Whether charge framed under Sec.307 IPC is correct basing on the the material/evidence on record and the medical certificate and the injuries sustained by the complainant ? - No-

Whether charge framed under  Sec.307 IPC is correct basing on the the   material/evidence   on   

record   and   the medical certificate and the injuries sustained by the complainant ? - No-

Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud 

Original Complainant that, in fact, approximately 17 to 18 persons attacked and beaten the complainant with an intention to commit murder and, therefore, the  learned trial Court rightly framed the  charge against the accused persons for the offences under Section 307 of the IPC.  

It is   submitted   that,   therefore,   when   the   learned   trial   Court exercised the discretion/powers judiciously, the High Court has committed   an   error   in   quashing   and  setting   aside   the   order passed by the learned trial Court in exercise of its Revisional Jurisdiction.

the High Court was of the opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the material on record, more particularly, the injuries sustained by the complainant, a charge under Section 325 of the IPC ought to have been framed.

Apex court held that 

Section 307 of the IPC reads as under:

“307.   Attempt   to  murder.—Whoever does any

act with such intention or knowledge, and under such

circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he

would   be   guilty   of   murder,   shall   be   punished   with

imprisonment of either description for a term which

may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;

and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the

offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life,

or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.”

Considering   the   material/evidence   on   record   and   the medical certificate and the injuries sustained by the complainant, it cannot be said that the intention of the accused was to cause death of the complainant.  

Therefore, as rightly observed by the High Court, a charge under Section 325/149 ought to have been framed.  

Therefore, the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the order passed by the trial Court insofar as framing the charge under Section 307 of the IPC. 

We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court

Whether sec. 80 DD [2 ] [a] - explanatory circular Circular No. CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008 and its proviso, denying the benefit of the insurance to the handicapped persons to get annuity or lumpsum amount during the lifetime of the parent/guardian of such a handicapped person, whereas the beneficiaries of other life insurance policy are getting annuity during the lifetime of the person who has taken insurance policy - violates the fundamental right of equality of the handicapped person enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. ? Public interest litigation - Sec.80 DD of Income Tax Act - "80DD. Deduction in respect of maintenance including medical treatment of a dependant who is a person with disability - Jeevan Aadhar Policy (Table 114) from the Life Insurance Corporation of India for the livelihood of their children. - The petitioner himself is a differently abled person as he is suffering from Cerebral Dysphagia - As per clause (b) of sub-section (1), if an assessee, being an individual or a HUF, has paid or deposited any amount under the scheme framed in this behalf by the LIC or any other insurer etc., such an assessee is entitled to deduction of a sum of Rs.75,000/- from his Gross Total Income in respect of the previous year. It is subject to the conditions which are specified in sub-section (2) of Section 80DD. We are concerned with the condition mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2).- (2) The deduction under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be allowed only if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:— (a) the scheme referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) provides for payment of annuity or lump sum amount for the benefit of a dependant, being a person with disability, in the event of the death of the individual or the member of the Hindu undivided family in whose name subscription to the scheme has been made;- As per this condition, disabled dependant would get annuity or lumpsum payment in the event of death of the individual or the death of the member of the HUF, in whose name subscription to the scheme has been made. In order to give effect to the aforesaid special provision meant for the benefit of persons with disability, LIC has floated insurance policy named ‘Jeevan Aadhar (Table 114)’ for the benefit of the handicapped dependants. Accordingly, those assessees who get the Jeevan Aadhar policy for the benefit of handicapped dependants and pay or deposit the amount under the said policy become entitled to the deduction mentioned in Section 80DD of the Act. -The grievance of the petitioner pertains to Circular No. CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008 which is issued by the Income Tax Department. As per this Circular, no benefit can be paid to the dependant till the proposer/life assured survives. Relevant portion of this Circular is extracted below: "Representations were received for allowing annuity payments for the disabled dependant before death of parents/life assured after a certain age. But CBDT/Govt. Of India have refused to do so. Hence it is clarified that no benefit can be paid to dependant till the proposer/life assured survives.” It is, thus, clear that even when the entire subscription is paid under this policy meant for handicapped persons, this policy does not have maturity claim. The amount is payable to the dependant only on the demise of the proposer/life assured.- Submission of the petitioner is that by incorporating such a provision, the respondents are denying the benefit of the insurance to the handicapped persons to get annuity or lumpsum amount during the lifetime of the parent/guardian of such a handicapped person, whereas the beneficiaries of other life insurance policy are getting annuity during the lifetime of the person who has taken insurance policy. This, according to the petitioner, violates the fundamental right of equality of the handicapped person enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution - Apex court hled that the petitioner may be justified in pointing out that there could be harsh cases where handicapped persons may need the payment on annuity or lumpsum basis even during the lifetime of their parents/guardians. For example, where guardian has become very old but is still alive, though he is not able to earn any longer or he may be a person who was in service and has retired from the said service and is not having any source of income. - In such cases, it may be difficult for such a parent/guardian to take care of the medical needs of his/her disabled child. Even when he/she has paid full premium, the handicapped person is not able to receive any annuity only because the parent/guardian of such handicapped person is still alive. -There may be many other such situations. However, it is for the Legislature to take care of these aspects and to provide suitable provision by making necessary amendments in Section 80DD of the Act - In fact, the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also felt that like other police holders, Jeevan Aadhar policy should also be allowed to mature after 55 years of age of the proposer and the annuity amount should be disbursed through the LLCs or National Trust - In the aforesaid circumstances, we dispose of this writ petition by urging upon respondent No.1 to have a relook into this provision by taking into consideration all the aspects, including those highlighted by the Court in this judgment, and explore the possibility of making suitable amendments.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1107 OF 2017
RAVI AGRAWAL .....PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, Ravi Agrawal, under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India as a Public Interest Litigation. The
petition is stated to be filed in the interest of handicapped children
whose parents have taken Jeevan Aadhar Policy (Table 114) from the
Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short, ‘LIC’) for the livelihood of
their children. The petitioner himself is a differently abled person as he
is suffering from Cerebral Dysphagia. The petitioner also is an income
tax assessee whose Permanent Account Number (PAN) issued by the
Income Tax Department is AAPPA5222M. He has stated that he has no
personal interest in the subject matter raised in this petition which he
has filed on behalf of the handicapped children.
2
2) Section 80DD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Act’) provides for payment of annuity of lump sum amount for the
benefit of a dependant, being a person with disability, in the event of the
death of the individual or the member of the Hindu Undivided Family
(HUF) in whose name subscription to the scheme stipulated in the said
provision has been made. Though it is a long provision, for our
purposes it would be suffice to reproduce sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)
thereof, which are as under:
"80DD. Deduction in respect of maintenance including
medical treatment of a dependant who is a person with
disability.— (1) Where an assessee, being an individual or a
Hindu undivided family, who is a resident in India, has, during the
previous year,—
(a) incurred any expenditure for the medical treatment (including
nursing), training and rehabilitation of a dependant, being a
person with disability; or
(b) paid or deposited any amount under a scheme framed in this
behalf by the Life Insurance Corporation or any other insurer or
the Administrator or the specified company subject to the
conditions specified in sub-section (2) and approved by the Board
in this behalf for the maintenance of a dependant, being a person
with disability, the assessee shall, in accordance with and subject
to the provisions of this section, be allowed a deduction of a sum
of seventy-five thousand rupees from his gross total income in
respect of the previous year:
Provided that where such dependant is a person with severe
disability, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect as if
for the words “seventy-five thousand rupees”, the words “one
hundred and twenty-five thousand rupees” had been substituted.
(2) The deduction under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be
allowed only if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—
(a) the scheme referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1)
provides for payment of annuity or lump sum amount for the
3
benefit of a dependant, being a person with disability, in the
event of the death of the individual or the member of the
Hindu undivided family in whose name subscription to the
scheme has been made;
(b) the assessee nominates either the dependant, being a person
with disability, or any other person or a trust to receive the
payment on his behalf, for the benefit of the dependant, being a
person with disability.
(3) If the dependant, being a person with disability, predeceases
the individual or the member of the Hindu undivided family
referred to in sub-section (2), an amount equal to the amount paid
or deposited under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be deemed
to be the income of the assessee of the previous year in which
such amount is received by the assessee and shall accordingly be
chargeable to tax as the income of that previous year.”
3) As per clause (b) of sub-section (1), if an assessee, being an individual
or a HUF, has paid or deposited any amount under the scheme framed
in this behalf by the LIC or any other insurer etc., such an assessee is
entitled to deduction of a sum of Rs.75,000/- from his Gross Total
Income in respect of the previous year. It is subject to the conditions
which are specified in sub-section (2) of Section 80DD. We are
concerned with the condition mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2).
As per this condition, disabled dependant would get annuity or lumpsum
payment in the event of death of the individual or the death of the
member of the HUF, in whose name subscription to the scheme has
been made. In order to give effect to the aforesaid special provision
meant for the benefit of persons with disability, LIC has floated insurance
policy named ‘Jeevan Aadhar (Table 114)’ for the benefit of the
handicapped dependants. Accordingly, those assessees who get the
4
Jeevan Aadhar policy for the benefit of handicapped dependants and
pay or deposit the amount under the said policy become entitled to the
deduction mentioned in Section 80DD of the Act. Synopsis of the said
policy introduced by the LIC gives a glimpse of the salient features of
this plan and is, thus, reproduced below:
"A) Synopsis of Plan
1) Age at entry (life assured) – Minimum 22 years, Maximum 65
years.
(handicapped dependant – 1 year)
The age of the life assured and handicapped dependant are
required to be admitted on the basis of standard age proof.
2) Maximum premium ceasing age – 75 years.
3) Premium paying term – 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 & 35 years.
4) Policy term this is whole life plan.
5) Sum assured – Minimum 50000, Maximum – no limit.
6) Mode of payment – Yearly, Half-Yearly, Quarterly, Monthly,
SSS, Single also.
7) Rebate on mode of payment – Yearly 3% of tabular premium,
Half-yearly 1.5% of tabular premium, Quarterly/ Monthly/SSS – no
rebate.
8) Rebate on high sum assured -
25,000 to 49,999 – Re.1/- per 1000 sum assured
50,000 and above – Rs.2/- per 1000 sum assured.
9) All extra mortality rate class are allowed.
10) All female categories i.e. I, II, III are alloewd.
11) Only NMS is allowed, not NMG.
12) Besides proposal form No. 3000, the life assured (proposer)
will be required to submit an addendum declaring the disability of
the handicapped dependant and a certificate stating that
handicapped dependant is suffering from a permanent physical
5
disability (including blindness) or having mental retardatoin as per
rules A physician, a surgeon, an oculist or a psychiatrist working
in Govt hospital should clearly state that due to disability such
person’s capacity for normal work or engaging in a gainful
employment or occupation is considerably reduced.”
4) The grievance of the petitioner pertains to Circular No.
CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008 which is issued by the
Income Tax Department. As per this Circular, no benefit can be paid to
the dependant till the proposer/life assured survives. Relevant portion of
this Circular is extracted below:
"Representations were received for allowing annuity payments for
the disabled dependant before death of parents/life assured after
a certain age. But CBDT/Govt. Of India have refused to do so.
Hence it is clarified that no benefit can be paid to dependant till
the proposer/life assured survives.”
5) The Jeevan Aadhar plan also mentions the aforesaid Circular on the
basis of which clause pertaining to maturity claim in the policy is
mentioned as under:
"F. MATURITY CLAIM
1) IN FORCE POLICY OR FULLY PAID UP POLICY
Policy does not have maturity claim. The provisions of maturity
claim under whole life policies i.e. after completing the age of 80
years by life assured: is not applicable under this policy.
Representations were received for allowing annuity payments for
the disabled dependant before death of parents/life assured after
certain age. But CBDT/Govt. Of India have refused to do so.
Hence it is clarified that no benefit can be paid to dependant till
the proposer/life assured survives. (co/crm/ps/622/23 dated
24/01/2008).”
It is, thus, clear that even when the entire subscription is paid
6
under this policy meant for handicapped persons, this policy does not
have maturity claim. The amount is payable to the dependant only on
the demise of the proposer/life assured.
6) Submission of the petitioner is that by incorporating such a provision, the
respondents are denying the benefit of the insurance to the handicapped
persons to get annuity or lumpsum amount during the lifetime of the
parent/guardian of such a handicapped person, whereas the
beneficiaries of other life insurance policy are getting annuity during the
lifetime of the person who has taken insurance policy. This, according to
the petitioner, violates the fundamental right of equality of the
handicapped person enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
7) The petitioner states that he had lodged a complaint before the
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDA) on
August 06, 2014. However, the said Authority in its reply expressed its
inability to provide any help having regard to the afore-mentioned
Circular dated January 24, 2008 of the CBDT. The petitioner even
approached the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with
Disabilities raising the aforesaid grievance. The Chief Commissioner
heard the matter on various dates and passed the order advising the
CBDT to once again examine the matter in consultation with the
Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, Ministry of
7
Social Justice and Empowerment, as well as National Trust. Relevant
portion thereof reads as under:
"11. During the hearing on 10.03.2015, it was observed that
Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) had already made the
submission that the issue of allowing for annuity payment to the
dependant with disability under Jeevan Aadhar Policy to
commence after certain age of a subscriber at 55, 58 or 60 years
was considered during the budgetary exercise for 2007-08 and
the same was not found to be acceptable.
12. In the light of the mandate of the Chief Commissioner for
Persons with Disabilities, no direction can be given to CBDT or
LIC as there is no allegation of non implementation of the stated
policy or its terms & conditions. It is, however, the view of this
office that Jeevan Aadhar is not the only LIC Policy that gives the
benefit of Income Tax exemption and only a few parents of
persons with disabilities may be tax payers to be able to avail the
tax exemption, such a well intentioned policy should not be linked
to such benefits as tax exemption. As the primary objective of the
policy is to benefit a person with disability, he/she should start
getting the annuity as early as possible in his/her lifetime.
13. With regard to the allegation of the complainant in Case No.
2602/1093/2014 that the LIC Agents and professionals told him at
the time of selling the policy that his child would start getting
pension @ Rs.2000/- per month for every one lakh of insured
amount is concerned, LIC is advised to investigate the matter and
intimate the outcome to the complainant under intimation to this
Court within two months from the date of receipt of these Record
of proceedings. In case it is established that it is a case of
mis-selling, then LIC is advised to suitably compensate the
complainant.
14. As National Trust was not represented during the hearing
despite the notice and it has suggested that insured amount
should be disbursed to the beneficiaries through its LICs, National
rust is directed to get in touch with the LIC and obtain the details
of the Jeevan Aadhar Policy holders. After obtaining the consent
of the policy holders for distribution of annuity through LLCs
National Trust shall inform LIC for making National Trust as the
nominee/Trusty for receiving the amount of annuity in respect of
such policy holders on the terms & conditions as may be finalized
between LIC and National Trust and ensure that a mechanism is
put in place to disburse the amount of annuity to the disabled
dependants of the policy holders till the dependant is alive.
8
15. Both the complainants strongly felt that like other policy
holders, Jeevan Aadhar Policy should also be allowed to mature
after 55 years of age of proposer and the annuity amount should
be disbursed through the LICs of National Trust.
16. In the light of the demand of the complainants, CBDT is
advised to once again examine the matter in consultation with
Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, Ministry
of Social Justice & Empowerment and National Trust.”
8) The Chief Commissioner had even sent reminder thereof to the CBDT to
look into the matter. However, nothing moved at the level of the CBDT.
In fact, the petitioner thereafter lodged his grievance with the Prime
Minister’s Office through Centralised Public Grievance Redressal and
Monitoring System Portal on October 15, 2015. As he did not receive
any response, it provoked the petitioner to file the instant writ petition
with the following prayers:
"(a) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order
of direction to Respondents No 1 to amend Section 80DD of the
Income Tax Act to allow for the payment of annuity or lump sum
amount to a person with disability on attaining the age of 55/58
years by the guardian/parent of disabled person, in addition to in
the event of death of the guardian/parent.
(b) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order
or direction to Respondents No 2 to amend the Scheme of Jeevan
Aadhar Policy (Table 114) to allow for the payment of annuity or
lump sum amount to a person with disability on attaining the age
of 55/58 years by the guardian/parent of disabled person, in
addition to in the event of death of the guardian/parent.
(c) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order
or direction to Respondents No 2 to pay annuity or a lump sum
amount to a person with disability, the guardian/parents of whom
already attained the age of 55/58 or will attend the age of 55/58
years in the future.
9
(d) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order
or direction to Respondent No 2 to make proper arrangement for
the payment of an annuity/pension to the handicapped dependant
after the death of the guardian, without any further formality
except the filing of death certificate of the parents/guardian. All
the paper formalities for the payment of annuity/pension should be
completed by the LIC after premium paying term of the policy and
a certificate should be issued by the LIC to the effect that all the
formalities for the payment of annuity/pension has been
completed, except filing of death certificate of parents/guardian.
This issuing of the certificate should be conclusive proof for
releasing of annuity/pension, pending till filing of death certificate
of parents/guardian.
(e) Pass such other orders and further orders as may be deemed
necessary on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.”
9) In essence, the grievance of the petitioner is that benefit of Jeevan
Aadhar policy should not be deferred till the death of the assessee/life
assured and it should be allowed to be utilised for the benefit of the
disabled person even during the lifetime of the assessee.
10) Union of India has filed its affidavit giving justification for the
aforesaid course of action. In this regard, it is submitted that vide
Finance Act (No.2), 1998, Section 80DD was substituted for Sections
80DD and 80DDA. The earlier Section 80DD provided for a deduction
of Rs.15,000/- to an individual or HUF on account of any expenditure
incurred for the medical treatment (including nursing), training and
rehabilitation of a dependant relative of an individual or member of HUF.
The substitution was done to provide for composite Section in respect of
deduction for expenditure on medical treatment, rehabilitation etc. and
10
for payment made under a scheme of LIC or any other insurer for the
dependant disabled person. Submission is that in effect Section 80DD
amalgamates the provisions of the two sections, namely, 80DD and
80DDA. Thus, both erstwhile Section 80DDA and present Section 80DD
provide that the annuity or lump sum amount for the benefit of the
dependant who is a person with disability will be disbursed only after the
death of the subscriber. Jeevan Aadhar scheme of LIC has been
designed keeping in mind the tax benefits under Section 80DDA/80DD
of the Act.
11) It is also submitted by respondent No.1/Union of India that the
aforesaid provision was specifically provided for in the Act keeping in
view the fact that the guardians of children with disability are always
faced with the grim reality about the need for maintenance of the
disabled after the death of the primary care giver, i.e. the parent or the
guardian. Many of them would like to deposit some amount during their
lifetime in some special instrument which would ensure payment of a
reasonable sum regularly to the disabled on their death. Thus, a
separate deduction from Gross Total Income of a specified amount
deposited in a year in any scheme of LIC or any other insurer
specifically framed for providing recurring or lump sum payment for the
maintenance and upkeep of a handicapped dependant after the death of
the assessee and approved by the CBDT in this behalf was incorporated
11
in the statute. As the scheme was designed to, to a great extent, to
assuage the anxiety in the minds of parents/guardians of handicapped
dependants about the destiny of their wards on their death and,
therefore, to allow for annuity payments to the handicapped dependant
under Jeevan Aadhar policy to commence after a certain age of the
subscriber is not possible.
12) Meeting the argument of the petitioner based on Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, it is argued that the deduction under Section 80DD
of the Act has been specifically provided for persons with disability. This
is a valid classification for providing specific regime for this class of
persons. The stated objective of the scheme was to assure the
parents/guardian of a dependant with disability of regular payment of
amount for the care of such dependant after the death of the
parent/guardian. Attention is drawn to the explanatory memorandum
relating to Finance Bill, 1998, which is as under:
"Rationalisation of benefits available to parents and guardian of
physically handicapped and disabled dependant.
Under the existing provisions of section 80DD, a deduction of
Rs.15,000/- is allowed to an individual or Hindu Undivided Family
in respect of expenditure incurred on medical treatment of a
handicapped dependant. Section 80DDA allows for a separate
deduction to a parent or guardian in respect of deposits upto
Rs.20,000/- made specified schemes of Life Insurance
Corporation or Unit Trust of India. It has been felt that the parents
or guardian of handicapped dependants may not have to incur
expenditure on medical treatment of a handicapped dependant
every year. However, the parent or the guardian would always
feel the need to provide for the future maintenance of the disabled
12
dependant. The existing provisions do not take such situations
into account. In order to allow a choice to the parent or the
guardian to spend either on the medical treatment of or for the
future need of the handicapped dependant, as the case may be,
the Bill seeks to provide a new section 80DD. With this provision,
the parent or the guardian could claim a deduction upto
Rs.40,000/- for the medical treatment and for future needs of the
handicapped dependant in the manner most suited to his needs.
The existing sections 80DD and 80DDA would get consequentially
merged with increase in overall limit of deduction from Rs.35,000
to Rs.40,000/-.”
13) Number of judgments were cited by the learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the Union of India to placate the argument of
discrimination based on Article 14 of the Constitution. Insofar as
respondent No.2/LIC is concerned, its simple answer is that the clause
in the policy is as per the prescribed norm approved by the CBDT. Of
course, LIC has also supported the reasons given by Union of India
behind the aforesaid Circular.
14) We have considered the respective submissions.
15) At the outset, it may be observed that Section 80DD of the Act is a
provision made by the Parliament under the Act in order to give incentive
to the persons whose dependants are persons with disability. Incentive
is to give such persons concessions in income tax by allowing
deductions of the amount specified in Section 80DD of the Act in case
such parents/guardians of dependants with disability take insurance
policies of the nature specified in this provision. Purpose is to
13
encourage these parents/guardians to make regular payments for the
benefit of dependants with disability. In that sense, the Legislature, in its
wisdom thought it appropriate to allow deductions in respect of such
contribution made by the parent/guardian in the form of premium paid in
respect of such insurance policies. Of course, this deduction is
admissible only when conditions stipulated therein are satisfied.
16) Insofar as insurance policy is concerned, it incorporates a
condition (which is impugned in the present writ petition) to the effect
that the amount shall not be given to he handicapped persons during the
lifetime of the parent/guardian/life assured. This is in conformity with
Section 80DD(2)(b) of the Act.
17) To some extent, the grievance of the petitioner may be justified in
this behalf in the plea that when there is a need to get these funds even
for the benefit of handicapped persons, that will not be given to such a
person only because of the reason that the assured who is a
parent/guardian is still alive. This would happen even when the entire
premium towards the said policy has been paid. The policy does not
have maturity claim. Thus, after making the entire premium for number
of years, i.e. during the duration of the policy, the amount would still
remain with the LIC. That may be so. However, the purpose behind
such a policy is altogether different. As noted from the provisions of
14
Section 80DD as well as from the explanatory memorandum of the
Finance Bill, 1998, by which this provision was added, the purpose is to
secure the future of the persons suffering from disability, namely, after
the death of the parent/guardian. The presumption is that during his/her
lifetime, the parent/guardian would take care of his/her handicapped
child.
18) Further, such a benefit of deduction from income for the purposes
of tax is admissible subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 80DD
of the Act. The Legislature has provided the condition that
amount/annuity under the policy is to be released only after the death of
the person assured. This is the legislative mandate. There is no
challenge to this provision. The prayer is that Section 80DD of the Act
be suitably amended. This Court cannot give a direction to the
Parliament to amend or make a statutory provision in a specified
manner. The Court can only determine, in exercise of its power of
judicial review, as to whether such a provision passes the muster of the
Constitutional Scheme. Though, there is no specific prayer in this
behalf, but in the body of writ petition, argument of discrimination is
raised. Here, we find that the respondents have been able to
successfully demonstrate that the main provision is based on
reasonable classification, which as a valid rational behind it and there is
a specific objective sought to be achieved thereby.
15
19) In State of U.P. and Another v. Kamla Palace, (2000) 1 SCC 557,
this Court, while considering a fiscal statute in relation to Article 14 of the
Constitution, has stated as under:
"11. Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification of
persons, objects and transactions by the legislature for the
purpose of attaining specific ends. To satisfy the test of
permissible classification, it must not be “arbitrary, artificial or
evasive” but must be based on some real and substantial
distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislature. (See Special Courts Bill,
1978, Re, seven-Judge Bench; R.K. Garg v. Union of India,
five-Judge Bench.) It was further held in R.K. Garg case that laws
relating to economic activities or those in the field of taxation
enjoy a greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as
freedom of speech, religion etc. Such a legislation may not be
struck down merely on account of crudities and inequities
inasmuch as such legislations are designed to take care of
complex situations and complex problems which do not admit of
solutions through any doctrinaire approach or straitjacket
formulae...”.
20) Further, in S.K. Dutta, Income Tax Officer v. Lawrence Singh
Ingty, (1968) 2 SCR 165, the Constitution Bench of this court held as
under:
"8. It is not in dispute that taxation laws must also pass the test of
Article 14. That has been laid down by this Court in Moopil Nair v.
State of Kerala. But as observed by this Court in East India
Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, in deciding whether a
taxation law is discriminatory or not it is necessary to bear in mind
that the State has a wide discretion in selecting persons or objects
it will tax, and that a statute is not open to attack on the ground
that it taxes some persons or objects and not others; it is only
when within the range of its selection, the law operates unequally,
and that cannot be justified on the basis of any valid classification,
that it would be violative of Article 14. It is well settled that a State
does not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It is
allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods
and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably.”
16
21) In State of A.P. and Others v. Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others,
(2001) 7 SCC 708, this Court held:
"8. What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is “class
legislation” and not “classification for purpose of legislation”. If the
legislature reasonably classifies persons for legislative purposes
so as to bring them under a well-defined class, it is not open to
challenge on the ground of denial of equal treatment that the law
does not apply to other persons. The test of permissible
classification is twofold: (i) that the classification must be founded
on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped
together from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that
differentia must have a rational connection to the object sought to
be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon classification, which is
scientifically perfect or logically complete. A classification would
be justified unless it is patently arbitrary. If there is equality and
uniformity in each group, the law will not become discriminatory,
though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out of peculiar
situation some included in a class get an advantage over others
so long as they are not singled out for special treatment...”
22) The petitioner may be justified in pointing out that there could be
harsh cases where handicapped persons may need the payment on
annuity or lumpsum basis even during the lifetime of their
parents/guardians. For example, where guardian has become very old
but is still alive, though he is not able to earn any longer or he may be a
person who was in service and has retired from the said service and is
not having any source of income. In such cases, it may be difficult for
such a parent/guardian to take care of the medical needs of his/her
disabled child. Even when he/she has paid full premium, the
handicapped person is not able to receive any annuity only because the
parent/guardian of such handicapped person is still alive. There may be
many other such situations. However, it is for the Legislature to take
17
care of these aspects and to provide suitable provision by making
necessary amendments in Section 80DD of the Act. In fact, the Chief
Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also felt that like other
police holders, Jeevan Aadhar policy should also be allowed to mature
after 55 years of age of the proposer and the annuity amount should be
disbursed through the LLCs or National Trust.
23) In the aforesaid circumstances, we dispose of this writ petition by
urging upon respondent No.1 to have a relook into this provision by
taking into consideration all the aspects, including those highlighted by
the Court in this judgment, and explore the possibility of making suitable
amendments.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
.............................................J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 03, 2019.

Whether there is primie faice case and balance of incoveniyance and irrepearable loss for granting interim injunction pending the suit ? suit for Declaration of title and injunction - or.39, rule 1 and 2 interim injunction pending suit - district judge refused to give interrim injunciton - high court granted status quo - Apex court held that The Writ Petition under Article 227 challenging the orders passed by Civil Courts refusing to grant interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC could very well be maintainable, -. The Learned Single Judge granted an order of status quo with respect to the construction of the Electricity Sub-station even though the Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein had failed to produce any documentary evidence whatsoever to establish their title to the suit property. The Additional District Judge in the earlier round of litigation, in Title Appeal No. 20/1999 vide Judgment dated 29.08.2005 had categorically held that late Smt. Shyal Devi, the mother of Respondents No. 1 to 3 and the predecessor in title, had failed to establish her title to the suit property. The said finding has admittedly not been challenged by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The said finding has attained finality. In this view of the matter, the Respondents failed to make out a prima facie case, which would have justified the grant of an interim injunction. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 also failed to establish that the Electricity Sub-station was being constructed on their land. The Respondents No. 1 to 3 failed to describe the specific area which was in their alleged possession over which the Electricity Sub-station was being constructed. The balance of convenience lies entirely in favour of the Appellant – The General Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board - since the entire Electricity Sub-station has been fully constructed, and is now at the stage of being energised for supply of electricity inter alia to four feeders viz. Bhuiyadih (BHU), Baridih (BRD), Vidyapatinagar (VPN). It is estimated to provide electricity to approximately 1 lakh people. The Board is statutorily empowered under Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003 to undertake all actions necessary for transmission or supply of electricity, subject to the procedure under the Electricity Act, 2003. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have failed to produce any evidence of their possession over the vacant land, no undue hardship or prejudice would be caused to them, in the event the Appellant – The General Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board is permitted to proceed with the energisation of the Electricity sub-station. In the event that Respondents No. 1 to 3 are able to establish their title and possession to any part of the property utilised for the Electricity Sub-station, they would be entitled to compensation for any damage, detriment or inconvenience caused, in accordance with S. 67(3) of the Electricity Act, 2003, and/or any other law for the time being in force. The Electricity Sub-station is complete in all respects and ready to be energised, as per the documentary evidence placed before the Court. The overriding public interest of providing electricity to the local populace would far outweigh the alleged interest of Respondent Nos.1 to 3. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the decision of the Civil Judge (Junior Division – I) and the District Judge in refusing to grant a Temporary Injunction in Title Suit , was justified, and is restored. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Appeals are allowed, and the impugned Judgment dated May 19, 2005 passed by the Learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court in Writ Petition No. 2081 of 2015 is hereby set aside. The impugned Judgment ordering the maintenance of status quo with respect to the Suit property till the final disposal of the Title Suit No. 45/2015 stands vacated. The findings given in this judgment are prima facie in nature given at the interim stage, and will not influence the trial of the case.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OFINDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21 OF 2019
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26645 of 2015]
The State of Jharkhand …Appellant
Versus
Surendra Kumar Srivastava & Ors. …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 22 OF 2019
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 2015]
J U D G M E N T
INDU MALHOTRA,J.
Leave granted.
1. The present Civil Appeals arise out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 26645
and 24684 of 2015 which have been filed to challenge the
Judgment dated May 19, 2015 passed by the Jharkhand
2
High Court in W.P. (C) No. 2081 of 2015. The Writ Petition
had been filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein to
challenge the Order dated 07.04.2015 refusing to grant
Interim Relief in an Application filed under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC in Title Suit No. 45/2015, and
Order dated 21.04.2015 passed by the District Court.
2. A brief factual background of this case is set out herein
below:
2.1. According to the Writ Petitioners/Respondent Nos. 1
to 3 herein, their mother – late Smt. Shyal Devi had
purchased about 3.61 acres of land1 (“suit property”)
from Raju Gour and Shatrughan Gour by way of two
unregistered Sale Deeds dated 30.04.1958. According
to Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, late Smt. Shyal Devi had
raised a structure over a part of the suit property,
and was cultivating the rest of it. The said land was

1 Recorded in R.S. Khatian of 1937 under Khata No. 19 (Plot Nos. 3737,
3733, 3710, 3741, 3749, 3751, 3752, 3753, 3754 and 3755), Khata No.
21 (Plot No. 3742), Khata No. 33 [Plot Nos. 3718, New Plot Nos. 2657,
2658, 2659, 2660, a portion of 2650, 2626(p), 2656(p), 2653(p), 2655(p)
Thana No. 1198 and 1151]. The above-described land was stated to be
situated in mouza agricultural and bara, P.S. Sidhgora, District
Singhbhum East, and was incorporated in new Khatian No. 24 in the
finally published record of rights of Jamshedpur Notified Area (1995-
1996).
3
situated adjacent to the land belonging to the Bihar
State Road Transport Corporation.
2.2. In 1992, Smt. Shyal Devi filed Title Suit No.
153/1992 before the Additional Munsif, Jamshedpur
alleging that the officials of the Bihar State Road
Transport Corporation were disturbing her possession
of the suit property since 1990.
The Additional Munsif vide Judgment and
Decree dated 18/27.02.1999 decreed the Suit in
favour of the Plaintiff – late Smt. Shyal Devi, and
confirmed her possession since 1958. The Bihar
State Road Transport Corporation was restrained
from interfering with the peaceful possession of Smt.
Shyal Devi. The relevant extract of the findings of the
Additional Munsif contained in the Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I
found that plaintiff [Smt. Shyal Devi] has
proved her possession of the suit land since
1958 and as such these issues are decided in
favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.”
4
2.3. The Bihar State Road Transport Corporation filed
Title Appeal No. 20/1999 to challenge the Judgment
and Decree dated 18/27.02.1999 before the
Additional District Judge, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur.
The Title Appeal No. 20/1999 was dismissed
by the Additional District Judge on the ground of
possession. However, the District Judge held that
the Plaintiff had failed to establish her title, and it
would be open for the Bihar State Road Transport
Corporation to file a suit against late Smt. Shyal Devi
for declaration of title over the land, and to seek her
eviction.
2.4. The Bihar State Road Transport Corporation
preferred Second Appeal No. 17509/2005 against the
Judgment dated 29.08.2005 passed by the Additional
District Judge before the Jharkhand High Court,
which is currently pending adjudication.
2.5. It is relevant to mention that late Smt. Shyal Devi did
not challenge the finding that she had failed to
5
establish her title before the High Court. Hence, the
finding of the Additional District Judge attained
finality.
2.6. During the pendency of the Second Appeal, the
Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur sought a No-Objection Certificate vide
letter dated 13.10.2012 from the Transport
Commissioner, Jharkhand for the construction of an
Electricity Sub-station on the land comprised in
Khata No. 24 (Plot Nos. 2650, 2652, 2656, and 2657)
in Jamshedpur, recorded in the name of the Bihar
State Road Transport Corporation.
The Transport Commissioner vide letter dated
04.03.2015 conveyed that it had no objection for
transfer of the said land for the construction of an
Electricity Sub-station thereupon.
2.7. During the pendency of proceedings before the High
Court, Smt. Shyal Devi expired 24.02.2014 leaving
behind three sons i.e. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, as her
legal representatives and successors.
6
2.8. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed Title Suit No. 45/2015
before the Civil Judge (Junior Division – I),
Jamshedpur seeking permanent injunction to
restrain the Appellant –The General Manager,
Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in S.L.P. (C) No.
24684 of 2015] from interfering with their alleged
possession of the suit property, along with an
Application for Temporary Injunction.
2.9. The Civil Judge (Junior Division – I) vide Order dated
07.04.2015 dismissed the Application for Temporary
Injunction filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. It was
held that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 failed to describe
the specific area/portion of the suit property which
was in their alleged possession, over which the
construction of the Electricity Sub-station was being
carried out by the Jharkhand State Electricity Board.
The Civil Judge (Junior Division – I)
concluded that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had failed to
make out a prima facie case, and held that no
irreparable loss would be caused, which could not be
compensated in terms of money.
7
2.10. Aggrieved by the Order dated 07.04.2015,
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed an Appeal under Order
XLIII, Rule 1(r) of the CPC before the District Judge
III-cum-MACT, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur.
The Appeal was dismissed vide Order dated
21.04.2015 whereby the District Judge affirmed the
Order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division – I)
dated 07.04.2015.
It was held that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had
failed to demarcate the suit property in the Plaint to
show that the construction activity was taking place
on their land. The Plaintiffs had not placed on record
the old Khatian, or the new Khatian.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were making a claim
of possession with respect to 3.61 acres of land
recorded in R.S. Khatian of 1937 under Khata No. 19
(Plot Nos. 3737, 3733, 3710, 3741, 3749, 3751,
3752, 3753, 3754 and 3755), Khata No. 21 (Plot No.
3742), Khata No. 33 [Plot Nos. 3718, New Plot Nos.
2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, a portion of 2650, 2626(p),
8
2656(p), 2653(p), 2655(p) Thana No. 1198 and
1151]. The said land stated to be situated in Mouza
Baridih and Bara, P.S. Sidhgora, District Singhbhum
East, in new Khatian No. 24 in the finally published
record of rights of Jamshedpur Notified Area (1995-
1996).
On the other hand, the Counsel for the State
Electricity Board stated that 1.47 acres of land
recorded as Khata No. 24 (Plot Nos. 2650, 2652,
2656 and 2657) was registered in the name of the
Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, as Anabad
land. The Board placed reliance on trace map, and a
letter dated March 4, 2015 addressed by the
Transport Commissioner, Ranchi, Jharkhand to the
Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur making the land available for the
Jharkhand State Electricity Board.
The District Court held that the Plaintiffs had
produced no rent receipts, or municipal receipts to
corroborate their plea of alleged possession over the
disputed suit property.
9
The District Court found that Respondent No.
3 – Narendra Kumar Srivastava had concealed a
material fact that he had filed a Writ Petition before
the High Court seeking an injunction from
construction of a boundary wall and digging on the
suit property by the Appellant – The General
Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in
S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 2015]. The Writ Petition came
to be withdrawn on 24.04.2015. The suppression of
a material fact warranted the drawing of an adverse
inference against the Respondents. The grant of
injunction being a discretionary relief, Respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 were found to not be entitled to the same.
2.11. Aggrieved by the judgment of the District Judge,
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed W.P. (C) No. 2081 of
2015 before the Jharkhand High Court seeking a writ
of certiorari to quash the Order dated 07.04.2015
passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division – I) in Title
Suit No. 45/2015, and Order dated 21.04.2015
passed by the District Court in Misc. Appeal No.
5/2015.
10
2.12. The Electricity Board filed a Counter Affidavit along
with photographs of the construction of the Electricity
Sub-station. It was submitted that almost 90% of the
construction work of the Electricity Sub-station had
already been completed. It was further stated that the
grant of an injunction would seriously affect public
interest, and the welfare scheme for providing
electricity to the local populace at subsidised rates.
2.13. The learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the
impugned Judgment dated 19.05.2015 allowed W.P.
(C) No. 2081 of 2015 filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3,
and directed the parties to maintain status quo with
respect to the suit property. It was clarified, that the
Appellant – The General Manager, Jharkhand State
Electricity Board [in S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 2015]
was, however, at liberty to raise construction on any
other land, except the disputed suit property.
The learned Single Judge held that the
findings of the courts below with respect to there
being no prima facie case in favour of Respondents
No. 1 to 3 was erroneous in view of the judicial
11
findings in their favour in the previous round of
litigation in Title Suit No. 153/1992, and Title
Appeal No. 20/1999.
The Single Judge held that the courts below
dismissed the Application for Temporary Injunction
filed by Respondent Nos 1 to 3 on the ground that
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (Plaintiffs) had failed to
specifically describe the disputed suit property, even
though the description of the disputed suit property
was not objected by the Jharkhand State Electricity
Board.
On balance of convenience, the Single Judge
held that in case the Appellant – The General
Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in
S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 2015] completes the
construction of the Electricity Sub-station,
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 would be under a
compulsion to accept compensation, even if the Title
Suit No. 45/2015 was decreed in their favour.
12
The Single Judge held that the photographs
produced by the Appellant Electricity Board only
indicated the raising of electricity poles, and no other
construction had been raised on the disputed Suit
Land.
3. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated 19.05.2015
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the
State of Jharkhand filed the present S.L.P. (C) No. 26645 of
2015, and the General Manager, Jharkhand State
Electricity Board filed S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 2015.
3.1. This Court vide Interim Order dated 14.12.2015,
granted liberty to the Appellant – The General
Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in S.L.P.
(C) No. 24684 of 2015] to draw the supply lines.
3.2. The Appellant – The General Manager, Jharkhand
State Electricity Board [in S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of
2015] in I.A. Nos. 91857 & 91859/2018, sought
permission to energise the Electricity Sub-station,
after depositing the costs of the suit property as
13
assessed by the Circle Officer, Jamshedpur before the
Deputy Commissioner, Jamshedpur.
3.3. During the pendency of the proceedings, the
Electricity Sub-station has been fully constructed
having a capacity of 33/11 K.V. As per the Executive
Engineer, Electricity Supply Division, Jamshedpur
approximately 1 lakh people residing in the nearby
areas would be benefitted by the supply of electricity,
and it would result in reduction of loss of load on
other Electricity Sub-stations situated in the vicinity.
4. The Appellants and Respondent No. 4 in both the Special
Leave Petitions were represented by Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha,
Senior Advocate, while Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were
represented by Mr. Satpal Singh, Advocate.
4.1. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellants, inter alia submitted that Writ Petition No.
2081 of 2015, seeking a writ of certiorari, was not
maintainable, as it was filed to challenge judicial
orders passed by civil courts. Learned Counsel placed
14
reliance on the decision of a three-judge bench in
Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath & Ors.2.
4.2. On merits, it was submitted that Respondent Nos. 1
to 3 did not have title to the disputed suit property.
The Counsel relied on the findings in the Judgment
dated 29.09.2005 passed in Title Appeal No. 20/1999
wherein the Additional District Judge had clearly held
that the mother of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had failed
to prove her title with respect to the disputed suit
property. The said finding attained finality, since late
Smt. Shyal Devi, or her legal heirs and successors i.e.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had not challenged the
finding any further.
4.3. It was further submitted that the State of Jharkhand
was the owner of the suit property, which was
evidenced from the revenue records of the suit
property recorded in the name of the Bihar State
Road Transport Corporation.

2 (2015) 5 SCC 423.
15
The learned Senior Counsel submitted that
TISCO Ltd. had transferred 16.529 acres of land to
the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation. The
suit property was recorded in the name of the Bihar
State Road Transport Corporation in the recent
survey (khatiyal). The Electricity Sub-station has
been constructed on 1.47 acres of land registered as
Khata No. 24 (Plot Nos. 2650, 2652, 2656 and 2657)
made available to the Jharkhand State Electricity
Board by the Transport Department, Ranchi,
Jharkhand vide letter dated 04.03.2015.
4.4. Pursuant to the interim Order dated 14.12.2015, the
Electricity Sub-station had been completely
constructed, and would provide electricity to over 1
lakh people residing in the vicinity.
4.5. It was further submitted that the learned Single
Judge erred in allowing W.P. (C) No. 2081 of 2015
since Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had failed to make out a
prima facie case in their favour. They had also failed
to demarcate the area in their alleged possession, in
16
the Plaint, on which the electricity Sub-station was
being constructed.
The balance of convenience was in favour of
the Appellant-Electricity Board, in view of the overriding public interest in providing electricity to over 1
lakh people. Further, no irreparable loss or injury
would be caused to Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as they
could always be adequately compensated under
Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003, if found
entitled.
4.6. On the other hand, Advocate Mr. Satpal Singh
supported the findings of the learned Single Judge of
the High Court.
It was submitted that the title to the disputed
suit property vested in Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 since
the issue pertaining to title was decided by the
Additional Munsif in favour of the mother of
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, vide Judgment dated
18.02.1999. Title Appeal No. 20/1999 filed by the
Bihar State Road Transport Corporation against the
17
Judgment of the Additional Munsif was dismissed by
the Additional District Judge, vide Judgment dated
29.08.2005. Although, Second Appeal No.
17509/2005 had been filed by the Bihar State
Transport Corporation against the Judgment dated
29.08.2005 passed by the Additional District Judge,
it was pending final determination before the High
Court.
The learned Advocate contended that the
mere pendency of the Second Appeal No.
17059/2005 would not entitle the Bihar State Road
Transport Corporation to transfer the disputed suit
property to the Appellant – General Manager,
Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in SLP (Civil) No.
24684 of 2015].
The Appellant–State Electricity Board failed to
establish its title or possession over the disputed
Suit property, since it had not produced any material
except the letter of the Transport Commissioner
dated 04.03.2015 and a map.
18
The learned Counsel relied on the decisions of
this Court in Meghmala & Ors. v. G. Narasimha
Reddy & Ors.3 and Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs v. M.
Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs & Anr.4 to submit
that a person who is in settled possession, even in
case he is a trespasser, has the right to be protected
against forcible eviction, and can be evicted only
after following the procedure prescribed by law.
5. The limited issue which arises for consideration in the
present Civil Appeals is whether the learned Single Judge
of the High Court was justified in directing the parties to
maintain status quo during the pendency of the Title Suit
No. 45/2015 before the Court of Civil Judge (Junior
Division – I), Jamshedpur.
6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
We have heard the Counsel for both parties at
length, perused the pleadings, and the written
submissions filed in the present Civil Appeals.

3 (2010) 8 SCC 383, paragraphs 46-48.
4 (2004) 1 SCC 769.
19
6.1. With respect to the first submission of the learned
counsel for the Appellants that the Writ Petition filed
by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3/Plaintiffs for a writ of
certiorari to quash the Order dated 07.04.2015
passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and the
Order dated 21.04.2015 passed by the District Judge
was not maintainable in view of the judgment of the
three-judge bench in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath &
Ors.5, there cannot be any dispute to the law laid
down by this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath
& Ors. (supra), but in the facts of the present case, we
do not propose to unsettle the judgment of the High
Court on the above ground due to two reasons, firstly,
in the High Court, the Appellants, who were
Respondents in the Writ Petition, did not challenge
the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, and secondly, had
the Appellants raised the above objection regarding
maintainability of the Writ Petition, the course open
for Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 was to amend

5 (2015) 5 SCC 423.
20
the cause title of the writ petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution, and such a Writ Petition under
Article 227 would have been clearly maintainable.
6.2. The Writ Petition under Article 227 challenging the
orders passed by Civil Courts refusing to grant
interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2
of the CPC could very well be maintainable, and the
opportunity to amend the cause title by Respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 by raising any objection to that effect
having been denied to them, we, instead of setting
aside the judgment of the High Court on the above
ground, proceed to examine the contentions on
merits.
6.3. The Learned Single Judge granted an order of status
quo with respect to the construction of the Electricity
Sub-station even though the Plaintiffs/Respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 herein had failed to produce any
documentary evidence whatsoever to establish their
title to the suit property.
21
The Additional District Judge in the earlier
round of litigation, in Title Appeal No. 20/1999 vide
Judgment dated 29.08.2005 had categorically held
that late Smt. Shyal Devi, the mother of Respondents
No. 1 to 3 and the predecessor in title, had failed to
establish her title to the suit property. The said
finding has admittedly not been challenged by
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The said finding has
attained finality. In this view of the matter, the
Respondents failed to make out a prima facie case,
which would have justified the grant of an interim
injunction.
6.4. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3
also failed to establish that the Electricity Sub-station
was being constructed on their land. The
Respondents No. 1 to 3 failed to describe the specific
area which was in their alleged possession over which
the Electricity Sub-station was being constructed.
6.5. The balance of convenience lies entirely in favour of
the Appellant – The General Manager, Jharkhand
State Electricity Board [in S.L.P. (C) No. 24684 of 
22
2015] since the entire Electricity Sub-station has
been fully constructed, and is now at the stage of
being energised for supply of electricity inter alia to
four feeders viz. Bhuiyadih (BHU), Baridih (BRD),
Vidyapatinagar (VPN). It is estimated to provide
electricity to approximately 1 lakh people. The Board
is statutorily empowered under Section 67 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 to undertake all actions
necessary for transmission or supply of electricity,
subject to the procedure under the Electricity Act,
2003.
6.6. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have failed to produce any
evidence of their possession over the vacant land, no
undue hardship or prejudice would be caused to
them, in the event the Appellant – The General
Manager, Jharkhand State Electricity Board [in S.L.P.
(C) No. 24684 of 2015] is permitted to proceed with
the energisation of the Electricity sub-station.
6.7. In the event that Respondents No. 1 to 3 are able to
establish their title and possession to any part of the
property utilised for the Electricity Sub-station, they 
23
would be entitled to compensation for any damage,
detriment or inconvenience caused, in accordance
with S. 67(3) of the Electricity Act, 2003, and/or any
other law for the time being in force.
6.8. The Electricity Sub-station is complete in all respects
and ready to be energised, as per the documentary
evidence placed before the Court. The overriding
public interest of providing electricity to the local
populace would far outweigh the alleged interest of
Respondent Nos.1 to 3.
In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, the decision of the Civil Judge
(Junior Division – I) and the District Judge in
refusing to grant a Temporary Injunction in Title Suit
No. 45/2015, was justified, and is restored.
7. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Appeals are
allowed, and the impugned Judgment dated May 19, 2005
passed by the Learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High
Court in Writ Petition No. 2081 of 2015 is hereby set aside.
The impugned Judgment ordering the maintenance of 
24
status quo with respect to the Suit property till the final
disposal of the Title Suit No. 45/2015 stands vacated.
The findings given in this judgment are prima facie
in nature given at the interim stage, and will not influence
the trial of the case.
The pending applications be disposed of accordingly.
Ordered accordingly.
…..……...........................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
..….……..........................J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi;
January 03, 2019

Whether the retrenched employee who accepted compensation in full ,can be reinstated under sec.25 H of ID Act without calling for filling of vacancies ? - No - Reinstatement of an employee under Section 25 (H) of the ID Act - against the orders of Labour court, the single Judge of High court ordered respondent herein , to be reinstated into service with back wages. - Apex court held that The object behind enacting Section 25(H) of the ID Act is to give preference to retrenched employee over other persons by offering them re­employment in the services when the employer takes a decision to fill up the new vacancies.-So, in order to attract the provisions of Section 25(H) of the ID Act, it must be proved by the workman that firstly, he was the “retrenched employee” and secondly, his ex­employer has decided to fill up the vacancies in their set up and, therefore, he is entitled to claim preference over those persons, who have applied against such vacancies for a job while seeking re­employment in the services.- The case at hand is a case where the respondent's termination was held illegal and, in consequence thereof, he was awarded lump sum compensation of Rs.12,500/­ in full and final satisfaction. It is not in dispute that the respondent also accepted the compensation. This was, therefore, not a case of a retrenchment of the respondent from service as contemplated under Section 25(H) of the ID Act. - the respondent was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 25 (H) of the ID Act and seek reemployment by citing the case of another employee (Peon) who was already in employment and whose services were only regularized by the appellant on the basis of his service record in terms of the Rules. -In our view, the regularization of an employee already in service does not give any right to retrenched employee so as to enable him to invoke Section 25 (H) of the ID Act for claiming reemployment in the services. The reason is that by such act the employer do not offer any fresh employment to any person to fill any vacancy in their set up but they simply regularize the services of an employee already in service. Such act does not amount to filling any vacancy.- In our view, there lies a distinction between the expression ‘employment’ and ‘regularization of the service”. The expression ‘employment’ signifies a fresh employment to fill the vacancies whereas the expression ‘regularization of the service’ signifies that the employee, who is already in service, his services are regularized as per service regulations. - In our view, the Labour Court was, therefore, justified in answering the reference in appellant's favour and against the respondent by rightly holding that Section 25(H) of the ID Act had no application to the facts of this case whereas the High Court (Single Judge and Division Bench) was not right in allowing the respondent's prayer by directing the appellant to give him re­employment on the post of Peon. -. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside and the award of the Labour Court is restored.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

  REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7 OF 2019
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17975 of 2014]
Management of the Barara
Cooperative Marketing­cumProcessing Society Ltd.  ... Appellant
Versus
Workman Pratap Singh … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 21.02.2014  passed by the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in
1
L.P.A. No. 317 of 2010 whereby the Division Bench of
the   High   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the
appellant   herein  and  affirmed  the   judgment   dated
26.11.2009 passed by the Single Judge of the High
Court   in   CWP   No.15066   of   2006   by   which   the
respondent herein was ordered to be reinstated into
service with back wages.
3. Few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow to
appreciate   the   short   controversy   involved   in   this
appeal.
4. The   appellant   is   the   Co­operative   Marketing
Society.   The   respondent   was   working   with   the
appellant as a Peon from 01.07.1973.  The appellant
terminated   the   services   of   the   respondent   on
01.07.1985.  The   respondent,   therefore,   got   the
reference   made   through   the   State   to   the   Labour
Court to decide the legality and correctness of his
termination order.
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5. By award dated 03.02.1988, the Labour Court
held the respondent's termination as bad in law and
accordingly   awarded   lump   sum   compensation   of
Rs.12,500/­   to   the   respondent   in   lieu   of
reinstatement in service. 
6. The   appellant   and   respondent   both   were
aggrieved by the award and filed writ petitions before
the   High   Court   to   challenge   the   legality   and
correctness of the award passed by the Labour Court.
The High Court, however, dismissed both the writ
petitions.   The   respondent   then   accepted   the
compensation,   which   was   awarded   by   the   Labour
Court.
7. In   the   year   1993,   the   respondent   filed   a
representation to the appellant praying therein that
since   the   appellant   has   recently   regularized   the
services   of   two   peons   on   01.01.1992   vide   their
resolution   dated   02.08.1993,   therefore,   he   has
3
become   entitled   to   claim   re­employment   in   the
appellant's services in terms of Section 25 (H) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to
as   “the   ID   Act”).   The   appellant,   however,   did   not
accept the prayer made by the respondent.
8. This led to making of an industrial reference to
the Labour Court by the State at the instance of the
respondent for deciding the question as to whether
the respondent is entitled to claim re­employment in
the appellant's services in terms of Section 25 (H) of
the ID Act.
9. The   Labour   Court   answered   the   reference
against the respondent and in appellant's favour. In
other   words,   the   Labour   Court   held   that   the
respondent was not entitled to claim any benefit of
Section 25 (H) of the ID Act to claim re­employment
in the appellant's services on the facts stated by the
respondent in his statement of claim.
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10. The   respondent   felt   aggrieved   and   filed   writ
petition in the High Court. The Single Judge by order
dated 26.11.2009 allowed the writ petition and set
aside the award of the Labour Court.  The High Court
directed re­employment of the respondent on the post
of Peon in the appellant's services. The appellantemployer felt aggrieved and filed appeal before the
Division Bench.
11. By   impugned   order,   the   Division   Bench
dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the
Single Judge, which has given rise to filing of the
present appeal by way of special leave in this Court
by the employer­the appellant.
12. Heard Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Shish Pal Laler, learned counsel
for the respondent.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
5
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside
the orders of the High Court (Single Judge and the
Division   Bench)   restore   the   award   of   the   Labour
Court.
14. In our considered opinion, there was no case
made out by the respondent (workman) seeking reemployment in the appellant's services on the basis
of Section 25 (H) of the ID Act.
15. In   the   first   place,   the   respondent   having
accepted the compensation awarded to him in lieu of
his right of reinstatement in service, the said issue
had finally come to an end; and Second, Section 25
(H) of the ID Act had no application to the case at
hand.
16. Section 25(H) of the ID Act applies to the cases
where   employer   has   proposed   to   take   into   their
employment any persons to fill up the vacancies.  It
is at that time, the employer is required to give an
6
opportunity to the “retrenched workman” and offer
him re­employment and if such retrenched workman
offers   himself   for   re­employment,   he   shall   have
preference over other persons, who have applied for
employment against the vacancy advertised. 
17. The object behind enacting Section 25(H) of the
ID Act is to give preference to retrenched employee
over other persons by offering them re­employment in
the services when the employer takes a decision to fill
up the new vacancies.
18. Section 25(H) of the ID Act is required to be
implemented as per the procedure prescribed in Rule
78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as “the ID Rules”) which, in
clear terms, provides that Section 25(H) of the ID Act
is applicable only when the employer decides to fill
up   the   vacancies   in   their   set   up   by   recruiting
persons.     It   provides   for   issuance   of   notice   to
7
retrenched   employee   prescribed   therein   in   that
behalf.
19. So, in order to attract the provisions of Section
25(H)   of   the   ID   Act,     it   must   be   proved   by   the
workman   that   firstly,   he   was   the   “retrenched
employee” and secondly, his ex­employer has decided
to fill up the vacancies in their set up and, therefore,
he is entitled to claim preference over those persons,
who have applied against such vacancies for a job
while seeking re­employment in the services.
20. The   case   at   hand   is   a   case   where   the
respondent's   termination   was   held   illegal   and,   in
consequence   thereof,   he   was   awarded   lump   sum
compensation   of   Rs.12,500/­   in   full   and   final
satisfaction.  It is not in dispute that the respondent
also accepted the compensation.  This was, therefore,
not a case of a retrenchment of the respondent from
8
service as contemplated under Section 25(H) of the ID
Act.
21. That   apart   and   more   importantly,   the
respondent was not entitled to invoke the provisions
of   Section   25   (H)   of   the   ID   Act   and   seek   reemployment by citing the case of another employee
(Peon) who was already in employment and whose
services were only regularized by the appellant on the
basis of his service record in terms of the Rules.
22. In our view, the regularization of an employee
already   in   service   does   not   give   any   right   to
retrenched employee so as to enable him to invoke
Section   25   (H)   of   the   ID   Act   for   claiming   reemployment in the services. The reason is that by
such   act   the   employer   do   not   offer   any   fresh
employment to any person to fill any vacancy in their
set up but they simply regularize the services of an
9
employee   already   in   service.     Such   act   does   not
amount to filling any vacancy.
23. In our view, there lies a distinction between the
expression   ‘employment’   and   ‘regularization   of   the
service”.     The   expression   ‘employment’   signifies   a
fresh employment to fill the vacancies whereas the
expression ‘regularization of the service’ signifies that
the employee, who is already in service, his services
are regularized as per service regulations.  
24. In our view, the Labour Court was, therefore,
justified   in   answering   the   reference   in   appellant's
favour and against the respondent by rightly holding
that Section 25(H) of the ID Act had no application to
the facts of this case whereas the High Court (Single
Judge and Division Bench) was not right in allowing
the respondent's prayer by directing the appellant to
give him re­employment on the post of Peon.
10
25. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order
is set aside and the award of the Labour Court is
restored.      
     ………………………………..J.
     (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
           ..………………………………J.
    (INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi,
January 02,2019
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HAPPY NEW YEAR 2019

Wish you all a HAPPY NEW YEAR 2019
God bless you all with great health, wealth and prosperty
     with warm regards
                  Your's 
                                       Advocatemmmohan