whether it is a suit between the licensor and the licensee or between the landlord and the tenant, such types of suits fall under Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act = Mahadev P Kambekar (D) TR. LRS. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Shree Krishna Woolen Mills Pvt. Ltd. …Respondent(s)

          REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5753­5754 OF 2011
Mahadev P Kambekar (D)
TR. LRS.              ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Shree Krishna Woolen Mills
Pvt. Ltd.            …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) These appeals are directed  against  the  final
judgment and order dated 19.07.2007 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal
No.169   of   1999   in   Suit   No.503   of   1980   and   in
Appeal   No.199   of   1999   in   Suit   No.503   of   1980
whereby   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
allowed   both   the   appeals   filed   by   the   appellants
1
herein   (defendant)   and   the   respondent(plaintiff)
herein respectively. 
2) In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in these appeals which lies in a narrow compass, it
is   necessary   to   set   out   the   relevant   facts
hereinbelow.
3) The appellants are the legal representatives of
Mahadev   Pandurang   Kambekar,   who   was   the
original   defendant   whereas   the   respondent­Shree
Krishna Woolen Mills Pvt. Ltd. is the plaintiff in the
Civil Suit out of which these appeal arise.
4) The dispute between the parties relates to the
land bearing survey Nos.58 and 60 (re­numbered as
CTS   741,741/1   to   741/7)   situated   at   NahurBhandup in Bombay suburban District (hereinafter
referred to as “the suit land”).
5) The plaintiff claims to be the lessee  of the suit
land   whereas   the   defendant   claims   to   be   the
owner/lessor of the suit land on the terms set out in
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the indenture of the lease deed dated 20.06.1958
executed between the parties.
6) A dispute arose between the parties. This led
the defendant to determine the lease in question by
serving   a   quit   notice   dated   19.02.1980   to   the
plaintiff   requesting   them   to   handover   the   leased
premises,   which   was   in   their   possession,   to   the
defendant.
7) The plaintiff then filed a Civil Suit (No.503 of
1980) against the defendant on the original side of
the Bombay High Court claiming therein the specific
performance of the contract (lease deed) in relation
to the suit land.
8) The suit was based essentially on clause 7 of
the Lease Deed which, according to the plaintiff,
enabled them to elect and exercise their right to
purchase   the   suit   land   from   the   defendant   on
fulfillment of the conditions set out therein.
9) The defendant on being served filed the written
statement. The defendant denied the claim and at
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the same time also filed his counter claim against
the plaintiff seeking their eviction from the suit land
and the arrears of rent.
10) The Single Judge by judgment/decree dated
24.12.1998 decreed the plaintiff’s suit for specific
performance of contract and directed the defendant
to   execute  the  conveyance  deed  in  favour  of  the
plaintiff   of   the   suit   land.   The   Single   Judge   also
allowed the counter claim filed by the defendant and
accordingly passed the decree for possession of the
suit land and arrears of rent for three years against
the plaintiff.
11) The appellants (defendant) and the respondent
(plaintiff) both felt aggrieved by the judgment/decree
passed by the Single Judge and filed their respective
appeals before the Division Bench.
12) So far as the defendant's (appellants herein)
Appeal No.169/1999 was concerned, it arose out of
the   decree   passed   against   him   for   specific
performance of the contract, whereas so far as the
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plaintiff's (respondent herein) appeal (No.199/1999)
was concerned, it arose out of the decree passed
against them for possession of the suit land and
arrears of rent.
13) By   impugned   judgment,   the   Division   Bench
allowed   both   the   appeals.     So   far   as   appeal
(169/1999) filed by the appellants (defendant) was
concerned,   the   Division   Bench   set   aside   the
judgment /decree and remanded the suit for re­trial
to the Single Judge on merits afresh in accordance
with law.
14) So   far   as   appeal   (199/1999)   filed   by   the
respondent (plaintiff) was concerned, the Division
Bench set aside the judgment/decree on the ground
that the counter­claim was not maintainable in view
of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, 1882 ( for short called “the Act 1882”) . In other
words,   the   Division   Bench   held   that   so   far   as
counter­claim   filed   by   the   defendant   against   the
plaintiff   is   concerned,   the   Single   Judge   wrongly
5
entertained it as it had no jurisdiction on its original
jurisdiction to entertain counter­claim of this nature
in the light of the provisions of Section 41 of the Act
1882.
15) The defendant (appellants herein), i.e., lessor
felt   aggrieved   by     that   part   of   the   order   of   the
Division Bench which resulted in dismissal of his
counter­claim and filed the present appeals by way
of special leave in this Court.
16) So far as the order of the Division Bench which
resulted in setting aside of the judgment/decree of
the Single Judge and remanding of the suit for retrial on merits is concerned, it attained finality as a
result of dismissal of SLP filed by the plaintiff in this
Court. 
17) The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   these   appeals,   is   whether   the
Division   Bench   was   right   in   dismissing   the
defendant's   counter­claim   as   being   not
maintainable.
6
18) Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Shyam Divan,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
19) Mr.   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the  appellants   (defendant)   and   Mr.
Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   respondent   (plaintiff)   addressed   the   Court   at
length.   However, having heard both the learned
counsel and on perusing the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
20) In our considered opinion, the issue involved
in the present appeals remains no longer res integra
and   is   decided   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Mansukhlal   Dhanraj   Jain   &   Ors.  vs.  Eknath
Vithal Ogale [(1995) 2 SCC 665].
21) In  Mansukhlal   case  (supra),   the   question
arose as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff
claiming   to   be   the   licensee   of   the   premises   on
monetary   consideration   and   seeking   permanent
7
injunction restraining the defendant (licensor) from
recovery   of   the   possession   of   the   premises   is
cognizable   by   the   City   Civil   Court,   Bombay
constituted under the Bombay City Civil Court Act
or   is   cognizable   by   the   Court   of   Small   Causes
Bombay as per Section 41(1) of the Act, 1882.
22) It is this question, which was examined by this
Court in detail in the light of the relevant provisions
of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, the Presidency
Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   1882   and   the   Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947.
23) Having examined the question, their Lordships
speaking through Majmudar, J. held that such suit
is cognizable and thus maintainable in the Court of
Small Causes, Bombay.
24) It is apposite to refer the discussion contained
in paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 17 and 18 which read as
under:
8
“11.  In   order   to   resolve   the   controversy
posed   for   our   consideration,   it   will   be
appropriate   to   note   the   relevant   statutory
provision   having   a   direct   bearing   on   this
question.   Section   41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause
Courts Act reads as under:
“41.   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything
contained elsewhere in this Act or in any
other law for the time being in force but
subject  to  the  provisions  of   sub­section
(2), the Court of Small Causes shall have
jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits
and  proceedings between  a  licensor  and
licensee,   or   a   landlord   and   tenant,
relating to the recovery of possession of
any   immovable   property   situated   in
Greater   Bombay,   or   relating   to   the
recovery of the licence fee or charges or
rent thereof, irrespective of the value of
the   subject­matter   of   such   suits   or
proceedings.”
12.   A  mere   look   at   the   aforesaid   provision
makes   it   clear   that   because   of   the   nonobstante   clause   contained   in   the   section,
even   if   a   suit  may  otherwise   lie  before   any
other   court,   if   such   a   suit   falls   within   the
sweep of Section 41(1) it can be entertained
only   by   the   Court   of   Small   Causes.   In   the
present   proceedings   we   are   not   concerned
with   the   provisions   of   sub­section   (2)   of
Section   41   and   hence   we   do   not   refer   to
them. For applicability of Section 41(1) of the
Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   the   following
conditions   must   be   satisfied   before   taking
the   view   that   jurisdiction   of   regular
competent civil court like City Civil Court is
ousted:
(i)   It   must   be   a   suit   or   proceeding
between the licensee and licensor; or
(ii) between a landlord and a tenant;
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(iii) such suit or proceeding must relate
to   the   recovery   of   possession   of   any
property situated in Greater Bombay; or
(iv)   relating   to   the   recovery   of   the
licence fee or charges or rent thereof.
13. In the present case, we are not concerned
with the 2nd and 4th conditions, as the only
contention   of   the   appellants   is   that   the
present suits do not satisfy conditions 1 and
3   for   attracting   Section   41(1).   The
respondents   claim   to   the   contrary.   It   is
obvious   that   if   the   present   suits   satisfy
conditions 1 and 3 they would clearly attract
the  applicability  of  Section  41(1)  of  the  Act
and such suits would be outside the purview
of regular civil court like the City Civil Court.
Therefore,   the   enquiry   which   becomes
relevant at this stage is to find out from the
averments   in   the  plaints  whether   these   are
suits  between  a   licensor  and  a   licensee  and
whether   they   relate   to   the   recovery   of
possession of immovable property situated in
Greater Bombay.
16.   It   is,  therefore,  obvious  that  the  phrase
“relating to recovery of possession” as found
in   Section  41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts
Act is comprehensive in nature and takes in
its  sweep  all  types  of   suits  and  proceedings
which   are   concerned   with   the   recovery   of
possession of suit property from the licensee
and,   therefore,   suits   for   permanent
injunction   restraining   the   defendant   from
effecting forcible recovery of such possession
from the licensee­plaintiff would squarely be
covered by the wide sweep of the said phrase.
Consequently in the light of the averments in
the   plaints   under   consideration   and   the
prayers   sought   for   therein,   on   the   clear
language  of  Section  41(1),  the  conclusion   is
inevitable   that   these   suits   could   lie   within
10
the   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   Small   Cause
Court, Bombay and the City Civil Court would
have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
17.   We   may   now   refer   to   the   relevant
decisions   of   this   Court   and   other   courts   to
which   our   attention   was   invited   by   learned
counsel   for   both   the   sides.   As   some   of   the
decisions referred to a pari materia provision
as found in Section 28 of the Bombay Rents,
Hotel and Lodging  House  Rates Control Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Bombay
Rent Act”), it will be necessary to refer to the
said  provision.  Section  28(1)  of  the  Bombay
Rent Act reads as under:
“28.   Jurisdiction   of   courts.—
Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in
any   law   and   notwithstanding   that   by
reason of the amount of the claim or for
any other reason, the suit or proceeding
would   not,   but   for   this   provision,   be
within its jurisdiction,—
(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small
Causes,   Bombay,   (aa)   in   any   area   for
which,   a   Court   of   Small   Causes   is
established   under   the   Provincial   Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887, such Court and
(b)   elsewhere,   the   Court   of   the   Civil
Judge   (Junior   Division)   having
jurisdiction   in   the   area   in   which   the
premises   are   situate   or,   if   there   is   no
such  Civil  Judge,  the  Court  of  the  Civil
Judge   (Senior  Division)  having  ordinary
jurisdiction,
shall  have   jurisdiction   to   entertain   and
try   any   suit   or   proceeding   between   a
landlord   and   a   tenant   relating   to   the
recovery   of   rent   or   possession   of   any
premises to which any of the provisions
of this Part apply….”
18.  When   Section  41(1)   of   the  Small   Cause
Courts  Act   is  read   in   juxtaposition  with  the
aforesaid Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act,
it becomes clear that pari materia words are
used   about   nature   of   suits   in   both   these
11
provisions   for   conferring   exclusive
jurisdiction  on  Small  Cause  Courts,  namely,
they   alone   can   entertain   such   suits   or
proceedings   relating   to   recovery   of
possession   of  premises.   It   is   of   course   true
that   Section   41   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts
Act   deals   with   such   suits   between   the
licensee and licensor while Section 28 of the
Bombay   Rent   Act   deals   with   suits   between
landlord  and  tenant. But  the  nature  of  such
suits as contemplated by both these sections
is   the   same,   namely,   it   should   be   the   suit
relating   to   the   recovery   of   possession   of
premises. Interpreting the phrase “relating to
recovery  of  possession”  as   found   in  Section
28 of the Bombay Rent Act, a Bench of three
learned  Judges  of   this  Court   in   the  case  of
Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram6 held
that   a   suit   for   declaration   that   one   of   the
plaintiffs   was   the   tenant   of   the   defendant
landlord and the other plaintiffs were his subtenants   and   they   were   entitled   to   be
protected from eviction squarely falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Cause
Court,   Bombay   under   Section   28   of   the
Bombay Rent Act and jurisdiction of the City
Civil   Court   for   entertaining   such   a   suit   is
excluded.   Imam,   J.   speaking   for   the   threeJudge   Bench   in   that   case   observed   at  page
374 of the report as under:
“The  present  suit  filed  in  the  City  Civil
Court raised in substance a claim to the
effect   that   the   plaintiffs   were   the
tenants   of   the   premises   within   the
meaning   of   the   Act.   Such   a   claim   was
one which arose out of the Act or any of
its   provisions.   The   suit   related   to
possession of the premises and the right
of   the   landlord   to   evict   any   of   the
plaintiffs was denied on the ground that
the first plaintiff was a tenant within the
meaning of the Act and the premises had
been   lawfully   sublet   by   him   to   the
12
second   and   third   plaintiffs.   The   City
Civil   Court   was   thus   called   upon   to
decide  whether   the   first  plaintiff  was   a
tenant   of   the   premises   within   the
meaning of the Act and whether he had
lawfully   sublet   the   same   to   the   second
and third plaintiffs. The City Civil Court,
therefore, had to determine whether the
plaintiffs  had  established  their  claim  to
be   in   possession   of   the   premises   in
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the
Act.”
25) In the light of the law laid down by this Court
in Mansukhlal’s case (supra) which was later relied
on   in  Prabhudas   Damodar   Kotecha   &   Ors.  vs.
Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr. [(2013) 15 SCC
358], we have no hesitation in affirming the view
taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment
which rightly held that the counter­claim filed by
the   defendant   (appellants   herein)   is   not
maintainable.
26) In our considered view, the law laid down in
these two cases has full application to the facts of
this case and we find no ground to take a different
view than what has been taken by the High Court.
13
27) The only distinction on the facts of the case of
Mansukhlal (supra) and the case at hand is that in
case   of  Mansukhlal  (supra),   the   dispute   was
between the licensee and the licensor in relation to
the land, whereas in the case at hand, the dispute
is between the landlord and the tenant.
28) This factual distinction, in our view, is of no
significance   for   deciding   the   issue   in   question
against the appellants by placing reliance on the law
laid   down   in   the   case   of  Mansukhlal  (supra)
because both the category of cases, i.e., the one
arising between the licensor and the licensee and
the   other   arising   between   the   landlord   and   the
tenant   in   relation   to   the   land   are   governed   by
Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act.
29) In other words, whether it is a suit between the
licensor and the licensee or between the landlord
and   the   tenant,   such   types   of   suits   fall   under
Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act and are,
14
therefore, cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes,
Bombay.
30) This takes us to deal with the next argument
of     Mr.   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellants that once the tenancy is determined such
suits would not come within the purview of Section
41 of the Small Cause Courts Act. This argument
was rejected by the Division Bench and, in our view,
rightly by placing reliance on the law laid down by
the   Bombay   High   Court   in   the   case   of  Nagin
Mansukhlal   Dagli  vs.  Haribhai   Manibhai   Patel
(AIR 1980 Bombay 123) (Para 8 of the said decision
quoted in the impugned order).  We approve the law
laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of
Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli (supra) as laying down the
correct   principle   of   law.   We,   therefore,   do   not
consider   it   necessary   to   elaborate   our   reasoning
more than what we have said.
15
31) Before   parting,     we   consider   it   apposite   to
make   it   clear   that   though   both   learned   senior
counsel in support of their respective submissions
referred extensively to the factual matrix of the case
from their respective list of dates, pleadings and the
documents but we have refrained from recording
any factual finding on any of the factual issues.
32) Indeed, in the light of what we have held supra
on legal question, it is not necessary.  It is now for
the parties to raise all such factual issue(s) such as
how much area was leased out, how much area is
outside the lease, who are the owners of the leased
area and the areas adjacent to leased area and all
incidental   questions   arising   therefrom   before   the
competent Court. 
33) It   is   apart   from   the   fact   that   these   factual
issues were also not gone into by the Division Bench
and indeed rightly.  It is for this reason, we find no
ground to deal with them for the first time in these
appeals else it will cause prejudice to the rights of
16
the parties while prosecuting their grievances before
the   competent   Court.   Now,   it   will   be   for   the
competent Court to come to its own conclusion on
their respective merits and pass appropriate orders
in accordance with law.
34) In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion   and   the
observations,   we   find   no   merit   in   these   appeals.
The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.
   
               
    ………...................................J.
     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                 
   …...……..................................J.
             [R. SUBHASH REDDY]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019
17

a dispute inter se private parties of the nature mentioned above could not be allowed to be raised in the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution for seeking issuance of mandamus against the State and its authorities in relation to the properties in question = N. Sankaranarayanan ….Appellant(s) VERSUS The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. ….Respondent(s)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.7390­7391 OF 2009
N. Sankaranarayanan     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing
Board & Ors.       ….Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.7405­7406  OF 2009
Aruna Theatres & Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd.     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing
Board & Ors.       ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
In Civil Appeal  Nos.7390­7391 of 2009
1. These appeals are directed against  the final
judgment and order dated 04.03.2008 passed by
1
the   High  Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   in  Writ
Appeal No.1499 of 2005 and Writ Petition No.5718
of 2005 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court     dismissed   the   writ   appeal   and   the   writ
petition filed by the appellant herein.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in   these   appeals,   it   is   necessary   to   set   out   few
relevant facts hereinbelow.
3. The appellant herein is the appellant in Writ
Appeal No.1499 of 2005 and writ petitioner in W.P.
No. 5718 of 2005 whereas respondent Nos. 1 to 6
herein are the respondents of the said  writ appeal
and the writ petition out of which these appeals
arise.
4. In the aforesaid writ petition, the Single Judge
passed   an   interim   order   dated   07.03.2005.   The
appellant herein (writ petitioner) felt aggrieved by
the said interim order and filed intra court appeal
before the Division Bench.
2
5.  The Division Bench,  with the consent of the
parties,   decided   the   main   writ   petition   itself   on
merits and finding no merit therein dismissed the
writ petition filed by the appellant herein by the
impugned order, which has given rise to filing of
these appeals by way of special leave by the writ
petitioner in this Court.
6. On perusal of the list of dates, special leave
petitions, writ petition, its counter, the documents
enclosed in the appeal and lastly, the findings of the
Division Bench in the impugned order, it is clear
that the dispute, which was subject matter of the
writ   petition   and   which   is   now   carried   in   these
appeals   at   the   instance   of   the   writ   petitioner
(appellant   herein),   is   essentially   between   the
members of one family whose ancestor was Late S.
Narayanapillai.   He   died   leaving   behind   six   sons.
Late   S.   Narayanapillai   owned   several   properties
3
which,  on  his   death,   were  inherited  by  his  legal
representatives. 
7.   The disputes arose between the members of
the family of Late S. Narayanapillai on his death.  In
order to resolve the disputes, the members of the
family,   therefore,   executed   one   memorandum   of
understanding on 24.09.1998 in relation to their
family properties. Unfortunately, the disputes did
not   come   to   an   end   and,   on   the   other   hand,
persisted amongst them, which led to filing of the
cases in the Company Law Board by some members
against   the   other   and   also   the   writ   petition   in
question by the appellant herein.
8. The dispute, which is subject matter of the
writ   petition   out   of   which   these   appeals   arise,
centers around to the land which is situated in a
scheme   known   as   "Ashok   Nagar   Scheme"   in
Chennai. The dispute is between the appellant,  who
is one of the members of the family and respondent
4
No. 2, which is a Private  Limited Company formed
by another member of the family.
9. One of the grievances of the appellant against
respondent   No.   2   in   the   writ   petition   is   that
respondent no 2 is running a petrol pump on a
portion of the land in question and has also let out
its part to respondent No. 3 who, in turn, is using
the same   as marriage hall for public under the
name   "Udayam   Kalyana   Mandapam".   This   act   of
respondent   No.   2   is   being   objected   to   by   the
appellant amongst them.
10.      It is with these background facts and the
grievance,  which is elaborated, the appellant filed a
writ petition and sought therein a relief for issuance
of a writ of mandamus against the State authorities
namely,  Tamil Nadu Housing Board (R­1), Chennai
City   Municipal   Corporation   (R­4)   and   Chennai
Metropolitan Development Authority (R­ 5) directing
them jointly and severally to take appropriate action
5
in   law   against   Respondent   Nos.   2   and   3   and
restrain them from continuing with their activities
on   the   land.   According   to   the   appellant,     the
activities undertaken by respondent No. 3 on the
land in question are illegal, hazardous and against
the public safety inasmuch as they are being carried
in violation of several provisions of the laws in force.
11. As   mentioned   above,   the   Division   Bench
dismissed the writ petition finding no merit therein
with the following reasons in Para 17, which reads
as under: 
“17.  A perusal of the records produced
before   this   Court   leaves   no   iota   of
doubt  that principally the  dispute  now
raised   before   this   Court   is   a   private
dispute   between   the   various   family
members  having  contesting  the  claims
to   be   on   the   Board   apart   from   those
relating to the affairs of the Company.
It is an admitted fact that the company
is  a  closely  held  company  by  a   family
members  of  six  brothers.    The  present
dispute   is   nothing   but   a   trial   for   the
show   of   their   respective   strength   to
each   other   herein.     A   petition   before
the   Company   Law   Board   is   pending
consideration   as   regards   the
continuance  of  the  directorship  of  Mr.
6
Muthusami.   Whatever be the merits of
the   petition   before   the   Company   Law
Board,   taking   note   of   the   various
contentions,   which   included   a  dispute
with reference to the area occupied by
the Theatre and the construction of the
mandapam   and   the   petrol   pump,   this
Court in the order passed on 19.9.2007
in  C.M.A.  No.1900  of  2007  has  rightly
directed   the   Company   Law   Board   to
dispose   of   the   main   petition   by
31.1.2008.”
 
12. The question, which arises for consideration in
these appeals, is whether the Division Bench was
justified in dismissing the appellant's writ petition
on the aforementioned reasoning.
13. We heard the learned counsel for the parties
and perused the record of the case. Having heard
the learned counsel, we are inclined to agree with
the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the
Division Bench in the impugned order.
14. In   our   considered   opinion   also,   the   writ
petition   filed   by   the   appellant   was   wholly
misconceived   and   deserved   dismissal   at   the
threshold.
7
15.  As rightly observed by the Division Bench, the
dispute sought to be raised by the appellant in his
writ   petition   was   essentially   a   private   property
dispute between the members of one family of which
the   appellant   and     respondent   No.   2   are   the
members.
16.  By indirect means such as the one resorted to
by the writ petitioner (appellant herein) by filing the
writ petition, a dispute inter se private parties of the
nature mentioned above could not be allowed to be
raised in the writ petition under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution for seeking issuance of mandamus
against the State and its authorities in relation to
the properties in question. 
17. It is not in dispute that the appellant did not
file   the   writ   petition   in   his   capacity   as   publicspirited person, i.e., Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
It was, on the other hand, a writ petition was filed
by the appellant essentially to settle his personal
8
property rights disputes qua respondent Nos. 2 and
3. It is a settled law that no writ petition can be
entertained   for   issuance   of   any   writ   against   any
private individual in respect of any private property
dispute.   The   remedy   in   such   case   lies   in   civil
Courts.
18. In   other  words,  it   is  a   settled   law  that  the
questions such as,  who is the owner of the land in
question,  the appellant or respondent No. 2 or any
other member of their family, whether the land in
question   was   let   out   by   respondent   No.   2   to
respondent No. 3 and,   if so,   when, why and for
what purpose, who had the right to let out the said
land (appellant or respondent No. 2 or any other
member of the family), what was the arrangements,
if any, made in the memorandum of settlement  in
relation to the land in question inter se members of
the family, whether it was breached or not  and,  if
so,   by whom, what activities are being carried on
9
the said land and, if so,   by whom, whether such
activities   are   legal   or   illegal   etc.   are   not   the
questions   which   can   be   raised   by   any   private
individual   against   other   private   individual   in   the
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. Even   if   the   writ   petitioner   did   not   raise
pointedly these questions for claiming reliefs in the
writ petition yet,  in our view,  such questions have
a material bearing while considering the grant of
reliefs   claimed   by   the   writ   petitioner   in   the   writ
petition.
20. It is not in dispute that some proceedings are
pending before the Company Law Board between
the   parties   in   relation   to   their   private   property
disputes.   If   that   be   so,     the   parties   to     such
proceedings   have   to   prosecute   the   proceedings
before CLB in  accordance with  law for obtaining
appropriate reliefs.
10
21. Before   parting,   we   consider   it   apposite   to
mention that we have not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the case. Rather,  it is not possible to
express any opinion for want of jurisdiction. The
parties,  therefore,  will be at liberty to take recourse
to all judicial remedies, as may be available to them
in   law,   for   adjudication   of   their   respective
grievances   in   appropriate   judicial   forum   against
each other.
22. Similarly, it is for the State authorities to see
as to whether any person(s) has/have contravened
or/and is/are contravening any provision(s) of any
Act or Rules or Regulations or Statutory Schemes in
any manner while using the properties and, if so,
what   action   is   called   for  qua  such   persons   and
against the activities carried on by such person(s) in
law.  We,   however,   express no opinion on any of
these issues and leave it for the State  authorities to
11
act against any such person(s) in accordance with
law.
23. We also make it clear that all such disputes
between the parties concerned on its merits will be
decided   strictly   in   accordance   with   law   by   the
Court/Tribunal/Authority,     as   the   case   may   be,
uninfluenced by any observation made by the High
Court in the impugned order and by this Court in
this order.
24. In the  light  of  the foregoing discussion and
with   the   aforementioned   observations   and   the
liberty,   we   find   no   merit   in   these   appeals.   The
appeals thus fail and are hereby dismissed. Interim
order,  if any,  passed stands vacated.
In Civil Appeal  Nos.7405­7406 of 2009
These appeals are filed by respondent No.2 in
the writ petition and the writ appeal against the
final judgment and order dated 04.03.2008 passed
12
by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.A.
No.1499 of 2005 and W.P. No.5718 of 2005.
In   view   of   the   order   passed   above   in   CA
Nos.7390­7391   of   2009,   these   appeals   are   also
dismissed.
         ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                 
       
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019.
13

interpretation of any terms and conditions of a document (such as the agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code = Shri Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan & Anr. ….Respondent(s)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1331  OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 23299 of 2018)
Shri Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan & Anr.       ….Respondent(s)
             
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   06.08.2018   of   the   High   Court   of
Judicature  at   Bombay   in  Second  Appeal   No.   44   of
2017 whereby the High Court dismissed the second
appeal filed by the appellant herein.
1
3. In   order   to   appreciate   the   short   controversy
involved   in   this   appeal,   few   relevant   facts   need
mention hereinbelow.
4. The   appellant   is   the   plaintiff   whereas   the
respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out of
which this appeal arises.
5. The   appellant   filed   a   civil   suit   against   the
respondents for specific performance of the contract in
relation to the suit property. The said suit was based
on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The respondents
filed their written statement and denied the appellant's
claim.   The   Trial   Court   by   judgment/decree   dated
05.07.2004 decreed the appellant’s suit and passed a
decree for specific performance of the contract against
the respondents.
6. The   respondents   felt   aggrieved   and   filed   first
appeal   before   the   District   Judge,   Pune.   By
judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the first Appellate
Court   allowed   the   respondents’   (defendants’)   appeal
2
and dismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt
aggrieved   and   filed   second   appeal   before   the   High
Court.
7. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the
second appeal holding that the appeal does not involve
any substantial question of law as is required to be
made   out   under   Section   100   of   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)
which has given rise to filing of  the present appeal by
way of special leave by the plaintiff in this Court.
8. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court
was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal
on the ground that it does not involve any substantial
question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   on   perusal   of   the   record   of   the   case,   we   are
3
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside the
impugned order remand the case to the High Court for
deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance
with   law   after   framing   appropriate   substantial
question(s) of law arising in the case.
11. Having perused the record and the judgments of
the   Trial   Court,   first   Appellate   Court   and   the
impugned order, we are of the considered view that the
High Court was not right in holding that the appeal
does not involve any substantial question of law within
the   meaning   of   Section   100   of   the
Code.   In   our   view,   the   appeal   did   involve   the
substantial question of law and the same, therefore,
should have been framed at the time of admission of
the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of
the Code for its final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5) of
the Code provides that the appeal shall be heard only
on the substantial question of law framed by the High
Court under Section 100 (4) of the Code.
4
12. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of
any terms and conditions of a document (such as the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a
substantial   question   of   law   within   the   meaning   of
Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the
parties admit the document.
13. As mentioned above, since the interpretation of
documents constitutes the substantial question of law,
the High Court should have first framed appropriate
substantial question(s) arising in the case especially
on the questions in relation to the true intent, rights
and obligations arising from Clauses 3, 5 and 15 of the
agreement   dated   08.08.1984   in   the   context   of
pleadings and the reversing findings of the two Courts
below   and   then   should   have   called   upon   the
respondents to reply to the questions framed keeping
in  view its jurisdiction  under Section  100(5) of the
Code and its proviso.
5
14. In   addition,   the   High   Court   also   could   have
framed questions on the issues, which are material for
grant   or   refusal   of   specific   performance   keeping   in
view the requirements of Section 16 of the Specific
Relief Act, pleadings of the parties, and the reversing
findings of the two Courts below on such issues with a
view to find out as to which finding is more preferable.
15. From the reading the impugned order, we find
that, on one hand, the High Court went on interpreting
the terms of the document after hearing the argument
of both sides (see appearance of both parties through
lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held
that it does not involve any substantial question of
law. It virtually, therefore, decided the second appeal
bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view
the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100
(4) and (5) of the Code.  In our view, the approach of
the High Court while deciding the second appeal was
6
not in conformity with the requirements of Section 100
of the Code.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents(defendants),
however, vehemently argued that the findings of the
High Court, which are of affirmance,   do not call for
any interference which rightly resulted in dismissal of
the suit on material issues but, in our view, it is now
for the High Court to examine the issue afresh on
merits after framing the substantial question(s) of law.
We, therefore, express no opinion on the merits of the
issues urged.
17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain
from entering into the merits of the case having formed
an opinion to remand the case and while allowing the
appeal and setting aside the impugned order remand
the case to the High Court with a request to admit the
appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s)
of law which arise(s) in the case in terms of Section
100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appeal
7
on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per
Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with law
without being influenced by any of our observations on
merits.
18. The appeal is accordingly allowed.  The impugned
order is set aside.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
               
         
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019.
8

mutation of a land in the revenue records does not create or extinguish the title over such land nor it has any presumptive value on the title. Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar (D) Th. LR ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Arthur Import and Export Company & Ors. …Respondent(s)

          REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1330  OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No.9394 of 2012)
Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar (D) Th. LR
                     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Arthur Import and Export Company
& Ors.            …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 30.09.2011 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ
Petition No.6235 of 2011 whereby the Single Judge
of the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by
the appellants herein.     
1
3. Few facts need mention infra to appreciate the
short controversy involved in this appeal.
4. The dispute, which has reached to this Court
in this appeal at the instance of one party to such
dispute,   arises   out   of   and   relates   to   the   entries
made   in   the   revenue   records   in   relation   to   the
disputed land.
5. The   dispute   began   from   the   Court   of
Superintendent   of   land   records.   Thereafter   it
reached to the Deputy Director of Land Records in
appeal. It then reached to the State in revision and
lastly, in the High Court in writ petition resulting in
passing the impugned order which has given rise to
filing of the present appeal by way of special leave in
this Court by the appellants.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The law on the question of mutation in the
revenue records pertaining to any land and what is
its   legal   value   while   deciding   the   rights   of   the
2
parties is fairly well settled by a series of decisions
of this Court. 
8. This Court has consistently held that mutation
of a land in the revenue records does not create or
extinguish the title over such land nor it has any
presumptive value on the title. It only enables the
person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay
the land revenue in question. (See  Sawarni(Smt.)
vs. Inder Kaur,  (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh
&  Anr.  Vs.  Daulat  Singh(dead)  by  L.Rs.  &  Ors.,
(1997) 7 SCC 137 and Narasamma & Ors. vs. State
of Karnataka & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 591). 
9.   The   High   Court   while   dismissing   the   writ
petition placed reliance on the aforementioned law
laid down by this Court and we find no good ground
to   differ   with   the   reasoning   and   the   conclusion
arrived at by the High Court. It is just and proper
calling for no interference.
10. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   civil   suits   in
relation to the land in question are pending in the
3
Courts between the parties. Therefore, it would not
be proper to embark upon any factual inquiries into
the question as to whether the entries were properly
made or not and at whose instance they were made
etc. in this appeal. It is more so when they neither
decide the title nor extinguish the title of the parties
in relation to the land.
11. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are
not   inclined   to   entertain   the   submission   of   Mr.
Naphade, learned senior counsel for the appellants
when he urged the issues on the facts.
12. To conclude,  we find no merit in this appeal.
It fails and is accordingly dismissed.
               
    ………...................................J.
     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                 
    …...……..................................J.
             [R. SUBHASH REDDY]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019
4

Whether the decree is an exparte decree ? G. Ratna Raj (D) by LRs. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Sri Muthukumarasamy Permanent Fund Ltd. & Anr. ….Respondent(s)

Suit for   redemption   of   mortgage   and   for permanent injunction in relation to the mortgaged property. - The plaintiff examined himself as PW­1. The defendants cross­examined the plaintiff.  Thereafter, the   plaintiff   closed   his   case.   The   case   was accordingly   posted   for   recording  defendants’ evidence. At   that   stage   of   the   proceedings,   the
defendants   did   not   appear   in   the   suit   and, therefore,   the   Court   proceeded  ex   parte  against them. The proceedings in the suit then continued as ex parte  against the defendants. The plaintiff then got   himself   re­examined   in   the   proceedings.   He, however,   could   not   be   re­cross­examined   by   the defendants because they were already proceeded ex parte in the proceedings. The   Trial   Court   (Single   Judge)   by judgment/decree   dated   25.02.2003   passed   a preliminary   decree  against   the defendants   in relation to the suit property. -IA No. 341/2006 filed   under   Order   9   Rule   13   of   Code   of   Civil Procedure,   1908   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the Code”)   for setting aside of the preliminary decree dated 25.02.2003 and  IA No.340/2006 filed for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code.- By order dated  14.03.2006, the Single Judge dismissed both the applications and held that the application filed by  defendant No.1 under Order 9 Rule 13  of the Code was not maintainable because the preliminary decree dated   25.02.2003 was not an "ex parte decree" -The Division Bench,   therefore, allowed the application filed by  defendant No.1 under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code subject to their  paying a cost of Rs.10,000/­     to   the   plaintiff. - 

Whether the decree is an exparte decree ?

Apex court held that 
whether   the remedy under Order 9 is lost or not what is necessary  to  be  seen   is  whether  in  the  first instance   the   Court   had   resorted   to   the Explanation of Rule 2.
The  Explanation  permits  the  court   in   its discretion   to   proceed   with   a   case   where
substantial  portion  of  evidence  of  any  party has   already   been   recorded   and   such   party fails   to   appear   on   any   day   to   which   the hearing   of   the   suit   is   adjourned. 
For   application   of   the provision, the court has to satisfy itself that:
(a) substantial portion of the evidence of any party   has   been   already   recorded;   
(b)   such party has failed to appear on any day; and 
(c) the  day   is  one   to  which   the  hearing  of   the suit is adjourned. 
Rule 2 permits the court to adopt any of the modes provided in Order 9 or to make such order as he thinks fit when on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear.  The  Explanation   is   in  the  nature  of an   exception   to   the   general   power   given under  the  rule,  conferring  discretion  on  the court to act under the specified circumstance i.e. where evidence or a substantial portion of evidence   of   any   party   has   been   already recorded   and   such   party   fails   to   appear   on the   date   to   which   hearing   of   the   suit   has been   adjourned.
It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the defendants were placed ex parte on the date when the   case   was   fixed   for   recording   defendants’evidence but the same was not recorded due to the defendants’   absence   on   the   said   date.   In   other words, it was a case where the defendants did not lead any evidence.  In such a situation arising in the case, in our view,   the  case   at   hand   would   not   fall   under Explanation to Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code because in  order  to  attract the  Explanation,  "such  party" which has led evidence or has led substantial part of the evidence, if fails to appear on any day to which   the   hearing   of   the   case   is   adjourned,   the Court may treat “such party” as "present" on that day and is accordingly empowered to proceed in the suit. 
We are,  therefore,  of the view that since the defendants were proceeded ex parte and were found
not to have led any evidence in the suit, the Court could only proceed under Order 17 Rule 3 (b) read
with Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code for disposal of the suit by taking recourse to one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order 9 of the Code or could have made any other order as it thinks fit. 
As   mentioned   above,   the   Trial   Court   did proceed to hear the suit ex parte by taking recourse to the Order 9 Rule 6 (a) in terms of Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code because on that day, the plaintiff was present when the suit was called on for hearing whereas the defendants were absent despite service of summons and accordingly the Trial Court passed the preliminary decree. Such decree, in our opinion, was   an   "ex   parte  decree"   within   the   meaning  of Order 9 Rule 6 (a) read with Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code and, therefore, could be set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 on making out a sufficient ground by the defendants.
we are of the view that the Division Bench was justified in allowing the applications filed by  defendant No.1 under   Order   9   Rule   13     of   the   Code   and,   in consequence,   was  justified   in   setting   aside   the preliminary   decree   dated     25.02.2003   passed   in O.S.  No.131/1999 treating the said decree as "ex parte decree".





Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2582­2583 OF 2011
G. Ratna Raj (D) by LRs.     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Sri Muthukumarasamy Permanent
Fund Ltd. & Anr.       ….Respondent(s)                                                                                                                                                       
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Application for substitution is allowed.
2. These appeals are directed against  the final
judgment and order dated 11.01.2008 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in O.S.A.
Nos.299 & 300 of 2006 whereby the Division Bench
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of   the   High   Court   allowed   the   appeals   filed   by
respondent No.1 herein.
3. The controversy involved in these appeals lies
in   a   narrow   compass.   However,   in   order   to
appreciate   the   same,   few   relevant   facts   need
mention hereinbelow.
4. The original appellant­G Ratna Raj (since dead
and now represented by his legal representatives)
was   the   plaintiff   whereas     respondent   No.1   was
defendant No.1 in the civil suit out of which these
appeals arise.   Respondent No.2 is impleaded as
party   respondent   in   this   Court   by   order   dated
06.02.2014.
5. The   original   plaintiff   (appellant   herein)­G
Ratna Raj filed a Civil Suit No.131/1999   against
the defendants (Sri Muthukumaraswamy Fund Ltd.­
Respondent No.1 herein and Balajee & Ors.) in the
High   Court   of   Madras   on   its   original   side
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jurisdiction   for   redemption   of   mortgage   and   for
permanent injunction in relation to the mortgaged
property. 
6. The defendants  on being served entered their
appearance and filed their written statement. The
Trial Court,  on the basis of pleadings,  framed the
issues. The plaintiff examined himself as PW­1. The
defendants cross­examined the plaintiff.  Thereafter,
the   plaintiff   closed   his   case.   The   case   was
accordingly   posted   for   recording   defendants’
evidence.
7. At   that   stage   of   the   proceedings,   the
defendants   did   not   appear   in   the   suit   and,
therefore,   the   Court   proceeded  ex   parte  against
them. The proceedings in the suit then continued as
ex parte  against the defendants. The plaintiff then
got   himself   re­examined   in   the   proceedings.   He,
however,   could   not   be   re­cross­examined   by   the
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defendants because they were already proceeded ex
parte in the proceedings. 
8. The   Trial   Court   (Single   Judge)   by
judgment/decree   dated   25.02.2003   passed   a
preliminary   decree   against   the   defendants   in
relation to the suit property. This led to filing of the
two   applications   (IA   No.340/2006   and   IA   No.
341/2006)   by     defendant   No.1   before   the   Trial
Court.
9. So far as IA No. 341/2006 is concerned, it was
filed   under   Order   9   Rule   13   of   Code   of   Civil
Procedure,   1908   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the
Code”)   for setting aside of the preliminary decree
dated 25.02.2003 and so far as IA No.340/2006 is
concerned, it was filed for condonation of delay in
filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the
Code.
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10. By order dated  14.03.2006, the Single Judge
dismissed both the applications and held that the
application filed by  defendant No.1 under Order 9
Rule 13  of the Code was not maintainable because
the preliminary decree dated   25.02.2003 was not
an "ex parte decree". In other words, he was of the
view   that   since   the   preliminary   decree   dated
25.02.2003   was   not   an  ex   parte  decree,   an
application under Order 9 Rule 13   of the Code
could not be filed for its setting aside. 
11.   Defendant   No.1   felt   aggrieved   and   filed
appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court.   By   impugned   order,   the   Division   Bench
allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the
Single   Judge.   The   Division   Bench   held   that   the
preliminary   decree   dated   25.02.2003   was   an  ex
parte  decree passed in the civil suit by the Trial
Court (Single Judge) and, therefore, the application
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filed by  defendant No.1 under Order 9 Rule 13 of
the Code was maintainable with a view to find out
as to whether such decree could be set aside under
Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code or not.
12.   The Division Bench,   therefore, allowed the
application filed by  defendant No.1 under Order 9
Rule 13 of the Code subject to their  paying a cost of
Rs.10,000/­     to   the   plaintiff.   The   civil   suit   was
accordingly   restored   to   its   original   file   for   its
disposal   on   merits   in   accordance   with   law.   It   is
against this order, the plaintiff has felt aggrieved
and filed the present appeals by way of special leave
in this Court.
13. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   these   appeals,   is   whether   the
Division  Bench  was justified in  setting aside the
preliminary decree dated  25.02.2003 by holding the
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same to be an "ex parte decree" for the purpose of
Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code.
14. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
15. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
16. In our opinion, the question involved in these
appeals is required to be decided keeping in view
the provisions of Order 9 Rule 6 (a) and Order 17
Rules 2 and 3 of the Code. 
  “Order 9 Rule 6 (1)(a)
6. Procedure when only plaintiff appears­ (1)
Where   the   plaintiff   appears   and   the
defendant  does  not  appear  when  the   suit   is
called on for hearing, then­
(a)     When   summons   duly   served   –   If   it   is
proved   that   the   summons   was   duly   served,
the Court may make an order that the suit be
heard ex parte;”
17. Rule 6(1)(a) provides that where the plaintiff
appears and the defendant does not appear when
the   suit   is   called   on   for   hearing,   then   if   the
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summons is held duly served on the defendant, the
Court may make an order that the suit be heard ex
parte.
18. Order 17 Rules 2 and 3  read as under :
  “Order 17 Rules 2 & 3
2. Procedure if parties fail to appear on day
fixed.—Where,   on   any   day   to   which   the
hearing  of  the  suit  is  adjourned,  the  parties
or any of them fail to appear, the court may
proceed to  dispose  of  the  suit  in  one  of  the
modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or
make such other order as it thinks fit.
Explanation.—Where   the   evidence   or   a
substantial   portion   of   the   evidence   of   any
party   has   already   been   recorded   and   such
party fails to appear on any day to which the
hearing   of   the   suit   is   adjourned,   the   court
may, in its discretion, proceed with the case
as if such party were present.
3.  Court   may   proceed   notwithstanding
either party fails to produce evidence, etc.—
Where any party to a suit to whom time has
been granted fails to produce his evidence, or
to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or
to   perform   any   other   act   necessary   to   the
further  progress  of  the   suit,   for  which   time
has   been   allowed,   the   court   may,
notwithstanding such default,—
(a)   if   the   parties   are   present,   proceed   to
decide the suit forthwith; or
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(b)   if   the   parties   are,   or   any   of   them   is,
absent, proceed under Rule 2.”
19.   Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code provides that
where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit
is   adjourned,   the   parties   or   any   of   them   fail   to
appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit
in one of the modes directed in that behalf by order
IX or make such other order as it thinks fit.
20. The Explanation appended to Order 17 Rule 2
of the Code provides that where the evidence or a
substantial portion of the evidence of any party has
already   been   recorded   and   such   party   fails   to
appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit
is   adjourned,   the   court   may,   in   its   discretion,
proceed with the case as if such party was present.
21. Order   17   Rule   3   of   the   Code,   however,
provides that where any party to a suit to whom
time has been granted fails to produce his evidence,
or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to
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perform   any   other   act   necessary   to   the   further
progress   of   the   suit,     for   which   time   has   been
allowed,   the   Court   may,   notwithstanding   such
default, (a) if the parties are present, proceed to
decide the suit forthwith,  or (b) if the parties are, or
any of them is, absent, proceed under Rule 2.
22. The scope of Order 17 Rule 2 and Order 17
Rule 3 of the Code came up for consideration before
this Court in the case of B. Janakiramaiah Chetty
vs.   A.K.  Parthasarthi  &  Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 641
wherein   Justice   Arijit   Pasayat   speaking   for   the
Bench held in paras 7 to 10 as under:
“7.  In   order   to   determine   whether   the
remedy under Order 9 is lost or not what is
necessary  to  be  seen   is  whether   in  the  first
instance   the   Court   had   resorted   to   the
Explanation of Rule 2.
8.  The  Explanation  permits  the  court   in   its
discretion   to   proceed   with   a   case   where
substantial  portion  of  evidence  of  any  party
has   already   been   recorded   and   such   party
fails   to   appear   on   any   day   to   which   the
hearing   of   the   suit   is   adjourned.   As   the
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provision   itself   shows,   discretionary   power
given   to   the   court   is   to   be   exercised   in   a
given   circumstance.   For   application   of   the
provision, the court has to satisfy itself that:
(a) substantial portion of the evidence of any
party   has   been   already   recorded;   (b)   such
party has failed to appear on any day; and (c)
the  day   is  one   to  which   the  hearing  of   the
suit is adjourned. Rule 2 permits the court to
adopt any of the modes provided in Order 9
or to make such order as he thinks fit when
on any day to which the hearing of the suit is
adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to
appear.  The  Explanation   is   in  the  nature  of
an   exception   to   the   general   power   given
under  the  rule,  conferring  discretion  on  the
court to act under the specified circumstance
i.e. where evidence or a substantial portion of
evidence   of   any   party   has   been   already
recorded   and   such   party   fails   to   appear   on
the   date   to   which   hearing   of   the   suit   has
been   adjourned.   If   such   is   the   factual
situation,   the   court   may   in   its   discretion
deem   as   if   such   party   was   present.   Under
Order 9 Rule 3 the court may make an order
directing   that   the   suit   be   dismissed   when
neither party appears when the suit is called
on for hearing. There are other provisions for
dismissal of the suit contained in Rules 2, 6
and   8.   We   are   primarily   concerned   with   a
situation   covered   by   Rule   6.   The   crucial
words   in   the  Explanation   are   “proceed  with
the case”. Therefore, on the facts it has to be
seen   in   each   case   as   to   whether   the
Explanation was applied by the court or not.
9.  In  Rule  2,   the   expression  used   is   “make
such order as it thinks fit”, as an alternative
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to adopting one of the modes directed in that
behalf by Order 9. Under Order 17 Rule 3(b),
the   only   course   open   to   the   court   is   to
proceed under Rule 2, when a party is absent.
Explanation thereto gives a discretion to the
court to proceed under Rule 3 even if a party
is absent. But such a course can be adopted
only when the absentee party has already led
evidence or a substantial part thereof. If the
position   is  not   so,   the   court  has  no  option
but to proceed as provided in Rule 2. Rules 2
and 3 operate in different and distinct sets of
circumstances.   Rule   2   applies   when   an
adjournment has been generally granted and
not   for   any   special   purpose.   On   the   other
hand, Rule 3 operates where the adjournment
has   been   given   for   one   of   the   purposes
mentioned in the rule. While Rule 2 speaks of
disposal   of   the   suit   in   one   of   the   specified
modes, Rule 3 empowers the court to decide
the   suit   forthwith.   The   basic   distinction
between the two rules, however, is that in the
former, any party has failed to appear at the
hearing, while in the latter the party though
present  has   committed   any   one   or  more  of
the enumerated defaults. Combined effect of
the Explanation to Rule 2 and Rule 3 is that
a discretion has been conferred on the court.
The   power   conferred   is   permissive   and   not
mandatory. The Explanation is in the nature
of   a   deeming   provision,   when   under   given
circumstances, the absentee party is deemed
to be present.
10. The crucial expression in the Explanation
is   “where   the   evidence   or   a   substantial
portion of the evidence of a party”. There is a
positive   purpose   in   this   legislative
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expression.   It   obviously   means   that   the
evidence   on   record   is   sufficient   to
substantiate   the   absentee  party’s   stand   and
for disposal of the suit. The absentee party is
deemed   to   be   present   for   this   obvious
purpose.   The   court   while   acting   under   the
Explanation   may   proceed   with   the   case   if
that   prima   facie   is   the   position.   The   court
has to be satisfied on the facts of each case
about  this  requisite  aspect.  It  would  be  also
imperative   for   the   court   to   record   its
satisfaction in that perspective. It cannot be
said   that   the   requirement   of   substantial
portion   of   the   evidence   or   the   evidence
having been led for applying the Explanation
is   without   any   purpose.   If   the   evidence   on
record   is   sufficient   for  disposal  of   the   suit,
there   is  no  need   for   adjourning   the   suit   or
deferring the decision.”
23. Now when we examine the facts of the case at
hand keeping in view the law laid down in the case
of  B  Janakiramaiah  Chetty  (supra), we find that
the plaintiff’s  evidence was recorded and his case
was   also   closed.   It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the
defendants were placed ex parte on the date when
the   case   was   fixed   for   recording   defendants’
evidence but the same was not recorded due to the
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defendants’   absence   on   the   said   date.   In   other
words, it was a case where the defendants did not
lead any evidence. 
24. In such a situation arising in the case, in our
view,   the   case   at   hand   would   not   fall   under
Explanation to Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code because
in  order  to  attract the  Explanation,  "such  party"
which has led evidence or has led substantial part
of the evidence, if fails to appear on any day to
which   the   hearing   of   the   case   is   adjourned,   the
Court may treat “such party” as "present" on that
day and is accordingly empowered to proceed in the
suit. 
25. In this case, the party,  who was absent and
was proceeded  ex parte  was the "defendants" and
they had not led any evidence whereas it was the
plaintiff, who was present and had led his evidence.
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26. In other words, if the plaintiff had remained
absent  and   was  found  to   have  led  evidence,  the
Court   could   have   invoked   its   powers   under
Explanation to Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code treating
the plaintiff as   "present" for passing appropriate
orders. Such is, however,  not the case here.
27. Similarly,   in   converse   situation,   if   the
defendants had remained absent (as has happened
in   this   case)   on   that   date   and   if   it   would   have
noticed that they had adduced the evidence either
fully or substantially prior to the date on which they
were   proceeded  ex   parte,   the   Court   could   have
invoked its powers under Explanation to Order 17
Rule   2   of   the   Code   treating   the   defendants   as
"present" on that day for passing appropriate orders
in the suit. Such is, however, again not the case
here.
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28.  We are,  therefore,  of the view that since the
defendants were proceeded ex parte and were found
not to have led any evidence in the suit, the Court
could only proceed under Order 17 Rule 3 (b) read
with Order 17 Rule 2 of the Code for disposal of the
suit by taking recourse to one of the modes directed
in that behalf by Order 9 of the Code or could have
made any other order as it thinks fit. 
29. As   mentioned   above,   the   Trial   Court   did
proceed to hear the suit ex parte by taking recourse
to the Order 9 Rule 6 (a) in terms of Order 17 Rule 2
of the Code because on that day, the plaintiff was
present when the suit was called on for hearing
whereas the defendants were absent despite service
of summons and accordingly the Trial Court passed
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the preliminary decree. Such decree, in our opinion,
was   an   "ex   parte  decree"   within   the   meaning   of
Order 9 Rule 6 (a) read with Order 9 Rule 13 of the
Code and, therefore, could be set aside under Order
9 Rule 13 on making out a sufficient ground by the
defendants.
30. In view of  the foregoing discussion, we are of
the view that the Division Bench was justified in
allowing the applications filed by   defendant No.1
under   Order   9   Rule   13     of   the   Code   and,   in
consequence,   was   justified   in   setting   aside   the
preliminary   decree   dated     25.02.2003   passed   in
O.S.   No.131/1999 treating the said decree as "ex
parte decree".
31. So   far   as   the   finding   on   the   question   of
sufficient ground for setting aside of the  ex parte
decree is concerned, suffice it to say, it being a pure
question  of  fact,  the  same does  not  call  for any
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interference   by   this   Court.   A   finding   on   such
question is binding on this Court. Moreover, we find
that   the   Division   Bench   imposed   a   cost   of
Rs.10,000/­     on   defendant   No.1   payable   to   the
plaintiff as condition for setting aside the  ex parte
decree. Defendant No.1,   therefore,   must pay the
cost to the plaintiff.
32. As a result of the foregoing discussion,  we find
no merit in these appeals, which are accordingly
dismissed.
33. The Trial Court (Single Judge) is now directed
to decide the Original Suit No. 131/1999 on merits
in accordance with law preferably within a period of
one   year   as   an   outer   limit.   Since   the   original
plaintiff has died and his legal representatives are
already   brought on record in these appeals, the
Trial Court will permit the plaintiff to amend the
cause title in the plaint and bring on record the
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legal   representatives(appellants   herein)   to   enable
them to prosecute the suit on merits in accordance
with law.
         ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                 
       
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
February 01, 2019.
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