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Sunday, February 3, 2019

Section 21 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 = VIJAY KUMAR JAIN … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STANDARD CHARTERED BANK & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8430 OF 2018
VIJAY KUMAR JAIN … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK
& ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1266 OF 2018
J U D G M E N T
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
1. The present appeal arises out of an Appellate Tribunal’s
judgment rejecting the appellant’s prayer for directions to the
resolution professional to provide all relevant documents including
the insolvency resolution plans in question to members of the
suspended Board of Directors of the corporate debtor in each case
1
so that they may meaningfully participate in meetings held by the
committee of creditors [“CoC”].
2. We may take the facts of Civil Appeal No.8430 of 2018.
Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. – the corporate debtor, was incorporated
on 06.01.1986. It is said to be a profit-making company in the
business of processing of oil-seeds and refining crude oil for edible
use. In September, 2017, Company Petition Nos.1371 and 1372
were filed by Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. and DBS Bank Ltd.,
being financial creditors of the aforesaid corporate debtor. These
two company petitions were admitted on 8th and 15th December,
2017, respectively, by the National Company Law Tribunal [“NCLT”].
One Shri Shailendra Ajmera of Ernst and Young was appointed as
the Interim Resolution Professional in both petitions. The CoC was
constituted under Section 21 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 [“Insolvency Code” or “Code”], and the appellant being
a member of the suspended Board of Directors was given notice
and the agenda for the first CoC meeting held on 12.01.2018, and
was permitted to attend the aforesaid meeting. He alleges, which is
disputed by the respondents, that subsequent meetings of the CoC
were held in which he was denied participation. As a result, the
2
appellant filed Miscellaneous Application No.518 of 2018 on
07.06.2018 before the NCLT in order that the appellant be allowed to
effectively participate in these meetings. It is stated before us that in
the tenth meeting dated 12.08.2018, the appellant executed a nondisclosure agreement for sharing resolution plans of the corporate
debtor. Under the said agreement, the appellant undertook to
indemnify the resolution professional and keep information that is
received as to the resolution plan strictly confidential.
3. By an order dated 01.08.2018, the NCLT dismissed the
application with liberty to the appellant to attend CoC meetings but
not to insist upon being provided information considered confidential
either by the resolution professional or the committee of creditors.
Against this order, the appellant filed an appeal before the Appellate
Tribunal which recognized the appellant’s right to attend and
participate in CoC meetings, but denied the appellant’s prayer to
access certain documents, most particularly, the resolution plans.
Thereafter, an application for modification/clarification of the
Appellate Tribunal’s order was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the
order dated 09.08.2018 of the Appellate Tribunal, the appellants
have filed the present appeal. In the meanwhile, on 23.08.2018, the
3
resolution plan of one Adani Wilmar Limited was approved by
majority of 96.86% of the committee of creditors. On 24.08.2018, the
resolution professional submitted its resolution plan, as approved by
the CoC, to the Adjudicating Authority. On 27.08.2018, this Court,
by an interim order, stated, while issuing notice, that the bids will not
be finalized by the Adjudicating Authority without the leave of this
Court. On 10.09.2018, this Court clarified, in an application filed by
the resolution professional, that the Adjudicating Authority could
continue with the proceedings but no order could be passed on the
same until this Court adjudicates on the present appeal.
4. On behalf of the appellants, we have heard Shri Shyam
Divan and Shri Arvind Kumar Gupta. The learned counsel referred to
Sections 24, 25, 29 and 31 of the Code together with Regulations
made thereunder. According to the learned counsel, under Section
24(3), the resolution professional has to give notice of each meeting
of the committee of creditors to the members of the suspended
Board of Directors, and under Regulation 21, the notice of these
meetings shall not only contain an agenda of the meetings but shall
also contain copies of all documents relevant to the matters to be
discussed and issues to be voted upon at the meeting. This
4
necessarily means that access to the resolution plans and other
relevant documents under consideration at these meetings must be
supplied together with the notice of the meeting to members of
suspended Board of Directors. They drew a dichotomy between the
committee of creditors and meetings of the committee of creditors
and stated that as they are “participants” in the meetings of the
committee of creditors, albeit without voting rights, yet, they are
persons who, in order to participate effectively, must be given the
necessary documents so that their views can also be considered by
the committee of creditors. According to them, Section 31(1) of the
Code makes it clear that once the resolution plan is passed by the
Adjudicating Authority, it shall be binding on the corporate debtor
together with guarantors and other stakeholders. This being the
case, it is clear that the erstwhile Board of Directors, which consists
of persons who may have given personal guarantees for the debts
owed by the corporate debtor, will be bound by the resolution plan,
and therefore, have a vital stake in what ultimately gets passed by
the committee of creditors. Apart from this, under Section 60(5) of
the Code, such persons have a right to challenge the terms of a
proposed resolution plan before the Tribunal, and under Section 61,
5
may go further against the Adjudicating Authority’s order to the
Appellate Tribunal. They relied upon and referred to the Bankruptcy
Law Committee Report of 2015 to buttress their submissions.
5. As against this, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, and Mr. Raunak
Dhillon, appearing on behalf of the resolution professional, relied
strongly on Section 30(3) of the Code and Regulation 39(2) of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution
Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 [“CIRP
Regulations”] which made it clear that resolution plans were only to
be given to the committee of creditors for its consideration. They
further argued that the terms “committee” and “participant” are
differently defined under the Regulations and that participants are
expressly excluded by Regulation 39. They also argued, that if any
of the Regulations go beyond the provisions of the Code, they must
be struck down as ultra vires, as under Section 30(3) of the Code,
the resolution professional is required to present resolution plans
only to the committee of creditors. They relied upon the Notes on
Clauses to Section 24 of the Code, which, according to them, made
it clear that the reason for the participation of the erstwhile Board of
Directors in meetings of the committee of creditors is so that they
6
may give information to assess the financial position of the corporate
debtor. They are not in the position, therefore, of other creditors,
who may go into merits and demerits of resolution plans as such
resolution plans affect creditors only and not such persons. They
relied upon this Court’s judgment in Mobilox Innovations Private
Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited, (2018) 1 SCC 353
[“Mobilox Innovations”], for the proposition that Notes on Clauses
are important parliamentary material that may be relied upon to
understand the object of the Section in question. They also relied
strongly upon Regulation 7(2)(h) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016, read
with the First Schedule thereto, which made it clear that confidential
information can only be shared with the consent of the relevant
parties. Further, the confidential information contained in proposed
resolution plans can only be shared with members of the committee
of creditors after receiving an undertaking from them under the
Regulations. They further argued that persons such as the appellant
are not persons aggrieved and since no prejudice is caused to them,
do not have a right to file any application under Section 60(5) of the
7
Code or appeals to the Appellate Tribunal from orders of the
Adjudicating Authority under Section 61.
6. Shri Krishnan Venugopal and Shri Nakul Sachdeva, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the committee of creditors, argued
that the expressions “information memorandum” and “resolution
plan” are separately defined and a specific procedure has been laid
down in the Code and Regulations dealing with them. They cannot
therefore be said to be “documents” within the meaning of
Regulation 21. They also strongly relied upon the Notes on Clauses
and stated that the role of members of the suspended Board of
Directors is that of information givers and not information seekers.
They further relied upon the proviso to Section 21(2) which,
according to them, made it clear that a director, who is also a
financial creditor, has no right to participate in a meeting of the
committee of creditors. Thus, a harmonious construction of the
various provisions of the Code would lead to the anomaly that a
director simplicitor would have the right to get documents but a
director who is a financial creditor would have no such right. They
also adverted to the expression “participant” as opposed to the
expression “committee” and stated that the legislature, in its wisdom,
8
created a differentiation between the two. They also stated that the
confidentiality requirement would be breached if a copy of the
resolution plan were to be given to the members of the suspended
Board of Directors and added that it would be in the interest of some
members of the suspended Board who may attempt to sabotage the
corporate insolvency resolution process, for which reason also,
resolution plans should be kept hidden from them. They argued that
the “persons aggrieved” in Section 61 would necessarily refer to
persons aggrieved for the purpose of Section 60(5) also, and as
members of the ex-Board of Directors cannot be said to be persons
aggrieved, they cannot possibly approach the Adjudicating Authority
under Section 60(5) or the Appellate Tribunal under Section 61.
7. Having heard learned counsel for all parties, it is important to
first advert to the relevant provisions of the Code and the
Regulations made thereunder. The relevant provisions of the Code
are hereinbelow:
“5. Definitions.—In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
xxx xxx xxx
9
(10) “information memorandum” means a
memorandum prepared by resolution
professional under sub-section (1) of Section
29;
xxx xxx xxx
(26) “resolution plan” means a plan proposed
by resolution applicant for insolvency resolution
of the corporate debtor as a going concern in
accordance with Part II;
xxx xxx xxx”
“21. Committee of creditors.—(1) The interim
resolution professional shall after collation of all claims
received against the corporate debtor and determination
of the financial position of the corporate debtor,
constitute a committee of creditors.
(2) The committee of creditors shall comprise all financial
creditors of the corporate debtor:
Provided that a financial creditor or the authorised
representative of the financial creditor referred to in subsection (6) or sub-section (6-A) or sub-section (5) of
Section 24, if it is a related party of the corporate debtor,
shall not have any right of representation, participation or
voting in a meeting of the committee of creditors:
Provided further that the first proviso shall not apply to
a financial creditor, regulated by a financial sector
regulator, if it is a related party of the corporate debtor
solely on account of conversion or substitution of debt
into equity shares or instruments convertible into equity
shares, prior to the insolvency commencement date.
(3) Subject to sub-sections (6) and (6-A), where the
corporate debtor owes financial debts to two or more
financial creditors as part of a consortium or agreement,
each such financial creditor shall be part of the
committee of creditors and their voting share shall be
determined on the basis of the financial debts owed to
them.
(4) Where any person is a financial creditor as well as an
operational creditor,—
10
(a) such person shall be a financial creditor to
the extent of the financial debt owed by the
corporate debtor, and shall be included in the
committee of creditors, with voting share
proportionate to the extent of financial debts
owed to such creditor;
(b) such person shall be considered to be an
operational creditor to the extent of the
operational debt owed by the corporate debtor
to such creditor.
(5) Where an operational creditor has assigned or legally
transferred any operational debt to a financial creditor,
the assignee or transferee shall be considered as an
operational creditor to the extent of such assignment or
legal transfer.
(6) Where the terms of the financial debt extended as
part of a consortium arrangement or syndicated facility
provide for a single trustee or agent to act for all financial
creditors, each financial creditor may—
(a) authorise the trustee or agent to act on his
behalf in the committee of creditors to the
extent of his voting share;
(b) represent himself in the committee of
creditors to the extent of his voting share;
(c) appoint an insolvency professional (other
than the resolution professional) at his own cost
to represent himself in the committee of
creditors to the extent of his voting share; or
(d) exercise his right to vote to the extent of his
voting share with one or more financial creditors
jointly or severally.
(6-A) Where a financial debt—
(a) is in the form of securities or deposits and
the terms of the financial debt provide for
appointment of a trustee or agent to act as
authorised representative for all the financial
creditors, such trustee or agent shall act on
behalf of such financial creditors;
(b) is owed to a class of creditors exceeding the
number as may be specified, other than the
11
creditors covered under clause (a) or subsection (6), the interim resolution professional
shall make an application to the Adjudicating
Authority along with the list of all financial
creditors, containing the name of an insolvency
professional, other than the interim resolution
professional, to act as their authorised
representative who shall be appointed by the
Adjudicating Authority prior to the first meeting
of the committee of creditors;
(c) is represented by a guardian, executor or
administrator, such person shall act as
authorised representative on behalf of such
financial creditors,
and such authorised representative under
clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) shall
attend the meetings of the committee of
creditors, and vote on behalf of each financial
creditor to the extent of his voting share.
(6-B) The remuneration payable to the authorised
representative—
(i) under clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (6-
A), if any, shall be as per the terms of the
financial debt or the relevant documentation;
and
(ii) under clause (b) of sub-section (6-A) shall
be as specified which shall form part of the
insolvency resolution process costs.
(7) The Board may specify the manner of voting and the
determining of the voting share in respect of financial
debts covered under sub-sections (6) and (6-A).
(8) Save as otherwise provided in this Code, all
decisions of the committee of creditors shall be taken by
a vote of not less than fifty-one per cent of voting share
of the financial creditors:
Provided that where a corporate debtor does not have
any financial creditors, the committee of creditors shall
be constituted and shall comprise of such persons to
exercise such functions in such manner as may be
specified.
12
(9) The committee of creditors shall have the right to
require the resolution professional to furnish any financial
information in relation to the corporate debtor at any time
during the corporate insolvency resolution process.
(10) The resolution professional shall make available any
financial information so required by the committee of
creditors under sub-section (9) within a period of seven
days of such requisition.”
24. Meeting of committee of creditors.—(1) The
members of the committee of creditors may meet in
person or by such electronic means as may be specified.
(2) All meetings of the committee of creditors shall be
conducted by the resolution professional.
(3) The resolution professional shall give notice of each
meeting of the committee of creditors to—
(a) members of committee of creditors,
including the authorised representatives
referred to in sub-sections (6) and (6-A) of
Section 21 and sub-section (5);
(b) members of the suspended Board of
Directors or the partners of the corporate
persons, as the case may be;
(c) operational creditors or their representatives
if the amount of their aggregate dues is not less
than ten per cent of the debt.
(4) The directors, partners and one representative of
operational creditors, as referred to in sub-section (3),
may attend the meetings of committee of creditors, but
shall not have any right to vote in such meetings:
Provided that the absence of any such director,
partner or representative of operational creditors, as the
case may be, shall not invalidate proceedings of such
meeting.
(5) Subject to sub-sections (6), (6-A) and (6-B) of Section
21, any creditor who is a member of the committee of
creditors may appoint an insolvency professional other
than the resolution professional to represent such
creditor in a meeting of the committee of creditors:
13
Provided that the fees payable to such insolvency
professional representing any individual creditor will be
borne by such creditor.
(6) Each creditor shall vote in accordance with the voting
share assigned to him based on the financial debts owed
to such creditor.
(7) The resolution professional shall determine the voting
share to be assigned to each creditor in the manner
specified by the Board.
(8) The meetings of the committee of creditors shall be
conducted in such manner as may be specified.”
(emphasis supplied)
“25. Duties of resolution professional.—(1) It shall be
the duty of the resolution professional to preserve and
protect the assets of the corporate debtor, including the
continued business operations of the corporate debtor.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the resolution
professional shall undertake the following actions,
namely—
(a) take immediate custody and control of all
the assets of the corporate debtor, including the
business records of the corporate debtor;
(b) represent and act on behalf of the corporate
debtor with third parties, exercise rights for the
benefit of the corporate debtor in judicial, quasijudicial or arbitration proceedings;
(c) raise interim finances subject to the approval
of the committee of creditors under Section 28;
(d) appoint accountants, legal or other
professionals in the manner as specified by
Board;
(e) maintain an updated list of claims;
(f) convene and attend all meetings of the
committee of creditors;
(g) prepare the information memorandum in
accordance with Section 29;
(h) invite prospective resolution applicants, who
fulfil such criteria as may be laid down by him
14
with the approval of committee of creditors,
having regard to the complexity and scale of
operations of the business of the corporate
debtor and such other conditions as may be
specified by the Board, to submit a resolution
plan or plans;
(i) present all resolution plans at the meetings
of the committee of creditors;
(j) file application for avoidance of transactions
in accordance with Chapter III, if any; and
(k) such other actions as may be specified by
the Board.”
(emphasis supplied)
“29. Preparation of information memorandum.—(1)
The resolution professional shall prepare an information
memorandum in such form and manner containing such
relevant information as may be specified by the Board for
formulating a resolution plan.
(2) The resolution professional shall provide to the
resolution applicant access to all relevant information in
physical and electronic form, provided such resolution
applicant undertakes—
(a) to comply with provisions of law for the time
being in force relating to confidentiality and
insider trading;
(b) to protect any intellectual property of the
corporate debtor it may have access to; and
(c) not to share relevant information with third
parties unless clauses (a) and (b) of this subsection are complied with.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
“relevant information” means the information required by
the resolution applicant to make the resolution plan for
the corporate debtor, which shall include the financial
position of the corporate debtor, all information related to
disputes by or against the corporate debtor and any
other matter pertaining to the corporate debtor as may
be specified.”
15
“30. Submission of resolution plan.—(1) A resolution
applicant may submit a resolution plan along with an
affidavit stating that he is eligible under Section 29-A to
the resolution professional prepared on the basis of the
information memorandum.
(2) The resolution professional shall examine each
resolution plan received by him to confirm that each
resolution plan—
(a) provides for the payment of insolvency
resolution process costs in a manner specified
by the Board in priority to the payment of other
debts of the corporate debtor;
(b) provides for the payment of the debts of
operational creditors in such manner as may be
specified by the Board which shall not be less
than the amount to be paid to the operational
creditors in the event of a liquidation of the
corporate debtor under Section 53;
(c) provides for the management of the affairs
of the corporate debtor after approval of the
resolution plan;
(d) the implementation and supervision of the
resolution plan;
(e) does not contravene any of the provisions of
the law for the time being in force;
(f) conforms to such other requirements as may
be specified by the Board.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (e), if any
approval of shareholders is required under the
Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) or any other law for
the time being in force for the implementation of actions
under the resolution plan, such approval shall be
deemed to have been given and it shall not be a
contravention of that Act or law.
(3) The resolution professional shall present to the
committee of creditors for its approval such resolution
plans which confirm the conditions referred to in subsection (2).
(4) The committee of creditors may approve a resolution
plan by a vote of not less than sixty-six per cent of voting
16
share of the financial creditors, after considering its
feasibility and viability, and such other requirements as
may be specified by the Board:
Provided that the committee of creditors shall not
approve a resolution plan, submitted before the
commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2017, where the resolution
applicant is ineligible under Section 29-A and may
require the resolution professional to invite a fresh
resolution plan where no other resolution plan is
available with it:
Provided further that where the resolution applicant
referred to in the first proviso is ineligible under clause
(c) of Section 29-A, the resolution applicant shall be
allowed by the committee of creditors such period, not
exceeding thirty days, to make payment of overdue
amounts in accordance with the proviso to clause (c) of
Section 29-A:
Provided also that nothing in the second proviso shall
be construed as extension of period for the purposes of
the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12, and the
corporate insolvency resolution process shall be
completed within the period specified in that sub-section.
Provided also that the eligibility criteria in Section 29-A
as amended by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 (Ord. 6 of 2018) shall
apply to the resolution applicant who has not submitted
resolution plan as on the date of commencement of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2018.
(5) The resolution applicant may attend the meeting of
the committee of creditors in which the resolution plan of
the applicant is considered:
Provided that the resolution applicant shall not have a
right to vote at the meeting of the committee of creditors
unless such resolution applicant is also a financial
creditor.
(6) The resolution professional shall submit the
resolution plan as approved by the committee of
creditors to the Adjudicating Authority.”
17
“31. Approval of resolution plan.—(1) If the
Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan
as approved by the committee of creditors under subsection (4) of Section 30 meets the requirements as
referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 30, it shall by
order approve the resolution plan which shall be binding
on the corporate debtor and its employees, members,
creditors, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in
the resolution plan:
Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before
passing an order for approval of resolution plan under
this sub-section, satisfy that the resolution plan has
provisions for its effective implementation.
(2) Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the
resolution plan does not [conform] to the requirements
referred to in sub-section (1), it may, by an order, reject
the resolution plan.
(3) After the order of approval under sub-section (1),—
(a) the moratorium order passed by the
Adjudicating Authority under Section 14 shall
cease to have effect; and
(b) the resolution professional shall forward all
records relating to the conduct of the corporate
insolvency resolution process and the
resolution plan to the Board to be recorded on
its database.
(4) The resolution applicant shall, pursuant to the
resolution plan approved under sub-section (1), obtain
the necessary approval required under any law for the
time being in force within a period of one year from the
date of approval of the resolution plan by the
Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (1) or within
such period as provided for in such law, whichever is
later:
Provided that where the resolution plan contains a
provision for combination, as referred to in Section 5 of
the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the resolution
applicant shall obtain the approval of the Competition
18
Commission of India under that Act prior to the approval
of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors.”
(emphasis supplied)
“60. Adjudicating Authority for corporate persons.—
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law for the time being in force, the National
Company Law Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain
or dispose of—
(a) any application or proceeding by or against
the corporate debtor or corporate person;
(b) any claim made by or against the corporate
debtor or corporate person, including claims by
or against any of its subsidiaries situated in
India; and
(c) any question of priorities or any question of
law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the
insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings
of the corporate debtor or corporate person
under this Code.
xxx xxx xxx”
“61. Appeals and Appellate Authority.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained under
the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), any person
aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority
under this part may prefer an appeal to the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx”
“62. Appeal to Supreme Court.—(1) Any person
aggrieved by an order of the National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme
Court on a question of law arising out of such order
under this Code within forty-five days from the date of
receipt of such order.
xxx xxx xxx”
19
The relevant provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of
India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons)
Regulations, 2016 read as under:
“2. Definitions.— (1) In these Regulations, unless the
context otherwise requires—
xxx xxx xxx
(d) “committee” means a committee of creditors
established under Section 21;
xxx xxx xxx
(l) “participant” means a person entitled to
attend a meeting of the committee under
Section 24 or any other person authorised by
the committee to attend the meeting;
xxx xxx xxx”
“19. Notice for meetings of the committee.— (1)
Subject to this Regulation, a meeting of the committee
shall be called by giving not less than five days' notice in
writing to every participant, at the address it has provided
to the resolution professional and such notice may be
sent by hand delivery, or by post but in any event, be
served on every participant by electronic means in
accordance with Regulation 20.
(2) The committee may reduce the notice period from
five days to such other period of not less than twentyfour hours, as it deems fit:
Provided that the committee may reduce the period to
such other period of not less than forty-eight hours if
there is an authorised representative.”
“21. Contents of the notice for meeting.—(1) The
notice shall inform the participants of the venue, the time
and date of the meeting and of the option available to
them to participate through video conferencing or other
audio and visual means, and shall also provide all the
20
necessary information to enable participation through
video conferencing or other audio and visual means.
(2) The notice of the meeting shall provide that a
participant may attend and vote in the meeting either in
person or through an authorised representative:
Provided that such participant shall inform the
resolution professional, in advance of the meeting, of the
identity of the authorised representative who will attend
and vote at the meeting on its behalf.
(3) The notice of the meeting shall contain the following

(i) a list of the matters to be discussed at the
meeting;
(ii) a list of the issues to be voted upon at the
meeting; and
(iii) copies of all documents relevant to the
matters to be discussed and the issues to be
voted upon at the meeting.
(4) The notice of the meeting shall—
(a) state the process and manner for voting by
electronic means and the time schedule,
including the time period during which the votes
may be cast;
(b) provide the login ID and the details of a
facility for generating password and for keeping
security and casting of vote in a secure manner;
and
(c) provide contact details of the person who
will address the queries connected with the
electronic voting.
(emphasis supplied)
“24. Conduct of meeting.— (1) The resolution
professional shall act as the chairperson of the meeting
of the committee.
(2) At the commencement of a meeting, the resolution
professional shall take a roll call when every participant
attending through video conferencing or other audio and
visual means shall state, for the record, the following,—
21
(a) his name;
(b) whether he is attending in the capacity of a
member of the committee or any other
participant;
(c) whether he is representing a member or
group of members;
(d) the location from where he is participating;
(e) that he has received the agenda and all the
relevant material for the meeting; and
(f) that no one other than him is attending or
has access to the proceedings of the meeting at
the location of that person.
(3) After the roll call, the resolution professional shall
inform the participants of the names of all persons who
are present for the meeting and confirm if the required
quorum is complete.
(4) The resolution professional shall ensure that the
required quorum is present throughout the meeting.
(5) From the commencement of the meeting till its
conclusion, no person other than the participants and
any other person whose presence is required by the
resolution professional shall be allowed access to the
place where meeting is held or to the video conferencing
or other audio and visual facility, without the permission
of the resolution professional.
(6) The resolution professional shall ensure that minutes
are made in relation to each meeting of the committee
and such minutes shall disclose the particulars of the
participants who attended the meeting in person, through
video conferencing, or other audio and visual means.
(7) The resolution professional shall circulate the minutes
of the meeting to all participants by electronic means
within forty eight hours of the said meeting.”
(emphasis supplied)
“35. Fair value and Liquidation value.—(1) Fair value
and liquidation value shall be determined in the following
manner—
(a) the two registered valuers appointed under
Regulation 27 shall submit to the resolution
22
professional an estimate of the fair value and
the liquidation value computed in accordance
with internationally accepted valuation
standards, after physical verification of the
inventory and fixed assets of the corporate
debtor;
(b) if in the opinion of the resolution
professional, the two estimates of a value are
significantly different, he may appoint another
registered valuer who shall submit an estimate
computed in the same manner; and
(c) the average of the two closest estimates
shall be considered the fair value or the
liquidation value, as the case may be.
(2) After the receipt of resolution plans in accordance
with the Code and these regulations, the resolution
professional shall provide the fair value and the
liquidation value to every member of the committee in
electronic form, on receiving an undertaking from the
member to the effect that such member shall maintain
confidentiality of the fair value and the liquidation value
and shall not use such values to cause an undue gain or
undue loss to itself or any other person and comply with
the requirements under sub-section (2) of Section 29.
(3) The resolution professional and registered valuers
shall maintain confidentiality of the fair value and the
liquidation value.”
“36. Information memorandum.— (1) Subject to subregulation (4), the resolution professional shall submit
the information memorandum in electronic form to each
member of the committee within two weeks of his
appointment, but not later than fifty-fourth day from the
insolvency commencement date, whichever is earlier.
(2) The information memorandum shall contain the
following details of the corporate debtor—
(a) assets and liabilities, with such description,
as on the insolvency commencement date, as
23
are generally necessary for ascertaining their
values.
Explanation.- “Description” includes the details
such as date of acquisition, cost of acquisition,
remaining useful life, identification number,
depreciation charged, book value, and any
other relevant details.
(b) the latest annual financial statements;
(c) audited financial statements of the corporate
debtor for the last two financial years and
provisional financial statements for the current
financial year made up to a date not earlier than
fourteen days from the date of the application;
(d) a list of creditors containing the names of
creditors, the amounts claimed by them, the
amount of their claims admitted and the security
interest, if any, in respect of such claims;
(e) particulars of a debt due from or to the
corporate debtor with respect to related parties;
(f) details of guarantees that have been given in
relation to the debts of the corporate debtor by
other persons, specifying which of the
guarantors is a related party;
(g) the names and addresses of the members
or partners holding at least one per cent stake
in the corporate debtor along with the size of
stake;
(h) details of all material litigation and an
ongoing investigation or proceeding initiated by
Government and statutory authorities;
(i) the number of workers and employees and
liabilities of the corporate debtor towards them;
and
(j) [* * *]
(k) [* * *]
(l) other information, which the resolution
professional deems relevant to the committee.
(3) A member of the committee may request the
resolution professional for further information of the
nature described in this Regulation and the resolution
24
professional shall provide such information to all
members within reasonable time if such information has
a bearing on the resolution plan.
(4) The resolution professional shall share the
information memorandum after receiving an undertaking
from a member of the committee to the effect that such
member or resolution applicant shall maintain
confidentiality of the information and shall not use such
information to cause an undue gain or undue loss to
itself or any other person and comply with the
requirements under sub-section (2) of Section 29.”
“37. Resolution plan.— A resolution plan shall provide
for the measures, as may be necessary, for insolvency
resolution of the corporate debtor for maximization of
value of its assets, including but not limited to the
following—
(a) transfer of all or part of the assets of the
corporate debtor to one or more persons;
(b) sale of all or part of the assets whether
subject to any security interest or not;
(c) the substantial acquisition of shares of the
corporate debtor, or the merger or consolidation
of the corporate debtor with one or more
persons;
(ca) cancellation or delisting of any shares of
the corporate debtor, if applicable;
(d) satisfaction or modification of any security
interest;
(e) curing or waiving of any breach of the terms
of any debt due from the corporate debtor;
(f) reduction in the amount payable to the
creditors;
(g) extension of a maturity date or a change in
interest rate or other terms of a debt due from
the corporate debtor;
(h) amendment of the constitutional documents
of the corporate debtor;
(i) issuance of securities of the corporate
debtor, for cash, property, securities, or in
25
exchange for claims or interests, or other
appropriate purpose;
(j) change in portfolio of goods or services
produced or rendered by the corporate debtor;
(k) change in technology used by the corporate
debtor; and
(l) obtaining necessary approvals from the
Central and State Governments and other
authorities.”
(emphasis supplied)
“38. Mandatory contents of the resolution plan.— (1)
The amount due to the operational creditors under a
resolution plan shall be given priority in payment over
financial creditors.
(1-A) A resolution plan shall include a statement as to
how it has dealt with the interests of all stakeholders,
including financial creditors and operational creditors, of
the corporate debtor.
(2) A resolution plan shall provide:
(a) the term of the plan and its implementation
schedule;
(b) the management and control of the business
of the corporate debtor during its term; and
(c) adequate means for supervising its
implementation.
(3) A resolution plan shall demonstrate that:
(a) it addresses the cause of default;
(b) it is feasible and viable;
(c) it has provisions for its effective
implementation;
(d) it has provisions for approvals required and
the timeline for the same; and
(e) the resolution applicant has the capability to
implement the resolution plan.”
“39. Approval of resolution plan.—(1) A prospective
resolution applicant in the final list may submit resolution
plan or plans in accordance with the Code and these
regulations to the resolution professional electronically
26
within the time given in the request for resolution plans
under regulation 36B along with:
(a) And affidavit stating that it is eligible under
section 29A to submit resolution plans; and
(b) [***]
(c) An undertaking by the prospective resolution
applicant that every information and records
provided in connection with or in the resolution
plan is true and correct and discovery of false
information and record at any time will render
the applicant ineligible to continue in the
corporate insolvency resolution process, forfeit
any refundable deposit, and attract penal action
under the Code.
(1A) A resolution plan which does not comply with the
provisions of sub-regulation (1) shall be rejected.
(2) The resolution professional shall submit to the
committee all resolution plans which comply with the
requirements of the Code and regulations made
thereunder along with the details of following
transactions, if any, observed, found or determined by
him:—
(a) preferential transactions under Section 43;
(b) undervalued transactions under Section 45;
(c) extortionate credit transactions under
Section 50; and
(d) fraudulent transactions under Section 66,
and the orders, if any, of the adjudicating
authority in respect of such transactions.
(3) The committee shall evaluate the resolution plans
received under sub-regulation (1) strictly as per the
evaluation matrix to identify the best resolution plan and
may approve it with such modifications as it deems fit:
Provided that the committee shall record the reasons for
approving or rejecting a resolution plan.
(4) The resolution professional shall endeavour to submit
the resolution plan approved by the committee to the
Adjudicating Authority at least fifteen days before the
maximum period for completion of corporate insolvency
27
resolution process under section 12, along with a
compliance certificate in Form H of the Schedule.
(5) The resolution professional shall forthwith send a
copy of the order of the Adjudicating Authority approving
or rejecting a resolution plan to the participants and the
resolution applicant.
(6) A provision in a resolution plan which would otherwise
require the consent of the members or partners of the
corporate debtor, as the case may be, under the terms of
the constitutional documents of the corporate debtor,
shareholders' agreement, joint venture agreement or
other document of a similar nature, shall take effect
notwithstanding that such consent has not been
obtained.
(7) No proceedings shall be initiated against the interim
resolution professional or the resolution professional, as
the case may be, for any actions of the corporate debtor,
prior to the insolvency commencement date.
(8) A person in charge of the management or control of
the business and operations of the corporate debtor after
a resolution plan is approved by the Adjudicating
Authority, may make an application to the Adjudicating
Authority for an order seeking the assistance of the local
district administration in implementing the terms of a
resolution plan.”
The relevant provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of
India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016 read as under:
“7. Certificate of registration.—
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The registration shall be subject to the conditions that
the insolvency professional shall—
xxx xxx xxx
(h) abide by the Code of Conduct specified in
the First Schedule to these Regulations; and
28
xxx xxx xxx”
“FIRST SCHEDULE
[Under Regulation, 7(2)(h)]
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INSOLVENCY
PROFESSIONALS
xxx xxx xxx
Confidentiality.
21. An insolvency professional must ensure that
confidentiality of the information relating to the
insolvency resolution process, liquidation or bankruptcy
process, as the case may be, is maintained at all times.
However, this shall not prevent him from disclosing any
information with the consent of the relevant parties or
required by law.
xxx xxx xxx”
8. The statutory scheme of the Code, insofar as the former
members of the Board of Directors are concerned, is as follows:
A committee of creditors is first constituted under Section 21
consisting only of all the financial creditors of the corporate debtor.
Under Section 24, all meetings of this committee are to be
conducted by the resolution professional who, however, does not
happen to be part of this committee. Section 24(3)(b) is important in
that, the resolution professional has to give notice of each and every
meeting of the committee of creditors, inter alia, to members of the
suspended Board of Directors. Like operational creditors who may
29
attend and participate in such meetings, provided the aggregate
dues owing to them are not less than ten per cent of the total debt,
both such operational creditors and erstwhile members of the Board
of Directors have no vote. Section 25(2)(f) and (i) are also important
in that, once the resolution professional convenes meetings of the
committee of creditors, he is to present all resolution plans at these
meetings. Under Section 30, the resolution professional shall
examine each resolution plan received by him in which he must
confirm, inter alia, that such plan provides for the repayment of the
debts of operational creditors which shall not be less than the
amount to be paid to them in the event of liquidation of the corporate
debtor. This plan is then submitted to the Adjudicating Authority if it
is approved by the requisite majority of the committee of creditors.
The Adjudicating Authority under Section 31(1), if satisfied that the
plan passes muster, shall then, by order, approve such plan, which
shall be binding on all stakeholders involved in the resolution plan,
including guarantors.
9. This statutory scheme, therefore, makes it clear that though
the erstwhile Board of Directors are not members of the committee
of creditors, yet, they have a right to participate in each and every
30
meeting held by the committee of creditors, and also have a right to
discuss along with members of the committee of creditors all
resolution plans that are presented at such meetings under Section
25(2)(i). It cannot be gainsaid that operational creditors, who may
participate in such meetings but have no right to vote, are vitally
interested in such resolution plans, and must be furnished copies of
such plans beforehand if they are to participate effectively in the
meeting of the committee of creditors. This is for the reason that
under Section 30(2)(b), repayment of their debts is an important part
of the resolution plan qua them on which they must comment. So
the first important thing to notice is that even though persons such
as operational creditors have no right to vote but are only
participants in meetings of the committee of creditors, yet, they
would certainly have a right to be given a copy of the resolution
plans before such meetings are held so that they may effectively
comment on the same to safeguard their interest.
10. However, it was argued before us that the Notes on Clauses
to Section 24 make it clear that the erstwhile members of the Board
of Directors are participants in these meetings only so that the
committee of creditors and the resolution professional may seek
31
information from them. The Notes on Clauses, heavily relied upon
by learned counsel for the respondents, read as follows:
“Clause 24 prescribes the modalities for the meeting of
the committee of creditors. The meetings are conducted
by the resolution professional and may be attended by
the members of the board directors or partners of the
corporate debtor. This gives an opportunity for the
committee of creditors and the resolution professional to
seek information that they may require to assess the
financial position of the corporate debtor and prepare a
resolution plan.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. This Court in Mobilox Innovations (supra) stated:
“27. The notes on clauses annexed to the Bill are
extremely important and read as follows……”
xxx xxx xxx
“38. It is, thus, clear that so far as an operational creditor
is concerned, a demand notice of an unpaid operational
debt or copy of an invoice demanding payment of the
amount involved must be delivered in the prescribed
form. The corporate debtor is then given a period of 10
days from the receipt of the demand notice or copy of the
invoice to bring to the notice of the operational creditor
the existence of a dispute, if any. We have also seen the
notes on clauses annexed to the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Bill of 2015, in which “the existence of a
dispute” alone is mentioned. Even otherwise, the word
“and” occurring in Section 8(2)(a) must be read as “or”
keeping in mind the legislative intent and the fact that an
anomalous situation would arise if it is not read as
“or”……”
32
12. There is no doubt whatsoever that Notes on Clauses are an
important aid to the construction of Sections of the Code as they
show what the Drafting Committee had in mind when such
provisions were drafted. However, a closer look at the Notes on
Clause 24 makes it clear that the third sentence of the Notes on
Clause 24 is itself problematic. First and foremost, it speaks of the
resolution professional seeking information. The resolution
professional does not seek information at a meeting of the
committee of creditors, which is what Section 24 is all about. The
resolution professional only seeks information from the erstwhile
Board of Directors under Section 29 before preparing an information
memorandum, which then includes the financial position of the
corporate debtor and information relating to disputes by or against
the corporate debtor etc. All this has nothing to do with Section 24 of
the Code which deals with meetings of the committee of creditors.
Secondly, the resolution professional does not prepare a resolution
plan as is mentioned in the Notes on Clause 24; he only prepares an
information memorandum which is to be given to the resolution
applicants who then submit their resolution plans under Section 30
of the Code. The committee of creditors, in turn, gets information so
33
that they can assess the financial position of the corporate debtor
from various sources before they meet. It is, therefore, difficult to
understand the Notes on Clause 24. Even assuming that the Notes
on Clause 24 may be read as being a one-way street by which
erstwhile members of the Board of Directors are only to provide
information, we find that Section 31(1) of the Code would make it
clear that such members of the erstwhile Board of Directors, who
are often guarantors, are vitally interested in a resolution plan as
such resolution plan then binds them. Such plan may scale down
the debt of the principal debtor, resulting in scaling down the debt of
the guarantor as well, or it may not. The resolution plan may also
scale down certain debts and not others, leaving guarantors of the
latter kind of debts exposed for the entire amount of the debt. The
Regulations also make it clear that these persons are vitally
interested in resolution plans as they affect them. Thus, under
Regulation 36 of the CIRP Regulations, the information
memorandum that is given to each member of the CoC and to any
potential resolution applicant, will contain details of guarantees that
have been given in relation to the debts of the corporate debtor (see
Regulation 36(2)(f) of the CIRP Regulations). Also, under Regulation
34
37(d) of the CIRP Regulations, a resolution plan may provide for
satisfaction or modification of any security interest. Security interest
is defined by Section 3(31) of the Code as follows:
“3. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
xxx xxx xxx
(31) “security interest” means right, title or
interest or a claim to property, created in favour
of, or provided for a secured creditor by a
transaction which secures payment or
performance of an obligation and includes
mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment
and encumbrance or any other agreement or
arrangement securing payment or performance
of any obligation of any person:
Provided that security interest shall not include a
performance guarantee;
xxx xxx xxx”
This would certainly include a guarantor who may be a member of
the erstwhile Board of Directors. Further, under Regulation 37(1)(f),
a resolution plan may provide for reduction in the amount payable to
the creditors, which again vitally impacts the rights of a guarantor.
Last but not least, a resolution plan which has been approved or
rejected by an order of the Adjudicating Authority, has to be sent to
“participants” which would include members of the erstwhile Board
of Directors – vide Regulation 39(5) of the CIRP Regulations.
Obviously, such copy can only be sent to participants because they
35
are vitally interested in the outcome of such resolution plan, and
may, as persons aggrieved, file an appeal from the Adjudicating
Authority’s order to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 61 of the
Code. Quite apart from this, Section 60(5)(c) is also very wide, and a
member of the erstwhile Board of Directors also has an independent
right to approach the Adjudicating Authority, which must then hear
such person before it is satisfied that such resolution plan can pass
muster under Section 31 of the Code.
13. It is also important to note that every participant is entitled to
a notice of every meeting of the committee of creditors. Such notice
of meeting must contain an agenda of the meeting, together with the
copies of all documents relevant for matters to be discussed and the
issues to be voted upon at the meeting vide Regulation 21(3)(iii).
Obviously, resolution plans are “matters to be discussed” at such
meetings, and the erstwhile Board of Directors are “participants”
who will discuss these issues. The expression “documents” is a wide
expression which would certainly include resolution plans.
14. Under Regulation 24(2)(e), the resolution professional has to
take a roll call of every participant attending through video
36
conferencing or other audio and visual means, and must state for
the record that such person has received the agenda and all
relevant material for the meeting which would include the resolution
plan to be discussed at such meeting. Regulation 35 makes it clear
that the resolution professional shall provide fair value and
liquidation value to every member of the committee only after receipt
of resolution plans in accordance with the Code [see regulation
35(2)]. Also, under Regulation 38(1)(a), a resolution plan shall
include a statement as to how it has dealt with the interest of all
stakeholders, and under sub-clause 3(a), a resolution plan shall
demonstrate that it addresses the cause of default. This Regulation
also, therefore, recognizes the vital interest of the erstwhile Board of
Directors in a resolution plan together with the cause of default. It is
here that the erstwhile directors can represent to the committee of
creditors that the cause of default is not due to the erstwhile
management, but due to other factors which may be beyond their
control, which have led to non-payment of the debt. Therefore, a
combined reading of the Code as well as the Regulations leads to
the conclusion that members of the erstwhile Board of Directors,
being vitally interested in resolution plans that may be discussed at
37
meetings of the committee of creditors, must be given a copy of
such plans as part of “documents” that have to be furnished along
with the notice of such meetings.
15. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the arguments of the
respondents that “committee” and “participant” are used differently,
which would lead to the result that resolution plans need not be
furnished to the erstwhile members of the Board of Directors, must
be rejected. Equally, the Regulations, far from going beyond the
Code, flesh out the true intention of the Code that is achieved by
reading the plain language of the Sections that have already been
adverted to. So far as confidential information is concerned, it is
clear that the resolution professional can take an undertaking from
members of the erstwhile Board of Directors, as has been taken in
the facts of the present case, to maintain confidentiality. The source
of this power is Regulation 7(2)(h) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016, read
with paragraph 21 of the First Schedule thereto. This can be in the
form of a non-disclosure agreement in which the resolution
professional can be indemnified in case information is not kept
strictly confidential.
38
16. The argument on behalf of the committee of creditors based
on the proviso to Section 21(2) is also misconceived. The proviso to
Section 21(2) clarifies that a director who is also a financial creditor
who is a related party of the corporate debtor shall not have any
right of representation, participation, or voting in a meeting of the
committee of creditors. Directors, simplicitor, are not the subject
matter of the proviso to Section 21(2), but only directors who are
related parties of the corporate debtor. It is only such persons who
do not have any right of representation, participation, or voting in a
meeting of the committee of creditors. Therefore, the contention that
a director simplicitor would have the right to get documents as
against a director who is a financial creditor is not an argument that
is based on the proviso to Section 21(2), correctly read, as it refers
only to a financial creditor who is a related party of the corporate
debtor. For this reason, this argument also must be rejected.
17. We may also mention in passing that the Bankruptcy Law
Committee Report of November, 2015 stated:
“II. The Code will enable symmetry of information
between creditors and debtors.
39
5. The law must ensure that information that is essential
for the insolvency and the bankruptcy resolution process
is created and available when it is required.
6. The law must ensure that access to this information is
made available to all creditors to the enterprise, either
directly or through the regulated professional.
7. The law must enable access to this information to third
parties who can participate in the resolution process,
through the regulated professional.”
Paragraph II (7) correctly reflects the reason for Section 24(3)(b) of
the Code.
18. We may indicate that the time that has been utilized in these
proceedings must be excluded from the period of the resolution
process of the corporate debtor as has been held in Arcelormittal
India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., Civil Appeal
Nos. 9402-9405/2018 [decided on 04.10.2018] (at paragraph 83). In
each of these cases, the appellants will be given copies of all
resolution plans submitted to the CoC within a period of two weeks
from the date of this judgment. The resolution applicant in each of
these cases will then convene a meeting of the CoC within two
weeks thereafter, which will include the appellants as participants.
The CoC will then deliberate on the resolution plans afresh and
either reject them or approve of them with the requisite majority,
40
after which, the further procedure detailed in the Code and the
Regulations will be followed. For all these reasons, we are of the
view that the petition and appeal must be allowed and the NCLAT
judgment set aside.
……………………J.
(R.F. Nariman)
……………………J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019
41

whether it is a suit between the licensor and the licensee or between the landlord and the tenant, such types of suits fall under Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act = Mahadev P Kambekar (D) TR. LRS. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Shree Krishna Woolen Mills Pvt. Ltd. …Respondent(s)

          REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5753­5754 OF 2011
Mahadev P Kambekar (D)
TR. LRS.              ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Shree Krishna Woolen Mills
Pvt. Ltd.            …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) These appeals are directed  against  the  final
judgment and order dated 19.07.2007 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal
No.169   of   1999   in   Suit   No.503   of   1980   and   in
Appeal   No.199   of   1999   in   Suit   No.503   of   1980
whereby   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
allowed   both   the   appeals   filed   by   the   appellants
1
herein   (defendant)   and   the   respondent(plaintiff)
herein respectively. 
2) In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in these appeals which lies in a narrow compass, it
is   necessary   to   set   out   the   relevant   facts
hereinbelow.
3) The appellants are the legal representatives of
Mahadev   Pandurang   Kambekar,   who   was   the
original   defendant   whereas   the   respondent­Shree
Krishna Woolen Mills Pvt. Ltd. is the plaintiff in the
Civil Suit out of which these appeal arise.
4) The dispute between the parties relates to the
land bearing survey Nos.58 and 60 (re­numbered as
CTS   741,741/1   to   741/7)   situated   at   NahurBhandup in Bombay suburban District (hereinafter
referred to as “the suit land”).
5) The plaintiff claims to be the lessee  of the suit
land   whereas   the   defendant   claims   to   be   the
owner/lessor of the suit land on the terms set out in
2
the indenture of the lease deed dated 20.06.1958
executed between the parties.
6) A dispute arose between the parties. This led
the defendant to determine the lease in question by
serving   a   quit   notice   dated   19.02.1980   to   the
plaintiff   requesting   them   to   handover   the   leased
premises,   which   was   in   their   possession,   to   the
defendant.
7) The plaintiff then filed a Civil Suit (No.503 of
1980) against the defendant on the original side of
the Bombay High Court claiming therein the specific
performance of the contract (lease deed) in relation
to the suit land.
8) The suit was based essentially on clause 7 of
the Lease Deed which, according to the plaintiff,
enabled them to elect and exercise their right to
purchase   the   suit   land   from   the   defendant   on
fulfillment of the conditions set out therein.
9) The defendant on being served filed the written
statement. The defendant denied the claim and at
3
the same time also filed his counter claim against
the plaintiff seeking their eviction from the suit land
and the arrears of rent.
10) The Single Judge by judgment/decree dated
24.12.1998 decreed the plaintiff’s suit for specific
performance of contract and directed the defendant
to   execute  the  conveyance  deed  in  favour  of  the
plaintiff   of   the   suit   land.   The   Single   Judge   also
allowed the counter claim filed by the defendant and
accordingly passed the decree for possession of the
suit land and arrears of rent for three years against
the plaintiff.
11) The appellants (defendant) and the respondent
(plaintiff) both felt aggrieved by the judgment/decree
passed by the Single Judge and filed their respective
appeals before the Division Bench.
12) So far as the defendant's (appellants herein)
Appeal No.169/1999 was concerned, it arose out of
the   decree   passed   against   him   for   specific
performance of the contract, whereas so far as the
4
plaintiff's (respondent herein) appeal (No.199/1999)
was concerned, it arose out of the decree passed
against them for possession of the suit land and
arrears of rent.
13) By   impugned   judgment,   the   Division   Bench
allowed   both   the   appeals.     So   far   as   appeal
(169/1999) filed by the appellants (defendant) was
concerned,   the   Division   Bench   set   aside   the
judgment /decree and remanded the suit for re­trial
to the Single Judge on merits afresh in accordance
with law.
14) So   far   as   appeal   (199/1999)   filed   by   the
respondent (plaintiff) was concerned, the Division
Bench set aside the judgment/decree on the ground
that the counter­claim was not maintainable in view
of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, 1882 ( for short called “the Act 1882”) . In other
words,   the   Division   Bench   held   that   so   far   as
counter­claim   filed   by   the   defendant   against   the
plaintiff   is   concerned,   the   Single   Judge   wrongly
5
entertained it as it had no jurisdiction on its original
jurisdiction to entertain counter­claim of this nature
in the light of the provisions of Section 41 of the Act
1882.
15) The defendant (appellants herein), i.e., lessor
felt   aggrieved   by     that   part   of   the   order   of   the
Division Bench which resulted in dismissal of his
counter­claim and filed the present appeals by way
of special leave in this Court.
16) So far as the order of the Division Bench which
resulted in setting aside of the judgment/decree of
the Single Judge and remanding of the suit for retrial on merits is concerned, it attained finality as a
result of dismissal of SLP filed by the plaintiff in this
Court. 
17) The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   these   appeals,   is   whether   the
Division   Bench   was   right   in   dismissing   the
defendant's   counter­claim   as   being   not
maintainable.
6
18) Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Shyam Divan,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
19) Mr.   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the  appellants   (defendant)   and   Mr.
Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   respondent   (plaintiff)   addressed   the   Court   at
length.   However, having heard both the learned
counsel and on perusing the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
20) In our considered opinion, the issue involved
in the present appeals remains no longer res integra
and   is   decided   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Mansukhlal   Dhanraj   Jain   &   Ors.  vs.  Eknath
Vithal Ogale [(1995) 2 SCC 665].
21) In  Mansukhlal   case  (supra),   the   question
arose as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff
claiming   to   be   the   licensee   of   the   premises   on
monetary   consideration   and   seeking   permanent
7
injunction restraining the defendant (licensor) from
recovery   of   the   possession   of   the   premises   is
cognizable   by   the   City   Civil   Court,   Bombay
constituted under the Bombay City Civil Court Act
or   is   cognizable   by   the   Court   of   Small   Causes
Bombay as per Section 41(1) of the Act, 1882.
22) It is this question, which was examined by this
Court in detail in the light of the relevant provisions
of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, the Presidency
Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   1882   and   the   Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947.
23) Having examined the question, their Lordships
speaking through Majmudar, J. held that such suit
is cognizable and thus maintainable in the Court of
Small Causes, Bombay.
24) It is apposite to refer the discussion contained
in paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 17 and 18 which read as
under:
8
“11.  In   order   to   resolve   the   controversy
posed   for   our   consideration,   it   will   be
appropriate   to   note   the   relevant   statutory
provision   having   a   direct   bearing   on   this
question.   Section   41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause
Courts Act reads as under:
“41.   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything
contained elsewhere in this Act or in any
other law for the time being in force but
subject  to  the  provisions  of   sub­section
(2), the Court of Small Causes shall have
jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits
and  proceedings between  a  licensor  and
licensee,   or   a   landlord   and   tenant,
relating to the recovery of possession of
any   immovable   property   situated   in
Greater   Bombay,   or   relating   to   the
recovery of the licence fee or charges or
rent thereof, irrespective of the value of
the   subject­matter   of   such   suits   or
proceedings.”
12.   A  mere   look   at   the   aforesaid   provision
makes   it   clear   that   because   of   the   nonobstante   clause   contained   in   the   section,
even   if   a   suit  may  otherwise   lie  before   any
other   court,   if   such   a   suit   falls   within   the
sweep of Section 41(1) it can be entertained
only   by   the   Court   of   Small   Causes.   In   the
present   proceedings   we   are   not   concerned
with   the   provisions   of   sub­section   (2)   of
Section   41   and   hence   we   do   not   refer   to
them. For applicability of Section 41(1) of the
Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   the   following
conditions   must   be   satisfied   before   taking
the   view   that   jurisdiction   of   regular
competent civil court like City Civil Court is
ousted:
(i)   It   must   be   a   suit   or   proceeding
between the licensee and licensor; or
(ii) between a landlord and a tenant;
9
(iii) such suit or proceeding must relate
to   the   recovery   of   possession   of   any
property situated in Greater Bombay; or
(iv)   relating   to   the   recovery   of   the
licence fee or charges or rent thereof.
13. In the present case, we are not concerned
with the 2nd and 4th conditions, as the only
contention   of   the   appellants   is   that   the
present suits do not satisfy conditions 1 and
3   for   attracting   Section   41(1).   The
respondents   claim   to   the   contrary.   It   is
obvious   that   if   the   present   suits   satisfy
conditions 1 and 3 they would clearly attract
the  applicability  of  Section  41(1)  of  the  Act
and such suits would be outside the purview
of regular civil court like the City Civil Court.
Therefore,   the   enquiry   which   becomes
relevant at this stage is to find out from the
averments   in   the  plaints  whether   these   are
suits  between  a   licensor  and  a   licensee  and
whether   they   relate   to   the   recovery   of
possession of immovable property situated in
Greater Bombay.
16.   It   is,  therefore,  obvious  that  the  phrase
“relating to recovery of possession” as found
in   Section  41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts
Act is comprehensive in nature and takes in
its  sweep  all  types  of   suits  and  proceedings
which   are   concerned   with   the   recovery   of
possession of suit property from the licensee
and,   therefore,   suits   for   permanent
injunction   restraining   the   defendant   from
effecting forcible recovery of such possession
from the licensee­plaintiff would squarely be
covered by the wide sweep of the said phrase.
Consequently in the light of the averments in
the   plaints   under   consideration   and   the
prayers   sought   for   therein,   on   the   clear
language  of  Section  41(1),  the  conclusion   is
inevitable   that   these   suits   could   lie   within
10
the   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   Small   Cause
Court, Bombay and the City Civil Court would
have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
17.   We   may   now   refer   to   the   relevant
decisions   of   this   Court   and   other   courts   to
which   our   attention   was   invited   by   learned
counsel   for   both   the   sides.   As   some   of   the
decisions referred to a pari materia provision
as found in Section 28 of the Bombay Rents,
Hotel and Lodging  House  Rates Control Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Bombay
Rent Act”), it will be necessary to refer to the
said  provision.  Section  28(1)  of  the  Bombay
Rent Act reads as under:
28.   Jurisdiction   of   courts.—
Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in
any   law   and   notwithstanding   that   by
reason of the amount of the claim or for
any other reason, the suit or proceeding
would   not,   but   for   this   provision,   be
within its jurisdiction,—
(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small
Causes,   Bombay,   (aa)   in   any   area   for
which,   a   Court   of   Small   Causes   is
established   under   the   Provincial   Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887, such Court and
(b)   elsewhere,   the   Court   of   the   Civil
Judge   (Junior   Division)   having
jurisdiction   in   the   area   in   which   the
premises   are   situate   or,   if   there   is   no
such  Civil  Judge,  the  Court  of  the  Civil
Judge   (Senior  Division)  having  ordinary
jurisdiction,
shall  have   jurisdiction   to   entertain   and
try   any   suit   or   proceeding   between   a
landlord   and   a   tenant   relating   to   the
recovery   of   rent   or   possession   of   any
premises to which any of the provisions
of this Part apply….”
18.  When   Section  41(1)   of   the  Small   Cause
Courts  Act   is  read   in   juxtaposition  with  the
aforesaid Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act,
it becomes clear that pari materia words are
used   about   nature   of   suits   in   both   these
11
provisions   for   conferring   exclusive
jurisdiction  on  Small  Cause  Courts,  namely,
they   alone   can   entertain   such   suits   or
proceedings   relating   to   recovery   of
possession   of  premises.   It   is   of   course   true
that   Section   41   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts
Act   deals   with   such   suits   between   the
licensee and licensor while Section 28 of the
Bombay   Rent   Act   deals   with   suits   between
landlord  and  tenant. But  the  nature  of  such
suits as contemplated by both these sections
is   the   same,   namely,   it   should   be   the   suit
relating   to   the   recovery   of   possession   of
premises. Interpreting the phrase “relating to
recovery  of  possession”  as   found   in  Section
28 of the Bombay Rent Act, a Bench of three
learned  Judges  of   this  Court   in   the  case  of
Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram6 held
that   a   suit   for   declaration   that   one   of   the
plaintiffs   was   the   tenant   of   the   defendant
landlord and the other plaintiffs were his subtenants   and   they   were   entitled   to   be
protected from eviction squarely falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Cause
Court,   Bombay   under   Section   28   of   the
Bombay Rent Act and jurisdiction of the City
Civil   Court   for   entertaining   such   a   suit   is
excluded.   Imam,   J.   speaking   for   the   threeJudge   Bench   in   that   case   observed   at  page
374 of the report as under:
“The  present  suit  filed  in  the  City  Civil
Court raised in substance a claim to the
effect   that   the   plaintiffs   were   the
tenants   of   the   premises   within   the
meaning   of   the   Act.   Such   a   claim   was
one which arose out of the Act or any of
its   provisions.   The   suit   related   to
possession of the premises and the right
of   the   landlord   to   evict   any   of   the
plaintiffs was denied on the ground that
the first plaintiff was a tenant within the
meaning of the Act and the premises had
been   lawfully   sublet   by   him   to   the
12
second   and   third   plaintiffs.   The   City
Civil   Court   was   thus   called   upon   to
decide  whether   the   first  plaintiff  was   a
tenant   of   the   premises   within   the
meaning of the Act and whether he had
lawfully   sublet   the   same   to   the   second
and third plaintiffs. The City Civil Court,
therefore, had to determine whether the
plaintiffs  had  established  their  claim  to
be   in   possession   of   the   premises   in
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the
Act.”
25) In the light of the law laid down by this Court
in Mansukhlal’s case (supra) which was later relied
on   in  Prabhudas   Damodar   Kotecha   &   Ors.  vs.
Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr. [(2013) 15 SCC
358], we have no hesitation in affirming the view
taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment
which rightly held that the counter­claim filed by
the   defendant   (appellants   herein)   is   not
maintainable.
26) In our considered view, the law laid down in
these two cases has full application to the facts of
this case and we find no ground to take a different
view than what has been taken by the High Court.
13
27) The only distinction on the facts of the case of
Mansukhlal (supra) and the case at hand is that in
case   of  Mansukhlal  (supra),   the   dispute   was
between the licensee and the licensor in relation to
the land, whereas in the case at hand, the dispute
is between the landlord and the tenant.
28) This factual distinction, in our view, is of no
significance   for   deciding   the   issue   in   question
against the appellants by placing reliance on the law
laid   down   in   the   case   of  Mansukhlal  (supra)
because both the category of cases, i.e., the one
arising between the licensor and the licensee and
the   other   arising   between   the   landlord   and   the
tenant   in   relation   to   the   land   are   governed   by
Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act.
29) In other words, whether it is a suit between the
licensor and the licensee or between the landlord
and   the   tenant,   such   types   of   suits   fall   under
Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act and are,
14
therefore, cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes,
Bombay.
30) This takes us to deal with the next argument
of     Mr.   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellants that once the tenancy is determined such
suits would not come within the purview of Section
41 of the Small Cause Courts Act. This argument
was rejected by the Division Bench and, in our view,
rightly by placing reliance on the law laid down by
the   Bombay   High   Court   in   the   case   of  Nagin
Mansukhlal   Dagli  vs.  Haribhai   Manibhai   Patel
(AIR 1980 Bombay 123) (Para 8 of the said decision
quoted in the impugned order).  We approve the law
laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of
Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli (supra) as laying down the
correct   principle   of   law.   We,   therefore,   do   not
consider   it   necessary   to   elaborate   our   reasoning
more than what we have said.
15
31) Before   parting,     we   consider   it   apposite   to
make   it   clear   that   though   both   learned   senior
counsel in support of their respective submissions
referred extensively to the factual matrix of the case
from their respective list of dates, pleadings and the
documents but we have refrained from recording
any factual finding on any of the factual issues.
32) Indeed, in the light of what we have held supra
on legal question, it is not necessary.  It is now for
the parties to raise all such factual issue(s) such as
how much area was leased out, how much area is
outside the lease, who are the owners of the leased
area and the areas adjacent to leased area and all
incidental   questions   arising   therefrom   before   the
competent Court. 
33) It   is   apart   from   the   fact   that   these   factual
issues were also not gone into by the Division Bench
and indeed rightly.  It is for this reason, we find no
ground to deal with them for the first time in these
appeals else it will cause prejudice to the rights of
16
the parties while prosecuting their grievances before
the   competent   Court.   Now,   it   will   be   for   the
competent Court to come to its own conclusion on
their respective merits and pass appropriate orders
in accordance with law.
34) In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion   and   the
observations,   we   find   no   merit   in   these   appeals.
The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.
   
               
    ………...................................J.
     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                 
   …...……..................................J.
             [R. SUBHASH REDDY]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019
17

a dispute inter se private parties of the nature mentioned above could not be allowed to be raised in the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution for seeking issuance of mandamus against the State and its authorities in relation to the properties in question = N. Sankaranarayanan ….Appellant(s) VERSUS The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. ….Respondent(s)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.7390­7391 OF 2009
N. Sankaranarayanan     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing
Board & Ors.       ….Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.7405­7406  OF 2009
Aruna Theatres & Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd.     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing
Board & Ors.       ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
In Civil Appeal  Nos.7390­7391 of 2009
1. These appeals are directed against  the final
judgment and order dated 04.03.2008 passed by
1
the   High  Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   in  Writ
Appeal No.1499 of 2005 and Writ Petition No.5718
of 2005 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court     dismissed   the   writ   appeal   and   the   writ
petition filed by the appellant herein.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in   these   appeals,   it   is   necessary   to   set   out   few
relevant facts hereinbelow.
3. The appellant herein is the appellant in Writ
Appeal No.1499 of 2005 and writ petitioner in W.P.
No. 5718 of 2005 whereas respondent Nos. 1 to 6
herein are the respondents of the said  writ appeal
and the writ petition out of which these appeals
arise.
4. In the aforesaid writ petition, the Single Judge
passed   an   interim   order   dated   07.03.2005.   The
appellant herein (writ petitioner) felt aggrieved by
the said interim order and filed intra court appeal
before the Division Bench.
2
5.  The Division Bench,  with the consent of the
parties,   decided   the   main   writ   petition   itself   on
merits and finding no merit therein dismissed the
writ petition filed by the appellant herein by the
impugned order, which has given rise to filing of
these appeals by way of special leave by the writ
petitioner in this Court.
6. On perusal of the list of dates, special leave
petitions, writ petition, its counter, the documents
enclosed in the appeal and lastly, the findings of the
Division Bench in the impugned order, it is clear
that the dispute, which was subject matter of the
writ   petition   and   which   is   now   carried   in   these
appeals   at   the   instance   of   the   writ   petitioner
(appellant   herein),   is   essentially   between   the
members of one family whose ancestor was Late S.
Narayanapillai.   He   died   leaving   behind   six   sons.
Late   S.   Narayanapillai   owned   several   properties
3
which,  on  his   death,   were  inherited  by  his  legal
representatives. 
7.   The disputes arose between the members of
the family of Late S. Narayanapillai on his death.  In
order to resolve the disputes, the members of the
family,   therefore,   executed   one   memorandum   of
understanding on 24.09.1998 in relation to their
family properties. Unfortunately, the disputes did
not   come   to   an   end   and,   on   the   other   hand,
persisted amongst them, which led to filing of the
cases in the Company Law Board by some members
against   the   other   and   also   the   writ   petition   in
question by the appellant herein.
8. The dispute, which is subject matter of the
writ   petition   out   of   which   these   appeals   arise,
centers around to the land which is situated in a
scheme   known   as   "Ashok   Nagar   Scheme"   in
Chennai. The dispute is between the appellant,  who
is one of the members of the family and respondent
4
No. 2, which is a Private  Limited Company formed
by another member of the family.
9. One of the grievances of the appellant against
respondent   No.   2   in   the   writ   petition   is   that
respondent no 2 is running a petrol pump on a
portion of the land in question and has also let out
its part to respondent No. 3 who, in turn, is using
the same   as marriage hall for public under the
name   "Udayam   Kalyana   Mandapam".   This   act   of
respondent   No.   2   is   being   objected   to   by   the
appellant amongst them.
10.      It is with these background facts and the
grievance,  which is elaborated, the appellant filed a
writ petition and sought therein a relief for issuance
of a writ of mandamus against the State authorities
namely,  Tamil Nadu Housing Board (R­1), Chennai
City   Municipal   Corporation   (R­4)   and   Chennai
Metropolitan Development Authority (R­ 5) directing
them jointly and severally to take appropriate action
5
in   law   against   Respondent   Nos.   2   and   3   and
restrain them from continuing with their activities
on   the   land.   According   to   the   appellant,     the
activities undertaken by respondent No. 3 on the
land in question are illegal, hazardous and against
the public safety inasmuch as they are being carried
in violation of several provisions of the laws in force.
11. As   mentioned   above,   the   Division   Bench
dismissed the writ petition finding no merit therein
with the following reasons in Para 17, which reads
as under: 
“17.  A perusal of the records produced
before   this   Court   leaves   no   iota   of
doubt  that principally the  dispute  now
raised   before   this   Court   is   a   private
dispute   between   the   various   family
members  having  contesting  the  claims
to   be   on   the   Board   apart   from   those
relating to the affairs of the Company.
It is an admitted fact that the company
is  a  closely  held  company  by  a   family
members  of  six  brothers.    The  present
dispute   is   nothing   but   a   trial   for   the
show   of   their   respective   strength   to
each   other   herein.     A   petition   before
the   Company   Law   Board   is   pending
consideration   as   regards   the
continuance  of  the  directorship  of  Mr.
6
Muthusami.   Whatever be the merits of
the   petition   before   the   Company   Law
Board,   taking   note   of   the   various
contentions,   which   included   a  dispute
with reference to the area occupied by
the Theatre and the construction of the
mandapam   and   the   petrol   pump,   this
Court in the order passed on 19.9.2007
in  C.M.A.  No.1900  of  2007  has  rightly
directed   the   Company   Law   Board   to
dispose   of   the   main   petition   by
31.1.2008.”
 
12. The question, which arises for consideration in
these appeals, is whether the Division Bench was
justified in dismissing the appellant's writ petition
on the aforementioned reasoning.
13. We heard the learned counsel for the parties
and perused the record of the case. Having heard
the learned counsel, we are inclined to agree with
the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the
Division Bench in the impugned order.
14. In   our   considered   opinion   also,   the   writ
petition   filed   by   the   appellant   was   wholly
misconceived   and   deserved   dismissal   at   the
threshold.
7
15.  As rightly observed by the Division Bench, the
dispute sought to be raised by the appellant in his
writ   petition   was   essentially   a   private   property
dispute between the members of one family of which
the   appellant   and     respondent   No.   2   are   the
members.
16.  By indirect means such as the one resorted to
by the writ petitioner (appellant herein) by filing the
writ petition, a dispute inter se private parties of the
nature mentioned above could not be allowed to be
raised in the writ petition under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution for seeking issuance of mandamus
against the State and its authorities in relation to
the properties in question. 
17. It is not in dispute that the appellant did not
file   the   writ   petition   in   his   capacity   as   publicspirited person, i.e., Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
It was, on the other hand, a writ petition was filed
by the appellant essentially to settle his personal
8
property rights disputes qua respondent Nos. 2 and
3. It is a settled law that no writ petition can be
entertained   for   issuance   of   any   writ   against   any
private individual in respect of any private property
dispute.   The   remedy   in   such   case   lies   in   civil
Courts.
18. In   other  words,  it   is  a   settled   law  that  the
questions such as,  who is the owner of the land in
question,  the appellant or respondent No. 2 or any
other member of their family, whether the land in
question   was   let   out   by   respondent   No.   2   to
respondent No. 3 and,   if so,   when, why and for
what purpose, who had the right to let out the said
land (appellant or respondent No. 2 or any other
member of the family), what was the arrangements,
if any, made in the memorandum of settlement  in
relation to the land in question inter se members of
the family, whether it was breached or not  and,  if
so,   by whom, what activities are being carried on
9
the said land and, if so,   by whom, whether such
activities   are   legal   or   illegal   etc.   are   not   the
questions   which   can   be   raised   by   any   private
individual   against   other   private   individual   in   the
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. Even   if   the   writ   petitioner   did   not   raise
pointedly these questions for claiming reliefs in the
writ petition yet,  in our view,  such questions have
a material bearing while considering the grant of
reliefs   claimed   by   the   writ   petitioner   in   the   writ
petition.
20. It is not in dispute that some proceedings are
pending before the Company Law Board between
the   parties   in   relation   to   their   private   property
disputes.   If   that   be   so,     the   parties   to     such
proceedings   have   to   prosecute   the   proceedings
before CLB in  accordance with  law for obtaining
appropriate reliefs.
10
21. Before   parting,   we   consider   it   apposite   to
mention that we have not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the case. Rather,  it is not possible to
express any opinion for want of jurisdiction. The
parties,  therefore,  will be at liberty to take recourse
to all judicial remedies, as may be available to them
in   law,   for   adjudication   of   their   respective
grievances   in   appropriate   judicial   forum   against
each other.
22. Similarly, it is for the State authorities to see
as to whether any person(s) has/have contravened
or/and is/are contravening any provision(s) of any
Act or Rules or Regulations or Statutory Schemes in
any manner while using the properties and, if so,
what   action   is   called   for  qua  such   persons   and
against the activities carried on by such person(s) in
law.  We,   however,   express no opinion on any of
these issues and leave it for the State  authorities to
11
act against any such person(s) in accordance with
law.
23. We also make it clear that all such disputes
between the parties concerned on its merits will be
decided   strictly   in   accordance   with   law   by   the
Court/Tribunal/Authority,     as   the   case   may   be,
uninfluenced by any observation made by the High
Court in the impugned order and by this Court in
this order.
24. In the  light  of  the foregoing discussion and
with   the   aforementioned   observations   and   the
liberty,   we   find   no   merit   in   these   appeals.   The
appeals thus fail and are hereby dismissed. Interim
order,  if any,  passed stands vacated.
In Civil Appeal  Nos.7405­7406 of 2009
These appeals are filed by respondent No.2 in
the writ petition and the writ appeal against the
final judgment and order dated 04.03.2008 passed
12
by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.A.
No.1499 of 2005 and W.P. No.5718 of 2005.
In   view   of   the   order   passed   above   in   CA
Nos.7390­7391   of   2009,   these   appeals   are   also
dismissed.
         ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                 
       
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019.
13

interpretation of any terms and conditions of a document (such as the agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code = Shri Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan & Anr. ….Respondent(s)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1331  OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 23299 of 2018)
Shri Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan & Anr.       ….Respondent(s)
             
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   06.08.2018   of   the   High   Court   of
Judicature  at   Bombay   in  Second  Appeal   No.   44   of
2017 whereby the High Court dismissed the second
appeal filed by the appellant herein.
1
3. In   order   to   appreciate   the   short   controversy
involved   in   this   appeal,   few   relevant   facts   need
mention hereinbelow.
4. The   appellant   is   the   plaintiff   whereas   the
respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out of
which this appeal arises.
5. The   appellant   filed   a   civil   suit   against   the
respondents for specific performance of the contract in
relation to the suit property. The said suit was based
on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The respondents
filed their written statement and denied the appellant's
claim.   The   Trial   Court   by   judgment/decree   dated
05.07.2004 decreed the appellant’s suit and passed a
decree for specific performance of the contract against
the respondents.
6. The   respondents   felt   aggrieved   and   filed   first
appeal   before   the   District   Judge,   Pune.   By
judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the first Appellate
Court   allowed   the   respondents’   (defendants’)   appeal
2
and dismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt
aggrieved   and   filed   second   appeal   before   the   High
Court.
7. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the
second appeal holding that the appeal does not involve
any substantial question of law as is required to be
made   out   under   Section   100   of   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)
which has given rise to filing of  the present appeal by
way of special leave by the plaintiff in this Court.
8. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court
was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal
on the ground that it does not involve any substantial
question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   on   perusal   of   the   record   of   the   case,   we   are
3
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside the
impugned order remand the case to the High Court for
deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance
with   law   after   framing   appropriate   substantial
question(s) of law arising in the case.
11. Having perused the record and the judgments of
the   Trial   Court,   first   Appellate   Court   and   the
impugned order, we are of the considered view that the
High Court was not right in holding that the appeal
does not involve any substantial question of law within
the   meaning   of   Section   100   of   the
Code.   In   our   view,   the   appeal   did   involve   the
substantial question of law and the same, therefore,
should have been framed at the time of admission of
the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of
the Code for its final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5) of
the Code provides that the appeal shall be heard only
on the substantial question of law framed by the High
Court under Section 100 (4) of the Code.
4
12. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of
any terms and conditions of a document (such as the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a
substantial   question   of   law   within   the   meaning   of
Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the
parties admit the document.
13. As mentioned above, since the interpretation of
documents constitutes the substantial question of law,
the High Court should have first framed appropriate
substantial question(s) arising in the case especially
on the questions in relation to the true intent, rights
and obligations arising from Clauses 3, 5 and 15 of the
agreement   dated   08.08.1984   in   the   context   of
pleadings and the reversing findings of the two Courts
below   and   then   should   have   called   upon   the
respondents to reply to the questions framed keeping
in  view its jurisdiction  under Section  100(5) of the
Code and its proviso.
5
14. In   addition,   the   High   Court   also   could   have
framed questions on the issues, which are material for
grant   or   refusal   of   specific   performance   keeping   in
view the requirements of Section 16 of the Specific
Relief Act, pleadings of the parties, and the reversing
findings of the two Courts below on such issues with a
view to find out as to which finding is more preferable.
15. From the reading the impugned order, we find
that, on one hand, the High Court went on interpreting
the terms of the document after hearing the argument
of both sides (see appearance of both parties through
lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held
that it does not involve any substantial question of
law. It virtually, therefore, decided the second appeal
bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view
the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100
(4) and (5) of the Code.  In our view, the approach of
the High Court while deciding the second appeal was
6
not in conformity with the requirements of Section 100
of the Code.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents(defendants),
however, vehemently argued that the findings of the
High Court, which are of affirmance,   do not call for
any interference which rightly resulted in dismissal of
the suit on material issues but, in our view, it is now
for the High Court to examine the issue afresh on
merits after framing the substantial question(s) of law.
We, therefore, express no opinion on the merits of the
issues urged.
17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain
from entering into the merits of the case having formed
an opinion to remand the case and while allowing the
appeal and setting aside the impugned order remand
the case to the High Court with a request to admit the
appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s)
of law which arise(s) in the case in terms of Section
100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appeal
7
on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per
Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with law
without being influenced by any of our observations on
merits.
18. The appeal is accordingly allowed.  The impugned
order is set aside.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
               
         
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019.
8

mutation of a land in the revenue records does not create or extinguish the title over such land nor it has any presumptive value on the title. Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar (D) Th. LR ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Arthur Import and Export Company & Ors. …Respondent(s)

          REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1330  OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No.9394 of 2012)
Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar (D) Th. LR
                     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Arthur Import and Export Company
& Ors.            …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 30.09.2011 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ
Petition No.6235 of 2011 whereby the Single Judge
of the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by
the appellants herein.     
1
3. Few facts need mention infra to appreciate the
short controversy involved in this appeal.
4. The dispute, which has reached to this Court
in this appeal at the instance of one party to such
dispute,   arises   out   of   and   relates   to   the   entries
made   in   the   revenue   records   in   relation   to   the
disputed land.
5. The   dispute   began   from   the   Court   of
Superintendent   of   land   records.   Thereafter   it
reached to the Deputy Director of Land Records in
appeal. It then reached to the State in revision and
lastly, in the High Court in writ petition resulting in
passing the impugned order which has given rise to
filing of the present appeal by way of special leave in
this Court by the appellants.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The law on the question of mutation in the
revenue records pertaining to any land and what is
its   legal   value   while   deciding   the   rights   of   the
2
parties is fairly well settled by a series of decisions
of this Court. 
8. This Court has consistently held that mutation
of a land in the revenue records does not create or
extinguish the title over such land nor it has any
presumptive value on the title. It only enables the
person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay
the land revenue in question. (See  Sawarni(Smt.)
vs. Inder Kaur,  (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh
&  Anr.  Vs.  Daulat  Singh(dead)  by  L.Rs.  &  Ors.,
(1997) 7 SCC 137 and Narasamma & Ors. vs. State
of Karnataka & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 591). 
9.   The   High   Court   while   dismissing   the   writ
petition placed reliance on the aforementioned law
laid down by this Court and we find no good ground
to   differ   with   the   reasoning   and   the   conclusion
arrived at by the High Court. It is just and proper
calling for no interference.
10. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   civil   suits   in
relation to the land in question are pending in the
3
Courts between the parties. Therefore, it would not
be proper to embark upon any factual inquiries into
the question as to whether the entries were properly
made or not and at whose instance they were made
etc. in this appeal. It is more so when they neither
decide the title nor extinguish the title of the parties
in relation to the land.
11. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are
not   inclined   to   entertain   the   submission   of   Mr.
Naphade, learned senior counsel for the appellants
when he urged the issues on the facts.
12. To conclude,  we find no merit in this appeal.
It fails and is accordingly dismissed.
               
    ………...................................J.
     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                 
    …...……..................................J.
             [R. SUBHASH REDDY]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019
4