Suit for declaration of tenancy rights and injunction - even though plaintiff failed to prove his case - being a licensee as proved is entitled for permanent injunction till he was dispossed through process of law The appellant had filed Suit seeking declaration to the effect that he is holding leasehold rights in the aforesaid shop and, therefore, he is a protected tenant. He had also claimed relief of permanent injunction seeking restraint against the defendant(s)(respondent(s) herein) from dispossessing the appellant(s) from the shop (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit premises').- Trail court dismissed the suit - categorically recording a finding that the appellant(s) was only a licensee and not a lessee. -However, it was also found as a fact that the appellant(s) was in settled possession of the suit premises. The injunction was refused only on the ground that the appellant(s) had not filed any site plan. - High court confirmed the same - Apex cour held that even as a licensee the appellant could not have been dispossessed without the process of law. This proposition has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent(s). Accordingly, these appeals are partly allowed holding that the appellant(s) is a licensee, decree of injunction is passed in favour of the appellant to the extent that the appellant shall not be dispossessed without the process of law meaning thereby the respondent(s) shall be permitted to recourse of legal proceedings in this behalf.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri 
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).10338/2018
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)  No(s).  36887/2016)
SHRI PEAREY LAL(DEAD) NOW REPRESENTED BY LRS.      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
SHRI JIA LAL-PUJARI (DEAD)
NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS & ORS. Respondent(s)
     
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10339-10341/2018
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)  No(s). 2660-2662/2018 )

O R D E R 
Leave granted.
These   appeals   are   filed   against   the   common   judgment   dated
04.08.2016   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Delhi   in   Regular   Second
Appeals   which   were   preferred   by   the   appellant(s)   herein.   For   the
sake   of   convenience   we   take   note   of   the   facts   from   the   appeal
arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.36887 of 2016.
The dispute  pertains to  the sweet  shop which  the appellant(s)
is   having   in   the   precinct   of   Kalkaji   Mandir,   Kalkaji,Delhi.   This
shop   comprises   of   two   rooms   and   two   varandas.   The   appellant   had
filed   Suit   No.386   of   1976   titled   as   �Pearey   Lal   Vs.   Ram   Nath�
seeking   declaration   to   the   effect   that   he   is   holding   leasehold
rights   in   the   aforesaid   shop   and,   therefore,   he   is   a   protected
tenant. He had also claimed relief of permanent injunction seeking

2
restraint   against   the   defendant(s)(respondent(s)   herein)   from
dispossessing   the   appellant(s)   from   the   shop   (hereinafter   referred
to   as   'the   suit   premises').   It   was   pleaded   in   the   plaint   filed   by
the   appellant(s)   that   he   was   inducted   as   tenant   sometime   in   the
year   1963   and   had   been   paying   rent   to   baridars.   Ad-interim
injunction   was   granted   to   the   appellant(s)   restraining   the
respondent(s)   from   dispossessing   the   appellant(s)   which   was   made
absolute till the disposal of the suit.  The defendant(s) had taken
the   plea   that   the   appellant(s)   was   only   a   licensee   in   the   suit
premises     and   had   no   right   to   stay   therein.   Various   issues   were
settled on which evidence was led by both the parties. The original
plaintiff   namely   Pearey   Lal   passed   away   on   27.05.1989   during   the
pendency of the suit and his legal representatives including Radhey
Shyam Sharma were brought on record.
After   arguments   the   Trial   Court   passed   the   judgment   dated
31.01.2012   dismissing   the   suit   categorically   recording     a   finding
that   the   appellant(s)   was   only   a   licensee   and   not   a   lessee.
However,   it   was   also   found   as   a   fact   that   the   appellant(s)   was   in
settled possession of the suit premises. The injunction was refused
only   on   the   ground   that   the   appellant(s)   had   not   filed   any   site
plan.   Regular   First   Appeal   was   filed   by   the   appellant.   Cross
objections   were   also   filed   by   the   legal   representatives   of   the
defendant no.10. Other defendants had accepted the judgment of the
Trial   Court   and   did   not   file   any   appeal.   Regular   First   Appeal   as
well   as   cross   objections   were   dismissed   by   the   learned   Additional
District   Judge   vide   judgment   dated   01.04.2013.   Regular   Second

3
Appeal   there-against   was   preferred   by   the   appellant(s)   which   has
been dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 04.08.2016.
  Mr.   C.A.   Sundram,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellant(s), made one main submission on the basis of facts which
have   been   established   before   the   Trial   Court   and   affirmed   by   the
Additional District Judge as well as by the High Court. He accepted
the   position   that   the   appellant   is   only   a   licensee.   However,   the
submission was that the finding of fact was also that the appellant
was in possession of the suit premises right from the year 1963. On
this   basis,   he   argued   that   even   as   a   licensee   the   appellant   could
not   have   been   dispossessed   without   the   process   of   law.   This
proposition   has   not   been   disputed   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent(s).
Accordingly, these appeals are partly allowed holding that the
appellant(s)   is   a   licensee,   decree   of   injunction   is   passed   in
favour of the appellant to the extent that the appellant shall not
be   dispossessed   without   the   process   of   law   meaning   thereby   the
respondent(s)   shall   be   permitted   to   recourse   of   legal   proceedings
in this behalf. We may record that as and when such a suit is filed
the   same   shall   be   adjudicated   on   its   own   merits.   No   order   as   to
costs.
......................J.
[A.K. SIKRI]
......................J.
        [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 03, 2018.

4
ITEM NO.11               COURT NO.4               SECTION XIV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  36887/2016
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  04-08-2016
in RSA No. 92/2013 passed by the High Court Of Delhi At New Delhi)
SHRI PEAREY LAL(DEAD) NOW REPRESENTED BY LRS.      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
SHRI JIA LAL-PUJARI (DEAD)
NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS & ORS. Respondent(s)
                                                                 
I.A. NO. 1/2016-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN REFILING
I.A. NO. 3/2017- PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON. )

WITH
SLP(C) No. 2660-2662/2018 (XIV)

Date : 03-10-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
For Petitioner(s) Mr. C.A. Sundram, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Debesh Panda, Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Adv.
Ms. Pooja Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Anshul Goyal, Adv.
                    Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR
                   Mr. Debesh Panda, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)   Mr. Arun K. Sinha, AOR
Mr. Sumit Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Sinha Shrey Nikhilesh, Adv.
Mr. Anil Nauriv, Adv.
                    Ms. Sumita Hazarika, AOR
Mr. Prabhas Chandra, Adv.
Ms. Ipsita Behura, Adv.
Mr. Harish Bhardwaj
Mr. R.K. Bhardwaj
                     Caveator-in-person

5
Mr. Dheeraj Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Neeraj Bhardwaj, Adv.
Ms. Sunita Bhardwaj, Adv.
                    Mr. Satyendra Kumar, AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeals are partly allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending   application(s),   if   any,   stands   disposed   of
accordingly.
(ASHWANI THAKUR)                                 (RAJINDER KAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

No court can grant decree/relief infavour of the defendant without counter claim and without pleadings and without producing the documents , while granting decree in favour of the plaintiff as he prayed for The suit for declaration of title and injunction- the trial court decreed the suit with costs. However, the defendants have been given the right to grow Tulsi and pluck flowers in the suit land for performance of pooja. - High court also confirmed the same - Apex court held that The defendant has not set up the case of having right of growing Tulsi and plucking flowers in the land in question and had only set up own title. That has not been proved. In the circumstances, having failed to prove the title and in the absence of any counter claim with respect to the right of growing Tulsi and plucking flowers, no decree could have been granted by the Trial court or by the High Court. The very basis of the defendants case was Gift Deed in proving which they have miserably failed and being not related in any capacity to the plaintiff, there was no question of relinquishing or release of any right whatsoever. The defendant could have succeeded only on the strength of having title or Gift Deed. In case, gift was there, there was no question of limited right being given to the defendant of growing Tulsi and plucking flowers. In the facts and circumstances of the case and that no issue was framed with respect to growing Tulsi and plucking flowers, no counter claim was filed by the defendent with respect to the aforesaid relief, in our considered opinion, it was not upon the trial court to pass such a decree in favour of defendant as has been done. Thus, the part of the decree passed by the trial court and by the High Court with respect to growing Tulsi and plucking flowers is hereby set aside. The appeal filed by the plaintiff is hereby allowed and the appeal filed by the defendant is hereby dismissed.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra 
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6760  OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.24164 of 2014)
 M. THIMMA REDDY                                    Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
 G. RAVINDRA & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)

 WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6815  OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C)No. 31415 of 2014)

O R D E R
Leave granted.
These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the
plaintiff   as   well   as   by   the   defendants   aggrieved   by
the   judgment   and   order   of   the   trial   court   and   High
Court. The suit of the plaintiff has been decreed by
the   trial   court   with   costs   and   the   plaintiff   has
been   declared   to   be   the   absolute   owner   of   the   suit
schedule   property   and   injunction   has   also   been
granted   as   against   the   defendants   not   to   interfere
in   the   peaceful   possession   of   the   plaintiffs   over
the suit schedule property.   However, the defendants

2
have   been   given   the   right   to   grow   Tulsi   and   pluck
flowers   in   the   suit   land   for   performance   of   pooja.
It   is   the   later   portion   by   which   the   defendant   have
been given right to grow Tulsi and pluck flowers for
performing   the   poojas   has   been   questioned   in   the
appeal   by   the   plaintiff   whereas   defendant   has   come
up   in   the   appeal   as   against   the   decree   granted   in
favour of plaintiff. The High Court has affirmed the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
The defendant had based its case on the basis
of   a   Gift   Deed   executed   by   M.Thimma   Reddy.   The   said
gift   deed,   has   not   been   produced   in   evidence   to
prove the case.   The plaintiff and defendant are not
related to each other.
     In settlement deed � P-2, there is a reference
to   the   fact   that   certain   portion   of   land   was
reserved   for   growing   of   Tulsi   and   plucking   the
flowers   for   the   purpose   of   charity   and   performance
of   pooja.     Reading   of   the   document   P-2   does   not
prove   the   title   in   favour   of   the   defendants   in   any
manner   whatsoever.     In   the   circumstances,   in   order
to   prove   the   title,   it   was   necessary   for   the
defendant   to   produce   the   gift   deed   and   to   prove   it.
That   has   not   been   done.   Even   other   relevant
documents   have   not   been   filed   as   observed   by   the
trial   court.   As   such,   the   concurrent   finding   that
has   been   recorded   that   the   defendant   has   not   been

3
able   to   prove   his   title   is   unassailable   and   is   in
accordance   with   law   in   view   of   the   facts   and   the
evidence   on   record.   The   title   and   possession   of
plaintiff has rightly been found established.
The   defendant   has   not   set   up   the   case   of
having   right   of   growing   Tulsi   and   plucking   flowers
in   the   land   in   question   and   had   only   set   up   own
title.   That   has   not   been   proved.   In   the
circumstances,   having   failed   to   prove   the   title   and
in   the   absence   of   any   counter   claim   with   respect   to
the   right   of     growing   Tulsi   and     plucking   flowers,
no decree could have been granted by the Trial court
or   by   the   High   Court.   The   very   basis   of   the
defendants   case   was   Gift   Deed   in   proving   which   they
have   miserably   failed   and   being   not   related   in   any
capacity   to   the   plaintiff,   there   was   no   question   of
relinquishing   or   release   of   any   right   whatsoever.
The   defendant   could   have   succeeded   only   on   the
strength   of   having   title   or   Gift   Deed.     In   case,
gift   was   there,   there   was   no   question   of   limited
right   being   given   to   the   defendant   of   growing   Tulsi
and  plucking flowers.            
      In the facts and circumstances of the case and
that   no   issue   was   framed   with   respect   to   growing
Tulsi   and     plucking   flowers,   no   counter   claim   was
filed by the defendent with respect to the aforesaid
relief,   in   our   considered   opinion,   it   was   not   upon

4
the   trial   court   to   pass   such   a   decree   in   favour   of
defendant   as   has   been   done.     Thus,   the   part   of   the
decree   passed   by   the   trial   court   and   by   the   High
Court   with   respect   to     growing   Tulsi   and     plucking
flowers is hereby set aside.
The   appeal   filed   by   the   plaintiff   is   hereby
allowed   and   the   appeal   filed   by   the   defendant   is
hereby dismissed.
Parties to bear their own costs. 
       �����������������������J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
���������������������� J.
[ S.ABDUL NAZEER ]
   New Delhi;
   17 th
 July, 2018.

5
ITEM NO.24               COURT NO.8               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).24164/2014
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  27-03-2014
in   RFA   No.   35/2012   27-03-2014   in   RFA   No.   1565/2011   passed   by   the
High Court Of Karnataka At Bengaluru)
M. THIMMA REDDY                                    Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
G. RAVINDRA & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 31415/2014

Date : 17-07-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.ABDUL NAZEER
For Petitioner(s) Mr. H.N.Nagmohan Das,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Shekhar G Devasa,Adv.
Mr. Manish Tiwari,Adv.
Mr. Luv Kumar,Adv.
                    M/S.Devasa & Co., AOR
                    Mrs.Vaijayanthi Girish, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. V.Giri,Sr. Adv.
Mr. Gurukrishna Kumar,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Girish Ananthamurthy,Adv.
                    Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
                    Mrs.Vaijayanthi Girish, AOR
                    M/S.Devasa & Co., AOR                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   appeal   filed   by   the   plaintiff   is   hereby
allowed   and   the   appeal   filed   by   the   defendant   is
hereby dismissed in terms of the signed order.
    (B.PARVATHI)                                (JAGDISH CHANDER)
    COURT MASTER                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

in a suit for mere injunction - an amendement of plaint can be allowed for specific performance of agreement of sale if it is in time Or.6, rule 17 CPC- amendment of plaint adding for specific perfromance of agreement of sale in a bare suit for injuntion - both courts dismissed the same - The reasoning given by the courts below is that the amendment would be barred by limitation if one is to calculate the limitation from the date of the agreement to sell or the date of the alleged cancellation, both of which took place in the years 2004 and 2005 respectively. Since the amendment was moved on 20.02.2014, the courts below have said that the amendment is time barred. - Apex court held that The Agreement to Sell dated 31.03.2004 itself states that a contingency has first to occur before the Agreement can be enforced, viz., a second appeal has to be disposed of. We are informed that the said second appeal was dismissed as withdrawn only on 12.12.2012. Therefore, at the earliest, limitation to enforce this Agreement would began only from the said date. The amendment made, therefore, cannot be said to be time barred. The amendment, therefore, stands allowed. The judgments passed by the courts below are set aside.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman 
1
IN�THE�SUPREME�COURT�OF�INDIA
�CIVIL� APPELLATE� JURISDICTION
� CIVIL�APPEAL�Nos.�10753�OF�2018
(Arising�out�of�SLP�(C)��No.�13459�of�2018)
��� �����������������
�� ���
KEWAL�KRISHAN ... � Appellant (s)
�
���������������������� Versus
DHARAMBIR�AND�ORS. ... � Respondent(s)
�������� O�R�D�E�R�
1) Delay condoned.
2) Leave granted.
3) An amendment application to a plaint which was filed for
injunction   simpliciter,   the   amendment   being   for   adding   the
relief   of   specific   performance,   has   been   turned   down   by   the
courts   below.     The   reasoning   given   by   the   courts   below   is
that the amendment would be barred by limitation if one is to
calculate   the   limitation   from   the   date   of   the   agreement   to
sell   or   the   date   of   the   alleged   cancellation,   both   of   which
took   place   in   the   years   2004   and   2005   respectively.     Since
the amendment was moved on 20.02.2014, the courts below have
said that the amendment is time barred.
4) Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of
the   view   that   this   is   not   correct.     The   Agreement   to   Sell
dated   31.03.2004   itself   states   that   a   contingency   has   first
to occur before the Agreement can be enforced, viz., a second
appeal has to be disposed of.   We are informed that the said

2
second appeal was dismissed as withdrawn only on 12.12.2012.
Therefore,   at   the   earliest,   limitation   to   enforce   this
Agreement would began only from the said date.  The amendment
made, therefore, cannot be said to be time barred.
5) The amendment, therefore, stands allowed.  The judgments
passed by the courts below are set aside.
6) With these observations, the appeal is allowed.
�
����.......................J.
                                           ��������������(ROHINTON�FALI�NARIMAN)
�.........................J.
��������� �������������������(NAVIN�SINHA)
�
���������
New�Delhi,
Dated:�October�26,�2018.������������

3
ITEM NO.45               COURT NO.8               SECTION IV-B
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  13459/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  28-11-2017
in CR No. 8141/2014 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana At
Chandigarh)
KEWAL KRISHAN                                      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
DHARAMBIR & ORS.                                   Respondent(s)
(Relief:-Permanent Injunction)
Date : 26-10-2018 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Daya Krishan Sharma, AOR
Mr. Rohit Vats, Adv.
Mr. I.C. Sharma, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Shish Pal Laler, Adv.
Mr. Sonit Sinhmar, Adv.
                   Mr. Devesh Kumar Tripathi, AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(MANAV SHARMA)                           (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                 BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file.) 

Injunction can be granted as the appellant will not be dispossessed except in accordance with law or any other law. suit for injunction-According to the appellant, there was said to be an attempt to forcibly dispossess them by the respondents and that is what drove them to file a suit for injunction.-The Trial Court granted the injunction but on appeal the High Court set aside the order of the Trial Court. The High Court went to the extent of holding that the grant of land to the appellant under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagana Act, 1952 was not permissible or irregular. - Apex court held that We have been informed that steps have not been taken by the respondents under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagana Act, 1952 to cancel the grant made to the appellant. In view of the above, it is clear that the possession of the appellant is not in dispute. That being the position, the appellant will not be dispossessed from the allotted land under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagana Act, 1952 or the land allotted to them in exchange of land under the said Act, except in accordance with law or any other law.In view of the above, the order passed by the High Court is set aside.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan Bhimarao Lokur

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal  No(s).  1332/2009
DOKHAM TIBBAT FOUNDATION                           Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
SATE OF UTTRANCHAL & ANR.                          Respondent(s)
  O R D E R
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.   The appellant
filed a suit for injunction (being Suit No. 212 of 2003) before the
Additional District Judge, Dehradun.
According to the appellant, there was said to be an attempt to
forcibly dispossess them by the respondents and that is what drove
them to file a suit for injunction.
The Trial Court granted the injunction but on appeal the High
Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 07.11.2007 in First
Appeal   No.   64/2003   set   aside   the   order   of   the   Trial   Court.     The
High Court went to the extent of holding that the grant of land to
the   appellant   under   the   U.P.   Bhoodan   Yagana   Act,   1952   was   not
permissible or irregular.
We   have   been   informed   that   steps   have   not   been   taken   by   the
respondents   under   the   U.P.   Bhoodan   Yagana   Act,   1952   to   cancel   the
grant made to the appellant.
In   view   of   the   above,   it   is   clear   that   the   possession   of   the
appellant   is   not   in   dispute.     That   being   the   position,   the
appellant will not be dispossessed from the allotted land under the
U.P.   Bhoodan   Yagana   Act,   1952   or   the   land   allotted   to   them   in
1

exchange of land under the said Act, except in accordance with law
or any other law.
Should any steps be taken in this regard, all contentions are
open to the parties.
In   view   of   the   above,   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   is
set aside.
The civil appeal is disposed of.  No order as to costs.
� ....................J.
[MADAN B. LOKUR]
� ....................J.
[DEEPAK GUPTA]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 18, 2018.
2

ITEM NO.109               COURT NO.4               SECTION X
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  1332/2009
DOKHAM TIBBAT FOUNDATION                           Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
SATE OF UTTRANCHAL & ANR.                          Respondent(s)

Date : 18-04-2018  This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Jain, Adv.
Ms. Abha Jain, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jatinder Kumar Sethi, Dy. A.G.
Mr. Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Adv.
Mr. Ashutosh Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Kamlendra Mishra, AOR
                   
         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The civil appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.
Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.
(MEENAKSHI  KOHLI)                       (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)
  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER
[Signed order is placed on the file]
3 

No injunction when the plaintiff's share is 6 pies and 3.125% in the entire suit property, and when the total undivided share of the other co-sharers including the plaintiffs share is 49% . Injunction order - Trail court granted - Hight court affirmed - Apex court held that The original plaintiff i.e., respondent No.1, holds 6 pies i.e., more than 3% in the suit property. Other defendants also have shares in the property which are specifically mentioned and out of which Kantilal has further purchased 2.1% shares of one Babubai and thus, Kantilal, the predecessor in title , was having approximately 51% share. Thus, the other persons including the original plaintiff, are holding 49% undivided share in the entire property. It is informed that one or two co-sharers have also filed suits against the present appellant. Thus, the plaintiffs in the suit may be having 3.125% share in the entire property but the total of other co- sharers is 49% and hence, not at all negligible. The appellant has challenged the title of the respondent/original plaintiff and also the document of 7.10.1965 is disputed. However, it is a matter of evidence. At this stage, the share of the appellant and the other co-sharers comes to nearly 50% and, therefore the appellant alone cannot be allowed to transfer, alienate or develop the suit property even to the extent of some share unless the suit property is partitioned especially, when he is predecessor-in-title who was a co-sharer had abandoned the property to him without the consent of other co-sharer earlier. Thus, though the share of the present plaintiff is 6 pies and 3.125% in the entire suit property, the total undivided share of the other co-sharers including the plaintiffs share is 49% and hence, i am of the view that the order passed by the learned trial Judge is correct and hence, not to be disturbed. The order of injunction is concerned, we are of the view that an adequate analysis was not made by the High Court and, therefore, the said order is set aside. The learned Single Judge while considering the proposals may look into various aspects and pass a reasoned order keeping in view the concept of � prima facie case� , balance of convenience and irreperable injury.

The Chief Justice of India 
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4307-4308 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.2672-2673 of 2018)
Cornell Housing Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.  Appellant(s)
                  Versus
Smt. Geeta Patkar and Others      Respondent(s)
O R D E R 
Leave granted.
These   appeals,   by   special   leave,   assail   the   order
dated   7 th
  August,   2017,   whereby   the   High   Court   of   Judicature
at   Bombay   in   appeal   from   Order   No.511   of   2017,   has   affirmed
the   order   of   injunction   passed   by   the   Civil   Judge,   Senior
Division, Thane.
On a perusal of the order passed by the High Court,
we find, after quoting few judgments, it has asribed reasons
which are to the following effect:-
�9. In   the   present   case,   both   the   parties
i.e.,   the   appellant   and   respondent   No.1/the
original   plaintiff,   both   claimed   rights
originally  on  the  basis  of  the  sale  deed  dated
5.10.1965.  Further, the plaintiff claims right
on   the   basis   of   second   document   dated
7.10.1965, which was executed between Kantilal,
the   plaintiff,   and   the   other   defendants.     In
the   said   impugned   registered   document,   of   the

2
total   suit   land   admeasuring   315   acres,
percentages   of   all   the   co-sharers   are
specifically mentioned.  Kantilal, the original
predecessor   in   title   of   the   appellant,
admittedly   holds   48.2%   shares   by   virtue   of   the
said   document.     The   original   plaintiff   i.e.,
respondent   No.1,   holds   6   pies   i.e.,   more   than
3% in the suit property.  Other defendants also
have   shares   in   the   property   which   are
specifically   mentioned   and   out   of   which
Kantilal   has   further   purchased   2.1%   shares   of
one Babubai and thus, Kantilal, the predecessor
in   title   ,   was   having   approximately   51%   share.
Thus,   the   other   persons   including   the   original
plaintiff,   are   holding   49%   undivided   share   in
the   entire   property.     It   is   informed   that   one
or two co-sharers have also filed suits against
the present appellant.  Thus, the plaintiffs in
the   suit   may   be   having   3.125%   share   in   the
entire   property   but   the   total   of   other   co-
sharers   is   49%   and   hence,   not   at   all
negligible.     The   appellant   has   challenged   the
title   of   the   respondent/original   plaintiff   and
also   the   document   of   7.10.1965   is   disputed.
However,   it   is   a   matter   of   evidence.     At   this
stage, the share of the appellant and the other
co-sharers   comes   to   nearly   50%   and,   therefore
the   appellant   alone   cannot   be   allowed   to
transfer, alienate or develop the suit property
even   to   the   extent   of   some   share   unless   the
suit   property   is   partitioned   especially,   when
he   is   predecessor-in-title   who   was   a   co-sharer
had   abandoned   the   property   to   him   without   the
consent   of   other   co-sharer   earlier.     The
submissions   of   the   learned   senior   counsel   that
the   plaintiff   has   not   asked   for   partition
cannot be appreciated at this stage because the
plaintiff   does   not   want   to   transfer   the
property   and,   therefore,   she   has   sought   only
declaration.
18. Thus,   though   the   share   of   the   present
plaintiff   is   6   pies   and   3.125%   in   the   entire
suit property, the total undivided share of the
other   co-sharers   including   the   plaintiff�s
share is 49% and hence, it am of the view that
the  order  passed  by  the  learned  trial  Judge  is
correct and hence, not to be disturbed.�

3
It is submitted by Mr. Harish N. Salve and Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellants
that   the   plaintiff-respondent   can   at   best   make   a   claim   of
49.25%   of   the   shares   in   the   property,   but   that   would   not
entitle   it   to   stop   development   in   the   rest   of   the   property.
Dr.   Abhishek   Manu   Singhvi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing
for   the   owner   would   submit   in   support   of   the   appellant   that
the development can take place in respect of the rest of the
property. 
Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   respondent   No.1   has   serious   objection   to   the   aforesaid
submission.  It is his contention that there was an agreement
between the owner and the respondent No.1 for a joint venture
in 1965.   The property is asset of the joint venture and the
purchase was made of the undivided property.  
A   proposal   has   also   been   given   by   Mr.   Salve   and
Mr.   Rohatgi   that   some   appeals   filed   by   the   other   plaintiffs
are pending before the High Court and they have no objection
if the appeals are allowed and the matter is remitted to the
trial   Judge   for   Suit   No.55   of   2010   to   be   tried   along   with
Suit   Nos.78   of   2011   and   776   of   2011   and   they   should   be
consolidated and tried by one Civil Judge, Senior Division.
Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   we
think   it   appropriate   that   the   High   Court   should   consider
these aspects appropriately.   However, as far as the present

4
order of injunction is concerned, we are of the view that an
adequate   analysis   was   not   made   by   the   High   Court   and,
therefore,   the   said   order   is   set   aside.     The   learned   Single
Judge   while   considering   the   proposals   may   look   into   various
aspects and pass a reasoned order keeping in view the concept
of � prima facie case� , balance of convenience and irreperable
injury.  
Liberty   is   granted   to   the   parties   to   mention   before
the High Court at Bombay.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   the   order   of   the   High
Court is set aside.  The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
The   matter   stands   restored   to   the   Single   Judge   for   hearing
afresh.
     

..................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
....................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
....................J.
[Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud]
New Delhi,
April 20 , 2018.

5
ITEM NO.35               COURT NO.1               SECTION IX
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  Nos.2672-2673/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  07-08-2017
in   CAAST   No.   22083/2017   07-08-2017   in   AFO   No.   511/2017   passed   by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay)
CORNELL HOUSING INFRASTRUCTURE PVT LTD             Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
GEETA PATKAR & ORS.                                Respondent(s)

Date : 20-04-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
          HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
          HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Harish N. Salve, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Praveen Samdani, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kunal Vajani, Adv.
                  Mr. Pranaya Goyal, AOR
Mr. Aman Gandhi, Adv.
Ms. Ankita Sangwan, Adv.
Ms. Priykshi Bhatnagar, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. C.U. Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Anirudh B. Laad, Adv.
                   Mr. Anuvrat Sharma, AOR
Ms. Alka Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Rubin Vakil, Adv.
                    Mr. Nikhil Goel, AOR
                   
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.

6
The   appeals   are   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the   signed
order.
(Chetan Kumar) (H.S. Parasher)
 Court Master    Assistant Registrar
(Signed order is placed on the file)