11. The need to remand the case has been occasioned on account of one factual error committed by the High Court while dealing with two submission of the appellant (employer) in Para 34 of the impugned order. It is noticed that while dealing with the submissions of the appellant(employer), viz., that the reference made to the Industrial Tribunal is improperly and presumptuously worded and secondly, the Industrial Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of the reference, the High Court instead of quoting the reference, by mistake quoted the operative portion of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and treated the operative portion of the award as reference and proceeded to examine the submissions and rejected the same.12. In our opinion, this being obviously an error apparent on the face of the record of the case and 7 rightly admitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, we have no option but to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High Court for deciding the writ petitions afresh on merits. We express no opinion on any of the issues dealt with by the High Court in the impugned order.

Non­Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11063 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 28379 of 2018)
Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing
Company Ltd.         …..Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Engineering Workers’ Association
& Ors.         …..Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11067 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C ) No. 28393 of 2018)
Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing
Company Ltd.         …..Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Engineering Workers’ Association
& Ors.         …..Respondent(s)
1
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.11064­11066 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 28386­28388 of 2018)
Mazda Services Etc.         …..Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing
Company Ltd. & Ors.         …..Respondent(s)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11068 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C ) No. 28437 of 2018)
Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing
Company Ltd.         …..Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Engineering Workers’ Association
& Ors.         …..Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
2
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against  the final
judgment and order dated 29.08.2018 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P.(C)
Nos.3150/2017,   3188/2017   and   3189/2017
whereby   the   High   Court   disposed   of   the   writ
petitions filed by the appellant herein and upheld
the   award   dated   02.03.2017   passed   by   the
Industrial   Tribunal,   Maharashtra,   Mumbai   in
Reference (IT) No.15 of 2006.
3. In order to appreciate the issues involved in
these appeals, few facts need mention hereinbelow.
4. An   industrial   reference   (IT)  15  of   2006   was
made by the Commissioner of Labour under Section
10 of  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “the   ID   Act”)     to   the   Industrial
Tribunal at the instance of the Engineering Workers’
3
Association(respondent   herein).   The   industrial
reference reads as under:
“Company shall take into its employment the
99   workmen   who   are   working   through   the
devise of the contractor M/s Mazda Services
and   whose   names   here   inter   impleaded   as
Complainants   in   Complaint   (ULP)   No.529   of
1995 w.e.f. 30.05.1995 and to pay them the
differences   in   wages   and   other   benefits   as
paid to the regular workmen of the company
and to continue to pay the same thereafter.”
5. The Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company
Ltd.   (employer),   Engineering   Workers’   Association
(Workers’   Association),   Godrej   Boyce   Shramik
Sangh   (recognized   union)   and     Mazda   Services
(contractor)   filed   their   respective   statements   in
support   of   their   case   and   also   adduced   their
evidence.   The   Tribunal,   by   awards   dated
23/24.07.2014 answered the references in favour of
the employer.
4
6. The   workers’   Association   felt   aggrieved   and
filed petitions bearing W.P.(C) Nos. 819, 820 and
821 of 2015 in the High Court of Judicature   at
Bombay   and   questioned   therein   the   legality   and
correctness of the awards. By common order dated
11.08.2015,   the   High   Court   allowed   the   writ
petitions   and   while   setting   aside   the   awards
remanded the cases to the Industrial Tribunal for
deciding the references afresh on merits.
7. By   award   dated   02.03.2017,   the   Industrial
Tribunal answered the reference in favour of the
Workers’   Association.   In   answering   so,   the
Industrial  Tribunal   also  directed   the  employer  to
pay   a   lump   sum   amount   of   Rs.   5   lacs   to   each
workman. The  employer felt aggrieved and filed writ
petitions (Nos.3150,3188 & 3189/2017) in the High
Court. By impugned order, the High Court upheld
5
the award of the Industrial Tribunal but quashed
the direction pertaining to payment of Rs. 5 lacs to
each workman.
8. Against   this   order   of   the   High   Court,   the
employer and the contractor have felt aggrieved and
filed the present appeals by way of special leave in
this Court.
9. Heard   Mr.   P.S.   Patwalia,   Mr.   J.P.   Cama,
learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr.
Vinay Navare,  learned counsel for the respondents.
10. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to allow the appeals and while setting
aside the impugned order remand the case to the
High Court for deciding the writ petitions afresh on
merits.
6
11. The   need   to   remand   the   case   has   been
occasioned   on   account   of   one   factual   error
committed by the High Court while dealing with two
submission of the appellant (employer) in Para 34 of
the impugned order. It is noticed that while dealing
with   the   submissions   of   the   appellant(employer),
viz.,     that   the   reference   made   to   the   Industrial
Tribunal is improperly and presumptuously worded
and   secondly,   the   Industrial   Tribunal   travelled
beyond the scope of the reference, the High Court
instead of quoting the reference, by mistake quoted
the operative portion of the award passed by the
Industrial   Tribunal   and   treated   the   operative
portion of the award as reference and proceeded to
examine the submissions and rejected the same.
12.  In our opinion, this being obviously an error
apparent on the face of the record of the case and
7
rightly admitted by the learned counsel appearing
for the respondents, we have no option but to set
aside the impugned order and remand the case to
the High Court for deciding the writ petitions afresh
on merits. We express no opinion on any of the
issues dealt with by the High Court in the impugned
order. 
13. In our view, the mistake being apparent, the
impugned order deserves to be set aside on this
ground alone.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
succeed   and   are   accordingly   allowed.   Impugned
order is set aside. The writ petitions out of which
these appeals arise are restored to their respective
numbers for their disposal on merits in accordance
with law.
8
15. We, however, make it clear that we have not
expressed our opinion on any of the issue arising in
the case having formed an opinion to remand the
case   to   the   High   Court.   The   High   Court   will,
therefore,   decide   the   writ   petitions   afresh
uninfluenced by any of our observations strictly on
merits.
16. We request the High Court to dispose of the
writ   petitions,   expeditiously,   preferably   within   6
months.                               
                   .
……...................................J.
                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
               
                                         …...................................J.
                       [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi,
November 16, 2018.
9

SUIT IS BARRED BY LIMITATION = plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the plaint even on the ground of limitation also. It is required to be noted that the agreement/agreement to sell and the general power of attorney were executed in the year 1987, on the basis of which the plaintiff had sought for the reliefs in the year 2004. Even, according to the plaintiff also, the title deed/sale deed in 13 favour of the original defendant no.1 executed by the developers M/s Ansal Properties was in the year 1994. Considering the evidence on record and even considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, it appears that throughout the plaintiff was aware of the execution of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1 executed in the year 1994, still the suit has been instituted in the year 2004 only, i.e. after a period of 10 years. Nothing is on record that any steps were taken by the original plaintiff to get the sale deed executed in his favour and/or in favour of his nominee. Therefore, the suit has been instituted after a period of 17 years after the execution of the agreement/agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and after a period of 10 years from the date of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is not entitled such reliefs, except of decree of recovery of amount paid to the original defendant no. 1.

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11070 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22667 of 2016]
Rakesh Malhotra .. Appellant
Versus
Kamaljit Singh Sandhu & Ors. .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and
order dated 29.2.2016 passed in R.S.A. No. 4015 of 2011 by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, by which the High Court has allowed the
said appeal preferred by the original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by setting aside
the judgment and order dated 10.8.2011 passed by the Additional District
Judge, Gurgaon and, consequently, has dismissed the suit preferred by the
appellant herein (original plaintiff). The original plaintiff (appellant herein)
has preferred the present appeal.
3. The facts leading to this appeal in nutshell are as follows:
2
That the appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘the original plaintiff’)
instituted Civil Suit No. 159 of 2004 against the respondents herein (original
defendants) seeking a declaration that the plaintiff is the owner and in
possession of the suit property – Plot No. 336 (old) 548 (new), measuring 420
square meters at Block B in the residential colony known as Sushant Lok,
Guugaon. It was also prayed to declare the sale deed dated 28.1.2002
executed in favour of the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 by original defendant
no. 1 as illegal, null and void. In the alternate, it was also prayed for decree of
possession of the suit property by directing the original defendant no. 1 to get
the sale deed executed and registered in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the
suit property, with consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the
original defendant nos. 2 and 3 from further selling/alienating/transferring the
suit property in question to anyone else, except the plaintiff, in any manner
whatsoever.
3.1 It was the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the suit property
was booked by the original defendant no. 1 with the developers - M/s Ansal
Properties and Industries Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘M/s Ansal
Properties’) However, by an Agreement to Sell dated 20.4.1987 executed by
the original defendant no. 1 being the original allottee from M/s Ansal
Properties in favour of the plaintiff, original defendant no. 1 sold/agreed to sell
the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. It was the case on behalf of the
original plaintiff that at the time of execution of the said written agreement
3
dated 20.4.1987, the plaintiff paid the sale consideration. However, it was
agreed to execute the sale deed as and when the developers M/s Ansal
Properties fulfills its obligation and complete the formalities. It was further
the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that simultaneously one General
Power of Attorney was also executed in favour of the plaintiff by the original
defendant no. 1 empowering the plaintiff to get the transfer in his favour as and
when the plaintiff will deposit all installments of M/s Ansal Properties and
desires to get transferred the suit property in his favour or in favour of his
nominee. It was also the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the
plaintiff was also put in possession. It was also the case of the original plaintiff
that thereafter the plaintiff paid the stamp duty. It was further the case on
behalf of the original plaintiff that, despite the above fact, when the developers
M/s Ansal Properties allotted the plot in question and executed the title deed in
favour of original defendant no. 1 (being the original allottee), the original
defendant no. 1 did not transfer the plot in question in his name and, in fact,
illegally transferred the suit property in favour of defendant nos. 2 and 3 on a
meagre amount of sale consideration by executing the sale deed dated
28.1.2002. With the above averments and prayers, the plaintiff instituted the
aforesaid suit in the Court of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Gurgaon.
3.2 The suit was resisted to by the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 by filing
the written statement. It was the case of original defendant nos. 2 & 3 that
4
they are the bona fide purchasers of the suit property for consideration. It was
also the case on behalf of the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 that the suit filed
by the plaintiff seeking a decree of possession and permanent injunction shall
not be maintainable unless there is a prayer for decree for specific
performance. It was the case on behalf of defendant nos. 2 and 3 that unless
the plaintiff renounces the plea of his title, he cannot seek decree of specific
performance. It was further the case on behalf of defendant nos. 2 and 3 that
the suit is collusive between the plaintiff and original defendant no. 1. It was
further case on behalf of the defendant nos. 2 and 3 that the suit is not within
the limitation. That, thereafter, original defendant nos. 2 and 3 also filed the
written statement denying the allegations and averments in the plaint.
3.3 It appears that, thereafter, the original plaintiff submitted an application
to amend the plaint by seeking the prayer of specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 submitted under Section 6 Rule 17 CPC.
However, the same came to be dismissed by the learned trial Court and attained
the finality.
3.4 On the basis of the averments in the plaint and the written statement, the
learned trial Court framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit
property?
2. Whether the sale deed dated 28.1.2002 executed by
defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 and 3 is illegal,
null and void on the ground alleged in plaint?
5
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for possession
in the alternative with consequential relief of permanent
injunction as prayed for?
4. Whether the suit is within limitation?
4A. Whether the defendant no. 2 and 3 are bonafide
purchasers as alleged?
5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the
present suit?
6. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the
purpose of jurisdiction of court fee?”
3.5 Thereafter, both the parties adduced the evidence, both oral as well as the
documentary. That, thereafter, on appreciation of evidence and considering the
submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, by the judgment and
decree dated 19.10.2010 the learned trial Court partly decreed the suit in favour
of the original plaintiff. The learned trial Court passed the decree for recovery
of Rs.2,46,645.50 with 9% interest throughout its realization. That the learned
trial Court passed the aforesaid decree dated 19.10.2010 in favour of defendant
no. 1 only. The suit and other reliefs came to be dismissed by the learned trial
Court.
4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated
19.10.2010 passed by the learned trial Court in Civil Suit No. 159 of 2004, the
original plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No. 109 of 2010 in the Court of
learned District Judge, Gurgaon.
4.1 That the first Appellate Court allowed the said appeal by quashing and
setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and,
consequently, decreed the suit by holding that the original plaintiff is entitled to
6
decree of declaration to the effect that the sale deed dated 28.1.2002 executed
by the original defendant no. 1 in favour of original defendant nos. 2 and 3 is
illegal, null and void and that the original plaintiff is entitled to decree of
specific performance of agreement to sell to execute the sale deed as per the
agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987.
4.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the
learned first Appellate Court setting aside the order of the learned trial Court,
original defendant nos. 2 and 3 preferred R.S.A. No. 4015 of 2011 before the
High Court. By the impugned judgment and order dated 29.2.2016, the High
Court has allowed the said appeal and consequently set aside the judgment and
decree of the first Appellate Court and dismissing the suit qua other reliefs and
has restored the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court.
4.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court, the original plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.
5. Heard Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents at length.
5.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein vehemently
submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has
committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside a well reasoned
judgment passed by the first Appellate Court and, that too, in the second
appeal. It is further submitted that, as such, the plaintiff paid the entire
7
consideration at the time of execution of the agreement/agreement to sell dated
20.4.1987 and, even thereafter, the entire stamp duty was paid by the plaintiff
and, therefore, as such, nothing further was pending to be done, except
executing the deed in favour of the original plaintiff by original defendant no.
1. It is submitted that even the plaintiff was also put in possession at the time
of execution of the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and the General Power of
Attorney by original defendant no. 1 in favour of the original plaintiff. It is
submitted that, therefore, the sale was complete in favour of the plaintiff and,
hence, the learned trial Court ought to have decreed the suit in toto and the
learned first Appellate Court, therefore, rightly decreed the suit, which ought
not to have been quashed and set aside by the High Court.
5.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant herein that the aforesaid vital/material aspects have not been
considered in true spirit by the High Court and that the High Court has
materially erred in quashing and setting aside a well reasoned judgment and
order passed by the first Appellate Court.
5.3 It is further submitted that the High Court has materially erred in
quashing and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate
Court on the ground that there was no prayer for specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled
to any decree for specific performance which was granted by the learned first
Appellate Court. It is submitted that, as such, there were necessary averments
8
in the plaint and even the reliefs sought in the plaint can be said to be the relief
for specific performance and even the issue no. 3 would cover the relief with
respect to specific performance. It is submitted that, therefore, the High Court
has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the order passed by
the first Appellate Court and, consequently, dismissing the suit.
5.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
High Court has not properly appreciated the facts that not only the substantial
amount was paid at the time of execution of the agreement/agreement to sell
dated 20.4.1987, even the subsequent installments were also paid by the
plaintiff and all the notices of demand of installments and other expenses were
directly between the plaintiff and the developer M/s Ansal Properties and that
the plaintiff paid the entire installments up to 20.4.1990.
5.5 It is further submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated
the fact that after the title deed/sale deed was executed by the developers M/s
Ansal Properties in favour of defendant no. 1 by the sale deed dated 31.3.1994,
the original defendant no. 1 assured the plaintiff that he will get the sale deed
executed in his favour. However, subsequently, the original defendant no. 1
did not execute the sale deed in favour of the original plaintiff and, on the
contrary, superciliously sold the suit property in favour of the original
defendant nos. 2 and 3 and, therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file the
suit. It is submitted that, therefore, the sale deed executed by original
defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant nos. 2 and 3 was illegal, null and void
9
and, therefore, the same was rightly declared to be illegal, null and void ab
initio by the first Appellate Court.
5.6 By making the above submissions, it is requested to allow the present
appeal and quash the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
and consequently restoring the judgment and order passed by the first
Appellate Court and to decree the suit.
6. The present appeal has been vehemently opposed by the learned counsel
appearing for the original defendant nos. 2 and 3. It is vehemently submitted
on behalf of the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 that the High Court has rightly
allowed the appeal preferred by the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 and rightly
quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned first
Appellate Court granting relief for specific performance of agreement to sell
dated 20.4.1987. It is submitted that in absence of any specific prayer in the
plaint/suit asking the decree of specific performance of Agreement to Sell, as
rightly observed by the High Court, the first Appellate Court was not justified
in granting the relief of specific performance of agreement to sell dated
20.4.1987.
6.1 It is further submitted on behalf of the defendant nos. 2 and 3 that, even
otherwise, the suit was barred by limitation. It is submitted that the original
plaintiff claimed the reliefs on the basis of the agreement to sell dated
20.4.1987, however, the suit was instituted in the year 2004. It is further
submitted that even the title deed/sale deed in favour of defendant no. 1 by the
10
developers M/s Ansal Properties was executed in the year 1994 and that the
original plaintiff was in knowledge of the same since the year 1994, still he
instituted the suit in the year 2004 only, i.e. after a period of 10 years. It is
submitted that, in the meantime, the original plaintiff did nothing to get the sale
deed executed in his favour and/or in favour of his nominee. It is submitted
that thereafter even the sale deed in favour of original defendant nos. 2 and 3
was executed by the original defendant no. 1 in the year 2002, which was a
registered sale deed with value and on payment of full sale consideration and
the original plaintiff instituted the suit in the year 2004 only. It is submitted
that, therefore, on consideration of evidence and in the circumstances of the
case, the High Court has rightly interfered with the judgment and order passed
by the first Appellate Court and, consequently, has rightly dismissed the suit.
6.2 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant nos. 2 and 3 has
submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and to buy the peace
and to put an end to the entire litigation, they are even ready and willing to pay
Rs.10,00,000/- to the original plaintiff as ex-gratia, which may be over and
above the decreetal to be paid by the original defendant no. 1 pursuant to the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court.
7. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties at length and perused the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and the judgment and
orders passed by the Courts below.
11
7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the suit the original
plaintiff sought the relief of declaration and permanent injunction only and
there was no specific prayer of specific performance of the agreement to sell
dated 20.4.1987. It is also required to be noted that even the original plaintiff
submitted the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to amend the plaint by
seeking relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated
20.4.1987. However, the same came to be dismissed and the same has attained
the finality. Even there was no specific issue framed by the learned trial Court
for specific performance with respect to the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987.
Nothing is on record that, at any point of time, the original plaintiff made any
grievance with respect to the non-framing of the issue with respect to specific
performance of the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987. Even no effort was
made before the learned trial Court to re-frame the issue. Therefore, as such,
there was no specific prayer for specific performance of the agreement to sell
dated 20.4.1987. Despite the above, the first Appellate Court granted relief of
specific performance of he agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 for which there
was no prayer in the plaint. Therefore, the High Court was justified in
reversing the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court granting
relief for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987.
7.2 Even the High Court is justified in not granting the other reliefs prayed
in the suit, namely, the declaration that the original plaintiff is the owner and in
possession of the suit property and even the suit for permanent injunction. It
12
is also required to be noted that the original plaintiff claimed reliefs on the
basis of the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and the general power of
attorney executed in the year 1987. The agreement dated 20.4.1987 is rightly
considered to be the agreement to sell only. The case on behalf of the original
plaintiff that the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 was a complete sale and it
was a sale deed cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the said
agreement/agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 was not a registered one and even
the same was not on the proper stamp duty and, therefore, as such, the same is
not admitted in evidence and the same can be used only for the collateral
purpose. Therefore, the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 is rightly
considered to be the agreement to sell only. Even considering the submissions
made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and even
considering the averments made in the agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987, the
same can be said to be an agreement to sell only, as even the title deed/sale
deed in favour of the original defendant no. 1 was executed in the year 1994.
Therefore, both the learned trial Court and the High Court are justified in
refusing to grant of declaration as sought in the plaint.
7.3 Even otherwise, the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the
plaint even on the ground of limitation also. It is required to be noted that the
agreement/agreement to sell and the general power of attorney were executed
in the year 1987, on the basis of which the plaintiff had sought for the reliefs in
the year 2004. Even, according to the plaintiff also, the title deed/sale deed in
13
favour of the original defendant no.1 executed by the developers M/s Ansal
Properties was in the year 1994. Considering the evidence on record and even
considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, it appears that throughout the
plaintiff was aware of the execution of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the
original defendant no. 1 executed in the year 1994, still the suit has been
instituted in the year 2004 only, i.e. after a period of 10 years. Nothing is on
record that any steps were taken by the original plaintiff to get the sale deed
executed in his favour and/or in favour of his nominee. Therefore, the suit has
been instituted after a period of 17 years after the execution of the
agreement/agreement to sell dated 20.4.1987 and after a period of 10 years
from the date of the title deed/sale deed in favour of the original defendant no.
1. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, the
plaintiff is not entitled such reliefs, except of decree of recovery of amount
paid to the original defendant no. 1.
7.4 In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we are in complete
agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Court as well as that of the
High Court, in not granting the other reliefs and granting the decree of
recovery of the amount paid by the original plaintiff to the original defendant
no. 1 only. In view of the reasons stated above, we see no reason to interfere
with the judgment and order passed by the High Court and, consequently, the
present appeal deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
14
8. However, as agreed, the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 are directed to
pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- to the original plaintiff ex-gratia, which they have
agreed to pay to put an end to the litigation and to buy a peace, to be paid to the
original plaintiff within a period of six weeks from today. On payment of the
aforesaid amount of Rs.10,00,000/- to the original plaintiff by original
defendant nos. 2 and 3, any proceedings pending between the parties, if any,
shall stand terminated.
9. With the above observations and directions, the present appeal stands
dismissed, however, with no costs. I.A., if any, stands disposed of.
………………………………..J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
………………………………..J.
(M. R. SHAH)
New Delhi,
November 16, 2018

1. Regarding renewal of the mining lease. 2. Regarding validity of the Environmental Clearance. 3. Regarding sale of iron ore in the form of ROM by Sarda Mines Private Limited. 4. Regarding diversion of additional land for mining and allied activities 5. Regarding production of iron ore without/in excess of the Environmental clearance. 6. Regarding enquiry done by the State Government for alleged violation of Rule 37, MCR, 1960 [Mineral Concession Rules of 1960]. 7. Regarding alleged ownership of the mining lease actually being with Jindal Steel and Power Ltd.

IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 1 of 14
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICITON
 I.A. No. 40 of 2015, I.A.No.42 of 2015,
IA No.61 of 2015 in IA No.40 of 2015 and IA No.111989 of 2018
IN
 WRIT PETITON (C) NO. 114 OF 2014
Common Cause …Petitioner
versus
Union of India & Ors. …. Respondents
(IN RE: SARDA MINES PVT. LTD.)
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. In this batch of substantive applications, we are concerned with what is
described as “Illegalities involved in the mining lease of Sarda Mines Private
Limited” by the Central Empowered Committee in its report of 16th October,
2014.
2. It is not necessary to repeat all the facts leading up to these applications
since the background has already been detailed by us in Common Cause v. State
of Orissa.
1

1
(2017) 9 SCC 499
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 2 of 14
3. While dealing with the mining lease of Sarda Mines Private Limited, the
Central Empowered Committee or the CEC concerned itself with seven issues.
They are:
1. Regarding renewal of the mining lease.
2. Regarding validity of the Environmental Clearance.
3. Regarding sale of iron ore in the form of ROM by Sarda Mines
 Private Limited.
4. Regarding diversion of additional land for mining and allied
 activities
5. Regarding production of iron ore without/in excess of the
 Environmental clearance.
6. Regarding enquiry done by the State Government for alleged
 violation of Rule 37, MCR, 1960 [Mineral Concession Rules of
 1960].
7. Regarding alleged ownership of the mining lease actually being
 with Jindal Steel and Power Ltd.
4. For the present, we are concerned only with the validity of the
environmental clearance granted to Sarda Mines Private Limited or SMPL and
the production of iron ore without/in excess of the environmental clearance. The
concern relates to a mining lease granted to SMPL over 947.046 hectares of land
for 20 years from 14th August, 2001 to 13th August, 2021. The mining lease is of
Thakurani Mines, Block B, Village Soyabali, District Keonjhar in Odisha. We
are not concerned with the validity or otherwise of the grant or renewal of the
mining lease to SMPL.
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 3 of 14
Grant of permission to mine
5. It has been pointed out to us and this is not disputed, that SMPL was
granted permission on 13th July, 1999 to extract 1,40,000 MT of iron ore per
annum. The permission granted clearly indicates that it is in the context of
reopening (to the extent of broken up area of 94.024 acres) the existing mine
where the highest production was 1,39,802.00 MT during 1966 as certified by the
Deputy Director (Mines). The said extraction or production was of iron ore and
the permission granted in 1999 was also for extraction or production of iron ore.
This was in accord with the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) that permits mining of the mineral iron
ore.
The permission granted on 13th July, 1999 reads as follows:
“Subject: Reopening of iron ore mines in Block-B in village Soyabali of
Thakurani iron ore mines in District Keonjhar, Orissa -
clarifications reg.
Sir,
This has reference to letter of 10th June, 1999 jointly from you and Shri
M.L. Sarda seeking clarification on applicability of the provisions of the
EIA Notification of 1994. We have noted the following:
(i) The Department of Steel and Mines, Government of Orissa has
agreed to renew mining lease in respect of Block-B covering an
area of 2340.20 acres in village Soyabali of the Thakurani iron ore
mines in favour of Shri S.L. Sarda and Shri M.L. Sarda.
(ii) The entire lease area is in reserve forest for which de-reservation
proposal has been forwarded by the DFO, Keonjhar to the PCCF,
Bhubaneswar.
(iii) Already broken up area is 94.024 acres.
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 4 of 14
(iv) Highest production from Block-B mines was 1,39,802.00 MT
during 1966 as certified by Dy. Director (Mines), Joda, Keonjhar
in his letter No. 7892 dated 26.5.99.
(v) Applications have been submitted to Orissa State Pollution
Control Board for obtaining “consent to operate” and IBM for
approval of mining plan.
Further, it has been noted that you are planning to reopen the mine
sometimes by the end of 1999 without change in broken up area and
production level. Also there is no plan to modernise the mine. It has also
been noted that wet drilling will be adopted on working phases. Besides
management of surface run off, mine water discharge and plantation of
OB dumps, water spraying on haul roads, transfer points and crushing
plant will be done regularly.
The provisions of EIA Notification of 1994 are not applicable to the
renewal of mining lease proposals that do not involve expansion or
modernisation. However, you should confine excavation only to already
broken up area of 94.024 acres as per mining plan approved and limit
production to 1,40,000 MTPA [TPA?]. You are also advised to obtain
other statutory approvals from the concerned authorities including the
forestry clearance under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and ensure
compliance with the general environmental conditions as indicated in
Annexure-I. In case, you plan any expansion or modernisation then prior
approval under the provisions of the EIA Notification of 1994 as amended
subsequently should be obtained from the Ministry.”
6. Again, the admitted position is that SMPL did not act upon the permission
granted on 13th July, 1999 till 13/14 August, 2001. The apparent reason is that the
mining lease in favour of SMPL was renewed only on 13/14 August, 2001. It is
only after the mining lease was renewed that SMPL started mining or extracting
iron ore on the basis of the permission granted on 13th July, 1999.
Grant of environmental clearance
7. The next important date that we are concerned with is 22nd September,
2004 that is the date on which SMPL was granted environmental clearance for
the extraction of iron ore. The environmental clearance granted to SMPL was for
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 5 of 14
expansion of production of iron ore (lump) from 1.5 lakh tonnes per annum
(LTPA) to 4.0 million tonnes per annum (MTPA). There was a progressive
gradation in the production capacity inasmuch as during the first year the increase
in production was permitted from 1.5 LTPA to 0.5 MTPA; 3.0 MTPA by the third
year and 3.750 MTPA from the fifth year to achieve the rated capacity in
production of 4.0 MTPA during the 17th year.
8. However, what is strange about the environmental clearance granted to
SMPL on 22nd September, 2004 is that it referred to the “proposal for expansion
of production of iron ore (lump)” from 1.5 LTPA to 4.0 MTPA. In fact, the
permission granted on 13th July, 1999 was for production of iron ore and not for
iron ore (lump). It is not even the case of SMPL that it was granted the permission
on 13th July, 1999 for the extraction or production of iron ore (lump), Moreover,
the MMDR Act refers to the mineral iron ore and not to iron ore (lump). The
concept of extraction or production of iron ore (lump) introduced in the
environmental clearance was alien to the permission granted on 13th July, 1999
and the MMDR Act. Therefore, the environmental clearance granted on 22nd
September, 2004 must be understood in the context of the permission granted on
13th July, 1999 and the MMDR Act. If so appreciated, then it is clear that
environmental clearance was granted to SMPL only related to the expansion of
production of iron ore from 1.5 LTPA to 4.0 MTPA. As mentioned above, it is
not even the case of SMPL that it was granted permission to extract iron ore
(lump) to the extent of 1.4 LTPA in terms of the permission granted on 13th July,
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 6 of 14
1999. Our understanding of the environmental clearance in this context and in
this regard keeping these factors in mind is of considerable importance insofar as
the decision in the applications is concerned, as will be apparent a little later.
Retrospective effect of the environmental clearance
9. Learned counsel for SMPL did not contest or dispute that an environmental
clearance does not have any retrospective effect. It is operational from the date it
is granted. In any event, this issue is no longer res integra having been settled in
the decision rendered in Common Cause in paragraph 87 of the Report. The
submission made, however, was that the benefit of retrospectivity of the
environmental clearance should be given to SMPL from the date on which the
mining lease was renewed, that is, with effect from 13/14 August, 2001. The
reason for claiming this benefit is that the expanded permissible production would
then commence from August 2001 and SMPL would be entitled to extract a larger
quantity of iron ore with the progressive gradation given in the environmental
clearance with the result that the 3
rd year of production would be 2004 and the 5th
year of production would be 2006 and not 2009. Similarly, the 17th year of
production would be 2018 and not 2021.
10. We simply cannot accept this submission since it is plainly contrary to the
decision of this Court in Common Cause. Moreover and additionally, accepting
the submission would mean that for the period from 13/14 August, 2001 till 22nd
September, 2004 SMPL would have the benefit of the permission granted on 13th
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 7 of 14
July, 1999 as well as the retrospective benefit of the environmental clearance
dated 22nd September, 2004 meaning thereby that SMPL would have two mining
permissions, which is obviously not possible. However, we cannot deny to SMPL
the benefit of the permission granted on 13th July, 1999 on the basis of which
SMPL carried out mining activities from the date of renewal of the mining lease
that is 13/14 August, 2001 till 22nd September, 2004. Even learned Amicus does
not have any objection to granting the benefit of the permission to SMPL for this
period, to the extent that SMPL extracted or produced 1.4 LTPA of iron ore
during this period. Therefore, the mining activity carried out by SMPL from
13/14 August, 2001 till the date of the environmental clearance, that is, 22nd
September, 2004 is legal to the extent of 1.4 LTPA and SMPL cannot be penalised
for this mining activity during this period.
11. It was submitted by learned counsel for SMPL that if the environmental
clearance is not given retrospective effect then it would mean that its validity
would not be co-extensive with the term of the mining lease. Resultantly, the
operation of the environmental clearance though granted for the life of the mining
lease would necessarily be curtailed to the detriment of SMPL. This submission
is noted only to be rejected. The submission made can hardly be a ground for
giving retrospective effect to the environmental clearance. If the life of the
environmental clearance is curtailed due to operation of the law, then so be it.
12. Learned counsel for SMPL has shown us a Summary of the Project,
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 8 of 14
Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan relating
to the proposed expansion of the Thakurani iron ore mine, Block-B, District
Keonjhar, Orissa. This document is of February 2002 and is to be found on page
25 of volume 168 of the paper book. He has drawn our attention to page 28 thereof
which relates to the mining proposed by open-cast method using drilling and
blasting. The production build-up is given in the form of a chart but it takes 2001-
2002 as the first year of production. This is obviously on the assumption that the
environmental clearance relates back to the date of renewal of the mining lease
in 2001. However, since we have held that the environmental clearance does not
and cannot have any retrospective effect, the first year of production should in
fact be 2004-2005 (pro rata) based on the environmental clearance. On the basis
of the chart pointed out by learned counsel for SMPL, it is quite clear that there
has been excess mining of iron ore from the first year of production itself. This
excess mining is clearly illegal and must be penalised in terms of our judgement
in Common Cause.
13. We leave it to the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to quantify the
penalty to be imposed on SMPL from 22nd September, 2004 and based on the
terms of the environmental clearance. The calculation should also take into
consideration our conclusion that the environmental clearance is not retrospective
and the first year of production, in view of the environmental clearance granted
to SMPL would be 2004-2005. Any mining in excess of the environmental
clearance by SMPL would be and is illegal.
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 9 of 14
Extraction of iron ore (lump)
14. The main rub of the controversy before us lies in the terminology employed
in the environmental clearance granted to SMPL - whether it was entitled to
extract iron ore (lump) or mineral iron ore, within the limits laid down in the
environmental clearance.
15. Before resolving this controversy, it must be clearly understood that
extraction of the mineral iron ore is the extraction of iron ore Run of Mine or
ROM. Lumps of iron ore are, in a sense, a by-product of ROM as are topsoil,
mineral rejects, sub-grade ore and fines and the distinctions made are for the
purposes of payment of royalty. The submission of learned counsel for SMPL is
to the effect that SMPL was entitled to extract iron ore (lump) in terms of the
environmental clearance. If this submission is to be taken literally, then SMPL
was entitled to extract only iron ore (lump) without extracting iron ore ROM. This
would be much like the argument put forth by Portia enabling Shylock to extract
his pound of flesh without spilling a drop of blood. However, we need not take a
decision in this regard merely on semantics.
16. That lumps are a by-product of the extraction of iron ore ROM is clear
from the decision of this Court rendered in National Mineral Development
Corporation Ltd. v. State of M.P.
2 wherein this Court noted the process of
winning the mineral as described by the appellant therein in the following words:

2
(2004) 6 SCC 281
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 10 of 14
“Iron ore deposits occur mostly in the hill ranges and iron ore is
found on the top of the hill i.e. on the surface. The process by
which the mineral is won has been described by the appellant as
under:
“The ore is extracted by opencast method of mining for
which mining benches are prepared. Firstly, holes are
drilled on the benches covering the entire height of the
bench at regular distance depending on ore types. After
charging of the holes with explosives this portion of the
bench is blasted. The blasted material known as ROM
(run-of-mines) consists of large boulders, fragments and
fines along with other contaminants. ROM is
transported to crushing plant by dumpers and crushed
to below 150 mm sizes. This crushed ROM contains
lump, fines and also contaminants such as alumina and
silica. The crushed ore is transported to screening plant
through conveyor belts and is washed with water and
screened in vibrating screens. Vibrating screens segregate
ore into different sizes such as lump, calibrated ore and
fines……” (Emphasis supplied by us).
17. Similarly, in Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India3
it was observed that in
the process of mining, iron ore is extracted (that is ROM) and separated into ore
lumps, fines and waste material which is commonly known as slime.
18. Looked at in this light, the context in which permission was granted to
SMPL on 13th July, 1999 is important. Permission was granted to SMPL to extract
the mineral iron ore. This had no reference at all to the sub-category or by-product
called iron ore (lump) but must be understood as permission to extract mineral
iron ore ROM. It was this permission that was sought to be proposed for
expansion of production and if it is looked at in this contemporaneous or historical
(whichever) background, then it is quite obvious that the environmental clearance

3
(2015) 6 SCC 193
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 11 of 14
granted on 22nd September, 2004 was only with reference to iron ore ROM. This
must also be read in the context of the MMDR Act which refers to the mineral
iron ore and does not refer to iron ore (lump). A combination of these two factors
convinces us that the environmental clearance granted to SMPL was only with
reference to iron ore ROM and not iron ore (lump), notwithstanding the
terminology employed in the environmental clearance.
19. Taking the view as canvassed by learned counsel for SMPL would lead to
a rather anomalous situation wherein, for the purposes of extracting iron ore
(lump) of a permissible quantity, SMPL could extract as much iron ore ROM as
it desired. In other words, for the purposes of extracting iron ore (lump) of 4.0
MTPA could it be said that SMPL was entitled to extract iron ore ROM to the
extent of 6.0 MTPA or even 8.0 MTPA? The answer to this is certainly in the
negative otherwise the environmental clearance granted to SMPL would be
devoid of any rational meaning whatsoever. Also taking this into consideration,
it does appear to us that though the environmental clearance granted to SMPL
was unhappily worded, it must be given a realistic meaning so that it is not
rendered ineffective on the ground of vagueness and to the detriment of the
environment as also to the detriment of SMPL.
20. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the Summary of the Project,
Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan of
February 2002 placed on record by SMPL in volume 168 of the paper book. The
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 12 of 14
table or chart on page 28 thereof and which forms a part of the document indicates
that for the production ore extraction of iron ore (lump) the total excavation of
iron ore ROM proposed is almost double the quantity. The chart is as follows:
Years Lump Ore
(+5- 180m
and 30 +
18m) (MT)
Total
Excavation
(MT)
ROM
(MT)
Top
Soil
(MT)
Mineral
rejects
(MT)
Subgrade
Ore (MT)
Fines,
-5 mm
(MT)
1
st year
2001-2002
0.500 1.151 0.770 0.000 0.349 0.032 0.270
2
nd year
2002-2003
1.196 2.159 1.840 0.000 0.267 0.052 0.644
3
rd year
2003-2004
1.976 3.499 3.040 0.000 0.121 0.338 1.064
4
th year
2004-2005
2.990 4.829 4.600 0.000 0.183 0.046 1.610
5
th year
2005-2006
3.750 6.058 5.770 0.000 0.231 0.057 2.020
Sub Total 10.412 17.696 16.020 0.000 1.151 0.525 5.606
2007-2011 18.750 33.571 28.850 0.024 1.342 3.355 10.100
2012-2016 18.750 33.547 28.850 0.000 1.342 3.355 10.100
2017-2021 20.00 35.779 30.770 0.000 1.431 3.578 10.770
Grand Total 67.912 120.593 104.90 0.024 5.266 10.813 36.576
21. It is quite clear to us even from the above chart that the interpretation
sought to be given by learned counsel for SMPL to the environmental clearance
was never intended and if it was, then the unfortunate consequence would be that
the environmental clearance must be held to be invalid and quashed, resulting in
greater damage to the interests of SMPL than envisaged. On a realistic
interpretation to the environmental clearance, for the purposes of calculating
excess or illegal production of iron ore, the entire extraction of iron ore ROM is
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 13 of 14
required to be taken into consideration.
22. We may note in this context that it has come on record that the entire iron
ore ROM extracted by SMPL is actually sold to Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. or
JSPL and it is not only iron ore (lump) that is sold to JSPL. In this factual
background, the issue of the relationship between SMPL and JSPL arises but we
are not concerned with this for the present. However, what is more important is
that it is the sale of iron ore ROM that is made by SMPL to JSPL and not the sale
of iron ore (lump). In other words, SMPL is desirous of taking full advantage of
its extraction and production of iron ore ROM but at the same time shying away
from the legal consequences that follow.
23. It was submitted by learned counsel for SMPL that the CEC has confused
itself between extraction or production of iron ore ROM and extraction or
production of iron ore (lump) and as a consequence, it has arrived at an incorrect
figure of excess or illegal mining by SMPL. In fact, the contention is that SMPL
has neither been involved in any excess or illegal mining and the conclusions
arrived at by the CEC are totally incorrect. We cannot accept this submission in
view of the discussion above, including the conduct and activities of SMPL, the
provisions of the MMDR Act and the context in which the permission and
environmental clearance was granted to SMPL. Under the circumstances, we find
no merit in the objections raised by SMPL to the report of the CEC with regard
to the validity of the environmental clearance or the excess or illegal mining of
IA Nos.40 of 2015 etc. in W.P. (C) No.114 of 2014 Page 14 of 14
iron ore by SMPL.
24. However, in view of our conclusion, the CEC might have to rework the
quantum of excessive or illegal mining carried out by SMPL and the consequent
penalty. For this, we grant 6 weeks’ time to the CEC to do the needful. All records
relevant for arriving at a decision should be made available by SMPL and the
concerned authorities to the CEC.
25. The substantive applications are disposed of to the above extent and in
terms of the above directions.
 ...……………………J
(Madan B. Lokur)

 ...…………………....J
New Delhi; (Deepak Gupta)
November 12, 2018

temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. = In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the Appellants-herein are not entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the regularization of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated 10 | P a g e to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh (supra) that temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. 12. We express no opinion on the contention of the State Government that the Appellants are not entitled to the reliefs as they are not working on Group ‘D’ posts and that some of them worked for short periods in projects. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, we allow these Appeals and set aside the judgments of the High Court holding that the Appellants are entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay scales applicable to regular employees working on the same posts. The State of Uttar Pradesh is directed to make payment of the minimum of pay scales to the Appellants with effect from 1st December, 2018.

Non Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 10956 of 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1045 of 2016)
Sabha Shanker Dube .... Appellant

Versus
Divisional Forest Officer & Ors. ….Respondents
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL Nos._10957-10963 of 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 1252-1258 of
2016)
 CIVIL APPEAL No._10964___ of 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 11108 of 2016)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
Leave granted
1. These Appeals are filed against the judgment of the
High Court of Allahabad dated 24th September, 2015 in
Special Appeal No.1198 of 2006 and others by which the
judgment of the learned Single Judge denying relief to the
Appellants was affirmed.
1 | P a g e
2. The Appellants are daily rated workers employed in
Group ‘D’ posts in the Forest Department in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. They filed Writ Petitions before the High
Court of Allahabad seeking regularization of their
services, the minimum of the pay scales available to their
counterparts working on regular posts and treating them
as being in continued service while condoning the breaks
in their service. The Writ Petitions were dismissed by a
learned Single Judge by a judgment dated 28th April,
2004. Regularization of daily wagers was directed to be
considered in accordance with the relevant rules by
condoning the breaks in service if it is less than 03
months. It was held that a direction for regularization
cannot be issued. The learned Single Judge rejected the
claim of the Appellants regarding the minimum of the pay
scales by holding that such a direction cannot be granted
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Special
Appeals filed by the Appellants were dismissed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad by a
judgment dated 24th September, 2015 by relying upon its
earlier judgment in Special Appeal No.1530 of 2007.
2 | P a g e
3. Special Appeal No.1530 of 2007 was filed by the
State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment of the
learned Single Judge dated 17th October, 2005 in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No.48322 of 2000 and others. The said
Writ Petitions were filed by daily wagers working in Group
‘C’ and Group ‘D’ posts in the Forest Department of the
State of Uttar Pradesh. Regularization of services and
equal pay for equal work were the reliefs that were
sought by the Petitioners in those Writ Petitions. The
learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions by
directing the State Government to re-consider the
Petitioners-therein for regularization of their services,
ignoring artificial breaks and by relaxing the minimum
educational qualifications and the physical endurance
requirements prescribed by the service rules. The
Selection Committee was directed to re-consider
candidature of all the Petitioners-therein for
regularization. Such of those persons who were found
eligible for regularization were directed to be regularized
in the vacancies that may arise in the future in their
respective divisions. There was a further direction that
3 | P a g e
the Petitioners-therein shall be continued on daily wages
till their regularization and be paid a minimum of the pay
scales.
4. In the Appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, a
Division Bench of the High Court set aside the directions
issued in the Writ Petitions relating to the relaxation of
minimum educational qualifications and physical
endurance requirements as also the direction pertaining
to the minimum of the pay scales to be paid to the daily
wagers. The directions issued by the learned Single Judge
to relax the conditions of the requisite minimum
qualifications and physical endurance requirements were
found to be unjustified by the Division Bench. Placing
reliance on a judgment of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Tilak Raj
1
 and State of Punjab v. Surjit
Singh
2
 , the Division Bench of the High Court held that
the daily wagers are not entitled to the minimum of the
pay scales.
5. We have heard Mr. B.H. Marlapalle and Mr. S.R.
Singh, learned Senior Counsels for the Appellants and Ms.
Aishwarya Bhati, learned Addl. Advocate General and Ms.
1 (2003) 6 SCC 23
2 (2009) 9 SCC 514
4 | P a g e
Rachna Gupta, learned Advocate on-Record appearing for
the Respondents. It was made clear by Mr. Marlapalle,
learned Senior Advocate that the only point that requires
consideration pertains to the entitlement of the
Appellants to the minimum of the pay scales applicable to
the regular employees in the Forest Department. It was
submitted on behalf of the Appellants that the judgment
of this Court in Civil Appeal No.3634 of 1998 in State of
U.P. & Ors. v. Putti Lal
3
 still holds the field and the
Division Bench ought to have granted the relief sought by
following the said judgment. The Appellants relied upon a
judgment of this Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v.
Jagjit Singh & Ors.
4
 to submit that they are entitled to
the minimum of the pay scales and the judgment of the
Division Bench is liable to be set aside. The Appellants
also draw support from the Civil Appeals5
 that were heard
by this Court against the orders passed in Contempt
Applications filed for disobedience of the orders of
payment of the minimum of the pay scales to the daily
wage workers in the Forest Department. This Court took
3 (2006) 9 SCC 337
4 (2017) 1 SCC 148
5 Civil Appeal Nos. 884-885 of 2016 and 879-883 of 2016
5 | P a g e
notice of an affidavit filed on behalf of the Principal Chief
Conservator of Forests, State of Uttar Pradesh in which it
was stated that the instructions were given to all the
officers concerned to implement the directions issued by
the High Court regarding payment of the minimum of pay
scales to the daily wagers. A direction was given by this
Court to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and
the Principal Secretary to the Department of Forests,
State of Uttar Pradesh to file separate affidavits in the
High Court regarding the implementation of the
directions. Mr. S.R. Singh, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for some of the Appellants informed us that all
the daily wagers were paid the minimum of the pay
scales from 29th January, 2016 to 31st March, 2018 at the
rate of Rs.18,000/- per month. After 31st March, 2018, the
pay was revised to 7,000/- per month. He submitted that
according to the recommendations of the 7th Pay
Commission, the minimum of the pay scale to which the
Appellants are entitled to is Rs.18,000/-.
6. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Addl. Advocate General
appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh contended that
6 | P a g e
the Appellants are working in projects after being
employed as and when the necessity arises. There is no
continuity of service and the employment of the
Appellants is made periodically after long breaks. She
submitted that the Appellants are not eligible for
regularization in accordance with the rules and they are
not working on sanctioned posts. She also submitted that
any relief granted in favour of the Appellants will result in
a heavy burden on the State exchequer.
7. It is necessary for us to refer to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Special
Appeal No.1530 of 2007 as all the impugned Special
Appeals were dismissed by following the said judgment.
The directions issued by the learned Single Judge to reconsider
the Writ Petitioners for regularization of their
services by ignoring the minimum educational
qualifications and the physical endurance requirements
as well as continuance of the Writ Petitioners on a daily
wage basis with the minimum of the pay scales were set
aside by the Division Bench.
7 | P a g e
8. The daily wagers relied upon a judgment of this
Court in Putti Lal (supra) and submitted that the same
relief may be extended to them. It is relevant to note that
the judgment in Putti Lal (supra) relates to a dispute
similar to that involved in this case. Daily rated wage
earners in the Forest Department in the State of Uttar
Pradesh approached the High Court for regularization of
their services. The Division Bench of the High Court of
Allahabad directed the State Government to constitute
the Committee as directed in order to frame the scheme
for regularization. The judgment of the High Court that
the daily rated wage workers shall be paid at the
minimum of the pay scales was affirmed by this Court on
the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Division
Bench of the High Court while deciding Special Appeal
No.1530 of 2007 referred to the judgment in Putti Lal
(supra) but placed reliance on a later judgment of this
Court Tilak Raj (supra). The Division Bench of the High
Court also cited the case of Surjit Singh (supra) to hold
that the daily wagers cannot seek the benefit of the
judgment of Putti Lal (supra) case in view of the
8 | P a g e
subsequent decisions of this Court wherein, according to
the High Court, it was held that daily wage employees
were not entitled to the minimum of the pay scales.
9. On a comprehensive consideration of the entire law
on the subject of parity of pay scales on the principle of
equal pay for equal work, this Court in Jagjit Singh
(supra) held as follows:
“ 58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to
determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of
labour. An employee engaged for the same work
cannot be paid less than another who performs the
same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a
welfare State. Such an action besides being
demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human
dignity. Anyone, who is compelled to work at a lesser
wage does not do so voluntarily. He does so to provide
food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his selfrespect
and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and
at the cost of his integrity. For he knows that his
dependants would suffer immensely, if he does not
accept the lesser wage. Any act of paying less wages
as compared to others similarly situate constitutes an
act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a
domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is
oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels
involuntary subjugation.”
9 | P a g e
10. The issue that was considered by this Court in Jagjit
Singh (supra) is whether temporary employees (daily
wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees
appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and
likewise) are entitled to the minimum of the regular pay
scales on account of their performing the same duties
which are discharged by those engaged on regular basis
against the sanctioned posts. After considering several
judgments including the judgments of this Court in Tilak
Raj (supra) and Surjit Singh (supra), this Court held that
temporary employees are entitled to draw wages at the
minimum of the pay scales which are applicable to the
regular employees holding the same post.
11. In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we
are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the
Appellants-herein are not entitled to be paid the
minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to
adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the
regularization of their services. We are concerned only
with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti
Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated
10 | P a g e
to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh
(supra) that temporary employees are entitled to
minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in
service.
12. We express no opinion on the contention of the
State Government that the Appellants are not entitled to
the reliefs as they are not working on Group ‘D’ posts and
that some of them worked for short periods in projects.
13. For the aforementioned reasons, we allow these
Appeals and set aside the judgments of the High Court
holding that the Appellants are entitled to be paid the
minimum of the pay scales applicable to regular
employees working on the same posts. The State of Uttar
Pradesh is directed to make payment of the minimum of
pay scales to the Appellants with effect from 1st
December, 2018.

 ...................................J.
 [S.A. BOBDE]

 ..................................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi,
November 14, 2018
11 | P a g e

Non refund of deposited amount on breach of contract can not be enforced through criminal law as it is only a civil dispute - FIR QUASHED -We, thus find that it is not possible to hold that the amount of Rs. One crore which was paid along with the development agreement as a deposit can be said to have been entrustment of property which has been dishonestly converted to his own use or disposed of in violation of any direction of law or contract by the Appellant. The Appellants have not used the amount nor misappropriated it contrary to any direction of law or contract which prescribes how the amount has to be dealt with. Going by the agreement dated 03.06.1993, the amount has to be returned upon the handing over of the constructed area of the owner which admittedly has not been done. Most significantly the Respondent No.2 has not demanded the return of the amount at any point of time. In fact, it is the specific contention of the Respondent No.2 that he has not demanded the amount because the agreement is still in subsistence. We do not see how it can be contended by any stretch of imagination that the Appellants have misappropriated the amount or 11 dishonestly used the amount contrary to any law or contract. In any case, we find that the dispute has the contours of a dispute of civil nature and does not constitute a criminal offence. 24. Having given our anxious consideration, we are of the view that assuming that there is a security deposit of Rs. One Crore and that he has misappropriated the dispute between the two parties can only be a civil dispute. We are of the opinion that the present case falls under the 1st, 3rd and 5th category set out in the para 102 of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). In such a situation, the High Court erred in dismissing the petition of the Appellants filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.We find that the prosecution is mala fide, untenable and solely intended to harass the Appellants. We are forfeited in view of the Respondent not having made any attempt to recover the deposit of Rs. One Crore through a civil action.We have, therefore, no hesitation in quashing the FIR and the charge sheet filed against the Appellants. Hence, the FIR No.0139/2014 dated 20.08.2014 and charge sheet dated 03.08.2018 are hereby quashed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1395 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3730 of 2016]
Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. ....Appellant(s)
Versus
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
Department of Home and Anr. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
S.A. BOBDE, J.
Leave granted.
2. This Criminal Appeal is filed by Appellants challenging the final
judgment and order dated 02.02.2016 of the High Court of Delhi. The
High Court vide the above dated final judgment and order dismissed
the petition filed by the Appellants under Section 482 of Criminal
Procedure Code and refused to quash FIR No.0139/2014 dated
20.08.2014. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court,
Respondent No.1 filed charge sheet dated 03.08.2018 in the Court of
Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Court, Delhi against the
Appellants herein. Thus, by way of amendment to the main prayer in
the appeal, Appellants have also prayed for quashing of charge sheet
dated 03.08.2018. Appellants seek quashing of the FIR dated
20.08.2014 and the charge sheet dated 03.08.2018.
1
Facts
3. This appeal is by an accused against whom a FIR was lodged on
20.08.2014, in respect of disputes arising out of the agreement dated
03.06.1993 entered into between the Appellant No.1 i.e. Mr. Anand
Kumar Mohatta and the complainant i.e. Ansal Properties &
Infrastructure Ltd. The FIR was lodged about 21 years after the
agreement. Initially, the FIR was also lodged against the wife of the
Appellant No.1 i.e. Mrs. Shobha Anand Mohatta, but no offence has
been made out against her after investigation.
4. The agreement entered into by the two parties is with regard to
the development of the property owned by the Appellants. This
property is situated at 20, Feroz Shah Road, New Delhi, which falls
under Lutyens Zone. The property was initially owned by the
Appellant No.1 and later on ownership of the property was transferred
to Appellant No.2 i.e. wife of Appellant No.1. Desirous of developing
the property, the Appellant No.1 entered into a development
agreement dated 03.06.1993 with Respondent No.2 M/s Ansal
Properties & Infrastructure Ltd. The parties agreed to develop the
said property by constructing a high-rise building comprising of flats.
Respondent No.2 paid a sum of Rs. One crore as contemplated by
clause 38 of the agreement. The agreement could not be fulfilled as
the new building regulations which were introduced prohibited the
construction of high-rise building in the Lutyens Bungalow Zone,
2
where the property is situated. (See New Delhi Municipal Council v.
Tanvi Trading and Credit Private Limited)
1
.
5. Thereafter, on 14.03.2011, the Appellant No.1 wrote a letter
stating that he does not wish to develop the property. The Appellants
did not take any further action neither did they return the amount
advanced by the Respondent No.2.
6. Apparently, since the Appellant had declined all alternate offers
made by the complainant but ostensibly on the ground that this
security amount of Rs. One crore had not been refunded, Respondent
No.2 on 19.11.2011 filed a Criminal Complaint before the SHO, Police
Station Barakhamba Road, New Delhi complaining of offences under
Section 406 and 420 followed by a complaint dated 10.09.2012 with
the Additional Commissioner of Police. On refusal of police authorities
to register FIR against the Appellants, the Respondent-complainant
invoked powers of the Court under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P.C on
03.11.2012. Thereafter, on 11.11.2013 Respondent No. 2 withdrew
the complaint filed under Section 156 (3). The FIR with which we are
concerned was lodged on 20.08.2014 against the Appellants for
offence under Section 406 of IPC on a fresh complaint filed by the
Respondent No.2.
7. Following which, the Appellants approached the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C seeking to quash FIR dated 20.08.2014.
According to the Appellants, the FIR was completely untenable in the
1 2008 (8) SCC 765
3
facts and circumstances of the case. Mainly, the amount of Rs. One
crore was rightfully retained by them and there was no question of
such retention constituting a criminal breach of trust. Moreover,
assuming that the Respondent No. 2 had a grievance only about the
retention of money, the redressal ought to have been sought before a
Civil Court. Therefore, the lodging of the FIR was mala fide in nature
and done with the intention to pressurize the Appellants to agree to
certain new terms and conditions of the agreement to which the
Appellants did not want to proceed with.
8. It is the case of the complainant-Respondent No.2 that the
Appellant No.1 is guilty of the offence under Section 406 since he had
clandestinely and surreptitiously transferred the subject property in
the name of his wife i.e. Appellant No.2. This was done to defeat the
agreement dated 03.06.1993. It is also said that the Appellants are
guilty of abusing the process of Court by undervaluing the property in
a collusive suit before the Bombay High Court and thus wrongly
transferred the property.
9. The High Court, however, disposed of the Appellants’ petition
filed under Section 482 on the ground that the petition has been filed
pre-maturely as the case is still at the stage of investigation. The
High Court directed the investigation to proceed and further directed
the Appellants to join the investigation. Appellants thereafter
preferred the present appeal by way of Special Leave Petition in this
Court. In the present appeal, this Court on the prima facie view of the
4
matter protected the Appellants from arrest and directed that the
investigation be continued. Accordingly, the Respondent No.1 carried
out investigation and has filed a report under Section 173 of the Cr.
P.C in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Court, Delhi.
Since, the police have now submitted a charge sheet, Appellants have
additionally filed amendment application seeking to incorporate
prayer for quashing of charge sheet in addition to prayer for quashing
of the FIR.
Contentions
10. Shri Mahesh Jethmalani, Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellants submitted that the transactions in the present case which
are set to constitute the offence under Section 406 cannot under any
circumstances be said to constitute an offence under that section.
Assuming that the Respondent No.2 have a grievance about the
alleged wrongful retention of the amount of Rs. One crore, the dispute
could at best be a civil dispute.
11. The learned counsel further submitted that the amount of Rs.
One crore advanced to the Appellants was liable to be refunded under
Clause 30 (b) which is as follows: -
“Developer handing over possession of the areas
of the Owner’s share to the Owner in the said
Group Housing Complex”.
Since this contingency did not arise the amount has not been
refunded. In addition, the counsel submitted that the Appellants
retained the amount because the developer i.e. Respondent No.2 is in
5
part possession of some of the subject property and has also not
complied with the obligation of having a tenant vacated from the
property.
12. Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent No.2
submitted that the petition for quashing of FIR was untenable since
the proceedings have gone past the stage of FIR and have resulted in
a charge sheet.
13. Shri Sanjiv Sen, vehemently submitted that the charge under
Section 406 against the Appellant No.1 arises from the fact that the
Appellant No.1 has fraudulently transferred the property which is the
subject matter of the development agreement dated 03.06.1993 to
his wife i.e Appellant No.2.
14. Shri Ajit Kumar Sinha, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the
Respondent No.1 i.e. State government of NCT, places reliance on the
charge sheet to submit that the Appellants have committed an
offence punishable under Section 406 by not returning the amount of
Rs. One Crore advanced by the Respondent No.2.
Conclusion
15. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel for the Respondent No.2 that once the charge sheet is
filed, petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in
6
Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat
2
. In the case of Joseph Salvaraj
A. (supra), this Court while deciding the question whether the High
Court could entertain the 482 petition for quashing of FIR, when the
charge sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the 482
petition, observed: -
“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is being
charged and is to be prosecuted would show that
the same are not made out even prima facie from
the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge-sheet
had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have
still examined whether the offences alleged to
have been committed by the appellant were prima
facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, chargesheet,
documents, etc. or not.”
16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision
invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 Cr. P.C
and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as follows: -
“482. Saving of inherent power of the High
Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to
limit or affect the inherent powers of the High
Court to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts the
exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of
court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled
principle of law that the High court can exercise jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when the discharge application is pending
2 (2011) 7 SCC 59
7
with the trial court3
. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that
proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the
stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have
materialized into a charge sheet. On the contrary it could be said that
the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has
taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is
undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any
court.
18. The second submission of learned counsel for the Respondent
No.2 is that the Appellant No.1 has fraudulently transferred the
property which is the subject matter of the agreement dated
03.06.1993 to his wife and has thereby committed criminal breach of
trust. This charge is wholly untenable and rather extraordinary since
the alleged fraudulent transfer of property by the Appellant No.1 to
his wife, assuming it to be illegal, by no stretch of imagination can
constitute the offence of a criminal breach of trust, since the property
was not entrusted by the Respondent No.2 to the Appellants. The
property belonged to Appellant No.1 and there was therefore no
question of Appellants having been entrusted with their own property,
and that too by the complainant, who had merely entered into a
development agreement in respect of the property.
19. Lastly, we find that the FIR and the charge sheet essentially
charged the petitioner for an offence under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C.
3 G. Sagar Suri and Anr. V. State of U.P and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 (Para 7). Umesh Kumar V.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 (Para 20)
8
for retaining the amount of Rs. One crore which was advanced to him
by the Respondents at the time of entering into the development
agreement.
Whether an offence under Section 406 made out
20. It is necessary to refer to Sections 405 and 406 of the IPC in
order to ascertain, whether in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, an offence under Section 406 is made out against the
Appellants.
Section 405 and 406 of the IPC reads as follows: -
“405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever,
being in any manner entrusted with property, or
with any dominion over property, dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use that
property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or
implied, which he has made touching the
discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any
other person so to do, commits “criminal breach
of trust”.
[Explanation [1].—A person, being an employer
[of an establishment whether exempted under
section 17 of the Employees’ Provident Funds
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of
1952), or not] who deducts the employee’s
contribution from the wages payable to the
employee for credit to a Provident Fund or
Family Pension Fund established by any law for
the time being in force, shall be deemed to have
been entrusted with the amount of the
contribution so deducted by him and if he makes
default in the payment of such contribution to
the said Fund in violation of the said law, shall
be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount
of the said contribution in violation of a direction
of law as aforesaid.]
9
[Explanation 2.—A person, being an employer,
who deducts the employees’ contribution from
the wages payable to the employee for credit to
the Employees’ State Insurance Fund held and
administered by the Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation established under the Employees’
State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be
deemed to have been entrusted with the
amount of the contribution so deducted by him
and if he makes default in the payment of such
contribution to the said Fund in violation of the
said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly
used the amount of the said contribution in
violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.]
406. Punishment for criminal breach of
trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of
trust shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
21. The essence of the offence lies in the use of the property
entrusted to a person by that person, in violation of any direction of
law or any legal contract which he has made during the discharge of
such trust. In the present case, the amount of Rs. One crore was paid
by the complainant-Respondent to the Appellants as an interest free
deposit on the signing of the agreement. It was liable to be refunded
to the complainant simultaneously on handing over of possession of
the area of the owner’s share to the owner in the group housing
complex vide Clause 30 (b) of the agreement dated 03.06.1993.
22. Two things are significant in the transaction between the parties.
Firstly, that the occasion for returning the amount i.e. the developer
handing over the possession of the area of the owner’s share to the
owner in the group housing complex, has not occurred. According to
the Appellants, the contract stands frustrated because no group
10
housing can be legally built on 20 Feroz Shah Road, New Delhi since it
falls in the Lutyens Bungalow Zone. Appellant No.1 has therefore,
terminated the contract. Further, the amount has been retained by
him as a security because not only is there any handing over of
constructed portion, the complainant has also got into part possession
of the property and has not handed it back. Also, the complainant has
failed to get the property vacated from the tenant’s possession.
23. We, thus find that it is not possible to hold that the amount of Rs.
One crore which was paid along with the development agreement as a
deposit can be said to have been entrustment of property which has
been dishonestly converted to his own use or disposed of in violation
of any direction of law or contract by the Appellant. The Appellants
have not used the amount nor misappropriated it contrary to any
direction of law or contract which prescribes how the amount has to
be dealt with.
Going by the agreement dated 03.06.1993, the amount has to
be returned upon the handing over of the constructed area of the
owner which admittedly has not been done. Most significantly the
Respondent No.2 has not demanded the return of the amount at any
point of time. In fact, it is the specific contention of the Respondent
No.2 that he has not demanded the amount because the agreement is
still in subsistence.
We do not see how it can be contended by any stretch of
imagination that the Appellants have misappropriated the amount or
11
dishonestly used the amount contrary to any law or contract. In any
case, we find that the dispute has the contours of a dispute of civil
nature and does not constitute a criminal offence.
24. Having given our anxious consideration, we are of the view that
assuming that there is a security deposit of Rs. One Crore and that he
has misappropriated the dispute between the two parties can only be
a civil dispute.
25. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and others
4
, this Court
observed as follows: -
“13. ….. Any effort to settle civil disputes and
claims, which do not involve any criminal
offence, by applying pressure through criminal
prosecution should be deprecated and
discouraged…..”
The Court noticed a growing trend in business circles to convert
purely civil dispute into criminal cases.
We find it strange that the complainant has not made any
attempt for the recovery of the money of Rs. One Crore except by
filing this criminal complaint. This action appears to be mala fide and
unsustainable.
26. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.
5
, this Court
has set out the categories of cases in which the inherent power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised. Para 102 of the judgment
reads as follows: -
4 2006 (6) SCC 736
5 (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335
12
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
13
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or
the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
27. We are of the opinion that the present case falls under the 1st, 3rd
and 5th category set out in the para 102 of the judgment in the case of
Bhajan Lal (supra). In such a situation, the High Court erred in
dismissing the petition of the Appellants filed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. This was a fit case for the High Court to exercise its inherent
power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR.
28. It is necessary here to remember the words of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others
6
 which read as follows: -
“7. …..In the exercise of this wholesome power,
the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding
if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the Court or that the ends of justice
require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent
powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is
6 1977 (2) SCC 699
14
designed to achieve a salutary public purpose
which is that a court proceeding ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case,
the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the
very nature of the material on which the
structure of the prosecution rests and the like
would justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice…..”
28. We find that the prosecution is mala fide, untenable and solely
intended to harass the Appellants. We are forfeited in view of the
Respondent not having made any attempt to recover the deposit of
Rs. One Crore through a civil action.
29. We have, therefore, no hesitation in quashing the FIR and the
charge sheet filed against the Appellants. Hence, the FIR
No.0139/2014 dated 20.08.2014 and charge sheet dated 03.08.2018
are hereby quashed.
30. For the aforesaid reasons, we hereby set aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 02.02.2016 of High Court of Delhi.
Accordingly, appeal is allowed along with the application filed by the
Appellants seeking amendment of main prayer.
….………………………………..J.
 [S.A. BOBDE]
….………………………………..J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 15, 2018
15