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Monday, February 4, 2019

“the land in dispute is freehold one and there is no legal bar to the same being sold.” In the given facts and circumstances, if the allotment has been made by the society as a freehold land to its members who have further transferred/sold the subject land/plot by registered sale deed to its successors/purchasers, their rights to become member of the society are indeed saved under Section 91 of the Act, 2003 that in no manner could be eluded by the bye­laws and that apart if anyone has any objection regarding the registered instrument(sale deed) pursuant to which right has been created, at least it is not open to examine its validity within the domain and ambit of Section 70 of the cooperative societies Act and any person, if felt aggrieved, the remedy lies only before the civil Court having jurisdiction questioning the registered instrument within the parameters available under the law.

  
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastog
 NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s) 1313  OF 2019
   (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 8138 of 2013)
DELHI DAYALBAGH COOPERATIVE HOUSE
BUILDING SOCIETY LTD. …….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
REGISTRAR
COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND ORS.     ……..Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s) 1314   OF 2019
   (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 9015 of 2010)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s) 1315   OF 2019
   (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 26905 of 2010)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 8138 of 2013,
SLP(Civil) No(s). 9015 of 2010,
SLP(Civil) No(s). 26905 of 2010
1. Leave granted.
2. The above noted appeals are directed against the orders
separately passed by the High Court of Delhi in writ petitions
filed at the instance of the present appellant Society which came
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to be dismissed upholding the order of the Cooperative Tribunal
setting   aside   the   award   passed   by   the   Registrar   Cooperative
Societies   holding   that   the   Arbitrator   had   no   jurisdiction   to
examine the validity and legality of the registered sale deed which
can be questioned only by availing a remedy in the Civil Court
holding   jurisdiction.     Orders   were   separately   passed   by   the
Tribunal in the cases of the individual members in whose favour
sale deed was executed by the society, having been separately
decided by the High Court, which has been challenged in these
batch of appeals.
3. The facts that emerge from the multitude and collateral and
exhaustive pleadings in brief are that the appellant is a house
building   Society   originally   registered   with   the   Registrar,
Cooperative   Societies,   Delhi   (“hereinafter   being   referred   to   as
“RCS”) under the provisions of the Bombay Cooperative Societies
Act, 1925.  On enactment of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act,
1972,   the   provisions   of   the   Act,   1972   and   the   rules   framed
thereunder came to govern the field.  However, the Act of 1972
came   to   be   repealed   by   the   Delhi   Cooperative   Societies   Act,
2003(hereinafter being referred to as the “Act 2003”) as amended
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by the Delhi Cooperative Societies(Amendment Act), 2006 which
now   governs   the   field   along   with   Delhi   Cooperative   Societies
Rules, 2007 framed thereunder.
4. The Society framed its bye­laws, namely, Delhi Dayalbagh
Cooperative   House   Building   Society   Ltd.,   Soami   Nagar,   New
Delhi, with the primary object to acquire the land either through
outright purchase or on lease for construction of houses for its
members,   either   on   rent   or   on   hire   purchase   system   or   by
outright   sale   with   a   stipulation   that   no   member   shall   be
permitted to transfer, sell or mortgage his house to any person
other than the members of the society or the society itself as
referred to under bye­law 51 and after the object being achieved
for which the Society has been formed, the procedure may be
followed for its liquidation as referred to under bye­law 65.  Para
5, 51 and 65 of bye­laws which are relevant for the purpose are
reproduced   as   under:­
”5. (i) Any person shall be eligible to be a
member of the society provided:­­
(a) he   is   a   follower   of   Radha   Soami
faith and a member of Radha  Soami
Satsang affiliated to Radha Soami Sabha,
Dayalbagh,  Agra;
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(b) He, at the time of enrolment as a
member, is domiciled in the  Union
Territory of Delhi or has been resident in
the Union  Territory   of   Delhi   for   two
years   or   more;   provided   that   this 
condition shall not apply to members of
All   India   Services   and   employees   of   the
Central   Government   and   the   Delhi
Administration.
(c) his   written   application   for
membership   has   been   approved   by   a 
majority of the Managing Committee.
(d) his   age   is   more   than   18   years,
except in the case of minor heir of  a
deceased member;
(e) he is not a member of any other
house building society;
(f) he or his wife (she or her husband
in case of a woman) or any of  his/her
dependents does not own a dwelling house
or a plot for  building a house in Delhi;
(g) directly   or   indirectly   he   does   not
deal in purchase or sale of house  or
land   for   construction   of   houses   either
himself or through any  of   his
dependents.
(h) he has carried out the provisions of
bye­law.
(ii)Every   person   seeking   membership   of   the   society
shall sign a declaration to the effect that he or his
wife(she or her husband) or any of his/her dependents
does not own a dwelling house or plot in Delhi and that
he/she is not a member of any other   co­operative
house building society.
(iii)Every member on admission shall pay Rs.10/­ as
admission fee which shall not be refunded in any case.
(iv)When a person’s application has been accepted by
the Committee and he has paid his admission fee and
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first instalment of this shares, he shall be deemed to
have   acquired   all   the   rights   and   incurred   all   the
obligations and liabilities of a member of the society as
laid down in the Co­operative Societies Act, the Rules
made there under and these bye­laws.
(v)Application   for   admission   as   member   and   for
allotment of shares shall be made to the Secretary in
the   form,   if   any,   prescribed   by   the   society   for   the
purpose.  Every such application shall be disposed off
by the Managing Committee who shall have power to
grant admission or to refuse it after recording reasons
for such refusal, provided, however, that any person
whose application has been refused by the Managing
Committee may prefer an appeal within 30 days to the
Assistant   Registrar,   Co­operative   Societies(Housing).
The decision of the Assistant Registrar shall be final.
51. No member shall be permitted to transfer, sell or
mortgage his house to any person other than the members
of the society or the society itself.
65. The society shall be wound up and dissolved only
by order of the Registrar under Section 39, 40 or 42 of the
Co­operative Societies Act.
After all the liabilities including the paid up share capital
have   been   met,   the  surplus   assets   shall   not   be  divided
among the members, but shall be devoted to any object of
public   utility   determined   by   the   General   Meeting   of   the
society within three months of the date of final liquidation,
and approved by the Registrar,  or they may in consultation
with them either be assigned by the Registrar in whole or in
part to any or all of the following :­
(a) an object of public utility of local interest ;
(b) a charitable purpose as defined in section (2)
of the Charitable Endowment Act ;
(c) or may be placed on deposit with The Delhi
State Co­operative Bank until such time as a new
society with similar conditions is registered when,
with the consent of the Registrar, such surplus may
be   credited   to   the   Reserve   Fund   of   such   new
society.”
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5. To fulfil the object with which the society was formed, it was
desirous of obtaining land for construction of dwelling units to be
made available for its members.  However, it did not go into the
market   to   purchase   land   but   approached   the   appropriate
Government for its assistance with an application invoking Part
VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to provide the land located
in   various   Khasras   admeasuring   137   bighas   &   11   biswas
situated   at   village   Chirag   Delhi   for   construction   of   dwelling
houses for its members. 
6. Part VII of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 under the heading
“Acquisition of Land for Companies” begins with Section 38 and
runs upto Section 44 B.  Section 38 was repealed by Section 68
of 1984 with effect from 24th September, 1984.  The issue in the
present case is pertaining to year 1955 when the acquisition
proceedings were initiated.  Section 38A was a part of the Statute
at the relevant point of time when the acquisition proceedings
were initiated by the appropriate Government in the year 1955.
7. Section 39 lays down that Sections 6 to 16 and Sections 18
to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire
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land on behalf of the company without previous consent of the
Government unless the company(includes society) executes an
agreement.  In terms of Section 40, a consent is to be obtained
after the appropriate Government record its satisfaction either on
the report of the Collector under Section 5A or by the inquiry
held as provided for the purpose of acquisition is to obtain land
for erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the
company or that such acquisition is needed for construction of
building or work for the Company and that work is likely to be
proved useful to the public. 
8. The State Government thus proceeded under Part VII of the
Land Acquisition Act and after holding preliminary enquiry as
envisaged under Section 40 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
and after recording its satisfaction, executed an agreement laying
down the terms & conditions with the appellant Society under
Section 41 dated 12th  April, 1955 which was published under
notification dated 13th May, 1955 in the Official Gazette in terms
of Section 42 of the Act, became the force of law and binding not
only upon the parties to the agreement but also on the public at
large.   The terms & conditions indicated in the agreement dated
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13th  May, 1955 published in the Gazette and relevant for the
present purpose are reproduced hereunder:­
“1. That   the   Society   shall   pay   to   the   State
Government or such person or persons as the State
Government   may   appoint   in   this   behalf   before
possession of the said land is given to the Society the
compensation, if any, as settled by the Collector or if
reference is made to the court by the final court or
appeal and all compensation inclusive of all payments
and allowances in respect thereof payable under the
said Act and all Courts costs and pleaders fees etc.
incurred  by  the  State Government   in defending  the
reference, if any, made to the court as aforesaid and on
appeal or appeals filed in connection therewith and all
compensation, pleaders fee etc. payable or paid by the
State Government to the claimant in the said matters.
The   State   Government   shall   not   be   bound   to   give
possession of the land until all the said money have
been paid, and may withdraw from the acquisition, and
in case of withdrawal the Society shall be liable to
indemnify the State Government against all expenses
incurred   and   damage   sustained   as   the   result   of
anything done by them in the matter of acquisition till
the date of withdrawal.
2. That upon such payment by the Society the Chief
Commissioner covenants to convey and grant to the
Society the said land described in the Schedule hereto,
to held the same to the said Society for every subject to
the conditions hereafter not forth, namely:­
(a) That the Society shall within 15 years of
being   put   in   possession   of   the   said   land
utilise   this   land   for   the   purpose   it   is
acquired.
(b) That   the   Society   its   successors   and
assignees   shall   use   the   said   land   for
aforesaid   purposes   and   for   no   other
purposes, whatsoever.
(c) That if the Society fails to carry out any
of the terms of this agreement or if the said
land no longer required by the said Society
for the aforesaid purpose, then the Society
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shall   forthwith   relinquish   and   restore   the
same  in  favour  of  the   Chief  Commissioner
and land shall be liable to be resumed and
taken by the State Government on payment
to   the   Society   of   the   amount   of   award   as
finally settled or the estimated market value
of   the   land   at   the   time   of   resumption,
whichever, shall be less and if there are any
buildings   on   the   land   the   Chief
Commissioner   may   at   his   option   either
purchase the buildings on payment of their
estimated   value   at   the   time   or   direct   the
Society to remove the buildings at its own
cost which such time as may be allowed by
the State Government.
(d) That   should   any   dispute   or   difference
arise   touching   or   concerning   the   subject
matter of this agreement or any covenant or
clause of thing contained therein, the same
shall be referred to the Sole Arbitration of any
person nominated by the Chief Commissioner
of Delhi or in case his designation is changed
or   his   office   is   abolished   to   the   sole
arbitration of any person nominated by the
officer, who for the time being is entrusted,
whether or not in addition to other functions
with the functions of the Chief Commissioner
of Delhi by whatever designation such officer
may be called. It will be no objection to any
such   appointment   that   the   arbitrator   so
appointed is a Government servant that he
had to deal with the matters to which this
indenture   relate   and   in   the   course   of   his
duties as such Government servant he has
expressed views on all or any of the matters
in  dispute   or  difference.   The   award   of   the
arbitrator   so   appointed   shall   be   final   and
binding on the parties.”
9. After acceptance of the terms & conditions of the agreement
being deduced in writing, duly published in the Official Gazette
under Section 42 of the Act, having the force of law, the State
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Government proceeded to complete the acquisition proceedings
and published the award under Section 11 of the Act dated 26th
February   1957   and   after   taking   possession   free   from
encumbrances under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act,
handed over possession to the society  in terms of the agreement
dated 13th  May, 1955 on 11th  June, 1957 and 30th  July, 1957
respectively.   It may be relevant to note that any agreement or
Memorandum   of   Understanding,   if   any,   executed   while
possession of the subject land was handed over to the society,
has not been placed by the society on record and inference can
be   drawn   that   while   handing   over   possession,   the   State
Government intended to comply with the terms & conditions of
the agreement dated 13th May, 1955 to be adhered to in its true
spirit   by   the   society   and   indisputedly   breach,   if   any,   of   the
conditions of the agreement has not been brought to the notice of
the Court. 
10. The appellant Society in fulfilment of its obligations and in
terms of the agreement dated 13th May, 1955 allotted plots to its
members within the stipulated period of 15 years by a separate
registered sale deed executed on certain terms and conditions.
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Since the terms and conditions of allotment as recited in the sale
deed are common, we have noticed from the registered sale deed
dated 30th  December 1968 in reference to plot no. B­68 to its
member Mr. Manocha, on acceptance of full consideration for the
plot in question.
11. Coming to the facts of the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C )
No. 8138 of 2013, Mr. K.L. Manocha, as a lead case, who was a
member of the Society allotted a plot no. B­68, Soami Nagar and
sale deed was executed in his favour on 30th December, 1968 in
the   same   terms.     It   reveals   that   Mr.   Manocha,   had   initially
constructed a single storey house later intended to demolish and
construct   a   multi   storey   structure   for   his   own   needs   and
requirements.  The appellant came across with the advertisement
in the magazine titled “Real Property Times” in June, 2005 for
sale of a basement, four bedroom apartments on each of the
upper   four   floors   of   the   building   constructed   on   the   plot   in
question.  This fact came to the notice of the society on 18th June,
2005.     The   society   published   a   notice   inviting   the   public   in
general that the residential plots in Soami Nagar cannot be sold
to persons who are not the members and who are not eligible to
be members of the society and violation of the society bye­laws
11
and the sale deed even if registered shall be at his own risk and
peril.
12. At this stage, a claim petition was filed at the instance of
society under Section 70 of the Act, 2003 seeking declaration of
the sale/transfer of the property in question by the allottee to a
non­member without prior notice or permission, as illegal and
void being in violation of clauses 2 & 3 of the sale deed and
clause 51 of the bye­laws and it was prayed that the same may
be cancelled and the property be referred back to the society.
13. The award was passed in favour of the appellant society and
against the respondent no. 2 dated 1st  December 2006 holding
that sale/transfer was violative of clauses 2 & 3 of the sale deed
and bye­law 51 directing the impleaded respondent(member of
the society) to hand over the property within the stipulated time
to the appellant society.   But no order was passed against the
transferees/purchasers   including   the   respondents   being   nonmembers of the society.  When the proceedings were initiated in
execution of the award and property was stated to be attached at
one stage on 28th  November, 2007, the respondents who were
stated to be the parties and claiming to be the purchasers and
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occupants filed separate appeals against the award before the
Cooperative Tribunal.   At the same time, the appellant society
also filed appeal assailing the award to the limited extent with
regard to deletion of names of the impleaded respondent nos. 3
and 4 with a prayer for reinstatement. The appeals filed by the
impleaded respondents and of the appellant society were heard
by the Tribunal and disposed of by a common judgment dated 6th
January, 2012.  The appeal of the appellant society was allowed
but the award passed by the Arbitrator dated 1st December, 2006
was set aside which was the subject matter of challenge before
the Delhi High Court and after being affirmed on dismissal of the
writ petition preferred by the appellant society, the matter is
under challenge in the present batch of appeals.
14. Civil appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 9015 of 2010 has
been filed against the order dated 28th October, 2009.  Although
the  question was the same with the additional factor raised that
in terms of condition nos. 2 & 3 of the sale deed, notice was
served on the society that was not responded failing which the
member proceeded to sell the subject plot but service of notice
was disputed by the appellant society and the Tribunal held that
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the appeal of the society for cancellation of the legally executed
registered sale deed is not a subject matter which is covered
under the provisions of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act and
rules framed thereunder and such registered instrument, if at all
one is aggrieved, could be challenged in a civil Court having
jurisdiction and in the writ petition preferred by the society, the
High   Court   while   upholding   the   view   of   the   Tribunal   further
observed that in the absence of the purchaser being impleaded as
party to the proceedings, his rights indeed has been jeopardised
who indisputedly was a necessary party to the proceedings and
when   the   valid   transaction   is   sought   to   be   set   aside   by   the
Arbitrator under its impugned award, the purchaser was to be
heard and was held against the appellant and on the twin ground
the writ petition came to be dismissed is the subject matter of
challenge.
15. In civil appeal arising out of SLP(C ) No. 26905 of 2010, the
order of the Tribunal which was on the same lines and placing
reliance on the earlier order of the High Court dated 28th October
2009, the Writ Petition(C ) no. 2136/2008 came to be dismissed
with additional fact taken into consideration that Section 91 of
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the   Act,   2003   gives   recognition   to   purchase   through   the
registered agreement to sell or power of Attorney or a sale deed
and   on   fulfilment   of   conditions,   the   applicant,   if   apply   for
membership by paying transfer fee, share money and admission
fee etc. as per the provision of the bye­laws, the society and the
committee has to grant membership to the applicant within 30
days   of   the   submission   of   application   and   refusal   by   the
Committee   may   give   rise   to   appeal   by   the   applicant   to   the
Registrar of the Cooperative Societies.
16. Mr.   Shekhar   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellant submits that it is not in dispute that the land was
acquired by the appropriate Government under Part VII of the
Land Acquisition Act and for the aforesaid purpose, the appellant
society and the Government entered into an agreement dated 13th
May, 1955 under Section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act which
came to be published in the official Gazette in compliance of
Section 42 of the Act and has a force of law and learned senior
counsel submits that in terms of the agreement, the Government
has to execute a deed of conveyance and grant the said land to
the society. Indisputedly, the Government has failed to execute
15
deed of conveyance or make the grant in favour of the society and
further to support its title, the society filed a Writ Petition No.
6406 of 2001 and order came to be passed on 7th January, 2004
directing the Government by Writ of Mandamus to execute the
deed of conveyance. Taking assistance thereof, learned senior
counsel submits that in the absence of any agreement/deed of
conveyance   been   executed   by   the   Government,   the   appellant
society itself does not hold a freehold title and is not a owner of
the subject land in question and so long as the society is not the
owner of the subject land, it could not transfer ownership rights
to its members as the transferor cannot confer on the transferee
a better right than what he himself possess and the purported
sale deeds executed by the society in favour of its members even
though indicated in the recital of the sale deed as owner of the
subject plot but that may not transfer any ownership/freehold
title on its members.
17. According to the  learned senior counsel, the title of  the
parcel of land is still with the Government and the Government
has not executed any deed of conveyance so far despite order of
the Delhi High Court dated 7th January, 2004 and the agreement
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dated 13th May, 1955 is nothing more than a promise to execute
a deed of conveyance and the agreement may have a binding
force in view of its publication in the Gazette under Section 42 of
the Land Acquisition Act but cannot be construed as extending
freehold title to the society. 
18. Learned senior counsel further submits that Section 44 A of
the Land Acquisition Act clearly provides that no company (which
include society) for whom land is acquired under Part VII of the
Act is entitled to transfer the land or any part thereof by sale,
mortgage, gift or otherwise except with the previous sanction of
the Government.   According to learned senior counsel, the sale
deeds   executed   after   1962,   when   Section   44   A   came   on   the
statute book w.e.f. 12th September, 1962 does not indicate that
any previous sanction has been obtained from the Government
and mere permission to use does not create any right or interest
on the subject land in favour of the society.  At least, in any case,
no ownership of freehold right is created so far and Section 54 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is merely a codification of the
principle of common law which may not be of any assistance to
the respondents as its defence.
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19. Learned senior counsel appears to be very futuristic in his
approach when submits that even if the Government decides at
later stage to grant ownership to the society, such ownership
would always be subject to Section 44A of the Land Acquisition
Act and society cannot make any transfer in any form, without
previous  consent  of  the Government  and the very concept of
freehold means that the holder of the land has an absolute right
to transfer and/or create any rights in the land without being
required to take any permission or consent of any other authority
or   person   and   in   this   context,   the   finding   which   has   been
recorded converting freehold rights in favour of the members in
respect of the plots allotted to them is erroneous and contrary to
law which according to him is not sustainable. 
20. According to learned senior counsel Mr. Shekhar Naphade,
the purported sale deed executed by the society in favour of its
members has no legal effect and even the terms on which the
members of the society are occupying their respective plots or
their houses confers no right in favour of the allottees.  Thus, the
transfer   made   by   individual   members   to   third   parties/non18
members without previous sanction of the Government are void
ab initio bad and such transfer without prior permission/consent
of the society even by registered sale deed apart from being in
violation of the provisions of the bye­laws are also hit by Section
44A of the Land Acquisition Act and no legitimate right can be
conferred on the allottee or its transferee to whom rights have
been   transferred   on   the   subject   plot   in   question   and   placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in   Zoroastrian
Cooperative  Housing  Society  Ltd.  and  another   Vs.  District
Registrar,   Cooperative   Societies(Urban)   and   Others  2005(5)
SCC 632.
21. Per contra, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
respondents while supporting the judgment of the High Court
submitted   that   the   question   which   has   been   raised   by   the
counsel for the appellant is beyond the pleadings and it was
never the case of the society either before the Arbitrator or the
Tribunal or the High Court or even in the pleadings in the civil
appeal   that   in   the   absence   of   any   deed   of   conveyance   being
executed in terms of clause 2 of the agreement dated 13th May,
19
1955,   the society does not hold freehold title/rights over the
subject land in question and   what is being argued before this
Court is beyond the pleadings and has been raised for the first
time   while   making   oral   submissions   and   there   is   no   factual
foundation on record in support of what is being prayed and
further submitted that the subject plots have been allotted to the
members of the society as its owner free from encumbrances
transferred by the Government, after being acquired at the behest
of the society under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
 22. Learned senior counsel for the respondents further submits
that after the agreement dated 12th  April, 1955 been executed
under   Section   41   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894   and
published in the Gazette dated 13th May, 1955 become a force of
law by virtue of Section 42 of the Act and the agreement dated
13th  May, 1955 recites certain terms & conditions and on its
satisfaction,   the   appropriate   Government   had   proceeded   to
complete the acquisition proceedings and handed over possession
of   the   subject   land   in   question   to   the   society   free   from
encumbrances on 11th June, 1957 & 30th July, 1957  and after
the   possession   was   taken   over   by   the   society,   the   society
20
proceeded in making allotment to its members by a registered
sale deed conferring rights and title in favour of the allottee. 
23. Learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that a
conjoint reading of clauses 2 & 3 of the sale deed (dated 30th
December, 1968 in the instant case), the society reserves its preemptive rights over the subject plot in question and if the society
fails to purchase within the stipulated period at the prevailing
market price, the member will be at liberty to dispose of in the
manner as he/she likes.
24. According to learned senior counsel, Section 91 of the Delhi
Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 envisage that any member of the
housing society who has sold his plot or flat on the registered
Power of Attorney or agreement for sale or by sale deed ceases to
be   a   member   of   the   society   and   the   transferee   who   has
purchased   the   subject   property   on   the   registered   Power   of
Attorney or agreement for sale or by sale deed on fulfilment of the
conditions as stipulated on depositing the transfer fee and share
money, if any, the Society and the Committee is under obligation
to grant membership to the applicant within 30 days from the
submission of application and  in case of refusal, there is remedy
21
to the applicant to approach the Registrar of the Cooperative
Societies for redressal of his/her grievance. 
25. Learned senior counsel submits that there is no refusal ever
made by the society to the transferees who had purchased the
subject plot in question contemplated under Section 91 of Act,
2003 failing  which  the  transferees,  in  their  own   capacity,  be
considered and deemed to be a member of the society in the
absence of any order being passed by the society to the contrary.
26. Learned senior counsel for the respondents further submits
that throughout even, from the correspondence evident from the
letter dated 27th July, 1985 from the Secretary of the Society to
Lt.  Governor  stated  in  para  2 that  the  “Delhi  Administration
acquired approx. 30 acres of land allotted to the society on 25th
March, 1957 on freehold basis”.   Later, in the letter dated 15th
March, 1989 addressed to the authority from the Secretary of the
Society,   it   was   stated   that   “the   status   of   the   land   is   totally
freehold and allotment of plots to the society’s members was also
on   the   same   basis.”     That   apart,   the   society,   at   one   stage,
approached   the   District   Judge   in   RCA   95/82   titled   as  Delhi
22
Dayalbagh Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. Vs. Arjun Das
and after the matter was being heard, the learned trial Judge also
recorded its finding that the subject land in dispute is being a
freehold and there is no legal bar to the same being sold and the
order   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Judge   never   came   to   be
challenged by the society and accepted the nature of the land of
which   the   possession   was   handed   over   by   the   appropriate
Government on completion of acquisition proceedings initiated at
the instance of the society vested free from encumbrances. 
27. Learned senior counsel further submits that Section 70 of
the   Act   have   a   limited   jurisdiction   to   examine   the   dispute
touching the constitution, management or the business of the
cooperative society to arbitration and the prayers made are in the
nature of declaration that the registered sale deed in favour of the
non­members be held to be null and void is indisputedly beyond
its scope and jurisdiction and has been rightly interfered by the
Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court on dismissal of the
writ petition preferred at the instance of the society and placed
reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Usha   Ranjan
23
Bhattacharjee and Others Vs. Abinash Chandra Chakaborty
and Ors. reported in 1997(10) SCC 344. 
28. Learned senior counsel submits that after the enactment of
the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 or 2003, the bye­laws
of the societies have to be in conformity with the provisions of the
Act.   There   is   a   restrictive   clause   if   inconsistent   with   the
provisions of the Act, 2003 may not have any enforceability under
the law and     further submits that the possession free from
encumbrances was handed over by the appropriate Government
to the society after passing of the award in June/July 1957 and
it may not be open for the appellant to take a summersault and
raise a question which was never agitated.   In last 60 years,
much water has flown in the Ganges, conferring rights over the
subject property and at this belated stage when number of sale
deeds have been executed at various point of time by the society
with its members which has been further transferred to nonmembers by registered power of attorney or agreement to sell or
sale deed and their rights are protected under Section 91 of Act,
2003 and at such belated stage when there is no residential plot
available with the society at its disposal, question of deed of
24
conveyance not executed may not arise for consideration and it
appears that this plea has been raised to nullify the winding up
proceedings which is adversely affecting the rights of the society.
29. We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties at
length and with their assistance perused the records.
30. Before adverting further, we will discuss some material facts
and the relevant provisions of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act
and the bye­laws of the society which may have a direct bearing
on the issue under consideration.
31. After the action been initiated by the society for providing
land in fulfilment of the public purpose in providing plots to its
members,   the   appropriate   Government   issued   a   notification
under Section 4 dated 19th  March, 1955 and after holding a
preliminary inquiry, as contemplated under Chapter 40 of Part
VII of the Act, 1894, and on its satisfaction, the appropriate
Government executed an agreement dated 12th April, 1955 with
the   society   under   Section   41   in   fulfilment   of   the   necessary
requirements, namely, payment to the Government of the cost of
25
acquisition, the transfer of land to the society on such payment
prescribing the terms on which the land shall be provided to the
society and where the acquisition is for the purpose of erecting
dwelling houses, all the provisions of Act connected therewith,
time and the manner in which the dwelling houses have to be
erected, on the terms & conditions came to be published in the
Gazette under Section 42 of the Act on 13th  May, 1955 which
became the law and binding on the parties and the public at
large.     The   appropriate   Government   thereafter   proceeded   in
making  declaration   under  Section   6  of  the   Act.     Consequent
thereto,   award   came   to   be   passed   under   Section   11   on   11th
February, 1957 and the appropriate Government took possession
of   the   subject   land   in   question,   free   from   all   encumbrances,
under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act and it has come on
record that possession was transferred to the society for whom
the acquisition proceedings were initiated at its instance on 11th
June,   1957   and   30th  July,   1957   respectively   free   from
encumbrances and, therefore, the title in transferring the land to
the   society   in   terms   of   the   agreement   dated   13th  May,   1955
created a statutory genesis.   It is not the case of either party that
there was any breach or violation of the terms and conditions
26
which has been referred to under the agreement dated 13th May,
1955 either by the society or its members or the purchasers or
the successors in interest.
32. The emphasis of learned senior counsel for the appellant
that the title of the land in question never stood transferred to
the   society   in   the   absence   of   the   deed   of   conveyance   been
executed, is without substance for the reason that the title at the
first place in favour of the society was not created by any of the
modes ascribable to the Transfer of Property Act and once the
acquisition proceedings have been initiated by the Government,
on fulfilment of the conditions referred to under Section 41 of
Land Acquisition Act on being published in the Gazette dated 13th
May 1955 under Section 42 of the Act which became the law,
there appears no further statutory requirement to register any
deed of conveyance under the Transfer of Property Act.  Besides
it,   the   consideration   amount   was   paid   by   the   society   as
demanded by the competent authority and physical and actual
possession,   free   from   encumbrances,   was   delivered   to   the
appellant society and the land stood conveyed and granted in
terms of clause 2 of the agreement.  At the same time, no party in
27
the instant proceedings ever raised any objection/dispute on the
issue   of   physical   possession   of   the   land   in   question   being
delivered to the appellant society and/or the same being passed
on   to   the   person   who   have   purchased   plots/flats   therein
subsequently.     In   the   given   facts   and   circumstances,   it   can
legitimately be observed that the marketable title in transferring
respective plots to its members has created a statutory genesis. 
33. It is also not the case of the appellant society that at any
later   stage,   after   the   appropriate   Government   handed   over
possession,   free   from   encumbrances,   of   the   subject   land   in
question to the society, it ever raised objection in reference to the
breach of the terms & conditions of the agreement dated 13th
May, 1955 to resume the subject land or for taking legal recourse
in reference to the title of the subject land in question.  In the
given facts and circumstances, a legal presumption can be drawn
that after the peaceful possession free from encumbrances, was
handed over by the State Government to the society, all rights of
the   said   land   stood   vested   with   the   society   free   from
encumbrances and transferred to its members on the terms as
indicated in the registered sale deed executed by the society.
28
34. The sale deed dated 30th December, 1968 was executed in
favour of one of the applicant Shri Manocha, member of the
society to whom plot no. B­68 was allotted by registered sale deed
on certain terms & conditions on depositing the cost of the land,
the physical possession of the subject land/plot was passed on to
the member of the society.  The extract clause of the sale deed
dated 30th December, 1968 which are standardised conditions in
all   the   sale   deeds   relevant   for   the   purpose   is   reproduced   as
under:­
“This   Sale   Deed   is   made   on   this   30th  day   of
December 1968 by the Delhi Dayalbagh Co­operative
House   Building   Society   Ltd.   Delhi,     in   favour   of
Shri/Smt. K.L. Manocha, son of Shri M.R. Manocha,
resident of Delhi, a member of the Society,
WHEREAS   the   Chief   Commissioner,   Delhi   vide
notification No. F­15 (147/34­LSG dated 17.3.55 and
notification No. F­15(147)/54­LSG dated 13.6.56 and
Awards   in   pursuance   thereof   acquired   land   for   the
colony of the Society now known as “SOAMI NAGAR
COLONY” and whereas the society is the owner of the
plot No. B­68 measuring 488 Sq. yds. forming part of
the SOAMI NAGAR COLONY and whereas the member
Shri K.L. Manocha has paid to the Society all the dues
in respect of the share money, the cost of the land, and
development charges.
AND WHEREAS the said plot No. B­68 situated in the
said colony of the Society has been hereunder sold to
Shri K.L. Manocha for a sum of Rs.1952/­(Rupees One
Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Two only) being the cost
of land, which amount has been paid by the member to
the society.
29
AND   WHEREAS   the   purchaser   member   has   agreed
that he/she shall pay to the vendor Society or to whom
it   directs,   the   amount   which   may   be   found   by   the
Vendor Society to be due from him/her in future in
respect of the aforesaid plot and in case of failure to
pay such dues which shall always be deemed as a debt
due to the Vendor Society, which dues shall be first
charge on the said plot and the building constructed
thereon.
AND WHEREAS the member Shri K.L. Manocha has
agreed to always abide by the Rules and Bye­laws of
the Society in force time to time.
AND   WHEREAS   the   purchaser   member   agreed   that
he/she shall construct a house on the said plot sold to
him/her within two years after the sale deed by the
vendor society is registered.
NOW THIS DEED OF SALE WITNESSETH AS UNDER:­
1. That subject to conditions stated in this sale deed and
in consideration of Rs. 1952/­ (Rupees One Thousand
Nine Hundred Fifty Two only) as the cost of the land
paid   by   the   member   to   the   said   society,   it   hereby
transfers,   and   conveys   to   the   member   Shri   K.L.
Manocha his/her heirs and assignees all rights in the
plot   of   land   no.   B­68   as   delineated   on   the   plan
annexed to this Sale Deed, to hold the same to the
member on the plan annexed to this Sale Deed, to held
the same to the member for ever.
2. The purchaser member will continue to be the member
of   the   vendor   society,   if   the   purchasing   member
proposes to sell or transfer his house or plot, he/she
undertakes   to   sell   or   transfer   it   to   or   through   the
society.   If the society does not purchase the house
within six months at the prevailing market price, the
member will be at liberty to dispose it off as he/she
likes.
3. The successor will have also to be a member of the
vendor Society.  If he/she does not become a member
of the society, he/she shall sell the house of plot to or
through the Society at the prevailing market price, if
the Society does not purchase the house within six
months, the successor will be at liberty to own it as
any other member or dispose it off as he/she likes.
30
4. That the purchaser member agrees to construct and
build house on the plot in accordance with the rules
and bye­laws of the Municipal Corporation and will not
do anything to violate the said rules and bye­laws of
the Corporation or of the Government which may bring
about or shift any liability on his/her account to the
Society and if he/she does anything which on his/her
account the vendor society is made liable, he/she shall
compensate the vendor Society and if/she does not pay
the vendor Society the said dues, the Vendor Society
liability on him/her will/be the first charge on the plot
and/or the house constructed by him/her.
5. Expenses   in   connection   with   the   registration   and
stamp will be borne by the vendor/society.”
35. Prior   to   the   enactment   of   the   Act   2003,   the   Delhi
Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 was in force, but by passage of
time, it revealed that the Act of 1972 fails to fulfil the object and
rule of cooperative societies which had undergone a sea change.
In order to gear up the cooperative societies to meet the challenge
posed due to economic liberalisation and superfast growth in the
field of Information Technology and to protect the interests of the
members   of   the   cooperative   societies   as   financial   stakes   had
become high, the Government of the National Capital Territory of
Delhi earlier appointed a Committee in 1995 to prepare a new
cooperative   law   and   after   a   detailed   discussion,   Committee
submitted   a   report   on   31st  August,   1998   which   was   further
31
reviewed by the Review Committee and after the report being
submitted, the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 came into
force   on   its   publication   in   the   Gazette   of   3rd  March,   2004.
Certain amendments were made vide the Cooperative Societies
Amendment Act, 2004 and 2006 respectively and in exercise of
power under Section 137, the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules,
2007 were framed to achieve the object of the provisions of the
Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003.
36. Apart from the provisions in reference to the settlement of
disputes as referred to under Chapter VIII, a separate Chapter IX
was   introduced   incorporating   the   special   provisions   for
Cooperative   Housing   societies.     The   Chapter   applies   to   all
cooperative housing societies including housing financial society.
Section 74(a) defines allottee a member of the cooperative society
to whom plot or land or site or flat could be allotted by the
cooperative society and the principal object of the cooperative
housing society is defined in Section 74(e) and (f) of Section 74
deals   with   dwelling   unit   which   includes   a   house,   flat   or
apartment for the purpose of dwelling and sub­section (k) defines
the occupancy rights of an allottee to possess and use the plot or
32
the land.  The limitation of membership has been provided under
Section 75 and the rights and privileges of members on allotment
of plot or dwelling unit in a cooperative housing society has been
defined   under  Section   76.    It   further  takes   note   of   not   only
allotment but has a provision for nomination and restriction on
transfer of share or interest of a member.  Permission to transfer
the occupancy right is not to be ordinarily refused is explained
under Section 80 with a special provision providing for settlement
of disputes and Section 91 introduces a special provision for
regularisation of occupancy rights of persons who have acquired
rights through the instrument on registered Power of Attorney or
agreement for sale or registered sale deed to become a member of
the society on depositing the requisite transfer fee, admission fee,
etc.  Section 74(e), (f), (k), Section 80 and Section 91 which are
relevant for the purpose are reproduced as under:­
74(e) "co-operative housing society" means a cooperative society-
(i) registered or deemed to be registered as a cooperative housing society under this Act;
(ii) the principal object of which is to provide its
members open plots under plot housing, dwelling
units or flats (whether in a multi-storeyed building
or otherwise) in a complex under group housing
and in case where open plots or dwelling units or
flats are already acquired to provide its members
33
common amenities and services including
services relating to the arrangement of finances
for facilitating construction of dwelling units in
order to solve their needs of dwelling units through
mutual-aid in accordance with the co-operative
principles, and includes a house building, copartnership, co-ownership housing society, cooperative housing maintenance society,
multipurpose co-operative housing society and
any other co-operative society of like nature and
purpose;
(iii) "co-operative housing maintenance society"
means a co-operative society formed by the
owners of dwelling units in a building for the
purpose of maintenance of the building and
provisions of common amenities, services, etc;
(iv) "co-ownership co-operative housing society"
means a co-operative society known as "house
building" or plotted society in which the land is
held either on lease-hold or free-hold basis by the
co-operative society and the houses constructed
on it are owned or to be owned by its members;
(v) "co-partnership co-operative housing society"
known as group housing means a co-operative
society in which land and buildings are held by the
co-operative society on lease-hold or free hold
basis and members are allotted flats or such other
premises in such buildings with a right to occupy
the same in accordance with terms of lease,
Government's guidelines and the bye-laws of such
group housing;
(vi) "multi-purpose co-operative housing society"
means a society formed with the object of
undertaking multifarious activities for the economic
and social development of its members,
particularly of slum dwellers and economically
weaker sections of the people, in addition to
providing better housing accommodation and
better environment to improve their quality of life;
(f) "dwelling unit" includes a house, flat and apartment for
the purpose of dwelling;
34
(k)"occupancy right" means the right of an allottee to
possess and use the plot of land, site or dwelling unit or flat
allotted to him with power to give it on hire or on lease and
licence or to mortgage it or to donate or to gift or to transmit it
by will or by inheritance or to transfer it after paying the
transfer fee;
80.Permission for transfer of occupancy right not to be
ordinarily refused and provision for appeal-
(1) No co-operative housing society shall ordinarily refuse to
grant to its member permission for transfer of his occupancy
right in the property of the co-operative housing society
unless the transferee is otherwise not qualified to be a
member:
Provided that nothing contained in any agreement,
contract or the bye-laws regarding eligibility for
membership stipulated therein shall apply to a
nominee, heir or legal representative of the
deceased member for his admission to membership
of the co-operative housing society:
Provided further that aforesaid transfer in case of
lease hold land shall be governed by the provisions
of the perpetual lease of land.
(2) The decision of the co-operative housing society on an
application for permission to such transfer shall be
communicated to the applicant within thirty days from the
date of receipt of the application.
(3) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the cooperative housing society refusing permission for such
transfer may within thirty days from the date on which the
refusal of permission is communicated to him appeal to
the Registrar.
(4) The Registrar shall dispose of the appeal within a
period of one hundred and twenty five days whose
decision shall be final.
91.A member of a housing society who has sold his plot or
flat on the power of attorney or agreement for sale or by
sale deed, shall cease to be a member of that society from
the date of the sale of plot or flat:
Provided that the purchaser having registered
power of attorney or registered agreement for sale
or registered sale deed, as the case may be, in
35
respect of such plot or flat, may apply for
membership by paying transfer fee of five hundred
rupees and share money and admission fee as
per the provisions of the bye-laws of the society
and the committee shall grant membership to the
applicant within thirty days after the submission of
his application. In case of refusal by the
committee, the applicant may appeal to the
Registrar within thirty days and the decision of the
Registrar shall be final:
Provided further that no purchaser shall be entitled
for more than one membership in a housing
society.
37. It may be further noticed that Section 131, save the existing
cooperative societies, registered either under the Act of 1904 or
under the Act of 1912 or under the Bombay Cooperative Societies
Act 1925 which was in force in Delhi or the Delhi Cooperative
Societies Act, 1972, shall be deemed to be registered under the
corresponding   provisions   of   this   Act(Act   of   2003)   and   rules
framed thereunder with the further legislative mandate that byelaws thereof shall, so far as the same are not inconsistent with
the express provisions of this Act, continue to be in force until
altered   or   rescinded.     Section   140   overrides   other   law,
notwithstanding anything inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act.  Section 141 being repeal and savings stipulates that the day
on which the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 comes into
force, the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 which was in
36
force   in   the   National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi   shall   stand
repealed preserving the actions under the Repeal Act.
  38. The Scheme of Act 2003, on its very inception, was
introduced with the object to meet the challenge posed due to
economic liberalisation and superfast growth and to protect the
interests of the members of the societies as financial stakes had
become   high   which   made   the   Government   and   the   National
Capital Territory of Delhi conscious by replacing the Act to subserve the purpose in protecting the interest of the members and
of the society which have been created for the welfare of its
members.     The   principal   object   of   the   cooperative   housing
societies   as   referred   to   under   Section   74(e),   shall   not   be
ordinarily refused for transfer of occupancy rights, as referred to
under Section 80 and Section 91 mandates that if a member of
the housing society has sold his plot or flat on the Power of
Attorney or agreement for sale or sale deed, shall cease to be a
member of the society from the date of the sale of the plot of land
and the purchaser will enter into his shoes having registered
power of Attorney or registered sale deed, as the case may be, in
respect of the plot or a flat on depositing the transfer fee, share
money and admission fee as per the provisions of the bye­laws.
37
The   society   and  the  committee  are  under  obligation  to   grant
membership to the applicant within a period of 30 days and if the
society have assigned reasons to refuse, the remedy lies with the
applicant to file appeal to the Registrar.  What is borne out from
the scheme of Act, 2003 that the purchaser having registered
Power of Attorney or agreement for sale or sale deed on fulfilment
of certain basic requirements on deposit the member fee, transfer
fee, share money and admission fee, etc. as per the provisions of
the bye­laws of the society is entitled ordinarily to become the
member of the society.  Section 91 read with Section 131 of the
Act   provides   that   any   bye­laws   if   inconsistent   or   any   other
enactment which is not in conformity with the provisions of Act of
2003, is ultimately the substantive law that has to prevail upon.
Section 131 & 141 of the Act, 2003 are reproduced below:­
131.   Saving   of   existing   co­operative   societies­  (1)
Every   existing   co­operative   society   which   had   been
registered under the Co­operative Credit Societies Act,
1904 or under the Co­operative Societies Act, 1912, or
under the Bombay Co­operative Societies Act, 1925, as
was   in   force   in   Delhi,   or   the   Delhi   Co­operative
Societies Act, 1972 shall be deemed to be registered
under   the   corresponding  provisions   of   this   Act   and
rules framed thereunder and bye­laws thereof shall, so
far as the same are not inconsistent with the express
provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered or
rescinded.
(2)   All   appointments,   rules   and   orders   made,
notifications and notices issued and suits and other
38
proceedings instituted under the said Acts shall, so far
as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act,
be deemed to have been respectively made, issued and
instituted  under  this  Act,  save  that   an  order  made
cancelling registration of a co­operative society shall be
deemed, unless the co­operative society has already
been   finally   liquidated,   as   an   order   issued   under
section 95 or section 96 or section 97 for its being
wound up.
141. Repeal and savings – On the day on which the
Delhi   Co­operative   Societies   Act,   2003   comes   into
force, the Delhi Co­operative Societies Act, 1972 (35 of
1972) in force in the National Capital Territory of Delhi
shall stand repealed:
Provided that the repeal shall not affect­
(a) The previous operation of the Act so repealed
or anything duly done or suffered thereunder;
or
(b) Any   right,   privilege,   obligation   or   liability
acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act
so repealed; or
(c) Any   penalty,   forfeiture   or   punishment
incurred in respect of any offence committed
against the Act so repealed; or
(d) Any   investigation,   legal   proceedings   or
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation,   liability,   penalty,   forfeiture   or
punishment   as   aforesaid   and   any   such
investigation,   legal   proceedings   or   remedy
may be instituted, continued or enforced and
any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment
may be imposed as if that Act had not been
repealed.”
39.  For saving the existing cooperative societies registered either
under the Act of 1904, 1912 or under the Act of 1925 which was
in force in Delhi at one stage or the Act of 1972, such existing
cooperative   societies   were   deemed  to   be  registered   under   the
39
corresponding provisions of the Act 2003 and the rules framed
thereunder and its bye­laws thereof, so far as the same are not
inconsistent   with   the   express   provisions   of   the   Act,   2003,
continue to be in force until altered or rescinded.  It goes without
saying that bye­laws of the existing cooperative societies have to
be in conformity with the express provisions of the Act of 2003
and all previous actions stood saved by virtue of Section 141 of
the Act.
40. The   contention   of   the   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellant that the sale/transfer of the plot in question by the
member of the society being in violation of condition nos. 2 and 3
of the registered sale deed or clause 51 of the bye­laws which put
restriction on the member to transfer or a sale or otherwise to a
non­member of the society, without permission of the society in
our opinion, deserves to be negated for the reason that there is
no restriction/prohibition under the provisions of the Act, 2003
which has been discussed in detail earlier and to be noticed that
if the bye­laws to the extent are inconsistent to the provisions of
Act 2003, it is the statute which will prevail and it is not the case
of the appellant that the transaction of sale/transfer of the plot in
40
question by the member of the society by registered sale deed or
registered   instrument   is   in   violation   of   the   provisions   of   the
mandate of Act 2003 or rules 2007 framed thereafter. 
41. To the contrary, it appears to be the duty of the Registrar
cooperative societies including the registered housing cooperative
society to scrutinise the bye­laws of the society and to the extent
they are inconsistent with the provisions of Act 2003 or of Rule
2007   framed   therein,   to   ask   them   to   make   appropriate
corrections and to amend it to make it in conformity with the Act,
2003.   It is needless to say that it is the onerous duty of the
competent authority to ensure that it performs the statutory task
in this behalf but if the task has not been performed as yet, at
least   no   provision   in   the   bye­laws   inconsistent   with   the
provisions of the Act, 2003 can have a force of law.
42. As regards clauses 2 & 3 of the original sale deed executed
between the member of the society at the time of initial allotment
is concerned, the society reserves its pre­emptive rights to have a
cooling period of six months before the member may have an
opportunity to transfer the subject plot in the manner he or she
likes at least there was no absolute bar or restrain under clause
41
2 or 3 of the original sale deed, of which reference has been
made, to transfer the land or is otherwise impermissible to a nonmember under any other laws.   But it was possible with prior
notice to the society and the cooling period of six months which
may enable the society to purchase the plot on the market value
and if it is unable to purchase, the member reserves the right to
transfer or sell out the plot in a manner he or she likes reserving
the pre­emptive rights of the society.  In the given circumstances,
transfer by a registered instrument cannot be held void unless it
is in contravention of any law, which is not the case of the
appellant society.
43. It reveals that what transpired before the Tribunal or the
High   Court   was   whether   the   transfer   of   title   by   a   registered
instrument as alleged was open for scrutiny within the scope of
Section 70 of Act, 2003.  Although it was never the case of the
appellant society that alleged registered sale deed was  void ab
initio, bad or obtained by fraud or malpractices and it was also
not the case of the appellant society that the member of the
society in transferring the rights over the property by a registered
42
sale deed, is in violation of any of the provisions of the Act of
2003, or the rules of 2007 framed thereunder. 
44. It is gainful to add that the possession was handed over to
the society on fulfilment of the conditions of the agreement dated
13th May, 1955, published in the Gazette under Section 42 of the
Land Acquisition Act, and became the law as observed, that at
the time when the possession was handed over to the society by
the State Government, no further deed or MOU was executed
restricting the rights of the society for fulfilment of its obligation
of  its  plots  to   its  members,  that  persuades  to  infer  that  the
possession was handed over to the society of the subject land in
question   by   the   Government   free   from   encumbrances   with
unrestrictive rights to execute the sale deed/allot the plots to its
members obviously as per its bye­laws keeping in view of the
mandate of the statutory provisions of the Act, 1973 or Act, 2003
which has later on taken over the field in protecting the interests
of   the   members   of   the   cooperative   societies   including   the
cooperative housing society as in the instant case.
45.   It   may   be   relevant   to   note   that   the   subject   land   was
throughout   exhibited   by   the   society   as   freehold   land   having
ownership rights and allotments were made by the society to its
43
members by the registered sale deed at the time of allotment of
plots.   It is to be noticed that a letter dated 27th July, 1985 was
written by the Secretary of the society to the Lt. Governor and it
was   mentioned   in   paragraph   2   of   the   letter   that   “Delhi
Administration acquired 30 acres of land allotted to the society
on 25th March, 1957 on freehold basis.” Later, in the letter dated
15th  March, 1989 issued to the Secretary of the Society it was
certified   that   the   status   of   the   land   is   totally   freehold   and
allotment of the plots to the society members was also on the
basis of it and the society at one stage approached to the civil
Court   in   RCA   No.   95/82   titled  Delhi   Dayalbagh   Cooperative
House Building Society Ltd. Vs. Arjun Das and it was observed by
the learned trial Judge that “the land in dispute is freehold one
and there is no legal bar to the same being sold.”  In the given
facts and circumstances, if the allotment has been made by the
society   as   a   freehold   land   to   its   members   who   have   further
transferred/sold the subject land/plot by registered sale deed to
its successors/purchasers, their rights to become member of the
society are indeed saved under Section 91 of the Act, 2003 that
in no manner could be eluded by the bye­laws and that apart if
anyone   has   any   objection   regarding   the   registered
44
instrument(sale deed) pursuant to which right has been created,
at least it is not open to examine its validity within the domain
and ambit of Section 70 of the cooperative societies Act and any
person, if felt aggrieved, the remedy lies only before the civil
Court having jurisdiction questioning the registered instrument
within the parameters available under the law.
46. The appellant society at one stage in their counter affidavit
has stated that the subject land is a grant under the Government
Grants Act.   It was nowhere the case ever set up and it was
raised just to denude the rights of the parties which deserves
outright rejection for the additional reason that the subject land
was acquired by the Government under Part VII of the Land
Acquisition   Act   and   transferred   to   the   society   free   from
encumbrances,   there   is   no   applicability   to   the   Government
Grants Act.  The judgment on which reliance was placed by the
learned   senior   counsel   for   the   appellant   in  Mohsin   Ali   and
Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1975(2) SCC 122 may not
be of any assistance.
45
47. As regards submission made in respect to Section 44A of
the Act is concerned, it may not have any application, since the
rights of the parties are governed after the land stood vested with
the   society  free  from  encumbrances  and   regulated  under  the
special   enactment   of   the   Act   2003   and   Rules   2007   framed
thereunder.
48. In   conclusion,   we   find   no   substance   in   either   of   the
submissions   made   by   the   appellant   to   interfere   with   the
judgment impugned before us.   The appeals, being devoid of
merit, are accordingly dismissed.
49. In terms of the dismissal of the appeals, application(s) for
impleadment, does not survive and are accordingly disposed of.
50. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
………………………….J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
New Delhi
January 30, 2019
46
47

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations = The legitimate expectation is not a wish or a desire or a hope, therefore, it cannot be claimed or demanded as a right. The payment of pension in the past will not confer an enforceable right in favour of the Institute or its employees. Thus, the resolution of the Board of the Institute to implement a retirement benefit scheme from its own resources will not bind the State Government to pay the amount of pension to the employees of the Institute. The employees of such Institute cannot be treated at par with the employees of the State Government nor the State can be burdened with the responsibility to pay pension to the employees of the Institute. Consequently, we find that the order of the Division Bench is not legally sustainable. Hence, we allow the appeal and dismiss the Writ Petition.



Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 884 OF 2019
 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 18502 of 2018)
The State of Bihar & Anr. ........Appellants
 Versus
Dr. Sachindra Narayan & Ors. ........Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Hemant Gupta, J.
The present appeal is directed against an order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna on 13.03.2018
whereby the Writ Petition was allowed directing the appellant to provide
financial assistance for payment of the arrears as well as current
pension to the employees of the Anugraha Narayan Sinha Institute of
Social Studies, Patna (Institute).
2. The Institute is incorporated by the Anugraha Narayan Sinha
Institute of Social Studies Act, 1964, (Act). The Institute has a perpetual
succession and a common seal. The Chairman of the Board of Control is
1
a nominee of the State Government. The State Government is also to
nominate two persons of eminence in consultation with the Chairman;
whereas, the others are ex-officio members such as Vice-Chancellor of
Patna University, another Vice-Chancellor to be nominated by the State
Government other than that of Patna University in rotation in
alphabetical order as per names of Universities; two representatives of
the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi; one
representative of the University Grants Commission; one faculty
member not below the rank of a Professor and a Secretary to the State
Government in the Department of Education and in the Department of
Finance.
3. In terms of Section 6 of the Act, the Board is the supreme
governing body of the Institute and is to exercise all the powers of the
Institute. Section 8 mandates the State Government to contribute a
sum of rupees two lacs in each financial year for the maintenance of the
Institute and such other sums as it may deem fit for special items of
research or education work, publication, buildings and proper
maintenance and development of the Institute. Section 9 of the Act
provides for establishment of Institute Fund, whereas, Section 10 deals
with the budget of the Institute. Section 16 of the Act empowers the
Board to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act,
whereas, Section 17 empowers the Board to make regulations
consistent with the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The relevant
provisions of the Act read as under:
2
“6. Functions of the Board. – (1) The Board shall be the
supreme governing body of the Institute and shall exercise
all the powers of the Institute.
 (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act the Board shall, in
particular-
(a) hold, control and administer the property and the funds
of the Institute;
(b) determine the form, provide for the custody and regulate
the use of the common seal of the Institute;
(c) determine and regulate all matter concerning the
Institute;
(d) administer any funds placed at the disposal of the Board
for specific purposes;
(e) create posts and appoint officers and other employees of
the Institute and define their duties and provide for the filling
of temporary vacancies:
Provided that no post the total emolument of which
exceeds Rs. 1,000 per month shall be created without the
previous sanction of the State Government;
(f) have power to accept transfers on behalf of the Institute
of any movable or immovable property to and for the
purposes of the Institute.
 xxx xxx xxx
8. Payment to Institute. - (1) The State Government shall
contribute to the institute a sum of two lakhs of rupees in
each financial year for the maintenance of the institute.
(2) The State Government may contribute from time to time
such additional sums to the Institute as it may deem fit for
special items of research or educational work, publication,
buildings and for the proper maintenance and development
of the Institute.
9. The Institute Fund. - (1) There shall be established a
Fund to be called the Anugraha Narayan Sinha Institute Fund
which shall be vested in the Institute to which shall be
credited-
(a) the balance, if any, standing to the credit of the Anugraha
Narayan Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna, on the date
of commencement of this Act;
(b) all moneys contributed to the Institute by the State
Government;
3
(c) all moneys received by or on behalf of the Institute from
the Central Government;
(d) all moneys received by or on behalf of the Institute by
way of grants, gifts, donations, benefactions, bequests or
transfers;
(e) all interests and profits arising from any transaction in
connection with any money belonging to the Institute;
(f) proceeds from the sale of the journals, pamphlets and
books; and
(g) all moneys received by the Institute in any other manner
or from any other source.
(2) All moneys credited to the Fund shall be deposited or
invested in such manner as the Institute may, with the
approval of the State Government, decide.
(3) The Fund shall be applied towards meeting the expenses
of the Institute including expenses incurred in the exercise of
its powers and discharge of its functions under this Act.
10. Budget. - (1) The Director shall, on or before the tenth
day of August each year, cause to be prepared and laid
before the Board, in such form as may be prescribed by the
Board, the budget estimate of the income and expenditure of
the Institute for the next financial year.
(2) The Board shall, as soon as may be after the tenth day of
August but not later than the first day of the following
September, examine and approve the estimate with or
without modification as it may deem fit and shall forthwith
submit a copy thereof to the State Government.
(3) The Board may from time to time during the financial
year reduce the amount of any item of budget grant or
transfer such amount or a portion thereof to any other item
of budget grant:
Provided that the Board shall have no power to transfer any
non-recurring grant for recurring expenditure:
[Provided further that the Board shall have no power to
transfer from one item to another item an amount exceeding
20 per cent of the original grant under any item.]
xxx xxx xxx
4
12. Accounts and audit. - (1) Subject to any rules made by
the State Government in this behalf, the accounts of receipts
and expenditure of the Institute shall be kept in such manner
and in such form as the Board may from time to time
prescribe.
(2) The Board shall, as soon as may be after closing its
annual accounts, prepare an annual statement of accounts in
such form as the State Government may from time to time
prescribe and forward the same to the Accountant-General,
Bihar, by such date as the State Government may, in
consultation with the Accountant-General, Bihar, determine.
(3) The accounts of the Institute shall be audited by the
Accountant-General, Bihar, or some other officer appointed
by him in this behalf and the Board shall take suitable action
on the matters arising out of the audit report.
(3A) The State Government may call upon the Institute to
adopt concurrent audit by the Chief Controller of Accounts
and Audit of the State Government.
(4) The Board shall forward the annual accounts of the
Institute together with the audit report thereon to the State
Government and the State Government shall cause the same
to be laid before the Legislature of the State.”
xxx xxx xxx
4. In terms of Section 16 of the Act, the Anugraha Narayan Sinha
Institute of Social Studies, Rules 1966 (Rules) were framed by the
Board. “Pay” is defined in Rule 2(xii), whereas Rule 9 provides for
maintenance of Institute’s provident fund and Rule 19 provides for
amendment of the Rules at any time by 2/3 majority of the members
at the meeting of the Board.
5. In terms of Section 17 of the Act, the Anugraha Narayan Sinha
Institute of Social Studies, Patna Regulation, 1966 (Regulations) have
been framed, which inter-alia empowers the Board to sanction
5
Dearness Allowance; House Rent Allowance and also the service
conditions of the employees of the Institute. Regulation 9 empowers
the Board to create such posts as may be necessary and may fix scale
of pay and allowances for posts subject to Section 6 of the Act. In
terms of Clause 16 of the Regulations, Staff Service Condition Rules
have been framed, however, such Rules do not provide for payment
of pension.
6. The Board in its meeting held on 15.02.1985 passed the
following resolution:
“The Board accepted the recommendation of the Committee
on Retirement Benefits dated 11.2.85 and decided that the
scheme as prepared may be implemented, provided that the
scheme as reported would be operated from Institute
resources and that no separate grant would be sought for it
from the Government…………. “
7. In this factual background, 27 petitioners (respondents 1 to 27
herein), in the present appeal invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court for a direction to the respondents (appellants herein) to pay the
arrears as well as current pension on the month to month basis which
has been stopped from the month of January 2014. The Writ Petition
was dismissed on 20.06.2017 holding that the resolution of the Board
dated 15.02.1985 was inconsistent with the Act and Rules, therefore,
the writ petitioners were not vested with any legal right.
Correspondingly, there is no legal obligation on the State to pay and
that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the authority of the
State to act contrary to law. It was also held that, the payment of
pension/family pension by the State for the last few years is an
6
illegality, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated by an order
of the Court.
8. However, an intra Court appeal was allowed on 13.03.2018
noticing that the Government of Bihar has earmarked grants under
the pension head during 2004-05 to 2010-11. It was held that though
the recommendations of the Committee on retirement benefits may
be implemented, provided that the scheme is operated from the
Institute’s resources, but the fact remains that the liability on account
of pension was duly mentioned in the annual budget of the State
Government, therefore, such release of the funds by the State
Government will be in the nature of grant as envisaged under Section
9(g) of the Act. The State Government would be estopped from
saying that it never considered payment of pension as a responsibility
after about 30 years. The Government approved the budget and
provided additional funds to meet the liabilities, therefore, it would
amount to consideration and acceptance of responsibility, may be in
form of grants only.
9. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the resolution of
Board was that the Retirement Benefit Scheme was to be operated
from the resources of the Institute and that “no separate grant would
be sought for it from the State Government”. Therefore, the financial
burden of the Retirement Benefit Scheme cannot be foisted upon the
State. The pension was resolved to be borne by the Institute from its
own funds. Still further, such resolution of the Board was not
7
approved by the State Government creating extra financial liability on
the State.
10. It is argued that in terms of Section 8 of the Act, the State
Government is to contribute a sum of rupees two lacs in each
financial year or such other sums for research or education work,
publication, buildings and for proper maintenance and development
of the Institute. Such provision does not contemplate payment of
recurring expenditure of pension which is not contemplated by
Section 8 of the Act. The money contributed by the State
Government is one source of the Institute funds. The Board has
limited power to transfer funds from one item to another item
exceeding 20 per cent of the original grant under any item. The
accounts of the Institute are required to be audited. Thus, it is
contended that though the officers of the State are members of the
Board and that such fact will make the Institute a “State” within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. But that fact will not make
the Institute as extension of the State Government, as the Institute is
a creation of a separate juristic entity under the State Statute. The
rules framed in terms of Section 16 of the Act again do not provide for
Provident Fund/Gratuity and for pension. It is argued that the Board as
an independent juristic entity is empowered to prepare its budget but
in terms of the resolution of the Board, financial burden of the pension
scheme cannot be passed on to the State Government.
11. It is further pointed out that the State Government has
disbursed grant from the year 2002-03 uptill 2010-11 which included
8
the break up of pension but it was a mistake, which was rectified from
the year 2011-12. It is contended that the State Government can
grant funds under the heads (1) Grant-in-aid for Salary, (2) Grant-inaid for creation of infrastructure, (3) Grant-in-aid other than salary
and infrastructure. Therefore, some amount released towards
pension in certain years including in terms of an order of this Court
will not create any right in favour of the writ petitioners as the role of
the State Government is to give grants as provided in Section 6 of the
Act but such grant cannot be claimed as matter of right.
12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Instituterespondent No. 28, submitted that the State Government has been
releasing Grant-in-aid including amount towards pension since the
Board has passed the resolution in the year 1985. Reference was
made to communications dated 09.09.2010 and 29.03.2005. It is also
pointed out that the Chief Minister of the State Government presided
over the meeting of the Board on 28.05.1985, wherein, the poor
financial condition of the Institute was discussed. It was resolved that
the three alternative schemes of retirement benefits, i.e. (i)
Contributory Provident Fund; (ii) Contributory Provident Fund-cumGratuity; (iii) General Provident Fund-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity
including benefit of commutation of pension will at all times be the
same as provided for in the statutes and Rules of Patna University
from time to time.
13. It is contended that contribution towards the amount of
pension has created legitimate expectation of the employees of the
9
Institute that they are entitled to pension at par with the employees
of Patna University. Thus, the employees have legitimate expectations
of receipt of pension from the State Government. Therefore, the
order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court does not call for
any interference.
14. On the other hand, Mr. V. N. Sinha, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 27 submitted that the State
Government is bound to disburse the amount necessary for payment
of pension as was being done from the date when the resolution was
passed in the year 1985. Therefore, it is too late for the State to turn
around to take a plea that the responsibility of the pension amount is
not of the State Government.
15. Section 6 of the Act empowers the Board to hold control and
administer the property and the funds of the Institute. The Board is
further empowered to create posts and appoint officers with a
condition that a post of which emoluments exceed rupees one
thousand per month shall not be created without the previous
sanction of the State Government. Therefore, the Board has freedom
to create posts and to hold, control and administer its property and
the funds, but the post carrying an emolument of rupees one
thousand per month or more cannot be created without the previous
approval of the State Government. Though the proviso to Section 6(2)
of the Act requires approval of the State Government in respect of
creation of post carrying pay of more than Rs.1000/-, but the intention
is that any financial expenditure of recurring nature would require the
10
approval of the State Government. Therefore, if the amount of
pension exceeds rupees one thousand per month, the same could not
be claimed from the State Government as a right without approval.
The State Government cannot be called upon to bear the burden of
the pension as such scheme was not approved or even sought for.
The provision of payment of pension in the Budget of the State
Government is a voluntary act not enforceable by a writ of
mandamus. The release of grant is in discretion of the grantor and
cannot be forced by the grantee.
16. It is true that in certain financial years as per documents on
record, the amount of pension was specifically mentioned while
granting grant to the Institute, but such amount is in discretion of the
State and cannot be enforced by a writ of mandamus. There is no
obligation on the State to disburse the grant towards the pension
amount in terms of the Act or the Rules or even in terms of the
resolution of the Board.
17. Sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of the Act mandates the State
Government to contribute a sum of rupees two lacs in each financial
year for the maintenance of the Institute, whereas, sub-Section (2)
empowers the State Government to contribute from time to time,
such additional sums as it may deem fit for special items of research
or education work, publication, buildings and for proper maintenance
and development of the Institute. Such payment for the special
projects, is in discretion of the State Government in view of the object
for which the grant is to be disbursed, but sub-Section (2) does not
11
include disbursement of the amount of pension as the contribution is
for limited purpose which is not recurring in nature.
18. The money contributed to the Institute by the State
Government is one source of the fund of the Institute fund. Section
9(3) of the Act provides that the funds shall be applied towards
meeting the expenses of the Institute including expenses incurred in
exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions under the Act.
Therefore, the retirement pension scheme, at best can be treated to
be a part of obligation of utilization of funds of the Institute but such
obligation to bear the amount of pension fund is not on State
Government as it is not mandated either by Section 8 or Section 9 of
the Act.
19. The argument of learned counsel for the Institute is that the
State Government has provided funds for payment of pension for the
last many years, therefore, the Institute and the employees of the
Institute have legitimate expectations to receive the amount of
pension, is again not tenable.
20. In the judgment reported as Union of India & Ors. v.
Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors.
1
, it was held that a
pious hope even leading to moral obligation cannot amount to a
legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be
inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an
established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. It
was held: -
1 (1993) 3 SCC 499
12
“28. Time is a three-fold present: the present as we
experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a
present expectation. For legal purposes, the expectation
cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a
wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or
demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and
sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however
confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by
themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and
a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences.
A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot
amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an
expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the
sanction of law or custom or an established procedure
followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is
distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such
expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable.
Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify
into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the
conventional sense.
xxx xxx xxx
33. On examination of some of these important decisions it is
generally agreed that legitimate expectation gives the
applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that
the doctrine of legitimate expectation is to be confined
mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which
results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an
undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to
claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities
as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of
such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of
the expectation where an overriding public interest requires
otherwise. In other words where a person's legitimate
expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision
then decision-maker should justify the denial of such
expectation by showing some overriding public interest.
Therefore even if substantive protection of such expectation
is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a
particular person. It simply ensures the circumstances in
which that expectation may be denied or restricted. A case
of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by
representation or by past practice aroused expectation which
it would be within its powers to fulfil. The protection is
13
limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within
those limits. But as discussed above a person who bases his
claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first
instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has
locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same
several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation
must be present. The decision taken by the authority must
be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in
public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of
change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with a
decision…..
xxx xxx xxx
35….It can therefore be seen that legitimate expectation can
at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to
judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited.
It would thus appear that there are stronger reasons as to
why the legitimate expectation should not be substantively
protected than the reasons as to why it should be protected.
In other words such a legal obligation exists whenever the
case supporting the same in terms of legal principles of
different sorts, is stronger than the case against it. As
observed in Attorney General for New South Wales case: “To
strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on
the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate
expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift
on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of
a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too
nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a
power when its exercise otherwise accords with law.” If a
denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to
denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory,
unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of
principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on
the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim
based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more
cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It
can be one of the grounds to consider but the court must lift
the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these
principles warranting interference…..”
21. In a judgment reported as Ram Pravesh Singh and Others
v. State of Bihar and Others
2
, the Court was examining the
2 (2006) 8 SCC 381
14
decision of the State Government that the assets and the liabilities of
a Society should be transferred to the State Electricity Board, but not
the services of the employees to the Board. It was the said decision
of the State which came up for consideration before this Court. It was
held that the Board never agreed nor decided to take services of any
of the employees of the Society. Therefore, it cannot be said that
there was any regularity or predictability or certainty in action which
can lead to a legitimate expectation. It was held:-
“22. The Board had never agreed nor decided to take
services of any of the employees of the Society. In fact, it is
not even the case of the appellants that the Board had at
any point of time held out any promise or assurance to
absorb their services. When the licence of the Society was
revoked, the State Government appointed a committee to
examine the question whether the Board can take over the
services of the employees of the Society. The Committee no
doubt recommended that the services of eligible and
qualified employees should be taken over. But thereafter the
State Government considered the recommendation and
rejected the same, apparently due to the precarious
condition of the Board which itself was in dire financial
straits, and was contemplating retrenchment of its own
employees. At all events, any decision by the State
Government either to recommend or direct the absorption of
the Society's employees was not binding on the Board, as it
was a matter where it could independently take a decision. It
is also not in dispute that for more than two decades or
more, before 1995, the Board had not taken over the
employees of any private licensee. There was no occasion for
consideration of such a course. Hence, it cannot be said that
there was any regularity or predictability or certainty in
action which can lead to a legitimate expectation.”
22. In view of the above judgments, legitimate expectation is one
of the grounds of judicial review but unless a legal obligation exists,
15
there cannot be any legitimate expectation. The legitimate
expectation is not a wish or a desire or a hope, therefore, it cannot be
claimed or demanded as a right. The payment of pension in the past
will not confer an enforceable right in favour of the Institute or its
employees.
23. Thus, the resolution of the Board of the Institute to implement
a retirement benefit scheme from its own resources will not bind the
State Government to pay the amount of pension to the employees of
the Institute. The employees of such Institute cannot be treated at
par with the employees of the State Government nor the State can be
burdened with the responsibility to pay pension to the employees of
the Institute. Consequently, we find that the order of the Division
Bench is not legally sustainable. Hence, we allow the appeal and
dismiss the Writ Petition.
The pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
….…………..........................J.
 (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud)
…………….................................J.
 (Hemant Gupta)
New Delhi,
January 30, 2019.
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