had not reached a stage of
completion, in order to enable the Companies to make payments, they
would require this extension. Both the application for extension and the
contempt petition came up for hearing before this Court on 23.10.2018,
and it was made clear, as a last opportunity, that the aforesaid amount
must be paid on or before 15.12.2018, and that interest at the rate of
12% per annum would also have to be paid for delayed payment
beyond 30.09.2018. It was also made clear that the petition for
contempt may be revived if payment is not so made by this date. A
second application to extend time was moved on 12.12.2018, citing the
same excuse of other spectrum not yet being saleable. This time,
extension of time was asked for making the payment within two weeks
from the date on which a No-Objection Certificate [“NOC”] is given by
the Department of Telecommunications [“DoT”] for sale of other
spectrum. On 13.12.2018, this Court made it clear that it was not
inclined to grant any such extension, as a result of which, the second
application for extension of time was dismissed as withdrawn. While
matters stood thus, a letter dated 21.01.2019 was written by the
advocates of the three Reliance Companies, who stated that on
6
09.01.2019, INR 118 crore had already been deposited with the
Registry of this Court, and that the total outstanding, as on date,
together with interest, would be roughly INR 570 crore. This letter
specifically states that the net figure of INR 453 crore would be paid by
31.01.2019, conditional upon withdrawal of the two contempt petitions
(a second contempt petition, being Contempt Petition No. 55 of 2019,
was also filed on 02.01.2019) and upon withdrawal of pending
arbitration proceedings. This was replied to by the advocates of
Ericsson, stating that an appropriate application may be moved in the
Supreme Court, as once notice of contempt is issued, the Court alone
can pass necessary orders to effectuate the settlement. However, on
01.02.2019, the RCom group wrote to various stock exchanges,
making it clear that they will now not resist the corporate insolvency
resolution process that had hitherto been stayed. This led to the filing
of a third contempt petition, namely, Contempt Petition No. 185 of
2019, in which, various prayers were asked for, including issuance of a
notice of contempt against the Chairman of the State Bank of India
[“SBI”], who headed the Joint Lenders’ Forum comprising of 46
financial creditors of the RCom group.
7
3. Shri Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of Ericsson, painstakingly took us through the NCLAT order
dated 30.05.2018 as well as our orders. According to the learned
Senior Advocate, the administration of justice has been sought to be
interfered with by the Reliance Companies in two ways. First and
foremost, the payment of INR 550 crore to his client was not
conditional upon sale of spectrum as is clear from all the orders
passed. In fact, this was the understanding of the NCLAT order dated
30.05.2018 by the Reliance Companies, as was clear from the
undertakings that were filed by their Directors pursuant to this order.
However, mischievously, the undertakings filed pursuant to this Court’s
order dated 03.08.2018 brought in this condition for the first time, and
was directly contrary to this Court’s order dated 03.08.2018. He argued
that this was the occasion for moving the first contempt petition on
01.10.2018 in which this was pointed out. He also argued that the reply
made to the contempt petition, together with the correspondence
between the parties, would show that no bona fide efforts were made
to pay this sum of INR 550 crore at any stage, and that the plea that
the Companies were unable to pay is clearly belied by their own
advocates’ letter dated 21.01.2019, in which it was stated that full
8
payment would be made within a period of 10 days. He, therefore,
argued that both on account of furnishing false undertakings to this
Court as well as wilfully breaching the said undertakings and this
Court’s orders, the administration of justice has been sought to be
interfered with. He cited judgments in order to buttress these
contentions.
4. On the other hand, Shri Mukul Rohatgi and Shri Kapil Sibal,
learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of RCom, and RITL and
RTL, respectively, have argued that at best, if the settled amount of
INR 550 crore, in the place of INR 1500 crore, was not paid to
Ericsson, the corporate insolvency resolution process, which was
stalled, would begin afresh, and Ericsson would then stand in line as
an operational creditor to claim the entire sum of INR 1500 crore. In
any case, it is also obvious from the NCLAT order dated 30.05.2018,
which was referred to by the orders of this Court, that the sum of INR
550 crore was to be paid from the sale of assets of the corporate
debtor, which is part and parcel of the order dated 30.05.2018. The
undertakings given by the Chairmen of the three Reliance Companies,
dated 09.08.2018, are therefore, in accordance with the NCLAT order
as well as the order of this Court dated 03.08.2018. They further
9
argued that, in any case, even if such undertakings were not in
accordance with these orders, no complaint was ever made by
Ericsson, which went along with the undertakings. They also argued
that, throughout, the three Reliance Companies did their best to pay
INR 550 crore, as is clear from the correspondence between the
parties and their conduct. Also, as recently as 07.01.2019, the moment
they got income tax refunds amounting to INR 118 crore, this sum was
deposited in the Registry of this Court, in compliance of this Court’s
orders. Therefore, according to them, there was no breach of
undertakings, nor has there been any wilful default. Despite their best
efforts, the DoT insisted on adhering to certain guidelines, as a result
of which, it did not give its NOC for sale of spectrum, and therefore, it
had now become impossible for the three Reliance Companies to pay
the aforesaid amount. The very fact that they have now succumbed to
the corporate insolvency resolution process going forward would show
their bona fides. In any case, they stated that they are still ready and
willing to pay whatever they can, by way of income tax refunds.
Another sum of INR 129 crore has now come by way of income tax
refunds, which can be further adjusted. Also, an extremely recent
refund order of INR 134 crore can also be used in part payment of the
10
sum of INR 550 crore. Thus, a total sum of INR 391 crore, out of INR
550 crore, can, in fact, be paid as of today. All this would show that
they are doing their best to make this payment, and therefore, cannot
be characterized as wilful defaulters. They also made a fervent prayer
that the special leave petition and the writ petition should be dismissed
as withdrawn, as the inevitable has now occurred, and the corporate
insolvency resolution process has to now go forward. They also cited
various judgments to buttress their submissions.
5. Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the Chairman, SBI, has argued that the Joint Lenders’ Forum,
being allowed to sell assets outside of the corporate insolvency
resolution process has nothing to do with the Ericsson transaction.
According to him, prayers (c) and (j) of the Contempt Petition No. 185
of 2019 are not reliefs that can be given in a contempt petition. Also, it
is wholly unnecessary to file an affidavit stating the total amount
received from sale of assets of the corporate debtors post the
settlement dated 30.05.2018. Equally, prayer (j), asking for a direction
for SBI to bring in amounts due and payable so as to purge itself of
contempt does not lie against the Joint Lenders’ Forum in view of the
11
fact that the Ericsson transaction is wholly independent of sale of
assets.
6. Since everything turns on the order of NCLAT dated 30.05.2018,
and the three orders of this Court, these orders are set out hereunder:
The order of the NCLAT, dated 30.05.2018, states:
“These appeals have been preferred by the
Appellants-Directors and Shareholders of ‘Reliance
Infratel Ltd.’; ‘Reliance Telecom Ltd.’ and ‘Reliance
Communications Ltd.’ against the common orders
dated 15th May, 2018 and 18th May, 2018, passed
by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company
Law Tribunal), Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, whereby
and whereunder, the application(s) under Section 9
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(hereinafter referred to as “I&B Code”) preferred by
the Respondent- ‘Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd.’-
(‘Operational Creditor’) have been admitted, order of
‘Moratorium’ has been passed and ‘Insolvency
Resolution Professional’ has been appointed.
Apart from the ground that an arbitration
proceeding is pending and the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has passed an order, some other grounds
have also been taken to assail the impugned orders.
2. The ‘Financial Creditors’- ‘Joint Lenders
Forum’, some other Banks and ‘Ericsson India Pvt.
Ltd.’- (‘Operational Creditor’) have appeared. It is
informed that interests of a number of Banks are
involved who are awaiting the decision of this
Appellate Tribunal as they intend to recover the
amount.
3. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Senior Counsel
for the ‘Joint Lenders Forum’- (‘Financial Creditors’)
12
submitted that they have reached an agreement with
the ‘Corporate Debtors’ for sale of assets of the
‘Corporate Debtors’, pursuant to which, the
‘Financial Creditors’ can recover a sum of Rs.
18,100 crores approximately. He further submits that
on re-structuring and sale of assets, the ‘Financial
Creditors’ can recover Rs. 37,000 Crores
approximately.
4. According to them, in view of the impugned
order, the Bank is not in a position to recover the
amount and there is recurring loss of more than
crores per day.
5. Mr. Rajeeve Mehra, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the ‘Standard Chartered
Bank’ has also taken similar plea and supported the
stand taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the
‘Joint Lenders Forum’.
6. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the Appellants submitted that
if the impugned order is stayed and/or set aside, the
parties may settle the matter.
7. The case was taken up yesterday (29th May,
2018) and on the request of the parties, the case
was adjourned to find out whether the Appellants
and the ‘Operational Creditors’ can settle the matter.
8. Mr. Salman Khursid, Mr. Arun Kathpalia and
Mr. Anil Kher, learned Senior Counsel appear on
behalf of the ‘Operational Creditors’ in the respective
cases. They submitted that the Respondent-
‘Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd.’- (‘Operational Creditor’) has
agreed to settle the matter if affront payment of Rs.
600 Crores (Rupees Six hundred Crores Only) is
made by the Appellants/’Corporate Debtors’.
9. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for
the Appellants informed that the Appellants have
agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 550 Crores (Rupees five
hundred fifty Crores only) (jointly) in favor of
13
‘Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd.’- (‘Operational Creditor’) and
sought for 120 days’ time to pay the total amount.
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of ‘Ericsson India Private Limited’-
(‘Operational Creditor’), on instructions from the
Respondent, informed that the 1st Respondent has
agreed to receive a sum of Rs. 550 Crores (Rupees
Five hundred fifty Crores only), if the total amount is
paid within 120 days as proposed by the learned
Senior Counsel for the Appellants.
11. Taking into consideration the stand taken by
the parties and the fact that if the ‘Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process’ is allowed to
continue, all the ‘Financial Creditors’ as also the
‘Operational Creditors’ may suffer more loss and the
Appellants have made out a prima facie case, as
agreed and suggested by learned Senior Counsel
for the Appellants and learned Senior Counsel for
the ‘Joint Lenders Forum’ and the learned Senior
Counsel for the ‘Operational Creditor’- ‘Ericsson
India Pvt. Ltd.’, we pass the following orders:
i. Until further orders, the impugned orders
dated 15th May, 2018 and 18th May, 2018,
passed by the Adjudicating Authority,
Mumbai Bench in C.P. (IB) 1385, 1386 &
1387 (MB)/2017, shall remain stayed. The
‘Resolution Professional’ will allow the
managements of the ‘Corporate Debtors’ to
function. He may attend the office of the
‘Corporate Debtors’ till further order is
passed by this Appellate Tribunal. Thereby,
the ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process’ initiated against the ‘Corporate
Debtors’ namely— ‘Reliance Infratel Ltd.’;
‘Reliance Telecom Ltd.’ and ‘Reliance
Communications Ltd.’ shall remain stayed,
until further orders.
14
ii. The ‘Financial Creditors’/’Joint Lenders
Forum’ with whom the assets of the
‘Corporate Debtors’ have been mortgaged
as also the ‘Corporate Debtors’ are given
liberty to sell the assets of the ‘Corporate
Debtors’ and to deposit the total amount in
the account of the lead Bank of Joint
Lenders Forum which shall be subject to
the decision of these appeals. If the
appeals are rejected, in such case, the
‘Financial Creditors’/’Joint Lenders Forum’
and other Banks with whom the amount is
deposited, will have to return the total
amount in the respective accounts of the
‘Corporate Debtors’.
iii. The Chairman, Managing Directors,
Directors and other members of the
‘Corporate Debtors’ namely— ‘Reliance
Infratel Ltd.’; ‘Reliance Telecom Ltd.’ and
‘Reliance Communications Ltd.’ are
directed to pay a sum of Rs. 550 Crores
(Rupees Five Hundred Fifty Crores Only)
(jointly) in favour of ‘Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd.’
within 120 days i.e. by 30th September,
2018. In case of non-payment of the
amount and part of the same, the
concerned appeal(s) may be dismissed and
this Appellate Tribunal may direct to
complete the ‘Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process’ and may pass
appropriate order. The payment of Rs. 550
Crores (Rupees Five Hundred Fifty Crores
Only) in favour of the ‘Operational Creditor’
shall be subject to the decision of these
appeals. If the appeals are dismissed, the
‘Operational Creditor’ will pay back the
amount to the ‘Corporate Debtors’.
12. The Appellants and the ‘Operational
Creditors’ are directed to file their respective
15
affidavits of undertaking in terms of their statement
as made and recorded above within 10 days.
Let the appeals be listed ‘for admission’ on 3rd
October, 2018.
13. In the meantime, it will be open to the
parties to file Interlocutory Application if orders and
directions given above are not complied.
Interlocutory Application Nos. 701-702, 709-710 and
712-713 of 2018 stand disposed of with aforesaid
observations and directions.
xxx xxx xxx”
The order of the Supreme Court, dated 03.08.2018, states:
“Applications seeking exemption from filing
certified copy of the impugned orders are allowed.
Permission to file Appeals is granted.
Applications for impleadment are allowed.
Reading the interim Order dated 30.05.2018 of
the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, it is
clear that Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd., who is an
Operational Creditor, is willing to settle its debt of
over Rs. 1500 Crores for a sum of Rs. 550 Crores
(Rupees Five Hundred Fifty Crores only) which is to
be paid within 120 days from the date of that order
i.e. by 30th September, 2018.
Having heard Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned
Senior Counsel for Neptune Steel Strips Ltd. and
Mahima Mercantile Credits Ltd., Mr. Kapil Sibal,
learned Senior Counsel for Reliance
Communications Limited & Ors. and Mr. Tushar
Mehta, learned ASG for Joint Lenders Forum/SBI,
we are of the view that this time-line shall be strictly
adhered to and payment of Rs. 550 Crores (Rupees
Five Hundred Fifty Crores only) be made on or
before 30th September, 2018.
16
In the meanwhile, the undertaking that is to be
given by the Chairman of the Company concerned
shall be given within a period of one week from
today.
Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned ASG appearing for
the Joint Lenders Forum agrees to this. Mr.
Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel for
Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. also agrees to it.
In this view of the matter, list on Monday, the 1st
October, 2018.
Needless to say, the sale of the assets
concerned will go through as has been stated in the
orders of the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx”
The order of the Supreme Court, dated 23.10.2018, states:
“I.A. No. 141871/2018:
The applicants in this I.A. state that - thanks to a
situation which is beyond their control - they have
not been able to make the requisite payment on or
before 30.09.2018 in accordance with the
undertaking given to this Court.
At the request of Mr. Kapil Sibal, as a last
opportunity, we make it clear that the amount that is
to be paid to Mr. Dave’s client shall be paid on or
before 15.12.2018. We also make it clear that
interest shall begin ticking on this amount at the rate
of 12% p.a. for delayed payment beyond
30.09.2018.
We make it clear that no time beyond
15.12.2018, in any case, will be given. We also
make it clear that Mr. Dave may revive his I.A. for
contempt, if payment is not made.
I.A. stands disposed of accordingly.
17
C.A. Nos. 9337-9338/2018:
The Civil Appeals are dismissed in terms of the
signed order.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
xxx xxx xxx”
The order of the Supreme Court, dated 13.12.2018, states:
“IA No. 180453/2018 in W.P. (C.) No. 845/2018
is dismissed as withdrawn.
List the matters on Friday, the 14th December,
2018.
xxx xxx xxx”
7. A perusal of the NCLAT order dated 30.05.2018 would show that
the financial creditors’/Joint Lenders’ Forum stated that they have
reached an agreement with the corporate debtors for the sale of assets
of the corporate debtors, pursuant to which they can recover a sum of
INR 18,100 crore. Also, from restructuring and sale of further assets, a
further sum of INR 37,000 crore could be recovered, which would then
suffice to pay off the entire debt of the secured creditors. This order
also recorded that Ericsson had agreed to settle the debt in its favour
(which amounted to roughly INR 1500 crore) for the sum of INR 550
crore within a period of 120 days. As a result of this, the erstwhile
management continued in the saddle; the corporate insolvency
resolution process was stayed until further orders; the financial
18
creditors’/Joint Lenders’ Forum was given liberty to sell assets of the
corporate debtors and to deposit the amount so received in an account
of the lead bank, i.e., SBI; and the sum of INR 550 crore was directed
to be paid by 30.09.2018. It was made clear that in case of nonpayment, the concerned appeals may be dismissed, and the NCLAT
may direct the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution
process. In any case, the amount so deposited with the financial
creditors’/Joint Lenders’ Forum would be subject to the decision of
these appeals, and that if the appeals are dismissed, the financial
creditors’/Joint Lenders’ Forum will pay back this amount to the
corporate debtors. Most importantly, the corporate debtors and
creditors were directed to file their respective affidavits of undertaking
in terms of the statements recorded.
8. At this stage, it is important to set out one sample undertaking
that has been filed on behalf of one of the Reliance Companies, i.e., by
the Director of RITL. This affidavit of undertaking reads as follows:
“BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW
APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
xxx xxx xxx
AFFIDAVIT OF UNDERTAKING OF THE
APPELLANTS
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I, Suresh Madihally Rangchar, S/o Sh. Rangachar M.
Raghavachar, aged about 54 years, R/o Imperial
Tower, Flat No. 3604, 36th Floor, South Wing, BB
Nakashe Marg, Tardeo, Mumbai – 400 036, do hereby
solemnly affirm and state as under:
1) That I am the Appellant and the Director of
the Reliance Infratel Ltd. in the above said
matter and as such I am well acquainted with
all the facts and circumstances of the case
and am fully competent to swear this affidavit
for the Reliance Infratel Ltd.
2) That I am giving this affidavit cum
undertaking on behalf of the Reliance Infratel
Ltd. pursuant to the order of this Hon’ble
Tribunal dated 30.05.2018.
3) That the Reliance Infratel Ltd. alongwith
Reliance Communications Ltd. and Reliance
Telecom Ltd. and their respective directors
shall jointly pay a sum of Rs.550 Crores
(Rupees Five Hundred Fifty Crores Only) to
Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. (Operational
Creditors) within a period of 120 days i.e. by
30th September, 2018.
xxx xxx xxx”
This undertaking makes it clear that the understanding of the three
Reliance Companies with regard to the NCLAT order dated 30.05.2018
was that a sum of INR 550 crore will be paid by 30.09.2018 without
there being any linkage to sale of assets, as separately stated in the
order. Even otherwise, reading the order as a whole, it is clear that
20
whereas INR 550 crore had to be paid within 120 days, sale of assets
could take place at any time in the future without any time limit being
mentioned. This being the case, it is futile to contend that this order
itself made it clear that the sum of INR 550 crore was to be obtained
only from sale of assets. Both the undertakings as well as a plain
reading of the NCLAT order, militate against any such linkage.
9. On 03.08.2018, the writ petition that was filed before this Court
was taken up. It is important to note that this writ petition expressly
states that this Court was approached so that it could pass orders
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash/close the
corporate insolvency resolution process, which no other court or
tribunal could do. This was done on the footing that the parties have
“fully, mutually, and finally settled all the disputes between them” as
has been noted in the NCLAT order dated 30.05.2018. When this writ
petition came up for hearing, the order dated 03.08.2018 clearly
records that the payment of INR 550 crore will be made on or before
30.09.2018, and an undertaking was to be given by the Chairmen of
the Reliance Companies to that effect. The order separately noted that
the sale of assets will continue, as has been stated in the orders of the
NCLT and the NCLAT. A reading of this order also leaves no manner
21
of doubt that the undertakings that were to be given by the Chairmen
of the Companies concerned were only that the payment of INR 550
crore was to be made on or before 30.09.2018. There is no doubt
whatsoever that there was no linkage with any sale of assets of these
Companies.
10. Despite the aforesaid position being clear, on 09.08.2018, the
affidavits of undertaking, in pursuance of this Court’s order dated
03.08.2018, were given by the Chairmen of the Reliance Companies.
A sample undertaking, filed by the Chairman of RCom, reads as
follows:
“IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
xxx xxx xxx
AFFIDAVIT OF UNDERTAKING/COMPLIANCE
I, Anil Dhirubhai Ambani, S/o Late Shri Dhirajlal
Dhirubhai Hirachand Ambani, aged about 60 years,
residing at 39, ‘Sea Wind’, Cuffe Parade Colaba,
Mumbai – 400005, do hereby solemnly affirm and
state on oath as under:
1. That I am the Chairman of the Reliance
Communications Limited (“Company”), the
holding company of Reliance Telecom
Limited and Reliance Infratel Limited, the
Petitioners in the above Writ Petition, I am
well acquainted with the facts of the case and
as such I am competent to swear this
affidavit.
22
2. By order dated 30 May, 2018, the Hon’ble
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(“NCLAT”) by way of an interim order
recorded settlement between the parties and
permitted sale of the assets for repayment to
the banks. Pursuant to the said order, the
Petitioner gave an Undertaking dated 1
st
June 2018 before the NCLAT inter alia
stating as under:
“that the Reliance Infratel Ltd.
alongwith Reliance Communications
Ltd. and Reliance Telecom Ltd. and
their respective Director shall jointly
pay a sum of Rs.550 Crores
(Rupees Five Hundred Fifty Crores
only) to Ericson India Pvt. Ltd.
(Operational Creditors) within a
period of 120 days i.e. 30th
September, 2018.”
3. In the Petitions filed before this Hon’ble Court for
orders under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to
be able to proceed with the sale and to effectuate the
settlement, this Hon’ble Court passed the following
order:
“......In the meanwhile, the undertaking that is
to be given by the Chairman of the Company
concerned shall be given within a period of
one week from today.”
4. Accordingly, in light of the order of this Hon’ble
Court dated 3
rd August, 2018, read with the order of
the Hon’ble NCLAT dated 30th May, 2018, I hereby
undertake that upon the sale of the assets of the
Company, the Company and its directors will honour
their undertaking extracted above.”
23
Similar undertakings were filed on behalf of the Chairmen of the other
two Reliance Companies. A perusal of these undertakings would show
that they are contrary to the undertakings given by the authorized
persons of these very Companies pursuant to the NCLAT order dated
30.05.2018. We have seen that whereas those undertakings were
unconditional, these undertakings are now conditional upon sale of
assets of the Companies. These undertakings have obviously not been
given in accordance with this Court’s order dated 03.08.2018. To
further compound this misdemeanor, an application to extend time by
60 days was moved on 27.09.2018, in which the same linkage was
made to sale of assets before the sum of INR 550 crore could be paid.
Contrary to Shri Rohatgi’s argument, Ericsson immediately protested in
the form of a contempt petition, being the first contempt petition that
was filed on 01.10.2018, in which it was clearly pointed out that the
said undertaking would show contumacious behavior coupled with the
fact that the Reliance Companies were wriggling out of the
commitment made to this Court. When the first contempt petition and
the first application for extension of time came up for hearing before
this Court, this Court, vide order dated 23.10.2018, made it clear that
as a matter of indulgence, a last opportunity would be granted to pay
24
the aforesaid sum on or before 15.12.2018, making it clear that this is
conditional upon payment of interest of 12% per annum for delayed
payment beyond 30.09.2018. It was also made clear that no further
extension would be granted and that Ericsson may revive the petition
for contempt if payment is not so made. This order again leads to only
one conclusion – that the averment made in the application for
extension of time that the sum of INR 550 crore will be paid out of sale
of assets was not accepted by this Court, as sale of assets could have
taken place even beyond 15.12.2018. This further becomes clear from
the fact that the contempt petition would be revived if this payment
were not to be made, i.e., it would be open for Ericsson to contend that
the undertaking given to this Court was not as per this Court’s order,
and that there had been wilful and contumacious default on part of the
Reliance Companies.
11. When a further application for extension of time was made on the
selfsame ground, this Court made it clear by its order dated
13.12.2018 that in view of the order passed on 23.10.2018, no further
extension of time could be granted, and revival of the contempt petition
would necessarily follow. As a result of this, this I.A. was dismissed as
withdrawn on the said date.
25
12. Meanwhile, in parallel proceedings, this Court did its utmost to
lend a helping hand, so that, independently of these orders, sale of
assets could also be affected. The DoT was called before this Court
and was asked to give its NOC for sale of spectrum. However, it was
pointed out that this NOC could only be given according to certain
guidelines, one of which mandated that the buyer of the spectrum
would have to undertake that it would be responsible for payment of
the erstwhile debts of the seller. The sale of spectrum to Reliance Jio,
therefore, did not fructify, not because the DoT wrongfully refused to
give its NOC, as has been alleged by the Reliance Companies in their
pleadings filed in this case. It fell through only because the prospective
buyer, Reliance Jio, refused to give the undertaking that if called upon,
it would pay the erstwhile debts of the seller of the spectrum.
13. We now come to two other contempt petitions that were filed.
Contempt Petition No.55 of 2019 dated 02.01.2019 was filed in view of
non-payment of the sum of INR 550 crore on or before 15.12.2018.
Contempt Petition No.185 of 2019 dated 05.02.2019 was filed pointing
out two subsequent facts. First, that by a letter dated 21.01.2019, the
Reliance Companies were willing to pay the entire sum of INR 550
crore with interest if two conditions were met, namely, withdrawal of
26
contempt petitions and withdrawal of arbitration proceedings. Ericsson
replied on 23.01.2019, stating that this could only be done by moving
an application before this Court as contempt proceedings were
pending. Secondly, this petition points out that, maliciously, instead of
moving such appropriate application, from 01.02.2019 onwards, an
about-turn was taken, and Ericsson was left in the lurch as a decision
was taken by the three Reliance Companies that the corporate
insolvency resolution process could be revived.
14. The law of contempt has been recognized in English law at least
from the 12th Century A.D. to the present time [see The History of
Contempt of Court: The Form of Trial and the Mode of Punishment by
Sir John C. Fox, at page 1]. It is always important to bear in mind, as
was stated in Attorney-General v. British Broadcasting
Corporation, [1980] 3 All ER 161 [House of Lords], per Lord Salmond,
that:
“The description “contempt of court” no doubt has an
[sic] historical basis but it is nevertheless most
misleading. Its object is not to protect the dignity of the
courts or the judges but to protect the administration of
justice…....”
(at page 170)
27
In the same judgment, Lord Scarman added:
“It is high time, I would think, that we re-arranged our
law so that the ancient but misleading term “contempt
of court” disappeared from the law's vocabulary.”
(at page 184)
Another edifying statement, by Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v.
Leveller Magazine Ltd. and Ors., [1979] 1 All ER 745 [House of
Lords], reads as follows:
“…… It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of
court, not the individual court or judge who is
attempting to administer it.
(at page 749)
15. It is also important to remember that while considering the
question of disobedience of an order, what must be regarded is the
letter and the spirit of the order, together with the bona fide or genuine
belief of the alleged contemnor as to such order [see Lakshman
Prasad Agarwal v. Syed Mohammad Kareem, 2009 (6) SCALE 413
at paragraph 5].
16. In Rosnan Sam Boyce v. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC
636, this Court referred to a party who gave an undertaking based on
an implication or assumption which was false to its knowledge. This
Court held:
28
“9. …… We are, of course, quite conscious of the fact
that the proceedings in the contempt are quasicriminal in nature, that the law of contempt has to be
strictly interpreted and that the requirements of that
law must be strictly complied with before any person
can be committed for contempt. However, as we have
pointed out, respondent 1 gave an undertaking based
on an implication or assumption which was false to its
knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent 2.
Respondent 2 was equally instrumental in the giving of
this undertaking. This implication or assumption was
made explicit by the clarification given by the learned
counsel for respondent 1 as set out earlier.
Respondent 2 was equally responsible for instructing
counsel to give this clarification which was false to the
knowledge of both, respondents 1 and 2. Both
respondent 1 and respondent 2 have tried to deceive
the court and the appellant. In view of this, we fail to
see how it can be said that they are not guilty of
contempt.……”
Finally, the Court directed the court receiver to take possession of the
suit premises from the tenant/sub-tenant and hand it over to the
landlord, as agent, so that the contempt committed be purged.
17. We have seen from the above narration of facts that the
undertakings given on 09.08.2018 by the three Chairmen of the three
Reliance Companies were neither as per the Court’s understanding of
its order dated 03.08.2018, nor the understanding of the three
Companies themselves, as is clear from the undertakings given by the
three Directors pursuant to the order dated 30.05.2018. In this view of
29
the matter, it is clear that the three Reliance Companies had no
intention, at the very least, of adhering to the time limit of 120 days or
to the extended time limit of 60 days plus, as was given by way of
indulgence, by the order dated 23.10.2018. The undertakings given on
the footing that the amount of INR 550 crore would be paid only out of
the sale of assets was false to the knowledge of the three Reliance
Companies. This itself affects the administration of justice, and is
therefore, contempt of court. What is of greater relevance is the fact
that, despite the Reliance Companies’ continuous protestations to the
contrary, the letter dated 21.01.2019 from the advocate for the three
Reliance Companies made it clear that the entire payment would be
made by 31.01.2019, albeit on fulfilment of two conditions. This letter is
of great importance and is set out in entirety hereinbelow:
“21 January, 2019
To,
xxx xxx xxx
SUB: COMPLETION OF SETTLEMENT
Dear Sir,
We are concerned for our clients Reliance
Communications Limited (RCom), Reliance Infratel
Limited (RITL) and Reliance Telecom Limited (RTL,
30
and collectively with RCom and RITL, the RCom
Group), who have instructed us to write to you on
behalf of your client Ericsson India Private Limited
(Ericsson) as under:
1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has vide its
order dated 3 August, 2018 in Writ Petition
(C) No. 845 of 2018, recorded the settlement
arrived at between the RCom Group and
Ericsson before the Hon’ble National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)
on 30 May, 2018, pursuant to which Rs.550
crores was to be paid to Ericsson by 30
September, 2018 as full and final settlement
of all dues and claims.
2. Vide its order dated 23 October, 2018,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court extended the
date for the RCom Group to make payment
to Ericsson and directed that interest at 12%
p.a. on such amount to be paid from 1
October, 2018. As on 31 January 2019, such
interest would amount to Rs.20.016 crores
being an amount of Rs.22.24 crores less TDS
of Rs. 2.224 crores.
3. Thus, the total net amount payable by the
RCom Group to Ericsson on 31 January,
2019 is Rs.570.016 crores.
4. Out of the total settlement payment set
out in para 3 above, the RCom Group has
deposited an amount of Rs.118 crores with
the Registry of the Supreme Court on 9
January, 2019 (Deposited Payment),
pursuant to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s
order dated 7 January, 2019.
5. The RCom Group will make the balance
net settlement payment of Rs.452.016 crores
(Balance Settlement Payment) in favour of
Ericsson on 31 January, 2019 to complete all
their payment obligations to Ericsson.
31
6. Ericsson is therefore required to:
a. Withdraw Contempt Petition
(Civil) Diary No.122/2019 and
Contempt Petition (C) No.1838/2018
in W.P.(C) No.845/2018 filed on its
behalf, immediately upon receipt of
the Balance Settlement Payment
and towards the same, prepare and
send for our consideration and for
us to mutually agree by 29 January,
2019, the draft application to be
made to the Hon’ble Supreme Court
for withdrawal of the said Contempt
Petitions;
b. Withdraw all its claims and
contentions as per the Arbitration
between RCom and its affiliates,
and Ericsson, pending before the
Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal comprising
Justice Mr. S.B. Sinha, Justice Mr.
Swatanter Kumar, and Justice V.S.
Sirpurkar, and towards the same,
prepare and sent for our
consideration and for us to mutually
agree by 29 January 2019, the draft
application to be made to the
Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal for
withdrawal of all claims and
contentions, and the consequent
termination of proceedings.
c. Sign and return the attached No
Dues Confirmation simultaneous
with the Demand Draft for an
amount of Rs. 452.016 crores, being
handed over to Ericsson on 31
January 2019.
Yours sincerely,
xxx xxx xxx”
32
18. It may be pointed out that in their reply to the Contempt Petition
No.55 of 2019, RCom and its group companies had stated that they
were “disabled” from paying the amount of INR 550 crore plus interest;
that they “were and are unable to pay”; and finally, that:
“xxx xxx xxx
39. The Respondents had submitted the Undertaking
on behalf of RCom Group Companies based on the
lenders’ consent for monetization of the Other
Spectrum for Rs.975 crores and in the genuine hope
and bonafide belief that Asset Monetization Scheme
would be implemented and Ericsson shall be paid an
amount of Rs.550 crores along with interest, however,
the same has become impossible to be achieved.
xxx xxx xxx”
19. Obviously, the letter dated 21.01.2019 by the advocates on
behalf of the Reliance Companies would belie each of the aforesaid
statements made in the said reply affidavit. There is, therefore, no
doubt whatsoever that the three Reliance Companies have wilfully not
paid the sum of INR 550 crore plus interest and have thus breached
the undertakings given to this Court.
20. Another disturbing feature of the reply affidavit filed in this Court
by the Chairman of RCom to Contempt Petition No. 55 of 2019 is the
statement that RCom has not taken or received any advantage on
33
account of the undertaking submitted before this Court. This, again, is
a wholly incorrect statement, given the fact that a writ petition was filed
in this Court seeking quashing of the corporate insolvency resolution
process on settlement of the matter with Ericsson, which could not be
achieved without such undertaking being given to this Court. We are of
the view that any unconditional apology given that there was no
intention to make any wrongful undertaking or that the undertaking was
submitted bona fide must be rejected. It is clear that this reply affidavit
clearly demonstrates the cavalier attitude of the deponent of this
affidavit to the highest court of the land.
21. However, Shri Rohatgi and Shri Sibal relied upon the following
judgments:
(i) Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, (1980) 3 SCC 47 was a
case where an express undertaking to hand over possession to a
receiver was not given. In this view of the matter, it was held that it
would not be possible to state that the appellant had wilfully disobeyed
or committed breach of such undertaking. This case has no application
on facts to the present case.
34
(ii) In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11
SCC 1, this Court held:
“17. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act
defines “civil contempt” and it means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction,
order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach
of undertaking given to a court. “Wilful” means an act
or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally
and with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something
the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad
purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It
signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or
with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to
constitute contempt the order of the court must be of
such a nature which is capable of execution by the
person charged in normal circumstances. It should not
require any extraordinary effort nor should be
dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or
omission of a third party for its compliance…….”
This case again has no application to the facts of this case. We have
seen that right from the beginning, the sum of INR 550 crore was
undertaken to be paid, without having to depend upon any act or
omission of a third party. To say that the sum of INR 550 crore would
be paid only out of sale of assets of the three Reliance Companies is a
deliberate misstatement made in the undertakings as well as the
applications for extension of time filed before this Court, which was
done with the purpose of circumventing the orders of this Court. We
35
are also of the view that in the facts of the present case, wilful default
is made out, as has been pointed out in this judgment.
(iii) In Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
(2010) 12 SCC 770, this Court held:
“23. Besides this, it would also not be correct to
overlook or ignore an important statutory ingredient of
contempt of a civil nature given out under Section 2(b)
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that the
disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to
satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience to the
order. Bearing this important factor in mind, it is
relevant to note that a proceeding for civil contempt
would not lie if the order alleged to have been
disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable or
rational interpretation of an order or circumstance
which is the factual position in the instant matter. It
would equally not be correct to infer that a party
although acting due to misapprehension of the correct
legal position and in good faith without any motive to
defeat or defy the order of the Court, should be viewed
as a serious ground so as to give rise to a contempt
proceeding.
24. To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it
would be relevant and appropriate to take into
consideration the settled legal position as reflected in
the judgment and order delivered in Ahmed Ali v.
Supdt., District Jail [1987 Cri LJ 1845 (Gau)] as also in
B.K. Kar v. High Court of Orissa [AIR 1961 SC 1367 :
(1961) 2 Cri LJ 438] that mere unintentional
disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of
contempt and although disobedience might have been
established, absence of wilful disobedience on the part
of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty unless the
contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct.
Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is not
36
sufficient to justify for holding one guilty of contempt. It
is further relevant to bear in mind the settled law on
the law of contempt that casual or accidental or
unintentional acts of disobedience under the
circumstances which negate any suggestion of
contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory only
and does not render the contemnor liable to
punishment and this was the view expressed also in
State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari [AIR 1954 Pat
513] and N. Baksi v. O.K. Ghosh [AIR 1957 Pat 528].”
This judgment also has no application to the facts of this case as the
only reasonable or rational interpretation of the orders involved in this
case leads to the result that INR 550 crore plus interest was to be paid
without any linkage to sale of assets within a fixed time limit. This is
also not a case of accidental or unintentional disobedience. As is clear
from the letter dated 21.01.2019, the Reliance Companies are able to
pay this amount, but are wilfully refusing to do so. Similarly, the
judgments in Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather, (1994) 4
SCC 34, at paragraph 34, and Gyanichand v. State of A.P., (2016) 15
SCC 164, at paragraph 11 also do not apply on the facts of this case.
The facts of this case are far from cases where directions or orders are
impossible of compliance.
22. At this stage, we may point out that the contempt petition against
the Chairman of SBI would not lie inasmuch as the Ericsson
37
transaction and the sale of assets by the Joint Lenders’ Forum are
completely independent of each other, as argued by Shri Dave himself,
and as has been held by us hereinabove. Also, the statement made in
paragraph 18 of the Contempt Petition No. 185 of 2019 that, “all the
respondents in the contempt petition were bound to have handed over
the amount of INR 550 crore to the petitioner on or before 15.12.2018
……” is patently incorrect inasmuch as respondent no. 4 (SBI) has
nothing to do with this amount of INR 550 crore which had to be paid
over to Ericsson only by the three Reliance Companies. The contempt
petition against the Chairman of SBI is, therefore, dismissed.
23. Having held the three Reliance Companies guilty of contempt of
this Court, it is now necessary to point out Section 12(4) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which reads as follows:
“12. Punishment for contempt of court.—
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court
in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a
company, every person who, at the time the contempt
was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible
to, the company for the conduct of the business of the
company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to
be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be
enforced with the leave of the court, by the detention in
civil prison of each such person :
38
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section
shall render any such person liable to such
punishment if he proves that the contempt was
committed without his knowledge or that he exercised
all due diligence to prevent its commission.
xxx xxx xxx”
The question now is as to the punishment to be awarded. Shri Rohatgi
pointed out that in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India,
(1998) 4 SCC 409, this Court had held:
“34. The object of punishment being both curative and
corrective, these coercions are meant to assist an
individual complainant to enforce his remedy and there
is also an element of public policy for punishing civil
contempt, since the administration of justice would be
undermined if the order of any court of law is to be
disregarded with impunity. Under some circumstances,
compliance of the order may be secured without resort
to coercion, through the contempt power. For example,
disobedience of an order to pay a sum of money may
be effectively countered by attaching the earnings of
the contemner. In the same manner, committing the
person of the defaulter to prison for failure to comply
with an order of specific performance of conveyance of
property, may be met also by the court directing that
the conveyance be completed by an appointed person.
Disobedience of an undertaking may in the like
manner be enforced through process other than
committal to prison as for example where the breach
of undertaking is to deliver possession of property in a
landlord-tenant dispute. Apart from punishing the
contemner, the court to maintain the majesty of law
may direct the police force to be utilised for recovery of
39
possession and burden the contemner with costs,
exemplary or otherwise.”
Thus, disobedience of an order to pay a sum of money may be
countered by orders of attachment instead of committal to prison. On
the other hand, Shri Dave pointed out that this Court had, in
Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai, (1976)
2 SCC 951, held that in cases of perverse and deliberate flouting of
undertakings, the High Court rightly observed that it had no option
except to convict the appellant and sentence him to three months’
imprisonment, with which this Court agreed. He also pointed out that in
Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai, (2008)
14 SCC 561, so-called apologies, which are only tactful moves when
contemnors are in a tight corner, should not be accepted and a jail
sentence should be awarded [see paragraphs 77 and 78]. He also
referred to and relied upon Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M.
Shetty, (1990) 1 SCC 259, where this Court held:
“11. When a court accepts an undertaking given by
one of the parties and passes orders based on such
undertaking, the order amounts in substance to an
injunction restraining that party from acting in breach
thereof. The breach of an undertaking given to the
court by or on behalf of a party to a civil proceedings
is, therefore, regarded as tantamount to a breach of
injunction although the remedies were not always
40
identical. For the purpose of enforcing an undertaking
that undertaking is treated as an order so that an
undertaking, if broken, would involve the same
consequences on the persons breaking that
undertaking as would their disobedience to an order
for an injunction. It is settled law that breach of an
injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a
court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of
which the court sanctions a particular course of action
is misconduct amounting to contempt. The remedy in
such circumstances may be in the form of a direction
to the contemnor to purge the contempt or a
sentence of imprisonment or fine or all of them. On
the facts and circumstances of this case in the light of
our finding that there was a breach of the undertaking
we think that mere imposition of imprisonment or fine
will not meet the ends of justice. There will have to be
an order to purge the contempt by directing
respondent 1-contemnor to deliver vacant possession
immediately and issuing necessary further and
consequential directions for enforcing the same.”
24. Given the facts as aforesaid, we are of the view that the
contempt of this Court needs to be purged by payment of the sum of
INR 550 crore together with interest till date. As stated by the letter
dated 21.01.2019, subject to any calculation error, an amount of INR
453 crore must be paid to Ericsson in addition to the deposit of INR
118 crore made in the Registry of this Court. The Registry of this Court
is directed to pay over the sum of INR 118 crore to Ericsson within a
period of one week from today. The RCom group is directed to purge
the contempt of this Court by payment to Ericsson of the sum of INR
41
453 crore within a period of four weeks from today. In default of such
payment, the Chairmen who have given undertakings to this Court will
suffer three months’ imprisonment. In addition to the aforesaid sum
being paid, a fine amounting to INR 1 crore for each Company must
also be paid to the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today.
This sum will be paid over to the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee. In default of payment of such fine, the Chairmen of these
Companies will suffer one month’s imprisonment.
Contempt Petitions are disposed of, as aforesaid.
………………………….J.
(R.F. Nariman)
………………………….J.
(Vineet Saran)
New Delhi;
February 20, 2019. 

Tuesday, February 19, 2019

The said doctor PW-1 specifically stated that the claimant did not tell him about any other injury except the one on the left hip; and that the claimant did not sustain any injury on his head. It appears from the testimony of the claimant-appellant that he allegedly 7 took treatment as regards scrotum in the months of November-December 1992, but there is no evidence on record to co-relate any such ailment or deformity concerning scrotum with the accident in question. Therefore, in our view, the High Court has been justified in rejecting the case of 95% permanent partial disablement and the suggestions about the injuries other than that on the left thigh bone of the appellant.- the question of just compensation, though it is noticed that the High Court has substantially reduced the amount of compensation awarded by 8 the Tribunal but then, such a reduction was the natural consequence of rejection of the case of 95% disablement. The High Court has, otherwise, examined the entire evidence on record and, in the ultimate analysis, the amount awarded by the High Court at Rs. 2,11,060/- cannot be said to be too low or grossly inadequate on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. In this view of the matter, some restriction by the High Court towards loss of earning or disallowance of expenses of medicines, do not make out a case for interference because, as observed, the ultimate award amount is not grossly inadequate in the given set of facts and circumstances. As regards interest, the Tribunal had been rather generous in awarding the same at an exorbitant rate of 15% p.a. that was liable to be reduced. In fact, the High Court has yet allowed a comparatively higher rate of interest at 9% p.a. We find absolutely no reason to consider any upward revision in the amount of compensation awarded in this case by the High Court.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari 
NON-REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6038 OF 2003
S. Kumar (Dead) Appellant(s)
VS.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari., J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order
dated 21.06.2001, as passed in C.M.A. No.1101 of 1995 and Cross Objection
No. 70 of 1996, whereby the High Court of Judicature at Madras has modified the
award dated 27.04.1995, as made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,
Chennai (II Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai) in MACT O.P. No. 2932 of
1992.
2. In the impugned judgment and order dated 21.06.2001, the High Court has
made substantial downward revision of the amount of compensation awarded by
1
the Tribunal to the injured claimant-appellant; and in place of the amount
awarded by the Tribunal to the tune of Rs. 4,58,060/- together with interest @
15% p.a., has awarded a sum of Rs. 2,11,060/- together with interest @ 9% p.a.
from the date of filing of the claim application. The High Court has made such
reduction in the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal after
disbelieving the case of 95% permanent partial disablement, as projected by the
claimant and accepted by the Tribunal; and has allowed compensation only with
reference to the injury of fracture of left thigh bone, as originally certified.
3. The question in this appeal, therefore, is as to whether the High Court was
justified in modifying the award and reducing the amount of compensation
awarded by the Tribunal? The background aspects of the matter, so far relevant
for the question at hand, may be noticed, in brief, as follows:
On 02.08.1992 at about 05.30 p.m., the claimant-appellant, while walking
alongside a road, sustained grievous injuries on being hit by an auto rickshaw
owned by the respondent no. 2 and insured by the respondent no. 1. The
appellant made the claim for compensation with the submissions, inter alia, that
at the time of accident, he was 25 years of age and was earning Rs. 2,750/- per
month while working as a mason. Apart from asserting rash and negligent driving
of the auto rickshaw in question, the appellant submitted that due to the accident,
he had sustained the injuries of fracture of left thigh bone and on left side of the
skull as also other injuries in his stomach region and testis; he remained inpatient in the Government Hospital for 3 months and later on, he had to take
2
treatment as out-patient for another 3 months. The claimant further submitted
that he was again admitted to the hospital where he remained in-patient until
25.12.1992 and operations were performed on his hip as also on testis, to bring
them back to the normal position. The claimant-appellant alleged that after the
accident, his left leg was shortened by 2”; that he was suffering from intermittent
headache and giddiness; and that due to the injuries, he was unable to do any
work, was unable to marry, and was not fit for marital life.
4. As regards his alleged injuries and disablement, the appellant examined
two doctors in evidence namely, Dr. Sai Chandran as PW-1 and Dr. Thiagarajan
as PW-4. While PW-1 pointed out that after examination, he found the left leg of
the claimant-appellant shortened by 2” due to the fracture of upper portion of his
thigh bone; that he could not sit and stand freely; and that his hip movements
were reduced by 15o
 because of which, he could not do any hard labour. The
said doctor had assessed the permanent partial disablement of the claimantappellant at 45%. However, in order to prove further disablement, the claimant
examined PW-4, who stated that on examination of the claimant-appellant, he
found fracture of left thigh bone and injury on skull; and that his left testis had not
come back to original position. The said doctor PW-4 even deposed to the extent
that the claimant-appellant would not be able to perform intercourse; and
purportedly assessed the permanent partial disablement at further 50%.
3
5. The Tribunal, with reference to the testimony of the said two doctors and
as also the testimony of claimant-appellant, proceeded to award compensation to
the tune of Rs. 4,58,060/- in the following manner: The Tribunal awarded a sum
of Rs. 31,000/- towards loss of earning from 03.08.1992 to 31.07.1993; Rs.
3,500/- towards travelling expenses; Rs. 6,360/- for nutrition and diet; Rs. 200/-
for damage to the dress material; Rs. 10,000/- towards medicines; Rs. 56,000/-
towards pain and suffering; Rs. 1,15,000/- towards permanent disablement and
Rs. 2,36,000/- towards future loss of earning. The Tribunal also awarded interest
@ 15% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application.
6. In appeal by the insurer, the High Court did not interfere with the amount of
compensation awarded towards loss of earning, travelling and dietary
expenditure, and dress material. However, the High Court found that there was
no proof towards cost of medicines and hence, disallowed the claim in that
regard. As regards other aspects related with injury and disablement, the High
Court meticulously examined the evidence including the testimony of the doctors,
PW-1 and PW-4 and disbelieved the suggestions of PW-4, who had allegedly
examined the claimant-appellant after about 2½ years of the accident. After
observing that at the initial stage, there had not been any indication of the alleged
scrotum injury as also the head injury, the High Court pointed out its specific
reasons for disbelieving the suggestions put forward by the claimant-appellant
with PW-4, particularly with reference to the testimony of PW-1 in the following:-
4
“12. …The evidence of the doctor P.W. 1 is that because of
the fracture in his left thigh bone the height of his left leg has
been reduced by two inches and he is not able to sit and he
cannot do heavy work and he has assessed the disability as
45%. He has given certificate Ex. P.1. P.W.1 has examined
the injured claimant on 26.6.1993 and issued that certificate
after perusal of the case sheet of the claimant as inpatient.
P.W. 1 specifically says that the claimant did not tell him that
he had sustained any other injury except the one on his left
hip and he did not sustain any injury on his head. Even though
P.W. 3 the claimant specifically says that he sustained injury
or his head also. P.W. 1’s evidence shows that the claimant
did not tell him with regard to any there was no scrotum injury
(sic). Ex. P.7 which was given after lapse of about 3 months
shows that left side of scrotum was normal and right side was
undescended testis with minimal Hydrocele and it also shows
that it was not due to accident and for the minimal Hydrocele
only surgery was done after a period of three months after the
accident. So, it is crystal clear that there was no scrotum
injury and nothing to the scrotum was caused due to that
accident. So, the evidence of P.W. 4 and the certificate issued
by him with regard to the disability for the injury caused to the
scrotum and private part are not reliable and no importance
can be attached to them.....”

7. The High Court, while rejecting the case of claimant-appellant regarding
the injury to scrotum and skull, reduced the compensation towards disablement
from Rs. 1,15,000/- to Rs. 50,000/-, towards pain and suffering from Rs. 56,000/-
to 20,000/-, and towards future loss of earning from Rs. 2,36,000/- to
Rs.1,00,000/- while observing as under:-
“14. On a perusal of the evidence of P.W. 4, we are of the
view that he is not speaking truth. He has not taken any x-ray
with regard to the damage caused to the private part of the
claimant. In the initial stage, after the accident, there was no
whisper at all by the claimant with regard to injury sustained
by him in his scrotum. Only in the year 1995, P.W. 4 examined
5
him and gave disability certificate for 50% for the damage
caused to his scrotum. There is also no acceptable proof that
because of this accident, his marital life was affected. For the
foregoing discussions, we are quite unable to accept that the
claimant has sustained 95% disability. There is no proof with
regard to permanent disability caused to the claimant and he
was deprived of his attending even to his normal work. Of
course, he has sustained fracture on his thigh and other
injuries...”
8. The High Court also reduced the rate of interest as awarded by the
Tribunal @ 15% p.a. and found it appropriate to award interest @ 9% p.a. with
reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Kaushnuma Begum
v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. : 2001 (2) SCC 9.
9. Seeking to assail the judgment of the High Court whereby, the amount of
compensation awarded by the Tribunal has been reduced substantially, learned
counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that the High Court has
committed a serious error in reducing the quantum of compensation by
disbelieving the testimony of doctors who had thoroughly examined and treated
the appellant. Learned counsel would argue that despite there being clear proof
of multiple injuries suffered by the appellant and his long drawn treatment,
the High Court has gone too restrictive in not awarding any amount towards
medicines and in reducing drastically the amount of compensation towards
disablement, loss of earning capacity and pain and sufferings. On the other hand,
learned counsel for the contesting respondent has duly supported the judgment
of the High Court.
6
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having examined the
record, we are satisfied that the High Court has made downward revision of the
quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal for cogent and convincing
reasons; and in the ultimate analysis, the amount awarded by the High Court
cannot be said to be too low or grossly inadequate so as to call for interference
by this Court.
11. On a bare look at the award of the Tribunal, it is but apparent that the
Tribunal merely summed up the alleged 45% permanent partial disablement of
the appellant, as initially certified by PW-1 (who had examined him immediately
after the accident) with 50% permanent partial disablement of the appellant, as
later on certified by PW-4 (who had allegedly examined him 2½ years after the
accident) and, in this manner, assessed the disablement to the extent of 95%.
The approach of the Tribunal had been suffering from obvious errors and infirmity
inasmuch as there was neither any basis nor any reason to sum up the
percentage of disablement stated by the two doctors and to take it to be a case
of 95% permanent partial disablement. Moreover, the Tribunal had totally failed to
consider that the suggestions about injury to the skull as also injury to the
scrotum were falsified by the testimony of the doctor PW-1, who had found the
only injury being that of fracture of left thigh bone. The said doctor PW-1
specifically stated that the claimant did not tell him about any other injury except
the one on the left hip; and that the claimant did not sustain any injury on his
head. It appears from the testimony of the claimant-appellant that he allegedly
7
took treatment as regards scrotum in the months of November-December 1992,
but there is no evidence on record to co-relate any such ailment or deformity
concerning scrotum with the accident in question. Therefore, in our view, the
High Court has been justified in rejecting the case of 95% permanent partial
disablement and the suggestions about the injuries other than that on the left
thigh bone of the appellant.
12. Moreover, a relevant feature of this case gets noticed per force and in view
of indisputable facts available on record. The claimant-appellant overtly
suggested in the claim application that he had suffered injuries to his private
parts and at the age of 25 years, such injuries resulted in his inability to have the
bliss of marital life. The appellant has, unfortunately, expired during the pendency
of this appeal and his legal representatives, being his wife, mother and three
children are substituted as appellants in his place. The very extent of the family
left behind by the appellant, inclusive of his wife and three children, obviously
falsify his suggestions about inability of having marital life. We do not wish to
elaborate further on this aspect of the matter; suffice it to observe for the present
purpose that the case of excessive injuries and disablement, as projected by the
claimant-appellant with reference to the testimony of PW-4 was bound to be, and
has rightly been, rejected by the High Court.
13. Coming to the question of just compensation, though it is noticed that the
High Court has substantially reduced the amount of compensation awarded by
8
the Tribunal but then, such a reduction was the natural consequence of rejection
of the case of 95% disablement. The High Court has, otherwise, examined the
entire evidence on record and, in the ultimate analysis, the amount awarded by
the High Court at Rs. 2,11,060/- cannot be said to be too low or grossly
inadequate on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. In this view of the
matter, some restriction by the High Court towards loss of earning or
disallowance of expenses of medicines, do not make out a case for interference
because, as observed, the ultimate award amount is not grossly inadequate in
the given set of facts and circumstances. As regards interest, the Tribunal had
been rather generous in awarding the same at an exorbitant rate of 15% p.a. that
was liable to be reduced. In fact, the High Court has yet allowed a comparatively
higher rate of interest at 9% p.a. We find absolutely no reason to consider any
upward revision in the amount of compensation awarded in this case by the High
Court.
14. For what has been discussed and observed hereinabove, this appeal fails
and is, therefore, dismissed.
 ...............................................J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

 ..............................................J.
 (DINESH MAHESHWARI) 1
New Delhi
Dated: 18 February, 2019.
9

482 Cr.P.C = on resettlement of accounts, the parties obtained the consent decree from DRT and paid the entire sum, therefore, there is no live issue, which now survives. The High Court then examined the question as to whether the issue of criminality is involved so as to allow the Trial Court to continue on its merits. After examining this issue with reference to charges and documents, the High Court held that no 7 criminality issue is found involved notwithstanding the settlement of the case between the parties. 16. We are also of the view that there arises no occasion to prosecute the respondents as was rightly held by the High Court while quashing the criminal case against the respondents.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2107­2125 OF 2011
C.B.I.  New Delhi            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
B.B. Agarwal & Ors. etc.  ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. These appeals are directed against  the final
judgment and order dated 18.04.2009 passed by
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl.MC
Nos.5722­30 of 2006 & Crl.MA No.9675 of 2006,
Crl.MC   No.74   of   2007   &   Crl.MA   Nos.235­36   of
1
2007, Crl.MC No.80 of 2007 & Crl.MA Nos.259­60
of   2007   and   Crl.MC   No.2376   of   2007   &   Crl.MA
Nos.8341­42   of   2007   whereby   the   High   Court
allowed   the   criminal   petitions   filed   by   the
respondents herein under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as “Cr.P.C.”) and quashed the criminal proceedings
in CBI Case No.RC.4(A)/94­CBI/BSC/DLI pending
before the Special Judge, Tis Hazari, Delhi against
the respondents herein.
2. A few   facts   need   mention   hereinbelow   to
appreciate the short controversy involved in these
appeals.
3. In the year 1992­93, it came to the notice of
Investigating   Agency   (CBI)   that   two   Limited
Companies,  namely,  M/s New Beam Ferro Alloys
Ltd.(NBFAL)   ­   Respondent   No.   6   and   M/s   West
2
Coast   Brewers   &   Distillers   Ltd.(WCBDL)­
respondent No. 7 came out with public issue of their
companies   and   in   execution   of   the   public   issue,
these Companies were alleged to have defrauded the
Punjab National Bank (PNB), PNB House Branch,
Sir P.M. Road, Fort, Mumbai to the tune of  Rs.15
crores approximately.
4. It may not be necessary to set out the details
as to how the alleged defalcation was done by the
said two Companies.
5. Suffice it to say, the investigation was carried
out by the CBI which led to filing of a criminal case
bearing   No.   RC4(A)/94­CBI/BSC/DLI   against   the
Directors of the companies and the officials of PNB
under Section 120B read with Sections 409, 420,
468,   471   of     the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860
(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) read with Section
13(2)   read   with   Section   13(i)   (c)   and   (d)   of   the
3
Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “PC   Act”)   in   the   designated   C.B.I.
Court,  Delhi.
6. The charge sheet was filed against 12 accused
persons   out   of   which   6   are   individuals   and
remaining are the Companies. It is not in dispute
that   during   the   pendency   of   this   case,     four
individual accused persons have died. It is also not
in dispute that out of the accused­Companies, the
names   of   two   companies,   namely,   WCBDL
(respondent   No.   7)   and   Surlex   Dignostic   Ltd.
(respondent   No.   8)   have   been   deleted   vide   order
dated  09.09.2011.
7.  It is not in dispute that PNB had also filed two
civil suits bearing Nos. 342/1995 and 2740/1995
against   the   Companies­WCBDL(R­7)   and   NBFAL
(R­6) and its Directors in Bombay High Court for
recovery of the outstanding dues and for settlement
4
of the accounts which were later transferred to the
Debt   Recovery   Tribunal,   Mumbai   (OA
No.3174/2000) for trial. It is also not in dispute that
during   the   pendency   of   these   civil   suits   and
pursuant   to   orders   passed   therein   directing   the
parties to undertake reconciliation of the accounts,
the   PNB   and   the   two   companies   through   their
Directors   reconciled   their   accounts   and
compromised the matter by entering into a one­time
settlement on 06.06.2006. The consent application
in O.A. No.3174 of 2000 was accordingly filed by the
parties in DRT, Mumbai  for disposal of the OA in
terms of the settlement arrived at between them.
8. The   DRT   by   its   order   dated   11.05.2006
accepted the settlement and accordingly disposed of
OA   No.   3174/2000   in   terms   of   settlement.   (See
documents   filed   in   IA­12323/2019).   In   terms   of
settlement order, the two companies were liable to
5
pay a total sum of Rs.12.20 crores to PNB, which
the two Companies, through their Directors, paid to
the PNB. It is not in dispute that now there are no
outstanding dues payable by these two Companies
to the PNB and the order of DRT stood complied
with.
9. It   is   with   these   background   facts,   the   12
respondents(accused) filed the petitions in the High
Court of Delhi under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking
to   quash   the   criminal   proceedings   filed   against
them.
10. By impugned order, the High Court allowed
the petitions and quashed the criminal proceedings,
which has given rise to filing of the present appeals
by way of special leave  by the CBI in this Court.
11. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in these appeals, is whether the High
Court was justified in allowing the petitions filed by
6
the respondents under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C
and quashing the criminal proceedings.
12. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
13. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
14. In our considered opinion, having regard to the
background   facts   stated   above,   we   find   no   good
ground to interfere in the impugned order.
15. The   High   Court   was   of   the   view   that   on
resettlement of accounts, the parties obtained the
consent decree from DRT and paid the entire sum,
therefore, there is no live issue, which now survives.
The High Court then examined the question as to
whether the issue of criminality is involved so as to
allow   the   Trial   Court   to   continue   on   its   merits.
After examining this issue with reference to charges
and   documents,   the   High   Court   held   that   no
7
criminality issue is found involved notwithstanding
the settlement of the case between the parties.
16.   We are also of the view that there arises no
occasion   to   prosecute   the   respondents   as   was
rightly held by the High Court while quashing the
criminal case against the respondents.
17. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   placing
reliance   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Rumi
Dhar(Smt.)   vs.   State   of   West   Bengal   &   Anr.,
(2009) 6 SCC 364 contended that notwithstanding
settlement   of   the   civil   suits   by   the   parties,   the
criminal case out of which these appeals arise has
to be brought to its logical end one way or the other
on merits and the High Court was, therefore, not
right in quashing the charge­sheet at its threshold
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
18. We find no merit in her submission. When we
take into account the entire undisputed controversy
8
mentioned   above,   we   also   find   that   there   is   no
criminality issue surviving qua those accused, who
are alive so as to allow the prosecuting agency to
continue with the criminal trial on merits. Indeed, it
would be an abuse of process, as was rightly held
by the High Court to which we concur.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no
merit in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly
dismissed.
     
                                     .………...................................J.
                                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
                               
     …...……..................................J.
                    [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi;
February 18, 2019
9

No grounds to challenge the Majority Award =supplies of the Respondent’s copper rods made by the Appellant to Hindustan Transmission Products Ltd. (in short, “HTPL”) after April 1995. Payment for the same were not made by HTPL to the Appellant, who also subsequently failed to make payment for the supplied goods to the Respondent. Hence, the Respondent invoked the 3 arbitration clause under the agreement dated 14.12.1993 and the dispute was referred to a three­member arbitral tribunal.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1862 OF 2014
MMTC LTD.  … APPELLANT
Versus
M/S VEDANTA LTD.  … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
This civil appeal arises out of the judgment and final order
dated 09.02.2009 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 949 of 2002, affirming the
judgment   and   order   dated   05.08.2002   of   the   Learned   Single
Judge whereby the Appellant’s Objections Petition challenging
the Majority Award dated 27.06.2001 had been disallowed. Vide
the   Majority   Award,   the   Appellant   had   been   directed   to   pay
certain amounts to the Respondent under their agreement dated
14.12.1993.
2.  The brief facts leading to the instant appeal are as follows:
M/s Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., (renamed M/s Vedanta Ltd.,
the Respondent herein) was a manufacturer of continuous Cast
1
Copper Rods. Vide the agreement dated 14.12.1993, MMTC Ltd.
(the Appellant herein), a government company, was appointed as
a   consignment   agent   from  whom   the   Respondent   could  avail
services such as storage, handling and marketing of the copper
rods produced by the Respondent. Such rods were to be stored at
various   godowns   of   the   Appellant.   The   agreement   dated
14.12.1993 contained an arbitration clause.
3.   Importantly,   under   the   aforementioned   agreement,   the
Appellant raised its own invoices in the name of the customers of
the products sold and delivered. Goods were to be sold only
against   payment   of   100%   advance   by   the   customer   to   the
Appellant, who then had to remit the same to the Respondent
after deducting service charges (i.e. commission) at the rate of Rs.
500/­ per metric tonne.
4.  The aforementioned agreement was materially altered for
the   first  time  on  06.01.1994,  in   terms  of   a  Memorandum   of
Understanding between the parties. This amendment enabled the
Appellant to supply goods to customers against a letter of credit
(usance   or   stand­by),   i.e.   without   advance   payment,   while
maintaining that it was the “total responsibility” of the Appellant
to ensure the bona fides of the letter of credit furnished and that
2
the principal and interest were paid on the due date for the
supplies made against the letter of credit. In case of a stand­by
letter of credit, it was further specified that it was the Appellant’s
responsibility, in the event of non­payment by the due date, to
negotiate the stand­by letter of credit in a timely way and credit
the sale proceeds to the Respondent. Interest was fixed at 18.25%
per annum.
5.  A further revision to the above terms was undertaken vide a
meeting between the parties on 20.01.1994, the minutes of which
indicate   that   the   Appellant   could   thereafter   extend   credit   to
customers on its own terms and responsibility, and in case of
credit being extended, payment to the Respondent was to be
effected by the Appellant upon delivery of the copper rods to the
customer.
6.  The dispute in the instant matter pertains to supplies of the
Respondent’s copper rods made by the Appellant to Hindustan
Transmission Products Ltd. (in short, “HTPL”) after April 1995.
Payment for the same were not made by HTPL to the Appellant,
who also subsequently failed to make payment for the supplied
goods to the Respondent. Hence, the Respondent invoked the
3
arbitration clause under the agreement dated 14.12.1993 and
the dispute was referred to a three­member arbitral tribunal.
7.  The majority of the arbitral tribunal found in favour the
Respondent,   and   vide   its   award   dated   27.06.2001,   inter   alia
directed the Appellant to pay to the Respondent a sum of Rs.
15,73,77,296/­   with   interest   at   the   rate   of   14%   p.a.   from
05.02.1997 till the date of the award and at the rate of 18% p.a.
thereafter, as well as an amount of Rs. 2.25 crores as interest on
overdue   payment   up   to   05.02.1996.   The   said   award   was
confirmed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of
Bombay as well as the Division Bench thereof.
8.  There   were   several   grounds   of   challenge   raised   by   the
Appellant before the learned Single Judge of the High Court;
however, before the Division Bench as well as before this Court
the main ground raised concerns the arbitrability of the dispute
under   the   arbitration   clause   under   the   agreement   dated
14.12.1993. This ground encompasses all other arguments raised
by the Appellant. To elaborate, it is the case of the Appellant that
it used to  supply  the  goods of  the Respondent  to  customers
arranged   by   the   Appellant   as   per   the   Agreement   dated
14.12.1993 only. However, sometimes, the Appellant had to make
4
a deviation from this procedure at the request of the Respondent,
i.e. M/s Vedanta Ltd., by allowing customers arranged by M/s
Vedanta Ltd. to lift its goods stored in the Appellant’s godowns. It
is further the case of the Appellant that whenever it made this
deviation, the Appellant was not bound by the contract between
the Respondent and the relevant customer, inasmuch as such
contract   was   independent   of   and   totally   different   from   the
agreement   dated   14.12.1993.   Whenever   there   was   a   direct
agreement   between   the   Respondent   and   its   customers   (not
arranged through the Appellant), the payment was to be made
directly   by   the   customers   to   the   Respondent   for   which   the
Appellant would not be responsible. However, if the transaction
took place pursuant to the agreement dated 14.12.1993, i.e. if
the   Appellant   was   supplying   the   Respondent’s   goods   to
customers booked through the Appellant, the Appellant would be
responsible   for   collecting   the   sale   consideration   from   the
customers,   and   to   remit   the   same   to   the   Respondent   by
deducting commission as agreed. Therefore, the direct agreement
between the Respondent and its customer HTPL in the instant
case would not be binding on the Appellant, and consequently
5
could not have been subjected to the arbitration proceedings that
led to the arbitral award dated 27.06.2001.
9.  On the contrary, the case of the Respondent is that there is
no such distinction within the nature of transactions undertaken
by the Appellant on behalf of the Respondent. Moreover, it is
submitted   that   though   there   was   an   agreement   between   the
Respondent   and   HTPL,   the   terms   of   such   agreement   were
communicated to the Appellant, upon whose acceptance of such
terms the agreement dated 14.12.1993 stood modified to such
extent.
10.  Before proceeding further, we find it necessary to briefly
revisit the existing position of law with respect to the scope of
interference with an arbitral award in India, though we do not
wish   to   burden   this   judgment   by   discussing   the   principles
regarding   the   same   in   detail.   Such   interference   may   be
undertaken   in   terms   of   Section   34   or   Section   37   of   the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the 1996 Act”).
While the former deals with challenges to an arbitral award itself,
the latter,  inter alia, deals with appeals against an order made
under Section 34 setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral
award.
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11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well­settled
by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral
award   and   may   interfere   on   merits   on   the   limited   ground
provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), i.e. if the award is against the
public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through
decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act
in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a
violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of
the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the
existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally,
the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover
compliance   with   statutes   and   judicial   precedents,   adopting   a
judicial   approach,   compliance   with   the   principles   of   natural
justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent
illegality”   itself   has   been   held   to   mean   contravention   of   the
substantive  law  of  India,  contravention  of  the   1996  Act,  and
contravention of the terms of the contract.
It is only if one of these conditions is met that the Court
may interfere with an arbitral award in terms of Section 34(2)(b)
(ii), but such interference does not entail a review of the merits of
the dispute, and is limited to situations where the findings of the
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arbitrator   are   arbitrary,   capricious   or   perverse,   or   when   the
conscience of the Court is shocked, or when the illegality is not
trivial but goes to the root of the matter. An arbitral award may
not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a
possible view based on facts. (See  Associate  Builders  v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49). Also see ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003)
5   SCC   705;  Hindustan   Zinc   Ltd.   v.   Friends   Coal
Carbonisation,   (2006)   4   SCC   445;   and  McDermott
International v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181).
It is relevant to note that after the 2015 amendments to
Section   34,   the   above   position   stands   somewhat   modified.
Pursuant to the insertion of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2), the
scope of contravention of Indian public policy has been modified
to the extent that it now means fraud or corruption in the making
of the award, violation of Section 75 or Section 81 of the Act,
contravention   of   the   fundamental   policy   of   Indian   law,   and
conflict   with   the   most   basic   notions   of   justice   or   morality.
Additionally, sub­section (2A) has been inserted in Section 34,
which provides that in case of domestic arbitrations, violation of
Indian public policy also includes patent illegality appearing on
8
the face of the award. The proviso to the same states that an
award   shall   not   be   set   aside   merely   on   the   ground   of   an
erroneous   application   of   the   law   or   by   re­appreciation   of
evidence.
12.  As far as interference with an order made under Section 34,
as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such
interference   under   Section   37   cannot   travel   beyond   the
restrictions   laid  down   under  Section   34.   In  other   words,   the
Court   cannot   undertake   an   independent   assessment   of   the
merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of
power by the Court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope
of the provision.  Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award
has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by the
Court   in   an   appeal   under   Section   37,   this   Court   must   be
extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.
13.   Having noted the above grounds for interference with an
arbitral award, it must now be noted that the instant question
pertains to determining whether the arbitral award deals with a
dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission   to   arbitration,   or   contains   decisions   on   matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. However, this
9
question   has   been   addressed   by   the   Courts   in   terms   of   the
construction of the contract between the parties, and as such it
can be safely said that a review of such a construction cannot be
made in terms of re­assessment of the material on record, but
only in terms of the principles governing interference with an
award as discussed above.
14.  It is equally important to observe at this juncture that while
interpreting the terms of a contract, the conduct of parties and
correspondences exchanged would also be relevant factors and it
is within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to consider the same. (See
McDermott   International   Inc.   v.   Burn   Standard   Co.   Ltd.
(supra); Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC, (2003) 8 SCC 593,
D.D. Sharma v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 325).
15. We have gone through the material on record as well as the
Majority Award, and the decisions of the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench. The majority of the arbitral tribunal as
well as the Courts found upon a consideration of the material on
record,   including   the   agreement   dated   14.12.1993,   the
correspondence   between   the   parties   and   the   oral   evidence
adduced,   that   the   agreement   does   not   make   any   distinction
10
within the type of customers, and furthermore that the supplies
to   HTPL   were   not   made   in   furtherance   of   any   independent
understanding between the Appellant and the Respondent which
was not governed by the agreement dated 14.12.1993.
16.   The   Appellant   has   highlighted   before   us   several
correspondences addressed to it from the Respondent that refer
to   the   fact   that   sales   to   HTPL   had   been   made   under   the
Respondent’s contract with HTPL. Indeed, it is evident from the
agreement dated 28.07.1994 between HTPL and the Respondent
that a direct agreement existed between them. However, as is
undisputed, the Appellant received its commission in its entirety
for the HTPL transaction, and thus clearly was a beneficiary of
the agreement between the Respondent and HTPL. Moreover, in
this regard, it was rightly observed in the Majority Award that the
Appellant could not show under what separate agreement it was
entitled to commission from such sales other than the agreement
dated 14.12.1993, and for what services, if its only role in the
transaction was to allow HTPL to lift goods from its godowns.
17. Indeed,   it   is   not   the   case   of   the   Appellant   that   it   only
provided   storage   services   to   the   Respondent   by   allowing   the
Respondent to store its goods in the warehouse of the Appellant
11
(i.e. that it only acted as a warehouse for the Respondent). In
fact,   a   series   of   correspondences   amongst   the   Appellant,   the
Respondent and HTPL clearly reveals that the Appellant was also
actively   involved   in   the   transaction   in   question   entered   into
between   the   Respondent   and   HTPL,   and   as   such   was   a
beneficiary   under   their   agreement,   as   observed   supra.   The
Appellant released the Respondent’s goods to HTPL as per the
directions of the Respondent without raising any objection, and
thereafter   engaged   in   correspondence   in   respect   of   the
transaction.
18.  It   would   be   appropriate   to   refer   to   some   such
communications   amongst   the   Appellant,   the   Respondent   and
HTPL for illustrative purposes. For instance, as mentioned by the
Respondent in a communication dated 19.09.1994 addressed to
HTPL, the Appellant was to honour the terms and conditions of
the   agreement   between   the   Respondent   and   HTPL.   The   said
communication also referred to negotiations about issuance of a
letters of credit in favour of the Appellant. Additionally, as can be
seen   from   the   correspondence   from   the   Appellant   to   the
Respondent   dated   26.08.1994,   the   Appellant   wrote   to   it   to
confirm that credit had to be supplied to HTPL at the discounted
12
interest   rate   of   16.25%   p.a.,   which   was   affirmed   by   the
Respondent   on   the   same   day.   At   the   same   time,   the
correspondence dated 28.03.1995 from the Respondent to the
Appellant discloses that a letter of credit issued by HTPL initially
sent  to   the   Respondent   was  forwarded  to   the   Appellant   with
directions  to  despatch  goods  after  verification  of  the letter of
credit and other related papers.
19.  The issuance of letters of credit in the name of the Appellant
with respect to the HTPL transaction was similar to the practice
adopted in case of letters of credit or demand drafts issued in all
other   transactions,   whether   directly   negotiated   by   the
Respondent, or procured through the Appellant, which suggests
that it was the duty of the Appellant in this case as well to ensure
that usance letter of credits issued were bona fide, and in case of
stand­by letters of credit, that they were negotiated in time in
case  of  failure  of  payment  on  the  due  date,  in  terms  of  the
agreement dated 14.12.1993.
20.  The   Courts   also   rightly   relied   upon   the   communication
dated 06.12.1995 from the Respondent to the Appellant adverting
to the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties
and referring to the fact that in respect of the sales made to HTPL
13
in the period of April, May and July 1995, an amount of Rs. 9.2
crores   together   with   interest   was   still   to   be   received.   The
response to the above communication, from the Appellant to the
Respondent, dated 08.12.1995, stated that the Appellant had
taken steps to set the matter right, and that the Appellant had
had certain internal difficulties which had since been resolved
and   the   Respondent   would   have   no   grounds   to   complain
thereafter. This communication clearly demonstrates the duty of
the Appellant to recover the dues from HTPL and forward the
same to the Respondent.
21.  Another important communication rightly relied upon by
the   Courts   is   the   Appellant’s   letter   dated   24.01.1996   to   the
Respondent,   informing   it   about   the   institution   of   a   suit   for
damages   by   HTPL   with   respect   to   the   quality   of   the   goods
supplied.   This   correspondence   refers   to   HTPL   as   a   customer
introduced to the Appellant by the Respondent. Crucially, it was
addressed in terms of the agreement dated 14.12.1993, which
amounts to a clear admission that the sales made to HTPL were
in terms of the said agreement.
22. In this view of the matter, it is not open to the Appellant to
argue that the agreement between the Respondent and HTPL was
14
independent   of   the   agreement   dated   14.12.1993   between   the
Appellant and the Respondent and that the latter did not apply to
such transaction.
23. Moreover, as noticed in the Majority Award and also by the
Courts, the oral evidence of the officers of the Appellant indicates
that the Appellant did not make any effort to ensure that the
letters of credits pertaining to the supplies made to HTPL were
honoured, pointing towards gross negligence on the part of the
Appellant.
24. Based upon the above discussion, in our opinion, the view
taken in the Majority Award, as confirmed by the High Court in
the exercise of its powers under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996
Act, is a possible view based upon a reasonable construction of
the   terms   of   the   agreement   dated   14.12.1993   between   the
Appellant and the Respondent and consideration of the material
on   record.   We   are   also   of   the   opinion   that   the   dispute   was
covered   under   the   agreement   between   the   Appellant   and   the
Respondent   dated   14.12.1993,   and   as   such   the   dispute   is
governed by the arbitration clause under the said agreement.
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the Majority Award on the
ground that the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable.
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25. Appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the order of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 949 of 2002 is
affirmed.
        ……………..…………………..J.
    [Mohan M. Shantanagoudar] 
…………………………………J.
[Vineet Saran]
New Delhi;
February 18, 2019.
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