whether any ex gratia payment made to the employee by the Bank would be regarded as Bonus (production, incentive or customary). This Court held that it was not. It was held that it is not possible to employ a term of service on the basis of employment contract. It was held that the payment made as ex gratia was neither in the nature of production bonus nor incentive bonus nor customary bonus and nor any statutory bonus. It cannot be regarded as part of the contract “employment”. It was accordingly held that the ex gratia payment made by the Bank cannot be regarded as remuneration paid or payable to the employees in fulfillment of the terms of the contract of employment within the meaning of definition of wage under Section 2 (rr) of the ID Act. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the respondent rightly paid Rs.1103.40 to the appellant by way of his wages for one month along with his dismissal order. Such payment, in our view, was made strictly in accordance with the requirements of Section 2(y) read with Section 6E (2) of the Act. On the other hand, we find that the appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Rs.110/­ was being paid to him every month by the respondent as a part of his term of the employment and, if so, under which head. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that such amount, even if, held to be the wages, the same could be adjustable against the payments made by the respondent under other head in the appellant’s monthly wages. The High Court, in our view, failed to examine the main question as to whether a payment of Rs.110/­ was in the nature of “wages” or its component within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the Act. Without deciding this question, the High Court held that such amount could be adjusted against the payment made by the employer (respondent) to the appellant under “leave encashment”. In our opinion, it was not the correct approach.

 whether any ex gratia payment made to the employee by the Bank would be regarded as
Bonus   (production,   incentive   or   customary).   This Court held that it was not. It was held that it is not possible to employ a term of service on the basis of employment contract. It was held that the payment made   as  ex   gratia  was   neither   in   the   nature   of production   bonus   nor   incentive   bonus   nor customary bonus and nor any statutory bonus. 
It cannot   be   regarded   as   part   of   the   contract “employment”. It was accordingly held that the  ex gratia  payment   made   by   the   Bank   cannot   be regarded as remuneration paid or payable to the employees in fulfillment of the terms of the contract of employment within the meaning of definition of wage under Section 2 (rr) of the ID Act. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion
that the respondent rightly paid Rs.1103.40 to the appellant by way of his wages for one month along with   his   dismissal   order.   Such   payment,   in   our view,   was   made   strictly   in   accordance   with   the requirements of Section 2(y) read with Section 6E (2) of the Act.  On the other hand, we find that the appellant   failed  to  adduce  any  evidence  to   prove that Rs.110/­ was being paid to him every month by the   respondent   as   a   part   of   his   term   of   the employment and, if so, under which head. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that such amount, even if, held to be the wages, the same could be adjustable against the payments   made   by   the   respondent   under   other head in the appellant’s monthly wages. The High Court,   in   our   view,   failed   to   examine   the   main question as to whether a payment of Rs.110/­ was in the nature of “wages” or its component within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the Act.  Without deciding this   question,   the   High   Court   held   that   such amount   could   be   adjusted   against   the   payment made by the employer (respondent) to the appellant under “leave encashment”. In our opinion, it was not the correct approach. 

        REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.3168 OF 2010
Shri H.D. Sharma        ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Northern India Textile
Research Association        …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 06.02.2009 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No.2311/2009 whereby the High
Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   filed   by   the
respondent herein and set aside the order of the
Industrial Tribunal.
1
2) In order to appreciate the issues involved in
this  appeal, which  lie in  a narrow  compass, few
facts need mention hereinbelow.
3) The   appellant   (workman)   was   appointed   on
26.05.1978 as Duplicating Machine Operator­cumClerk
  by   the   respondent­   Northern   India   Textile
Research   Association,   Ghaziabad   (UP).   On
24.04.1987,   the   appellant   was   dismissed   from
service on five charges of misconduct after holding a
Departmental Enquiry.
4) The   respondent   (employer)   on   27.04.1987
moved an application before the Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal at Meerut under Section 6E (2)
of  the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) read with Rule 31 (2) of the
Rules (Adj case No. 53/1986) and sought approval
of the dismissal of the appellant.   The respondent
contended   that   they   have   complied   with   all
necessary   pre­requisites   for   seeking   approval   as
2
provided in proviso to sub­Section (2) of Section 6E
of the Act.
5) During the pendency of approval proceedings,
the State Government, on 03.08.1988, also made an
Industrial   Reference   (31/1988)   to   the   Industrial
Tribunal under Section 4K of the Act for deciding
the   legality   and   correctness   of   the   appellant’s
dismissal order dated 24.04.1987.
6) In the meantime, the appellant (workman) filed
his reply to approval proceedings (53/1986) filed by
the   respondent   in   the   Industrial   Tribunal.   The
appellant opposed the respondent's prayer for grant
of   approval   essentially   on   the   ground   that   the
respondent   (employer)   did   not   ensure   full
compliance   with   the   pre­requisites,   which   were
necessary   for   grant   of   approval   to   the   dismissal
order   in   terms   of   proviso   to   sub­Section   (2)   of
Section 6E of the Act. The appellant contended that
in terms of proviso to sub­Section (2) of Section 6E
3
of   the   Act   his     services   could   not   have   been
discharged/dismissed   unless   he   had   been   paid
“wages for one month”.  It was contended that the
respondent though paid the wages for one month,
but did not pay “full wages of one month” to the
appellant. 
7) In other words, the grievance of the appellant
was that the respondent was under legal obligation
to pay to the appellant full wages for one month so
as   to   enable   them   to   obtain   approval   for   his
dismissal as provided in sub­Section (2) of Section
6E of the Act but since there was a short payment
of Rs.110/­ in total monthly wages, the respondent
could not be said to have ensured full compliance
with the proviso to sub­Section (2) of Section 6E of
the Act. It was contended that it is only after the full
compliance with Section 6E is done which is held
mandatory by this Court, the respondent becomes
entitled   to   claim   its   benefit   else   not.   It   was,
4
therefore,   contended   that   since   the   respondent
failed to ensure full compliance with Section 6E of
the   Act,   no   approval   could   be   accorded   to   the
dismissal order as provided under Section 6E of the
Act.
8) The respondent filed rejoinder stating therein
the break up of the appellant’s monthly wages with
a   view   to  show   that   they   had   paid   full  monthly
wages   to   the   appellant   as   per   the   terms   of
employment   along   with   the   dismissal   order   and,
therefore, there was a full compliance with proviso
to sub­Section (2) of Section 6E of the Act entitling
them to seek approval to the appellant’s dismissal
order.
9) In   the   meantime,   the   respondent   filed   an
application and sought permission of the Industrial
Tribunal to allow them to withdraw their application
which they had filed for obtaining approval to the
dismissal   order.   According   to   the   respondent,   in
5
view of the Industrial Reference No.31/1988 having
already made by the State to the Industrial Tribunal
wherein the legality and correctness of the dismissal
order was being examined, it was not necessary for
them to seek any approval to such dismissal order,
as required under Section 6E of the Act, from the
Industrial Tribunal.
10) By   order   dated   29.06.1990,   the   Industrial
Tribunal dismissed the respondent’s aforementioned
application. The respondent felt aggrieved and filed
a writ petition (W.P. No.18679/1990) in the High
Court.  By order dated 11.02.1998, the High Court
allowed the writ petition and set aside the order
dated   29.06.1990.   It   was   held   that   two   parallel
proceedings in relation to the same matter cannot
be   allowed   to   be   continued.   Felt   aggrieved,   the
appellant (workman) filed SLP(c) No. 8465/1998 in
this Court.
6
11) By order dated 28.03.2000, this Court allowed
the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court
and   remanded   the   case   to   the   High   Court.   This
Court   held   that   firstly,   the   scope   of   proceedings
under  the two provisions was entirely different; and
secondly,   since   the   Act   provided   separate   rights,
protection   and   remedies   to   the   parties   for
prosecuting these proceedings, the disposal of one
proceedings would not bring to an end the other.
The High Court was, therefore, requested to decide
the writ petition afresh on merits keeping in view
the observations made.
12) On remand, when the High Court took up the
writ petition for its disposal, the respondent did not
press their withdrawal  application in view of the
decision of the Constitution Bench in  Jaipur  Zila
Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal
Sharma  &  Ors.  (2002) 2 SCC 244 wherein it was
laid  down   that   proviso  to   Section   33(2)(b)  of  the
7
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,   which is akin to
Section 6E of the Act, is unambiguous, clear and
equally   mandatory   in   nature   for   ensuring   its
compliance.   It was held that if the employer has
failed to ensure compliance with the provisions and
the   conditions   stated   therein,   the   discharge   or
dismissal order passed by the employer would be
void and inoperative.
13) Since Section 6E of the Act is in pari materia
with Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
the interpretation of Section 33 (2)(b) made by this
Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank
(supra) will have its full application to Section 6E of
the Act. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed
as having rendered infructuous. 
14) The Industrial Tribunal thereafter proceeded to
try   the   reference   on   merits.     An   issue   on   the
question of compliance with Section 6E (2)(b) of the
Act,   as   directed   by   the   High   Court   in   the   order
8
dated   02.03.2005   passed   in   W.P.No.13094/2005,
was   accordingly   framed.   Parties   adduced   their
evidence.
15) So   far   as   the   appellant   is   concerned,   he
adduced the evidence to prove that he was paid
total   sum   of   Rs.1103.30   by   way   of   his   monthly
wages   in   terms   of   proviso   to   sub­Section   (2)   of
Section 6E of the Act along with the dismissal order
whereas   his   actual   monthly   wages   payable   was
Rs.1214.40  thereby   leaving   a  deficit  of   Rs.110/­.
The respondent on their part produced the wages
register   to   prove   the   appellant’s   actual   monthly
wages, its nature and also gave its break up.
16) By   order   dated   24.07.2008,   the   Industrial
Tribunal   answered   the   reference   in   appellant's
favour.     It was held that the respondent did not
ensure full compliance with proviso to Section 6E
(2) inasmuch as the respondent failed to pay full
wages   of   one   month   to   the   appellant.   In   other
9
words,   it   was   held   that   there   was   a   deficit   of
Rs.110/­   in   paying   monthly   wages   by   the
respondent to the appellant along with the dismissal
order and hence the appellant was held deemed to
be   in   service   as   if   no   dismissal   order   had   been
passed.
17) The respondent felt aggrieved by the order of
the Industrial Tribunal and filed a writ petition in
the High Court out of which this appeal arises. By
impugned order, the High Court allowed the writ
petition and set aside the order of the Industrial
Tribunal.  It was held that assuming that there was
a short payment of Rs.110/­ while paying monthly
wages to the appellant, yet since the respondent
had also paid a sum of Rs.1618.30 to him towards
leave encashment in his monthly wages, a sum of
Rs.110/­   could   always   be   adjusted   out   of
Rs.1618.30.   It   was   accordingly   held   that   in   this
way, it can be held that the respondent has ensured
10
full compliance with Section 6E(2) of the Act while
paying monthly wages to the appellant along with
his   dismissal   order.     The   High   Court,   therefore,
accorded   sanction   to   the   respondent   as   required
under   Section   6E(2)   of   the   Act   and   upheld   the
dismissal order as being legal.
18) The workman (appellant herein) felt aggrieved
and has filed the present appeal by way of  special
leave in this Court.
19) Three questions arise for consideration in this
appeal. First, whether the High Court was justified
in   allowing   the   respondent's   writ   petition   and
thereby was justified in setting aside the order of
the Industrial Tribunal; Second, whether an isolated
payment   of   Rs.110/­   made   by   the   employer
(respondent) to the employee (appellant) by way of
interim relief (ex gratia) in August 1986 in monthly
wages can be regarded as wages under Section 2(y)
read with Section 6E(2) of the Act or in other words,
11
whether such payment is a part of the appellant’s
monthly wages; and third whether the respondent
can be held to have paid wages for one month to the
appellant in compliance with the requirements of
Section 6E (2) of the Act so as to enable them to
claim sanction to the appellant’s dismissal order.  
20) Heard Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel for
the   appellant   and   Mr.   Jitendra   Mohan   Sharma,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
21) Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties at length and on perusal of the record of the
case,   we   are   inclined   to   uphold   the   conclusion
arrived at by the High Court but we do so on our
reasoning given hereinbelow. In other words, though
we uphold the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court,  but  not   the  reasoning  of  the  High  Court.
This we say for the following reasons.
22) In our view, the respondent’s application made
under   Section   6E(2)   of   the   Act   deserves   to   be
12
allowed by granting them approval to the appellant’s
dismissal.
23) Section 2 (y) and Section 6E (2) of the Act are
relevant. They are quoted below: 
“Section 2(y)
‘Wages’   means   all   remuneration   capable   of
being   expressed   in   terms   of   money,   which
would, if the terms of employment, expressed
or   implied,   were   fulfilled,   be   payable   to   a
workman in respect of his employment, or of
work   done   in   such   employment,   and
includes:­
(i) such   allowances   (including   dearness
allowance)   as   the   workman   is   for   the
time being entitled to;
(ii) the value of any house accommodation,
or   of   supply   of   light,   water,   medical
attendance  or  other amenity  or  of  any
service or of any concessional supply of
foodgrains or other articles;
(iii) any traveling  concession, but does  not
include­
(a) any bonus;
(b) any   contribution  paid  or  payable
by   the   employer   to   any   pension
fund or provident fund or for the
benefit of the workman under any
law for the time being in force;
13
(c) any   gratuity   payable   on   the
termination of his service.
Section 6E
Conditions   of   service,   etc.   to   remain
unchanged   in   certain   circumstances   during
the pendency of proceedings –
(1) ……………….
(2) During   the   pendency   of   any   such
proceeding   in   respect   of   an   industrial
dispute,   the   employer   may,   in
accordance   with   the   standing   orders
applicable   to   a  workman   concerned   in
such dispute­
(a)………………
(b)   for   any  misconduct   not   connected
with   the  dispute,  discharge  or  punish,
whether by dismissal or otherwise;
Provided   that   no   such   workman   shall   be
discharged or  dismissed, unless  he has been
paid wages for one month and an application
has   been   made   by   the   employer   to   the
authority   before   which   the   proceeding   is
pending   for  approval  of  the  action  taken  by
the employer.”
(emphasis supplied)
24) Section 2(y) defines the term ‘wages’ whereas
Section 6E provides that condition of service of a
workman   has   to   remain   unchanged   in   certain
14
circumstances. Proviso to Section 6E(2) says that no
workman can be discharged or dismissed from the
services   unless   he   has   been   paid   wages   for   one
month and an application is made by an employee
to an authority before whom the proceedings are
pending   for   approval   of   the   action   taken   by   the
employer against the workman. 
25) Coming to the facts of this case, to answer
these three questions posed above, we find that the
appellant has relied on the break up of his monthly
wages.   It is this amount which, according to the
appellant,   should   have   been   paid   to   him   by   the
respondent as a pre­condition to give effect to his
dismissal order. The break up reads as under:
Basic Salary Rs.
334.00
F.D.A Rs.
108.00
F.D.A Rs.
62.00
A.D.A Rs.
494.35
15
Interim Relief Rs.
110.00
H.R.A. Rs.
75.60
C.C.A. Rs.
30.45
Rs.1214.
40
26) So far as the respondent is concerned, they
relied   on   the   details   of   the   appellant’s   monthly
wages   payable/paid   to   him   at   the   time   of   his
dismissal in full and final satisfaction.  It reads as
under:
1. Salary   for   April   from  1.4.87   to
27.4.89   4   days   under   LWP
suspension 926.70
2. Increments   from   25.11.86   to
31.3.87 67.90
994.60
Less:PF/EPF deduction 73.00
3. Leave encashment for 44 days 1618.30
4. One  months   notice   pay   as   per
provision   of   UP   Industrial
Disputes Act Section 6E(2)(b) 1103.40
3643.30
16
27) According to the appellant, there was a short
payment   of   Rs.110/­   because   he   was   paid
Rs.1103.40   whereas   his   monthly   wages   was
Rs.1214.40.
28) The stand of the respondent was that there
was no short payment because a sum of Rs.110/­
was paid to the appellant only once in August 1986
by way of  ex gratia  in the form of “interim relief”.
This   sum,   i.e.,   (Rs110/­),   according   to   the
respondent,   was   thereafter   never   paid   to   the
appellant after August, 1986 till 24.04.1987 (date of
dismissal   order).     It   is   for   this   reason,   the
respondent contended that a sum of Rs.110/­ is
neither a wage and nor its component and nor the
appellant has any right in law to claim such amount
under   the   terms   of   his   employment   from   the
respondent.
29) What   types   of   payment   would   constitute   a
wage or its component within the meaning of the
17
word “wages” as defined under Section 2 (rr) of the
Industrial Disputes Act has been the subject matter
of several decisions of this Court. The word “wages”
defined in Section 2(y) of the Act is in peri materia
with   the   definition   of   word   “wages”   defined   in
Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
30) A question arose before the Three Judge Bench
in   the   case   of  Bharat   Electronics   Limited  vs.
Industrial Tribunal, Karnataka, Bangalore & Anr.
(1990)   2   SCC   314   as   to   whether   “night   shift
allowance” would form part of “wages” in the context
of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
31) Justice M.M. Punchhi (as His Lordship then
was and later CJI) speaking for the Bench examined
the   object   of   Section   33(2)(b)   of   the   Industrial
Disputes Act. After referring to earlier decision of
this   Court   in  Syndicate   Bank   Limited  vs.
Ramanath (1968) 1 SCR 327, it was held that the
18
intention of the legislature in providing for such a
contingency is not far to seek. It was held that the
section   was   enacted   “to   soften   the   rigour   of
unemployment that will face the workman against
whom an order of discharge or dismissal has been
passed”. This Court held that one month's wages as
thought and provided to be given are conceptually
for the month to follow, the month of unemployment
and in the context wages for the month following
the date of dismissal and not a repetitive wage of
the month previous to the date of dismissal. This
Court further held that if the converse is read in the
context   of   the   proviso   to   Section   33(2)(b),   it
inevitable   would   have   to   be   read   as   double   the
wages as earned in the month previous to the date
of dismissal and that would, in our view, be reading
in the provision something which is not there, either
expressly or impliedly. This Court held that we have
to   blend   the   contextual   interpretation   with   the
19
conceptual interpretation to come to the view that
night shift allowance could never be part of wages,
and   those   would   be   due   only   in   the   event   of
working.   It   was   held   that   the   conclusion   is
inescapable that the workman had to earn night
shift allowance by actually working in the night shift
and   his   claim   to   that   allowance   was   contingent
upon his reporting to duty and being put to that
shift.   It   was   held   that   the   night   shift   allowance
automatically did not form part of his wages and it
was not such an allowance which flowed to him as
his entitlement not restricted to his service.
32) Now coming to the facts of this case, we find
that it has come in evidence that the respondent
had paid Rs.110/­ to the appellant in August 1986
by way of “interim relief” as an ex gratia payment. It
is not in dispute that a sum of Rs.110/­ was paid
only once in August 1986 and not thereafter.
20
33) In   our   opinion,   such   payment   cannot   be
termed either as  wages or its component within the
meaning of Section 2 (y) read with Section 6E (2) of
the Act. 
34) The reason is that any isolated one time  ex
gratia  payment made by way of an interim relief
neither satisfies the requirement of Section 2 (y) and
nor it satisfies the requirement of clauses (i) to ( iii )
of Section 2 (y) of the Act.
35) If such amount had been paid regularly by the
respondent to the appellant in compliance with his
terms of employment, it would have been regarded
as wages or its component within the meaning of
Section 2(y) of the Act.  In order that any payment is
regarded as “wages”, it must be proved that it was
being   paid   by   the   employer   to   his   employee
21
pursuant to the terms of his employment. It is only
then a right is created in employee’s favour to claim
such   amount   from   the   employer   provided   the
employee proves that he has fulfilled the terms of
his employment.
36) A question arose before the Two Judge Bench
in  Ghaziabad   Zila   Sahkari   Bank   Ltd.  vs.
Additional Labour Commissioner & Ors. (2007) 11
SCC 756 as to whether any ex gratia payment made
to the employee by the Bank would be regarded as
Bonus   (production,   incentive   or   customary).   This
Court held that it was not. It was held that it is not
possible to employ a term of service on the basis of
employment contract. It was held that the payment
made   as  ex   gratia  was   neither   in   the   nature   of
production   bonus   nor   incentive   bonus   nor
customary bonus and nor any statutory bonus. It
cannot   be   regarded   as   part   of   the   contract
“employment”. It was accordingly held that the  ex
22
gratia  payment   made   by   the   Bank   cannot   be
regarded as remuneration paid or payable to the
employees in fulfillment of the terms of the contract
of employment within the meaning of definition of
wage under Section 2 (rr) of the ID Act.
37) We are, therefore, of the considered opinion
that the respondent rightly paid Rs.1103.40 to the
appellant by way of his wages for one month along
with   his   dismissal   order.   Such   payment,   in   our
view,   was   made   strictly   in   accordance   with   the
requirements of Section 2(y) read with Section 6E
(2) of the Act.  On the other hand, we find that the
appellant   failed  to  adduce  any  evidence  to   prove
that Rs.110/­ was being paid to him every month by
the   respondent   as   a   part   of   his   term   of   the
employment and, if so, under which head.
38)  In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of
the view that the High Court was not justified in
holding that such amount, even if, held to be the
23
wages, the same could be adjustable against the
payments   made   by   the   respondent   under   other
head in the appellant’s monthly wages. The High
Court,   in   our   view,   failed   to   examine   the   main
question as to whether a payment of Rs.110/­ was
in the nature of “wages” or its component within the
meaning of Section 2(y) of the Act.  Without deciding
this   question,   the   High   Court   held   that   such
amount   could   be   adjusted   against   the   payment
made by the employer (respondent) to the appellant
under “leave encashment”. In our opinion, it was
not the correct approach. 
39) In the light of afore­mentioned reasons, though
we uphold the conclusion of the High Court but do
not   agree   to   the   reasoning   on   which   such
conclusion is based.
24
40) In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no
merit in this appeal. It thus fails and is accordingly
dismissed.   
               
    ………...................................J.
     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                 
   …...……..................................J.
                          [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
25

no order can be passed by any Court in any judicial proceedings against any party to such proceedings without hearing and giving such party an opportunity of hearing - Apex court held that in this case, we find that the High Court issued some mandatory directions to the State in relation to the subject­matter of the proceedings but it was done without hearing the appellants(respondents in the writ petition before the High Court). It is for this reason, we are unable to uphold the impugned order.- remanded the case giving liberty to raise their pleas before High Court.

no order can be passed by any Court in any judicial proceedings against any party
to   such   proceedings   without   hearing   and   giving such party an opportunity of hearing  - Apex court held that  in   this   case,  we   find   that   the   High   Court issued some mandatory directions to the State in relation to the subject­matter of the proceedings but it   was   done   without   hearing   the appellants(respondents  in  the writ  petition  before the High Court).  It is for this reason, we are unable to uphold the impugned order.- remanded the case giving liberty to raise their pleas before High Court.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 11757­11758 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 3449­3450 of 2017)
Johra & Ors.            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of  Haryana & Ors.   ….Respondent(s)   
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   are   filed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 16.05.2016 passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh
in C.W.P. No.9512 of 2016 whereby the Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   disposed   of   the   writ
petition   filed   by   respondent   No.8   herein   with   a
direction to the Deputy Commissioner, Sonipat to
obtain a report from a fact finding inquiry regarding
1
the unauthorized encroachment of the appellants
herein over the land of the Gram Panchayat and to
restore the said land to the Gram Panchayat with
police help.  Against the said order, the appellants
herein  filed review petition which was dismissed by
the High Court by order dated 21.10.2016 in RACW­312
of 2016 in CWP No.9512/2016.
3. Few facts need mention  infra  for the disposal
of these appeals.
4. At the outset, it may be mentioned that it was
not in dispute that the High Court while disposing
of the writ petition filed by respondent No.8 herein
against   the   appellants   and   State   issued   certain
mandatory   directions   to   the   State   Authorities   in
respect of the subject matter of the writ petition for
their compliance.  It is also not in dispute that the
appellants  were  arrayed  in  the  said writ  petition
(No.9512 of 2016) as respondent Nos. 8 to 80.
2
5. Indeed, we also find that the High Court also
observed (see page 2 of the impugned order) that
they do not deem it necessary to issue any notice to
any of the private respondents except to the State
and its Authorities considering the nature of the
order they intend to pass for the disposal of the writ
petition.
6.   Against this order, the private respondent Nos.
8 to 80 of the writ petition have felt aggrieved and
filed these appeals by way of special leave in this
Court.
7. Though learned counsel for the parties made
lengthy   submissions   on   merits   of   the   case   in
support of their respective stands but keeping in
view the admitted fact emerging from the record of
the   proceedings   that   the   impugned   order   was
passed   without   hearing   the   present   appellants
despite they  being  party  respondents  in  the  writ
3
petition,   we   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the
impugned order is not legally sustainable.
8. We   may   reiterate   the   basic   fundamental
principle of law that no order can be passed by any
Court in any judicial proceedings against any party
to   such   proceedings   without   hearing   and   giving
such party an opportunity of hearing. 
9. Principle of natural justice demands that the
party   to   the   proceedings   must   be   heard   by   the
Court before passing any order in relation to the
subject   matter   of   such   proceedings   (see
observations of an eminent Judge ­ Vivian Bose in
Sangram   Singh  vs.  Election   Tribunal  (AIR 1955
SC 425).
10.   The fact that a person is made a party to the
judicial proceedings in relation to a certain dispute
has   a   legitimate   right   to   raise   an   objection   that
before passing any order in such proceedings, he
should be at least heard and his views/stand in
4
relation to the subject matter of the proceedings be
taken into consideration. The Court is duty bound
to   hear   all   such   person(s)   by   giving   them   an
opportunity to place their stand.
11. In   this   case,   we   find   that   the   High   Court
issued some mandatory directions to the State in
relation to the subject­matter of the proceedings but
it   was   done   without   hearing   the
appellants(respondents  in  the writ  petition  before
the High Court).  It is for this reason, we are unable
to uphold the impugned order.
12. We have not set out the entire factual dispute
which led to filing of the writ petition, nor set out
the stand taken by the parties against each other
before the High Court and nor dealt with any factual
issues   arising   in   the   case   though   argued
vehemently   by   both   the   learned   counsel   against
each other.
5
13. In our view, it is for the parties to raise all
their pleas before the High Court to enable it to
decide   in   accordance   with   law.   We,   therefore,
express no opinion on any of the pleas.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
succeed   and   are   accordingly   allowed.   Impugned
order is set aside. The writ petition, out of which
these   appeals   arise,   is   restored   to   its   original
number before the High Court.
15. Let the writ petition be decided by the High
Court after hearing all the parties in accordance
with law. Since the matter relates to a large piece of
the land, it must be disposed of within six months
from the date of this order without allowing any
party to seek any adjournment.
     ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
6

a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between the private persons - No writ is maintainable. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. - Apex court held that writ is not maintainable for restoration of possession of property between private parteis and set aside the orders of Division Bench of High Court - Liberty is given to file civil suit

 a   regular   suit   is   the   appropriate   remedy   for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between   the   private   persons - No writ is maintainable.   
The   remedy   under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. - Apex court held that writ is not maintainable for restoration of possession of property between private parteis and set aside the orders of Division Bench of High Court - Liberty is given to file civil suit

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11759 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 30465 of 2017)
Roshina T            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Abdul Azeez K.T. & Ors.    ….Respondent(s)   
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   30.08.2017  passed   by   the   High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C)
No. 15385/2017  whereby the Division Bench of the
1
High   Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   filed   by
respondent No.1 herein and directed the appellant
herein, by issuing a writ of mandamus, to restore
the possession of the flat in question to respondent
No.1 herein.
3. Facts   of   the   case   lie   in   a   narrow   compass.
They,   however,   need   mention   in   brief  infra  to
appreciate   the   short   question   involved   in   this
appeal.
4. The   dispute   essentially   relates   to   the
possession of a flat bearing No. 3D, 3rd  floor located
in   building   known   as   Royal   Court­Block   IV   at
Kozhikode (hereinafter referred to as “the flat”) and
is   between   the   appellant   and   respondent   No.   1
herein.
5. Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition being
W.P.(C) No. 15385 of 2017 before the High Court of
Kerala   against   the   appellant   herein   and   other
2
respondents(local police authorities) seeking therein
a relief of restoration of his possession over the flat
in   question.   The   appellant   contested   the   writ
petition   on   various   factual   and   legal   grounds
including   raising   an   objection   about   the
maintainability of the writ petition and the reliefs
claimed therein.
6. By   impugned   order,   the   Division   Bench
allowed the writ petition and directed the appellant
(respondent No. 5 in the writ petition) to restore the
possession of the flat in question to respondent No.
1 herein (writ petitioner in the High Court) which
has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way
of  special  leave  by respondent  No.  5  of  the  writ
petition in this Court.
7. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition
3
filed   by   respondent   No.   1   herein   and   Secondly,
whether the High Court was justified in issuing a
mandamus against the appellant directing him to
restore   the   possession   of   the   flat   to   respondent
No. 1.
8. Heard Mr. Haris Beeran, learned counsel for
the   appellant   and   Mr.   R.   Basant,   learned   senior
counsel,   Mr.   A.K.   Joseph   and   Mr.   Nishe   Rajen
Shonker, learned counsel for the respondents.
9. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the
impugned order and dismiss the writ petition filed
by respondent No. 1 herein out of which this appeal
arises.
10. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   writ   petition
filed by the respondent No. 1 under Article 226/227
of the Constitution of India against the appellant
4
before   the   High   Court   for   grant   of   relief   of
restoration of the possession of the flat in question
was not maintainable and the same ought to have
been dismissed in limine as being not maintainable.
In   other   words,   the   High   Court   ought   to   have
declined to entertain the writ petition in exercise of
extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of
Constitution for grant of reliefs claimed therein. 
11. It is not in dispute that the reliefs for which
the   writ   petition   was   filed   by   respondent   No.   1
herein against the appellant pertained to possession
of the flat.  It is also not in dispute that one Civil
Suit No. 807/2014 between the appellant and the
respondent No. 1 in relation to the flat in question
for grant of injunction was pending in the Court of
Munsif at Kozhikode. It is also not in dispute that
the appellant and the respondent No. 1 are private
individuals   and  both   are   claiming  their   rights   of
5
ownership and possession over the flat in question
on various factual grounds.
12. In the light of such background facts arising in
the case, we are of the considered opinion that the
filing of the writ petition by respondent No. 1 herein
against the appellant herein under Article 226/227
of the Constitution of India in the High Court, out of
which this appeal arises, was wholly misconceived.
13. The question as to who is the owner of the flat
in question, whether respondent No. 1 was/is in
possession of the flat and, if so, from which date,
how and in what circumstances, he claimed to be in
its   possession,   whether   his   possession   could   be
regarded as legal or not qua its real owner etc. were
some   of   the   material   questions   which   arose   for
consideration in the writ petition. 
14. These   questions,   in   our   view,   were   pure
questions of fact and could be answered one way or
6
the   other   only   by   the   Civil   Court   in   a   properly
constituted   civil   suit   and   on   the   basis   of   the
evidence adduced by the parties but not in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
by the High Court. 
15. It has been consistently held by this Court that
a   regular   suit   is   the   appropriate   remedy   for
settlement of the disputes relating to property rights
between   the   private   persons.   The   remedy   under
Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available
except where violation of some statutory duty on the
part of statutory authority is alleged. In such cases,
the   Court   has   jurisdiction   to   issue   appropriate
directions to the authority concerned. It is held that
the   High   Court   cannot   allow   its   constitutional
jurisdiction  to   be  used  for deciding  disputes,  for
which   remedies   under   the   general   law,   civil   or
criminal are available. This Court has held that it is
7
not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by
way of a civil suit or application available to an
aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution being special and extraordinary,
it   should   not   be  exercised  casually   or  lightly  on
mere asking by the litigant. (See Mohan Pande vs.
Usha  Rani, 1992 (4) SCC 61 and  Dwarka  Prasad
Agrawal vs BD Agrawal, (2003) 6 SCC 230).
16. In our view, the writ petition to claim such
relief   was   not,   therefore,   legally   permissible.   It,
therefore,   deserved   dismissal   in  limine  on   the
ground of availability of an alternative remedy of
filing   a   civil   suit   by   respondent   No.   1   (writ
petitioner) in the Civil Court.
17. We   cannot,   therefore,   concur   with   the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court   when   it   unnecessarily   went   into   all   the
8
questions of fact arising in the case on the basis of
factual pleadings in detail (43 pages) and recorded a
factual finding that it was the respondent No. 1 (writ
petitioner) who was in possession of the flat and,
therefore, he be restored with his possession of the
flat by the appellant.
18. In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while
so directing exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction
conferred   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution.
Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had
virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit
and itself to a Civil Court. In our view, it was not
permissible. 
19. Learned   counsel   for   respondent   No.   1,
however,   strenuously   urged   that   the   impugned
order does not call for any interference because the
High Court has proceeded to decide the writ petition
on admitted facts.
9
20. We   do   not   agree   with   the   submissions   of
learned counsel for respondent No.1 for the reasons
that   first   there   did   exist   a   dispute   between   the
appellant and respondent No. 1 as to who was in
possession of the flat in question at the relevant
time; Second, a dispute regarding possession of the
said flat between the two private individuals could
be decided only by the Civil Court in civil suit or by
the   Criminal   Court   in   Section   145   Cr.P.C
proceedings   but   not   in   the   writ   petition   under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
21. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   we   are
unable   to   agree   with   the   reasoning   and   the
conclusion   arrived   at   by   the   High   Court   in   the
impugned order.
22. As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is
accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside.
10
The writ petition filed by respondent No. 1, out of
which this appeal arises, stands dismissed.
23. Liberty is, however, granted to the parties to
file civil proceedings in the Civil Court for claiming
appropriate reliefs in relation to the flat in question
for adjudication of their respective claims.
24. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   while
prosecuting any civil/criminal proceedings by the
parties, as the case may be, any observations and
the   findings   recorded   by   the   High   Court   in   the
impugned order will not be looked into because the
impugned order has since been set aside by this
Court.   
   ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
11

Illegal possession is liable to be evicted along with damages - claimed to purchase in public auction - Section 35 of the Municipalities Act praying therein for a direction to the Nagar Palika for execution of the sale deed in his favour in relation to quarter No.6. - commissioner allowed his application and direct to execute a registered sale deed and also fixed rate of sale - writ to High court - High court dismissed the same - Apex court held that the possession of the appellant since inception, i.e., since June 1990 in quarter No.6 was unauthorized and was that of a trespasser.- there was no allotment letter issued by Nagar Palika in relation to quarter No.6 - failed to file any such allotment letter nor could file any acceptance letter of Nagar Palika indicating acceptance of his so­called highest bid - failed to show as to how much amount he actually paid to the Nagar Palika towards the sale/auction price for quarter No. 6 - there was no privity of contract between the appellant and the Nagar Palika which could justify appellant’s entry in quarter No. 6 as being legal - in the absence of any document of title or/and legal document executed by the Nagar Palika in appellant's favour in relation to quarter No.6 before the appellant entering in quarter No.6 in June 1990, the appellant’s possession cannot be held legal. - the possession of any person in any immovable property is legal, it is necessary for such person to prove prima facie that he is either the owner of such property or is in possession as a lawful tenant or is in its permissive possession with the express consent of its true owner.- These documents are not the documents of title, nor do they prove appellants legal possession over quarter No.6 and nor do these documents in any way bind the Nagar Palika - damages were also ascertained from the concerned advocates and fixed at 3,000/- per month instead of remanding - ordert to evict the quarter with in 3 months and order to pay damages from1990 to till the eviction - failing which directed to approach the apex court for legal remedies.

Illegal possession is liable to be evicted along with damages - claimed to purchase in public auction - Section 35 of the Municipalities Act praying therein   for   a   direction   to   the   Nagar   Palika   for execution of the sale deed in his favour in relation to quarter No.6. - commissioner allowed his application and direct to execute a registered sale deed and also fixed rate of sale - writ to High court - High court dismissed the same - Apex court held that the possession of the appellant since   inception,   i.e.,  since   June  1990  in   quarter No.6   was   unauthorized   and   was   that   of   a trespasser.- there was no allotment letter issued by Nagar   Palika   in   relation   to   quarter   No.6 - failed to file any such allotment letter nor could file any acceptance letter of Nagar Palika indicating acceptance of his so­called highest bid -  failed to show as to how much amount he actually paid to the Nagar Palika towards the sale/auction price for quarter No. 6 - there was no privity of contract between the appellant and the Nagar Palika which could justify appellant’s entry in quarter   No.   6   as   being   legal -   in   the absence   of   any   document   of   title   or/and   legal document   executed   by   the   Nagar   Palika   in appellant's favour in relation to quarter No.6 before the   appellant   entering   in   quarter   No.6   in   June 1990,   the appellant’s possession cannot be held legal. - the   possession   of   any   person   in   any immovable property is legal, it is necessary for such person to prove  prima facie  that he is either the owner of such property or is in possession as a lawful tenant or is in its permissive possession with the express consent of its true owner.- These   documents   are   not   the documents   of   title,   nor  do  they   prove   appellants legal possession over quarter No.6 and nor do these documents in any way bind the Nagar Palika - damages were also ascertained from the concerned advocates and fixed at 3,000/- per month instead of remanding - ordert to evict the quarter with in 3 months and order to pay damages from1990 to till the eviction - failing which directed to approach the apex court for legal remedies.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.11761­11762  OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 25218­25219 of 2018)
Masroor Ahmad Khan            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Uttarakhand & Ors.   ….Respondent(s)   
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   are   filed   against   the   final
judgment   and  order  dated  28.08.2018  in  Special
Appeal No.25 of 2015 and order dated 07.09.2018
in   Review   Application   MCC   No.1193   of   2018   in
Special Appeal No.25 of 2015 passed by the High
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Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital whereby the High
Court dismissed the special appeal and the Review
Application filed by the appellant herein.
3. In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved   in   these   appeals,   few   facts   need   to   be
mentioned hereinbelow.
4. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 are the Nagar Palika
Parishad, Nainital (hereinafter referred to as “the
Nagar Palika”).  In 1990, the Nagar Palika issued an
advertisement to auction their residential quarter
Nos.6 and 7 situated at Waverly Compound (Gopala
Sadan)   Mallital,   Naintal.   So   far   as   this   case   is
concerned, it relates to quarter No. 6.
5. The appellant herein claimed to be one of the
participants in the auction proceedings and also the
highest   bidder.   The   appellant   claimed   that   he
occupied   quarter   No.6   and   started   living   therein
since June 1990. The appellant complained that in
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the   year   2001   (18.07.2001),   the   Nagar   Palika
instead of executing the sale deed in his favour in
relation to quarter No.6, passed a resolution to sell
quarter No.6 along with other quarters in public
auction.
6. The appellant, therefore, filed an application
under Section 35 of the Municipalities Act praying
therein   for   a   direction   to   the   Nagar   Palika   for
execution of the sale deed in his favour in relation
to quarter No.6. 
7. By order dated 21.07.2006, the Commissioner,
Nainital passed an order directing Nagar Palika to
execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant. He
also fixed the rate at which the sale deed was to be
executed followed by another order to that effect.
8. The   Nagar   Palika   felt   aggrieved   and   filed
application/appeal to the State (respondent No.1).
By order dated 12.03.2007, the State set aside the
3
order of the Commissioner dated 21.07.2006 which
gave   rise   to   filing   of   the   writ   petition   by   the
appellant   in   the   High   Court   at   Nainital.   By
impugned order, the High Court dismissed the writ
petition and also the review application filed by the
appellant herein, giving rise to filing of the present
appeals by way of special leave in this Court.
9.   The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration,   in   this   case   is   whether   the   High
Court was justified in dismissing the special appeal
filed by the appellant.
10. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
11. In our opinion, the possession of the appellant
since   inception,   i.e.,  since   June  1990  in   quarter
No.6   was   unauthorized   and   was   that   of   a
trespasser.  This we say for more than one reason. 
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12. First, there was no allotment letter issued by
Nagar   Palika   in   relation   to   quarter   No.6   to   the
appellant in the so­called auction proceedings held
in 1990; Second, the appellant also failed to file any
such allotment letter nor could file any acceptance
letter of Nagar Palika indicating acceptance of his
so­called highest bid; Third, the appellant also failed
to show as to how much amount he actually paid to
the Nagar Palika towards the sale/auction price for
quarter No. 6 and, if so, when; Fourth, there was no
privity of contract between the appellant and the
Nagar Palika which could justify appellant’s entry in
quarter   No.   6   as   being   legal   and   lastly,   in   the
absence   of   any   document   of   title   or/and   legal
document   executed   by   the   Nagar   Palika   in
appellant's favour in relation to quarter No.6 before
the   appellant   entering   in   quarter   No.6   in   June
5
1990,   the appellant’s possession cannot be held
legal. 
13. It is a settled principle of law that in order to
prove   that   the   possession   of   any   person   in   any
immovable property is legal, it is necessary for such
person to prove  prima facie  that he is either the
owner of such property or is in possession as a
lawful tenant or is in its permissive possession with
the express consent of its true owner. Such is not
the case here. 
14.   The appellant has not taken any such plea
and even if he claims to have taken, then also, in
our view, he has failed to prove such plea for want
of any evidence. 
15. We have also perused the documents filed by
the appellant in that behalf. Having perused, we are
of the view that these documents are of no help to
him to prove his ownership or/and possession in
6
quarter   No.6.   These   documents   are   not   the
documents   of   title,   nor  do  they   prove   appellants
legal possession over quarter No.6 and nor do these
documents in any way bind the Nagar Palika. 
16. It is for all these reasons, we are of the opinion
that the appellant was in possession of quarter No.6
as a trespasser since June 1990 and, therefore, he
was liable to be evicted from the said quarter by the
Nagar Palika.  Not only that the appellant has also
rendered himself liable to pay damages for wrongful
use   and   occupation   of   quarter   No.6   since   June
1990(see page E) to the Nagar Palika till he vacates
the quarter No.6.
17. In order to decide the quantum of damages, we
do not consider proper to remand the case to the
competent   authority   under  The   Public   Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
7
18. We,   therefore,   enquired   from   the   lawyers
representing   the   parties   as   to   what   is   the
approximate area of quarter No. 6 and what would
be its monthly rent that it could fetch in the market
during the period in question.
19.  Having heard their views, we have formed an
opinion that the appellant should be made liable to
pay Rs.3000/­ per month to the Nagar Palika by
way   of   damages   for   the   use   and   occupation   of
quarter No. 6 from June 1990 till he handovers its
vacant possession. The sum which we have fixed
balances   the   rights   and   equities   between   the
parties. 
20. The appellant is granted three months’ time to
vacate quarter No. 6 situated at Waverly Compound
(Gopala   Sadan)   from   the   date   of   this   order.   The
appellant is further directed to pay to the Nagar
Palika (respondent No.3 herein) the damages for use
8
and occupation of the quarter No.6 from June 1990
(the month when he occupied the quarter) till the
date he vacates the quarter in terms of this order
within three months. 
21. The   damages   be   calculated   at   the   rate   of
Rs.3000/­   per   month   from   June   1990   till   the
delivery of possession. 
22. In case the appellant fails to vacate the quarter
and fails to pay the damages, it would be construed
as non­compliance of this Court's order and in that
eventuality the Nagar Palika would be at liberty to
move   to   this   Court   against   the   appellant   for
appropriate order. 
24. The appeal stands accordingly finally disposed of.
     ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
9

fair price shop - Licence was cancelled - filed appeal before commissioner - commissioner dismissed the appeal - writ - High court set aside the commissioner order - but mainly on the ground that it was not a reasoned order - make no observation regarding restoration of licence - Apex court held that In our considered opinion, the High Court having held that the order of the Commissioner was not legally sustainable because it was an unreasoned order, it had two options to follow. One, to decide the controversy on merits in the writ petition itself and the other to remand the case to the Commissioner for deciding the appeals afresh on merits in accordance with law by passing reasoned order after dealing with all the contentions raised by the parties in support of their case. - Remanded the case to dispose afresh.

 fair price shop - Licence was cancelled - filed appeal before commissioner - commissioner dismissed the appeal - writ - High court set aside the commissioner order - but mainly on the ground that it was not a reasoned order -  make no observation regarding restoration of licence - Apex court held that In   our   considered   opinion,   the   High   Court having held that the order of the Commissioner was not legally sustainable because it was an unreasoned order, it had two options to follow. One, to decide the controversy on merits in the writ petition itself and the other to remand the case to the Commissioner for deciding the appeals afresh on merits in accordance with law by passing reasoned order after dealing with all the contentions raised by the parties in support of their case. - Remanded the case to dispose afresh.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.11763 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 28637 of 2018)
Meera Mishra            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Satish Kumar & Ors.   ….Respondent(s)   
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 12.07.2018 passed by the
High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,   Bench   at
1
Lucknow in Writ Petition No.3476 of 2007 whereby
the Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by respondent No.1 herein and set aside
the   order   dated   14.02.2007   passed   by   the   SubDivisional
Magistrate, Mishrit cancelling the license
of   respondent   No.1   for   fair   price   shop   and   order
dated   07.06.2007   passed   by   the   Commissioner,
Lucknow Division, Lucknow rejecting his appeals.
3. The issue involved in this appeal is short as
would be clear from the facts stated infra.
4. The dispute relates to a fair price shop at Gram
Panchayat   Ambaghat,   Block   Godalamau,   Tehsil
Mishrit District Sitapur (UP).   It is between the two
private   individuals,   namely,   the   appellant   and
respondent   No.   1   herein.  Both   are   asserting  their
respective rights to run the shop.
2
5. By order dated 14.02.2007, the Sub­Divisional
Magistrate,   Mishrit   cancelled   the   license   of
respondent No. 1 in relation to the shop in question
and,   therefore,   he   filed   appeals   before   the
Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow. 
6. By order dated 07.06.2007, the Commissioner
dismissed the appeals, therefore, respondent No. 1
filed   a   writ   petition   before   the   High   Court   of
Judicature at  Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow.  
7. By impugned order, the High Court allowed the
writ   petition   and   set   aside   the   order   dated
14.02.2007 of SDM, Mishrit and also the order dated
07.06.2007 of the Commissioner, Lucknow in Appeal
No.38/2006­07 and Appeal No.651/2006­07.
8. The   High   Court   set   aside   the   order   of   the
Commissioner mainly on the ground that it was not a
reasoned order. In other words, the High Court was
3
of the view that the Commissioner did not discuss all
the issues arising in the case.   
9. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has
filed this appeal by way of special leave in this Court
because according to  the  appellant, the  impugned
order has adversely affected his right to run the shop.
10. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   this   appeal,   is   whether   the   High
Court was right in allowing the respondent No.1's
writ petition.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
inclined to allow the appeal and remand the case to
the Commissioner for deciding the appeals afresh on
merits after hearing the appellant, respondent No. 1
and State (concerned department).
4
12. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   High   Court
having held that the order of the Commissioner was
not legally sustainable because it was an unreasoned
order, it had two options to follow. One, to decide the
controversy on merits in the writ petition itself and
the other to remand the case to the Commissioner for
deciding the appeals afresh on merits in accordance
with law by passing reasoned order after dealing with
all the contentions raised by the parties in support of
their case. 
13. The High Court did not exercise any option. As a
consequence, the  merits of  the case could  not be
examined   either   by   the   Commissioner   in   appeal
properly or the High Court in writ petition. In our
view, the parties were entitled for a decision of their
5
case on merits by the Appellate Court (Commissioner)
and then by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.
In this case, neither the Commissioner could record
any finding on the merits and nor the High Court.  It
is for this reason, we are inclined to prefer the second
option and while giving effect to the impugned order
remand   the   case   (appeal)   to   the   Commissioner   to
enable   him   to   examine   the   merits   of   the   case   in
accordance with law.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed in part. The case
is remanded to the Commissioner, Lucknow Division,
Lucknow   (UP)   for   deciding   the   appeals   afresh   on
merits.
6
15. The   appeals   bearing   Nos.38/2006­07   and
651/2006­2007   are   accordingly   restored   to   their
respective numbers on the file of the Commissioner
for their disposal in accordance with law on merits.
16. The   appellant   and   respondent   No.1   both   will
appear before the Commissioner, Lucknow on 14th
December, 2018 and file a copy of this Order. The
Commissioner   will   then   fix   any   suitable   date   for
hearing the appeals and on that day will hear the
appellant,   respondent   No.1   and   the   concerned
department of the State, and after hearing all the
parties will pass a reasoned order on all the issues
arising   in   this   case   relating   to   fair   price   shop   in
question uninfluenced by any observations made by
the High Court and this Court.
7
17. Parties   are   permitted   to   file   additional
documents, if any, in support of their case before the
Commissioner in appeals.   Let   the   proceedings   be
over   within   three   months   from   the   date   of
appearance of the parties.
     ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
8