Brevity being a virtue, it must be observed as far as possible while expressing an opinion. Apex court held that having rightly formed an opinion to remand the case to the First Appellate Court, there was no need for the High Court to devote 60 pages in writing the impugned order. In our view, it was not required. The examination could be confined only to the issue of remand and not beyond it. At the same time, there was no need to cite several decisions and that too in detail.

   Brevity being a virtue, it must be observed as far as possible while expressing an opinion.    Apex court held  that having rightly formed an opinion to remand the case to the First Appellate Court, there was no need for the High Court to devote 60 pages in writing the
impugned order. In our view, it was not required. The examination could be confined only to the issue of remand and not beyond it.  At the same time, there was no need to cite several decisions and that too in detail.  

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.11764­11765 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 29497­29498 of 2018)
Surjeet Singh & Anr. Etc. Etc.            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Sadhu Singh & Ors.   ….Respondent(s)   
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 24.09.2018 passed by the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in C.R.
No.182 of 2015 and C.R. No.183 of 2015 whereby the
1
High Court allowed the revision petitions filed by the
respondents herein.
3. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants and on perusal of the record of the case,
we find no good ground to interfere in the impugned
order because we find that the High Court has only
remanded the case to the first Appellate Court to
decide the first appeal and cross objection afresh on
merits in accordance with law.  An order of remand,
in our opinion, in the facts of this case, does not call
for any interference.     It is more so when in the
opinion of the High Court a case of remand was made
out.
4. Before parting, we cannot resist observing that
having rightly formed an opinion to remand the case
to the First Appellate Court, there was no need for
the High Court to devote 60 pages in writing the
impugned order. In our view, it was not required.
2
The examination could be confined only to the issue
of remand and not beyond it.  At the same time, there
was no need to cite several decisions and that too in
detail.  Brevity being a virtue, it must be observed as
far as possible while expressing an opinion. 
5. The appeals stand dismissed in limine.
     ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
3

Termination of Service - claim before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (referred to as “the CGIT”) claiming inter alia an enhanced severance package, waiver of outstanding Housing Loan, and full pension -The Ld. CGIT passed an Award dated 01.06.2009, and directed the R2­Bank to reinstate the Appellant, with full terminal benefits. - Eventhough not claimed reinstatement - Writ filed - High court allowed writ and order to refund the excess amount she withdraw under various interim orders etc., and held that she voulantrily abonden the post eventhough offerred various alternative equal posts - termination of her service as her post as confidential secretary become reduntant as the Officer with whom the Appellant was attached, left the services of the R2­Bank.- Appellant challenged the High court order - Apex court held that sec.25 F no notice is mandatory much more R2 Bank complied all necessary things under sec.25 F of I.D.Act -Once it is established that the Appellant had voluntarily abandoned her service, she could not have been in “continuous service” as defined under S. 2(oo) the I.D. Act, 1947. S. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 lays down the conditions that are required to be fulfilled by an employer, while terminating the services of an employee, who has been in “continuous service” of the employer. Hence, S. 25F of the I.D. Act, would cease to apply on her.- Apex court modified the order of High court and allowed to record full statisfaction of entire claim /package in full and final settlement .

Termination of Service - claim  before   the   Central Government Industrial Tribunal (referred to as “the   CGIT”)   claiming  inter   alia  an   enhanced severance   package,   waiver   of   outstanding Housing Loan, and full pension -The   Ld.   CGIT   passed   an   Award   dated 01.06.2009, and directed the R2­Bank to reinstate  the   Appellant,   with   full   terminal benefits. - Eventhough not claimed reinstatement - Writ filed - High court allowed writ and order to refund the excess amount she withdraw under various interim orders etc., and held that she voulantrily abonden the post eventhough offerred various alternative equal posts - termination of her service as her post as confidential secretary become reduntant   as   the   Officer with whom the Appellant was attached, left the services   of   the   R2­Bank.- Appellant challenged the High court order - Apex court held that sec.25 F no notice is mandatory much more R2 Bank complied all necessary things under sec.25 F of I.D.Act -Once it is established that the Appellant had voluntarily abandoned her service, she could not   have   been   in   “continuous   service”   as defined under S. 2(oo) the I.D. Act, 1947.  S. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 lays down the conditions that are required to be fulfilled by an employer, while terminating the services of an employee, who has been in “continuous service”
of the employer. Hence, S. 25F of the I.D. Act, would cease to apply on her.- Apex court modified the order of High court and allowed to record full statisfaction of entire claim /package in full and final settlement .

“REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 11766­11767 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 30205­30206 of 2017)
Manju Saxena          …Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Anr.                    …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
Leave granted.
1. The   present   S.L.P.s   arise   out   of   the   impugned
Judgment dated 14.07.2017 passed in L.P.A. No.
467/2017, and Order dated 13.09.2017 passed in
R.P.   No.   380/2017   of   the   Delhi   High   Court,
wherein the High Court dismissed the L.P.A filed by
1
the Appellant against the 2nd  Respondent ­ HSBC
Bank.
2. Briefly   stated,   the   factual   matrix   in   which   the
present S.L.P. has been filed are summarized as
under:
2.1 The Appellant was appointed on 01.04.1986 as
a   “Lady   Confidential   Secretary”   by   the   2nd
Respondent­ HSBC Bank, (hereinafter referred
to as “the R2­Bank”).
Subsequently,   on   23.04.1992   the   Appellant
came to be promoted as a “Senior Confidential
Secretary” to the Senior Manager (North India)
of HSBC. 
2.2 In May 2005, the post of “Senior Confidential
Secretary”   became   redundant,   as   the   Officer
with whom the Appellant was attached, left the
services   of   the   R2­Bank.   Her   services   were
utilized by giving her some other duties for the
time being, till alternate jobs could be offered to
her.
The Management admittedly offered her four
alternate   jobs   of   (i)   Business   Development
2
Officer,   (ii)   Customer   Service   Officer,   (iii)
Clearing   Officer,   and   (iv)   Banking   Services
Officer. Each of these jobs were in the same pay
scale. 
The Appellant has admitted in her Statement
of Claim dated 20.03.2006, that she declined to
accept any of these jobs on the ground that
such jobs were either temporary in nature, or
the claimant did not possess the experience or
work­knowledge to take up such jobs. 
2.3   On   01.10.2005,   the   Bank   issued   a   Letter
terminating the services of the Appellant on the
ground   that   her   current   job   had   become
redundant. The Appellant was offered several
job opportunities, however, she did not choose
any of these offers. The Bank had offered a
generous   severance   package,   which   she   was
not prepared to accept. The Bank terminated
her service, and paid 6 months’ compensation
in   lieu   of   Notice   as   per   the   contract   of
employment. In addition, as a special case, the
Bank   paid   Compensation,   which   was
3
equivalent   to   15   days’   salary   for   every
completed   year   of   service.   The   total   amount
paid to the Appellant was Rs. 8,17,071/­.
2.4   The   Appellant   raised   an   Industrial   Dispute
before   the   Regional   Labour   Commissioner
under   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   I.D.   Act)   on
03.10.2005,   and   sought   enhancement   of   the
severance package paid to her. It is relevant to
note that the Appellant did not raise any claim
for re­instatement to the R2­Bank.
Conciliation   proceedings   were   commenced
between the Appellant and R2­Bank, wherein
the Appellant made the following claims:
HEADS AMOUNT (INR)
Severance  69,99,600.00
Provident Fund 8,90,111.60
Gratuity  3,81,209.00
Leave Encashment 86,541.40
Compensation + Notice Pay 8,17,071.00
TOTAL 91,74,533.00
4
The Bank, in response, offered the following
package:
HEADS AMOUNT (INR)
Severance  32,79,600.00
Provident Fund 8,90,111.60
Gratuity  3,81,209.00
Leave Encashment 86,541.40
Compensation + Notice Pay 8,17,071.00
TOTAL 57,29,533.00
The only difference between the two parties
was with respect to the amount of Severance
payable to the Appellant. Since the parties were
unable   to   arrive   at   a   settlement,   the
conciliation proceedings failed. 
2.5   The   Appellant   filed   her   Statement   of   Claim
dated   20.03.2006,   before   the   Central
Government Industrial Tribunal (referred to as
“the   CGIT”)   claiming  inter   alia  an   enhanced
severance   package,   waiver   of   outstanding
Housing Loan, and full pension. The Claim was
opposed by the R2­Bank. The R2­Bank filed its
5
Written Statement and contested the claim of
the Appellant, stating that the Appellant was
not a “workman” under the I.D. Act, 1947. The
Bank further stated that they had followed the
procedure outlined under the  I.D. Act, while
terminating the services of the Appellant.
The   Ld.   CGIT   passed   an   Award   dated
01.06.2009, and directed the R2­Bank to reinstate
  the   Appellant,   with   full   terminal
benefits. 
2.6   The   R2­Bank   filed   Writ   Petition   bearing   No.
W.P.   (C)   11344/2009   before   the   Delhi   High
Court, to challenge the Award passed by the
CGIT. The High Court vide Interim Order dated
22.03.2013 remanded the matter to the CGIT
for fresh consideration on the point whether the
Appellant   could   be   considered   to   be   a
“Workman” as per the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.     The   Writ   Petition   was   kept   pending
during the pendency of the remand. The CGIT
passed a fresh Award dated 15.07.2015 holding
6
the Appellant to be a “workman” under the I.D.
Act, 1947. 
The   Ld.   CGIT   directed   the   R2­Bank   to   reinstate
the Appellant with continuity of service,
full back wages, and all consequential benefits.
2.7 During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the
Appellant had filed an Application under S. 17B
of   the   I.D.   Act,   1947   before   the   Delhi   High
Court seeking interim maintenance. The High
Court   vide   Interim   Order   dated   27.07.2012
directed   payment   of   a   monthly   sum   of   Rs.
75,000/­   to   the   Appellant,   towards   Interim
Maintenance u/S. 17B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
2.8 Aggrieved by the Order dated 27.07.2012, the
R2 Bank filed an L.P.A. before the Delhi High
Court to challenge the amount awarded to the
Appellant u/S. 17B. The Division Bench vide
Order dated 24.08.2012, reduced the monthly
sum payable to Rs. 58,330/­ per month which
was as per her last drawn salary.
7
The S.L.P. filed by the Appellant being S.L.P. (C)
No. 36513/2012 to challenge the Order dated
24.08.2012, came to be dismissed vide Order
dated 07.01.2013.
The Appellant accordingly has been paid back
wages u/S. 17B at Rs. 58,330/­ per month.
2.9 The Appellant also raised a claim for waiver of
the   outstanding   amount   of   a   Housing   Loan
availed by her during the course of her service,
which   was   outstanding   on   the   date   of   her
termination. The total amount of outstanding
loan was approximately Rs. 22,16,702/­.
The   Appellant   challenged   proceedings   for
recovery initiated by the R2­Bank before the
Delhi High Court in W.P. (C) No. 19451/2006.
A Consent Order dated 18.03.2010 came to be
passed whereby the outstanding amount of Rs.
22,16,702/­ towards the Housing Loan, was to
be adjusted from her back wages, subject to the
final outcome of the W.P. (C) No. 13344/2009.
8
2.10 The Writ Petition filed by the R2­Bank was
allowed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   vide
Judgment   and   Order   dated   12.04.2017,   and
the Award passed by the CGIT came to be set
aside. 
The   High   Court   accepted   the   R2­Bank’s
submissions,   and   held   that   the   Appellant’s
refusal   to   accept   any   of   the   four   alternate
positions   offered   to   her,   amounted   to
“abandonment” of her job. Hence there was no
question of her services having been illegally
terminated.   The   Appellant   had   received
monetary compensation under several heads,
to   the   tune   of   Rs.   1,07,73,736/­   during   the
pendency   of   the   Writ   Petition,   which   was
almost   13   times   her   legal   entitlement.   This
included   payments   made   under   the   various
heads   such   as   Compensation   paid   during
termination, Gratuity, Payment towards Interim
Award,   Payments   under   S.   17B,   Payment
towards   legal   expenses.   The   Appellant   was
9
directed to refund the entire amount except the
sum   of   Rs.   8,17,071/­,   which   was   the
compensation paid at the time of termination.
2.11   Aggrieved   by   the   Judgment   &   Order   dated
12.04.2017   in   W.P.   (C)   11334/2018,   the
Appellant filed L.P.A. No. 467/2017 before the
Division   Bench.   The   Division   Bench   vide
Judgment & Order dated 14.07.2017 dismissed
the   L.P.A.,   and  upheld   the   Judgment   of  the
learned Single Judge holding that the Appellant
had abandoned her job.
The   Division   Bench   however   modified   the
operative   direction   passed   by   the   Ld.   Single
Judge for restitution of the amounts paid. The
Division Bench ordered that the Appellant shall
not be required to restitute the amount of Rs.
8,17,071/­ paid at the time of termination, the
litigation   expenses,   and   the   amounts   paid
under S. 17B of the I.D. Act, 1947.
10
2.12   The   Appellant   filed   Review   Petition   No.
380/2017   which   was   dismissed   vide   Order
dated 13.09.2017.
2.13   The   Appellant   has   assailed   the   Judgment
dated 14.07.2017 and Order dated 13.09.2017
passed by the Division Bench in the L.P.A. and
the Review Petition, by the present S.L.P.s.
3. The   Appellant   was   appearing   in   Person.   Even
though the Court had made a suggestion that a
Counsel   be   appointed   to   represent   her,   she
declined the same. The submissions made by the
Appellants are:
3.1 The Appellant submitted that she is entitled to
a Severance Package of Rs. 69.99 lakhs, which
is equivalent to her last drawn salary of Rs.
58,330/­ per month for a period of 10 years,
i.e. 120 months.
The calculations put forth by the Appellant is
as follows:
11
[Severance   Package   =   Last   drawn   monthly
Salary x 120 months];
[Rs. (58,330 x 120) = Rs. 69,99,600/­]
3.2 The Appellant submitted that she had been in
“continuous service” for over 20 years with the
R2­bank. Consequently, she was eligible for all
benefits payable to a ‘workman’ under the I.D.
Act.
3.3 The Appellant further submitted that the terms
of the Housing Loan taken by her during the
course   of   service,   provided   for   782certain
relaxations and benefits to the employees. The
Appellant submitted that her outstanding loan
amount should be waived by the R2­Bank.
3.4 The Appellant submitted that the R2­bank had
been   deducting   T.D.S.   on   all   the   payments
made to her during the pendency of the legal
proceedings. The Appellant submits that this
deduction is illegal, and she is entitled to a
refund of a sum of Rs. 13,69,083/­ deducted
towards T.D.S.
12
4. The R2­Bank was represented by Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
Sr.   Adv,   alongwith   Mr.   Gagan   Gupta,   Adv,   the
Counsel for the R2­bank inter alia submitted:
4.1 It is the admitted position that the Appellant’s
post had become redundant when her boss left
the   Bank.   The   Appellant   was   offered   four
alternate positions of (i) Business Development
Officer,   (ii)   Customer   Service   Officer,   (iii)
Clearing   Officer,   and   (iv)   Banking   Services
Officer in the same pay scale. The Appellant
however declined each of these offers. In these
circumstances,   her   services   came   to   be
terminated.   As   a   special   case,   a   severance
amount of Rs. 8,17,071/­ was paid apart from
the other benefits.
4.2   It   was   further   submitted   that   the   Bank
complied with all the mandatory requirements
specified in S. 25F (a) and (b) of the I.D. Act.
The compensation of Rs. 8,17,071/­ granted to
the   Appellant,   was   computed   in   accordance
with S. 25F (b) i.e. compensation equivalent to
13
15 days’ salary multiplied by the   number of
years of employment.
The   High   Court   had   recorded   that   the
Appellant   had   already   received   monetary
benefits in excess of the compensation she was
entitled   to   under   the   law.   Therefore,   the
Appellant   was   not   entitled   to   any   additional
amount.
4.3   The   R2­Bank   submitted   that   during
Conciliation   proceedings,   they   had   offered   a
Severance Package of Rs. 32.79 lacs which was
worked out on the basis of the last drawn Basic
Salary + Monthly Allowances, for past 10 years
(equal to 120 months). The Basic Salary was
Rs. 19,280/­ and Monthly Allowances [H.R.A. +
Medical + L.T.A. of Rs. 8,050/­]. The total basic
component was Rs. 27,330/­ (19,280 + 8,050).
The   severance   package   by   the   Bank   was
computed as follows:
Severance   Package   =   (Monthly   basic
component x 120 months) = Rs. 27,330 x 120
= Rs. 32,79,600/­
14
5.   We   have   perused   the   pleadings   and   Written
Submissions made by the parties.
5.1 It is the admitted position that the Bank had
offered   four   alternative   positions   such   as
“Business   Development   Officer”,   “Customs
Service  Officer”,  which   were  at   par   with   her
existing   pay   scale   and   emoluments.   The
Appellant was however not willing to accept any
of the alternate positions offered to her. Nor
was   she   willing   to   accept   the   redundancy
package offered to her. In the circumstances
the R2­Bank was justified in terminating the
services of the Appellant, vide termination letter
dated 01.10.2005.
5.2 The   Bank   has   complied   with   the   statutory
requirements   under   S.   25F   of   the   I.D.   Act
which   lays   down   the   conditions   that   an
employer must comply, on the retrenchment of
a workman.
In the present case, the High Court has held
that the Appellant had “abandoned” her job, on
15
her   refusal   to   accept   any   of   the   alternative
positions with the bank, on the same pay scale.
5.3 The   concept   of   “abandonment”   has   been
discussed at length in a Judgment delivered by
a 3­Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in The
Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. v Venkatiah &
Ors.1 wherein it was held that abandonment of
service can be inferred from the existing facts
and   circumstances   which   prove   that   the
employee   intended   to   abandon   service.   This
case   was   followed   by   a   two   judge   bench   in
Vijay S Sathaye v Indian Airlines Ltd. & Ors.2
 .
In the case before us, the intentions of the
Appellant can be inferred from her refusal to
accept any of the 4 alternative positions offered
by the R2­Bank. It is an admitted position that
the alternative positions were on the same pay
scale, and did not involve any special training
or technical knowhow.
In   any   event,   the   claims   raised   by   the
Appellant   before   various   forums   were   with
1
(1964) 4 SCR 265
2
(2013) 10 SCC 253
16
respect   to   enhancement   of   compensation,
which are monetary in nature. The Appellant’s
conduct   would   constitute   a   voluntary
abandonment   of   service,   since   the   Appellant
herself had declined to accept the various offers
of   service   in   the   Bank.   Furthermore,   even
during   conciliation   proceedings   she   has   only
asked for an enhanced severance package, and
not reinstatement.
Once it is established that the Appellant had
voluntarily abandoned her service, she could
not   have   been   in   “continuous   service”   as
defined under S. 2(oo) the I.D. Act, 1947.
S. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 lays down the
conditions that are required to be fulfilled by an
employer, while terminating the services of an
employee, who has been in “continuous service”
of the employer. Hence, S. 25F of the I.D. Act,
would cease to apply on her.
The condition precedent for Retrenchment of
an employee, as provided in S. 25F of the I.D.
Act,   1947   was   discussed   by   a   Constitution
17
Bench   of   this   Court   in  Hathisingh
Manufacturing   Ltd.  v  Union   of   India3
,   while
deciding the constitutional validity of S. 25FFF.
The Constitution Bench held, 
“9.   …Under   Section   25­F,   no
workman   employed   in   an
industrial   undertaking   can   be
retrenched   by   the   employer
until (a) the workman has been
given   one   month’s   notice   in
writing   indicating   the   reasons
for   retrenchment   and   the
period   has   expired   or   the
workman has  been paid  salary
in   lieu   of   such   notice,   (b)   the
workman   has   been   paid
retrenchment   compensation
equivalent   to  15  days’  average
salary for every completed year
of   service  and  (c)  notice   in  the
prescribed manner is served on
the   appropriate
Government….By   S.   25F   a
prohibition   against
retrenchment,   until   the
conditions   prescribed   by   that
Section   are   fulfilled   in
imposed.” 
S. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 is extracted herein
below:
“25F.   Conditions   precedent   to
retrenchment   of   workmen.­   No
3 AIR 1960 SC 923
18
workman   employed   in   any
industry   who   has   been   in
continuous   service   for   not   less
than   one   year   under   an
employer  shall be retrenched by
that employer until—
(a) The workman has been given
one   month's   notice   in   writing
indicating   the   reasons   for
retrenchment  and   the  period   of
notice   has   expired,   or   the
workman  has  been  paid   in   lieu
of   such   notice,   wages   for   the
period of the notice; 
(b)  the  workman  has  been  paid,
at   the   time   of   retrenchment,
compensation   which   shall   be
equivalent   to   fifteen   days'
average pay [for every completed
year   of   continuous   service]   or
any part thereof in excess of six
months; and 
(c)   notice   in   the   prescribed
manner   is   served   on   the
appropriate Government [or such
authority as may be specified by
the   appropriate   Government   by
notification   in   the   Official
Gazette].”
In the present case, the R2­Bank has paid the
Appellant   a   sum   of   Rs.   8,17,071/­,   which
included 6 months’ pay in lieu of Notice under
S. 25F(a) and an additional amount calculated
19
on the basis of 15 days’ salary multiplied by the
number of years of service, in compliance with
S. 25F(b).  
However,   no   Notice   was   sent   to   the
Appropriate Government or authority notified,
in compliance with S. 25F(c) of the I.D. Act. 
A three Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmail
Singh & Ors. v State of Punjab & Ors.4
 Held that
the requirement of clause (c) of S. 25F can be
treated only as directory and not mandatory.
This was followed in Pramod Jha & ors. v State
of   Bihar   &   Ors.5
  wherein   it   was   held   that
compliance with  S. 25F(c) is not mandatory.
5.4 The   Appellant   has   admittedly   received   an
amount   of   Rs.   1,07,73,736/­   under   various
heads:
HEADS AMOUNT (IN RS.)
Towards Notice Period  1,77,684/­
Severance Pay 6,39,387/­
Gratuity  3,81,209/­
Back   Wages   pursuant   to
Execution
8,00,000/­
4
(1991) 1 SCC 189
5
(2003) 4 SCC 619
20
Towards Interim Award 33,19,096/­
Payments   made   under   S.
17B.
54,56,360/­
TOTAL 1,07,73,736/­
The Appellant has claimed an amount of Rs.
69.99   lakhs.   The   Appellant   has   already
received almost double the amount claimed by
her. 
6. In   light   of   the   discussions   above,   the   afore­said
amounts received by her may be treated as a final
settlement   of   all   her   claims.   The   impugned
Judgment of the Division Bench dated 14.07.2017,
is modified to this extent. 
          The Civil Appeals stand dismissed, with no
order as to costs. All applications stand disposed
of accordingly.
…………...........................J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
.……………………J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi,
December 3rd 2018
21
22

The powers of the Appellate Court under Section 386 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the accused and thereby was justified in confirming the conviction and the sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge - High Court in it's Appeal Power has to examine the each and every evidence of the prosecution - on issues arising in the case and the same should have been examined in the light of the challenge made by the accused in appeal and then a finding should have been recorded either of affirmation or modification or reversal, as the case may be. - mere mentioning that the trial court did all things correctly is not enough

The powers of the Appellate Court under Section 386 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the accused and thereby was   justified   in   confirming   the   conviction   and   the sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge - High Court in it's Appeal Power has to examine the each and every evidence of the prosecution - on issues arising in the case and the same should   have   been   examined   in   the   light   of   the challenge made by the accused in appeal and then a finding should have been recorded either of affirmation or modification or reversal, as the case may be. - mere mentioning that the trial court did all things correctly is not enough 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1540 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 8739 of 2018)
Kanubhai Bhagvanbhai Nayak            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Gujarat    ….Respondent(s) 
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No.1512
of 2011 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein and
confirmed the order of conviction and sentence dated
1
30.09.2011   passed   by   the   9th  Additional   Sessions
Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No.101 of 2010.
3) Few   facts   need   mention   hereinbelow   for   the
disposal of the appeal.
4) By impugned order, the Division Bench of the
High Court dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the
appellant (accused) and confirmed his conviction and
sentence   awarded   by   the   9th   Additional   Sessions
Judge,   Vadodara   in   Sessions   Case   No.   101/2010
under Section 302 of the  Indian  Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) which gave rise to
filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by
the appellant(accused) in this Court.
5) The question, which arises for consideration in
this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified in
dismissing the appeal filed by the accused and thereby
was   justified   in   confirming   the   conviction   and   the
sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge.
2
6) Heard Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Ms. Puja Singh, learned
counsel for the respondent.
7) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   on   perusal   of   the   record   of   the   case,   we   are
constrained   to   allow   the   appeal,   set   aside   the
impugned   order   and   remand   the   case   to   the   High
Court   for   deciding   the   criminal   appeal   afresh   on
merits.
8) The   need   to   remand   the   case   has   been
occasioned because we find that the Division Bench
has neither discussed any issue arising in the case nor
appreciated the evidence and nor recorded its findings
on any of the issues arising in the case and urged by
the appellant.
9) Mere   perusal   of   the   impugned   order   would
indicate that the Division Bench has first set out the
post mortem report and on its perusal observed that
3
the injuries on the body of the deceased reveal that the
death was homicidal leading to murder. The Division
Bench then observed that the evidence led by “various
witnesses” reveal that it was the accused who was
present at the scene of the offence and carried the
attack on deceased.  The Division Bench then observed
that   since   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge   had
“minutely   examined”   all   the   evidence   led   by   the
prosecution   and   has   given   cogent   and   convincing
reasons, the High Court is in complete agreement with
the view taken by the Additional Sessions Judge. It is
only with this narration of facts, the Division Bench
dismissed the appeal.
10) In our opinion, keeping in view the powers of the
Appellate Court under Section 386 (b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Division Bench should
have   examined   the   evidence   of   each   prosecution
witnesses on issues arising in the case and the same
4
should   have   been   examined   in   the   light   of   the
challenge made by the accused in appeal and then a
finding should have been recorded either of affirmation
or modification or reversal, as the case may be. 
11) There is neither any reference to any evidence,
nor its appreciation and nor there is any discussion
much less finding in the impugned order.
12) The High Court, in our opinion, is empowered in
its appellate jurisdiction to examine the issues of facts
and   law   while   examining   the   legality   and   the
correctness   of   the   impugned   order.     It   is   equally
incumbent   upon   the   Division   Bench   to   deal   with
issues urged and then record its findings one way or
the other keeping in view the law laid down by this
Court which governs the issues.
5
13) We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur
with such disposal of the appeal and feel inclined to
set aside the impugned order and remand the case to
the Division Bench of the High Court with a request to
decide the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with
law.
14) Having formed an opinion to remand the case, we
do not consider it proper to go into the merits of the
case.   We, therefore, leave all the issues open to be
decided   by   the   Division   Bench   on   merits,   in
accordance   with   law   uninfluenced   by   our
observations.
6
15) In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order
is set aside.  We request the High Court to dispose of
the   appeal   as   expeditiously   as   possible   preferably
within six months.     
16) Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed
of.
     .………...................................J.
     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
7

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants’ application filed under Section 482 of the Code. - The High Court not referred the case facts at least in breif in it's Judgment and order and just cited all decided cases and dismissed the application under sec.482 of Cr.P.C. - it is the duty of court to give brief facts of the case and principles of law and application of the same to the facts of the case and has to give it's final order - Apex court set aside the same and remanded the same to High Court for fresh disposal ;

 Whether the High Court   was   justified   in   dismissing  the appellants’ application filed under Section 482 of  the Code. - The High Court not referred the case facts at least in breif in it's Judgment and order and just cited all decided cases and dismissed the application under sec.482 of Cr.P.C. - it is the duty of court to give brief facts of the case and principles of law and application of the same to the facts of the case and has to give it's final order - Apex court set aside the same and remanded the same to High Court for fresh disposal ;

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1544  OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 9651 of 2018)
Geeta & Ors.            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.    ….Respondent(s) 
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   05.09.2018  passed   by   the   High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in an Application
1
filed   under   Section   482   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the
Code”)   bearing   No.29904   of   2018   whereby   the
Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   dismissed   the
application filed by the appellants herein.
3. Few facts need mention infra to appreciate the
short controversy involved in this appeal.
4. By impugned order, the Single Judge of the
High Court dismissed the appellants’ petition filed
under   Section   482   of   the   Code   wherein   the
challenge was to quash the order dated 18.06.2018
as well as the entire proceedings in in Complaint
Case No. 537/2018 under Section 498­A of   the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
“IPC”) Police Station Dhanuara, Dist. Amroha, J.P.
Nagar pending in the Court of 2nd  Additional Civil
2
Judge   (Junior   Division)   Judicial   Magistrate,
Amroha, JP Nagar.
5. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court   was   justified   in   dismissing   the   appellants’
application filed under Section 482 of  the Code.
6. Heard   Mr.   Pradeep   Kumar   Yadav,   learned
counsel for the appellants.  None appeared for the
respondents.
7. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants and on perusal of the record of the case,
we are inclined to set aside the impugned order and
remand the case to the High Court for deciding the
appellants’   application,   out   of   which   this   appeal
arises, afresh on merits in accordance with law after
notice to other side.
3
8. On perusal of the impugned order, we find that
the Single Judge has only quoted the principle of
law laid down by this Court in several decisions
relating to powers of the High Court on the issue of
interference in cases filed under Section 482 of the
Code from Para 2 to the concluding para but has
failed to even refer to the facts of the case at hand
much   less   in   detail   to   appreciate   the   factual
controversy.
9. In   other   words,   the   Single   Judge   has   not
mentioned the bare facts of the case with a view to
appreciate the factual controversy, such as, what is
the nature of the complaint/FIR filed against the
appellants, the allegations on which it is filed, the
offences   under   which   appellants   prosecution   is
sought,   who filed the complaint/FIR/proceedings,
4
whether it pertains to a cognizable offence or not,
the   grounds   on   which   the   complaint/FIR/
proceedings is challenged, why such grounds are
not made out under Section 482 of the Code etc.
10. We are, therefore, at a loss to know the factual
matrix of the case much less to appreciate except to
read the legal principles laid down by this Court in
several decisions. 
11. In our view, the learned Judge ought to have
first set out the brief facts of the case with a view to
understand the factual matrix and then examined
the challenge made to the proceedings in the light of
the principles of law laid down by this Court to
enable him to record the findings as to on what
basis and the reasoning, these principles apply to
5
the facts of the case at hand so as to either call for
any interference therein or not. 
12. Indeed, this is the least that is required in the
order in support of the conclusion. It enables the
Higher Court to appreciate the facts in its proper
perspective and also enable to examine the question
as to whether the reasoning given is factually and
legally sustainable.
13. We find that the aforementioned exercise was
not   done   by   the   High   Court   while   passing   the
impugned order.
14.  We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur
with the High Court and feel inclined to set aside
the impugned order and remand the case to the
High Court (Single Judge) with a request to decide
the application afresh on merits in accordance with
6
law   keeping   in   view   aforementioned   observations
after issuing notice to respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
15. Having formed an opinion to remand the case
in the light of our reasoning mentioned above, we do
not consider it proper to go into the merits of the
case.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds   and   is   accordingly   allowed.   Impugned
order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High
Court for its decision on merits uninfluenced by any
of our observations in this order.
   ………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   …...……..................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
December 03, 2018
7

concurrent findings of the courts below - no reason to interfere. - Second appellant took the plea of alibi - failed to discharge - non disclosing the name of lover of deceased by the accused is fatal to belive the case of accused /appellant No.1 given under Sec.313 - both courts below accepted the prosecution version - of course inaction of police from breaking open the doors to save the victim from the hands of accused and watching for 5 minutes till the accused came out after compelting their job - spell some doubts - can not detract the court from coming to different version due to failure of accused in discharging their burden - held that concurretn findings can not be distrubed.

There is a case for the
appellant that the conduct of P.W.2 in not breaking
5
open the door and only watching the occurrence for
five minutes renders the evidence suspect.

8. We are not persuaded to overturn the
concurrent findings of the courts below

No doubt, the High Court has
taken the view that D.W.1 has not given complaint
to the higher police officers. The High Court no
doubt also finds fault with the first appellant in
6
not disclosing the name of the person with whom his
wife was found to be in a compromising position.
Even proceeding on the basis that he may not have
known the name of the person it still does not
detract from us reposing confidence in the
testimony of the police officer. The presence of
the second appellant and her being apprehended by
the police officers, has been believed by both the
Courts and this is completely inconsistent with the
case set up by the appellants. In such
circumstances, we see no reason to interfere.

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.580 OF 2010
ASHWANI KUMAR & ANR. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF PUNJAB ..RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. The appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment of the High court of Punjab &
Haryana in Criminal Appeal No.103 of 2000
dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants,
confirming the conviction and sentence under
1
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
3. The prosecution case is that on 18.9.1998
the Assistant sub-inspector along with Head
Constable of police and other police officials were
on patrol duty and while so at about 1.30 p.m.,
they heard shrieks from one room of the house,
which was bolted from the inside. From the gaps in
the door of that room, the Assistant sub-Inspector
peeped inside the room and found that one man was
sitting on the chest of the lady, who was made to
lie on the ground and he was pressing her neck.
One lady was standing near that place and holding a
pucca brick, in her hand. She gave two blows with
the said brick on the person of the lady lying on
the ground. She told the man, the co-accused that
the said lady who was being assaulted was insulting
her before others who was his wife. She also
exhorted the man that he should finish her,
2
thereupon the man lifted a ‘khurpa’ and gave blows
with it. After killing her, both man and the woman
came out and they proclaimed that they have
accomplished their job. It is this man and woman
who are appellants before us.
4. The murdered lady was the wife of the
first appellant. The prosecution advanced its case
through the sub-inspector who was examined as P.W.2
and Head Constable who was examined as P.W.3 Under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. the first appellant has given
the following written statement:
“On the day of occurrence, I left my house
for going to Amritsar. On the way, I
found that I have left my purse at my
house. As such, I returned back to take
my purse. I saw a man holding my wife in
his arms and my wife also holding him. On
seeing me, he ran away. In a rage, I gave
push to my wife and her head struck
against wall. My wife started saying that
I cannot satisfy her sexually and
continued to say that my six months old
son is not from my loins but is from the
loins of this person. She told that she
will have other child from loins of her
lover also. I lost control over myself and
under this provocation caused injuries to
3
my wife. I had extreme love with my child.
I myself had appeared before police and
informed about the occurrence. The police
made out a false case against me later on
and police men became false witnesses.”
5. The second appellant in her 313 statement
claimed that she was innocent and was not present
at the time of the alleged occurrence.
6. The Trial Court on the basis of the
evidence accepted the prosecution version and
convicted the appellants. The High Court also
reposed confidence in the prosecution version.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants
impugned the prosecution version and drew our
attention to the evidence of D.W.1. D.W.1 has
inter alia stated as follows:
Many persons had collected there at the place.
He asked first appellant as to what he had done,
thereupon the first appellant disclosed that he
suspected that somebody was present in his house
4
along with his wife and the doors were closed and
out of sudden provocation, he had killed his wife.
He informed this incident to C. Karam Singh and SPO
Kultar Singh who came on a scooter at the place of
occurrence. He would say that before their arrival
no other police official arrived at the spot. C.
Karam Singh and SPO Kultar Singh then took the
first appellant to the police station. In his
cross examination he has stated that he did not
move any application regarding this incident to the
higher police authorities or executive authorities.
He denied that ASI who had come as prosecution
witness and other police officials had arrested
both accused. As many as 12 stab wounds have been
noted. This is besides 3 lacerated wounds.
According to the doctor, the death in this case was
due to haemorrhage and shock as a result of stab
injuries which was sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. There is a case for the
appellant that the conduct of P.W.2 in not breaking
5
open the door and only watching the occurrence for
five minutes renders the evidence suspect.
8. We are not persuaded to overturn the
concurrent findings of the courts below. As
observed by the High Court, there is no motive for
the police officials to falsely implicate the
appellants. The case of the second appellant is
one of alibi. She has not discharged her burden to
show that she was elsewhere. On the other hand,
there is evidence of the police officials that
after committing the crime, the appellants came out
and proclaimed that they have accomplished what
they wanted. They were apprehended. In such
circumstances, we see no reason to allow the
appellants to rely upon the statement of the first
appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C or upon the
deposition of D.W.1. No doubt, the High Court has
taken the view that D.W.1 has not given complaint
to the higher police officers. The High Court no
doubt also finds fault with the first appellant in
6
not disclosing the name of the person with whom his
wife was found to be in a compromising position.
Even proceeding on the basis that he may not have
known the name of the person it still does not
detract from us reposing confidence in the
testimony of the police officer. The presence of
the second appellant and her being apprehended by
the police officers, has been believed by both the
Courts and this is completely inconsistent with the
case set up by the appellants. In such
circumstances, we see no reason to interfere. The
appeal fails and stands dismissed.
…………………………………CJI.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
………………………………………J.
(K.M. Joseph)
New Delhi;
November 28, 2018
7