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Sunday, February 17, 2019

Custody of Child = while determining the question as to which parent the care and control of a child should be given, the paramount consideration remains the welfare and interest of the child and not the rights of the parents under the statute.= Statements made by the parents during the course of mediation may not be relied upon on the ground of confidentiality but natural responses and statements made by the minor to the Counsellor would certainly afford a chance to decide what is in the best interest of the child. A child may respond naturally and spontaneously in its interactions with the Counsellor, who is professionally trained to make the child feel comfortable. Record of such interaction may afford valuable inputs to the Court in discharge of its duties in parens patriae jurisdiction. If during such interaction issues or aspects concerning welfare of a child are noticed, there is no reason why the Court be deprived of access to such aspects. As held by this Court in various judgments, the paramount consideration ought to be to see what is in the best interest of the child. In terms of Sub Rule (viii) of Rule 8, the Counsellor is obliged to give report, inter alia, relating to home environment of the parties concerned, their personalities and their relationship with the child and/or children in order to assist the Judge in deciding the question of guardianship of any child or children. The intention is clear that the normal principle of confidentiality will not apply in matters concerning custody or guardianship issues and the Court, in the best interest of the child, must be equipped with all the material touching upon relevant issues in order to render complete justice. This departure from confidentially is consistent with the underlined theme of the Act in general and Section 12 in particular. Once there is a clear exception in favour of categories stated therein, principles in any other forms of mediation/conciliation or other modes of Alternative Dispute Resolution regarding confidentiality cannot be imported. The effect of such exception cannot be diluted or nullified. In our view, the High Court considered the matter in correct perspective in paragraphs 17 to 20 of its judgment dated 07.02.2017.;who is the “Counsellor” within the meaning of Rule 8; whether the Counsellor who assisted the court in the present matter comes within the four corners of said provision. It is true that under Section 6 the Counsellors are appointed by the State Government in consultation with the High Court. It is also true that the Counsellor in the present case was not the one who was appointed in terms of Section 6 but was appointed by a committee of the High Court and her assistance had been requested for in connection with many matters. The order passed on 06.05.2016 had indicated that the Mediator could join “any other person” as may be deemed necessary for a holistic and effective mediation. The next order dated 11.05.2016 did mention the name of the Counsellor and the fact that the Counsellor had a fruitful meeting with Aditya. The Counsellor, thereafter, interacted with him on 08.07.2016 and 11.07.2016, based on which interaction, a report was submitted on 21.07.2016. The engagement of the Counsellor was thus in complete knowledge of the parties as well as with express acceptance of the High Court. It may be that said Counsellor was not appointed under Section 6 of the Act but if the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, there cannot be undue reliance on a technicality. As a matter of fact, the width of Section 12 of the Act would admit no such restriction. The report given by the Counsellor in the present case cannot, therefore, be eschewed from consideration. It is noteworthy that there was absolutely nothing against the Counsellor and in the judgment under appeal, the High Court went on to observe in para No.30 that the Counsellor was well experienced and known for her commitment and sincerity to secure a settlement which would be satisfactory to all. We do not, therefore, see any reason why the reports in the present case, be kept out of consideration. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment dated 11.12.2017 passed by the High Court and restore the earlier judgment dated 17.02.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi.

 
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit
SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1694 OF 2019
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.9267 OF 2018)
PERRY KANSAGRA ……Appellant
VERSUS
SMRITI MADAN KANSAGRA ..…. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the final Judgment and Order dated 11.12.2017
passed by the High Court of Delhi allowing Review Petition No.221 of 2017
preferred by the respondent against the judgment and order dated 17.02.2017
passed by the High Court of Delhi in MAT App. (F.C.) No.67 of 2016.
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 2
3. The appellant (Kenyan and British Citizen) and Respondent (Indian
Citizen) got married on 29.07.2007 at New Delhi. After marriage, the
Respondent shifted to Nairobi, Kenya and settled into her matrimonial home
with the appellant. A son, named Aditya Vikram Kansagra was born to the
couple on 02.12.2019 at New Delhi. After delivery, the respondent returned
back to Nairobi along with Aditya. Thereafter, the Respondent and Aditya
travelled from Kenya to India on few occasions. Aditya holds Kenyan as well
as British passport.
4. The appellant, Respondent and Aditya came from Nairobi to New Delhi
on 10.03.2012. According to the appellant, the return tickets for travel back
to Nairobi were booked for 06.06.2012. While in India, in May 2012, the
Respondent filed a civil suit registered as CS (OS) No.1604 of 2012 before
the High Court of Delhi praying inter alia for an injunction to restrain the
appellant from removing Aditya from the custody of the Respondent. Upon
notice being issued, the appellant contested the suit in which visitation orders
were passed by the High Court from time to time. The appellant thereafter
filed Guardianship Petition praying inter alia that he be declared the legal
Guardian of Aditya and be given his permanent custody. The Guardianship
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 3
Petition dated 06.11.2012 was registered as No.G-53 of 2012 before the
Family Court, Saket, New Delhi.
5. In terms of visitation orders passed by the High Court, the appellant
along with paternal grandparents were permitted to meet Aditya for 2 hours
on Friday, Saturday and Sunday in the 2nd week of every month. According to
the appellant he flew from Nairobi to New Delhi every month to meet Aditya
along with the paternal grandparents. In view of the pendency of the
guardianship petition, CS (OS) No.1604 of 2012 was disposed of by the High
Court on 31.08.2015, leaving the parties to place their grievances before the
Family Court. The arrangement of visitation was thereafter modified by the
Family Court by its orders dated 09.02.2016 and 09.03.2016.
6. On 18.04.2016, an application was filed by the appellant praying that the
Family Court may direct the Court Counsellor to bring Aditya to the Court for
an in-chamber meeting, which prayer was objected to by the Respondent.
After hearing both sides, the Family Court allowed said application vide
Order dated 04.05.2016, and directed that Aditya be produced before the
Court 07.05.2016. The relevant part of the Order was as under:-
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 4
“…..The court is parens patriae in such proceedings.
Petitioner’s visitation with the child is anyway
scheduled for 07.05.2016. Let the child be produced
before the court at 10 am on 07.05.2016 before he goes
for meeting with his father and grand parents.”
7. The Respondent being aggrieved, filed MAT App. (FC) No.67 of 2016
before the High Court. On 06.05.2016, after hearing both sides, Division
Bench of the High Court referred the parties to mediation and also directed
that Aditya be produced before the Court on 11.05.2016. Paragraphs 7 and 9
of said Order were :-
“7. During our interaction with the parties, a desire is
expressed by the parties to make one more attempt for
a negotiated settlement of all disputes between the
parties by recourse to mediation. The parents of the
respondent are also present and have joined the
proceedings before us. They have also submitted that
they would like to make an attempt for a negotiated
settlement for all disputes between the parties.
 … … … … …
9. With the consent of parties, it is directed as
follows:
(i) The parties shall appear before Ms. Sadhana
Ramchandran, learned Mediator in SAMADHANDelhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre
on 9th May, 2016 at 2:30 pm.
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 5
(ii) It shall be open for the learned Mediator to join
any other person or relative of the parties, as may be
deemed necessary, for a holistic and effective
mediation.
(iii)In case, the respondent or any of his relative are
not available in India, it shall be open for the learned
Mediator to join them by any electronic mode of
communication including Skype, Video Conferencing,
etc. at the cost of the respondent.
(iv) It shall also be open for the learned Mediator to
meet the child at any place, as may be deemed
convenient to her, and to arrange any visitation or
meetings with the respondent of the child with the
consent of the parties.”

8. Thereafter, the matter came up on 11.05.2016. The High Court
interacted with Aditya and following observations were made in paras 2 to 6
of its Order :-
“2. We are also informed that the child has today met
with Ms. Sadhana Ramachandran, learned Mediator as
well as Ms. Swati Shah, Counsellor in SAMADHAN –
Delhi High court Mediation and Conciliation Centre
and that the mediation efforts are still underway.
3. The son of the parties – Master Aditya Vikram
Kansagra has been produced before us today. We have
also had a long conversation with him and are deeply
impressed with the maturity of this intelligent 6½ year
old child who displays self confidence and a
remarkable capacity of expressing himself with clarity.
He exhibits no sign of confusion or nervousness at all.
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 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 6
4. We also note that the child was comfortable in his
interaction with his father and grandparents in court.
The child has expressed happiness at his visitations
with his father and grandparents. He unreservedly
stated that he looks forward to the same. Master
Aditya Vikram Kansagra is also able to identify other
relatives in Kenya and enthusiastically refers to his
experiences in that country. It is apparent that the
child has bonded well with them.
5. We must note that the child is at the same time
deeply attached to his mother and Nani. His bearing
and personality clearly bear the stamp of the fine
upbringing being given to him by the appellant and her
mother.
6. As of now, since 9th February, 2016, the child is
meeting his father and grandparents between 10:30 am
and 05:00 pm on Saturday and Sunday in the second
week of every month and for two hours on Friday in
the second week of every month. The visitation is
supervised as the court has appointed a Counsellor who
has been directed to remain present throughout the
visitation.”
9. During the ensuing mediation sessions, the Mediator and the Counsellor
interacted with Aditya. The Counsellor interacted with Aditya on 08.07.2016
and 11.07.2016. Based upon her interactions with him, the Counsellor
submitted a report dated 21.07.2016 in a sealed cover. Though, mediation
was attempted on many occasions, the parties were unable to resolve their
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 7
disputes and differences and an interim report was submitted by the Mediator
on 22.07.2016. On 11.08.2016, the sealed cover containing the report of the
Counsellor was opened and the report was taken on record. Copies of the
report of the Counsellor were given to the parties. In an application moved
the next day, i.e. on 12.08.2016, the appellant relied upon the report of the
Counsellor dated 21.07.2016 and prayed for permission to speak to Aditya on
telephone. While opposing the prayer, the respondent objected to such
reliance on the ground of confidentiality. The Mediator thereafter filed final
report in November, 2016 reporting failure.
10. Thereafter the matter came up for final arguments before another
Division Bench of the High Court. The Respondent raised the issue of
admissibility of the reports submitted by the Mediator and Counsellor
contending that the reports could not be relied upon in view of principle of
confidentiality. The High Court dealt with said submissions and while
disposing of the appeal, by its judgment dated 17.02.2017 observed as under:-
“10. The mediation has failed.
11. But we are called upon to decide an important
question concerning confidentiality of the mediation
process for the reason on October 11, 2016 a report
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 8
was received from the Mediator which was taken on
record and copy given to both parties. The report of
the Mediator refers to a child counsellor being involved
who had also given an independent report which was
also taken on record.
… … … … … … …
“13. The report of the child counsellor is to the effect
that the child was normal and in spite of being happy
with his mother he seems to idolize his father and
affectionately remembers his house in Kenya; about
which house he loved talking with the counsellor. The
affection and the bond of the child with the father was
commended as the positive attitude of the appellant
who, obviously was not torturing the child. The child
showed his love, affection and comfort for the
appellant, evidenced by he fondly and happily talking
about a recent vacation in Kashmir with his mother.
The child was not uncomfortable with the idea of
making a trip to Kenya.
… … … … … … …
17. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
mediation proceedings are confidential proceedings
and anything disclosed, discussed or proposed by the
parties before the mediator cannot be recorded, much
less divulged. The reason being that very often during
mediations, offers, counter offers and proposals are
made. The ethos of mediation would bar disclosure of
specified communications and writings associated with
mediation. Parties are encouraged during mediation to
engage in honest discussions as regards their problems
and in matrimonial disputes these honest discussions
many a time give rise to a better understanding
between the couple. Such an approach encourages a
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 9
forget and forgive attitude to be formed by the parties.
If either spouse is under an apprehension that the wellmeant deliberations might subsequently be used
against them it would hamper an unreserved
consideration of their problems. The atmosphere of
mutual trust during mediation warrants complete
confidentiality.
18. But where the scope of mediation is the solution of
a child parenting issue, report by a mediator or a child
counsellor concerning the behavior and attitude of the
child would not fall within the bar of confidentiality for
the reason no information shared by the couple is being
brought on record. The mandate of Section 12 of the
Family Courts Act, 1984 cannot be lost sight of.
19. In the instant case, what has been taken on record
during mediation proceedings is the report of the Child
Counsellor and the mediator, which we find are reports
commending the good attitude of both parents who,
unlike many other couples, are not using the child as a
tool to take revenge against the other. As noted above,
the interaction by the previous Division Bench with the
child has been recorded in the order dated May 11,
2016 i.e. the child being equally comfortable with both
parents and having a desire to spend quality time with
not only his mother and relatives from the maternal
side but even with the father and relatives from the
paternal side. Such reports are a neutral evaluation of
expert opinion to a Court to guide the Court as to what
orders need to be passed in the best interest of the
child. These reports are not confidential
communications of the parties.
20. Having answered the issue which incidentally
arose, and noting that otherwise the appeal has been
rendered infructuous, we terminate further proceedings
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 10
in the appeal inasmuch as no orders are now warranted
to be passed in the appeal.
21. The learned Judge Family Court would consider
granting over night interim custody to the respondent
when he is in India by imposing such terms and
conditions which would ensure that the child is not
removed from the territory of India. The issue
concerning the appellant claiming that she has lost the
Kenyan passport of the child and a fresh passport being
issued in the name of the child would also be looked
into by the learned Judge, Family Court.”
11. On 18.03.2017, the respondent filed Review Petition No.221 of 2017
questioning the judgment dated 17.02.2017. The Review Petition was
allowed by yet another Division Bench of High Court by judgment and order
dated 11.12.2017. After posing the question, “..whether the Counsellor’s
report furnished in the course of mediation proceedings or the Mediator’s
report in case of mediation, when the process fails, can be used by either of
the parties during trial”, the High Court concluded that the reports of the
Mediator and the Counsellor “..shall be disregarded by the family court, when
it proceeds to decide the merits of the case”. During the course of its
discussion, the High Court noted Delhi High Court Mediation and
Conciliation Rules, 2004; Format of application of SAMADHAN (the Delhi
High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre); Conciliation rules of
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 11
UNCITRAL; Sections 75 and 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; Mediation Training Manual issued by the Mediation and Conciliation
Project Committee, Supreme Court of India and Chartered Institute of
Arbitrator’s Rules mandating confidentiality in matters pertaining to
mediation and observed as under:-
“21. There can, be no quarrel with the proposition that
the mediation proceedings are confidential and
anything disclosed, discussed or proposed before the
mediator need not be recorded, much less divulged and
that if it is done there would always be an apprehension
that the discussion may be used against the parties and
it would hamper the entire process. The atmosphere of
mutual trust warrants complete confidentiality and the
same is in fact noted in the main judgment. The
petitioner is aggrieved by its later part which notes
“but where the scope of the mediation is resolution of
child parenting issue, the report concerning the
behavior and attitude of the child would not fall within
the bar of confidentiality”. To our mind, this is against
the principle of mediation and charts the course of a
slippery slope, as this judgment would hereafter
discuss.
22. No exceptions are made in the mediation rules
either in our laws or in various jurisdictions mentioned
above to the absolute rule of confidentiality. This
Court held the mandate of Section 12 of the Family
Courts Act, 1984 cannot be lost sight of; yet the issue
is whether the order dated May 6, 2016 was passed
purely under Section 12 of the Family Courts Act,
1984 or it was simply to facilitate mediation of
disputes between the parents of the child.
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 12
… … … … … … … …
25. Section 12 of the 1984 Act, empowers the Family
Court with the discretion to refer the parties to a
counsellor, Undoubtedly, that power also extends to the
appellate court. However, this case has three rather
unusual features: one that the Court never authorized
the mediator to exercise power that is vested statutorily
with it. The discretion to involve or not to involve a
counsellor is the Court’s and is non delegable. The
respondent husband’s argument that the referral order
permitted the mediator to involve “others” cannot be
meant to authorize the exercise of discretion that is
solely vested with the Court. Second, the issue of
confidentiality is to be examined because the mediator
furnished two reports-to the Court, in this case. A
mediator’s position is unique; undoubtedly she (or he)
has professional training and competence to handle
issues that involve intense and bitter struggle over
matrimonial issues, properties, shared household,
custody, (temporary or permanent) and in commercial
matters, issues that have monetary and financial
impacts. In all cases, parties express their fears, their
expectations and their dearly held positions on the
strength of the confidence that they repose in the
mediator and the mediation process- both of which are
reinforced by the absolute cloak of confidentiality.
Given these imperatives, mediator’s reports, where the
process has led to failure, should not record anything
at all. Having regard to this position the fact that a
mediator in a given case, proposes-for all the best and
bona fide reasons, the involvement of a counsellor,
does not in any manner undermine or take away the
Court’s sole power to exercise it. In the eventuality of
the parties’ agreeing, to such a course, they have to be
asked to approach the Court, for appropriate orders: the
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 13
Court would then refer them to the counsellor. The
question of the kind of report to be submitted to the
Court and whether it would be a part of the record
would be known during the course of the proceeding.
In the present case, the parties merely consented.
There is nothing to show that the parties were aware
that the mediator’s report, with regard to not merely
what transpired, but with respect to her reflections,
would be given to the court; nor was there anything to
show that they were aware - when they consented to
the involvement of a counsellor that her report would
be given to the court. The third unusual feature is that
in at least two sittings with the counsellor, the mediator
was present. This “joint” proceeding is, in the opinion
of the Court, unacceptable. It can lead to undesirable
consequences, especially if the mediator and counsellor
proceed to furnish their reports (as they did in this
case). A reading of both reports in the present case,
paints a definite picture to the reader strongly
suggestive of a plausible course of action or
conclusion. It is this, the power of suggestion, which
parties are guaranteed protection from, when they
agree to mediation. Imagine if there were to be a
possibility of divergence of opinion. Where would that
lead? Aside from adding to contentiousness, the Court
too would be left confounded.
… … … … … … … …
29. The observations made in the main judgment
dated February 17, 2017 in effect would permit the
mediators to exercise de facto, or in default, the
exclusive powers of the Court under Section 12 of the
1984 Act, which are non delegable. There is no
question of validation of such action, by a later order of
the Court. The danger of this would be that Courts can
well draw upon such irregularly produced material, to
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 14
arrive at conclusions. The requirement of Section 12
also has to be understood as the mandate of law that
only the Court and no other body can refer the parties
to counseling. The proposition that something which
the law mandates to be performed in one manner and
no other manner “where a power is given to do a
certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done
in that way or not at all”1
 applies with full force. The
order dated May 06, 2016 in this case merely referred
the parties to the mediator and carved out the course
and ambit of mediation. The report of the counsellor
was never sought by the Court, and yet was treated to
be one under Section 12 of the Act of 1984. Had the
Court invoked Section 12 of the Family Courts Act,
1984 it would have clearly spelt out and recorded that
while doing so; and in that sense there ought to have
been a clear invocation of Section 12. The absence of
such reference necessarily meant that the reference to
“others’ meant only those connected with the dispute,
such as family members of either the husband or the
wife, whose participation was to facilitate amicable
dispute resolution, not independent evaluation by a
counsellor in an unguided manner to be incorporated
or annexed to a mediation report.
30. If such a position is allowed as in this case,
mediation may then well be used as a forum for
gathering expert opinion which would then enter the
main file of the case. The mandate of Section 89 of the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, read with Rule 20 and
Rule 21 of the Delhi High Court Mediation and
Conciliation Rules, 2004 provides for confidentiality
and non-disclosure of information shared with the
mediator and during the proceedings of mediation. In
the present case, the help of the counsellor sought by
1Nazir Ahmed v King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 243 followed by State of UP v. Singhara
Singh AIR 1964 SC 358
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 15
the mediator to get holistic settlement between the
parties was not ordered in the manner visualized by
Section 12 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Consequently, neither the report of the mediator nor of
the counsellor could have been allowed to be exhibited.
They are contrary to the mandate of principles
governing the mediation – they undermine party
autonomy and choice; besides, they clearly violate
Section 75 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The
observations in the judgment dated February 17, 2017
to the extent it notes that “the reports of the mediator
as also of the counsellor concerning the behavior and
attitude of the child, especially when the mediation
process has failed would not fall within the bar of
confidentiality and hence cannot be used in any
proceeding…… Such reports are a neutral evaluation
of expert opinion to a Court to guide the Court as to
what orders need to be passed in the best interest of the
child. These reports are not confidential
communications of the parties” and carving a general
exception to mediation confidentiality in child custody
matters and disputes for which the Family Court can
seek the assistance of the counsellor, under Section 12
of the 1984 Act, are hereby recalled. We hasten to add
that this judgment is not a reflection on the mediator
whose unstinted track record is known to all, or the
endeavor of the counsellor, who too is very
experienced in her field. Their commitment and
sincerity to secure a settlement satisfactory to all, and
the mediation process in general, is not doubted; this
judgment should in no way dampen that zeal and
determination that they have displayed.”
12. The view taken by the High Court in allowing the review is presently
under challenge. Mr. Anunya Mehta, learned Advocate for the appellant
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 16
submitted - (a) the High Court exceeded the scope of review jurisdiction as if
it was sitting in appeal over the earlier judgment; that in terms of law laid
down by this court an error which is not self-evident and which is required to
be detected by a process of reasoning cannot be termed as error apparent on
the face of the record; b) the report of the Counsellor was not hit by
confidentiality as it merely recorded the interaction of the Counsellor with the
child and did not record any information or submission by parties to the lis;
that there is a recognized exception to the rule of confidentiality in child
custody matters as the court, in such matters exercises parens patriae
jurisdiction.
Mr. Saurabh Kirpal, learned Advocate for the respondent responded -
(i) mediation reports are part of confidential proceedings and cannot be
permitted to be used in court proceedings for which reliance was placed on
various statutory provisions; (ii) the Counsellor was not appointed under
Section 6 of the Family Courts Act; (iii) exception under Rule 8 (viii) to (xiv)
of the Family Court Rules cannot be read as exception to Rules 20 and 23 of
the Mediation Rules; (iv) the mediation reports given by the Counsellor-inmediation did not fall within the exceptions provided in rule 8; (v) there was
no waiver of confidentiality and the respondent had objected to the use of the
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
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 17
reports at the first instance; (vi) the earlier order being based on a
misconception of law, the High Court was right in exercising review
jurisdiction.
13. The issues that arise for our consideration can broadly be put under two
heads:
a) Whether the High Court was justified in exercising review
jurisdiction and setting aside the earlier judgment and
b) Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the reports of
the Mediator and the Counsellor in this case were part of confidential
proceedings and no party could be permitted to use the same in any
court proceedings or could place any reliance on such reports.
14. As regards the first issue, relying on the decisions of this Court in
Inderchand Jain (dead) through Lrs. vs. Motilal (dead) through Lrs.2
, Ajit
Kumar Rath vs. State of Orissa and others3
 and Parsion Devi and others vs.
Sumitri Devi and others4
, it was submitted by the appellant that the exercise
of review jurisdiction was not warranted at all. In Inderchand Jain2
 it was
observed in paras 10, 11 and 33 are as under:-
2
 (2009) 14 SCC 663
3
(1999) 9 SCC 596
4
(1997) 8 SCC 715
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“10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review
court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A
rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It
constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a
judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be
altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent
jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order.
11. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas
v. Union of India5
 this Court held: (SCC p. 251, para
56)
“56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can
be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to
substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within
the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of
power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in
disguise.”
… … … … … … … … … …
33. The High Court had rightly noticed the review
jurisdiction of the court, which is as under:
“The law on the subject—exercise of power of review,
as propounded by the Apex Court and various other
High Courts may be summarised as hereunder:
(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal
and have to be strictly confined to the scope and
ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when
some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record
is found. But error on the face of record must be such
an error which must strike one on mere looking at the
5
(2000) 6 SCC 224
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record and would not require any long-drawn process
of reasoning on the points where there may
conceivably be two opinions.
(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on merits.
(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for
any sufficient reason which is wide enough to
include a misconception of fact or law by a court or
even an advocate.
(v) An application for review may be necessitated
by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae
neminem gravabit.”
In our opinion, the principles of law enumerated by it, in
the facts of this case, have wrongly been applied.”
In Ajit Kumar Rath3
, it was observed:-
 “29. In review proceedings, the Tribunal deviated
from the principles laid down above which, we must
say, is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to
rewrite a judgment by which the controversy had been
finally decided. This, we are constrained to say, is not
the scope of review under Section 22(3)(f) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985…………”
Similarly, in Parsion Devi4
the principles were summarized as under:
“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be
open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record. An error which is
not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
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the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its
power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC
it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
“reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be
allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.
15. On the other hand, reliance was placed by the respondent on the decision
in Board of Control for Cricket in India and another vs. Netaji Cricket Club
and others6
 to submit that exercise in review would be justified if there be
misconception of fact or law. Para 90 of said decision was to the following
effect:
“90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which
would include a mistake in the nature of the
undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An
application for review would also be maintainable if
there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would
constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts
and circumstances of the case. The words “sufficient
reason” in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide
enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a
court or even an advocate. An application for review
may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine
“actus curiae neminem gravabit”.”
6
(2005) 4 SCC 741
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16. We have gone through both the judgments of the High Court in the
instant case and considered rival submissions on the point. It is well settled
that an error which is required to be detected by a process of reasoning can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. To justify
exercise of review jurisdiction, the error must be self-evident. Tested on this
parameter, the exercise of jurisdiction in the present case was not correct.
The exercise undertaken in the present case, in our considered view, was as
if the High Court was sitting in appeal over the earlier decision dated
17.02.2017. Even assuming that there was no correct appreciation of facts
and law in the earlier judgment, the parties could be left to challenge the
decision in an appeal. But the review was not a proper remedy at all. In our
view, the High Court erred in entertaining the review petition and setting aside
the earlier view dated 17.02.2017. Having so concluded, the logical course in
the circumstances would be to set aside the judgment under appeal and permit
the respondent to challenge the judgment dated 17.02.2017. But such a
course would entail further litigation and therefore, we have considered the
matter from the stand point of second issue as well.
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17. At the outset, we must, therefore, consider various provisions on which
reliance was placed by either side.
18. The Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was
enacted to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to
promote conciliation and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to
marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. Section 4
deals with “appointment of Judges” and sub-section (4) states that while
selecting persons for appointment as Judges – every endeavor shall be made
to ensure that persons committed to the need inter alia to promote the welfare
of children and to promote settlement of disputes by conciliation and
counselling, are selected. Under Section 6 Counsellors can be appointed by
the State Government in consultation with the High Court. Section 7 deals
with “jurisdiction” and under sub clause (g) of sub-section (1) the jurisdiction
extends in relation to guardianship issues, or the custody of, or access to, any
minor. Section 9 deals with “duty of Family Court to make efforts for
settlement” and empowers the Court, subject to any rules made by the High
Court, to follow such procedure as may be deemed fit. Section 10 deals with
“procedure generally” and states inter alia that Family Court can lay down its
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own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement. Section 12 deals with
“assistance of medical and welfare experts” and Section 20 gives overriding
effect to the Act. Section 21 enables the High Court to frame rules which may
inter alia provide for “efforts which may be made by, and the procedure
which may be followed by, a Family Court for assisting and persuading
parties to arrive at a settlement”.
The relevant Sections being Sections 6, 9 and 12 of the Act are as
under:-
“6. Counsellors, officers and other employees of
Family Courts. – (1) The State Government shall in
consultation with the High Court, determine the
number and categories of counsellors, officers and
other employees required to assist a Family Court in
the discharge of its functions and provide the Family
Court with such counsellors, officers and other
employees as it may think fit.
(2) The terms and conditions of association of the
counsellors and the terms and conditions of service of
the officers and other employees, referred to in subsection (1), shall be such as may be specified by rules
made by the State Government.
9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for
settlement – (1) In every suit or proceeding, endeavor
shall be made by the Family Court in the first instance,
where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature
and circumstances of the case, to assist and persuade
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the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the
subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this
purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made
by the High Court, follow such procedure as it may
deem fit.
(2). If, in any suit or proceeding, at any stage, it
appears to the Family Court that there is a reasonable
possibility of a settlement between the parties, the
Family Court may adjourn the proceedings for such
period as it think fit to enable attempts to be made to
effect such a settlement.
(3) The power conferred by sub-section (2) shall
be in addition to, and not in derogation of any other
power of the Family Court to adjourn the proceedings.
12. Assistance of medical and welfare experts.- In
every suit or proceedings, it shall be open to a Family
Court to secure the services of a medical expert or such
person (preferably a woman where available), whether
related to the parties or not, including a person
professionally engaged in promoting the welfare of the
family as the court may think fit, for the purposes of
assisting the Family Court in discharging the functions
imposed by this Act.”
19. Pursuant to the rule making power, the High Court of Delhi notified
the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the
Rules). Rule 5 deals with Institution of Proceedings while Rule 8 deals with
procedure to be followed to arrive at a settlement. Rule 8 is to the following
effect.
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“8. Procedure to be followed to arrive at a settlement
(i) In every suit or proceeding the Judge may, at any
stage, direct the parties to attend a counsellor with a
view to promote conciliation and to secure speedy
settlement of disputes.
(ii) The parties shall be bound to attend the counsellor
on the date and time fixed by the Judge.
(iii)The counsellor may require the parties or any one
of them to appear on a date and time fixed for further
counselling. In case any of the parties fails to appear,
the counsellor may report the matter to the Judge and
the Judge shall pass such orders including awarding of
costs, as the circumstances of the case may require.
The Judge may nevertheless require the counsellor to
submit a report.
(iv) The counsellor, in the discharge of his duties may:-
(a) Pay visits to the homes of both or any of the
parties.
(b) Interview, relatives, friends and
acquaintances of the parties or any of them.
(c) Seek such information from the employer of
any of the parties, as may be deemed necessary.
v) With the prior permission of the Judge the
counsellor may:-
a) refer the parties to an expert in other areas,
such as medicine or psychiatry.
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b) seek assistance of any of the institutions,
organizations or persons mentioned in Section 5
of the Act.
vi) The counsellor shall maintain a diary in respect of
every case giving in brief the steps taken.
vii) Information gathered by the counsellor, any
statement made before the counsellor or any notes or
report prepared by the counsellor will be treated as
confidential. The counsellor shall not be called upon to
disclose such information, statements, notes or report
to any court except with the consent of both the parties.
viii) The counsellor shall not be asked to give evidence
in any court in respect of such information statements
or notes.
Provided, however, that the counsellor will submit
to the Judge a report relating to the home environment
of the parties concerned, their personalities and their
relationship with their child and/or children in order to
assist the Judge in deciding the question of the custody
or guardianship of any child or children of the
marriage.
Provided further that the counsellor will also submit to
the Judge a report relating to the home environment,
income or standard of living of the party or parties
concerned in order to assist the Judge in determining
the amount of maintenance and/or alimony to be
granted to one of the parties.
ix) The Judge may also request the counsellor to
submit a report on any other matter, the Judge consider
necessary.
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x) A copy of any report may be supplied to the
parties, on such request being made by the parties.
xi) The parties will be entitled to make their
submissions on the report.
xii) The counsellor shall not be asked to give evidence
in any court in respect of any report made by him.
xiii) Save as aforesaid, the counsellor will submit a
brief memorandum to the Judge informing the Judge of
the outcome of the proceedings within the time
specified by the Judge.
xiv)When the parties arrive at a settlement before the
counsellor relating to the dispute or any part thereof,
such settlement shall be reduced to writing and shall be
signed by the parties and countersigned by the
counsellor. The Judge shall pronounce a decree or
order in terms thereof unless the Judge considers the
terms of the settlement unconscionable or unlawful.
xv) Cohabitation between the parties in the course of
conciliation proceedings will not be deemed to be
condonation of the matrimonial offence.
xvi)Even after passing of the decree or order the Judge
may require the counsellor to supervise the placement
of children in custody of a party and to pay surprise
visits to the home where the child resides. In case any
alternation is required in the arrangements the
counsellor will make a report to the Judge. The Judge
may after notice to the parties pass such orders as
Judge may deem fit.
xvii)The Judge may require the counsellor to
supervise, guide and/or assist reconciled couples, even
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after the disposal of the case for such further period as
the court may order.
xviii) On a request received from the counsellor
the Judge may issue process to any person to appear
before the counsellor at such place, date and time as
may be desired by the counsellor.”
20. Since reliance has been placed on various other statutory provisions to
bring home the issue regarding confidentiality in mediation process, some of
those provisions are also extracted herein:-
A] Sections 75 and 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are
to the following effect:-
“75. Confidentiality – Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force,
the conciliator and the parties shall keep confidential
all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings.
Confidentiality shall extend also to the settlement
agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for
purposes of implementation and enforcement.
81. Admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.
– The parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence
in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such
proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of
the conciliation proceedings,-
(a) views expressed or suggestions made by the other
party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;
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(b) admissions made by the other party in the course
of the conciliation proceedings;
(c) proposals made by the conciliator;
(d) the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the
conciliator.”
B] Rule 20 of the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre
(SAMADHAN) is to the following effect:-
“Rule 20: Confidentiality, disclosure and
inadmissibility of information.
(a) When a Mediator /Conciliator receives factual
information concerning the dispute(s) from any
party, he shall disclose the substance of that
information to the other party, so that the other party
may have an opportunity to present such
explanation as it may consider appropriate.
Provided that, when a party gives information to the
Mediator/Conciliator subject to a specific condition
that it be kept confidential, the Mediator/Conciliator
shall not disclose that information to the other party.
(b)Receipt or perusal, or preparation of records, reports
or other documents by the Mediator/Conciliator,
while serving in that capacity shall be confidential
and the Mediator/Conciliator shall not be compelled
to divulge information regarding those documents
nor as to what transpired during the
Mediator/Conciliator before any Court or tribunal
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or any other authority or any person or group of
persons.
(c) Parties shall maintain confidentiality in respect of
events that transpired during the Mediation/
Conciliation and shall not rely on or introduce the
said information in other proceedings as to:
(i) views expressed by a party in the course of
the mediation/conciliation proceedings;
(ii) documents obtained during the
mediation/conciliation which were expressly
required to be treated as confidential or other
notes, drafts or information given by the
parties or the Mediator/Conciliator;
(iii) proposals made or views expressed by the
Mediator/Conciliator.
(iv) admission made by a party in the course of
mediation/conciliation proceedings;
(v) The fact that a party had or had not indicated
willingness to accept a proposal.
d) There shall be no audio or video recording of the
mediation/conciliation proceedings.
e) No statement of parties or the witnesses shall be
recorded by the Mediator/Conciliator.”
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C] The format of the application which the Centre for Mediation and
Conciliation (SAMADHAN) requires every party to fill in is to the
following effect :-
“I agree to attend all the Mediation Sessions at the time
and place fixed by the Mediator. Any party can
withdraw from mediation if they so choose on finding
that it is not helping them or their case. Each party will
bear its own lawyer’s fees. Each party will also share
the cost of the Mediator’s fees equally, unless the Court
directs otherwise.
The entire process of mediation will be confidential
and whatever is submitted to the Mediator will not be
divulged or produced or be admissible in any Court
proceedings. The Mediator will not be compelled to
appear as a witness in any Court of law.
The mediation process is voluntary and not binding on
the parties till they, on their own volition, reach a
settlement agreement and sign the same.”
D] Certain other provisions relied upon by the respondent are:-
“i) The UNICITRAL Conciliation Rules contain Article
14, which provides for confidentiality of all matters
relating to conciliation.
ii) That Section of the Uniform Mediation Act, USA,
2003, provides for privilege against disclosure,
admissibility and discovery of communication and
information exchanged during mediation process.
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iii) That Rule of the Honk Kong International Arbitration
Centre Rules mandates mediation to be a private and a
confidential process.
iv) The Code of Practice of Family Mediators followed
by the Family Mediation Council, England and Wales in
paragraph 5.5 provides that the Mediator must not
disclose any information about, or obtained in the course
of the mediation to anyone, including a court appointed
officer or court, without express consent of each
participant, an order of the court or where the law imposes
an overriding obligation of disclosure on Mediator to do
so.
v) The Family Justice Courts, Singapore also mandates
that all information and matters discussed during the
Family Dispute Resolution Conferences, counselling,
mediation or co-mediation are to be confidential.
vi) The Members Code of Professional Conduct of
Family Mediation Canada in Article 7 extends the
principle of confidentiality to the documents prepared
specifically for or resulting from mediation.
vii) The California Rules of Court, 2017 also provides for
confidentiality to be maintained in mediation relating to
child custody matters.”
21. In Afcons Infrastructure Limited and another vs. Cherian Varkey
Construction Company Private Limited and others7
 while dealing with
issues concerning scope and width of Section 89 Civil Procedure Code and
7
(2010) 8 SCC 24
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 33
the modalities of Alternative Dispute Resolution mentioned therein, this Court
noted various kinds of disputes in respect of which process of Alternative
Dispute Resolution has normally been found to be suitable. Para 28 of the
decision was as under:-
“28. All other suits and cases of civil nature in
particular the following categories of cases (whether
pending in civil courts or other special
tribunals/forums) are normally suitable for ADR
processes:
(i) All cases relating to trade, commerce and contracts,
including
• disputes arising out of contracts (including all money
claims);
• disputes relating to specific performance;
• disputes between suppliers and customers;
• disputes between bankers and customers;
• disputes between developers/builders and customers;
• disputes between landlords and tenants/licensor and
licensees;
• disputes between insurer and insured;
(ii) All cases arising from strained or soured
relationships, including
• disputes relating to matrimonial causes, maintenance,
custody of children;
• disputes relating to partition/division among family
members/coparceners/co-owners; and
• disputes relating to partnership among partners.
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 34
(iii) All cases where there is a need for continuation of
the pre-existing relationship in spite of the disputes,
including
• disputes between neighbours (relating to
easementary rights, encroachments, nuisance, etc.);
• disputes between employers and employees;
• disputes among members of
societies/associations/apartment owners’ associations;
(iv) All cases relating to tortious liability, including
• claims for compensation in motor accidents/other
accidents; and
(v) All consumer disputes, including
• disputes where a
trader/supplier/manufacturer/service provider is keen to
maintain his business/professional reputation and
credibility or product popularity.
The above enumeration of “suitable” and “unsuitable”
categorisation of cases is not intended to be exhaustive
or rigid. They are illustrative, which can be subjected
to just exceptions or additions by the court/tribunal
exercising its jurisdiction/discretion in referring a
dispute/case to an ADR process.”
22. In Moti Ram (dead) through Lrs. and another vs. Ashok Kumar and
another8
 it was held that mediation proceedings are totally confidential and in
case the mediation is unsuccessful, the Mediator should not write anything
8
(2011) 1 SCC 466
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that was discussed, proposed or done during the mediation proceedings. The
observations in that behalf were:-
“2. In this connection, we would like to state that
mediation proceedings are totally confidential
proceedings. This is unlike proceedings in court which
are conducted openly in the public gaze. If the
mediation succeeds, then the mediator should send the
agreement signed by both the parties to the court
without mentioning what transpired during the
mediation proceedings. If the mediation is
unsuccessful, then the mediator should only write one
sentence in his report and send it to the court stating
that the “mediation has been unsuccessful”. Beyond
that, the mediator should not write anything which was
discussed, proposed or done during the mediation
proceedings. This is because in mediation, very often,
offers, counter offers and proposals are made by the
parties but until and unless the parties reach to an
agreement signed by them, it will not amount to any
concluded contract. If the happenings in the mediation
proceedings are disclosed, it will destroy the
confidentiality of the mediation process.”
Similarly, while dealing with a matter arising under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, it was held by this Court in Govind Prasad Sharma
and others vs. Doon Valley Officers Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.9
that “both the Conciliator and the parties must keep as confidential all matters
relating to conciliation proceedings”.
9 AIR 2017 SC 4968 : 2017 (11) SCALE 231
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23. Reliance was placed by the respondent on the decisions mentioned above
and some statutory provisions including procedural norms in different
jurisdictions to submit that there must be absolute confidentiality in respect of
any statements made during the course of mediation. The appellant, however,
relies upon Sub-Rule(viii) of Rule 8 of the Rules in support of the submission
that in relation to matters, inter alia, of custody or guardianship of any child
or children, the Counsellor could be asked to submit to the Judge a report
relating to home environment of the parties concerned, their personalities and
their relationship with the child and or children in order to assist the Judge in
deciding the questions involved in the matter.
24. We, thus, have line of cases dealing with mediation/conciliation and
other proceedings in general and Rule 8 of the Rules dealing inter alia, with
custody issues which is in the nature of an exception to the norms of
confidentiality. It is true that the process of mediation is founded on the
element of confidentiality. Qualitatively, Mediation or Conciliation stands on
a completely different footing as against regular adjudicatory processes.
Instead of an adversarial stand in adjudicatory proceedings, the idea of
mediation is to resolve the dispute at a level which is amicable rather than
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 37
adversarial. In the process, the parties may make statements which they
otherwise they would not have made while the matter was pending
adjudication before a court of law. Such statements which are essentially
made in order to see if there could be a settlement, ought not to be used
against the maker of such statements in case at a later point the attempts at
mediation completely fail. If the statements are allowed to be used at
subsequent stages, the element of confidence which is essential for healthy
mediation/conciliation would be completely lost. The element of
confidentiality and the assurance that the statements would not be relied upon
helps the parties bury the hatchet and move towards resolution of the disputes.
The confidentiality is, thus, an important element of mediation/conciliation.
25. Complete adherence to confidentiality would absolutely be correct in
normal matters where the role of the court is purely of an adjudicator. But
such an approach may not essentially be conducive when the court is called
upon and expected to discharge its role in the capacity as parens patriae and
is concerned with the welfare of a child. All custody and guardianship issues
are resolved on the touchstone or parameter of “best interest of the child”. In
custody and guardianship disputes between two parties, a minor child is in a
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peculiar situation. At times, both sides are busy fighting legal battles and the
court is called upon in parens patriae to decide what is in the best interest of
the child. In order to reach correct conclusion, the court may interview the
child or may depend upon the analysis of an expert who may spend some
more time with the child and gauge the upbringing, personality, desires or
mental frame of the child and render assistance to the court. It is precisely for
this reason that the element of confidentiality which is otherwise the basic
foundation of mediation/conciliation, to a certain extent, is departed from in
Sub-Rule (viii) of Rule 8 of the Rules.
26. If the reports of the Counsellor touching upon the home environment of
the parties concerned, their personalities and their relationship with their child
or children would assist the court in determining the custody or guardianship
issues, any technicality ought not to stand in the way. Sub-Rule (viii) of Rule
8 seeks to achieve that purpose and makes such material available for the
assessment of the court. The observations of this Court in Ashish Ranjan vs.
Anupma Tandon and another10 have crystalized the approach to be adopted
in matters concerning custody or guardianship issues. Paras 18 & 19 of the
decision are as under:
10 (2010) 14 SCC 274
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“18. It is settled legal proposition that while
determining the question as to which parent the care
and control of a child should be given, the paramount
consideration remains the welfare and interest of the
child and not the rights of the parents under the statute.
Such an issue is required to be determined in the
background of the relevant facts and circumstances and
each case has to be decided on its own facts as the
application of doctrine of stare decisis remains
irrelevant insofar as the factual aspects of the case are
concerned. While considering the welfare of the child,
the “moral and ethical welfare of the child must also
weigh with the court as well as his physical wellbeing”. The child cannot be treated as a property or a
commodity and, therefore, such issues have to be
handled by the court with care and caution, with love,
affection and sentiments applying human touch to the
problem. Though, the provisions of the special statutes
which govern the rights of the parents or guardians
may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which
can stand in the way of the court exercising its parens
patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases. (Vide Gaurav
Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal11.)
19. The statutory provisions dealing with the custody
of the child under any personal law cannot and must
not supersede the paramount consideration as to what
is conducive to the welfare of the minor. In fact, no
statute on the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate
the vital factor of the welfare of the minor. (Vide
Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw12
,
Chandrakala Menon v. Vipin Menon13
, Nil Ratan
11(2009) 1 SCC 42 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2009 SC 557
12 (1987) 1 SCC 42 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 13 : AIR 1987 SC 3
13 (1993) 2 SCC 6 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 485
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Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu14
, Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral
Mittal15 and Athar Hussain v. Syed Siraj Ahmed16.)”
27. Statements made by the parents during the course of mediation may not
be relied upon on the ground of confidentiality but natural responses and
statements made by the minor to the Counsellor would certainly afford a
chance to decide what is in the best interest of the child. A child may respond
naturally and spontaneously in its interactions with the Counsellor, who is
professionally trained to make the child feel comfortable. Record of such
interaction may afford valuable inputs to the Court in discharge of its duties in
parens patriae jurisdiction. If during such interaction issues or aspects
concerning welfare of a child are noticed, there is no reason why the Court be
deprived of access to such aspects. As held by this Court in various
judgments, the paramount consideration ought to be to see what is in the best
interest of the child.
28. In terms of Sub Rule (viii) of Rule 8, the Counsellor is obliged to give
report, inter alia, relating to home environment of the parties concerned, their
personalities and their relationship with the child and/or children in order to
14 (2008) 9 SCC 413
15 (2010) 1 SCC 591 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 192
16 (2010) 2 SCC 654 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 528
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assist the Judge in deciding the question of guardianship of any child or
children. The intention is clear that the normal principle of confidentiality
will not apply in matters concerning custody or guardianship issues and the
Court, in the best interest of the child, must be equipped with all the material
touching upon relevant issues in order to render complete justice. This
departure from confidentially is consistent with the underlined theme of the
Act in general and Section 12 in particular. Once there is a clear exception in
favour of categories stated therein, principles in any other forms of
mediation/conciliation or other modes of Alternative Dispute Resolution
regarding confidentiality cannot be imported. The effect of such exception
cannot be diluted or nullified. In our view, the High Court considered the
matter in correct perspective in paragraphs 17 to 20 of its judgment dated
07.02.2017.
29. There is, however, one aspect which must also be considered and that is
who is the “Counsellor” within the meaning of Rule 8 and whether the
Counsellor who assisted the court in the present matter comes within the four
corners of said provision. It is true that under Section 6 the Counsellors are
appointed by the State Government in consultation with the High Court. It is
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 42
also true that the Counsellor in the present case was not the one who was
appointed in terms of Section 6 but was appointed by a committee of the High
Court and her assistance had been requested for in connection with many
matters. The order passed on 06.05.2016 had indicated that the Mediator
could join “any other person” as may be deemed necessary for a holistic and
effective mediation. The next order dated 11.05.2016 did mention the name
of the Counsellor and the fact that the Counsellor had a fruitful meeting with
Aditya. The Counsellor, thereafter, interacted with him on 08.07.2016 and
11.07.2016, based on which interaction, a report was submitted on
21.07.2016. The engagement of the Counsellor was thus in complete
knowledge of the parties as well as with express acceptance of the High
Court. It may be that said Counsellor was not appointed under Section 6 of
the Act but if the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, there
cannot be undue reliance on a technicality. As a matter of fact, the width of
Section 12 of the Act would admit no such restriction. The report given by
the Counsellor in the present case cannot, therefore, be eschewed from
consideration. It is noteworthy that there was absolutely nothing against the
Counsellor and in the judgment under appeal, the High Court went on to
observe in para No.30 that the Counsellor was well experienced and known
 SLP(C)No.9267 of 2018
 Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra
 43
for her commitment and sincerity to secure a settlement which would be
satisfactory to all.
30. We do not, therefore, see any reason why the reports in the present case,
be kept out of consideration.
31. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment dated 11.12.2017
passed by the High Court and restore the earlier judgment dated 17.02.2017
passed by the High Court of Delhi. There shall be no order as to costs.
…………..…..……..……J.
 (Abhay Manohar Sapre)
....………….……………J.
 (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
February 15, 2019 

whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a criminal offence. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the court. 24 In the present case, the son of the appellants has instituted a civil suit for the recovery of money against the first respondent. The suit is pending. The first respondent has filed the complaint against the appellants six years after the date of the alleged transaction and nearly three years from the filing of the suit. The averments in the complaint, read on its face, do not disclose the ingredients 13 necessary to constitute offences under the Penal Code. An attempt has been made by the first respondent to cloak a civil dispute with a criminal nature despite the absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute a criminal offence. The complaint filed by the first respondent against the appellants constitutes an abuse of process of court and is liable to be quashed.


Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 238 OF 2019
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) No. 1434 OF 2018
PROF R K VIJAYASARATHY & ANR .... APPELLANTS

Versus
SUDHA SEETHARAM & ANR ....RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 The present appeal arises from the judgment and final order dated 1
January 2016 of the High Court of Karnataka, rejecting the prayer of the
appellants to quash the criminal proceedings instituted by the first respondent
against them. The High Court stayed the criminal proceedings till the disposal of
a pending civil suit instituted by the son of the appellants against the first
respondent.
3 The facts relevant to the present dispute are thus:
Rajiv Vijayasarathy Ratnam, (the son of the appellants) and Savitha Seetharam
(the daughter of the first respondent) were married on 24 May 2002. They moved
1
to the United States of America and a child was born to them in 2009. Savitha
was involved in a car accident on 5 February 2010 and proceedings were
initiated against her abroad. It is alleged by the appellants that fearing the
attachment of their son’s property in the proceedings, an amount of Rs 20 lakhs
was transferred by Rajiv to the bank account of the first respondent on 17
February 2010. Following a breakdown in marital relations, Savitha and Rajiv
have been living separately since October 2010. Multiple rounds of litigation
ensued in various courts.
4 Savitha filed a private complaint1
 against her husband Rajiv and the
appellants alleging the commission of various offences, including criminal
intimidation and a demand for dowry. The High Court of Karnataka quashed the
proceeding against appellant No. 2. On 14 February 2013, Rajiv filed a civil suit
for recovery of money2
 against the first respondent for the return of the money
allegedly transferred by him into her bank account. The suit is pending. Two
divorce petitions instituted by Savita have been dismissed by the family court.
5 On 25 February 2016, the first respondent filed a private complaint3
against the appellants which forms the subject matter of the present appeal. The
first respondent alleges that the amount of Rs 20 Lakhs which was transferred by
the son of the appellants was returned in cash to the appellants with interest of
Rs 24,000 on 1 July 2010. No receipt was allegedly received by the first
respondent. It is alleged that the appellants and their son have colluded to siphon
the money and that the civil suit filed by the son of the appellants is without merit.
1 PCR No. 3418 of 2012; FIR No. 18 of 2012 registered on 23 February 2012
2 O. S. No. 1305 of 2013
3 PCR 2116 of 2016
2
On 11 May 2016, the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate referred the complaint
for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
On 19 May 2016, a First Information Report4
 was registered under Sections 405,
406, 415 and 420 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Aggrieved by the
judgment and final order of the High Court rejecting their petition to quash the
FIR, the appellants have filed the present appeal.
6 Mr Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the appellants
urged the following submissions:
i) No offence is made out from the averments in the complaint as they stand;
ii) The first respondent has admitted that the amount which forms the subject
matter of the present dispute was received from the son of the appellants;
iii) The subject matter of the present dispute is of a civil nature and the criminal
complaint constitutes an abuse of the process of the court; and
iv) The allegations in the present complaint are similar to the previous complaint
filed by the daughter of the first respondent.
7 On the other hand, Ms Pritha Srikumar, learned counsel for the
respondents urged the following submissions:
i) The criminal proceeding is not liable to be quashed as the allegations in the
complaint disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under
Sections 405, 406, 415 and 420 of the Penal Code;
ii) The appellants have colluded with their son to siphon the money as no receipt
was given to the first respondent when the amount of Rs 20,24,000 was
transferred; and
iii) The law does not require that the complaint should reproduce verbatim every
ingredient of the criminal offence in the complaint.
4 FIR
3
8 The rival submissions fall for our consideration.
9 The primary question before this Court is whether the High Court has erred
in rejecting the plea of the appellants for quashing the criminal proceedings
against them. The question at the heart of the present dispute is whether the
averments in the complaint disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute an
offence under the Penal Code.
10 Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure saves the inherent power of
the High Court to make orders necessary to secure the ends of justice. In Indian
Oil Corpn. v NEPC India Ltd.
5
, a two judge Bench of this Court reviewed the
precedents on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973 and formulated guiding principles in the following terms:
“12. …
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a
whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations.
Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the
material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness
of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while
examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse
of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding
is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for
wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle
or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used
sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the
legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary
factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the
5 (2006) 6 SCC 736
4
ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail,
the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the
complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft
of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for
making out the offence.
(v) …”
11 The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, is required to examine whether the averments in the
complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for an offence alleged under the
Penal Code. If the averments taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients
necessary for the offence, the criminal proceedings may be quashed under
Section 482. A criminal proceeding can be quashed where the allegations made
in the complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence under the Penal
Code. The complaint must be examined as a whole, without evaluating the merits
of the allegations. Though the law does not require that the complaint reproduce
the legal ingredients of the offence verbatim, the complaint must contain the
basic facts necessary for making out an offence under the Penal Code.
12 The first respondent has alleged in the complaint that the appellants have
committed offences under Sections 405, 406, 415 and 420 read with Section 34
of the Penal Code. It would thus be necessary to examine the ingredients of the
above offences and whether the allegations made in the complaint, read on their
face, attract those offences under the Penal Code.
13 Section 405 of the Penal Code reads thus:
“Section 405.- Criminal breach of trust.- Whoever, being in
any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion
5
over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the
mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the
discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so
to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.
A careful reading of Section 405 shows that the ingredients of a criminal breach
of trust are as follows:
i) A person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with
dominion over property;
ii) That person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to their own use
that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer
any other person to do so; and
iii) That such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation
of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the
discharge of such trust.
Entrustment is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly
misappropriates property entrusted to them contrary to the terms of an obligation
imposed is liable for a criminal breach of trust and is punished under Section 406
of the Penal Code6
.
14 Section 415 of the Penal Code reads thus:
“Section 415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
6 Section 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.- Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
6
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which
act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm
to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
“cheat”.”
The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating are as follows:
i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving
him;
ii) (a) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any
property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property,
or
(b) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to do or to omit to
do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b) above, the act or omission should be one which
caused or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind,
reputation or property.
A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence. A
person who dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property is liable
for the offence of cheating.
15 Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus:
“Section 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing deliver
of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a
valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and
7
which is capable to being converted into a valuable security,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.”
The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows:
i) A person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and
ii) The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to
(a) deliver property to any person; or
(b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed
and capable of being converted into valuable security.
Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under
Section 420.
16 A court exercising its inherent jurisdiction must examine if on their face, the
averments made in the complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for the
offence. The relevant extract of the complaint filed by the first respondent is
extracted below:
“The accused person’s son Mr. Rajiv Vijayasarathy Ratnam
started to transfer all his monies to different accounts and
also transferred some monies belonging to him in the US to
his parents accounts in Bangalore, India and he also
pleaded his wife i.e. Complainant’s daughter that he also
wanted to divert some funds unto Complainant’s account
in Bangalore…That Rajiv Vijayasarathy Ratnam diverted
some of his monies to Accused No. 1 and 2 and the
Complainant…
It is further pertinent to mention that the accident occurred on
05.02.2010 and money was transferred on 17.02.2010, the
transfer was due to the insecurity at the behest of Mr.
Rajiv Vijayasarathy Rathnam, the money was not sought
or required by the complainant.
8
The Complainant daughter Ms. Savitha Seetharam convinced
the Complainant to accept transfer of monies which was for
the benefit of the Accused person’s son Mr. Rajiv
Vijayasarathy Ratnam and to hold it in trust for him and
accordingly the son of the accused transferred monies on
17th February 2010 to the Complainant account Rs.
20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs only) … It is pertinent to
mention that the accused person’s son Mr. Rajiv
Vijayasarathy Ratnam insisted the Complainant and her
husband to pay the said monies by way of cash to the
accused person’s including the interest…Mr. Rajiv
Vijayasarathy Ratnam sought for the return of the
aforesaid monies i.e. of Rs. 20,00,000/-”
“…The said monies were paid in cash as per the dicta of the
accused person’s son Mr. Rajiv Vijayasarathy Ratnam has
filed a false and frivolous suit…” (Emphasis supplied)
17 The condition necessary for an act to constitute an offence under Section
405 of the Penal Code is that the accused was entrusted with some property or
has dominion over property. The first respondent has stated that the disputed
sum was transferred by the son of the appellants of his own volition to her. The
complaint clearly states that the amount was transferred for the benefit of the son
of the appellants and that the first respondent was to hold the amount ‘in trust’ for
him. The complaint alleges that the money was transferred to the appellants ‘as
per the dicta’ of the son of the appellants. There is on the face of the complaint,
no entrustment of the appellants with any property.
18 The condition necessary for an act to constitute an offence under Section
415 of the Penal Code is that there was dishonest inducement by the accused.
The first respondent admitted that the disputed sum was transferred by the son of
the appellants to her bank account on 17 February 2010. She alleges that she
9
transferred the money belonging to the son of the appellants at his behest. No act
on part of the appellants has been alleged that discloses an intention to induce
the delivery of any property to the appellants by the first respondent. There is
thus nothing on the face of the complaint to indicate that the appellants
dishonestly induced the first respondent to deliver any property to them. Cheating
is an essential ingredient to an offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code. The
ingredient necessary to constitute the offence of cheating is not made out from
the face of the complaint and consequently, no offence under Section 420 is
made out.
19 In Binod Kumar v State of Bihar7
certain amounts were due and payable
to a contract worker. When the amount due was not paid due to a termination of
the contract, the worker filed a criminal case against the appellant for criminal
breach of trust. The appellants’ petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for quashing was dismissed by the High Court. A two judge Bench of
this Court examined the ingredients of the offence and whether the complaint on
its face disclosed the commission of any offence. This Court quashed the criminal
proceedings holding thus:
“14. At this stage, we are only concerned with the question
whether the averments in the complaint taken at their face
value make out the ingredients of criminal offence or not.
18. In the present case, looking at the allegations in the
complaint on the face of it, we find that no allegations are
made attracting the ingredients of Section 405 IPC. Likewise,
there are no allegations as to cheating or the dishonest
intention of the appellants in retaining the money in order to
have wrongful gain to themselves or causing wrongful loss to
the complainant. Excepting the bald allegations that the
appellants did not make payment to the second respondent
7 (2014) 10 SCC 663
10
and that the appellants utilised the amounts either by
themselves or for some other work, there is no iota of
allegation as to the dishonest intention in misappropriating the
property…
19. Even if all the allegations in the complaint taken at the
face value are true, in our view, the basic essential
ingredients of dishonest misappropriation and cheating are
missing. Criminal proceedings are not a shortcut for other
remedies. Since no case of criminal breach of trust or
dishonest intention of inducement is made out and the
essential ingredients of Sections 405/420 IPC are missing,
the prosecution of the appellants under Sections 406/120-B
IPC, is liable to be quashed.”
20 The suit for recovery of money was instituted by the son of the appellants
against the first respondent in 2013. The complaint alleging offences under the
Penal Code was filed by the first respondent belatedly in 2016. It is clear from the
face of the complaint, that no amount was entrusted by the first respondent to
either of the appellants and there was no dishonest inducement of the first
respondent by the appellants to deliver any property. As stated by the first
respondent in the complaint, the money belonged to the son of the appellants. It
was transferred by the appellants’ son to her on his own volition. The money was
alleged to have been returned to the appellants on the instructions of their son. A
plain reading of the complaint thus shows that the ingredients necessary for
constituting offences under Sections 405, 415 and 420 of the Penal Code are not
made out.
21 The respondents have relied on the decision of this Court in Rajesh Bajaj
v State of NCT of Delhi8
. In that case, the Delhi High Court had quashed an FIR
alleging an offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code on the ground that the
8 (1999) 3 SCC 259
11
complaint did not disclose the commission of any offence. Allowing the
complainant’s appeal, this Court held thus:
“9. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim
reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of
the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the
complainant should state in so many words that the intention
of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the
definition into different components of the offence to make a
meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been
precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this
stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the
complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal
proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise
that one or two ingredients have not been stated with
details…”
The decision does not advance the submission of the first respondent. As we
have noted above, the complaint in the present case is bereft of the basic facts
necessary to constitute the offences alleged under Sections 405, 406, 415 and
420 of the Penal Code.
22 Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the actions of the
first respondent constitute an abuse of process of the court. It is contended that
the present dispute is of a civil nature and the first respondent has attempted to
cloak it with a criminal flavor to harass the aged appellants. It is also contended
that there is an undue delay in filing the complaint from which the present appeal
arises, and this demonstrates the mala fide intention of the first respondent in
filing the complaint against the appellants. Learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants relied on the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v L
Muniswamy9
. In that case, the prosecution alleged that eight of the accused had
9 (1977) 2 SCC 699
12
conspired to kill the complainant. The Karnataka High Court quashed the
proceedings on the ground that no sufficient ground was made out against the
accused. A three judge Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal by the State
with the following observations:
“7…In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court
is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion
that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of
the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require
that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the
High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal
matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose
which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a
criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution,
the very nature of the material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in
quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.”
23 The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
to be exercised with care. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, a High Court can
examine whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a
cloak of a criminal offence. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal
offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation
of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the court.
24 In the present case, the son of the appellants has instituted a civil suit for
the recovery of money against the first respondent. The suit is pending. The first
respondent has filed the complaint against the appellants six years after the date
of the alleged transaction and nearly three years from the filing of the suit. The
averments in the complaint, read on its face, do not disclose the ingredients
13
necessary to constitute offences under the Penal Code. An attempt has been
made by the first respondent to cloak a civil dispute with a criminal nature despite
the absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute a criminal offence. The
complaint filed by the first respondent against the appellants constitutes an abuse
of process of court and is liable to be quashed.
25 For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High
Court is set aside and the criminal proceedings arising from PCR 2116 of 2016
instituted by the first respondent against the appellants are quashed. We
however clarify, that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the pending
civil suit filed by the son of the appellants for the recovery of money. The pending
suit shall be disposed of in accordance with the law.
 …….……..…...…...….......………………........J.
 [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD]
……....…..…....…........……………….…........J.
 [HEMANT GUPTA]
New Delhi;
February 15, 2019.
14

suit for specific performance - essential pleadings of facts and proof is mandatory = It was for the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to pay the stipulated amount and it was not for the appellants to raise such question…" 16. When the pleadings in the present case are examined with reference to the principle aforesaid, it is but apparent that in the plaint, the plaintiff referred to the agreement in question whereby, the defendant had allegedly agreed to sell the house in question to him for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- and averred that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- from him. The plaintiff stated that the agreement was executed on 16/17.04.1975. Thereafter, the plaintiff straight away referred to the fact that subsequent to the execution of agreement, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was promulgated; and Section 27 thereof prohibited transfer of property without prior permission of the Competent Authority. The plaintiff further averred that he served notice dated 06.05.1979 on the defendant asking him to seek permission and to execute the sale deed; that the notice was personally served on the defendant on 17.05.1979; and that the defendant in his reply dated 06.07.1979, feigned ignorance about the agreement. The plaintiff further averred that the defendant was bound to execute the sale deed of the house after seeking necessary permission and for the defendant having failed to do so, the suit was being filed. There is not even a remote suggestion in the plaint averments that the plaintiff had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Even in the plaintiff’s testimony as PW-1, it is difficult to find a 13 categorical assertion that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The testimony of the plaintiff as PW-1 is essentially directed towards the existence and validity of the alleged agreement and the surrounding dealings of the parties; but is lacking in those material assertions on readiness and willingness on his part, which remain essential for grant of the relief of the specific performance.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari 
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8199 OF 2009
MEHBOOB-UR-REHMAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. Appellant(s)
VS.
AHSANUL GHANI Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
The appellant herein (since deceased and represented by his legal
representatives) had filed the suit for specific performance of Agreement to Sell,
being O.S. No. 392 of 1979, that was decreed by the Court of II Additional Civil
Judge, Kanpur Nagar by the judgment and decree dated 10.12.1981. However,
the decree so passed by the Trial Court was reversed by the Court of IX
Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar in its judgment and decree dated
03.07.1995 in Appeal No.54 of 1982, essentially on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to aver and prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform
his part of the contract. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in its
impugned judgment dated 10.12.2007 in R.S.A. No. 931 of 1995, while
2
dismissing the second appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant, affirmed the decree
passed by the First Appellate Court. Aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellant has
preferred this appeal.
2. Briefly put, the relevant background aspects of the matter are that on
13.08.1979, the plaintiff-appellant filed the suit aforesaid with the averments that
the defendant-respondent had executed an agreement dated 16/17.04.1975 in
his favour for sale of the property in question, being House Number 102 at
Faithful Ganj, Kanpur Nagar, for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/-; and that a sum
of Rs. 15,000/- was paid as earnest money while the remaining amount was
payable at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. The plaintiffappellant further averred that after the agreement, the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 came to be promulgated prohibiting transfer of the property
without permission of the Competent Authority; and the defendant-respondent
was required to obtain such permission but failed to do so despite requests. The
plaintiff-appellant yet further averred that on 06.05.1979, he served a notice on
the defendant-respondent for obtaining permission from the Ceiling Authorities
and for execution of the sale deed to which, the defendant-respondent sent a
reply dated 06.07.1979 stating ignorance about the agreement and sought a
copy thereof for proper reply while alleging that his signatures were obtained on
some papers in relation to a suit filed by the State Bank of India. The plaintiffappellant stated that these were the false pretexts taken by the defendant who
3
was bound to execute the sale deed for the house in question after seeking
necessary permission; and for him having failed to do so, the suit was being filed
for enforcing specific performance of the agreement.
3. The defendant-respondent, while denying the plaint averments, inter alia,
alleged that he was involved as a guarantor in relation to the loan taken by a firm
M/s Adam Textiles from the State Bank of India and his house in question was
hypothecated to the said bank; and when the bank threatened to take action
against him, the plaintiff, who was known to him, assured of contesting the matter
on his behalf and persuaded him to hand over possession of the house in
question on rental basis. The defendant alleged that he got deceived on
persuasion of the plaintiff and, for the purpose of conducting the trial of the suit
filed by the bank, his signatures were obtained on blank papers on which, some
document was fabricated; and that the copy of the alleged agreement was never
supplied to him despite demand. The defendant also took the objections
regarding limitation, valuation and court fees.
4. On the pleading of parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues for
determination of the questions involved in the matter:-
“1. Whether the suit is under valued and court fee
paid is insufficient?
2. Whether the suit is barred by time?
3. Whether the agreement is forged as alleged?
4. Whether the agreement was got affected by
fraud, misrepresentation as alleged in paras 12 to
15 of W.S.?
4
5. To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled?”
5. After taking the evidence and having heard the parties, the Trial Court
decreed the suit on 10.11.1981 while recording the findings, inter alia, to the
effect that time was not the essence of the contract; that the defendant was
required to obtain necessary permission from the Urban Ceiling Authorities and
he having not done so, the suit was within time; that the defendant refused to
honour his commitment in the letter dated 07.08.1979, which was received by the
plaintiff on 17.08.1979, whereas the suit had already been filed on 13.08.1979
and hence, the same was well within limitation; that by way of his testimony as
PW-1 and with the help of the notice dated 06.05.1979 (Exhibit 3), the plaintiff
succeeded to prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of
agreement; that the agreement was neither forged nor obtained by fraud or misrepresentation; and that in his reply notice dated 06.07.1979 (Exhibit A-12), the
defendant did not challenge the existence of agreement.
6. While challenging the decree of the Trial Court, the defendant raised the
grounds in the first appeal, inter alia, that the finding of the Trial Court that the
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement was perverse and
for want of necessary averments, the suit ought to have been dismissed.
7. As per the law applicable at the relevant point of time, the said first appeal
was filed in the High Court and the plaintiff, while appearing in the said appeal as
respondent, moved an application seeking leave to amend the plaint whereupon,
5
the High Court passed the order dated 29.07.1982 that the application for
amendment would be decided at the time of final hearing of the appeal. Later on,
in view of alteration of jurisdiction, the appeal was transmitted by the High Court
to the District Court and was ultimately assigned to the IX Additional District
Judge, Kanpur Nagar as Appeal No. 54 of 1982. On 28.02.1995, the First
Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff's application seeking leave to amend the
plaint and thereafter, allowed the appeal on 25.04.1995 while holding that the
plaintiff had failed to take the necessary averments in the plaint on his readiness
and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
8. The second appeal preferred by the plaintiff-appellant against the
judgment and decree so passed by the First Appellate Court was admitted by the
High Court on the following substantial questions of law:-
“(i) Whether lower appellate court is justified in
dismissing the suit for non-compliance of
provisions of Section 14 and 16 of Specific Relief
Act without any pleading and/or issue on the said
point?
(ii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court ought to have
framed the issues if relevant and ought to have
remitted it to Trial Court?”
9. The High Court, in its impugned judgment dated 10.12.2007, examined in
detail the contentions of the parties and law applicable to the case, particularly
with reference to Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter also
referred to as ‘the Act’) and several decisions of this Court including that in
6
Umabai and another vs. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by LRS. and
another : (2005) 6 SCC 243, and rejected the contentions urged on behalf of the
plaintiff-appellant while observing as under:-
“It is clear from the averments made in the plaint and
from the evidence brought on record that there is
complete absence of continuous readiness and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff. There is nothing
in his conduct which may even remotely show that prior
to the notice dated 6.5.1979 the plaintiff had expressed
any readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract.
The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
that the defendant also did not raise such a plea does
not help the plaintiff-appellant because under Section
16 (c) of the Act is for the plaintiff to aver and prove this
fact. This is what was observed by the Supreme Court
in Umabai (supra). The Trial Court, while deciding
issue No. 5 merely observed that certain sections of the
Act including section 16(c) of the Act was not applicable
because the plaintiff has been ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. This finding has been
arrived at without any discussion. The Lower Appellate
Court, on the other hand, has elaborately dealt with this
issue. It has observed that under the alleged
agreement dated 16/17-4-1975 permission was
required to be taken within one month of the agreement
and then the sale-deed was required to be executed but
the plaintiff not only failed to make any specific
averment in the plaint about readiness and willingness
but also failed to prove the same. In the light of the
discussion made above, the finding recorded by the
Lower Appellate Court is correct.”
10. The contention on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the First Appellate
Court was not justified in rejecting the application for amendment was also
negatived by the High Court with the following observations:-
7
“The Lower Appellate Court by a detailed order had
rejected the application filed at the belated stage for
amending the plaint by adding a relief about readiness
and willingness. At the time of the admission of the
Second Appeal, the Court did not formulate any
substantial question of law as to whether the
amendment application had been illegally rejected.
This plea, therefore, cannot be considered at the time
of hearing of the Second Appeal. However, even
otherwise there is no infirmity in the order rejecting the
amendment application as it had been moved with a
considerable delay and would involve a retrial as
evidence would have to be led by the parties on this
issue.”
11. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, learned counsel for the appellant
has strenuously argued that in the absence of any objection in the written
statement regarding non-compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act and without any
issue to that effect, the First Appellate Court and the High Court were not justified
in non-suiting the appellant only on the ground of the so called want of pleading
on readiness and willingness. Learned counsel would submit that for the purpose
of Section 16(c) of the Act, while examining the question regarding readiness and
willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the Court is required
to see the pith and substance of the entire pleadings and evidence and not just
the letter and form; and on the substance of the matter, such readiness and
willingness is duly proved on record. Learned counsel would also argue that
there was no justification in rejection of the application for amendment, if at all
any question regarding averment on readiness and willingness was being raised;
and for substantial justice between the parties, such an amendment ought to
8
have been allowed. In this regard, learned counsel has also argued with
reference to proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ('CPC') that even if a substantial question of law involved in the
matter had not been formulated at the time of admission of appeal, the same
could have been formulated and decided by the High Court for ensuring
substantial justice; and in the present case, the High Court has wrongly confined
itself only to the questions formulated at the time of admission, while putting the
matter in a strait jacket. Per contra, learned counsel for the defendantrespondent has duly supported the judgment of the High Court with the
submissions that the plaintiff-appellant having failed to establish his readiness
and willingness to perform his part of the alleged agreement, the suit has rightly
been dismissed.
12. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions and
having examined the record with reference to the law applicable, we are inclined
to agree with the High Court that, in the present suit, specific performance of the
agreement in question cannot be enforced in favour of the plaintiff-appellant for
want of proof of his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of
the essential terms of the contract.
13. It remains trite that the relief of specific performance is not that of common
law remedy but is essentially an exercise in equity. Therefore, in the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, even while providing for various factors and parameters
9
for specific performance of contract, the provisions are made regarding the
contracts which are not specifically enforceable as also the persons for or against
whom the contract may be specifically enforced. In this scheme of the Act,
Section 16 thereof provides for personal bars to the relief of specific
performance. Clause (c) of Section 16 with the explanation thereto, as applicable
to the suit in question, had been as follows:-
"16. Personal bars to relief.- Specific performance of a
contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-
(a) *** *** ***
(b)*** *** ***
 (c) [who fails to aver and prove]1
 that he has
performed or has always been ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of the contract which
are to be performed by him, other than terms the
performance of which has been prevented or
waived by the defendant.
Explanation:--For the purpose of clause (c),---
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money,
it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender
to the defendant or to deposit in court any money
except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff [must aver]2
 performance of, or
readiness and willingness to perform, the contract
according to its true construction.”
14. Though, with the amendment of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 by Act No. 18
of 2018, the expression “who fails to aver and prove” is substituted by the
1 By Act No. 18 of 2018, the expression “who fails to aver and prove” is substituted by the expression
“who fails to prove”
2 By the same Act No. 18 of 2018, the expression “ must aver” is substituted by the expression “must
prove”
10
expression “who fails to prove” and the expression “must aver” stands substituted
by the expression “must prove” but then, the position on all the material aspects
remains the same that, specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in
favour to the person who fails to prove that he has already performed or has
always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract
which are to be performed by him, other than the terms of which, the
performance has been prevented or waived by the other party. As per the law
applicable at the relevant time, it was incumbent for the plaintiff to take the
specific averment to that effect in the plaint. Of course, it was made clear by this
Court in several decisions3
, that such requirement of taking the necessary
averment was not a matter of form and no specific phraseology or language was
required to take such a plea. However, and even when mechanical reproduction
of the words of statue was not insisted upon, the requirement of such pleading
being available in the plaint was neither waived nor even whittled down. In the
case of A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed: (2017) 4 SCC 654, even while
approving the decree for specific performance of the agreement on facts, this
Court pointed out that the requirement analogous to that contained in Section
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was read in its forerunner i.e., the Specific
Relief Act, 1877 even without specific provision to that effect. Having examined
the scheme of the Act and the requirements of CPC, this Court said,-
3 vide Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty: (1999) 6 SCC 337; and
Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha and Ors.: (2005) 7 SCC 534,
11
 “22. Therefore, the plaint which seeks the relief of
specific performance of the agreement/contract must
contain all requirements of Section 16 (c) read with
requirements contained in Forms 47 and 48 of
Appendix ‘A’ CPC”
15. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has
already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential
terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff,
mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any
effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in
such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the
evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has
performed his part of the contract or has always been ready and willing to do so.
In this regard, suffice it would be to refer to the principles enunciated by this
Court in the case of Umabai (supra) as under:-
"30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties,
with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the
plaintiff-respondents were all along and still are ready
and willing to perform their part of contract as is
mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the
Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to
the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in
the plaint or a statement made in the examination-inchief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiffrespondents must be judged having regard to the
entirety of the pleadings as also the evidences brought
on records.
*** *** ***
12
45. It was for the plaintiff to prove his readiness and
willingness to pay the stipulated amount and it was not
for the appellants to raise such question…"
16. When the pleadings in the present case are examined with reference to
the principle aforesaid, it is but apparent that in the plaint, the plaintiff referred to
the agreement in question whereby, the defendant had allegedly agreed to sell
the house in question to him for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- and averred
that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- from him. The plaintiff stated
that the agreement was executed on 16/17.04.1975. Thereafter, the plaintiff
straight away referred to the fact that subsequent to the execution of agreement,
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was promulgated; and
Section 27 thereof prohibited transfer of property without prior permission of the
Competent Authority. The plaintiff further averred that he served notice dated
06.05.1979 on the defendant asking him to seek permission and to execute the
sale deed; that the notice was personally served on the defendant on
17.05.1979; and that the defendant in his reply dated 06.07.1979, feigned
ignorance about the agreement. The plaintiff further averred that the defendant
was bound to execute the sale deed of the house after seeking necessary
permission and for the defendant having failed to do so, the suit was being filed.
There is not even a remote suggestion in the plaint averments that the plaintiff
had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract. Even in the plaintiff’s testimony as PW-1, it is difficult to find a
13
categorical assertion that he had performed or has always been ready and willing
to perform his part of the contract. The testimony of the plaintiff as PW-1 is
essentially directed towards the existence and validity of the alleged agreement
and the surrounding dealings of the parties; but is lacking in those material
assertions on readiness and willingness on his part, which remain essential for
grant of the relief of the specific performance.
17. In the above set of circumstances, we are unable to find any fault in the
findings of the High Court that the plaintiff had failed to aver and prove his
continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The suit
was bound to fail on this ground alone.
18. So far as the proposition for amendment of the plaint is concerned, we are
unable to find any illegality on the part of the First Appellate Court and the High
Court in rejecting the prayer belatedly made by the plaintiff. As noticed, the
averment and proof on readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract has been the threshold requirement for a plaintiff who seeks the relief of
specific performance. The principle that the requirement of such averment had
not been a matter of form, applied equally to the proposition for amendment at
the late stage whereby, the plaintiff only attempted to somehow improve upon the
form of the plaint and insert only the phraseology of his readiness and
willingness. In such a suit for specific performance, the Court would be, and had
always been, looking at the substance of the matter if the plaintiff, by his conduct,
14
has established that he is unquestionably standing with the contract and is not
wanting in preparedness as also willingness to perform everything required of
him before he could be granted a relief whereby, the performance of other part of
the contract could be enjoined upon the defendant. In the present case, the
plaintiff-appellant had failed to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the contract. The Trial Court made a rather assumptive
observation that he had proved such readiness and willingness. Thereafter, the
plaintiff sought leave to amend the plaint only when the ground to that effect was
taken in the first appeal by the defendant. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, in our view, it was too late in the day for the plaintiff to fill up such a
lacuna in his case only at the appellate stage. In other words, the late attempt to
improve upon the pleadings of the plaint at the appellate stage was only an
exercise in futility in the present case.
19. Moreover, the High Court has pointed out, and rightly so, that no
substantial question of law as regards the correctness of the order refusing the
application for amendment was formulated. In the scheme of the provisions
relating to second appeal, it remains fundamental, as per Section 101 CPC, that
no second appeal would lie except on the ground mentioned in Section 100.
Sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure read as under:-
“100. Second Appeal.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in
force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree
15
passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if
the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial
question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree
passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal
shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the
appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of
law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and
the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to
argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such
question.
101. Second appeal on no other grounds.-No second appeal
shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in Section 100."
20. As per Section 100 CPC, the appeal would lie to the High Court from the
decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate only if the High Court is
satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law; such question is
required to be stated in the Memorandum of Appeal; the High Court is required to
formulate the question on being satisfied that the same is involved in the case;
the appeal is to be heard on the question so formulated; and at the time of
hearing, the respondent could urge that the case does not involve such a
question. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC makes it clear that
the Court could hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law not
16
formulated by it, but only after recording the reasons that the case involves such
a question. In the case of Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan and Ors.: (2018)
4 SCC 562 this Court has pointed out the contours of the powers of High Court
under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC as under:-
“21……… The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also
recognises the power of the High Court to hear the appeal
on any other substantial question of law which was not
initially framed by the High Court under sub-section (4).
However, this power can be exercised by the High Court
only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional
question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal”.
21. We are clearly of the view that the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section
100 CPC is not intended to annul the other requirements of Section 100 and it
cannot be laid down as a matter of rule that irrespective of the question/s
formulated, hearing of the second appeal is open for any other substantial
question of law, even if not formulated earlier. The said proviso, by its very
nature, could come into operation only in exceptional cases and for strong and
convincing reasons, to be specifically recorded by the High Court. There being
no such strong and convincing reason in the present case to formulate and hear
the second appeal on any other question of law, the High Court cannot be faulted
in rejecting the contentions urged on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant in this
regard.
17
22. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are satisfied that the relief
of specific performance of agreement in question has rightly been declined by the
First Appellate Court and the High Court. No case for interference being made
out, the appeal stands dismissed.
...............................................J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

 ...............................................J.
(DINESH MAHESHWARI) 1
New Delhi,
Dated: 15th February, 2019.