whether the Tribunal becomes functous officeo after 30 days of publication of it's award and as such no power to recall the exparte award ? Apex court held that This Court in Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi’s case (supra) has clearly held that the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) did not say that the Industrial Courts would have nojurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside an award made after thirty days of its publication.

whether the Tribunal becomes functous officeo after 30 days of publication of it's award and as such no power to recall the exparte award ?
Apex court held that  This Court in  Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi’s case  (supra) has clearly held that the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) did   not   say   that   the   Industrial   Courts   would   have   nojurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside an award made after thirty days of its publication. 

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REPORTABLE
  IN     THE     SUPREME     COURT   OF INDIA
    CIVIL     APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL     APPEAL     NO. 8320   Of 2011
SRI MAHABIR PROSAD CHOUDHARY    ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S. OCTAVIUS TEA AND
INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANR.    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
    ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   the   Division   Bench
judgment dated 23.12.2009 of Calcutta High Court in F.M.A. No.
1187 of 2009 by which the appeal filed by appellant has been
dismissed. 
2. The   issue   involved   in   this   appeal   lies   in   a   very   narrow
compass.  The necessary facts of the case to be noticed for
deciding the issue are:­
2.1 The   appellant   was   working   as   Accountant   in   the
respondent   company   since   1986.     There   had   been
change   of   management   in   the   year   2004   in   the
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company.     The   appellant   was   not   allowed   to   work
w.e.f.   02.05.2005.     The   State   of   West   Bengal
referred the industrial dispute between the company
and the appellant to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal.
The Tribunal framed the issue as to whether refusal
of   employment   to   Shri   Mahabir   Prosad   Choudhary   by
the management w.e.f. 02.05.2005 is justified?
2.2 After   receiving   the   reference,   the   Industrial
Tribunal   on   27.08.2007   issued   summons   upon   the
parties   concerned   directing   them   to   appear   on
19.09.2007.   The workman appeared on 19.09.2007 but
no one appeared from the company, since the summons
were   received   back   with   the   remarks   “left”.
11.10.2007   was   again   fixed   by   the   Tribunal.     On
11.10.2007, Tribunal noted that summons sent through
Process Server has been served upon the company. The
advocate for the workman appeared and filed W/S. The
W/S was filed without serving the copy of W/S to the
company.     On   05.11.2007,   none   of   the   parties   had
appeared   and   27.11.2007   was   fixed   for   W/S   by   the
company.   On 29.11.2007, no one appeared on behalf
of   the   company,   the   Tribunal   fixed   for   ex­parte
hearing.   26.12.2007 was fixed for documents of the
workman.  On 26.12.2007, documents were filed, which
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were   kept   on   record   and   29.01.2008   was   fixed   for
ex­parte hearing.  The Tribunal again on the request
of   the   workman   deferred   the   case,   which   was   fixed
for ex­parte hearing for 26.02.2008.  On 26.02.2008,
none appeared for the company, workman was heard and
the   award   was   pronounced.     The   Hon’ble   Tribunal
disposed of the award ex­parte by allowing the claim
of   reinstatement   with   full   back   wages.     The   award
was also published on 27.03.2008. 
2.3 The   company   filed   an   application   on   02.05.2008   to
recall   the   ex­parte   award.     The   company   stated   in
its   application   that   as   per   the   agreement   dated
10.06.2004   with   its   erstwhile   management,   the   new
management   has   no   responsibility   in   respect   of
senior   executives   and   managerial   staff   of   the   old
management   including   the   appellant.     The   company
states   that   ex­parte   award   was   received   on
22.04.2008   and   thereafter   an   application   has   been
filed   for   recall   of   the   ex­parte   award   dated
26.02.2008.   The Tribunal heard the parties on the
application   filed   by   the   company.     The   tribunal
although   return   the   finding   that   the   award   was
passed in violation of principles of natural justice
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and no notice under Rule 20B(5) and Rule 21 of the
West   Bengal   Industrial   Disputes   Rules,   1958
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “1958   Rules”)   were
served on the company.   The Tribunal, however, took
the view that application being filed by the company
after   30   days   of   publication   of   the   award,   the
Tribunal   has   become   functus   officio,   hence   the
application is rejected. 
2.4 After rejection of application, the company filed a
writ petition in the Calcutta High Court.   Learned
Single   Judge   vide   its   judgment   and   order   dated
11.02.2009   allowed   the   writ   petition   setting   aside
the   award   and   the   order   dated   30.09.2008   of   the
Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal was directed to
reconsider   the   issue   between   the   parties   as
expeditiously   as   possible   in   accordance   with   law
upon   affording   them   opportunity   of   being   heard.
Against   the   judgment   of   learned   Single   Judge,   the
appellant filed an appeal before the Division Bench,
which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment of
the Calcutta High Court.       
   
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3. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant in
support   of   the   appeal   contends   that   notice   issued   by   the
Industrial   Tribunal   in   Form   D2   was   served   on   the   company,
which has also been recorded by the Industrial Tribunal, there
was   no   cause   for   non­appearance   of   the   company   before   the
Tribunal.   The   Tribunal   rightly   proceeded   ex­parte   due   to
non­appearance   of   the   company.     He   submits   that   the
application for recall of the ex­parte award was filed after
30 days from publication of award, the Tribunal having become
functus officio,  The Tribunal has rightly taken the view that
application   for   recall   cannot   be   entertained.     He   further
submits   that   the   view   of   the   High   Court   that   there   was
violation   of   Rule   20B(5)   and   Rule   21   of   1958   Rules   is
erroneous.       He   submits   that   Rule   20B(5)   contemplates   that
Tribunal, in event, if the W/S had been filed, the same shall
be   made   available   to   the   party   concerned   or   its   authorised
representative   in   the   office   of   Industrial   Tribunal/Labour
Court.  He submits that Rule 20B(5) does not contemplate that
any notice has to be issued to the other party for receiving
the W/S.  He submits that there is no non­compliance of Rule
20B(5).  He submits that High Court committed error in taking
the view that notice was required to be served under Rule 21
to the company before hearing the case ex­parte.  No one has
6
appeared on behalf of the respondent.
4. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the appellant and have perused the records.
5. Before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Calcutta   High   Court,
main submission, which was pressed by the appellant was that
application filed by the company for recall of the ex­parte
order was after 30 days of publication, hence, could not have
been entertained.   The Division Bench of the High court has
elaborately   dealt   with   the   said   issue   and   repelled   the
contention.   There is no dispute regarding dates and events,
which took place in the present case.   The date of ex­parte
award is 26.02.2008, the publication of the award was made on
27.03.2008 and the case of the company was that it came to
know   about   the   award   on   22.04.2008.   The   date   of   filing   of
application for recall of ex­parte award is 02.05.2008, the
application was clearly beyond 30 days from publication of the
award.
6. Before we proceed to consider the submissions raised by
learned counsel for the appellant, it is relevant to notice
certain Rules of 1958 Rules.  Rule 20B deals with Statement of
case or written statement.  Rule 20B is as follows:­
20B.   Statement   of   case   or   written   statement. ­   (1)
7
The   Industrial   Tribunal/Labour   Court   shall,   on   the
date fixed in the summons for the appearance of the
parties   direct   the   party   which   appears   to   the
Tribunal/Labour   Court   to   be   the   party   at   whose
instance the reference has been initiated or where no
such party can be ascertained, the party, which, in
the opinion of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court,
ought   to   be   required   to   state   its   case   first
(hereinafter referred to as the first party) to state
its   case,  together   with   the   grounds   upon   which   the
claim for relief is founded, and a list of relevant
documents   which   are   in   their   possession   and   upon
which they want to rely, in writing on a date fixed
by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court which shall
ordinarily be within two weeks from the date of the
order.
(2) After the first party has complied with the order
passed   under   sub   rule   (1),   the   other   party
(hereinafter referred to as the second party) shall
be asked to file its written statement and a list of
relevant documents which are in their possession and
upon which they want to rely on a date fixed by the
Industrial   Tribunal/Labour   Court,   which   shall
ordinarily be within two weeks from the date of the
order.
(3)   Every   statement   of   case   and   every   written
statement shall be signed and verified in the manner
prescribed by rule 69 or rule 70, as the case may be.
(4) Each party shall file along with its statement of
case or the written statement, as the case may be, as
many   copies   thereof   as   may   be   directed   by   the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
(5) A copy of the statement of case or the written
statement shall be served on the first party or the
second party, as the case may be, by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court within seven days from the date
on   which   copies   of   the   statement   of   case   or   the
written statement, as the case may be, are filed by
making   it   over   to   the   party   concerned   or   to   its
authorised   representative   in   the   Office   of   the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on a date and time
fixed   for   the   purpose   and   intimated   to   the   party
concerned by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
8
7. Rule 21, which empowers the Tribunal to proceed ex­parte
is as follows:­
“21.   Board,   Court,   Labour   Court,   Tribunal,   or
Arbitrator   may   proceed   ex­parte. ­   If   without
sufficient   cause   being   shown,   any   party   to   a
proceeding   before   a   Board,   Court,   Labour   Court,
Tribunal   or   Arbitrator   fails   to   attend   or   to   be
represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal
or Arbitrator may proceed as if such party had duly
attended or had been represented.
8. Rule 27 deals with the correction of errors and review of
an award, which is to the following effect:­
“27. Correction of errors and review of an award. ­
The Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or Arbitrator
may ­
(i)   correct   any   clerical   or   arithmetical   mistake
arising   from   an   accidental   slip   or   omission   in   any
award made by it or him, and
(ii) review an award on the ground of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record, either of
its/his own motion or on the application of any of
the parties ;
(iii) for sufficient cause set aside after notice to
the opposite party or parties as the case may be, the
ex­parte award or an award on the footing that the
industrial   dispute   under   reference   is   no   longer   in
existence   either   of   its/his   own   motion   or   on   the
application of any of the parties :
Provided that no correction shall be made without
previous notices to the parties or opposite party, as
9
the case may be.
Provided   further   that   no   application   for   review
under clause (iii) shall be entertained on the expiry
of the 15th day from the date of the award.”
9. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government
Industrial   Tribunal   and   Others,   (1980)   Supp.   SCC   420,   had
occasion to consider Rule 22 of Industrial Disputes (Central)
Rules,   1957   as   well   as   Industrial   Disputes   (Bombay)   Rules,
1957.  Rule 22 of Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, are pari
materia with Rule 21 of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes
Rules, 1958.   This Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd.
(supra)  has held that Rule 22 and Rule 24B were sufficiently
the source of power for the Industrial Courts to recall the
ex­parte award.  Following was laid down in Paragraph 11:­
“11. The language of Rule 22 unequivocally makes the
jurisdiction   of   the   Tribunal   to   render   an  ex   parte
award   conditional   upon   the   fulfilment   of   its
requirements. If there is no sufficient cause for the
absence   of   a   party,   the   Tribunal   undoubtedly   has
jurisdiction   to   proceed   ex   parte.  But  if   there   was
sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from
appearing,   then   under   the   terms   of   Rule   22,   the
Tribunal will have had no jurisdiction to proceed and
consequently, it must necessarily have power to set
aside the ex parte award. In other words, there is
power to proceed ex parte, but such power is subject
to the fulfilment of the condition laid down in Rule
22.   The   power   to   proceed   ex   parte   under   Rule   22
carries with it the power to enquire whether or not
there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party
at the hearing.”
       
10. The submission which was pressed before the High Court in
10
the present case that application having been filed to recall
after expiry of 30 days from publication of the award as per
the judgment of this Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), the
Tribunal has become functus officio and could not have been
entertained   the   application.     This   Court   had   occasion   to
consider this very aspect in  Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs.
L.H. Patel and Another, (2009) 2 SCC 81.   This Court noticed
the observation made by this Court in the case of  Grindlays
Bank Ltd. (supra)  in Paragraph No.14 as well as judgment of
this Court in  Anil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court
II, (2001) 10 SCC 534  in Paragraph Nos. 16, 17 and 18, this
Court laid down following:­
“14. In Grindlays Bank this Court held that Rules 22
and 24(b) were sufficiently the source of power for
the Industrial Courts to recall an ex parte award. It
was   pointed   out   that   in   terms   of   Rule   22   the
Industrial   Courts   could   proceed   ex   parte   in   the
matter only in case a party to the proceeding failed
to   attend   or   be   represented   without   showing
sufficient   cause.   The   Court   held   that   power   to
proceed ex parte under Rule 22 carried with it the
power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient
cause for the absence of the party at the hearing and
in case the party was able to show sufficient cause
for   its   non­appearance   on   the   date   the   court   had
proceeded ex parte against it, to recall the award.
(Vide para 11 of the decision.)
16.  Coming   now   to   the   submission   based   on   Section
17­A of the Act the Court in para 14 of the decision
held and observed as follows: (Grindlays Bank case,
SCC pp. 425­26)
“14.   The   contention   that   the   Tribunal   had
11
become functus officio and, therefore, had no
jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award
and   that   the   Central   Government   alone   could
set   it   aside,   does   not   commend   to   us.
Sub­section   (3)   of   Section   20   of   the   Act
provides   that   the   proceedings   before   the
Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the
date   on   which   the   award   becomes   enforceable
under Section 17­A. Under Section 17­A of the
Act,   an   award   becomes   enforceable   on   the
expiry   of   30   days   from   the   date   of   its
publication under Section 17. The proceedings
with   regard  to   a   reference   under   Section   10
of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be
concluded   until   the   expiry   of   30   days   from
the  publication  of   the   award.   Till   then  the
Tribunal   retains   jurisdiction   over   the
dispute   referred   to   it   for   adjudication   and
up to that date it has the power to entertain
an   application   in   connection   with   such
dispute.   That   stage  is   not   reached   till  the
award becomes enforceable under Section 17­A.
In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex
parte   award   on   9­12­1976.   That   award   was
published   by   the   Central   Government   in   the
Gazette   of   India   dated   25­12­1976.   The
application   for   setting   aside   the   ex   parte
award   was   filed   by   Respondent   3,   acting   on
behalf   of   Respondents   5   to   17   on   19­1­1977
i.e.   before   the   expiry   of   30   days   of   its
publication   and   was,   therefore,   rightly
entertained   by   the   Tribunal.   It   had
jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on
merits.”
(emphasis added)
From   the   above   quotation   it   would   appear   that   in
Grindlays   Bank  the   recall   application   was   filed
within   thirty  days   from   the   date   of   publication   of
the   award   and   hence,   the   objection   raised   on   the
basis of Section 17­A did not arise in this case. In
Grindlays   Bank  this   Court   did   not   say   that   the
Industrial   Courts   would   have   no   jurisdiction   to
entertain an application for setting aside an award
made   after   thirty   days   of   its   publication.
12
Nevertheless, on the basis of the passage marked in
italics   in   the   above   quotation   Ms   Issar   strongly
contended   that   that   is   the   true   import   of   the
judgment.
17.  We   are   unable   to   accept.   The   position   is   made
clear in the later decision in  Anil Sood  v.  Labour
Court.   In  Anil   Sood  interestingly   the   Labour   Court
had rejected the recall application on the very same
ground that after making the award it became functus
officio in the matter. The order of the Labour Court
was   challenged   before   the   High   Court   but   the   High
Court also took the same view. In appeal this Court
noted that the award was made on 11­9­1995 and the
application   for   its   recall   was   filed   on   6­11­1995.
The   Court   referred   to   the   earlier   decision   in
Grindlays Bank and the provisions of sub­sections (1)
and (3) of Section 11 of the Act and in paras 6, 7
and 8 of the decision observed and held as follows:
(Anil Sood case, SCC p. 536)
“6.   The   aspect   that   the   party   against   whom
award is to be made due opportunity to defend
has to be given is a matter of procedure and
not that of power in the sense in which the
language   is   adopted   in   Section   11.   When
matters are referred to the tribunal or court
they   have   to   be   decided   objectively   and   the
tribunals/courts   have   to   exercise   their
discretion   in   a   judicial   manner   without
arbitrariness   by   following   the   general
principles   of   law   and   rules   of   natural
justice.
7. The power to proceed ex parte is available
under Rule 22 of the Central Rules which also
includes the power to inquire whether or not
there was sufficient cause for the absence of
a   party   at   the   hearing,   and   if   there   is
sufficient cause shown which prevented a party
from appearing, then if the party is visited
with   an   award   without   a   notice   which   is   a
nullity and therefore the Tribunal will have
no   jurisdiction  to   proceed   and   consequently,
it   must   necessarily   have   power   to   set   aside
13
the ex parte award.
8. If this be the position in law, both the
High Court and the Tribunal (sic Labour Court)
fell into an error in stating that the Labour
Court had become functus officio after making
the award though ex parte. We set aside the
order made and the award passed by the Labour
Court and affirmed by the High Court in this
regard, in view of the fact that the learned
counsel   for   the   respondent   conceded   that
application filed by the appellant be allowed,
set aside the ex parte award and restore the
reference.”
18. In light of the decision in Anil Sood we find no
substance   in   the   appellant’s   submission   based   on
Section 17­A of the Act. There being no substance in
the first limb of the submission there is no question
of   any   conflict   between   Rule   26(2)   of   the   Bombay
Rules and Section 17­A of the Act.”
 
11. This Court in  Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi’s case  (supra)
has clearly held that the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra)
did   not   say   that   the   Industrial   Courts   would   have   no
jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside an
award made after thirty days of its publication.  This Court’s
judgment   in  Radhakrishna   Mani   Tripathi   (supra)  is   clearly
applicable in the present case.   Furthermore, in the present
case,   the   Tribunal,   which   rejected   the   application   of   the
company to recall the ex­parte award had itself returned the
finding   that   there   was   violation   of   principles   of   natural
justice since a copy of W/S was not sent to the company.  The
14
High Court after considering the submission of the parties had
made following observations:­
“On   a   perusal   of   the   order   dated   30.09.2008   it   is
difficult   for   this   Court   to   accept   the   contention
raised on behalf of the workman.  It appears from the
said   order   that   the   Tribunal   had   accepted   the
position that notice under Rule 21 of the said Rules
had not been served upon the company before placing
the case for ex­parte hearing.  It has also accepted
that Written Statement filed the workman had not been
served   upon   them   in   accordance   with   provisions
contained in Rules 20B(5) of the said Rules.  On the
face of such finding recorded by the Tribunal, it is
absolutely   clear   that   proceedings   were   conducted
before   it,   leading   to  the  impugned   award,  in   clear
violation   of   principles   of   natural   as   well   as
mandatory   provisions   of   law.     The   award   passed   on
26.2.2008   is   liable   to   be   set   aside   only   on   this
ground.”
12. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant has
strenuously contended that present is not a case of any breach
of Rule 20B(5) as held by the High Court.  The relevant order
of the Industrial Tribunal has been brought on the record by
the appellant, i.e., of 11.10.2007, where workman had appeared
and filed Written Statement.  It has been noted in the order
that copy of the W/S cannot be served upon the another party
as none appeared on behalf of the company.   Sub­rule (5) of
Rule 20B, which is relevant for present case is reproduced for
ready reference:­
20B. Statement of case or written statement. –
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
15
(5) A copy of the statement of case or the written
statement shall be served on the first party or the
second party, as the case may be, by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court within seven days from the date
on   which   copies   of   the   statement   of   case   or   the
written statement, as the case may be, are filed by
making   it   over   to   the   party   concerned   or   to   its
authorised   representative   in   the   Office   of   the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on a date and time
fixed   for   the   purpose   and   intimated   to   the   party
concerned   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal/Labour   Court.
13. A perusal of sub­rule(5) of Rule 20B indicates that the
copy of the statement of the case or the W/S is to be served
on the first party or the second party, as the case may be, by
the   Industrial   Tribunal/Labour   Court   within   seven   days   from
the   date   on   which   copies   of   the   statement   of   case   or   the
written statement, as the case may be, are filed, by making it
over   to   the   party   concerned   or   to   its   authorised
representative in the Office of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour
Court on a date and time fixed for the purpose and intimated
to   the   party   concerned   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal/Labour
Court.  The duty, thus, has been cast on the Tribunal to serve
a copy of W/S or statement of case on either side.  The use of
word “shall be served” in sub­clause (5) of Rule 20B has to be
given some meaning and purpose. The provision obviously cast a
duty   on   Industrial   Tribunal   and   the   Court   to   ensure   that
service should be completed within seven days. Another aspect,
which is decipherable from the Rule is that Tribunal has to
16
ensure   that   statement   of   case   of   W/S   has   to   be   served  by
making it available to the party concerned or its authorised
representative in the office of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour
Court on a date and time fixed for the purpose.  The last line
of the sub­rule (5) used the expression “on a date and time
fixed for the purpose and intimated to the party concerned by
the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court”.   The above expression
contains   two   requirements,   firstly,   the   Industrial
Tribunal/Labour   Court   has   to   fix   a   date   for   service   of
statement of case of W/S within 7 days, specially, fixed date
for the purpose and secondly date and time fixed for purpose
has   to   be   intimated   to   the   party   concerned.     Although
sub­rule(5)   does   not   contemplate   issuing   any   second   notice
after receipt of the statement of a case or a W/S, i.e. date
and time is required to be fixed for the purpose of statement
of   case  and  a   date   and   time,   which   is   also   required  to   be
intimated   to   the   party   concerned   for   the   purpose.     In   the
facts of present case, it has to be held that the Tribunal was
required   to   intimate   date   and   time   for   receiving   of   the
written statement by the company.  Neither the order sheet of
Tribunal indicate that any date was fixed for such service of
W/S nor any intimation was sent to the company.  Thus, there
was a clear breach of sub­rule(5) of Rule 20B, no error has
17
been   committed   by   High   Court   in   taking   the   view   that   Rule
20B(5) has been violated, resulting in violation of principles
of natural justice. 
14. Now   coming   to   Rule   21,   which   empowers   the   Tribunal   to
proceed   when   any   party   to   a   proceeding   fails   to   attend.
Learned counsel for the appellant is right in his submission
that the plain language of Rule 21 does not indicate that it
is   necessary   for   Tribunal   to   issue   any   notice   to   a   party
before proceeding ex­parte.   However, the expression used in
Rule 21 is “may proceed”.  Thus, on non­appearance on one day
does   not   oblige   the   Tribunal   to   proceed   ex­parte.     The
Tribunal   or   arbitrator   can   exercise   his   discretion   and   may
decide to send a notice before proceeding ex­parte in facts of
each   case,   which   may   be   required   in   facts   of   a   particular
case.   But   even   otherwise   accepting,   the   submission   of   the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   no   mandatory   notice
under Rule 21 was required to be issued by the Tribunal to the
company, there being violation of Rule 20B(5), the High Court
committed   no   error   in   setting   aside   the   order   of   the
Tribunal’s ex­parte award by directing the Tribunal to proceed
afresh.
15. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that
18
appellant has already attained the age of superannuation in
July, 2018.
16. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any
error in the judgment of the High Court.   The appeal being
devoid of any merit is dismissed.   Parties shall bear their
own costs.
..........................J.
         ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
..........................J.
      ( INDU MALHOTRA)
NEW DELHI,
December 04, 2018.

(i) Whether the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics) newly sanctioned in the School in the year 2012-2013 was required to be filled up by direct recruitment taking the cadre strength of the Higher Secondary School Teacher or the same was required to be filled up by transfer? and (ii) Whether for filling the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher, Rule 5 of KSS Rules were to be resorted to? Apex court held that Thus, the Statutory Scheme as delineated by Chapter XXXII of Kerala Education Rules shall alone be applicable while making recruitment to the teaching posts and Rule 5 Note (3) of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 is not attracted. - The ratio laid down in the case of Maya Mathew (supra) is fully attracted since Chapter XXXII of the Kerala Education Rules, which is under consideration was inserted in the year 2011 in the Rules, i.e. much subsequent to Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1992. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, thus, has taken correct view of the matter and has rightly reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge restoring back the order of the State Government directing the management to appoint respondent by transfer as Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics).

(i) Whether the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics) newly sanctioned in the
School in the year 2012-2013 was required to be filled up by direct recruitment taking the
cadre strength of the Higher Secondary School Teacher or the same was required to be filled
up by transfer? and (ii) Whether for filling the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher, Rule 5 of KSS Rules were to be resorted to?
Apex court held that  Thus, the Statutory Scheme as delineated by Chapter XXXII of Kerala Education Rules shall alone be applicable while making recruitment to the teaching posts and Rule 5 Note (3) of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 is
not attracted. - The ratio laid down in the case of Maya Mathew (supra) is fully attracted since Chapter XXXII of the Kerala Education Rules, which is under consideration was inserted in the year 2011 in the Rules, i.e. much subsequent to Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1992. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, thus, has taken correct view of the matter and has rightly reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge restoring back the order of the State Government directing the management to appoint respondent by transfer as Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics).

26
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. Of 2018
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 27838 of 2016)
V.K. GIRIJA ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RESHMA PARAYIL & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
 ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed against the Division Bench
judgment of Kerala High Court dated 17.08.2016 in Writ
Appeal No. 1504 of 2015 by which judgment the Writ
Appeal filed by the respondent was allowed, reversing
the judgment of learned Single Judge. The learned
Single Judge has allowed the Writ Petition filed by the
appellant, setting aside the order of the State
Government which had directed for appointment of
respondent Reshma Parayil.
26
3. The brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for
deciding the issue are:-
3.1 The respondent No.5 is an aided institution.
Respondent No.1 was serving as Upper Primary
Assistant in the school. The school was upgraded
as Higher Secondary School in the year 2011-2012.
Consequent to the upgradation, 13 new posts of
Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior) were
created. Out of 13 posts 4 posts of Higher
Secondary School Assistant (Junior) were filled
up by transfer of Higher Secondary School
Assistant and 9 posts were filled up by direct
recruitment. In 2012-2013, a new commerce batch
with economics was allotted vide Government order
dated 15.07.2013 by virtue of which two posts of
Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior) and two
posts of Higher Secondary School Teacher
(Commerce and Economics)were created. Both the
posts of Higher Secondary School Teacher were
filled up by direct recruitment by the
management. The appellant was appointed on
26.08.2013 as Higher Secondary School Teacher
26
(Economics) by direct recruitment.
3.2 The respondent No.1, who was working as Higher
Secondary School Assistant in the School, filed a
complaint to the Regional Deputy Director of
Education questioning the direct recruitment of
the appellant. Respondent No.1 claimed that she
being Higher Secondary School Assistant available
in the school, the post of Higher Secondary
School Teacher (Economics) was required to be
filled up by transfer of respondent No.1. The
complaint of respondent No.1 was rejected by
Deputy Director of Education vide his order dated
22.02.2014. An appeal was filed by the
respondent No.1 to the Director of Education,
which too was dismissed on 07.07.2014.
3.3 Respondent No.1 filed a revision before the State
Government, which revision petition was allowed
by the State Government vide order dated
01.11.2014. The State Government held that the
post of Higher Secondary School Teacher
(Economics) was required to be filled up by
transfer of Reshma Parayil (the respondent
herein). The State Government set aside the order
of Deputy Director of Education and directed the
26
management to fill up the post of Higher
Secondary School Teacher (Economics) by transfer
of respondent No.1, if she is otherwise eligible.
The order of the State Government was challenged
by appellant before the High Court by filing a
Writ Petition NO. 30707 of 2014. Learned Single
Judge relying on Rule 5(3) of the Kerala State &
Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 took the view
that vacancy has to be filled up on the basis of
cadre strength and not on the basis that the
first vacancy should be filled up by transfer.
The order of the Regional Deputy Director and
Director of Education was upheld and that of the
State Government was set aside. The respondent
No.1 aggrieved by the judgment of learned Single
Judge filed a Writ Appeal before the Division
Bench.
3.4 The Division Bench vide its judgment dated
17.08.2016 has allowed the Writ Appeal and set
aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
The Division Bench relied on an earlier Division
Bench judgment in Ajithakumari Vs. Shamma, (2009)
1 KLT 808, which according to Division Bench
26
covered the issue. The Division Bench took the
view that Rule 5 of Kerala State and Subordinate
Service Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as
‘KSS Rules) has no application and the vacancy of
Higher Secondary School Teacher was to be filled
up by transfer. Aggrieved by the judgment of the
Division Bench, the appellant has filed this
appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
Division Bench committed error in holding that vacancy
of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics) was to
be filled up by transfer. He submits that as per Rule
5 of KSS Rules, Note (3), when the method of
recruitment is both by transfer and direct recruitment,
and a ratio is fixed for different methods of
recruitment, the candidate from each method shall be
decided by applying the fixed ratio or percentage of
the cadre strength of the post. He submits that
vacancy in Higher Secondary School Teacher has no
relevance for deciding the mode of recruitment and as
per cadre strength, the post on which appellant was
appointed fell into direct recruitment quota. The
26
learned Single Judge was correct in its view that
appellant was correctly appointed. Learned counsel for
the appellant has placed reliance on two judgments of
this Court namely, S. Prakash and Another Vs. K.M.
Kurian and Others, (1999) 5 SCC 624 and Prasad Kurien
and Others Vs. K.J. Augustin and Others, (2008) 3 SCC
529.
5. The submission made by learned counsel for the
appellant has been refuted by learned counsel appearing
for respondent No.1. Learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 submits that provisions of KSS Rules
has no application. He submits that the recruitments
has to be made in accordance with Kerala Education
Rules, 1959, Rule 4 Chapter XXXII. He submits that
Chapter XXXII has been substituted in the Education
Rules by G.O. dated 09.11.2001 published in Gazette on
12.11.2001, which is subsequent to Kerala State and
Subordinate Services Rules, 1992, hence the Kerala
Education Rules regulating the appointment of Higher
Secondary School Teachers shall prevail. He submits
that for appointment of Higher Secondary School
Teachers cadre strength is not to be looked into rather
26
appointment has to be made in accordance with Rule 4 of
Chapter XXXII. He submits that judgment of this Court
in Maya Mathew Vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2010) 4
SCC 498 has clarified the situation and upheld that
Special Rules (Kerala Education Rules, 1959) pertaining
to recruitment, made subsequent to Kerala State and
Subordinate Services Rules, which shall prevail. The
earlier two judgments of this Court relied by learned
counsel for the appellant have also been explained and
distinguished. He submits that present case is fully
covered by this Court’s judgment in Maya Mathew
(supra). He further submits that respondent was fully
eligible for appointment as Higher Secondary School
Teacher (Economics) fulfilling all the qualifications.
The post has wrongly been filled up by direct
appointment by the appellant, which deserves to be set
aside. He submits that the Division Bench rightly
allowed the appeal, hence the appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
6. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
7. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the
26
parties and pleadings on record, following are three
issues, which arise for consideration in the present
case:-
(i) Whether the post of Higher Secondary School
Teacher (Economics) newly sanctioned in the
School in the year 2012-2013 was required to be
filled up by direct recruitment taking the
cadre strength of the Higher Secondary School
Teacher or the same was required to be filled
up by transfer?
(ii) Whether for filling the post of Higher
Secondary School Teacher, Rule 5 of KSS Rules
were to be resorted to?
(iii) Whether the Management committed error in
making appointment of the appellant as Higher
Secondary School Teacher (Economics) by direct
recruitment?
8. The Kerala Education Act, 1958 and the Rules framed
thereunder regulate the recruitment of teaching staff
in aided Higher Secondary School. Chapter XXXII of
Kerala Education Rules deals with method of appointment
and qualifications of teachers and non-teaching staff
in aided Higher Secondary School. Rule 3 deals with
26
categories of posts in aided Higher Secondary School.
Rule 3 contains 8 categories out of which category 1 is
Principal; Category 2 is Higher Secondary School
Teacher in different subjects (total 39) and Category 3
is Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior) in several
subjects (total 39). Rule 4 deals with method of
appointment. Rule 4(2) and 4(3) deals with appointment
of Higher Secondary School Teacher and Higher Secondary
School Teacher(Junior). Rules 4(2) and 4(3) are as
follows:-
Sl.
No.
Category Method of Appointment
1. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxxx
2. Higher Secondary
School Teacher
(1) By transfer from
Junior Lecturer in the
subject concerned under
the management / Higher
Secondary School Teacher
(Junior)
(2) In the absence of
qualified hands under
clause (1) above, the
vacancies shall be
apportioned in the ratio
1:3 between appointment by
transfer and direct
appointment as detailed
below:
(i) a)By transfer from
High School Assistants,
who possess the requisite
qualifications, under the
Educational Agency.
26
b) In the absence of
qualified persons under
(a) above, by transfer
from qualified Upper
Primary School Assistants/
Lower Primary School
Assistants who possess the
requisite qualification in
the subject concerned,
under the Educational
Agency.
(ii) By direct appointment
Note:- (i) When qualified
persons are not available
to fill up the vacancies
set apart for appointment
by transfer under item
2(i) above such vacancies
shall also be alloted for
direct appointment.
(ii) Appointments under
item (I) above shall be
made from select lists of
qualified persons prepared
on the basis of seniority
and merit.
3. Higher Secondary
School Teacher
(Junior)
1. (i) By transfer from
qualified High School
Assistants in the subject
concerned under the
Educational Agency.
(ii) In the absence of
qualified hands under item
(i) above, by transfer
from qualified Upper
Primary School
Assistants / Lower Primary
School Assistants in the
subject concerned under
the Educational Agency.
26
2. By direct appointment
Note:- (i) 25% of the
total posts shall be
filled up by the method
specified in item (I)
above on seniority - cum
suitability basis and 75%
of such post shall be
filled up by direct
appointment.
(ii) When qualified
persons are not available
to fill up the vacancies
set apart for appointment
by transfer under item 1
above, such vacancies also
shall be allotted for
direct appointment.
9. Another Rules, which are relevant for consideration are
Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1992,
reliance has been placed on Rule 5 of the said Rules,
which is to the following effect:-
5. Method of recruitment. ______ Where the normal
method of recruitment to any service, class or
category is neither solely by direct recruitment
nor solely by transfer, but is both by direct
recruitment and by transfer._____
(a) the proportion or order in which the Special
Rules concerned may require vacancies to be
filled by persons recruited direct and by those
recruited by transfer shall be applicable only to
substantive vacancies in the permanent cadre;
(b) person shall be recruited direct only against
a substantive vacancy in such permanent cadre,
26
and only if the vacancy is one which should be
filled by direct recruit under the Special Rules
referred to in clause (a); and
(c) recruitment to all other vacancies shall be
made by transfer.
Note. __ (1) All permanent vacancies and
temporary vacancies except those of short
duration shall be treated as substantive
vacancies.
(2) The vacancies on account of leave and
deputation with a duration of less than six
months shall be treated as vacancies of short
duration, provided, such vacancies with a
duration of three months to six months should not
be treated as vacancies of short duration, if the
vacancies are likely to last long or new
vacancies are likely to arise.
(3) Whenever a ratio or percentage is fixed for
different methods of recruitment/appointment to a
post the number of vacancies to be filled up by
candidates from each method shall be decided by
applying the fixed ratio or percentage to the
cadre strength of the post to which the
recruitment/transfer is made and not to the
vacancies existing at that time.
10.The appellant’s submission is that for making
appointment on the post of Higher Secondary School
Teacher, Rule 5(3) of the KSS Rules are applicable and
as per the said Rules, since recruitment on the post of
Higher Secondary School Teacher is provided by two
methods, i.e. by direct recruitment and transfer, for
filling the post, the cadre strength of Higher
26
Secondary School Teacher is to be taken for
apportioning the vacancy into ratio of 1:3. He submits
that the learned Single Judge has rightly relied on
Rule 5(3) of KSS Rules and has held that ratio can only
to be worked out if the cadre strength is maintained
whereas the Division bench of the Kerala High Court has
reversed the judgment of learned Single Judge.
11.Learned counsel for the respondent submits that for the
above recruitment on the post of Higher Secondary
School Teacher, Rule 5(3) of KSS Rules is not
applicable and the appointment has to be made only on
the basis of Rule 4 of Kerala Education Rules. He
further submits that Special Rules namely Kerala State
and Subordinate Services Rules, 1992 are Special Rules,
which were framed in the year 1992, the chapter XXXII
of the Kerala Education Rules having been inserted by
G.O. dated 09.11.2001 w.e.f. 12.11.2001, there is no
applicability of the KSS Rules.
12.We may now first look into the statutory Scheme as
delineated by Rule 4 of Kerala Education Rules. The
first issue is as to whether for filling up the post of
Higher Secondary School Teacher, the vacancy has to be
allocated as per the cadre strength. A perusal of the
26
Rule 4(2) contemplates that post of Higher Secondary
School Teacher is to be filled up first “by transfer
from Junior Lecturer in the subject concerned under the
management / Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior)”.
Thus, every vacancy of Higher Secondary School Teacher
has to be filled up first by the transfer of Higher
Secondary School Teacher (Junior) in the subject
concerned. There is a purpose and object for providing
a particular Scheme for filling up the post of Higher
Secondary School Teacher. Higher Secondary School
Teacher (Junior) is also lecturer in concerned subject
and the Statute required that whenever post in Higher
Secondary School Teacher arises, the same shall be
first offered to the Junior Lecturer in the subject.
Above statutory Scheme serves the interests of the
School, students and the teachers already serving in
the institution. A Junior Lecturer working in the same
subject is first choice to fill up the post, which
obviates the management to take any other steps for
recruitment. The second method of recruitment under
Rule 4(2) begins with the word “in the absence of
qualified hands under clause (1) above”. Thus,
recruitment under Clause (2) shall be resorted only
26
when no qualified hands under clause (1), i.e. Junior
Lecturer in the concerned subject is not available.
Further, the second phrase of Rule 4(2) begins with the
word “the vacancies shall be apportioned in the ratio
1:3 between appointment by transfer and direct
recruitment”. The clear intendment is that vacancy
arising in Higher Secondary School Teacher has to be
apportioned in ratio of 1:3. There is no concept of
looking to the cadre of the post of Higher Secondary
School Teacher while apportioning the vacancy under
Rule 4(2), the cadre strength is not to be looked into
in view of the method of recruitment provided under
Rule 4(2), i.e. of vacancies of Higher Secondary School
Teacher is filled up first by transfer of Junior
Lecturer. A plain reading of the above Statutory
Provision clearly indicates that for apportioning the
vacancy, the cadre strength of the Higher Secondary
School Teacher is not to be looked into to find out as
to which vacancy will go to transfer or direct
recruitment. Now coming to the facts of the present
case, in the year 2012-2013, two new posts were created
in Higher Secondary School Teacher, i.e. Commerce and
Economics, both were the new vacancies and no Junior
26
Lecturers, i.e. Higher Secondary School Teacher
(Junior) qualified in the subject being available, Rule
4(2) has to be resorted to. The ratio mentioned is
1:3, which means that first vacancy is to be filled up
by transfer. Resorting to cadre strength, thus, was
not contemplated by plain reading of Rule 4(2). We,
thus, do not find any substance in the submission of
the counsel for the appellant. Above interpretation of
Rule 4(2) is reinforced by looking to Rule 4(3), which
deals with recruitment of Higher Secondary School
Teacher (Junior). Higher Secondary School
Teacher(Junior) is also to be filled up by transfer
from qualified High School Assistant in the subjects
concerned. In absence of qualified hands, by transfer
from qualified Upper Primary School Assistants/ Lower
Primary School Assistants in the subjects concerned
under the Educational Agency. For filling up the posts
in the subjects concerned, the direct recruitment is
also provided as one mode of recruitment. Note 1,
which is very relevant, provides “25% of the total
posts shall be filled up by the method specified in
item (I) above on seniority-cum-suitability basis and
75% of such post shall be filled up by direct
26
appointment”. Here, Note 1, uses two expressions
“total posts” and “such posts”. Thus, computation of
25% and 75% is to be based on that total posts of
Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior). The language
used in Note 1 when read in contradiction to Rule 4(2)
(ii), the intention is clear that whereas for
appointment in Higher Secondary School Teacher, the
vacancy shall be apportioned, whereas for filling up
the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior),
“total posts” are to be apportioned on the basis of
cadre strength.
13.Now, we come to the Kerala State and Subordinate
Services Rules, 1958 – Rule 5. Rule 5 begins with the
words “where the normal method of recruitment to any
service, class or category is neither solely by direct
recruitment nor solely by transfer, but is both by
direct recruitment and by transfer”. Rule 5 of 1958
Rules also provides for method of recruitment and Note
(3) to Rule 5 provides that whenever a ratio or
percentage is fixed for different methods of
recruitment/appointment to a post the number of
vacancies to be filled up by candidates from each
method shall be decided by applying the fixed ratio or
26
percentage to the cadre strength of the post to which
the recruitment/transfer is made and not to the
vacancies existing at that time. The Special Rules are
1992 Rules. The Kerala Education Act, 1958 and Kerala
Education Rules both are General Rules but in view of
the fact that Chapter XXXII has been inserted in the
Rules by notification dated 09.11.2001, which makes it
clear that appointment of teachers and non-teaching
staff in aided Higher Secondary School Teacher is to be
governed by Kerala Education Rules. Further, the
recruitment under Rule 4(2) of Higher Secondary School
Teacher is a recruitment specially statutory designed
in a different manner providing for all vacancy in
Higher Secondary School Teacher subjects, to be first
filled up by Junior Lecturer in the subjects concerned
under the management. Thus, recruitment under Rule 4(2)
cannot be said to be “normal method of recruitment” to
any service as contemplated by Rule 5 of KSS Rules.
Thus, KSS Rules cannot be held to be applicable for
making recruitment under Rule 4(2) of Chapter XXXII of
the Kerala Education Rules. Further, a set of Rules of
Chapter XXXII having been brought subsequent to Special
Rules, intendment is clear that it was intended that
26
general rule being Chapter XXXII shall be followed for
appointment of teachers in aided institutions. This
Court in the case of Maya Mathew (supra) had occasion
to consider Kerala State and Subordinate Services
Rules, 1958 in reference to a general rule namely
Kerala State Homeopathy Services Rules, 1989. Note (3)
of Rule 5 of Kerala State and Subordinate Services
Rules, 1958 came up for consideration in the above
case. Whereas Rule 3 of the Homeopathy Rules also
provided for method of appointment and ratio to be
maintained in making appointment. Kerala State and
Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 were referred as
General Rules in the aforesaid judgment. The
Homeopathy Rules wee referred to as Special Rules,
which was repugnant to General Rules. In Para 12 of
the judgment, rules of interpretation governing two set
of Rules were noticed to the following effect:-
“12. The rules of interpretation when a subject
is governed by two sets of rules are well
settled. They are:
(i) When a provision of law regulates a
particular subject and a subsequent law
contains a provision regulating the same
subject, there is no presumption that the
latter law repeals the earlier law. The
rule-making authority while making the
later rule is deemed to know the existing
26
law on the subject. If the subsequent law
does not repeal the earlier rule, there can
be no presumption of an intention to repeal
the earlier rule;
(ii) When two provisions of law—one being a
general law and the other being a special
law govern a matter, the court should
endeavour to apply a harmonious
construction to the said provisions. But
where the intention of the rule-making
authority is made clear either expressly or
impliedly, as to which law should prevail,
the same shall be given effect.
(iii) If the repugnancy or inconsistency subsists
in spite of an effort to read them
harmoniously, the prior special law is not
presumed to be repealed by the later
general law. The prior special law will
continue to apply and prevail in spite of
the subsequent general law. But where a
clear intention to make a rule of universal
application by superseding the earlier
special law is evident from the later
general law, then the later general law,
will prevail over the prior special law.
(iv) Where a later special law is repugnant to
or inconsistent with an earlier general
law, the later special law will prevail
over the earlier general law.”
14.Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958
contains Rule 2, which is to the following effect:-
“2. Relation to the Special Rules.—If any
provision in the General Rules contained in the
part is repugnant to a provision in the Special
Rules applicable to any particular service
contained in Part III, the latter shall in
respect of that service, prevail over the
provision in the General Rules in this part.”
15.The earlier judgments of this Court in S. Prakash and
26
Another Vs. K.M. Kurian and Others, (supra) and Prasad
Kurien and Others Vs. K.J. Augustin and Others,
(supra), which had considered Note 3 of Rule 5 of
Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 were
also considered and distinguished. In Paragraph 14 to
20, following has been laid down:-
“14. The question whether there can be an
exception to the primacy given to the Special
Rules by Rule 2 of the General Rules, was
considered by this Court in S. Prakash and Prasad
Kurien, with particular reference to Note (3) to
Rule 5 of the General Rules.
15. In S. Prakash, this Court considered whether
the provisions of the Special Rules, the Kerala
Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax Service
Rules, will have to yield to Note (3) to Rule 5
of the General Rules. This Court held: (SCC pp.
633-34, para 14)
“14. From the aforesaid discussion, it is
clear that if the intention of the
rule-making authority was to establish a
rule of universal application to all the
services in the State of Kerala for which
the Special Rules are made, then the
Special Rules will give way to the General
Rules enacted for that purpose. This has
to be found out from the language used in
the Rules which may be express or by
implication. If the language is clear and
unqualified, the subsequent General Rule
would prevail despite repugnancy. If the
intention of the rule-making authority is
to sweep away all the Special Rules and to
establish a uniform pattern for
computation of the ratio or percentage of
direct recruits and by transfer, in such a
26
case, the Special Rules will give way. …
The language of Note (3) is crystal clear
and is for removal of any ambiguity by
using positive and negative terms. It
applies to all the Special Rules whenever
a ratio or percentage is prescribed in the
Rules. It also emphatically states that it
has to be computed on the cadre strength
of the post to which the recruitment is to
be made and not on the basis of the
vacancies existing at that time.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Prasad Kurien, while considering the
Special Rules, the Kerala Excise and Prohibition
Subordinate Service Rules, 1974, vis-à-vis Note
(3) to Rule 5 of the General Rules, this Court
followed the dictum in S. Prakash.
17. These decisions reiterate the position that
if the intention of the rule-making authority is
to make a later general rule to apply to all
services in the State, for which different
earlier special rules exist, then the existing
special rules will give way to such later general
rule. That is, where the general rule is made
subsequent to the special rule and the language
of the general rule signified that it was
intended to apply to all services and prevail
over any prior special rules, the intention of
the rule-making authority should be given effect
by applying the subsequent general rule instead
of the earlier special rule.
18. This Court held that the language of Note (3)
to Rule 5 of General Rules showed that it was
intended to prevail over existing Special Rules
which indicated a contrary position. What is
significant is that the two decisions considered
the Special Rules that were earlier in point of
time to the General Rules as amended by the 1992
Amendment rules which introduced Note (3) to Rule
5 of the General Rules.
19. This Court held, on reading the General Rules
26
in conjunction with the Special Rules, that Note
(3) to Rule 5 of General Rules will prevail over
the corresponding provisions in the Special Rules
showing a different intention, when deciding
whether the ratio of each feeder category should
be determined with reference to the cadre
strength or existing vacancies.
20. What logically follows from the principle
enunciated in the two decisions is that if any
special rule is subsequent to the general rule,
then the question of examining whether the prior
general rule will prevail over a later special
rule will not arise at all having regard to the
categorical provision contained in Rule 2 of the
General Rules. The principle laid down in those
decisions will not apply where the special rule
is made subsequent to the general rule.”
16.This Court clearly held that principle laid down in S.
Prakash and Another Vs. K.M. Kurian and Others, (supra)
and Prasad Kurien and Others Vs. K.J. Augustin and
Others, (supra) shall not apply where the Special Rules
are made subsequent to the General Rules. The ratio
laid down in the above case is fully applicable in the
facts of the present case. Thus, the Statutory Scheme
as delineated by Chapter XXXII of Kerala Education
Rules shall alone be applicable while making
recruitment to the teaching posts and Rule 5 Note (3)
of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 is
not attracted.
17.Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance
26
on judgments of this Court in S. Prakash and Another
Vs. K.M. Kurian and Others, (supra) and Prasad Kurien
and Others Vs. K.J. Augustin and Others, (supra). Both
the above judgments had been considered and
distinguished by this Court in the case of Maya Mathew
(supra). The ratio laid down in the case of Maya
Mathew (supra) is fully attracted since Chapter XXXII
of the Kerala Education Rules, which is under
consideration was inserted in the year 2011 in the
Rules, i.e. much subsequent to Kerala State and
Subordinate Services Rules, 1992. The Division Bench
of the Kerala High Court, thus, has taken correct view
of the matter and has rightly reversed the judgment of
the learned Single Judge restoring back the order of
the State Government directing the management to
appoint respondent by transfer as Higher Secondary
School Teacher (Economics).
18.Learned counsel for the appellant lastly has submitted
that appellant has been working and satisfactorily
discharging her duties for last more than 5 years and
respondent may get another chance for being appointed
by transfer when any other vacancy arises on the post
of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics). We do
26
not find any substance in the above submission when as
per Rule 4(2), the respondent was entitled for
appointment by transfer, which claim has been accepted
by the State Government, the claim of respondent cannot
be negated on the premise as contended by the
appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent,
however, during submissions has fairly submitted that
she has no objection, if the appellant is adjusted on
the post, which is at present held by the respondent.
19.In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the
view that appellant has no right to hold the post of
Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics) and on the
said post, the respondent is to be appointed as per the
direction of the State Government and affirmed by the
Division Bench. We, thus, direct the management to
appoint the respondent on or before 31.12.2018 so as to
enable the respondent to join her post of Higher
Secondary School Teacher (Economics) w.e.f. 01.01.2019.
In the ends of justice, we, however, observe that the
appellant, if willing to work on the post, at present,
held by the respondent No.1, the respondents shall
adjust her and allow her to work on the post occupied
by the respondent No.1 w.e.f. the same date, i.e.
26
01.01.2019. In event, the appellant does not accept the
aforesaid post, it shall be open for the respondents to
proceed in accordance with law. We make it clear that
the above direction is being given in particular
circumstances of the present case and shall not be
treated as any precedent. Subject to above, the appeal
is dismissed.

......................J.
 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
 ( AJAY RASTOGI )
New Delhi,
December 04, 2018. 

whether - the “manufactured drugs” - the present respondents - should be tried for the violation of provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 but not under sec.22 of NDPS Act. ? Apex court held - No - While suspending the sentence pending appeal, the High court made unnecessary observation which was against settled law and as such set aside the order of High Court and held that we are unable to agree on the conclusion reached by the High Court for reasons stated further. First, we note that Section 80 of the N.D.P.S Act, clearly lays down that application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is not barred, and provisions of N.D.P.S. Act can be applicable in addition to that of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The statute further clarifies that the provisions of the N.D.P.S Act are not in derogation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. - Additionally, it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute the offender in accordance with law. In the present case, since the action of the accused­Respondents amounted to a prima­facie violation of Section 8 of the N.D.P.S Act, they were charged under Section 22 of the N.D.P.S Act.

whether - the “manufactured drugs” - the   present   respondents -   should   be   tried   for   the   violation   of provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 but not under sec.22 of NDPS Act. ?
Apex court held - No - While suspending the sentence pending appeal, the High court made unnecessary observation which was against settled law and as such set aside the order of High Court and held that  we are unable to agree on the conclusion reached by the High Court for reasons stated further. First, we note that Section 80 of the N.D.P.S Act, clearly lays down that application of the Drugs   and   Cosmetics   Act   is   not   barred,   and   provisions   of N.D.P.S.   Act   can   be   applicable   in   addition   to   that   of   the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The statute further clarifies   that   the   provisions   of   the   N.D.P.S   Act   are   not   in derogation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. - Additionally, it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute the offender in accordance with law. In the present case, since the action of the accused­Respondents amounted to a  prima­facie violation of Section 8 of the N.D.P.S Act, they were charged under Section 22 of the N.D.P.S Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1512  OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 4762 OF 2018)
STATE OF PUNJAB …APPELLANT
VERSUS
RAKESH KUMAR         …RESPONDENT
WITH
Criminal Appeal No. 1514  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4816 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1515 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4817 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1517 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP(Crl) No.4869 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1516 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4818 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1513  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4796 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1518 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4881 of 2018)
1
REPORTABLE
Criminal Appeal No. 1521 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5032 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1530 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5897 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1520 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4968 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1526  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5893 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1525 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5892 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1519 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4953 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1528  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5895 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1523  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5886 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1527  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5894 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1524  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5891 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1529  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5896 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1522 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5877 of 2018)
2
Criminal Appeal No. 1533  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7223 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1532 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7222 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1536 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7228 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1531 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7221 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1534  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7225 of 2018)
And
Criminal Appeal No. 1535  of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7227 of 2018)
JUDGMENT
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals are filed by the State having been aggrieved
by the common judgment and order dated 29th  January, 2018
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, allowing the
applications   for   suspension   of   sentence,   preferred   by   the
accused­respondents   herein   under   Section   389   Cr.P.C.   and
3
directing to release them on bail, while the Appeals are pending
in the High Court.
3. In   order   to   appreciate   the   merits   of   theseappeals,   brief   facts
which have emerged from the case of the prosecution need to be
noted   at   the   outset.   In   all   these   appeals,   the   accusedrespondents
were apprehended with“manufactured drugs” and
convicted   by   the   Trial   Court   for   offences   committed   under
Section   21   or   Section   22   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as
“N.D.P.SAct”). The alleged offences and conviction recorded by
the Trial Court against the respondents are listed below:
S.NO.
CASE
NO.
NAME OF
ACCUSED
RECOVERY CONVICTION
JUDGMENT
BY & DATE
1.
CRAS­840­
SB2015
Rakesh
Kumar
3500 tablets of
Microlit containing
Diphenoxylate salt
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Special
Judge, Sri
Muktsar
Sahib –
18.11.2014
2.
CRAS­227­
SB2015
Anwar
Khan @
Soni
3.900 kgs of
intoxicating powder
containing
Dexiropropoxyphen
e salt
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Sangrur –
17.11.2014
3. CRASMonnu
81.76 gms salt
Diphenoxylate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
Special
Judge,
4
3148­
SB2015
Hydrochloride
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Ferozepur –
04.06.2015
4.
CRAS4134­
SB2015
Dharmu
Diphenoxylate
powder in
commercial quantity
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI
&Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Ludhiana  –
25.05.2015
5.
CRAS5246­
SB2015
Gurwinder
Singh
70 gms containing
Diphenoxylate salt
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Ludhiana –
10.11.2015
6.
CRAS­71­
SB2016
Mohd.
Akhtar @
Soni
19110 mls of
intoxicating liquid
10 capsules of
Parvon Spas, 10
tablets of Euphoria
U/s 22 (a)
& 2(c) of
NDPS Act
– 1 year
RI &
Rs.5000/­
fine and
10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Sangrur –
09.12.2015
7.
CRAS­323­
SB2015
Munish
Kumar 15 Vials of Rexcof
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Bathinda –
09.01.2015
8.
CRAS­200­
SB2017
Gudawar
Ram @
Gabbu
60 gms intoxicating
powder containing
Diphenoxylate salt
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court, SBS
Nagar –
09.12.2016
9. CRA­ Baljinder 7500 mls of Corex U/s 22 of Judge,
5
S­766­
SB2017
Singh @
Banty
syrup containing
Codeine phosphate
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Special
Court,
Sangrur –
20.12.2016
10.
CRAS1413­
SB2017
Sukhraj
Kaur @
Raj
120 bottles of
Rexcof containing
Codeine phosphate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Sangrur –
08.03.2017
11.
CRAS4055­
SB2016
Gurpreet
Singh @
Gopi
25 gms Heroin &
250 gms
intoxicating powder
containing
Alprazolam
U/s 21 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Amritsar –
06.09.2016
12.
CRAS2933­
SB2016
Salwinder
Singh @
Shinda
320 gms
intoxicating powder
containing
Diphenoxylate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court, Tarn
Taran –
09.08.2016
13.
CRAS­985­
SB2017
Karamjit
Singh @
Karma
10 Vials of Rexcof
containing Codeine
Phosphate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Faridkot –
04.01.2017
14.
CRAS­723­
SB2016
Mandeep
Singh @
Mani
300 gms
intoxicating powder
containing
Diphenoxylate
Hydrochloride
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Addl.
Sessions
Judge,
Amritsar –
23.12.2015
15. CRAS1531­
SB2016
Jagmohan
Singh @
Mithu
100 gms
intoxicating powder
containing
Diphenoxylate
Hydrochloride
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
Judge,
Special
Court,
Amritsar –
10.03.2016
6
lac fine.
16.
CRAS2398­
SB2017
Nachhatar
Singh @
Sonu
60 gms intoxicating
powder containing
Diphenoxylate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court, Tarn
Taran–
16.05.2017
17.
CRAS1972­
SB2017
Gaurav
Bajaj (the
other
appellant
Manpreet
Singh)
50 bottles of Rexcof
syrup & 250 tablets
of Carisona from
Gaurav Bajaj 45
bottles of Rexcof
syrup & 200 tablets
of Carisona from
Manpreet Singh
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Fazilka–
17.03.2017
18.
CRAS3921­
SB2013
Gurpreet
Singh
19 vials of Rexcof,
1200 tablets of
Pinotil and 450
tablets of
Alprazolam
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Bathinda –
24.10.2013
19.
CRAS1529­
SB2017
Jaspal
Singh
12 vials of Rexcof
containing codeine
Phosphate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Sangrur –
07.03.2017
20.
CRAS­750­
SB2014
Sanjiv
Kumar &
Paramjit
Singh @
Pamma
1300 tablets
weighing 101, 400
gms from Sanjiv
Kumar; 400 tablets
weighing 31.200
gms from Paramjit
Singh @ Pamma
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court­III,
Ferozepur –
27.01.2014
21.
CRAS4894­
SB2015
Akash
Kumar
3500 mls containing
Codeine Phosphate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Sangrur –
16.10.2015
7
22.
CRAS2574­
SB2017
Satnam
Singh
20 vials of Rexcof
containing
Dextropropoxyphene
U/s 22of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Faridkot –
06.07.2017
23.
CRAS1616­
SB2017
Amit
Kumar
Mehta
2000 tablets
containing
Diphenoxylate
Hydrochloride
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Judge,
Special
Court,
Patiala –
01.03.2017
24.
CRAS­185­
SB2017
Gurjant
Singh @
Janta
60 gms intoxicating
powder containing
Diphenoxylate
U/s 22 of
NDPS Act
– 10 years
RI &
Rs.1.00
lac fine.
Addl.
Sessions
Judge, Tarn
Taran –
20.10.2016
25.
CRMM23054­
2017
Gurpreet
Singh @
Tuli
100 tablets marka
Alprazolam in 5
strips, 12 injections
Buprenorphine 2
ml, 2 bottles of
injections Avil 10 ml
& 116 gms
intoxicant powder
U/s
22/61/85
of NDPS
Act
Judge,
Special
Court,
Jalandhar
4. Aggrieved by the Judgment and conviction by the respective Trial
Courts, the accused­respondents approached the High Court
through various appeals. The accused­respondents, during the
pendency   of   the   appeals,   preferred   an   application   seeking
suspension of sentence. Since a common question of law was
involved in the above appeals, the High Court heard the matters
8
together   and   passed   a   common   order   dated   29.01.2018,
allowing the applications for suspension of sentence preferred
by   the   accused­respondents.   The   High   Court   observed   that
manufactured   drugs,   be   it   containing   narcotic   drugs   or
psychotropic substances, if manufactured by a manufacturer,
must   be   tried,   if   violation   is   there,   under   the   Drugs   and
Cosmetics Act and not under the NDPS Act, except those in
loose form by way of powder, liquid etc.   Dissatisfied by the
above   order   dated   29.01.2018,   the   State   has   preferred   the
present appeals.
5. The counsel on behalf of the appellant­State, while criticizing the
impugned order passed by the High Court, drew our attention
to the relevant provisions of the N.D.P.S Act and Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940, and submitted that, the N.D.P.S Act, itself
does not bar the application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
1940. Further, the counsel  also  argued that, the  impugned
judgment   is   in   gross   violation   of   the   decision   rendered   in
Inderjeet  Singh  v. State  of  Punjab  2014 (3) RCR (Criminal)
953, by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court. The counsel also relied upon the decision rendered by
9
this Court in Union of India v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande (2014)
13 SCC 1, wherein it was clearly held that dealing in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances is permissible only if it is
for   medical   or   scientific   purposes.   But   even   the   usage   for
medical and scientific purposes is not restriction free, as it is
subject to rules under the N.D.P.S Act.
6. On   the   contrary,   the   counsel   on   behalf   of   the   accusedrespondents
has supported the reasoning of the High Court
while stating that it is very farfetched to presume that, any
person who is apprehended with bulk quantity of manufactured
drug, without having a license for the same, has committed an
offence which is liable to be prosecuted under the N.D.P.S Act.
The counsel further submitted that, the High Court was correct
to conclude that, it can be considered as a violation of the
provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Therefore,
there   was   no   error   in   granting   the   relief   of   suspension   of
sentence,   considering   that   the   appeals   are   not   going   to   be
adjudicated in the near future.
7. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties.
8. At the outset it is essential to note the objectives of the two
10
legislations before us, i.e., the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
and the N.D.P.S Act. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was
enacted   to   specifically   prevent   sub­standard   drugs   and   to
maintain high standards of medical treatment. (See Chimanlal
Jagjivandas  Sheth  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  AIR  1963  SC
665) The Drugs and Cosmetics Act,1940 was mainly intended
to   curtail   the   menace   of   adulteration   of   drugs   and   also   of
production, manufacture, distribution and sale of spurious and
sub­standard drugs. On the other hand, the N.D.P.S Act is a
special law enacted by the Parliament with an object to control
and   regulate   the   operations   relating   to   narcotic   drugs   and
psychotropic substances. After analyzing the objectives of both
the Acts, we can safely conclude that while the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act deals with drugs which are intended to be used
for   therapeutic   or   medicinal   usage,   on   the   other   hand   the
N.D.P.S Act intends to curb and penalize the usage of drugs
which are usedfor intoxication or for getting a stimulant effect.
9. At   this   juncture,   it   is   also   pertinent   to   note   the   relevant
provisions under the N.D.P.S Act. Section 8 of the 1985 Act, is
the   prohibitory   clause   whose   violation   would   lead   to   penal
11
consequence:
Section 8. Prohibition of certain operations.
­No person shall­
(a)   cultivate   any   coca   plant   or   gather   any
portion of coca plant; or
(b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis
plant; or
(c)   produce,   manufacture,   possess,   sell,
purchase,   transport,   warehouse,   use,
consume,   import   inter­State,   export   interState,
import into India, export from India or
transship   any   narcotic   drug   or   psychotropic
substance,
except for medical or scientific purposes and in
the manner and to the extent provided by the
provisions of this Act or the rules or orders
made thereunder and in a case where any such
provision, imposes any requirement by way of
licence,   permit   or   authorization   also   in
accordance with the terms and conditions of
such licence, permit or authorization:
Provided   that,   and   subject   to   the   other
provisions of this Act and the rules made there
under, the prohibition against the cultivation
of   the   cannabis   plant   for   the   production   of
ganja   or   the   production,   possession,   use,
consumption,   purchase,   sale,   transport,
warehousing,   import   inter­State   and   export
inter State of ganja for any purpose other than
medical and scientific purpose shall take effect
only   from   the   date   which   the   Central
Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf.
10. Further, Section 21 provides for punishment for contraventions in
12
relation to manufactured drugs and preparations and Section 22
provides   for   punishment   for   contraventions   in   relation   to
psychotropic substances. Both the above provisions provide for
the imposition of rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years,
and the imposition of a fine which shall not be less than one lakh
rupees but which may be extended to two lakh rupees, if the
recovered substance amounts to commercial quantity. However,
the   proviso   appended   thereto   empowers   the   Court,   with   a
discretionary power to impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees
for reasons to be recorded in the judgment.
11. In the present case, the accused­respondents were found in bulk
possession   of   manufactured   drugs   without   any   valid
authorization. The counsel on behalf of the appellant­State has
extensively stressed that the actions of the accused­Respondents
amounts to clear violation of Section 8 of the N.D.P.S Act as it
clearly   prohibits   possession   of   narcotic   substances   except   for
medicinal or scientific purposes. In furtherance of the same, the
counsel on behalf of the appellant­State has put emphasis on the
judgment rendered by this court in the case of Union of India
13
vs. Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra), wherein it was held that:
“25.  In other words, DEALING IN narcotic
drugs   and   psychotropic   substances   is
permissible only when such DEALING is for
medical   purposes   or   scientific   purposes.
Further, the mere fact that the DEALING
IN   narcotic   drugs   and   psychotropic
substances   is   for   a  medical   or   scientific
purpose does not by itself lift the embargo
created Under Section 8(c). Such a dealing
must be in the manner and extent provided
by the provisions of the Act, Rules or Orders
made thereunder. Sections 9 and 10 enable
the   Central   and   the   State   Governments
respectively   to   make   rules   permitting   and
regulating   various   aspects   (contemplated
under Section 8(c), of DEALING IN narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances.
26.The Act does not contemplate framing of
rules for prohibiting the various activities of
DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances.   Such   prohibition   is   already
contained   in   Section   8(c).  It   only
contemplates  of  the  framing  of Rules  for
permitting  and  regulating  any  activity  of
DEALING   IN   narcotic   drugs   or
psychotropic substances…”
(emphasis supplied)
12. In the present appeals before us, the trial courts after analyzing
the evidence placed before them, held the accused Respondents
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and convicted them for offences
committed under Section 21 and Section 22 of the N.D.P.S Act.
14
13. The   counsels   for   the   accused­respondents   have   strongly
supported the judgment of the High Court wherein it was held
that, since the present matters deal with “manufactured drugs”
the   present   respondents   should   be   tried   for   the   violation   of
provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
14. However, we are unable to agree on the conclusion reached by the
High Court for reasons stated further. First, we note that Section
80 of the N.D.P.S Act, clearly lays down that application of the
Drugs   and   Cosmetics   Act   is   not   barred,   and   provisions   of
N.D.P.S.   Act   can   be   applicable   in   addition   to   that   of   the
provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The statute further
clarifies   that   the   provisions   of   the   N.D.P.S   Act   are   not   in
derogation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. This Court in
the case of Union of India vs. Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra),
has held that,
“35.   …essentially the Drugs & Cosmetics Act,
1940   deals   with   various   operations   of
manufacture,   sale,   purchase   etc.   of   drugs
generally  whereas   Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic   Substances   Act,   1985   deals
with   a   more   specific   class   of   drugs   and,
therefore,   a   special   law   on   the   subject.
Further the provisions of the Act operate in
addition to the provisions of 1940 Act.”
15
(emphasis supplied)
15. The   aforesaid   decision   further   clarifies   that,   the   N.D.P.S   Act,
should not be read in exclusion to Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
1940.  Additionally, it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute
the offender in accordance with law. In the present case, since the
action of the accused­Respondents amounted to a  prima­facie
violation of Section 8 of the N.D.P.S Act, they were charged under
Section 22 of the N.D.P.S Act.
16. In light of above observations, we find that decision rendered by
the High Court holding that the accused­respondents must be
tried under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 instead of the
N.D.P.S   Act,   as   they   were   found   in   possession   of   the
“manufactured drugs”, does not hold good in law. Further, in the
present case, the accused­respondents had approached the High
Court seeking suspension of sentence. However, in granting the
aforesaid relief, the High Court erroneously made observations on
the merits of the case while the appeals were still pending before
it. 
17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and
16
the gravity of offence alleged against the accused­respondents,
the order of the High Court directing suspension of sentence and
grant of bail is clearly unsustainable in law and the same is liable
to be set aside.
18. Accordingly the impugned order passed by the High Court is
hereby set aside and the concerned authorities are directed to
take the accused­respondents herein into custody forthwith.
19. Lastly, the counsels for respondents in Appeals arising out of SLP
(Crl) No.4816/2018 and SLP (Crl) No.4817/2018 have specifically
pleaded   that   the   respondents   have   already   undergone   a
considerable period under incarceration. In light of the same, we
request the High Court to expedite the hearings and dispose of
the   appeals   accordingly.   It   is   needless   to   observe   that   the
observations made during the course of this order are only for
deciding these appeals.
20. The   appeals   stand   allowed   in   aforesaid   terms.   As   a   sequel
pending applications, if any shall also stand disposed of.
17
……………………………..J.
(N. V. Ramana)
……………………………..J.
(Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)
……………………………..J.
(M.R. Shah)
NEW DELHI,
DECEMBER 03, 2018
18

Land acquisition Act - Trial court fixed market value at 21,000/-. The High Court reduced the same and fixed the market rate at Rs.14,500/­ per Gunta and deducting 30% towards development charges fixed at Rs.10,250/­ per Gunta. - Apex court held that there is enough evidence to prove the potentiality of the land in question as would be clear from the findings of the Land Acquisition Officer Apart from it, the landowners have also proved the market value of the land in question by filing 10 sale deeds wherein it is established that price of the land situated in the adjacent area has varied from Rs.7250/­ per Gunta to Rs.57,000/­ per Gunta between 1977 till 1982. we are of the view that there was no justifiable reason for the High Court to reduce the rate from Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta to Rs.14,500/­ per Gunta and then deducting 30% towards development charges fixed at Rs. 10,250/­ per Gunta and held that we consider just and proper to fix Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta as the market value of the land in question and after deducting 10% towards the development charges fix the market price of the land in question at Rs.18,900/­ per Gunta.

  Land acquisition Act - Trial court fixed market value at 21,000/-. The High Court  reduced the same and fixed the market rate at Rs.14,500/­ per Gunta and deducting 30% towards development charges fixed at Rs.10,250/­ per Gunta. - Apex court held that there is enough evidence to prove the potentiality of the land in question as would   be   clear   from   the   findings   of   the   Land Acquisition Officer  Apart from it, the landowners have also proved the market value of the land in question by filing 10 sale deeds wherein it is established   that   price   of   the   land   situated   in   the adjacent area has varied from Rs.7250/­ per Gunta to Rs.57,000/­ per Gunta between 1977 till 1982. we are of the view that there was no justifiable
reason  for  the  High  Court  to  reduce  the  rate  from Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta to Rs.14,500/­ per Gunta and then   deducting   30%   towards   development   charges fixed at Rs. 10,250/­  per Gunta and held that we consider just and proper to fix Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta as the market value of the land in question and after deducting   10% towards the development
charges fix the market price of the land in question at Rs.18,900/­  per Gunta.

  REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.6057 OF 2012
Mallappa Dead by L.Rs. & Ors.        ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Special Land Acquisition
Officer & Anr.        …Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No.1573 OF 2018
Arvind  & Ors.         ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The Special Land Acquisition
Officer         …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
In Civil Appeal No.6057/2012
1. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
order/judgment dated 12.10.2007 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. No.594 of
2003 whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed
1
by   the   respondents   herein   and   reduced   the
compensation   awarded   to   the   appellants   herein   by
award dated 30.09.2002 passed by the Additional Civil
Judge (Sr. Division) Hubli in LAC No.58/87.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in
this appeal, it is necessary to set out the facts of the
case hereinbelow.
3. The   appellants   are   the   claimants   (landowners)
and   the  respondents   are  the  State  Authorities­nonapplicants
  in   the   land   acquisition   reference
proceedings out of which this appeal arises. The State
of Karnataka in exercise of powers conferred under
Section   28(1)   of   the   Karnataka   Industrial   Areas
Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”) acquired the land measuring 24 acres 15 guntas
bearing Survey No. 44, Naruab Thimmasagar Village,
Hubli Taluk District Dharwad. The land was acquired
for   Karnataka   Industrial   Areas   Development   Board,
2
Bangalore for a public purpose "expansion of existing
industrial estate in Tahsil Hubli".
4. The   notification   was   accordingly   issued   under
Section 28(1) on 23/28.06.1980. It was published in
the official Gazette on 03.07.1980 (page 152  part III1).
  This   notification   was   followed   by   issuance   of
another notification on 27.05.1981 under Section 28
(4) of the Act. The appellants being the owners of the
land   in   question   became   entitled   to   claim
compensation for their land.
5. This   led   to   initiation   of   the   proceedings   for
determination   of   the   compensation   payable   to   the
appellants for their land under the Act. The Special
Land Acquisition Officer (respondent No. 1 herein) by
his award dated 27.10.1986 awarded compensation to
the appellants at the rate of Rs.5/­ per sq. meter = Rs.
500/­ per Gunta.
6. The   appellants   (landowners)   felt   aggrieved   and
prayed for making a reference to the Civil Court for re3
determination   of   the   rate   of   compensation.   It   was
accordingly   made.   By   award   dated   30.09.2002,   the
Reference   Court   partly   answered   the   reference   in
appellants’   favour   and   enhanced   the   rate   of
compensation at Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta.
7. The appellants and the State Authorities both felt
aggrieved of the award of the Reference Court and filed
appeals in the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore.
The appellants prayed for further enhancement in the
rate   of   compensation   whereas   the   State   prayed   for
reduction in the rate.
8. By   impugned   judgment/order,   the   High   Court
allowed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   State   in   part   and
reduced the rate of compensation to Rs.10250/­ per
Gunta   from   Rs.21,000/­   per   Gunta   fixed   by   the
Reference Court. The High Court fixed the market rate
at Rs.14,500/­ per Gunta and deducting 30% towards
development charges fixed at Rs.10,250/­ per Gunta.
As a consequence, the appeal filed by the landowners
4
was dismissed which has given rise to filing of this
appeal by way of special leave by the landowners in
this Court.
9. The question, which arises for consideration in
this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified in
reducing the rate of compensation from Rs.21,000/­
per Gunta to Rs. 10,250/­ per Gunta.
10. In other words, the question, which  arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court
was justified in holding that the market value of the
land in question was Rs.10,250/­ per Gunta on the
date of its acquisition.   
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   on   perusal   of   the   record   of   the   case,   we   are
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside the
impugned order of the High Court restore the award of
the   Reference   Court/Civil   Court   with   slight
modification as indicated infra.
5
12. It may be mentioned that the State had also filed
appeal   by   special   leave   in   this   Court   against   the
impugned   order   of   the   High   Court   wherein   the
grievance of the State was that the High Court was not
justified in fixing the market rate at Rs. 10,250/­ per
Gunta. According to the State, the rate should have
been   determined   at   a   much   lower   rate   than
Rs.10,250/­   per   Gunta.   This   Court   by   order   dated
04.11.2015 dismissed the appeal filed by the State and
affirmed the impugned order.
13. On perusal of the record, we find that the Special
Deputy   Commissioner   (LAO)   while   awarding
compensation   recorded   a   finding   that   the   acquired
land in question is suitable for construction of the
buildings. It was also held that the land is situated in
the  midst  of well­developed area of  the city and  is
surrounded by several big factories, industrial estate
and the housing colonies. It was also held that the
land is abutting the main road passing through Hubli.
6
14. In addition, the appellants filed 10 sale deeds by
way of exemplars to prove the market value. These sale
deeds were executed from 1977 to 1982 in relation to
adjacent lands. The value of the land sold by these
sale   deeds   varies   from   Rs.7250/­   per   Gunta   to
Rs.57,000/­ per Gunta. The lands involved in these
sale deeds are of smaller area.
15. As   mentioned   above,   while   appreciating   the
aforementioned   evidence,   the   Special   Deputy
Commissioner determined the market rate of the land
in   question   at   Rs.500/­   per   Gunta   whereas   the
Reference Court fixed the compensation at the rate of
Rs.21,000/­   per   Gunta.   The   High   Court,   however,
reduced it to Rs.10,250/­  per Gunta.
16. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   market   rate
determined   by   the   reference   Court   at   the   rate   of
Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta was the proper market rate of
the land in question and the same, therefore, should
have been upheld by the High Court. In other words,
7
the High Court was not justified in reducing the rate
determined by the reference Court from Rs.21,000/­
per Gunta to Rs.10,250/­ per Gunta and instead the
High Court should have upheld the rate fixed by the
Reference Court.
17. In our considered view, there is enough evidence
to prove the potentiality of the land in question as
would   be   clear   from   the   findings   of   the   Land
Acquisition Officer mentioned above. Apart from it, the
landowners have also proved the market value of the
land in question by filing 10 sale deeds wherein it is
established   that   price   of   the   land   situated   in   the
adjacent area has varied from Rs.7250/­ per Gunta to
Rs.57,000/­ per Gunta between 1977 till 1982.
18. Taking   into   consideration   the   aforementioned
factors, we are of the view that there was no justifiable
reason  for  the  High  Court  to  reduce  the  rate  from
Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta to Rs.14,500/­ per Gunta and
8
then   deducting   30%   towards   development   charges
fixed at Rs. 10,250/­  per Gunta. 
19. In our opinion, having regard to the totality of the
facts and the circumstances emerging from the record
and   keeping   in   view   the   evidence   adduced   by   the
parties, we consider just and proper to fix Rs.21,000/­
per Gunta as the market value of the land in question
and after deducting   10% towards the development
charges fix the market price of the land in question at
Rs.18,900/­  per Gunta.
20. In other words, we hold and accordingly fix the
market value of the land in question at the rate of Rs.
18,900/­  per Gunta for payment of compensation to
the appellants for their land. The appellants are also
entitled to get other statutory compensation payable
under the Act, which is now to be re­calculated on the
basis of the market rate fixed by this Court.
21. The respondents  are accordingly directed to recalculate
  the   compensation   amount   payable   to   the
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appellants in the light of the market rate fixed by this
Court, i.e., Rs.18,900/­ per Gunta and after making
proper   verification   pay   to   the   appellants   the   total
compensation within 3 months.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order
is set aside.
In Civil Appeal No.1573 of 2018
This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 17.07.2017 passed by the High Court
of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in M.F.A. No.24071 of
2011 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal
filed by the appellants herein and reduced the rate of
compensation   to   10,250/­   per   Gunta   from
Rs.21,000/­ per Gunta on the grounds of parity which
was   granted   to   the   adjacent   land   in   question   in
S.No.44 in LAC No.58/1987.
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In view of the order passed above in C.A. No.6057
of 2012, this appeal is disposed of on the same terms.
               
    ………...................................J.
       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   
   …...……..................................J.
                          [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
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