LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

Unfortunately, in our society, the victim of a sexual offence, especially a victim of rape, is treated worse than the perpetrator of the crime. The victim is innocent. She has been subjected to forcible sexual abuse. However, for no fault of the victim, society instead of empathizing with the victim, starts treating her as an ‘untouchable’. A victim of rape is treated like a “pariah” and ostracised from society. Many times, even her family refuses to accept her back into their fold. The harsh reality is that many times cases of rape do not even get reported because of the false notions of so called ‘honour’ which the family of the victim wants to uphold. Apex court issued the following directions:- 1. No person can print or publish in print, electronic, social media, etc. the name of the victim or even in a remote manner disclose any facts which can lead to the victim being identified and which should make her identity known to the public at large. 2. In cases where the victim is dead or of unsound mind the name of the victim or her identity should not be disclosed even under the authorization of the next of the kin, unless circumstances justifying the disclosure of her identity exist, which shall be decided by the competent authority, which at present is the Sessions Judge. 3. FIRs relating to offences under Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or 376E of IPC and offences under POCSO shall not be put in the public domain. 4. In case a victim files an appeal under Section 372 CrPC, it is not necessary for the victim to disclose his/her identity and the appeal shall be dealt with in the manner laid down by law. 5. The police officials should keep all the documents in which the name of the victim is disclosed, as far as possible, in a sealed cover and replace these documents by identical documents in which the name of the victim is removed in all records which may be scrutinised in the public domain. 6. All the authorities to which the name of the victim is disclosed by the investigating agency or the court are also duty bound to keep the name and identity of the victim secret and not disclose it in any manner except in the report which should only be sent in a sealed cover to the investigating agency or the court. 7. An application by the next of kin to authorise disclosure of identity of a dead victim or of a victim of unsound mind under Section 228A(2)(c) of IPC should be made only to the Sessions Judge concerned until the Government acts under Section 228A(1)(c) and lays down a criteria as per our directions for identifying such social welfare institutions or organisations. 8. In case of minor victims under POCSO, disclosure of their identity can only be permitted by the Special Court, if such disclosure is in the interest of the child. 9. All the States/Union Territories are requested to set up at least one ‘one stop centre’ in every district within one year from today like ' BHAROSA" in Hyd.



Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Madan Bhimarao Lokur


1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL/CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 565 OF 2012
NIPUN SAXENA & ANR. …PETITIONER(S)
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2013
W.P. (C) No. 22 of 2013
W.P. (C) No. 148 of 2013
SLP (CRL.).......CRLMP. No.16041/2014
W.P. (C) No. 568 of 2012
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta, J.
1. How and in what manner the identity of adult victims of
rape and children who are victims of sexual abuse should be
protected so that they are not subjected to unnecessary ridicule,
2
social ostracisation and harassment, is one of the issues which
arises in these cases.
2. We are dividing this judgment into two parts. The first part
deals with the victims of the offence of rape under the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and the second part deals with
victims who are subjected to offences under the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short ‘POCSO’).
3. In this judgment any reference to “media” will include all
types of media including press, electronic and social media etc..
Ist Part
4. Unfortunately, in our society, the victim of a sexual offence,
especially a victim of rape, is treated worse than the perpetrator
of the crime. The victim is innocent. She has been subjected to
forcible sexual abuse. However, for no fault of the victim, society
instead of empathizing with the victim, starts treating her as an
‘untouchable’. A victim of rape is treated like a “pariah” and
ostracised from society. Many times, even her family refuses to
accept her back into their fold. The harsh reality is that many
times cases of rape do not even get reported because of the false 
3
notions of so called ‘honour’ which the family of the victim wants
to uphold. The matter does not end here. Even after a case is
lodged and FIR recorded, the police, more often than not,
question the victim like an accused. If the victim is a young girl
who has been dating and going around with a boy, she is asked
in intimidating terms as to why she was dating a boy. The
victim’s first brush with justice is an unpleasant one where she is
made to feel that she is at fault; she is the cause of the crime.
5. If the victim is strong enough to deal with the
recriminations and insinuations made against her by the police,
she normally does not find much succour even in court. In Court
the victim is subjected to a harsh cross-examination wherein a
lot of questions are raised about the victim’s morals and
character. The Presiding Judges sometimes sit like mute
spectators and normally do not prevent the defence from asking
such defamatory and unnecessary questions. We want to make
it clear that we do not, in any manner, want to curtail the right of
the defence to cross-examine the prosecutrix, but the same
should be done with a certain level of decency and respect to
women at large. Over a period of time, lot of effort has been
4
made to sensitise the courts, but experience has shown that
despite the earliest admonitions, the first as far back as in 19961,
the Courts even today reveal the identity of the victim.
6. Section 228A was introduced in the IPC vide Amendment
Act No. 43 of 1983 with effect from 25.12.1983 and reads as
follows:
“228A. Disclosure of identity of the victim of
certain offences etc.-
(1) Whoever prints or publishes the name or any
matter which may make known the identity of any
person against whom an offence under section 376,
section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section
376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB or
section 376E is alleged or found to have been
committed (hereafter in this section referred to as the
victim) shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years
and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing
or publication of the name or any matter which may
make known the identity of the victim if such printing
or publication is-
(a) by or under the order in writing of the officerin-charge of the police station or the police
officer making the investigation into such
offence acting in good faith for the purposes of
such investigation; or
(b) by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the
victim; or
(c) where the victim is dead or minor or of

1
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384
5
unsound mind, by, or with the authorisation in
writing of, the next of kin of the victim:
Provided that no such authorisation shall be given by
the next of kin to anybody other than the chairman or
the secretary, by whatever name called, of any
recognised welfare institution or organisation.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section,
"recognised welfare institution or organisation" means
a social welfare institution or organisation recognised
in this behalf by the Central or State Government.
(3) Whoever prints or publishes any matter in relation
to any proceeding before a court with respect to an
offence referred to in sub-section (1) without the
previous permission of such Court shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years and shall also be liable
to fine.
Explanation.-The printing or publication of the
judgment of any High Court or the Supreme Court
does not amount to an offence within the meaning of
this section.”
7. We may also refer to Section 327 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’) which provides that Courts
should be open and normally public should have access to the
Courts. Sub-section (2) of Section 327 was inserted by the same
Amendment Act No.43 of 1983. Section 327, as amended, reads
as follows:-
“Section 327. Court to be open.-
(1) The place in which any criminal Court is held for
the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence
shall be deemed to be an open Court to which the
public generally may have access, so far as the same
6
can conveniently contain them:
Provided that the presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if
he thinks fit, order at any stage of any inquiry into, or
trial of, any particular case, that the public generally,
or any particular person, shall not have access to, or
be or remain in, the room or building used by the
Court.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), the inquiry into and trial of rape or an offence
under section 376, section 376A, section 376AB,
section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section
376DA, section 376DB or section 376E of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be conducted in camera:
Provided that the presiding Judge may, if he thinks fit,
or on an application made by either of the parties,
allow any particular person to have access to, or be or
remain in, the room or building used by the Court:
Provided further that in camera trial shall be
conducted as far as practicable by a woman Judge or
Magistrate.
(3) Where any proceedings are held under sub-section
(2), it shall not be lawful for any person to print or
publish any matter in relation to any such
proceedings, except with the previous permission of
the Court:
Provided that the ban on printing or publication of
trial proceedings in relation to an offence of rape may
be lifted, subject to maintaining confidentiality of
name and address of the parties.”
8. Vide the Amendment Act of 1983 cases of rape, gang rape
etc. were excluded from the category of cases to be tried in open
Court. Later other similar offences were included vide
Amendment Act of 2013.
7
9. Sub-section (1) of Section 228A, provides that any person
who makes known the name and identity of a person who is an
alleged victim of an offence falling under Sections 376, 376A,
376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or 376E commits a
criminal offence and shall be punishable for a term which may
extend to two years.
10. What is however, permitted under sub-section (2) of Section
228A IPC is making known the identity of the victim by printing
or publication under certain circumstances described therein.
Any person, who publishes any matter in relation to the
proceedings before a Court with respect to such an offence,
without the permission of the Court, commits an offence. The
Explanation however provides that printing or publication of the
judgment of the High Courts or the Supreme Court will not
amount to any offence within the meaning of the IPC.
11. Neither the IPC nor the CrPC define the phrase ‘identity of
any person’. Section 228A IPC clearly prohibits the printing or
8
publishing “the name or any matter which may make known the
identity of the person”. It is obvious that not only the publication
of the name of the victim is prohibited but also the disclosure of
any other matter which may make known the identity of such
victim. We are clearly of the view that the phrase “matter which
may make known the identity of the person” does not solely mean
that only the name of the victim should not be disclosed but it
also means that the identity of the victim should not be
discernible from any matter published in the media. The
intention of the law makers was that the victim of such offences
should not be identifiable so that they do not face any hostile
discrimination or harassment in the future.
12. A victim of rape will face hostile discrimination and social
ostracisation in society. Such victim will find it difficult to get a
job, will find it difficult to get married and will also find it difficult
to get integrated in society like a normal human being. Our
criminal jurisprudence does not provide for an adequate witness
protection programme and, therefore, the need is much greater to
protect the victim and hide her identity. In this regard, we may
make reference to some ways and means where the identity is
9
disclosed without naming the victim. In one case, which made
the headlines recently, though the name of the victim was not
given, it was stated that she had topped the State Board
Examination and the name of the State was given. It would not
require rocket science to find out and establish her identity. In
another instance, footage is shown on the electronic media where
the face of the victim is blurred but the faces of her relatives, her
neighbours, the name of the village etc. is clearly visible. This
also amounts to disclosing the identity of the victim. We,
therefore, hold that no person can print or publish the name of
the victim or disclose any facts which can lead to the victim being
identified and which should make her identity known to the
public at large.
13. Sub-section (2) of Section 228A IPC makes an exception for
police officials who may have to record the true identity of the
victim in the police station or in the investigation file. We are not
oblivious to the fact that in the first information report (for short
‘FIR’) the name of the victim will have to be disclosed. However,
this should not be made public and especially not to the media.
We are of the opinion that the police officers investigating such
10
cases and offences should also as far as possible either use a
pseudonym to describe the victim unless it is absolutely
necessary to write down her identity. We make it clear that the
copy of an FIR relating to the offence of rape against a women or
offences against children falling within the purview of POCSO
shall not be put in the public domain to prevent the name and
identity of the victim from being disclosed. The Sessions
Judge/Magistrate/Special Court can for reasons to be recorded
in writing and keeping in view the interest of the victim permit
the copy of the FIR to be given to some person(s). Some examples
of matters where her identity will have to be disclosed are when
samples are taken from her body, when medical examination is
conducted, when DNA profiling is done, when the date of birth of
the victim has to be established by getting records from school
etc.. However, in these cases also the police officers should move
with circumspection and disclose as little of the identity of the
victim as possible but enough to link the victim with the
information sought. We make it clear that the authorities to
which the name is disclosed when such samples are sent, are
also duty bound to keep the name and identity of the victim
secret and not disclose it in any manner except in the report
11
which should only be sent in a sealed cover to the investigating
agency or the court. There can be no hard and fast rule in this
behalf but the police should definitely ensure that the
correspondence or memos exchanged or issued wherein the name
of the victim is disclosed are kept in a sealed cover and are not
disclosed to the public at large. They should not be disclosed to
the media and they shall also not be furnished to any person
under the Right to Information Act, 2015. We direct that the
police officials should keep all the documents in which the name
of the victim is disclosed in a sealed cover and replace these
documents by identical documents in which the name of the
victim is removed in all records which may be scrutinised by a
large number of people. The sealed cover can be filed in the court
along with the report filed under Section 173 CrPC.
14. As far as clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 228A IPC is
concerned, if an adult victim has no objection to her name being
published or identity being disclosed, she can obviously authorize
any person in writing to disclose her name. This has to be a
voluntary and conscious act of the victim. There are some
victims who are strong enough and willing to face society even
12
after their names are disclosed. Some of them, in fact, help other
victims of rape and they become a source of inspiration to other
rape victims. Nobody can have any objection to the victim
disclosing her name as long as the victim is a major.
15. Coming to clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 228A IPC,
we are of the opinion that where the victim is a minor, Section
228A will no longer apply because of the enactment of POCSO
which deals specifically with minors. In fact, the words ‘or minor’
should for all intents and purposes be deemed to be deleted from
clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 228A IPC.
16. The vexatious issue which troubles us is with regard to the
next of kin of the victim giving an authority to the Chairman or
the Secretary of recognized welfare institutions or organizations
to declare the name. As per the materials placed before us till
date neither the Central Government nor any State Government
has recognized any such social welfare institutions or
organizations to whom the next of kin should give the
authorization.
13
17. Before dealing with this technical aspect as to whom the
authorisation is to be given, we feel that a word of caution is
needed with regard to the right of the next of the kin of the
victim. A person of unsound mind is as much a citizen of the
country as a sane person. A person of unsound mind who is also
subjected to such a heinous sexual offence suffers a trauma
which is unimaginable. The issue for consideration is – in what
circumstances the next of kin should be permitted to authorize
the naming and identification of the victim? It was urged before
us that in certain matters the name of the victim should be
permitted to be disclosed or published because the name and
face of the victim can then become a rallying point to prevent
other such sexual offences. The victim becomes a symbol of
protest or is treated as an iconic figure. We are not at all
impressed with this argument. Should the person who is dead or
who is of unsound mind be permitted to become a symbol if such
person herself might not want to be a rallying point? We are also
of the considered view that it is not at all necessary to disclose
the identity of the victim to arouse public opinion and sentiment.
This is a serious issue dealing with victims of heinous sexual
14
offences and needs to be dealt with sensitivity. Furthermore, all
of us are fully aware that without disclosing her true identity
‘Nirbhaya’ became the most effective symbol of protest the
country has ever known. If a campaign has to be started to
protect the rights of the victim and mobilise public opinion it can
be done so without disclosing her identity.
18. We may also add that in this modern age where we have
dealt with cases where daughters have been raped by their
fathers, where victims of rape especially minor victims are very
often subjected to this heinous crime either by family members or
friends of the family, it is not unimaginable that the so called
next of kin may for extraneous reasons including taking money
from a media house or a publishing firm which wants to publish
a book, disclose the name of the victim. We do not, in any
manner, want to comment upon the role of the parents but we
cannot permit even one case of this type and in the larger interest
we feel that, as a matter of course, the name of the victim or her
identity should not be disclosed even under the authorization of
the next of the kin, without permission of the competent
authority.
15
19. It has been urged on behalf of the Union of India that the
words “next of kin” will have to be given the same definition as is
contemplated under the Indian Succession Act, 1925. We do not
want to enter into this dispute. As pointed by us, in certain
cases, the interest of the next of kin may not be the same as the
interest of the victim. In such circumstances, the applicant may
not be the next of kin, but the “next friend” of the child, who may
be entitled to move such an application. It will be for the Court
or the competent authority to decide who is the “next friend”.
20. As pointed out above, neither the Central Government nor
any State Government has recognized any such welfare
institution or organization. No guidelines have been laid down in
the IPC as to what will be the nature of such organisation and
what will be the qualifications of the persons who are made the
Chairman or Secretary of such organisation. These matters
cannot be left indeterminate.
16
21. There may be cases where the identity of the victim, if not
her name, may have to be disclosed. There may be cases where a
dead-body of a victim is found. It is established that the victim
was subjected to rape. It may not be possible to identify the
victim. Then, obviously her photograph will have to be published
in the media. Even here, we would direct that while this may be
done, the fact that such victim has been subjected to a sexual
offence need not be disclosed. There may be other situations
where the next of kin may be justified in disclosing the identify of
the victim. If any such need should arise, then we direct that an
application to authorise disclosure of identity should be made
only to the Sessions Judge/magistrate concerned and the said
Sessions Judge/magistrate shall decide the application on the
basis of the law laid down by us. We are exercising power under
Article 142 of the Constitution in this regard because the
Government has not identified any social or welfare
institution/organisation and the law as laid down cannot be
administered. We direct that if the Government wants to actually
act under Section 228A (2) (c) IPC, it must before identifying such
social welfare institution or organisation clearly lay down some
rules or clear cut criteria in this regard. What should be the
17
nature of the organisation? How should the application be
made? In what manner that application should be dealt with?. A
clear cut procedure must be laid down. Till that is done, our
directions shall prevail.
22. As far as sub-section (3) of Section 228A IPC is concerned,
we would like to make it clear that the IPC clearly lays down that
nobody can print or publish any matter in relation to any
proceedings falling within the purview of Section 228A and in
terms of Section 327(2) CrPC. These are in camera proceedings
and nobody except the presiding officer, the court staff, the
accused, his counsel, the public prosecutor, the victim, if at all
she wants to be present or the witness shall be there. It is the
bounden duty of all of them to ensure that what happens in court
is not disclosed outside. This is not to say that there can be no
reporting of such cases. The press can report that the case was
fixed before Court and some witnesses were examined. It can
report for what purpose the case was listed but it cannot report
what transpired inside the court or what was the statement of the
victim or the witnesses. The evidence cannot be disclosed. We
are not elaborating and dealing with the issue of publication in
18
press in greater detail since this issue is engaging our attention
in Nivedita Jha’s case2 but it is clear that nobody can be
permitted to violate Section 327(3) CrPC, the language of which is
very clear and unambiguous.
23. Sub-section (3) of Section 228A IPC makes printing or
publication of any matter in relation to such proceedings before a
court an offence unless its publication is made with the previous
permission of such court.
24. This Court, more than two decades back in Gurmit Singh’s
case (supra) raised a note of caution. It found that sexual crimes
against women were rising. This court held that victims of sexual
abuse or assault were treated without any sensitivity during the
course of investigation and trial. The Court further held that trial
of rape cases in camera should be the rule and open trial an
exception. Though the Court did not refer to Section 228A IPC,
the following observations are pertinent:
“21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape
in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that

2 Nivedita Jha v. State of Bihar, SLP(C) No. 24978 of 2018
19
while we are celebrating woman’s rights in all spheres,
we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad
reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society
towards the violation of human dignity of the victims
of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not
only violates the victim’s privacy and personal
integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological
as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not
merely a physical assault — it is often destructive of
the whole personality of the victim. A murderer
destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist
degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The
courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while
trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal
with such cases with utmost sensitivity……
22. There has been lately, lot of criticism of the
treatment of the victims of sexual assault in the court
during their cross-examination. The provisions of
Evidence Act regarding relevancy of facts
notwithstanding, some defence counsel adopt the
strategy of continual questioning of the prosecutrix as
to the details of the rape. The victim is required to
repeat again and again the details of the rape incident
not so much as to bring out the facts on record or to
test her credibility but to test her story for
inconsistencies with a view to attempt to twist the
interpretation of events given by her so as to make
them appear inconsistent with her allegations. The
court, therefore, should not sit as a silent spectator
while the victim of crime is being cross-examined by
the defence. It must effectively control the recording of
evidence in the court. While every latitude should be
given to the accused to test the veracity of the
prosecutrix and the credibility of her version through
cross-examination, the court must also ensure that
cross-examination is not made a means of harassment
or causing humiliation to the victim of crime. A victim
of rape, it must be remembered, has already
undergone a traumatic experience and if she is made
to repeat again and again, in unfamiliar surroundings
what she had been subjected to, she may be too
ashamed and even nervous or confused to speak and
her silence or a confused stray sentence may be
20
wrongly interpreted as “discrepancies and
contradictions” in her evidence.”
Dealing with Section 327 CrPC this Court held as follows:-
24……..It would enable the victim of crime to be a little
comfortable and answer the questions with greater
ease in not too familiar a surroundings. Trial in
camera would not only be in keeping with the selfrespect of the victim of crime and in tune with the
legislative intent but is also likely to improve the
quality of the evidence of a prosecutrix because she
would not be so hesitant or bashful to depose frankly
as she may be in an open court, under the gaze of
public. The improved quality of her evidence would
assist the courts in arriving at the truth and sifting
truth from falsehood…………..The courts should, as far
as possible, avoid disclosing the name of the
prosecutrix in their orders to save further
embarrassment to the victim of sex crime. The
anonymity of the victim of the crime must be
maintained as far as possible throughout. In the
present case, the trial court has repeatedly used the
name of the victim in its order under appeal, when it
could have just referred to her as the prosecutrix. We
need say no more on this aspect and hope that the
trial courts would take recourse to the provisions of
Sections 327(2) and (3) CrPC liberally. Trial of rape
cases in camera should be the rule and an open trial in
such cases an exception.”
25. Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh3 is one
of first cases where specific reference was made to Section 228A
IPC. This Court held as follows:-
“2. We do not propose to mention the name of the

3
(2003) 8 SCC 551
21
victim. Section 228-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short “IPC”) makes disclosure of the identity of
victims of certain offences punishable. Printing or
publishing the name or any matter which may make
known the identity of any person against whom an
offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or
376-D is alleged or found to have been committed can
be punished. True it is, the restriction does not relate
to printing or publication of judgment by the High
Court or the Supreme Court. But keeping in view the
social object of preventing social victimization or
ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for which
Section 228-A has been enacted, it would be
appropriate that in the judgments, be it of a High
Court or a lower court, the name of the victim should
not be indicated. We have chosen to describe her as
“victim” in the judgment.”
This Court held that the bar imposed under Section 228A
IPC did not in term apply to the printing or publication of
judgments of the High Courts and the Supreme Court because of
the Explanation to Section 228A. However, keeping in view the
social object of preventing the victims or ostracising of victims, it
would be appropriate that in judgments of all the courts i.e. trial
courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court the name of the
victim should not be indicated. This has been repeated in a large
number of cases and we need not refer to all.
22
26. The Kerala High Court in the case of Aju Varghese v. State
of Kerala4 held as follows:-
“8. The statutory provision as explained by the
Supreme Court clearly shows that the provision was
specifically intended to ensure that the victim is not
exposed to further agony by the consequent social
victimization or ostracism pursuant to disclosure of
her identity. It is clear that, it is intended to protect
her from psychological and sociological torture or
mental agony, that may follow the unfortunate
incident of sexual violence. Society has a duty to
support the victims of sexual violence and to ensure
that they come back to normalcy and start leading a
normal life. Victims of such violence are not denuded
of their fundamental right to privacy and are liable to
be insulated against unnecessary public comments.
Definitely, it serves an avowed social purpose and has
an element of public interest involved in it. Section is
so clear, unambiguous and the consequence of breach
of it is inescapable and the question whether the
disclosure was intended, bonafide or without
knowledge of law has not relevance. Hence, the
provision of section 228A IPC prohibiting the
disclosure of the name by an accused is absolute and
cannot be diluted.”
27. Before parting with this aspect, we would like to deal with a
situation not envisaged by the law makers. As we have held
above, Section 228A IPC imposes a clear cut bar on the name or
identity of the victim being disclosed. What happens if the
accused is acquitted and the victim of the offence wants to file an
appeal under Section 372 CrPC? Is she bound to disclose her

4 Crl. MC No.5247 of 2017 decided on 27.09.2018
23
name in the memo of appeal? We are clearly of the view that
such a victim can move an application to the Court praying that
she may be permitted to file a petition under a pseudonymous
name e.g. ‘X’ or ‘Y’ or any other such coded identity that she may
choose. However, she may not be permitted to give some other
name which may indirectly harm another person. There may be
certain documents in which her name will have to be disclosed;
e.g., the power of attorney and affidavit(s) which may have to be
filed as per the Rules of the Court. The Court should normally
allow such applicant to file the petition/appeal in a
pseudonymous name. Where a victim files an appeal we direct
that such victim can file such an appeal by showing her name as
‘X’ or ‘Y’ along with an application for non-disclosure of the name
of the victim. In a sealed envelope to be filed with the appeal she
can enclose the document(s), in which she can reveal her identity
as required by the Rules of the appellate court. The Court can
verify the details but in the material which is placed in the public
domain the name of the victim shall not be disclosed. Such an
application should be heard by the Court in Chambers and the
name should not be reflected even in the cause-list till such
24
matter is decided. Any documents disclosing the name and
identity of the victim should not be in the public domain.
IInd Part
28. In this part of the judgment we shall deal with the issues
which relate to non-disclosure of the name and identity of a
victim falling within the purview of the POCSO. At the outset, we
may note that the reasons which we have given in Ist Part of the
judgment dealing with the adult victims, apply with even greater
force to minor victims.
29. A minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be
protected even more than a major victim because a major victim
being an adult may still be able to withstand the social
ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a
minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against
minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator
of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close
friend. Efforts are made to hush up the crime. It is now
recognised that a child needs extra protection. India is a
25
signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Child, 1989 and Parliament thought it fit to enact POCSO in the
year 2012, which specifically deals with sexual offences against
all children. The Act is gender neutral and whatever we say in
this Part will apply to all children.
30. Chapter VI of POCSO deals with procedure relating to
recording the statement of a child. Section 24 deals with the
statement recorded by the police. For our purpose sub-section
(5) of Section 24 is relevant which reads as follows:
“Section 24 - Recording of statement of a child.-
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(5) The police officer shall ensure that the identity of
the child is protected from the public media, unless
otherwise directed by the Special Court in the interest
of the child.”
Section 25 POCSO states that statements of the child
recorded under Section 164 CrPC which permits an advocate to
be present will not be applicable in the case of children. Trials
under POCSO are conducted by the Special Court which is
26
expected to be child friendly and specifically provides that the
Special Court shall not permit aggressive questioning or
character assassination of the child. Sub-section (7) of Section
33 which is relevant reads as follows:
“Section 33 - Procedure and powers of Special
Court.-
xxx xxx xxx
(7) The Special Court shall ensure that the identity of
the child is not disclosed at any time during the course
of investigation or trial:
Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the
Special Court may permit such disclosure, if in its
opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, the
identity of the child shall include the identity of the
child's family, school, relatives, neighbourhood or any
other information by which the identity of the child
may be revealed.”
Section 37 provides that all trials under POCSO are to be
conducted in camera unless otherwise specifically decided for
reasons to be recorded by the Special Court. A bare reading of
Section 24(5) and Section 33(7) makes it amply clear that the
name and identity of the child is not to be disclosed at any time
during the course of investigation or trial and the identity of the
child is protected from the public or media. Furthermore,
27
Section 37 provides that the trial is to be conducted in camera
which means that the media cannot be present. The entire
purpose of the POCSO is to ensure that the identity of the child is
not disclosed unless the Special Court for reasons to be recorded
in writing permits such disclosure. This disclosure can only be
made if it is in the interest of the child and not otherwise. One
such case where disclosure of the identity of the child may be
necessary can be where a child is found who has been subjected
to a sexual offence and the identity of the child cannot be
established even by the investigating team. In such a case, the
Investigating Officer or the Special Court may allow the
photograph of the child to be published to establish the identity.
It is absolutely clear that the disclosure of the identity can be
permitted by the Special Court only when the same is in the
interest of the child and in no other circumstances. We are of the
view that the disclosure of the name of the child to make the
child a symbol of protest cannot normally be treated to be in the
interest of the child.
31. It is contended by the learned amicus curiae that interest of
the child has not been defined. We are of the view that it is
28
neither feasible nor would it be advisable to clearly lay down
what is the meaning of the phrase “interest of the child”. We
have, however, given some examples hereinabove and we do not
want to tie down the hands of the Special Court, who may have
to deal with such cases. Each case will have to be dealt within
its own factual scenario.
Section 23 of POCSO contains provisions which relate to
procedure for media. It reads as follows:
“Section 23 - Procedure for media.-
(1) No person shall make any report or present
comments on any child from any form of media or
studio or photographic facilities without having
complete and authentic information, which may have
the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon
his privacy.
(2) No reports in any media shall disclose, the identity
of a child including his name, address, photograph,
family details, school, neighbourhood or any other
particulars which may lead to disclosure of identity of
the child:
Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the
Special Court, competent to try the case under the Act,
may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion such
disclosure is in the interest of the child.
(3) The publisher or owner of the media or studio or
photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally
liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.
29
(4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
period which shall not be less than six months but
which may extend to one year or with fine or with
both.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 23 prohibits any person from
filing any report or making any comments on any child in any
form, be it written, photographic or graphic without first having
complete and authentic information. No person or media can
make any comments which may have the effect of lowering the
reputation of the child or infringing upon the privacy of the child.
Sub-section (2) of Section 23 clearly lays down that no report in
any media shall disclose identity of a child including name,
address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or
any other particulars which may lead to the disclosure of the
identity of the child. This clearly shows that the intention of the
legislature was that the identity of the child should not be
disclosed directly or indirectly. The phrase ‘any other particulars’
will have to be given the widest amplitude and cannot be read
only ejusdem generis. The intention of the legislature is that the
privacy and reputation of the child is not harmed. Therefore, any
information which may lead to the disclosure of the identity of
30
the child cannot be revealed by the media. The media has to be
not only circumspect but a duty has been cast upon the media to
ensure that it does nothing and gives no information which could
directly or indirectly lead to the identity of the child being
disclosed.
32. No doubt, it is the duty of the media to report every crime
which is committed. The media can do this without disclosing
the name and identity of the victim in case of rape and sexual
offences against children. The media not only has the right but
an obligation to report all such cases. However, media should be
cautious not to sensationalise the same. The media should
refrain from talking to the victim because every time the victim
repeats the tale of misery, the victim again undergoes the trauma
which he/she has gone through. Reportage of such cases should
be done sensitively keeping the best interest of the victims, both
adult and children, in mind. Sensationalising such cases may
garner Television Rating Points (TRPs) but does no credit to the
credibility of the media.
31
33. Where a child belongs to a small village, even the disclosure
of the name of the village may contravene the provisions of
Section 23(2) POCSO because it will just require a person to go to
the village and find out who the child is. In larger cities and
metropolis like Delhi the disclosure of the name of the city by
itself may not lead to the disclosure of the identity of the child
but any further details with regard to the colony and the area in
which the child is living or the school in which the child is
studying are enough (even though the house number may not be
given) to easily discover the identity of the child. In our
considered view, the media is not only bound not to disclose the
identity of the child but by law is mandated not to disclose any
material which can lead to the disclosure of the identity of the
child. Any violation of this will be an offence under Section 23(4).
34. The learned amicus curiae urged that child for purposes of
publication should only mean a living child. Her contention
appears to be that when the child is dead then the name and
identity of child can be disclosed. Her submission is based on
the assumption that if the name and identity of the child is
disclosed, public sentiment can be generated and a movement
32
can be started to get justice for the child. According to her, it is
difficult to garner such support if the name of the deceased child
victim is not disclosed. We are not at all in agreement with this
submission. The same reasoning which we have given above for
victims will apply to dead victims also. In the case of dead
victims, we have to deal with another factor. We have to deal
with the important issue that even the dead have their own
dignity. They cannot be denied dignity only because they are
dead.
35. Though in this case we are dealing with cases of victims but
we may make reference to Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which reads as
follows:-
“Section 74. Prohibition on disclosure of identity of
children.-
(1) No report in any newspaper, magazine, news-sheet
or audio-visual media or other forms of
communication regarding any inquiry or investigation
or judicial procedure, shall disclose the name, address
or school or any other particular, which may lead to
the identification of a child in conflict with law or a
child in need of care and protection or a child victim or
witness of a crime, involved in such matter, under any
other law for the time being in force, nor shall the
picture of any such child be published:
33
Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the
Board or Committee, as the case may be, holding the
inquiry may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion
such disclosure is in the best interest of the child.
(2) The Police shall not disclose any record of the child
for the purpose of character certificate or otherwise in
cases where the case has been closed or disposed of.
(3) Any person contravening the provisions of subsection (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to six months or fine which
may extend to two lakh rupees or both.”
36. The name, address, school or other particulars which may
lead to the identification of the child in conflict with law cannot
be disclosed in the media. No picture of such child can be
published. A child who is not in conflict with law but is a victim
of an offence especially a sexual offence needs this protection
even more.
37. The Sikkim High Court in Subash Chandra Rai v. State of
Sikkim5 dealing with this issue held as follows:-
“27……….The mandate of the provision requires no
further clarification. Suffice it to say that neither for a
child in conflict with law, or a child in need of care and

5 2018 CriLJ 3146
34
protection, or a child victim, or witness of a crime
involved in matter, the name, address, school or other
particulars which could lead to the child being
tracked, found and identified shall be disclosed, unless
for the reasons given in the proviso extracted
hereinbefore. The Police and Media as well as the
Judiciary are required to be equally sensitive in such
matters and to ensure that the mandate of law is
complied with to the letter.”
38. In the case of Bijoy v. State of West Bengal6, the Calcutta
High Court has given a detailed judgment setting out the reasons
while dealing with the provisions of POCSO and held that neither
during investigation nor during trial the name of the victim
should be disclosed.
The Calcutta High Court has also given other directions to
ensure that the provisions of the law are followed in letter and
spirit, and the fundamental rights of a child victim and other
basic human rights are protected. We are in agreement with all
these directions. Though some of the issues dealt with in these
directions do not strictly arise in this case, keeping in view the
fact that we are dealing with the rights of children, we are
annexing the directions issued by the Calcutta High Court as
Annexure-1 to this judgment. We request all the Chairpersons

6 2017 CriLJ 3893
35
and Members of all the Juvenile Justice Committee of all the
High Courts in the country to go through the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court and the directions issued therein and they
may issue similar directions, keeping in view the particular needs
of each High Court/State.
39. Before parting we would like to emphasize the need to have
child friendly courts. POCSO mandates setting up of childfriendly courts. Though some progress has been made in this
regard, a lot still requires to be done.
40. Any litigant who enters the court feels intimidated by the
atmosphere of the court. Children and women, especially those
who have been subjected to sexual assault are virtually
overwhelmed by the atmosphere in the courts. They are scared.
They are so nervous that they, sometimes, are not even able to
describe the nature of the crime accurately. When they are
cross-examined in a hostile and intimidatory manner then the
nervousness increases and the truth does not come out.
36
41. It is, therefore, imperative that we should have courts which
are child friendly. Section 33(4) POCSO enjoins on the Special
Court to ensure that there is child friendly atmosphere in court.
Section 36 lays down that the child should not see the accused at
the time of testifying. This is to ensure that the child does not
get scared on seeing the alleged perpetrator of the crime. As
noted above, trials are to be conducted in camera. Therefore,
there is a need to have courts which are specially designed to be
child friendly and meet the needs of child victims and the law.
42. These courts need not only be used for trying cases under
the POCSO but can also be used as trial courts for trying cases of
rape against women. In fact, it would be in the interest of
children and women, and in the interest of justice if one stop
centres are also set up in all the districts of the country as early
as possible. These one stop centres can be used as a central
police station where all crimes against women and children in the
town/city are registered. They should have well trained staff who
are sensitive to the needs of children and women who have
undergone sexual abuse. This staff should be given adequate
training to ensure that they talk to the victims in a 
37
compassionate and sensitive manner. Counsellors and
psychiatrists should also be available on call at these centres so
that if necessary the victims are counselled and in some cases it
would be appropriate if the counsellors question the victims in a
manner in which they have been trained to handle the victims of
such offences. These one stop centres should also have adequate
medical facilities to provide immediate medical aid to the victims
and the medical examination of the victims can be conducted at
the centre itself. These one stop centres should also have video
conferencing facility available where the statement of the victims
to be mandatorily recorded under Section 164 CrPC can be
recorded using video conferencing facilities and the victims need
not be produced in the court of the magistrate. There should be
court room(s) in these one stop centres which can be used for
trial of such cases. As far as possible these centres should not
be situated within the court complex but should be situated near
the court complex so that the lawyers are also not
inconvenienced. Resultantly, the victims of such offences will
never have to go to a court complex which would result in a
victim friendly trial. Once such centre which has already been 
38
set up is “BHAROSA” in Hyderabad. This can be used as a model
for other one stop centres in the country.
43. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we issue the following
directions:-
1. No person can print or publish in print, electronic,
social media, etc. the name of the victim or even in a
remote manner disclose any facts which can lead to
the victim being identified and which should make her
identity known to the public at large.
2. In cases where the victim is dead or of unsound mind
the name of the victim or her identity should not be
disclosed even under the authorization of the next of
the kin, unless circumstances justifying the disclosure
of her identity exist, which shall be decided by the
competent authority, which at present is the Sessions
Judge.
3. FIRs relating to offences under Sections 376, 376A,
376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or 376E of 
39
IPC and offences under POCSO shall not be put in the
public domain.
4. In case a victim files an appeal under Section 372
CrPC, it is not necessary for the victim to disclose
his/her identity and the appeal shall be dealt with in
the manner laid down by law.
5. The police officials should keep all the documents in
which the name of the victim is disclosed, as far as
possible, in a sealed cover and replace these
documents by identical documents in which the name
of the victim is removed in all records which may be
scrutinised in the public domain.
6. All the authorities to which the name of the victim is
disclosed by the investigating agency or the court are
also duty bound to keep the name and identity of the
victim secret and not disclose it in any manner except
in the report which should only be sent in a sealed
cover to the investigating agency or the court.
40
7. An application by the next of kin to authorise
disclosure of identity of a dead victim or of a victim of
unsound mind under Section 228A(2)(c) of IPC should
be made only to the Sessions Judge concerned until
the Government acts under Section 228A(1)(c) and lays
down a criteria as per our directions for identifying
such social welfare institutions or organisations.
8. In case of minor victims under POCSO, disclosure of
their identity can only be permitted by the Special
Court, if such disclosure is in the interest of the child.
9. All the States/Union Territories are requested to set up
at least one ‘one stop centre’ in every district within
one year from today.
44. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Registrar General of
all the High Courts so that the same can be placed before the
Chairpersons of the Juvenile Justice Committee of all the High
Courts for issuance of appropriate orders and directions and also
41
to ensure that sincere efforts are made to set up one stop centres
in every district.
45. In view of the above, we dispose of these petitions as far as
issues dealt with hereinabove are concerned.
….……………………..J.
(MADAN B. LOKUR)
.….…………………….J.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
New Delhi
December 11, 2018
42
ANNEXURE – 1
(Directions issued by the Calcutta High Court in the case
of Bijoy v. State of West Bengal, 2017 Cri.L.J.3893)
1. Police Officer or the Special Juvenile Police Unit receiving
complaint as to commission or likelihood of commission of
offence under the Act shall forthwith register the same in
terms of Section 19 of the Act and furnish a copy free of cost
to the child and/or his/her parents and inform the child or
his/her parents or any person in whom the child has trust
and confidence of his/her right to legal aid and
representation and if the child is unable to arrange for
his/her legal representation, refer the child to the District
Legal Services Authority for necessary legal
aid/representation under section 40 of the Act. Failure to
register First Information Report in respect of offences
punishable under sections 4, 6, 7, 10 & 12 of POCSO shall
attract penal liability under section 166-B of the Indian
Penal Code as the aforesaid offences are cognate and/or
pari materia to the Penal Code offences referred to in the
said penal provision.
43
2. The Police Officer on registration of FIR shall promptly
forward the child for immediate emergency medical aid,
whenever necessary, and/or for medical examination under
section 27 of the Act and ensure recording of the victim's
statement before Magistrate under Section 25 of the Act. In
the event, the Police Officer or the Special Juvenile Police
Unit is of the opinion that the child falls within the
definition of "child in need of (sic) care and protection” as
defined under Section 2(d) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, [as suitably modified by
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 (sic)] the said Police Officer or the Special Juvenile
Police Unit shall forthwith forward the child to the
jurisdictional Child Welfare Committee for providing care,
protection, treatment and rehabilitation of the child in
accordance with law.
3. Whenever a registration of FIR is reported to the Special
Court, the Special Court shall make due enquiries from the
investigating agency as to compliance of the aforesaid
requirements of law as stated in (1) and (2) above and pass
44
necessary orders to ensure compliance thereof in
accordance with law, if necessary.
4. Officer-in-Charge of the police station and the Investigating
Officer in the case including the Special Juvenile Police Unit
shall ensure that the identity of the victim is not disclosed
in the course of investigation, particularly at the time of
recording statement of the victim under section 24 of the
Act (which as far as practicable may be done at the
residence or a place of choice of the victim or that of his/her
parents/custodian, as the case may be), his/her
examination before Magistrate under section 25 of the Act,
forwarding of the child for emergency medical aid under
section 19(5) and/or medical examination under section 27
of the Act.
5. The Investigating Agency shall not disclose the identity of
the victim in any media and shall ensure that such identity
is not disclosed in any manner whatsoever except the
express permission of the Special Court in the interest of
justice. Any person including a police officer committing
45
breach of the aforesaid requirement of law shall be
prosecuted in terms of section 23(4) of the said Act.
6. Trial of the case shall be held in camera in terms of section
37 of the Act and evidence of the victim shall be promptly
recorded without unnecessary delay and following the
procedure of screening the victim from the accused person
as provided in section 36 of the Act. The evidence of the
victim shall be recorded by the Court in a child friendly
atmosphere in the presence of the parents, guardian or any
other person in whom the child has trust and confidence by
giving frequent breaks and the Special Court shall not
permit any repetitive, aggressive or harassive questioning of
the child particularly as to his/her character assassination
which may impair the dignity of the child during such
examination. In appropriate cases, the Special Court may
call upon the defence to submit its questions relating to the
incident during cross-examination in writing to the Court
and the latter shall put such questions to the victim in a
language which is comprehensible to the victim and in a
decent and non-offensive manner.
46
7. In the event, the victim is abroad or is staying at a far off
place or due to supervening circumstances is unable to
physically attend the Court to record evidence, resort shall
be taken for recording his/her evidence by way of video
conference.
8. The identity of the victim particularly his/her name,
parentage, address or any other particulars that may reveal
such identity shall not be disclosed in the judgment
delivered by the Special Court unless such disclosure of
identity is in the interest of the child.
9. The Special Court upon receipt of information as to
commission of any offence under the Act by registration of
FIR shall on his own or on the application of the victim
make enquiry as to the immediate needs of the child for
relief or rehabilitation and upon giving an opportunity of
hearing to the State and other affected parties including the
victim pass appropriate order for interim compensation
and/or rehabilitation of the child. In conclusion of
47
proceeding, whether the accused is convicted or not, or in
cases where the accused has not been traced or had
absconded, the Special Court being satisfied that the victim
had suffered loss or injury due to commission of the offence
shall award just and reasonable compensation in favour of
the victim. The quantum of the compensation shall be fixed
taking into consideration the loss and injury suffered by the
victim and other related factors as laid down in Rule 7(3) of
the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2012
and shall not be restricted to the minimum amounts
prescribed in the Victim Compensation Fund. The
interim/final compensation shall be paid either from the
Victim Compensation Fund or any other special
scheme/fund established under section 357A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (sic) or any other law for the time
being in force through the State Legal Services Authorities
or the District Services Authority in whose hands the Fund
is entrusted. If the Court declines to pass interim or final
compensation in the instant case it shall record its reasons
for not doing so. The interim compensation, so paid, shall
be adjusted with final compensation, if any, awarded by the 
48
Special Court in conclusion of trial in terms of section 33(8)
of the Act.
10. The Special Court shall ensure that the trial in cases
under POCSO is not unduly protracted and shall take all
measures to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible
preferably within a year from taking cognizance of the
offence without granting unreasonable adjournment to the
parties in terms of section 35(2) of the Act.
*****

Monday, December 10, 2018

Suit for declaration of title and cancellation of the order of learned Chief Sales Commissioner, and for consequent relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from reauctioning the suit land or alienating it in any other manners under the provisions of The Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act 1976 as the plaintiff is a bonafide purchaser - The suit schedule property was auctioned in the restricted auction under the provisions of The Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act 1976 . It was originally sold to one Mohan Singh - a rider on the sale is that not to alienate the suit property till the final realisation of the loan amount taken by the allottee for purchase of the land or till the expiry of 10 years which is later.- but he sold it to the plaintiff and the plaintiff purchased the same - resulted in cancellation of the sale in favour of Mohan Singh and order to resumption of the land - that order becomes final - suit field - suit is barred by sec.16 of the said Act - No sec.80 C.P.C. notice was given - no dispensing of notice was obtaiend from the court - Apex court dismissed the suit - set aside the order of High court and that of trial court.

Image result for Mr. Justice R.Subhash Reddy
Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit

C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11930 OF 2018
[Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.27108 of 2018]
Gopal Singh (Dead) by LRs ... Appellants
Versus
Swaran Singh & Ors. ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. Subhash Reddy, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the legal heirs of the
deceased defendant no.5 in the suit, aggrieved by the
judgment and order dated 16.02.2018 passed by the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal
No.1163 of 1991 (O&M). Respondent nos.1 to 4 herein were
the plaintiffs in Suit No.496 of 1985 filed before the SubJudge 1st Class, Sultanpur Lodhi, District Kapurthala in the
State of Punjab. In the said suit following reliefs were
claimed by them :
1
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
“Suit for declaration that they are absolute
owners in possession being bonafide purchasers
for consideration and without notice of land
measuring 82 kanals 3 marlas bearing khasra
nos.54/22min (4-0), 61//2 (8-0), 1min (4-18),
9(10-4), 54//22min (4-0), 61//min (4-0), 55//16
(8-0), 17 (7-7), 54//19min (4-0), 20 (8-0), 21
(8-0), 54///19min (4-0), 25/25 (6-17), and
60/5/2 (0-17), total 82 kanals 3 marlas,
situated in village Kamalpur Patti, Tehsil
Sultanpur Lodhi, District Kapurthala as per
Jamabandi for the year 1981-82 and the order of
learned Chief Sales Commissioner, Kapurthala
dated 28.3.1985 vide which the sale in favour of
Mohan Singh son of Alladatta of village
Mothawala, Tehsil Sultanpur Lodhi, District
Kapurthala dated 23.12.1964 qua the suit land
has been cancelled and allotment of this land in
favour of Gopal Singh defendant no.5 has been
considered right is highly illegal, arbitrary,
unwarranted without jurisdiction, against the
provisions of law and is thus unsustainable and
not binding on the rights and title of the
plaintiffs over the suit land with the
consequent relief of permanent injunction
restraining the defendants from reauctioning the
suit land or alienating it in any other manners
and further restraining the defendants from
interfering in the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs in the suit land in any manner.”
3. The suit schedule property was auctioned in the
restricted auction under the provisions of The Punjab
Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act 1976 [for short ‘the
Act’]. It was originally sold to one Mohan Singh, son of
Aladitta, resident of Kamalpur in the auction held on
2
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
23.12.1964. There was a restriction on transfer which was
held pursuant to an auction, not to alienate the suit
property till the final realisation of the loan amount taken
by the allottee for purchase of the land or till the expiry
of 10 years which is later. On the ground that the said
Mohan Singh has breached the condition, proceedings were
initiated for resumption of the land. Initial order for
resumption passed by the authority was set aside in the writ
petition by the High Court. Thereafter, further order was
passed by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Sales
Commissioner, Kapurthala on 28.03.1985. The aforesaid order
was passed by recording a finding that cancellation of the
auction was proper and further confirmed the allotment made
in favour of the appellants herein.
4. The said order dated 28.03.1985 passed by the
competent authority under the provisions of the Act and the
rules framed thereunder has become final.
5. The trial court, by recording the finding that
respondent-plaintiffs are bonafide purchasers, has decreed
the suit by declaring the order dated 28.03.1985 passed by
the competent authority under the provisions of the Act as
3
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
null and void and granted consequential relief of injunction
restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs
from the suit land.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial
court dated 25.01.1989, the appellant herein who is
defendant no.5 has filed Civil Appeal No.57 of 1989 and
defendant nos.1 to 4 which are authorities of the State also
filed Civil Appeal No.59 of 1989. By the common judgment and
decree dated 18.01.1991, the first appellate court allowed
the appeals by setting aside the judgment and order of the
trial court mainly on the ground that in view of the
provision under Section 16 of the Act, Civil Court has no
jurisdiction to try the suit. Further, it was also held by
the appellate court that the suit is liable to be dismissed
because no notice, as required under Section 80 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (CPC) was given before filing the suit
and no application was filed to dispense with the
requirement of giving notice under Section 80(2).
7. Aggrieved by the common judgment and decree passed in
the said civil appeals by the first appellate court, the
respondent-plaintiffs have filed Second Appeal Nos.1163 and
4
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
1164 of 1991. Said appeals are allowed by the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh by judgment and decree dated
16.02.2018. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the
trial court were restored.
8. We have heard Mr. Vikas Mahajan, learned counsel for
the appellants and Mr. Neeraj Jain, learned senior counsel
for the respondents who are on caveat and also perused the
written submissions submitted on behalf of the parties.
9. In this appeal, it is the case of the appellants that
against the initial cancellation of sale vide order dated
17.06.1975 the vendees of the original transferee have
approached the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.5210 of
1975 and in view of the judgment dated 09.10.1979, after
hearing all the necessary parties, order dated 28.03.1985
was passed by the competent authority, cancelling the sale
and said order has become final and not challenged before
the revenue authorities. It is the case of the appellants
that the validity of the order dated 28.03.1985 cannot be
the subject matter of challenge before the civil court in
view of the bar under Section 16 of the Act. It is further
submitted that in view of the opportunity provided by the
5
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
authorities judgment relied on by the High Court cannot be
applied having regard to the facts and circumstances. It is
submitted that in any event the finding recorded by the
first appellate court that suit is not maintainable for not
issuing notice under Section 80 of the CPC is not interfered
with and without recording any finding Second Appeal is
allowed.
10. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondentplaintiffs that respondent-plaintiffs are bonafide
purchasers of the suit land for a valuable consideration and
in similar cases this Court has dismissed the Special Leave
Petitions, as such, there is no ground to interfere with the
same. It is further submitted that in any event, in view of
Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, Civil Court
is competent to entertain the suit for grant of relief as
prayed for. It is also pleaded that defect in the prayer,
if any, for quashing the order dated 28.03.1985, may not
come in the way of the respondent-plaintiffs for seeking
relief of declaration of their title which is to be
protected in view of the provision under Section 41 of the
Transfer of Property Act 1882.
6
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
11. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, we have
perused the impugned judgment and the judgments of the lower
appellate court and the trial court.
12. It is not in dispute that originally land was put to
restricted auction to sell the land under the provisions of
the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There are
restrictions on the alienation of the land as per the
original transfer. At first instance when the order of
cancellation was passed, matter was carried to High Court
and the High Court has disposed of the petition by directing
the authorities not to take steps for eviction of the
petitioners therein unless they are provided opportunity
before passing appropriate order. After order was passed by
the High Court, order dated 28.03.1985 was passed cancelling
the transfer and further allotment made in favour of the
appellants herein was confirmed. Section 16 of the Act
reads as under :
“16. Bar of jurisdiction and finality of orders
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act, every order made by any officer or
authority under this Act shall be final and no
Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain
any suit or proceeding, in respect of any matter
which the State Government, or any officer or
7
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
authority apopinted under this Act is empowered
by or under this Act to determine, and no
injunction shall be granted by any Court or
other authority in respect of any action taken
or to be taken in pursuance of any power
conferred by or under this Act.
(2) Nothing in the Punjab Public Premises and
Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973,
shall apply to package deal property.”
13. From a reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear
that every order made by any officer or authority under the
said Act is final and no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction
to entertain any suit or proceeding and no injunction shall
be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any
action taken under provisions of the Act. The first
appellate court, by applying the aforesaid provision, has
clearly recorded a finding that the suit is barred and
further it was also held that suit is not maintainable
against the State and its authorities, who are defendant
nos.1 to 4, without issuing notice under Section 80 of CPC.
There is also nothing on record seeking leave from the court
for dispensing with issuance of notice as provided under
Section 80(2) of the CPC. The said aspect is not at all
dealt by the High Court. So far as the bar of the suit
8
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
under Section 16 is concerned, the High Court referred to
Special Leave Petition(C) No.26714 of 2015, but, it appears
that the said petition is dismissed for non-prosecution.
High Court also referred to certain other earlier judgments
to support a finding on the validity of the order dated
28.03.1985. But we are of the view that when the suit
itself is barred, it is not open for the civil court to
record any finding on the validity of the order dated
28.03.1985. Even the judgment of the Full Bench of the High
Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Vinod Kumar
& Ors.1 cannot be applied unless it is held that the order
passed by the primary authority is a nullity. As we are of
the view that the respondent-plaintiffs had an opportunity
before the authority and when the said order has become
final, in view of the bar under Section 16 of the Act, the
High Court has committed error in recording finding on the
validity of the order dated 28.03.1985. Further, as rightly
contended by counsel for the appellants that the appellate
court also has not disturbed the finding of the lower
appellate court on issue of notice as contemplated under
Section 80 of the CPC.
1 1986 (1) PLR 222
9
C.A.@ SLP(C)No.27108/18
14. For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal and set
aside the judgment and order dated 16.02.2018 passed in
R.S.A.No.1163 of 1991 and consequently the Civil Suit No.496
of 1985 stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.
.................... J.
[Uday Umesh Lalit]
.................... J.
[R. Subhash Reddy]
New Delhi
December 07, 2018
10

suit for Declaration of title and permanent injunction - Trial court dismissed the suit stating that the instant suit is not barred under the principle of res­judicata, as the earlier suit in O.S. No. 134 of 1977 was dismissed only for the default of the plaintiff no.1. However, as the respondents­plaintiffs failed to prove the source of their title they will not be entitled to claim the relief of permanent injunction. - High court reversed the trial court judgment and decreed the suit in their favour by placing reliance on the documentary and oral evidence placed on record. The High Court observed that, the alleged suit property was not included in the book of endowments, moreover, the plaintiffs have been paying taxes in regard to the suit property in their name. Therefore, the defendants in the guise of a certificate cannot claim the suit premises. - Apex court held that we observe that, the respondents­plaintiffs in order to prove their title has relied upon several permissions of the municipality and tax receipts to prove his title. But while, the aforesaid documents might imply possession but they cannot be relied to confer title upon the holder.-the appellant­defendant no.4 has put forth the earlier order dated 26.12.1976 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in O.A. No. 2 in 1973, involving the same suit property. It was categorically held therein, that the suit property is related to the temple, and the plaintiff no.1 is staying therein to perform his duty. - becomes final as the suit filed by the plaintiff was dimssed by default - the same was barred by limitation - It is an established position of law that, the burden to prove ownership over the suit property is on the plaintiff. - The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. Section 103 provides that burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue. -In the present case, the respondents­plaintiffs failed to discharge their burden of proof by being unable to furnish necessary documentary and oral evidence to prove their claim. But, the High Court without appreciating the aforesaid evidences and claims made by the appellant (defendant no.4), decreed the suit in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs by solely relying on the entry made in the book of endowments department stating the boundaries of the temple. The aforesaid judgment of the High Court is untenable in law as it is based on erroneous appreciation of evidence - set aside the High court order and restored the trial court order.

                                                     Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana

                                     Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL   NO. 7843 OF 2009
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEE,                    …APPELLANT(s)
SRI RAM MANDIR JAGTIAL
KARIMNAGAR DISTRICT, A.P
VERSUS
S. RAJYALAXMI (DEAD) & ORS.               …RESPONDENT(S)
 
    JUDGMENT
    N.V. RAMANA, J.
1.  The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated
18th November 2006, passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1964 of 1993 wherein the High
Court allowed the appeal preferred by the respondents and set
aside the order of the Subordinate Judge in O.S. No.69 of 1987,
thereby decreeing the suit in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs.
1
REPORTABLE
2. A brief reference to the facts may be necessary for the disposal of
the   present   case.   The   original   plaintiff   no.1  (predecessor­ininterest of respondent nos. 1 to 6 herein) and original plaintiff no.2
(respondent no.7 herein) preferred a suit against the defendants
(appellant   and   respondent   no.8,9   and   10   herein)   seeking   a
declaration that they are the owners of the suit schedule ‘A’ house
bearing H. No. 5­6­69 (old), 6­1­7 (old), reassigned new nos. 6­1­
81 and 6­1­81/1 situated at Brahminwadi, Jagtial.  The original
plaintiffs had also prayed for a declaration that the suit schedule
‘B’ properties are not in existence and the said properties do not
belong to the temple. Lastly, they also sought a consequential
relief   of   permanent   injunction   against   the   defendants   from
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit
property.
3. The respondents­plaintiffs  claimed to be the owners of the suit
schedule “A” house and further contended that they have been
residing in the suit property since the time of their ancestors.
Hence it is recorded in their name and they have been paying
taxes   to   the   municipality   with   respect   to   the   same.   A   Ram
Mandir, situated to the west of the suit property bearing H.Nos.5­
6­70   (old)   &   6­1­8   (old)   corresponding   to   H.No.6­1­82   (new),
2
which is shown as Endowments property by the Endowments
department.   Plaintiff   no.1   has   stated   that   the   eastern   and
southern boundaries of the temple are shown to be the house of
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also brought to the notice of the court,
the permission dated 14.10.1977, granted in their favour by the
municipality, for re­roofing. The original plaintiff no.1 and plaintiff
no.2 effectuated an oral partition of the suit schedule ‘A’ property
on 27.6.1983.
4. The cause of action in the present suit arose when respondent
no.9   (defendant   no.2­   Deputy   Commissioner   of   Endowments
Department) allegedly passed an  ex­parte  order on 24.10.1986
declaring   the   suit   schedule   ‘A’   house   and   movable   properties
shown in schedule ‘B’ and other properties belonged to the Ram
Mandir, Jagtial in O.A. No.70 of 1985. Pursuant to the same, the
appellant   (defendant   no.4­Chairman   Board   of   Trustee   Sri   Ram
Mandir) filed a Petition in the court of Judicial Magistrate, under
Section 93(2) of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions
and Endowments Act 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”)
for the delivery of possession of suit schedule ‘A’ and the suit
schedule   ‘B’   properties   alongside   other   properties   of   the   Ram
Mandir in Cr. M. P No. 173 of 1987.
3
5. The respondents­plaintiffs, apprehending abrupt interference in
possession and enjoyment of the suit property, preferred this suit
for declaration of title and perpetual injunction concerning suit
schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties in O.S. no.69 of 1987.
6. The   appellant   (defendant   no.4)  resisted   the   suit   on   multiple
grounds. Although the appellant (defendant no.4) admitted that
the ancestors of the  plaintiffs  were performing “Annasatram” at
the Ram Mandir, he particularly denied that the ancestors of the
plaintiffs had constructed the suit schedule ‘A’ house about 100
years back along with H. No. 6­2­21. The suit schedule ‘A’ house
was constructed from the funds donated by the devotees.  It was
further alleged that the plaintiff no.1 had filed O.A no.2 of 1973
under Section 77 of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner
Endowments   Department   Hyderabad  (defendant   no.2)  for
declaration that the Ram Mandir is not an endowment property,
but the same was dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner vide
order dated 26.12.1976.  The Deputy Commissioner held that the
temple is a public institution which is registered and entered in
the   book   of   endowments.   Aggrieved,   the   plaintiff   no.1   had
preferred   O.S.   no.134   of   1977   under   Section   78   of   the   Act,
seeking   to   set   aside   the   earlier   order   passed   by   the   Deputy
4
Commissioner. This suit was also dismissed on 19.08.1981 and
has now attained finality. However, the plaintiffs being the priests
got the suit property mutated in their favour during the pendency
of the proceeding. Since, plaintiff no.1 was the pujari and was
looking after the  affairs  of the  temple, he  misrepresented the
matter before the Assistant Commissioner of the Endowments
Department (defendant no.3) at the time of preparing the list of
properties of the Ram Mandir and got his name illegally recorded.
The plaintiff no.1 had also concocted several documents, such as
municipal permission for re­roofing. Further, all the mutations
and entries made or done in the municipality are in his capacity
of being a Pujari and custodian of the temple, and not as the
owner of the property. The appellant further submitted that the
Schedule B properties are in existence and are in the custody of
the   plaintiff   no.1   itself,   who   supressed   this   fact.   Lastly,   the
appellant,  submitted   that   the   plaintiffs   have   exhausted   all
remedies and have filed the suit to prolong the litigation and
hence is liable to be dismissed.
7. The   trial   court,   taking   into   consideration   the   aforesaid
submissions of the parties and the dispute in the present case,
framed the following issues:
5
i. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the declaration
that the suit property are belonging to them and the
schedule   “B”   properties   are   not   in   existence   and
whether they are not the properties of the Ram Mandir?
ii. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the permanent
injunction?
iii. Whether the suit is barred by the res judicata?
iv. Whether the court fee paid is not correct?
v. To what relief?
8. The   trial   court,   after   perusing   both   oral   and   documentary
evidence   on   record,   dismissed   the   suit   preferred   by   the
respondents­plaintiffs. The trial court held that the instant suit is
not barred under the principle of res­judicata, as the earlier suit
in O.S. No. 134 of 1977 was dismissed only for the default of the
plaintiff   no.1.   However,   as   the   respondents­plaintiffs  failed   to
prove the source of their title they will not be entitled to claim the
relief of permanent injunction.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal of the suit, the respondentsplaintiffs  preferred an appeal before the High Court in Appeal
Suit no. 1964 of 1993. The High Court set aside the order of the
trial court stating that the same was passed without considering
the facts and law in the correct perspective. Thereby, the High
Court vide order dated 18.11.2006 allowed the appeal preferred
by the respondents­plaintiffs and decreed the suit in their favour
by placing reliance on the documentary and oral evidence placed
6
on   record.   The   High   Court   observed   that,   the   alleged   suit
property was not included in the book of endowments, moreover,
the   plaintiffs   have   been   paying   taxes   in   regard   to   the   suit
property in their name. Therefore, the defendants in the guise of
a certificate cannot claim the suit premises. Aggrieved, by the
aforesaid order of the High Court decreeing the suit in favour of
the   respondents­plaintiffs,  the   appellant  (defendant   no.4)  has
preferred the present appeal.
10. Heard the learned counsels for both the parties.
11. The counsel on behalf of the appellant (defendant no.4) submitted
that the High Court gravely erred in decreeing the suit in favour
of the respondents­plaintiffs by merely relying on the entry in the
book of endowments as to the boundaries. Further, the counsel
averred that, the plaintiff no.1 manipulated the record showing
himself to be the owner of the suit property, whereas he was a
pujari acting as a custodian of the temple. Lastly, the counsel
rested his argument by stating that since the certificate issued by
the Deputy Commissioner in O.A. No. 70 of 1985 is still valid, the
plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree restraining the defendants
from   dispossessing   them   from   Schedule   ‘A’   property   and
recovering Schedule ‘B’ property.
7
12. On   the   contrary   the   counsel   on   behalf   of   the   respondentsplaintiffs submitted that, the suit property was never recorded as
an endowment. On the contrary, the suit property was earlier
recorded in the name of the ancestors of the plaintiffs and now it
devolves in the name of plaintiffs. The permission granted by the
municipality   on   14.10.1977,   to   construct   the   re­roofing
strengthens the presumption in their favour. Therefore, the High
Court was correct to decree the suit in their favour by relying on
the documentary and oral evidence placed on record.
13. At the outset it is pertinent to peruse few significant evidences
adduced by both the parties.
14. The plaintiffs had examined P.W.3 (Purohith) to prove that the
suit property was partitioned in the year 1914 vide Arbitration
Award dated 21.12.1914. But this document was never placed on
record in the earlier rounds of litigation. On the contrary, plaintiff
no.1 in the earlier litigation in O.A. No. 2 of 1973 had stated that,
the suit property was not a Mandir but a house which was built
by his father after obtaining due permission from the local tehsil
in 1927. The aforesaid contradiction draws suspicion as to the
credibility of the witness, as regards to the building of the suit
8
house and temple in 1927 and fact of partition pursuant to the
arbitration agreement in 1914, which are inconsistent. 
15. D.W.2, who was once acting as the fit person on behalf of the
trust   of   Ram   Mandir   stated   that,   even   the   suit   schedule   ‘A’
property was a part of the endowment property.
16. D.W.3,   further   clarified   the   status   of   the   suit   schedule   ‘A’
property by stating that it was used as lodging by the pilgrims
and pujaris, it was also used to cook food for distribution. D.W.3
also contended that, the name of the plaintiffs got recorded as
the owners as they were the pujaris of the temple.
17. The plaintiffs in order to substantiate their claims furthers placed
on   record   documentary   evidences   comprising   of   permissions
granted by the municipality, property tax assessment papers, tax
receipts and extract of the Book of Endowments of Ram Mandir.
After   perusing   evidence   on   record,   we   observe   that,   the
respondents­plaintiffs in order to prove their title has relied upon
several permissions of the municipality and tax receipts to prove
his   title.   But   while,   the   aforesaid   documents   might   imply
possession but they cannot be relied to confer title upon the
holder. Further, the respondents­plaintiffs have strongly relied
upon the book of endowments as maintained by the Endowment
9
Department which shows the boundaries of the temple. In any
case, this document alone is not sufficient to claim the title over
the suit premises as it was only intended to demarcate the temple
premises.
18. On the contrary, the appellant­defendant no.4 has put forth the
earlier   order   dated   26.12.1976   passed   by   the   Deputy
Commissioner in O.A. No. 2 in 1973, involving the same suit
property. It was categorically held therein, that the suit property is
related to the temple, and the plaintiff no.1 is staying therein to
perform   his   duty.   The   earlier   order   also   stated   that,   the   suit
property was originally granted as Inam to the forefathers of the
plaintiffs for the conducting pooja and to feed the brahmins. In the
aforesaid order, it also noted that, the plaintiff had removed the
idols from the suit temple to meet his personal needs.  Aggrieved,
by the aforementioned order in O.A. No. 2 in 1973, plaintiff no.1
thereafter had filed O.S. No.134/77, before the Chief Judge, City
Civil Court which came to be dismissed on 19.08.1981 for default,
hence has attained finality. Therefore, the present suit involving
the same property seeking similar relief as O.S. No.134/77 is
barred by time. However, the defence has also clearly averred that
since the plaintiffs and their forefathers were working as pujaris in
10
the   Ram   Temple,   the   endowment   department   in   order   to
demarcate the Ram Mandir itself, mentioned the suit property as
the adjoining premises. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, the plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence
to counter the case put forth by the appellant­defendant no.4.
19. It is an established position of law that, the burden to prove
ownership   over   the   suit   property   is   on   the   plaintiff.   (See
Corporation   of   City   of   Bangalore   vs.   Zulekha   Bi   and   Ors.
(2008) 11 SCC 306). This court in the case of Parimal vs. Veena
(2011) 3 SCC 545, held that:
19.  The   provisions   of   Section   101   of   the
Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof
of   the   facts   rests   on   the   party   who
substantially  asserts  it  and  not  on  the  party
who  denies   it. In fact, burden of proof means
that a party has to prove an allegation before he
is entitled to a judgment in his favour. Section
103   provides   that   burden   of   proof   as   to   any
particular fact lies on that person who wishes the
court   to   believe   in   its   existence,   unless   it   is
provided by any special law that the proof of that
fact   shall   lie   on   any   particular   person.   The
provision   of   Section   103   amplifies   the   general
rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies
on the person who asserts the affirmative of the
facts in issue. 
(emphasis supplied)
20. In the present case, the respondents­plaintiffs failed to discharge
their   burden   of   proof   by   being   unable   to   furnish   necessary
11
documentary and oral evidence to prove their claim. But, the
High   Court   without   appreciating   the   aforesaid   evidences   and
claims made by the appellant (defendant no.4), decreed the suit
in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs by solely relying on the
entry made in the book of endowments department stating the
boundaries of the temple. The aforesaid judgment of the High
Court   is   untenable   in   law   as   it   is   based   on   erroneous
appreciation of evidence.
21. In light of the aforesaid observations we set aside the judgment of
the   High   Court   decreeing   the   suit   in   favour   of   respondentsplaintiffs  in the absence of any evidence to substantiate their
claim. 
22. Resultantly,   we   restore   the   order   passed   by   the   Subordinate
Judge, Jagtial in O.S 69 of 1987. The appeal is allowed, however,
without any order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, shall
also stand disposed of.
……………………………..J.
(N. V. Ramana)
……………………………..J.
(Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)
NEW DELHI,
DECEMBER 10, 2018.
12
13

Sections 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, 148 IPC and Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 - Trial court convicted the accused whereas High court reversed the same -Apex court held that We concur with the aforesaid order of acquittal rendered by the High Court, as the present case is ridden with multiple investigative laches and flaws which goes to the root of the matter. Firstly, it is apt to note that out of the seven eye witnesses who participated in the TIP, five of them identified the accused without committing any mistake. - no documentary evidence has been provided to proof that the identity of the accused was kept concealed. Secondly, it is surprising that, although the postmortem report describes that there were only two wounds in the body of the deceased, one being the entry and the other being the exit wound, allegedly a bullet was still recovered from the ashes of the deceased. Thirdly, the prosecution has failed to establish that the bullet allegedly recovered from the ashes of the deceased 20 days later was indeed fired from the pistol recovered from accusedrespondent Wasif Haider. Even, the recovery of pistol is doubtful. Fourthly, as regards to the place of incident, the prosecution failed to ascertain the same with precision. Fifthly, the prosecution failed to examine Ram Chandra, the orderly of the deceased who was also injured in the same incident and had suffered a gunshot injury. Sixthly, the prosecution has also failed to adduce any independent witness. Lastly, it is surprising that although the charges have been framed under Section 307 of IPC, the prosecution has absolutely failed to substantiate the charges by means of evidence. In the instant appeals before us, the prosecution has failed to link the chain of circumstances so as to dispel the cloud of doubt about the culpability of the accused­respondents. It is a well settled principle that a suspicion, however grave it may be cannot take place of proof, i.e., there is a long distance between “may be” and “must be”, which must be traversed by the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt The accused cannot be expected to relinquish his innocence at the hands of an inefficacious prosecution, which is ridden with investigative deficiencies. The benefit of doubt arising out of such inefficient investigation, must be bestowed upon the accused.


                                                          Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana 
                                                               Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1702­1706 OF 2014
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                     … APPELLANT
VERSUS
WASIF HAIDER ETC.            … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
    N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. These appeals by special leave arise out of the common
impugned judgment dated 29.05.2009, passed by the High Court
of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1419, 1430, 1518 and 898
of 2004, whereby the High Court has reversed the judgment of
conviction passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur in
Sessions Trial No. 164/2002 dated 22.01.2004 under Sections
302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, 148 IPC and Section 7 of
REPORTABLE
1
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932. Whereas the High Court in
Government Appeal no. 5270 of 2005 preferred by the appellantState, has dismissed the appeal against the acquittal of accused
no.1­respondent (Wasif Haider) for offences under Sections 25
and 27 of Arms Act, 1959 and Sections 4 and 15 of Explosive
Substances   Act,   1908,   while   affirming   the   judgment   dated
3.8.2005   passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   judge,   Kanpur
acquitting   the  accused   no.1­respondent   (Wasif   Haider)  in
Sessions Trial No. 143 and 144 of 2002.
2. Brief facts as unfolded from the prosecution story are
that, while the complainant (P.W.2­ S.O., P.S. Moolganj, Kanpur)
along with other police personnel was on duty at the parade
crossing, he came to know that a crowd of around 200­300 rioters
were   causing   rampage   and   destruction   at   the   Chaubey   Gola
Temple. Immediately, the complainant accompanied by the police
force   and   A.D.M   (Finance   and   Revenue)­Sri   Chandra   Prakash
Pathak   (hereinafter   referred   as   “the   deceased”),   and   half   a
section   of   Provincial   Armed   Constabulary   [“PAC”]   proceeded
towards   scene   of   occurrence.   Admittedly,   when   the   deceased
along with police personnel were at a distance of around 100­150
paces from Sunehri Mosque on the Nai Sarak, rioters started
2
firing   upon   them   resultantly   injuring   the   deceased   and   his
orderly, Ram Chandra. In order to control the law and order
situation, the police were compelled to fire in their defense. When
the police party reached the mosque, the rioters had already fled
away. Subsequently, when the police party reached Chaubey Gola
Temple where rioters had already looted some houses and had
also committed arson. In the meanwhile, the police also received
the information that the deceased had succumbed to the gunshot
injuries in the hospital. Finally, the F.I.R., Case Crime No. 7 of
2001 came to be registered at 8.05P.M. on 16.03.2001 against
200­300 unknown rioters.
3. On   the   same   night,   after   conducting   the   inquest
proceedings,   the   dead   body   was   sent   for   post   mortem
examination and the investigation commenced. The investigation
officer after recording the statement of witnesses, inspected the
place of occurrence and prepared Site Plan ext. Ka­6. A bullet
which was recovered from the ashes of deceased was sent for
Forensic examination.
4. On   02.08.2001   accused   no.   2­respondent   (Mumtaz
alias  Maulana) was brought to Kanpur by the Delhi police. On
04.08.2001,   accused   no.   1­respondent   (Wasif   Haider)   was
3
arrested. Accused no. 3­respondent (Hazi Atiq) and accused no.
4­respondent   (Safat   Rasool)   were   arrested   on   17.09.2001   and
18.09.2001   respectively   and   thereafter   the   Test   Identification
Parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was held on 27.09.2001
at   District   Jail,   Kanpur.   Subsequent   to   the   completion   of
investigation, the charge­sheet was submitted.
5. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
It is pertinent to note that in the statements made by the accused
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They claimed that there existed an
inordinate delay in conducting the TIP, as  this time period was
used by the prosecution witnesses to see them at their homes or
places   of   work   to   mark   them   carefully   for   the   subsequent
identification. They stressed on the fact that they were not kept
concealed   in   a   veil (baparda).   The   accused­respondents   have
further stated that, prior to the TIP, the police had taken their
photographs   and   had   shown   it   to   the   other   witnesses.  This
creates a considerable doubt about the genuineness of the TIP.
Further, the accused­respondents have alleged that, they were
wrongfully roped in the case when the police failed to trace the
real culprits. The accused respondents have also put forth that,
although they had clear antecedents, but they were implicated in
4
the crime falsely.
6. By   order   dated   22.01.2004,   the   trial   court,   while
relying upon the prosecution version, rejected the defence story
and convicted the accused persons as under,
ACCUSED CHARGES CONVICTION
[1]. Wasif Haider
[A­1]
[2]. Mumtaz alias
Maulana [A­2]
[3]. Hazi Atiq [A­3]
[4]. Safat Rasool
[A­4]
S. 302/ 149 IPC Life Imprisonment
S. 307/ 149 IPC RI for 5 years
S. 148 RI for 1 year
S. 7 Criminal Law
Amendment Act
RI for 3 months
All of them were acquitted for the charges
under Sections 395, 397, 436 and 153A IPC.
Wasif Haider [A­1]
Acquitted for charges under Sections 25 and
27 of Arms Act, 1959 and Sections 4 and 15
of Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
7. Aggrieved by the abovementioned order of conviction
and sentence, the accused­respondents appealed before the High
Court. The High Court on analysis of evidence found that, not
only there exists various contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses but there exists lack of corroboration of the
5
same.   While   passing   the   order   of   acquittal   the   High   Court
observed that the case of prosecution was ridden with flaws in
investigation, most importantly the identification of the accused
was highly suspicious and the TIP was held to be “too good to be
believed”.   Accordingly,   the   High   Court   through   the   impugned
judgment acquitted the accused­respondents and set aside the
aforesaid order of conviction as the prosecution failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the High
Court acquitting all the accused, the State of Uttar Pradesh has
preferred these appeals.
9. The learned Counsel, Mr. Dinesh Kumar Goswami, on
behalf of the appellant­State while supporting the prosecution’s
case,   submitted   that   pursuant   to   the   arrest   of   the   accusedrespondents their identification was properly done after taking
due   precautions   and   following   the   procedure.   Moreover,   the
prosecution witnesses had clearly identified the accused persons
in the identification parade and in the court as well. On the issue
of   delay   caused   in   conducting   the   TIP,   the   counsel   also
vehemently   submitted   that,   there   was   no   inordinate   delay   in
conducting the TIP as canvassed by the counsels for the accused6
respondents. The High Court has committed a grave error by not
placing reliance on the TIP as there is nothing on record to vitiate
the results of the same. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted
that since there existed sufficient evidence to prove the culpability
of the accused­respondents, the Sessions Judge had correctly
passed the order of conviction against them and therefore prayed
for setting aside the impugned order.
10. On the other hand, the learned Counsel, Ms. Kamini
Jaiswal, appearing on behalf of the accused­respondents no. 1, 3
and 4, while supporting the order of acquittal rendered by the
High Court, submitted that, the entire prosecution story hinges
on the identification of the accused­respondents, the genuineness
of which in itself is questionable. It was further argued that, when
admittedly the witnesses were at a great distance from the place
of  occurrence, it  was not  plausible  to  identify  specifically  the
accused­respondents, that too in the absence of any particular
hulia or distinguishing marks from amongst a crowd of 200­300
rioters. Further, there was inordinate delay in conducting the TIP
which was fatal for the prosecution.
11. Further, the learned Counsel, Mr. Siddhartha Dave, on
behalf   of   accused­respondent   no.   2   submitted   that   accused7
respondent   no.   2   has   been   dragged   into   the   matter   only   on
account of confessional statement of the co­accused which has
not been corroborated, and no other incriminating evidence is
available on record.
12. Heard learned counsels for the parties. At the outset,
we would like to state that in an appeal against acquittal, the
appellate court would interfere only where there exists perversity
of   fact   and   law   [See  Bannareddy   and   Ors.   v.   State   of
Karnataka   and   Ors.,   (2018)   5   SCC   790].   Further,   the
presumption   of   innocence   is   further   reinforced   against   the
acquitted­accused   by   having   a   judgment   in   his   favor   [See
Rabindra   Kumar   Pal   @   Dara   Singh   v.   Republic   of   India,
(2011) 2 SCC 490 in para. 94].
13. We   concur   with   the   aforesaid   order   of   acquittal
rendered by the High Court, as the present case is ridden with
multiple investigative laches and flaws which goes to the root of
the matter. We shall be addressing the same in seriatim.
14. Firstly,   it   is   apt   to   note   that   out   of   the   seven   eye
witnesses who participated in the TIP, five of them identified the
accused without committing any mistake. As observed by the
8
accused no.3­respondent, Hazi Atiq has big protruding teeth, the
accused no.4­respondent Safat Rasool was suffering from polio
hence had permanent physical disability, but surprisingly this
fact was never mentioned either in the F.I.R. or in the witness
statements.   The   specific   identification   of   the   four   accusedrespondents,   from   a   group   of   200­300   rioters,   with   100%
perfection; without a mention of any distinguishing marks seems
highly improbable considering the distance of the witnesses from
the place of occurrence. Moreover, there existed an inordinate
delay of 55 days in conducting the TIP of the accused no.1 and 2.
Although, the involvement of accused no.3 and 4 was brought to
light on 03.08.2001 itself, the prosecution did not take any effort
to arrest or interrogate them for 6 weeks. But no reasonable
explanation was provided for the aforesaid inordinate delay.
15. Furthermore,   no   documentary   evidence   has   been
provided   to   proof   that   the   identity   of   the   accused   was   kept
concealed.   On   the   contrary,   D.W.3,   Mohd.   Shamim   Siddique,
Record Keeper in the Police Office stated that the general diary
does not mention that the accused no.2­respondent Mumtaz alias
Maulana was kept  baparda. The defence also pleaded that, the
aforesaid inordinate delay was used by the prosecution witnesses
9
to see the accused­respondents at their homes or places of work
to   mark   them   carefully   for   the   subsequent   identification.
Additionally,   accused   no.1­respondent   Wasif   Haider,   in   his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. went to the extent of saying
that, prior to the TIP he was shown to the witnesses and his
photographs and videotapes were prepared. In Mulla v. State of
U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 508 para 55, this court laid down that a TIP
has to be conducted timely, if not, then the delay has to be
explained   and   such   delay   should   not   cause   exposure   of   the
accused. However, in the case at hand, not only there was a delay
in conducting the TIP, but no explanation for the same has been
forthcoming from the prosecution. This creates a considerable
doubt about the genuineness of the TIP.
16. Secondly,  it   is   surprising   that,   although   the   postmortem report describes that there were only two wounds in the
body of the deceased, one being the entry and the other being the
exit wound, allegedly a bullet was still recovered from the ashes of
the   deceased.   The   F.S.L.   report   shows   that   this   bullet   was
charred and blistered. This recovery of bullet from the ashes of
the deceased is irreconcilable with the post­mortem report which
allegedly   states   an   exit   wound,   implying   that   the   bullet   had
10
already left the body. The aforesaid fact raises a suspicion on
both the Post­Mortem report and the F.S.L. report as they are
incompatible with each other.
17. Thirdly, the prosecution has failed to establish that the
bullet allegedly recovered from the ashes of the deceased 20 days
later was indeed fired from the pistol recovered from accusedrespondent Wasif Haider. Even, the recovery of pistol is doubtful.
While, the prosecution case reveals that one .380 bore pistol colt
was recovered from the possession of  the  accused­respondent
Wasif   Haider,   on   the   contrary,   the   evidence   of   P.W.2­S.O.,
Rajendra Dhar Dwivedi reveals that one .320 bore pistol colt was
recovered pursuant to his arrest. Additional contradiction can be
seen in the sanction order wherein two pistols of .380 bore were
shown   to   be   recovered   from   the   possession   of   the   accusedrespondent Wasif Haider.
18. Fourthly,   as   regards   to   the   place   of   incident,   the
prosecution failed to ascertain the same with precision. While the
F.I.R. reveals the place of occurrence to be in front of Sunehri
Masjid, P.W.2, the complainant later improved over his earlier
statement and stated that, the incident actually took place in
Noorani Masjid. On the contrary, the two site plans show the
11
place of incident to be Noorani Masjid.
19. Fifthly,   the   prosecution   failed   to   examine   Ram
Chandra, the orderly of the deceased who was also injured in the
same   incident   and   had   suffered   a   gunshot   injury.   The
prosecution was also unable to prove the injury report of the
above victim. Such a failure is fatal to the prosecution case as his
presence in the place of occurrence is beyond doubt. It has been
placed   on   record   that,   despite   Ram­Chandra   attending   the
proceedings of the trial regularly he was not examined by the
prosecution.
20. Sixthly, the prosecution has also failed to adduce any
independent witness. Even though it is wrong to disbelieve the
evidence   adduced   from   the   official   witnesses,   but   prudence
demands that their evidence needs to tested on the altar of strict
scrutiny. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the
evidences adduced by the prosecution witnesses do not inspire
the confidence of this Court.
21. Lastly, it is surprising that although the charges have
been   framed   under   Section   307   of   IPC,   the   prosecution   has
absolutely   failed   to   substantiate   the   charges   by   means   of
evidence. It  is  rather  unfortunate  that  the  courts  below  have
12
failed to  take  note  of the  same.  The trial court  has  erred  in
convicting the respondents for the aforesaid offence, without any
evidence to prove the same.
22. In the instant appeals before us, the prosecution has
failed to link the chain of circumstances so as to dispel the cloud
of doubt about the culpability of the accused­respondents. It is a
well settled principle that a suspicion, however grave it may be
cannot take place of proof, i.e., there is a long distance between
“may   be”   and   “must   be”,   which   must   be   traversed   by   the
prosecution   to   prove   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt   [See
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004)10 SCC 699].
23. This Court in  Kailash   Gour   and   Ors.   v.   State   of
Assam, (2012) 2 SCC 34 has held that, 
“44.  The   prosecution,   it   is   axiomatic,
must   establish   its   case   against   the
accused   by   leading   evidence   that   is
accepted   by   the   standards   that   are
known   to   criminal   jurisprudence
regardless   whether   the   crime   is
committed   in   the   course   of   communal
disturbances or otherwise.  In short, there
can only be one set of rules and standards
when   it   comes   to   trials   and   judgment   in
criminal cases unless the statute provides for
anything specially applicable to a particular
case or class of cases…”
(emphasis supplied)
13
24. In   the   present   case,   the   cumulative   effect   of   the
aforesaid   investigative   lapses   has   fortified   the   presumption   of
innocence in favor of the accused­respondents. In such cases, the
benefit of doubt arising out of a faulty investigation accrues in
favor of the accused.
25. Although   we   acknowledge   the   gravity   of   the   offence
alleged against the accused­respondents and the unfortunate fact
of a senior official losing his life in furtherance of his duty we
cannot overlook the fact that the lapses in the investigation have
disabled the prosecution to prove the culpability of the accused.
The accused cannot be expected to relinquish his innocence at
the hands of an inefficacious prosecution, which is ridden with
investigative deficiencies. The benefit of doubt arising out of such
inefficient investigation, must be bestowed upon the accused. 
26. In   our   opinion,   there   exists   no   perversity   in   the
judgment of the High Court. Further, in the absence of compelling
reasons,   this   Court   is   not   keen   to   entertain   these   appeals
challenging the order of acquittal.
27. We   are   also   not   inclined   to   interfere   with   the
concurrent order of acquittal for offences committed under the
Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act presently before us in
14
Criminal Appeal no. 1706 of 2014. 
28. The   appeals   are   accordingly   dismissed.   Pending
applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
……………………………..J.
(N. V. Ramana)
……………………………..J.
(Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)
NEW DELHI,
DECEMBER 10, 2018.
15