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Thursday, December 13, 2018

Corporate Law - Custom Duty - Whether the rejection of declared value by assessee basing on imported purchase bills along wiht invocies and purchase orders and enhancement of the same without assigning sufficient reasons/evidence, is valid and correct ? The respondent had imported various varieties of the said Aluminum scrap and filed Bills of Entry along with invoices and purchase orders in respect therein declaring the transaction value of the imported goods for the purpose of paying custom duty. - The declared value was not accepted by the Assessing Officer who found the same to be low and reassessment was done by increasing the assessable value. -The assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer was challenged by filing appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise and Customs- All these appeals were dismissed.- Challenging the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the respondent approached the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal- the appeals of the respondent were allowed thereby rejecting the enhancement of assessable value by the Revenue. - Tribunal held that as provided by Section 14 of Customs Act, 1962, the assessable value has to be arrived at on the basis of the price which is actually paid and in a case the price is not sole consideration or if the buyers and sellers are related persons then after establishing that the price is not sole consideration the transaction value can be rejected and taking the other evidences into consideration the assessable value can be arrived at.- Such exercise has not been done in these cases on hand. Therefore, we reject the enhancement of assessable value in respect of the Bills of Entry which are involved in all the appeals being decided and we restore the assessable value as declared by the appellant in said Bills of Entry. - Apex court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the tribuanl orders by holding that"….It is manifest from the aforeextracted order of the Tribunal that no details of any contemporaneous imports or any other material indicating the price notified by LME had either been referred to by the adjudicating officer in the adjudication order or such material was placed before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the appeal. The learned counsel for the Revenue has not been able to controvert the said observations by the Tribunal. In that view of the matter no fault can be found with the order passed by the Tribunal setting aside the additional demand created against the assessee.”


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri 
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 18300-18305 OF 2017
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE
AND SERVICE TAX, NOIDA .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S. SANJIVANI NON-FERROUS TRADING
PVT. LTD. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
The issue raised in these appeals pertains to the transaction
value/assessable value in respect of imported Aluminum Scrap, which
was imported by the respondent herein. The respondent had imported
various varieties of the said Aluminum scrap during the period 27th
August, 2013 to 29th December, 2014 and filed 843 Bills of Entry along
with invoices and purchase orders in respect therein declaring the
transaction value of the imported goods for the purpose of paying
custom duty. The declared value was not accepted by the Assessing
2
Officer who found the same to be low. Accordingly, the said declared
value was rejected and reassessment was done by increasing the
assessable value.
2) In a writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court of Allahabad,
on the directions of the High Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, NOIDA passed a speaking order dated 25th March, 2015,
giving his reasons to reject the transaction value as declared by the
respondent and enhancing the same by taking into consideration the
value of imported goods, namely, grades of scrap Aluminum contents
therein as well as quantum of presence of other metals.
3) The assessment order dated 25th March, 2015 passed by the Assessing
Officer was challenged by filing appeals before the Commissioner
(Appeals), Central Excise and Customs, NOIDA. All these appeals were
dismissed. Challenging the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the
respondent approached the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”). By the impugned
common judgment dated 17th January, 2017, the appeals of the
respondent were allowed thereby rejecting the enhancement of
assessable value by the Revenue. It is the said order of the Tribunal,
which is the subject matter of these appeals.
4) The entire basis of the order of the Tribunal is contained in paragraph 7
of the impugned judgment and since that paragraph contains the
3
reasons which persuaded the Tribunal to set aside the order of the
authorities below, we reproduce this para along with paragraph 8 which
disclosed the outcome of the appeals, in entirety.
"7. Having considered the rival contentions and on perusal of
record, we find that the Original Authority was directed by the
Hon’ble High Court to pass speaking order on the enhancement
of assessable value. We find that the Original Authority in its
Order-in-Original dated 25/03/2015 passed comments on the
ground of writ petition and did not properly examine the evidence
available with the department required to be examined for
enhancement of assessable value. Further, we find that as held
in the case laws stated above and as provided by Section 14 of
Customs Act, 1962, the assessable value has to be arrived at on
the basis of the price which is actually paid and in a case the
price is not sole consideration or if the buyers and sellers are
related persons then after establishing that the price is not sole
consideration the transaction value can be rejected and taking the
other evidences into consideration the assessable value can be
arrived at. Such exercise has not been done in these cases on
hand. Therefore, we reject the enhancement of assessable value
in respect of the Bills of Entry which are involved in all the appeals
being decided and we restore the assessable value as declared
by the appellant in said Bills of Entry.
8. In result, we set aside all the impugned Orders-in-Appeal
and allow all the appeals. The appellant shall be entitled for
consequential relief, if any, in accordance with law.
5) The precise submission of Mr. K. Radhakrishna, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Revenue was that as per the Tribunal itself, the
reasons for upsetting the order in original are:
(a) That he did not properly examine the evidences available with the
Department, which were required to be examined for the purpose of
enhancement of assessable value.
(b) As per the provisions of Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and
4
the case law in respect thereof, the assessable value has to be arrived
at on the basis of the price which is actually paid and in case the price is
not the sole consideration or if the buyers and sellers are related
persons then after establishing that the price is not the sole
consideration, the transaction value can be rejected. However, such
exercise has not been done in these cases.
6) It was submitted that if the Original Authority/Assessing Officer had failed
to examine the evidence that was available with the Department and had
not undertaken the exercise regarding price being not the sole
consideration, the Tribunal should have remanded the case back to the
Assessing Officer for examining the material and undertaking that
exercise. To put it otherwise, the entire thrust of the argument of Mr.
Radhakrishna was that appeals could not have been allowed
straightaway by accepting the transaction value given by the
respondent/assessee and another opportunity should have been given
to the Assessing Authority in this behalf.
7) This argument may seem to be attractive, but only when there is a
cursory look at the aforesaid observations of the Tribunal that the
Assessing Officer did not examine the evidence available with the
Department which was necessitated for such a purpose. However, the
observations of the Tribunal have to be understood in their entirety and
in the context in which these are made. The Tribunal has categorically
5
mentioned that as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Customs Act
and the principles laid down in the case law (which it referred to in the
earlier part of the judgment) interpreting this provision, the assessable
value has to be arrived at on the basis of the price which is actually paid.
It is the basic principle enshrined in the aforesaid provision, i.e., Section
14, which can be culled out from the catena of judgments pronounced by
this Court.
8) In Eisher Tractors Ltd., Haryana vs. Commissioner of Customs,
Mumbai1
, this Court held as under:
"6. Under the Act customs duty is chargeable on goods. According
to Section 14(1) of the Act, the assessment of duty is to be made
on the value of the goods. The value may be fixed by the Central
Government under Section 14(2). Where the value is not so fixed,
the value has to be determined under Section 14(1). The value,
according to Section 14(1), shall be deemed to be the price at
which such or like goods are ordinarily sold, or offered for sale, for
delivery at the time and place of importation — in the course of
international trade. The word “ordinarily” necessarily implies the
exclusion of “extraordinary” or “special” circumstances. This is
clarified by the last phrase in Section 14 which describes an
“ordinary” sale as one “where the seller and the buyer have no
interest in the business of each other and the price is the sole
consideration for the sale …”. Subject to these three conditions
laid down in Section 14(1) of time, place and absence of special
circumstances, the price of imported goods is to be determined
under Section 14(1-A) in accordance with the Rules framed in this
behalf.
xxx xxx xxx
9. These exceptions are in expansion and explicatory of the
special circumstances in Section 14(1) quoted earlier. It follows
that unless the price actually paid for the particular transaction
falls within the exceptions, the Customs Authorities are bound to
assess the duty on the transaction value.
1(2001) 1 SCC 315
6
xxx xxx xxx
12. Rule 4(1) speaks of the transaction value. Utilisation of the
definite article indicates that what should be accepted as the
value for the purpose of assessment to customs duty is the price
actually paid for the particular transaction, unless of course the
price is unacceptable for the reasons set out in Rule 4(2).
“Payable” in the context of the language of Rule 4(1) must,
therefore, be read as referring to “theparticular transaction” and
payability in respect of the transaction envisages a situation
where payment of price may be deferred.
xxx xxx xxx
13. That Rule 4 is limited to the transaction in question is also
supported by the provisions of the other rules each of which
provide for alternate modes of valuation and allow evidence of
value of goods other than those under assessment to be the basis
of the assessable value. Thus, Rule 5 allows for the transaction
value to be determined on the basis of identical goods imported
into India at the same time; Rule 6 allows for the transaction value
to be determined on the value of similar goods imported into India
at the same time as the subject goods. Where there are no
contemporaneous imports into India, the value is to be determined
under Rule 7 by a process of deduction in the manner provided
therein. If this is not possible the value is to be computed under
Rule 7-A. When value of the imported goods cannot be
determined under any of these provisions, the value is required to
be determined under Rule 8 “using reasonable means consistent
with the principles and general provisions of these Rules and subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and on the
basis of data available in India”. If the phrase “the transaction
value” used in Rule 4 were not limited to the particular transaction
then the other rules which refer to other transactions and data
would become redundant.
xxx xxx xxx
22. In the case before us, it is not alleged that the appellant has
misdeclared the price actually paid. Nor was there a
misdescription of the goods imported as was the case in Padia
Sales Corpn. [1993 Supp (4) SCC 57] It is also not the
respondent's case that the particular import fell within any of the
situations enumerated in Rule 4(2). No reason has been given by
the Assistant Collector for rejecting the transaction value under
Rule 4(1) except the price list of vendor. In doing so, the Assistant
Collector not only ignored Rule 4(2) but also acted on the basis of
the vendor's price list as if a price list is invariably proof of the
7
transaction value. This was erroneous and could not be a reason
by itself to reject the transaction value. A discount is a
commercially-acceptable measure which may be resorted to by a
vendor for a variety of reasons including stock clearance. A price
list is really no more than a general quotation. It does not preclude
discounts on the listed price. In fact, a discount is calculated with
reference to the price list. Admittedly in this case a discount up to
30% was allowable in ordinary circumstances by the Indian agent
itself. There was the additional factor that the stock in question
was old and it was a one-time sale of 5-year-old stock. When a
discount is permissible commercially, and there is nothing to show
that the same would not have been offered to anyone else
wishing to buy the old stock, there is no reason why the declared
value in question was not accepted under Rule 4(1).”
9) To the same effect, are other judgments, reiterating the aforesaid
principle, such as, Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta vs. South
India Television (P) Ltd.2
, Chaudhary Ship Breakers vs.
Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad3
 and Commissioner of
Customs, Vishakhapatnam vs. Aggarwal Industries Ltd.4
.
10) The law, thus, is clear. As per Sections 14(1) and 14(1-A), the value of
any goods chargeable to ad valorem duty is deemed to be the price as
referred to in that provision. Section 14(1) is a deeming provision as it
talks of ‘deemed value’ of such goods. Therefore, normally, the
Assessing Officer is supposed to act on the basis of price which is
actually paid and treat the same as assessable value/transaction value
of the goods. This, ordinarily, is the course of action which needs to be
followed by the Assessing Officer. This principle of arriving at transaction
2(2007) 6 SCC 373
3(2010) 10 SCC 576
4(2012) 1 SCC 186
8
value to be the assessable value applies. That is also the effect of Rule
3(1) and Rule 4 (1) of the Customs Valuation Rules, namely, the
adjudicating authority is bound to accept price actually paid or payable
for goods as the transaction value. Exceptions are, however, carved out
and enumerated in Rule 4(2). As per that provision, the transaction
value mentioned in the Bills of Entry can be discarded in case it is found
that there are any imports of identical goods or similar goods at a higher
price at around the same time or if the buyers and sellers are related to
each other. In order to invoke such a provision it is incumbent upon the
Assessing Officer to give reasons as to why the transaction value
declared in the Bills of Entry was being rejected; to establish that the
price is not the sole consideration; and to give the reasons supported by
material on the basis of which the Assessing Officer arrives at his own
assessable value.
11) In South India Television (P) Ltd., the Court explained as to how the
value is derived from the price and under what circumstances the
deemed value mentioned in Section 14(1) can be departed with.
Following discussion in the said judgment needs to be quoted
hereunder:
"10. We do not find any merit in this civil appeal for the following
reasons. Value is derived from the price. Value is the function of
the price. This is the conceptual meaning of value. Under Section
2(41), “value” is defined to mean value determined in accordance
with Section 14(1) of the Act. Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962
is the sole repository of law governing valuation of goods. The
Customs Valuation Rules, 1988 have been framed only in respect
9
of imported goods. There are no rules governing the valuation of
export goods. That must be done based on Section 14 itself. In
the present case, the Department has charged the respondent
importer alleging misdeclaration regarding the price. There is no
allegation of misdeclaration in the context of the description of the
goods. In the present case, the allegation is of underinvoicing.
The charge of underinvoicing has to be supported by evidence of
prices of contemporaneous imports of like goods. It is for the
Department to prove that the apparent is not the real. Under
Section 2(41) of the Customs Act, the word “value” is defined in
relation to any goods to mean the value determined in accordance
with the provisions of Section 14(1). The value to be declared in
the bill of entry is the value referred to above and not merely the
invoice price.
xxx xxx xxx
12. However, before rejecting the invoice price the Department
has to give cogent reasons for such rejection. This is because the
invoice price forms the basis of the transaction value. Therefore,
before rejecting the transaction value as incorrect or
unacceptable, the Department has to find out whether there are
any imports of identical goods or similar goods at a higher price at
around the same time. Unless the evidence is gathered in that
regard, the question of importing Section 14(1-A) does not arise.
In the absence of such evidence, invoice price has to be accepted
as the transaction value. Invoice is the evidence of value. Casting
suspicion on invoice produced by the importer is not sufficient to
reject it as evidence of value of imported goods. Undervaluation
has to be proved. If the charge of undervaluation cannot be
supported either by evidence or information about comparable
imports, the benefit of doubt must go to the importer. If the
Department wants to allege undervaluation, it must make detailed
inquiries, collect material and also adequate evidence. When
undervaluation is alleged, the Department has to prove it by
evidence or information about comparable imports. For proving
undervaluation, if the Department relies on declaration made in
the exporting country, it has to show how such declaration was
procured. We may clarify that strict rules of evidence do not apply
to adjudication proceedings. They apply strictly to the courts'
proceedings. However, even in adjudication proceedings, the AO
has to examine the probative value of the documents on which
reliance is placed by the Department in support of its allegation of
undervaluation. Once the Department discharges the burden of
proof to the above extent by producing evidence of
contemporaneous imports at higher price, the onus shifts to the
importer to establish that the invoice relied on by him is valid.
10
Therefore, the charge of underinvoicing has to be supported by
evidence of prices of contemporaneous imports of like goods.
13. Section 14(1) speaks of “deemed value”. Therefore, invoice
price can be disputed. However, it is for the Department to prove
that the invoice price is incorrect. When there is no evidence of
contemporaneous imports at a higher price, the invoice price is
liable to be accepted. The value in the export declaration may be
relied upon for ascertainment of the assessable value under the
Customs Valuation Rules and not for determining the price at
which goods are ordinarily sold at the time and place of
importation. This is where the conceptual difference between
value and price comes into discussion.”
12) The observations of the Tribunal made in the impugned judgment are to
be appreciated in the light of the principles of law specified in the
aforesaid judgment, inasmuch as the Tribunal has categorically
remarked that the normal rule is that assessable value has to be arrived
at on the basis of the price which is actually paid, as provided by Section
14 of the Customs Act and the case law referred to by it (In paragraph 5,
the Tribunal referred to its own judgments which follow the aforesaid
principle laid down by this Court).
13) It is, therefore, rightly contended by Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondent that the reason given for
setting aside the order that the normal rule was that the assessable
value has to be arrived at on the basis of the price which was actually
paid, and that was mentioned in the Bills of Entry. The Tribunal has
clearly mentioned that this declared price could be rejected only with
cogent reasons by undertaking the exercise as to on what basis the
11
Assessing Authority could hold that the paid price was not the sole
consideration of the transaction value. Since there is no such exercise
done by the Assessing Authority to reject the price declared in the Bills
of Entry, Order-in-Original was, therefore, clearly erroneous.
14) In Commissioner of Customs vs. Prabhu Dayal Prem Chand5
, this
Court was confronted with almost same kind of fact situation. On the
basis of the information received subsequently from the London Metal
Exchange (for short, ‘LME’) to the effect that the price of the two metals,
viz., brass scrap and copper scrap, in LME as on the date of import was
more than the price declared by the respondent, demanded additional
duty amounting to Rs. 90,248/- and Rs. 1,94,035 respectively,
from the assessee on the said two Bills of Entry. This order was set
aside by the Tribunal and appeals there against by the Customs were
dismissed by this Court. The Court noted, while accepting the plea of
the assessee, that they were not confronted with any contemporaneous
material relied upon by the Revenue for enhancing the price declared by
them in the Bills of Entry. It also noted the following remarks of the
Tribunal:
"In the present case as mentioned above, even though there is a
reference to contemporaneous import in the order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner no material regarding such import has
been placed before us or made available by the appellant at any
point of time. Therefore, assessment in this case has to be taken
as having been made purely on the basis of LME bulletin without
any corroborative evidence of imports at or near that price which
5(2010) 13 SCC 535
12
is not permissible under law. We, therefore, set aside the
impugned order and allow the appeal.”
Dismissing the appeals, this Court observed as follows:
"….It is manifest from the aforeextracted order of the Tribunal that
no details of any contemporaneous imports or any other material
indicating the price notified by LME had either been referred to by
the adjudicating officer in the adjudication order or such material
was placed before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the
appeal. The learned counsel for the Revenue has not been able
to controvert the said observations by the Tribunal. In that view of
the matter no fault can be found with the order passed by the
Tribunal setting aside the additional demand created against the
assessee.”
15) We, thus, do not find any merit in these appeals and dismiss the same.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 10, 2018.
13
ITEM No. 1501           Court No. 3               SECTION  IIA
(For Judgment)
               
     S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
   
      CIVIL  APPEALS NOS. 18300­18305 OF 2017
                             
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND  Appellant(s)
SERVICE TAX,  NOIDA
                        VERSUS
M/S. SANJIVANI NON FERROUS TRADING PVT. LTD. Respondent(s)
Date : 10.12.2018   This matter  was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. B.Krishna Prasad, Adv.
                       
For Respondent(s) Mr. Chirag M.Shroff, Adv.
         Ms. Neha Sangwan, Adv.
Ms. Mahima C.Shroff, Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K.Sikri pronounced the
judgment   of   the   Bench   comprising   His   Lordship   and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.Abdul Nazeer.
The   appeals   are   dismissed     in   terms   of   the
signed reportable judgment.
Pending   applications,   if   any,   shall   stand
disposed of.
(Shashi Sareen)
AR­cum­PS
(Rajinder Kaur)
Branch Officer
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

Wednesday, December 12, 2018

when the death sentence awarded to the appellant can be converted into a sentence of imprisonment for life ? We are also of opinion that all the courts including this Court overlooked consideration of the probability of reform or rehabilitation and social reintegration of the appellant into society. There is no meaningful discussion on why, if at all, the appellant could not be reformed or rehabilitated.In Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan13 an opinion was expressed in paragraph 76 of the Report that since the appellant therein had been languishing on death row for more than six years that would be a mitigating circumstance in his favour - the death sentence awarded to the appellant is converted into a sentence of imprisonment for life.



Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan Bhimarao Lokur
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 1 of 19
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITON (CRL.) NO.245 OF 2010
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 811 OF 2009
M.A. Antony @ Antappan …Petitioner
 versus
State of Kerala ….Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The broad allegations against the appellant have been stated in the
decision of this Court in the criminal appeal out of which the present
Review Petition arises. It would be more convenient to reproduce the
allegations from the decision:
“On the intervening night of 6th and 7th January, 2001,
when inmates of Aluva Municipal Town of Ernakulam
District in the State of Kerala were in deep sleep,
Manjooran House located in the midst of the town
became a scene of ghastly crime. Six members of one
family in the Manjooran House lost their lives in a matter
of three hours, Antony @ Antappan, the appellant herein,
in search of greener pastures abroad for which purpose
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 2 of 19
he needed money but was refused to be paid by the
members of the Manjooran family, and therefore as per
the prosecution’s version used knife, axe, and
electrocuted and strangulated Kochurani and Clara at
about 10 in the night of 6.1.2001 and Augustine, his wife
Mary, and their children – Divya and Jesmon at midnight.
The Manjooran House full of life at 10 in the night by the
stroke of midnight became a graveyard. The appellant
after causing the death of Kochurani and Clara is said to
have waited for the arrival of other four members of the
family who had gone to see a film show. On their arrival
he turned them into corpses. He waited for their arrival
to kill them as he knew that for the two murders
committed earlier by him he would be suspected by them,
as he was in the house when they left the house for the
film show. The prosecution alleges that all these murders
were cold blooded, planned and executed with precision
and the appellant ensured that there is no trace of life left
in them before he left the scene of occurrence. When put
to trial for murders, appellant, however, pleaded
innocence and claimed trial.”
2. After trial, the Sessions Court in Ernakulam in Kerala in Sessions
Case No.154 of 2004 found the appellant guilty of the offences and
convicted him by judgment and order dated 31st January, 2005. It appears
that submissions on the question whether the appellant should be awarded
life sentence or death sentence were addressed on the same day or
immediately thereafter since on 2nd February, 2005 the Trial Judge
sentenced the appellant “to be hanged by the neck till he is dead”.
3. The Trial Judge stated, while awarding the sentence of death, as
follows:
“231. The cruel tendency of the accused was writ large even
in the manner of attack. His conduct and behaviour is
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 3 of 19
repulsive to the collective conscience of the society. It is clear
that he does not value the lives of others in the least. The fact
that the murders in this case were committed in such a
deliberate and diabolic manner even beyond the slight
expectation of the victims, without any provocation
whatsoever from the side of the victims that too having
enjoyed the hospitality and kindness of the victims, indicate
the cold blooded and premeditated approach of the accused to
put to death the victims which included two innocent children
in their earlier teenages also, for a sordid purpose.
232. It was clearly come out that his wife and child are not
residing with the accused. He does not know even the school
at which his wife is working as teacher. Even according to
him, she has not cared to come to reside with him after the
incident in this case. In fact, all my searches for extenuating
circumstances in this case are in vain. From various judicial
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on
the subject, it has come out that in the choice of sentence the
court has to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors
available on the facts of the case to find out whether special
reasons do exist to categories [categorize] the case as one
among the “rarest of rare cases”.
233. The accused is a hardened criminal beyond any
correction and rehabilitation. In this case the culpability has
assumed the preparation of extreme depravity. The accused
is a preferred example of blood thirsty, irreclaimable and
hardened criminal. This court is of the view that, to spare such
a criminal from the gallows is to render the justicing system
suspect and to have recourse to the lesser alternative in
sentencing this accused will be a mockery of justice. As this
incident had sent tremors in the society and the collective
conscience of the community as such was shocked, it is not to
be humane but to be callous to allow such a criminal to return
to the society. When multiple murders are committed in the
most cruel, inhuman, extreme, brutal, gruesome, diabolic,
revolting and dastardly manner, this court cannot wriggle out
of the infliction of the extreme penalty. Matters being so,
special reasons do exist in this case under Section 354(3) Cr.
P.C. and this case comes within the category of “rarest of rare
case” in which the “lesser alternative is unquestionably
foreclosed.”
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 4 of 19
4. The conviction and sentence came up for confirmation before the
High Court of Kerala in Death Sentence Reference No.5 of 2005. The
appellant was also aggrieved by his conviction and sentence and he
preferred Criminal Appeal No.385 of 2005 against the judgment and
sentence of the Trial Court.
5. By a judgment and order dated 18th September, 2006 the High Court
confirmed the death sentence and dismissed the appeal of the appellant.
6. On the award of the death sentence, the High Court took the view
that the crime committed by the appellant was most cruel and diabolical.
It was observed that he had no respect, no care, no dignity, no mercy for
human life and his living in this world is most dangerous to society. The
High Court expressed its views on the sentence to be awarded to the
appellant in paragraph 49 of the judgement. This reads as follows:
“49. On the question of sentence all that has been urged
before us by Mr. Ramakumar is that the present is not a ‘rarest
of rare’ case where the appellant should be given capital
punishment. No arguments have been raised to show any
mitigating circumstances. We have reconsidered and yet
reconsidered every aspect of the case. On every
reconsideration, our view gets more and more strengthened
that in the present case, death penalty has to be imposed. It is
indeed a rarest of rare case. In this country of seers and sages,
even a worm unconsciously trampled under the foot is
considered to be a sin. Guided and motivated by tradition of
non-violence, people in this country do not even think of
physically harming anyone. Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of
the Nation and many other stalwarts brought freedom to this
Nation from the British Empire by fighting a bloodless war of
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 5 of 19
independence. The appellant has trampled these lofty ideals
and traditions of this country under his foot. He extinguished
all members of a family in a most cruel and gruesome manner.
He became instrumental in causing black and unmitigated
tragedy and caused shudders to the society. In causing death
of six members of a family, he acted in a most cruel and
diabolical manner. He used every possible instrument in the
house to cause their death. As the confession goes if knives
would not be enough to kill the inmates, he would use
furniture in the house to strike them, and if that be not enough
he would axe them, and even if that be not enough he would
electrocute them and if still not enough he would strangulate
them. In cruelty and brutality, he exceeded all limits. It is
unimaginable, unthinkable and difficult to believe that after
causing six murders by splashing blood all around the house,
he would sit in the same house for almost five hours as if he
was not siting amongst six dead people, but amongst trophies
won by him in a prestigious event. He has no respect, no care,
no dignity, no mercy for human life. His living in this world
is most dangerous to the society. We need not refer to various
judicial precedents as every case has its own facts, but would
hasten to make reference to only one case which appears
nearest on facts of the present case. In Dayanidhi Bisoi v.
State of Orissa, 2003 Crl.L.J. 3697 (SC), a case which was
based upon circumstantial evidence, accused was related to
the deceased. He was enjoying hospitality and kindness of
deceased in the evening. He killed entire family of deceased
which included a three years child in the night. Murders were
committed when the victims were sleeping and there was no
provocation from the victims. The motive was only to gain
financial benefits. The Supreme Court found it to be case of
cold blooded murder with premeditated approach of accused.
It was held to be a rarest of rare case. The accused was
sentenced to death.”
7. Feeling aggrieved by his conviction and confirmation of the death
sentence, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 811 of 2009 in this
Court which was dismissed by a judgment and order dated 22nd April,
2009. This Court did not at all advert to or discuss the quantum of sentence
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 6 of 19
awarded to the appellant. This was decided on its facts and dismissed.
8. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal, the appellant
preferred Review Petition (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 but that was dismissed by
an order dated 13th April, 2010.
9. In view of the decision of this Court in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v.
The Registrar Supreme Court of India & others1
the said review petition
was re-opened for consideration and that is how it is before us.
Submissions
10. Learned counsel for the appellant raised a variety of grounds for
commuting the death sentence awarded to the appellant into one of life
sentence. It was contended that the case was one of circumstantial
evidence and therefore the sentence of death should not be awarded. It
was also contended that this Court as well the High Court and the Trial
Court failed to consider the probability of reformation of the appellant. It
was also contended that the prior history and criminal antecedents of the
appellant were not relevant in awarding the sentence. It was submitted that
the Trial Judge had erroneously described the appellant as a hardened
criminal. In fact, we find that learned counsel for the appellant is correct in
this submission since there is absolutely nothing on record to show that the
appellant had previously committed any crime whatsoever. Indeed, there

1
(2014) 9 SCC 737
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 7 of 19
is nothing on record to even suggest that the appellant was a hardened
criminal.
11. We do not propose to deal with the submissions advanced by learned
counsel since similar submissions were raised before us in Rajendra
Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra in which we have delivered
judgment today. The cases cited by learned counsel for the appellant in
this petition as well as in Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik were the same and
we would only be duplicating our efforts and repeating what we have
already said.
12. Apart from the above submissions, it was contended by learned
counsel for the appellant that the socio-economic circumstances relating to
the appellant are relevant for an objective consideration of the award of
sentence and these have not been considered by any court including this
Court.
13. It was submitted that the “collective conscience of the society” and
reference to it for the purposes of imposition of a sentence is totally
misplaced. It is not possible to determine public opinion through evidence
recorded in a trial for an offence of murder and it is even more difficult, if
not impossible, to determine something as amorphous as the collective
conscience of the society.
14. Finally, it was submitted that the appellant has been in custody for a
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 8 of 19
considerable period of time and that by itself is a good ground for
commutation of his sentence from death to life imprisonment. In this
context, it was stated that the appellant was arrested on 18th February, 2001.
He remained in custody until he was granted bail on 25th January, 2002.
He was again arrested when the Trial Court convicted him on 31st January,
2005 and since then he is continuously in custody having spent about 14
years in custody and about three years on bail.
Consideration of socio-economic factors
15. There is no doubt that the socio-economic factors relating to a
convict should be taken into consideration for the purposes of deciding
whether to award life sentence or death sentence. One of the reasons for
this is the perception (perhaps misplaced) that it is only convicts belonging
to the poor and disadvantaged sections of society that are awarded capital
sentence while others are not. Although Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab2
does not allude to socio-economic factors for being taken into
consideration as one of the mitigating factors in favour of a convict, the
development of the law in the country, particularly through the Supreme
Court, has introduced this as one of the factors to be taken into
consideration. In fact, in Bachan Singh this Court recognised that a range
of factors exist and could be taken into consideration and accepted this

2
(1980) 2 SCC 684
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 9 of 19
position. In paragraph 209 of the Report it is rather felicitously stated as
follows:
“209. There are numerous other circumstances justifying the
passing of the lighter sentence; as there are countervailing
circumstances of aggravation. “We cannot obviously feed into a
judicial computer all such situations since they are astrological
imponderables in an imperfect and undulating society.”
Nonetheless, it cannot be over-emphasised that the scope and
concept of mitigating factors in the area of death penalty must
receive a liberal and expansive construction by the courts in
accord with the sentencing policy writ large in Section 354(3).
Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging of murderers
has never been too good for them.3 Facts and Figures, albeit
incomplete, furnished by the Union of India, show that in the past,
courts have inflicted the extreme penalty with extreme infrequency
— a fact which attests to the caution and compassion which they
have always brought to bear on the exercise of their sentencing
discretion in so grave a matter. It is, therefore, imperative to voice
the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guide-lines
indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore
scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the highroad
of legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that for persons
convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death
sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity
of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's
instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare
cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”
(Emphasis supplied by us).
16. Following the view laid down by the Constitution Bench of this
Court, we endorse and accept that socio-economic factors must be taken
into consideration while awarding a sentence particularly the ground
realities relating to access to justice and remedies to justice that are not
easily available to the poor and the needy.

3 We may add that hanging of murderers has never been too good for them either!
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 10 of 19
17. The consideration of socio-economic factors is tied up with another
important issue (which need not necessarily or always be taken into
consideration for sentencing purposes, but could be relevant in a given
case) and that is whether the convict has had adequate legal representation.
Several accused persons belonging to the weaker sections of society cannot
afford defence counsel and they are obliged to turn to the National Legal
Services Authority, the State Legal Services Authority or the District Legal
Services Committee for legal representation. While these authorities
provide the best legal assistance possible at their command, it sometimes
falls short of expectations resulting in the conviction of an accused and,
depending upon the facts of the case and the sentencing process followed,
a sentence of death follows.
18. That the poor are more often than not at the receiving end in access
to justice and access to the remedies available is evident from a fairly recent
report prepared by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee4 which
acknowledges, through Project Sahyog, enormous delays in attending to
cases of the poor and the needy. Quality legal aid to the disadvantaged and
weaker sections of society is an area that requires great and urgent attention
and we hope that a vigorous beginning is made in this direction in the new
year.

4 Website of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee – www.sclsc.nic.in
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 11 of 19
19. Reverting to the issue of socio-economic factors, we are not sure
when this was introduced as a mitigating factor for consideration in
deciding whether life imprisonment or death sentence should be awarded.
Be that as it may, the earliest decision to which our attention was drawn is
State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony5
in which this Court cautioned against being
overwhelmed by the gravity or brutality of the offence. As held in Bachan
Singh, it is not only the crime that is of importance in the sentencing
process but it is also the criminal. With this in view, this Court considered
the plight of the have-not and commuted the death sentence into one of
imprisonment for life. This is what this Court said in paragraph 23 of the
Report:
“23. The last question is what sentence should be imposed upon
the respondent. The learned Sessions Judge has imposed
maximum penalty that could be imposed under the law, namely,
sentence of death. The murder of near and dear ones including two
innocent kids is gruesome. We must however be careful lest the
shocking nature of crime may induce an instinctive reaction to
the dispassionate analysis of the evidence both as to offence
and the sentence. One circumstance that stands out in favour of
the respondent for not awarding capital punishment is that the
respondent did not commit murder of his near and dear ones
actuated by any lust, sense of vengeance or for gain. The plight of
an economic have-not sometimes becomes so tragic that the
only escape route is crime. The respondent committed murder
because in his utter helplessness he could not find few chips to
help his ailing wife and he saw the escape route by putting an
end to their lives. This one circumstance is of such an
overwhelming character that even though the crime is detestable
we would refrain from imposing capital punishment. The

5
(1985) 1 SCC 505
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 12 of 19
respondent should accordingly be sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for life.” (Emphasis supplied by us).
20. In Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat6
this Court
considered the socio-economic condition of the appellant therein, namely
that he was a migrant labourer and was living in impecunious
circumstances and therefore it could not be said that he would be a menace
to society in future. The sentence of death was converted into one of
imprisonment for life. This is what this Court said in paragraph 13 of the
Report:
“…..The appellant was aged 36 years at the time of the occurrence
and there is no evidence that the appellant had been involved in
any other criminal case previously and the appellant was a migrant
labourer from U.P. and was living in impecunious circumstances
and it cannot be said that he would be a menace to society in future
and no materials are placed before us to draw such a conclusion.
We do not think that the death penalty was warranted in this
case…...”
21. Similarly, in Sushil Kumar v. State of Punjab7
the poverty of the
convict was taken into consideration as a factor for sentencing. This Court
in paragraph 46 of the Report held as follows:
“Extreme poverty had driven the appellant to commit the
gruesome murder of three of his very near and dear family
members – his wife, minor son and daughter. There is nothing on
record to show that appellant is a habitual offender. He appears to
be a peace-loving, law abiding citizen but as he was povertystricken, he thought in his wisdom to completely eliminate his
family so that all problems would come to an end. Precisely, this
appears to be the reason for him to consume some poisonous
substances, after committing the offence of murder.” (Emphasis
supplied by us).

6
(2005) 3 SCC 127
7
(2009) 10 SCC 434
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 13 of 19
22. In Mulla v. State of Uttar Pradesh8
this Court specifically noted in
paragraph 80 of the Report that one of the factors that appears to have been
left out in judicial decision-making on the issue of sentencing, is the socioeconomic factor which is a mitigating factor although it may not dilute the
guilt of the convict. This is what this Court held:
“80. Another factor which unfortunately has been left out in
much judicial decision-making in sentencing is the socioeconomic factors leading to crime. We at no stage suggest that
economic depravity justify moral depravity, but we certainly
recognise that in the real world, such factors may lead a person
to crime. The 48th Report of the Law Commission also reflected
this concern. Therefore, we believe, socio-economic factors
might not dilute guilt, but they may amount to mitigating
circumstances. Socio-economic factors lead us to another related
mitigating factor i.e. the ability of the guilty to reform. It may not
be misplaced to note that a criminal who commits crimes due to
his economic backwardness is most likely to reform. This Court
on many previous occasions has held that this ability to reform
amounts to a mitigating factor in cases of death penalty.”
(Emphasis supplied by us).
23. In Kamleshwar Paswan v. Union Territory of Chandigarh9
this
Court noted the fact that the convict was a rickshaw puller and a migrant
with psychological and economic pressures. The socio-economic condition
of the convict was therefore taken into consideration for the purposes of
sentencing him. It was held in paragraph 8 of the Report as follows:

8
(2010) 3 SCC 508
9
(2011) 11 SCC 564
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 14 of 19
“8. We cannot also ignore the fact that the appellant was a
rickshaw-puller and a migrant in Chandigarh with the
attendant psychological and economic pressures that so often
overtake and overwhelm such persons. Village Kishangarh is a
part of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and at a stone's throw
from its elite sectors that house the Governors of Punjab and
Haryana, the Golf Club, and some of the city's most important and
opulent citizens. It goes without saying that most such
neighbourhoods are often the most unfriendly and indifferent to
each others' needs. Little wonder his frustrations apparently came
to the fore leading to the horrendous incident.” (Emphasis supplied
by us).
24. Finally, in Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra10 it
was noted that the convicts were living in acute poverty. However, their
conduct in jail was heartening inasmuch as they had educated themselves
and has shown that if given a second chance, they could live a meaningful
and constructive life. This Court noted as follows:
“38. At the same time, all the four accused were young in age at
the time of commission of the offence i.e. 23-29 years. They
belong to the economically, socially and educationally deprived
section of the population. They were living in acute poverty. It
is possible that, being young, they had a yearning for quick money
and it is these circumstances that had led to the commission of the
crimes in question. Materials have been laid before this Court to
show that while in custody all the accused had enrolled
themselves in Yashwantrao Chavan Maharashtra Open
University and had either completed the BA examination or
are on the verge of acquiring the degree…….. There is no
material or information to show any condemnable or reprehensible
conduct on the part of any of the appellants during their period of
custody. All the circumstances point to the possibility of the
appellant-accused being reformed and living a meaningful and
constructive life if they are to be given a second chance…….”
(Emphasis supplied by us).

10 (2014) 4 SCC 292
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 15 of 19
25. There is, therefore, enough case law to suggest that socio-economic
factors concerning a convict must be taken into consideration while taking
a decision on whether to award a sentence of death or to award a sentence
of imprisonment for life.
26. On the facts of the present case, we find from the decision of the
Trial Court that the convict was working as a driver on a casual basis. He
was desirous of obtaining employment in the Gulf and was making all
attempts in this direction. He managed to arrange a visa but had to pay the
agent Rs.62,000/-. Due to severe financial constraints he could only
arrange Rs.25,000/- for making the initial payment. He continued making
attempts to raise the amount. His economic condition was so severe that
for the purposes of going to Gulf he had to proceed from Ernakulam to
Mumbai by train and while he could manage to purchase the ticket, he was
unable to pay for reservation charges. Under these circumstances, he had
gone to the house of the deceased family for getting money or by stealing
it or by grabbing it by any other means. It is under this financial and
economic stress that his presence in the house of the deceased family was
explained. But unfortunately for him and the deceased family, he was
unable to obtain any funds from them and this led to his decision to kill all
of them.
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 16 of 19
Public opinion or collective conscience of the society
27. With regard to the second submission made by learned counsel for
the appellant, that is, relating to the collective conscience of the society or
public opinion, we draw attention to an extremely educative discussion on
the topic in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra11 in paragraphs 80 to 89 of the Report. We do not find the
necessity of repeating the enlightening discussion. We may only note that
in this decision, reference was made with regard to this topic in Bachan
Singh in paragraph 126 of the Report to the following effect:
“126. Incidentally, the rejection by the people of the approach,
adopted by the two learned Judges in Furman12, furnishes proof of
the fact that judicial opinion does not necessarily reflect the moral
attitudes of the people. At the same time, it is a reminder that
Judges should not take upon themselves the responsibility of
becoming oracles or spokesmen of public opinion: Not being
representatives of the people, if is often better, as a matter of
judicial restraint, to leave the function of assessing public
opinion to the chosen representatives of the people in the
legislature concerned.” (Emphasis supplied by us).
In our opinion therefore, the learned Trial Judge was in error in coming to
the conclusion that the collective conscience of the society was disturbed
and felt repulsed by the gravity of the crime committed by the appellant.
In view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Bachan Singh
and in Bariyar it would be wise if impressions gathered on what is
perceived to be public opinion or collective conscience of the society are

11 (2009) 6 SCC 498
12 Furman v. Georgia, 33 L Ed 2d 346 : 408 US 238 (1972)
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 17 of 19
eschewed while sentencing a convict found guilty of a grave or brutal
crime. On the facts of the present case, we find that there was no material
whatsoever to come to the conclusion that the gravity of the crime caused
revulsion in the society or that it had materially disturbed normal life in the
society. Consequently, the view expressed by the learned Trial Judge in
this regard must be disregarded for the purposes of imposing an appropriate
sentence on the appellant.
Conclusion
28. On an overall consideration of the facts of the case from the point of
view of the crime and the criminal, we are of opinion that even though the
case may be one of circumstantial evidence, it is now well settled that that
by itself is not enough to convert a sentence of death into a sentence of
imprisonment for life. We have held so in Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik
and do not feel the necessity of repeating what has already been said.
29. We are also of opinion that all the courts including this Court
overlooked consideration of the probability of reform or rehabilitation and
social reintegration of the appellant into society. There is no meaningful
discussion on why, if at all, the appellant could not be reformed or
rehabilitated.
30. The Trial Court was in error proceeding on the basis, while awarding
a sentence of death to the appellant by observing that he was a hardened
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 18 of 19
criminal. There is no such evidence on material or on record.
31. The socio-economic condition of the appellant was a significant
factor that ought to have been taken into consideration by the Trial Court
as well the High Court while considering the punishment to be given to the
appellant. While the socio-economic condition of a convict is not a factor
for disproving his guilt, it is a factor that must be taken into consideration
for the purposes of awarding an appropriate sentence to a convict.
32. We do not think it necessary to consider on the facts of this case, the
period of incarceration of the appellant as a factor for deciding whether or
not he should be awarded the death sentence. This is a factor that ought to
have been placed before the Trial Judge and while we could certainly take
this into consideration, we hesitate to do so in view of some uncertainty in
this regard. In Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan13 an opinion was expressed
in paragraph 76 of the Report that since the appellant therein had been
languishing on death row for more than six years that would be a mitigating
circumstance in his favour. There are a number of cases where convicts
have been on death row for more than six years and if a standard period
was to be adopted, perhaps each and every person on death row might have
to be given the benefit of commutation of death sentence to one of life
imprisonment. The long delays in courts must, of course, be taken into

13 (2011) 3 SCC 685
R.P. (Crl.) No.245 of 2010 in Crl. Appeal No. 811 of 2009 Page 19 of 19
account, but what is needed is a systemic and systematic reform in criminal
justice delivery rather than ad hoc or judge-centric decisions.
33. In view of the above discussion, the death sentence awarded to the
appellant is converted into a sentence of imprisonment for life.
34. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.
 ………………………J.
 (Madan B. Lokur)

 ………………………J.
 (S. Abdul Nazeer)
 New Delhi; .……………………..J.
 December 12, 2018 (Deepak Gupta)

Whether the order of High Court refused to transfer winding up proceedings pending before it to the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), and has set aside an order dated 13.04.2018 of the NCLT by which order a financial creditor’s petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Insolvency Code” or “Code”) has been admitted.? The Respondent No. 1 company had become a non-performing asset - the BIFR was of the prima facie opinion that the company ought to be wound up, which opinion was forwarded to the High Court.-The High Court ultimately registered the case as Company Petition No. 19/2009 -The Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. (Respondent No. 3) acquired substantially all the financial debts of Respondent No. 1.-in a writ petition filed by a workers’ union, being Writ Petition No. 504/2000, the High Court, directed the Official Liquidator to be provisionally attached to the Court, and to join in the evaluation of the value of goods and material lying in the factory premises of the company so that dues of the workmen could be paid -the Respondent No. 3 herein preferred an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency Code, - the NCLT - admitted the same. - a moratorium was declared in terms of Section 14 of the Code and an interim resolution professional was appointed.-the High Court, refused to transfer the winding up proceedings pending before it, and set aside the NCLT order dated 13.04.2018, stating that it had been passed without jurisdiction - Apex court held that It is clear that Respondent No. 3 has filed a Section 7 application under the Code is an independent proceeding which has nothing to do with the transfer of pending winding up proceedings before the High Court. It was open for Respondent No. 3 at any time before a winding up order is passed to apply under Section 7 of the Code. This is clear from a reading of Section 7 together with Section 238 of the Code - if there is any inconsistency between Section 434 as substituted and the provisions of the Code, the latter must prevail - the NCLT was absolutely correct in applying Section 238 of the Code to an independent proceeding instituted by a secured financial creditor, namely, the Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. - High Court could not have held that the proceedings before the NCLT were without jurisdiction. - the High Court judgment has to be set aside. The NCLT proceedings will now continue from the stage at which they have been left off. Obviously, the company petition pending before the High Court cannot be proceeded with further in view of Section 238 of the Code. The writ petitions that are pending before the High Court have also to be disposed of in light of the fact that proceedings under the Code must run their entire course. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman

Image result for Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mukeshkumar Rasikbhai Shah
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mukeshkumar Rasikbhai Shah

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12023 OF 2018
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO.18598 OF 2018]
JAIPUR METALS & ELECTRICALS
EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION
THROUGH GENERAL SECRETARY
MR. TEJ RAM MEENA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
JAIPUR METALS & ELECTRICALS LTD.
THROUGH ITS
MANAGING DIRECTOR & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been filed by an employees’
union challenging the judgment of the High Court of Judicature
for Rajasthan dated 01.06.2018, in which the High Court has
refused to transfer winding up proceedings pending before it to
1
the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), and has set
aside an order dated 13.04.2018 of the NCLT by which order a
financial creditor’s petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Insolvency Code” or “Code”)
has been admitted.
3. This case has had a chequered history. On 30.09.1997,
the account of the Respondent No. 1 company had become a
non-performing asset, and since the company’s net worth had
turned negative, a reference was made to the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (“BIFR”) under the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (“SIC
Act”). On 26.09.2002, the BIFR was of the prima facie opinion
that the company ought to be wound up, which opinion was
forwarded to the High Court. The High Court ultimately
registered the case as Company Petition No. 19/2009. The
Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. (Respondent
No. 3) acquired substantially all the financial debts of
Respondent No. 1. The State of Rajasthan tried to revive the
company, but with no success. Ultimately, in a writ petition filed
2
by a workers’ union, being Writ Petition No. 504/2000, the High
Court, on 07.12.2017, directed the Official Liquidator to be
provisionally attached to the Court, and to join in the evaluation
of the value of goods and material lying in the factory premises
of the company so that dues of the workmen could be paid.
4. In the meanwhile, on 11.01.2018, the Respondent No. 3
herein preferred an application under Section 7 of the
Insolvency Code, stating that it had an assigned debt of INR
356 crores owed to it by the Respondent No. 1. Considering the
fact that the debt was admitted by the company and that till
date no liquidation order had been passed in the winding up
proceedings that were pending before the High Court, the NCLT
held, referring to the non-obstante clause contained in Section
238 of the Insolvency Code, that it was satisfied that the
conditions of Section 7 had been fulfilled and that, therefore,
the application should be admitted. Accordingly, a moratorium
was declared in terms of Section 14 of the Code and an interim
resolution professional was appointed.
3
5. Meanwhile, in Company Petition No. 19/2009 and other
connected matters, being various writ petitions that were filed
by labour unions, the High Court, by an interim order dated
26.04.2018, stayed implementation of the order passed by the
NCLT on 13.04.2018. Against this order, a Special Leave
Petition (“SLP”) was preferred in which this Court, on
09.05.2018, dismissed the SLP as withdrawn and directed the
petitioner to make submissions before the High Court in the
pending company petition and allied matters. The High Court
then passed the impugned judgment dated 01.06.2018, in
which it refused to transfer the winding up proceedings pending
before it, and set aside the NCLT order dated 13.04.2018,
stating that it had been passed without jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the writ petitions and the company petition were placed for
further orders on 05.07.2018. On 16.07.2018, this Court issued
notice and stayed the operation of the impugned judgment.
6. Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Advocate, appearing
on behalf of the appellant, and Shri P. Chidambaram, learned
Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3,
4
have argued that a perusal of the Eleventh Schedule of the
Code and amendments made to the Companies Act, 2013,
particularly to Section 434 therein, would show that all winding
up proceedings pending before the High Court are to stand
transferred to the NCLT at such stage as may be prescribed by
the Central Government by rules made in this behalf. They then
referred to Rule 5 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending
Proceedings) Rules, 2016 (“2016 Transfer Rules”), and in
particular, to Rule 5(2) thereof. They then argued that as Rule
5(2) was not continued on and after 29.06.2017, it would be
clear that winding up of companies that are initiated under the
SIC Act cannot, after such omission, be continued to be dealt
with by the High Court. According to them, the High Court
judgment was incorrect as Rule 5, and not Rule 6, of the 2016
Transfer Rules applied. Post omission of Rule 5(2), therefore,
proceedings would in any case stand transferred to the NCLT.
Alternatively, they argued that in any case, the 2018
amendment made to Section 434(1)(c) added a proviso, by
which any party to any winding up proceedings that are pending
before a High Court may file an application for transfer of such
5
proceedings, and the Court is then obliged to transfer such
proceedings to the NCLT. They also argued that in any case, a
Section 7 application made by Respondent No. 3 before the
NCLT was an independent application which was correctly
admitted by the NCLT, which correctly applied Section 238 of
the Insolvency Code.
7. Shri Siddharth Dave, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of Respondents No. 4 and 5, supported the judgment of the
High Court. According to the learned counsel, even if Rule 5 of
the 2016 Transfer Rules were to apply, Rule 5(2) made it clear
that the present proceedings would continue before the High
Court, being proceedings for winding up of a company pursuant
to Section 20 of the SIC Act. The omission of this Rule in the
amendment made to Rule 5 on 29.06.2017 would not impact
the High Court continuing to deal with this matter as the SIC Act
had been repealed with effect from 01.12.2016, and together
with the repeal, it was necessary to state that proceedings for
winding up that were initiated under Section 20 of the SIC Act
would continue to be dealt with by the High Court. Once this
6
was stated to be so, when the amendment was made to Rule 5,
it became unnecessary to continue with the said provision as all
such proceedings are to continue to be dealt with by the High
Court on and from the date of repeal of the SIC Act. Equally,
according to the learned counsel, Section 238 of the Code has
no application as it is a non-obstante clause which interdicts a
clash between the Insolvency Code and other statutes.
Inasmuch as the amendments to Section 434 of the Companies
Act, 2013 have been made pursuant to the Eleventh Schedule
of the Insolvency Code itself, Section 238 would have no
application, and, therefore, the winding up proceedings pending
before the High Court would have to reach their logical
conclusion. This being so, the High Court judgment is correct.
8. Having heard learned counsel for all parties, we first need
to deal with a preliminary objection raised by Shri Siddharth
Dave. According to the learned counsel, an appeal against the
judgment dated 01.06.2018 has been filed by Respondent No.
3, and since this appeal is still pending, we should not entertain
an SLP filed at the behest of an employees’ union which is in
7
cahoots with Respondent No. 3. Ordinarily, we would have
relegated the appellant to the Division Bench, but since the
questions raised are of importance generally, it is better that an
authoritative decision be given at the earliest. It is for this
reason that we have entertained this SLP directly against the
order of a single Judge. Shri Luthra has also pointed out that it
is incorrect to say that the client that he represents is a
derecognized or unrecognized union in cahoots with
Respondent No. 3, and has pointed out a certificate of
registration of the said union. Be that as it may, since this SLP
raises important questions of law which need to be decided at
the earliest, we have disregarded this preliminary objection.
9. Section 255 of the Insolvency Code reads as follows:
“255. Amendments of Act 18 of 2013.—The
Companies Act, 2013 shall be amended in the
manner specified in the Eleventh Schedule.”
In pursuance of this Section, the Eleventh Schedule to the
Code makes various amendments to the Companies Act, 2013.
On 15.11.2016, with effect from 01.12.2016, Section 434 of the
Companies Act, 2013 was substituted as follows:
8
“434. Transfer of certain pending
proceedings.—(1) On such date as may be
notified by the Central Government in this
behalf,—
(a) all matters, proceedings or cases
pending before the Board of Company
Law Administration (herein in this
section referred to as the Company
Law Board) constituted under subsection (1) of Section 10-E of the
Companies Act, 1956, immediately
before such date shall stand
transferred to the Tribunal and the
Tribunal shall dispose of such matters,
proceedings or cases in accordance
with the provisions of this Act;
(b) any person aggrieved by any
decision or order of the Company Law
Board made before such date may file
an appeal to the High Court within
sixty days from the date of
communication of the decision or
order of the Company Law Board to
him on any question of law arising out
of such order:
Provided that the High Court may if
it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from
filing an appeal within the said period,
allow it to be filed within a further
period not exceeding sixty days; and
(c) all proceedings under the
Companies Act, 1956, including
proceedings relating to arbitration,
compromise, arrangements and
reconstruction and winding up of
companies, pending immediately
9
before such date before any District
Court or High Court, shall stand
transferred to the Tribunal and the
Tribunal may proceed to deal with
such proceedings from the stage
before their transfer:
Provided that only such
proceedings relating to the winding up
of companies shall be transferred to
the Tribunal that are at a stage as may
be prescribed by the Central
Government:
(2) The Central Government may make rules
consistent with the provisions of this Act to
ensure timely transfer of all matters,
proceedings or cases pending before the
Company Law Board or the courts, to the
Tribunal under this section.”
On and from 17.08.2018, by an amendment made to the
Eleventh Schedule of the Code, Section 434 was substituted as
follows:
“434. Transfer of certain pending
proceedings.—(1) On such date as may be
notified by the Central Government in this
behalf,—
(a) all matters, proceedings or cases
pending before the Board of
Company Law Administration
(herein in this section referred to as
the Company Law Board)
constituted under sub-section (1) of
Section 10-E of the Companies Act,
1956, immediately before such date
10
shall stand transferred to the
Tribunal and the Tribunal shall
dispose of such matters,
proceedings or cases in accordance
with the provisions of this Act; (b) any person aggrieved by any
decision or order of the Company
Law Board made before such date
may file an appeal to the High Court
within sixty days from the date of
communication of the decision or
order of the Company Law Board to
him on any question of law arising
out of such order:
Provided that the High Court
may if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from filing an appeal
within the said period, allow it to be
filed within a further period not
exceeding sixty days; and (c) all proceedings under the
Companies Act, 1956, including
proceedings relating to arbitration,
compromise, arrangements and
reconstruction and winding up of
companies, pending immediately
before such date before any District
Court or High Court, shall stand
transferred to the Tribunal and the
Tribunal may proceed to deal with
such proceedings from the stage
before their transfer:
Provided that only such
proceedings relating to the winding
up of companies shall be transferred
to the Tribunal that are at a stage as
11
may be prescribed by the Central
Government:
Provided further that only such
proceedings relating to cases other
than winding up, for which orders for
allowing or otherwise of the
proceedings are not reserved by the
High Courts shall be transferred to
the Tribunal:
Provided also that— (i) all proceedings under the
Companies Act, 1956 other than
the cases relating to winding up
of companies that are reserved
for orders for allowing or
otherwise such proceedings; or (ii) the proceedings relating to
winding up of companies which
have not been transferred from
the High Courts;
shall be dealt with in accordance
with provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956 and the Companies
(Court) Rules, 1959:]
Provided also that proceedings
relating to cases of voluntary
winding up of a company where
notice of the resolution by
advertisement has been given under
sub-section (1) of Section 485 of the
Companies Act, 1956 but the
company has not been dissolved
before the 1st April, 2017 shall
continue to be dealt with in
accordance with provisions of the
12
Companies Act, 1956 and the
Companies (Court) Rules, 1959:
Provided further that any party or
parties to any proceedings relating
to the winding up of companies
pending before any Court
immediately before the
commencement of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2018, may file an
application for transfer of such
proceedings and the Court may by
order transfer such proceedings to
the Tribunal and the proceedings so
transferred shall be dealt with by the
Tribunal as an application for
initiation of corporate insolvency
resolution process under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 (31 of 2016).
(2) The Central Government may make rules
consistent with the provisions of this Act to
ensure timely transfer of all matters,
proceedings or cases pending before the
Company Law Board or the courts, to the
Tribunal under this section.”
10. On 07.12.2016, in exercise of powers under Section 434
of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Section 239 of the
Insolvency Code, the Companies (Transfer of Pending
Proceedings) Rules, 2016, came into force with effect from
01.04.2017. What is of relevance for decision in the present
13
case is Rules 5 and 6 of the 2016 Rules, which are set out as
follows:
“5. Transfer of pending proceedings of
Winding up on the ground of inability to pay
debts.—(1) All petitions relating to winding up
under clause (e) of Section 433 of the Act on
the ground of inability to pay its debts pending
before a High Court, and where the petition has
not been served on the respondent as required
under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules,
1959 shall be transferred to the Bench of the
Tribunal established under sub-section (4) of
Section 419 of the Act, exercising territorial
jurisdiction and such petitions shall be treated
as applications under Sections 7, 8 or 9 of the
Code, as the case may be, and dealt with in
accordance with Part II of the Code:
Provided that the petitioner shall submit all
information, other than information forming part
of the records transferred in accordance with
Rule 7, required for admission of the petition
under Sections 7, 8 or 9 of the Code, as the
case may be, including details of the proposed
insolvency professional to the Tribunal within
sixty days from date of this notification, failing
which the petition shall abate.
(2) All cases where opinion has been forwarded
by Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction, for winding up of a company to
a High Court and where no appeal is pending,
the proceedings for winding up initiated under
the Act, pursuant to Section 20 of the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,
1985 shall continue to be dealt with by such
14
High Court in accordance with the provisions of
the Act.
6. Transfer of pending proceedings of
winding up matters on the grounds other
than inability to pay debts.—All petitions filed
under clauses (a) and (f) of Section 433 of the
Companies Act, 1956 pending before a High
Court and where the petition has not been
served on the respondent as required under
Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959
shall be transferred to the Bench of the Tribunal
exercising territorial jurisdiction and such
petitions shall be treated as petitions under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of
2013).”
11. By an amendment dated 29.06.2017, Rule 5 was then
substituted as follows:
“5. Transfer of pending proceedings of
Winding up on the ground of inability to pay
debts.—(1) All petitions relating to winding up
under clause (e) of Section 433 of the Act on
the ground of inability to pay its debts pending
before a High Court, and where the petition has
not been served on the respondent under Rule
26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 shall
be transferred to the Bench of the Tribunal
established under sub-section (4) of Section
419 of the Companies Act, 2013 exercising
territorial jurisdiction and such petitions shall be
treated as applications under Sections 7, 8 or 9
of the Code, as the case may be, and dealt with
in accordance with Part II of the Code:
Provided that the petitioner shall submit all
information, other than information forming part
15
of the records transferred in accordance with
Rule 7, required for admission of the petition
under Sections 7, 8 or 9 of the Code, as the
case may be, including details of the proposed
insolvency professional to the Tribunal upto 15th
day of July, 2017, failing which the petition shall
stand abated:
Provided further that any party or parties to
the petition shall, after the 15th day of July,
2017, be eligible to file fresh applications under
Sections 7 or 8 or 9 of the Code, as the case
may be, in accordance with the provisions of
the Code:
Provided also that where a petition relating
to winding up of a company is not transferred to
the Tribunal under this Rule and remains in the
High Court and where there is another petition
under clause (e) of Section 433 of the Act for
winding up against the same company pending
as on 15th December, 2016, such other petition
shall not be transferred to the Tribunal, even if
the petition has not been served on the
respondent.”
12. It is clear that under Section 434 as substituted by the
Eleventh Schedule to the Code vide notification dated
15.11.2016, all proceedings under the Companies Act, 2013
which relate to winding up of companies and which are pending
immediately before such date as may be notified by the Central
Government in this behalf shall stand transferred to the NCLT.
The stage at which such proceedings are to be transferred to
16
the NCLT is such as may be prescribed by the Central
Government.
13. When Rules 5 and 6 of the 2016 Transfer Rules (unamended) are read, it is clear that three types of proceedings
are referred to. Under Rule 5(1), petitions which relate to
winding up under clause (e) of Section 433 of the Companies
Act, 1956 on the ground of inability to pay debts that are
pending before the High Court are to be transferred to the
NCLT in case the petition has not been served on the
respondent. They shall then be treated as applications under
Sections 7, 8, or 9 of the Code and dealt with in accordance
with Part II of the Code. Similarly, all petitions filed under
clauses (a) and (f) of Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956
pending before the High Court, in which the petition has not
been served on the respondents, shall be transferred to the
NCLT. Only such petitions will continue to be treated as
petitions under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. The
third category of cases dealt with by Rules 5 and 6 is contained
in Rule 5(2). This category relates to cases where the BIFR has
17
forwarded an opinion to the High Court to wind up a company
under Section 20 of the SIC Act. All such cases, whatever be
the stage, shall continue to be dealt with by the High Court in
accordance with the provisions of the SIC Act.
14. It is clear that the present case relates to Rule 5(2) alone.
Despite the fact that Section 20 of the SIC Act speaks of a
company being wound up under the Companies Act, 1956
under the just and equitable provision, which is Section 433(f)
of the Companies Act, 1956, yet, since cases that fall under
Section 20 of the SIC Act are dealt with separately under Rule
5(2), they cannot be treated as petitions that have been filed
under Section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956, which are
separately specified under Rule 6. The High Court is therefore
not correct in treating petitions that are pursuant to Section 20
of the SIC Act as being pursuant to Section 433(f) of the
Companies Act, 1956 and applying Rule 6 of the 2016 Transfer
Rules.
15. However, though the language of Rule 5(2) is plain
enough, it has been argued before us that Rule 5 was
18
substituted on 29.06.2017, as a result of which, Rule 5(2) has
been omitted. The effect of the omission of Rule 5(2) is not to
automatically transfer all cases under Section 20 of the SIC Act
to the NCLT, as otherwise, a specific rule would have to be
framed transferring such cases to the NCLT, as has been done
in Rule 5(1). The real reason for omission of Rule 5(2) in the
substituted Rule 5 is because it is necessary to state, only
once, on the repeal of the SIC Act, that proceedings under
Section 20 of the SIC Act shall continue to be dealt with by the
High Court. It was unnecessary to continue Rule 5(2) even after
29.06.2017 as on 15.12.2016, all pending cases under Section
20 of the SIC Act were to continue to be dealt with by the High
Court before which such cases were pending. Since there could
be no opinion by the BIFR under Section 20 of the SIC Act after
01.12.2016, when the SIC Act was repealed, it was
unnecessary to continue Rule 5(2) as, on 15.12.2016, all
pending proceedings under Section 20 of the SIC Act were to
continue with the High Court and would continue even
thereafter. This is further made clear by the amendment to
Section 434(1)(c), with effect from 17.08.2018, where any party
19
to a winding up proceeding pending before a Court immediately
before this date may file an application for transfer of such
proceedings, and the Court, at that stage, may, by order,
transfer such proceedings to the NCLT. The proceedings so
transferred would then be dealt with by the NCLT as an
application for initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution
process under the Code. It is thus clear that under the scheme
of Section 434 (as amended) and Rule 5 of the 2016 Transfer
Rules, all proceedings under Section 20 of the SIC Act pending
before the High Court are to continue as such until a party files
an application before the High Court for transfer of such
proceedings post 17.08.2018. Once this is done, the High Court
must transfer such proceedings to the NCLT which will then
deal with such proceedings as an application for initiation of the
corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code.
16. The High Court judgment, therefore, though incorrect in
applying Rule 6 of the 2016 Transfer Rules, can still be
supported on this aspect with a reference to Rule 5(2) read with
20
Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013, as amended, with
effect from 17.08.2018.
17. However, this does not end the matter. It is clear that
Respondent No. 3 has filed a Section 7 application under the
Code on 11.01.2018, on which an order has been passed
admitting such application by the NCLT on 13.04.2018. This
proceeding is an independent proceeding which has nothing to
do with the transfer of pending winding up proceedings before
the High Court. It was open for Respondent No. 3 at any time
before a winding up order is passed to apply under Section 7 of
the Code. This is clear from a reading of Section 7 together with
Section 238 of the Code which reads as follows:
“238. Provisions of this Code to override
other laws.—The provisions of this Code shall
have effect, notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other
law for the time being in force or any instrument
having effect by virtue of any such law.”
18. Shri Dave’s ingenious argument that since Section 434 of
the Companies Act, 2013 is amended by the Eleventh Schedule
of the Code, the amended Section 434 must be read as being
part of the Code and not the Companies Act, 2013, must be
21
rejected for the reason that though Section 434 of the
Companies Act, 2013 is substituted by the Eleventh Schedule
of the Code, yet Section 434, as substituted, appears only in
the Companies Act, 2013 and is part and parcel of that Act. This
being so, if there is any inconsistency between Section 434 as
substituted and the provisions of the Code, the latter must
prevail. We are of the view that the NCLT was absolutely
correct in applying Section 238 of the Code to an independent
proceeding instituted by a secured financial creditor, namely,
the Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. This being
the case, it is difficult to comprehend how the High Court could
have held that the proceedings before the NCLT were without
jurisdiction. On this score, therefore, the High Court judgment
has to be set aside. The NCLT proceedings will now continue
from the stage at which they have been left off. Obviously, the
company petition pending before the High Court cannot be
proceeded with further in view of Section 238 of the Code. The
writ petitions that are pending before the High Court have also
to be disposed of in light of the fact that proceedings under the
22
Code must run their entire course. We, therefore, allow the
appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment.
…………………………..J.
(R.F. NARIMAN)
…………………………..J.
(M.R. SHAH)
New Delhi;
December 12, 2018.
23

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

Whether the eviction proceedings under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupation) Act, 1971 by Estate Officer - the appellants­ Government of India Company is maintainable ? Apex court held No - confirmed the order of High court - We, therefore, do not express any opinion on the issues raised by the appellants in their written submissions and accordingly grant liberty to them to file a Civil Suit in the competent Court of jurisdiction against the respondents for their eviction in relation to the suit properties and raise all such pleas in the suit on merits. We, however, make it clear that the respondents will not be allowed to raise a plea that the suit is barred by limitation. Let the suit be filed within 6 months by the appellants against the respondents so as to enable the Civil Court to decide the same on merits in accordance with law.




Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

  NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4487 OF 2009
Western Coalfields Ltd. & Anr.   .. Appellant(s)
Versus
M/s Ballapur Collieries Company
& Ors.  .. Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No.4488 OF 2009
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. These appeals are filed against the common
final judgment and order dated 22.01.2007 passed
1
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, Nagpur in Civil Revision Application Nos.
801 & 803 of 2002 whereby the High Court allowed
the revision petitions filed by respondent Nos.1­8
herein.
2. The proceedings in question which are subject
matter of these appeals arise out of initiation  of
eviction proceedings by the appellants­ Government
of India Company against the respondents under
the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized   Occupation)   Act,   1971   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “the   Act”)   in   relation   to   the   suit
property.
3. By   impugned   order,   the   High   Court   in   the
revision petitions filed by respondent Nos.1­8 herein
under Section 9 of the Act against the order of the
District Judge   allowed the revision petitions and
held that having regard to the nature of controversy
2
and   factual   issues   raised   by   the   parties   against
each other in the eviction proceedings, the proper
remedy of the appellants would be to file a civil suit
against the respondents for their eviction from the
suit properties rather than to take recourse to the
summary remedy of eviction under the Act before
the Estate Officer. 
4. The appellants felt aggrieved by the said order
and have filed these appeals by way of special leave
in this Court.
5. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case and
the written submissions filed by the appellants, we
are inclined to agree with the observations made by
the High Court in the impugned order.
6. In our opinion, keeping in view the nature of
the factual controversy raised by the parties before
the   Estate   Officer,   the   proper   remedy   of   the
3
appellants   would   be   to   file   civil   suit   against   the
respondents   for   their   eviction   from   the   suit
properties under the general law rather than to take
recourse   to   the   summary   remedy   of   eviction
provided under the Act.
7. We, therefore, do not express any opinion on
the issues raised by the appellants in their written
submissions and accordingly grant liberty to them
to   file   a   Civil   Suit   in   the   competent   Court   of
jurisdiction   against   the   respondents   for   their
eviction in relation to the suit properties and raise
all such pleas in the suit on merits. 
8. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   the
respondents will not be allowed to raise a plea that
the suit is barred by limitation.  
9. Let the suit be filed within 6 months by the
appellants against the respondents so as to enable
4
the  Civil  Court to  decide the same on  merits in
accordance with law.
10. With   these   observations,   the   appeals   are
accordingly disposed of.
 
………………………………..J
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
            …..………………………………J.
     (INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi,
December 11, 2018

5