Contempt of court = not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. = the High Court took suo motu action as it was prima facie convinced that unauthorised construction was carried out in Sainik Farms despite the direction contained in order dated November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993. = The report of the Committee of advocates, however, was based on the site visit made in January, 2001 after a gap of more than 6 months from 7th June, 2000 and 3 months from 14th September, 2000 when the demolition was actually carried out. The factual position stated in the said report, therefore, may not be the actual position as obtained on the date of demolition i.e. 7th June, 2000 and 14th September, 2000. It is not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. The factual position stated in the reply affidavit filed by the appellant also reveals that continuous follow-up action was being taken in respect of unauthorised structures including those which were demolished. Furthermore, the appellant was transferred from the concerned ward w.e.f. 27th September, 2000 and any development or illegal activity unfolding after that date cannot 11 be attributed to the appellant. All these aspects have not been considered by the High Court. - In our opinion, it is not possible to hold that the demolition work undertaken on 7th June, 2000 and 14th September 2000 was not in conformity with the position reflected in the contemporaneous office submissions/record and photographs submitted by the appellant to his superior authority.- As a matter of fact, the appellant ought to succeed on the singular ground that the High Court unjustly proceeded against him without framing formal charges or furnishing such charges to him; and moreso because filing of affidavit by the appellant was supported by contemporaneous official record, which cannot be termed as an attempt to obstruct the due course of administration of justice. Accordingly, this appeal ought to succeed.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2006
R. S. Sehrawat … Appellant(s)
:Versus:
Rajeev Malhotra & Ors. …. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 19 (1) (b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, assails the judgment and
orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
at New Delhi in C.M. No.820 of 2001 in C.W.P. No.6734 of
2000 dated 1st June, 2001 and in R.A. No.6600 of 2001 in
C.W.P. No.6734 of 2000 dated 10th May, 2006 whereby the
appellant has been found guilty of filing false affidavit and
attempting to mislead the Court, thus committing contempt of
2
court by his acts which were of such a nature that they tended
to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. The
appellant has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of 30 (Thirty) days and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-
(Twenty Five Thousand Only). Review petition against the said
decision came to be dismissed on 10th May, 2006.
2. Briefly stated, the appellant was working as a Junior
Engineer in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). The writ
petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) had alleged that the
appellant and other officials, including police officials had, by
their act of commission and omission, first permitted the writ
petitioner to carry on unauthorised construction on the
property bearing Plot No.37-C measuring 834 square yards at
Asoka Avenue, Sainik Farms, New Delhi and later on
unilaterally demolished the said structure. This was the
grievance made in Civil Writ Petition No.6734 of 2000 filed by
respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 had prayed for taking
action against the appellant and other officials including police
officials involved in the alleged incident of demolition of the
3
structure. The Division Bench of the High Court adverting to
the direction issued in Public Interest Litigation bearing
C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993 dated November 3, 1997 restraining
unauthorised constructions in unauthorised colonies, issued
notice on 6th December, 2000 in the present writ petition to
the officers of the MCD and the police personnel who were
posted during the time the construction was raised on the plot
belonging to respondent No.1, to show cause as to why
proceedings for contempt of court should not be initiated
against them.
3. After receipt of notice, the appellant, as well as other
officials, filed their respective affidavits. The appellant filed his
detailed affidavit on 3rd January, 2001 inter alia pointing out
the primary responsibility of the officials who were expected to
comply with the directions issued on November 3, 1997 by the
High Court. As regards his role in the capacity of Junior
Engineer, the appellant asserted that he discharged the task
assigned to him from time to time by his superior officers and
submitted compliance reports to them in that behalf. He
4
further asserted that he had undertaken 14 major demolition
actions in Sainik Farms alone between 7th March, 2000 and
27th September, 2000 and razed these constructions to the
ground. It was asserted that the writ petitioner illegally
constructed the building at the same location inspite of the
demolition action taken on the earlier occasions. In support of
the contention that he had resorted to the demolition of
concerned structure, he placed reliance on the office
submission made by him to his superiors as well as the
photographs of the structures taken before and after the
demolition drive. The stand taken by the appellant was
contested by respondent No.1. To verify the factual position,
the High Court vide order dated 12th January, 2001 appointed
a Committee of advocates to inspect the site and submit a fact
finding report. That report was submitted to the High Court by
the Committee of advocates on 23rd January, 2001.
4. The High Court vide order dated 24th January, 2001 after
recording its prima facie opinion issued show cause notice to
the concerned officials including the appellant as to why they
5
should not be convicted and punished for contempt of court.
After the said order, the appellant filed a further affidavit
dated 8th February, 2001 and reiterated the stand taken in the
earlier affidavit as also explained the position of possibility of
reconstruction on the same location after the demolition was
done on 7th June, 2000 and 14th/15th September, 2000. The
appellant also relied on contemporaneous evidence such as
the report and photographs of the demolition. The High Court,
however, was not impressed by the explanation offered by the
appellant and proceeded to record finding of guilt against the
appellant for filing false affidavit on January 3, 2001. The
appellant preferred a review petition which was dismissed on
10th May, 2006. As a result, the appellant has challenged both
the orders by way of the present appeal.
5. The principal grievance of the appellant is that no proper
charge was framed and conveyed to the appellant. The first
show cause notice issued to the appellant in terms of order
dated 6th December, 2000 was presumably for non-compliance
of the direction given on November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441
6
of 1993; whereas the second show cause notice issued to the
appellant pursuant to order dated 24th January, 2001 was for
filing an incorrect and misleading affidavit dated 3rd January,
2001. The appellant had revealed the factual position in his
affidavit dated 3rd January, 2001 and further affidavit dated
8th February, 2001. The factual position stated in the said
affidavits has not been analysed by the High Court at all,
much less in its proper perspective. On the contrary, the High
Court, proceeded to record a finding of guilt, being swayed
away by the factual position recorded in the report submitted
by the Committee of advocates, completely overlooking the
plausible explanation offered by the appellant that the
unauthorised structure in question was demolished on 7th
June, 2000 and again on 14th/15th September, 2000. The
contemporaneous record regarding the extent of demolition in
the form of office submission, press reports and photographs
was also brought to the notice of the High Court. However,
that has been overlooked. The grievance of the appellant is
that in the affidavit dated 8th February, 2001 a specific
disclosure was made about the video recording done by news
7
channels and liberty to play the video clippings was sought
but the High Court did not deal with this request of the
appellant at all. The time period between the demolition and
the inspection by the Committee of advocates being quite
substantial, the possibility of reconstruction of the structures
in question could not be ruled out. However, the High Court
has not dealt with this aspect.
6. The respondent No.1 and the Amicus Curiae espousing
the cause of the respondent No.1, would, however, contend
that there is no error in the approach or the conclusion
recorded by the High Court.
7. We have heard Mr. Ashok Mathur advocate for the
appellant, Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel
appearing as amicus curiae and Mr. Ashok Kumar Panda,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
8. As noted earlier, action against the appellant and other
officials was initiated by the High Court in terms of order
8
dated 6th December, 2000. The relevant portion of the said
order reads thus:
“............
In the instant petition, unauthorized construction was
carried out in Sainik Farm which happens to be an
unauthorized colony. It is not disputed that the petitioner
started construction on Plot No.37C measuring 834 Sq. Yds.
At Ashoka Avenue, Sainki Farm, New Delhi, in July 2000.
The building was allowed to come up and when it was
nearing completion the same was demolished on 30.10.2000.
We fail to understand as to how the building activity could
be permitted/allowed from July 2000 till October 2000 when
order of this court dated November 3, 1997 was in force. It
prima facie appears to us that the building in question could
not have come up unless the concerned officers of the MCD
and the Police connived with the petitioner. The allegation of
the petitioner is that he paid bribes to various offices for
raising the construction. He has named those officers.
In the circumstances, we consider it appropriate to
issue notices to the following officers of the MCD and the
Police, who were posted during the time the construction
was raised on the plot in question, to show cause why
proceedings for contempt of court be not initiated against
them:
1. Mr. R.S. Sherawat (JE) MCD
2. Mr. U.S. Chowhan (JE) MCD
3. Mr. S.R. Bhardwaj, A.E. South zone Building Department
MCD.
4. Mr. Puran Singh Rawat, Baildar, MCD
5. Mr. Rakesh Baildar, MCD
6. Mr. Man Mohan, S.I. Chowki Incharge, Sainik Farms
7. Mr. V.K. Malhotra, Ex. Engineer MCD
8. Mr. Vir Singh, SHO.
The aforesaid officers are present and they accept notice.
They are granted two weeks time to file affidavits in reply to
the show cause notice. Pleadings in the writ petition be
completed before the next date.”
9
9. On a bare perusal of this order, it is evident that the High
Court took suo motu action as it was prima facie convinced
that unauthorised construction was carried out in Sainik
Farms despite the direction contained in order dated
November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993. The order also
records that the show cause notice was accepted by the
officers present in Court. The appellant, like other officers,
filed his affidavit revealing the relevant facts concerning him
vide affidavit dated 3rd January, 2001. The appellant had
explained the factual position as to the action of demolition of
unauthorised structures in Sainik Farms during the relevant
period as per the task assigned to him by his superior officers
and reporting of that fact to his superiors by way of
contemporaneous office submission. The correctness of the
said contemporaneous office reports could not be and has not
been questioned or doubted as such. The reply affidavit makes
it amply clear that the Commissioner of the Corporation was
personally supervising the demolition work of unauthorised
constructions and, therefore, there was no reason to doubt the
10
contemporaneous record in the form of office submissions and
photographs reinforcing the fact of demolition. The report of
the Committee of advocates, however, was based on the site
visit made in January, 2001 after a gap of more than 6
months from 7th June, 2000 and 3 months from 14th
September, 2000 when the demolition was actually carried
out. The factual position stated in the said report, therefore,
may not be the actual position as obtained on the date of
demolition i.e. 7th June, 2000 and 14th September, 2000. It is
not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and
were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is
undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous
persons clandestinely and without notice. The factual position
stated in the reply affidavit filed by the appellant also reveals
that continuous follow-up action was being taken in respect of
unauthorised structures including those which were
demolished. Furthermore, the appellant was transferred from
the concerned ward w.e.f. 27th September, 2000 and any
development or illegal activity unfolding after that date cannot 
11
be attributed to the appellant. All these aspects have not been
considered by the High Court.
10. During the pendency of this appeal the appellant has
also brought on record a fact that he had faced departmental
action on the basis of same set of facts regarding his acts of
commission and omission for the following three charges:
“Shri R.S. Sehrawat while functioning as JE (B) in Building
Department, South Zone and remained incharge of the area
of Sainik Farm w.e.f. 07.03.2000 to 27.09.2000, committed
gross misconduct on the following counts:
1. He is connivance with the owner/builders allowed them to
carry out and complete the unauthorized construction in
P.Nos 37-C, 49, H-541, Sainik Farms unabatedly and did not
take effective action to stop/demolish the same at its
initial/ongoing stage.
2. He also did not book the said unauthorized construction in
Sainik Farm just to avoid demolition action u/s 343/344 of
the DMC Act.
3. He also submitted wrong affidavit in the High Court
mentioning therein that unauthorized construction in
P.No.49 and H-541, Sainik Farms were demolished but the
same were found still existing at site. Thus, he mislead the
Hon‟ble High Court.
He, thereby contravened Rule 3 (I) (i) (ii) & (iii) of the CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964 as made applicable to the employees
of the MCD.”
12
Notably, the appellant has been exonerated in the said enquiry
by a detailed report analysing all the official records
supporting the stand of the appellant.
11. Be that as it may, the law relating to contempt
proceedings has been restated in the case of Sahdeo Alias
Sahdeo Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others1
in paragraph 27 as follows:
“27. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that
the High Court has a power to initiate the contempt
proceedings suo motu for ensuring the compliance with the
orders passed by the Court. However, contempt proceedings
being quasi-criminal in nature, the same standard of proof is
required in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The
alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all
safeguards/rights which are provided in the criminal
jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. There must be
a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by
a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of
the said provision. The alleged contemnor is to be informed
as to what is the charge, he has to meet. Thus, specific
charge has to be framed in precision. The alleged contemnor
may ask the Court to permit him to cross-examine the
witnesses i.e. the deponents of affidavits, who have deposed
against him. In spite of the fact that contempt proceedings
are quasi-criminal in nature, provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”) and the
Evidence Act are not attracted for the reason that
proceedings have to be concluded expeditiously. Thus, the
trial has to be concluded as early as possible. The case
should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. There
must be clear and reliable evidence to substantiate the
allegations against the alleged contemnor. The proceedings

1 (2010) 3 SCC 705
13
must be concluded giving strict adherence to the statutory
rules framed for the purpose.”
We may usefully refer to two other decisions dealing with
the issue under consideration. In Muthu Karuppan,
Commissioner of Police, Chennai Vs. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi
and Anr.,
2 this Court observed thus:
“15. Giving false evidence by filing false affidavit is an evil
which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand.
Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered
expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent,
but there must be a prima facie case of „deliberate falsehood‟
on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied
that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge.”
“17. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in
nature, burden and standard of proof is the same as
required in criminal cases. The charges have to be framed as
per the statutory rules framed for the purpose and proved
beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the alleged
contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Law does not
permit imposing any punishment in contempt proceedings
on mere probabilities, equally, the court cannot punish the
alleged contemnor without any foundation merely on
conjectures and surmises. As observed above, the contempt
proceeding being quasi-criminal in nature require strict
adherence to the procedure prescribed under the rules
applicable in such proceedings.”

2
 (2011) 5 SCC 496
14
In Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. Vs. Syed Hasibur Rahaman
and Ors.,
3 this Court observed thus:
“14. The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed
at this juncture, viz., the burden of standard of proof. The
common English phrase „he who asserts must prove‟ has its
due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said
to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the
„standard of proof‟, be it noted that a proceeding under the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal,
and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a
criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be
established beyond reasonable doubt....”
12. In the present case, going by the material on record it is
not possible to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant had contributed to the reconstruction of the
unauthorised structure before or after 27th September, 2000.
Furthermore, the appellant was not served with any charges
muchless specific charge which he was expected to meet. Yet,
the final conclusion in the impugned judgment is that the acts
of the appellant tended to substantially interfere with the due
course of justice and amounted to committing criminal

3
 (2001) 3 SCC 739
15
contempt of court for having filed incorrect affidavit. The High
Court made no attempt to verify or examine the
contemporaneous record relied upon by the appellant in
support of his plea that the factual position stated in the
affidavit filed by him was borne out and reinforced from the
said record. The affidavit so filed cannot be termed as
incorrect or misleading by relying on the report of the
advocates‟ committee, which was prepared after a gap of 6
months from the date of first demolition (7th June, 2000) and 3
months from the second demolition (14th September, 2000).
13. The finding recorded by the High Court that the property
was not razed to the ground based on the report prepared in
January, 2001, therefore, is not the correct approach and is
manifestly wrong. The High Court ought to have tested the
authenticity and veracity of the contemporaneous record in
the form of office submissions, Misel Band register, office files,
notices, photograph and press reports etc. relied upon by the
appellant. It would be a different matter if the
contemporaneous record did not support the stand taken by
16
the appellant in the affidavits filed by him dated 3rd January,
2001 and 8th February, 2001 respectively. As a matter of fact,
the appellant has already faced departmental enquiry in which
the matter in issue has been exhaustively dealt with and the
plea taken by the appellant has been found to be correct.
14. Be that as it may, the appellant has been found guilty in
reference to the notice issued in terms of order dated 24th
January, 2001, the relevant portion whereof reads thus:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out in the
affidavit of Mr. R.S. Sehrawat, it is mentioned that property
Nos.49 and H-541 were demolished on 7th June, 2000 and
14th September, 2000 respectively. Mr. Awasthy has shown
photographs of these properties. From the photographs, it
appears that the properties are intact and were not
demolished, therefore we are prima facie of the opinion that
even Mr. Sehrawat has taken liberties with truth. Issue
notices to Mr. U.S. Chauhan and Mr. R.S. Sehrawat, Junior
Engineers, MCD, to show cause why they should not be
convicted and punished for contempt of Court. Let the
affidavits in response be filed by 6th February, 2001.”
15. In response to the second notice given to the appellant,
he filed a further affidavit dated 8th February, 2001 to urge as
under:
17
“3. That the deponent submits that the deponent had not
filed any false affidavit, nor did the deponent take liberties
with truth while filing the affidavit on 3.1.2001 before this
Hon‟ble Court. I state that in the order dated 24.1.2001, qua
the deponent it has been recorded that properties No.49 and
H-541, which were demolished by the deponent on 7.6.2000
and on 14.9.2000/15.9.2000 were not demolished as per the
report of the committee appointed by this Hon‟ble Court and
the photographs of these properties.
4. That the deponent submits that property No.49 was
demolished on 7.6.2000 and the photo copies of the
photographs of the existing building before demolition and
after demolition have already been filed by the deponent
along with the deponent‟s affidavit filed on 3.1.2001. The
deponent is filing photocopies of further photographs of the
demolished property. I further state that the press had prior
information for the demolition to be carried out at Sainik
Farms on 7.6.2000 and the press photographers and
reporters were at Sainik Farms. The photograph of the
demolished building at 49, Sainik Farm was taken by the
photographers of some news papers. The times of India,
edition dated 8.6.2000 showed the demolished structure.
This is independent evidence which corroborates the stand of
the deponent. I further state that the video team of the
Doordarshan video taped the demolition of 49 Sainik Farms
and the clippings were shown in the programme “Aaj Tak” on
7.6.2000 itself at 10 P.M. I crave indulgence of this Hon‟ble
Court to summon the video film from the Doordarshan
Authorities prepared for the programme Aaj Tak telecasted
on 7.6.2000. I state that the owner of the property has
reconstructed the same after its earlier demolition. I state
that as stated by me in the earlier affidavit filed by the
deponent, I was no longer assigned the work of Junior
engineer for Sainik Farms after 27.9.2000 and the structure
has been re-erected, only thereafter. I state that during my
tenure as Junior Engineer incharge of Sainik Farms only one
property was bearing No.49 Sainik Farms, which was
demolished by me.
5. That as regards property No. H-541, Sainik Farms, I
state that the committee report has not referred to the same.
However, 29.1.2001, I visited the site of the said property
and state that the said property has also been reconstructed
after the earlier demolition carried out by me. I state that the
reconstructed property is still in the process of finishing and
18
painting work is still going on in the property. I state that the
committee members should be requested by this Hon‟ble
Court to immediately report whether the buildings are in the
process of being painted or has been recently completed and
painted as the same would show and prove its
reconstruction. I have already filed the photographs showing
the demolished property by me along with my earlier
affidavit.
6. That I state that as already stated by me in my
affidavit filed before this Hon‟ble Court on 3.1.2001, the
Commissioner of the Corporation was weekly reviewing the
activities at Sainik Farms and the Zonal Engineer and the
Executive Engineer of the Zone were also personally
supervising the demolition operations carried out by me. The
reports of the said Zonal Engineer and Executive Engineers
should also be called.
7. That I state that I should be given an opportunity to
lead evidence of the press photographers, Doordarshan team
which video taped the demolitions on 7.6.2000 as also the
evidence of the Zonal Engineer and Executive Engineer to
prove that I had carried out the demolitions and have not
filed any affidavit nor have taken liberties with truth.”
16. This specific stand taken by the appellant has not been
considered by the High Court at all. The appellant made this
grievance in the review petition, but of no avail. In our opinion,
it is not possible to hold that the demolition work undertaken
on 7th June, 2000 and 14th September 2000 was not in
conformity with the position reflected in the contemporaneous
office submissions/record and photographs submitted by the
appellant to his superior authority.
19
17. As a matter of fact, the appellant ought to succeed on the
singular ground that the High Court unjustly proceeded
against him without framing formal charges or furnishing
such charges to him; and moreso because filing of affidavit by
the appellant was supported by contemporaneous official
record, which cannot be termed as an attempt to obstruct the
due course of administration of justice. Accordingly, this
appeal ought to succeed.
18. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and orders
passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi in C.M. No.820 of 2001 in C.W.P. No.6734 of 2000 dated
1st June, 2001 and in R.A. No.6600 of 2001 in C.W.P. No.6734
of 2000 dated 10th May, 2006 are quashed and set aside and
the show cause notices issued to the appellant pursuant to the
order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 6th
20
December, 2000 and dated 24th January, 2001 are hereby
dropped. Appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms.
…………………………….CJI.
 (Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
 (A.M. Khanwilkar)
New Delhi;
September 05, 2018.

the appellant was travelling in a tractor bearing Registration No.KA-15-T-2011 as a Coolie = the appellant did make an unsuccessful attempt to persuade us to take a view that the permanent disability should be reckoned as 67% to the whole body. However, after going through the evidence of the doctor who had treated the appellant and the medical records, we find that the assessment made by the tribunal about the extent of permanent disability at 60% to the whole body seems to be a possible view. We are not inclined 10 to disturb the said finding and also because it has been justly affirmed by the High Court, being concurrent finding of fact

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8278-8279 OF 2018
 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1116-1117/2018)
Shivaraj .…Appellant(s)
:Versus:
Rajendra & Anr. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. These appeals are directed against the common
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka
at Bengaluru dated 13th August, 2015 in M.F.A. No.7662 of
2013 (MV) and M.F.A. No.9995 of 2013 (MV) whereby the
High Court allowed the appeal preferred by respondent No.2
(insurer) and dismissed the appeal for enhancement of
compensation preferred by the appellant (injured claimant).
2. Briefly stated, on 23rd February, 2010 at about 8:30
a.m., the appellant was travelling in a tractor bearing
Registration No.KA-15-T-2011 as a Coolie, on Bangalore
2
Road, Survey No.266, Bangalore. The driver of the tractor
was driving at a high speed, in a rash and negligent manner
and dashed the tractor against a big mud stone, resulting in
the tractor turning turtle and the appellant suffering
grievous injuries. The appellant was immediately taken to
North Side Hospital and Diagnostic Center, Bangalore,
where he underwent medical treatment as an inpatient,
from 23rd February, 2010 to 27th February, 2010. Later on,
he was shifted to Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital,
Bangalore, as an inpatient from 27th February, 2010 to 7th
May, 2010 and underwent 4 (four) different surgeries.
According to the appellant, despite receiving best medical
treatment, he suffered permanent physical disability to an
extent of 59.4% both lower limbs, 18.9% towards Vertebra,
Clavicle and Scapula and 80% towards urethral injury,
which is about 67% to the whole body. The appellant was
only 25 years of age at the time of the accident and was
working as a coolie. On account of his permanent disability,
the appellant has become incapable of working as a coolie
and is thus denied of his income to the extent of Rs.6,000/-
per month.
3
3. Resultantly, a claim petition was filed by the appellant
before the III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Member, MACT,
Bangalore, bearing M.V.C. No.3533/2010, under Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation
of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakh Only) for the
injuries sustained by him in the accident.
4. The appellant examined 4 witnesses in support of his
claim and also produced Exhs. P1 to P24. The respondent
examined RW1 Sagayaraj, Administrative Officer and
produced Exhs. R1 and R2. After analysing the evidence
produced by the parties, the tribunal proceeded to answer
the three issues framed by it on the basis of the pleadings.
5. The tribunal held that the claimant was able to prove
the facts that the accident occurred on 23rd February, 2010
at 8:30 a.m. while he was going in the stated tractor, due to
rash and negligent driving of the driver of the tractor. The
tribunal held that the appellant was travelling as a loader in
the tractor and not as a gratuitous passenger. After
4
adverting to the Insurance Policy, the tribunal noticed that
the same covered risk of 1+4. The tribunal held that the
respondent No.2 admitted issuance of the Insurance Policy
to the offending vehicle and its validity as on the date of the
accident. The tribunal then proceeded to quantify the
compensation amount on the notional income of the
appellant at Rs.150/- per day as a coolie and, keeping in
mind the age of the appellant at the relevant time i.e. 25
years, applied multiplier of 18. The tribunal adjudged the
permanent disability of the appellant to the extent of 60% to
the whole body and on that basis, computed the loss of
future income of the appellant at Rs.5,83,000/-(Rupees Five
Lakh Eighty Three Thousand Only). The tribunal arrived at
the following calculation to be awarded as compensation to
the appellant payable jointly by the owner of the vehicle and
the insurer, along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date of petition till the date of realization. The
computation of compensation amount towards different
heads arrived at by the tribunal is as follows:
5
Compensation Heads Compensation
amount
1. Pain and agony Rs. 85,000/-
2. Medical expenses Rs.1,42,324/-
3. Future medical expenses Rs. 50,000/-
4. Loss of income during laid up period Rs. 12,000/-
5. Rest, Nourishment and attendant
charges
Rs. 5,000/-
6. Loss of future income Rs.5,83,000/-
7. Conveyance Rs. 5,000/-
8. Loss of amenities & discomfort in life Rs. 20,000/-
Total Rs.9,02,324/-

6. Feeling aggrieved by the said award, respondent No.2
(insurer) preferred an appeal being M.F.A. No.7662 of 2013
(MV) and the appellant preferred a separate appeal being
M.F.A. No.9995 of 2013 (MV) for enhancement of the
compensation amount. The High Court disposed of both
these appeals by the impugned common judgment and
order. The High Court broadly agreed with all other findings
given by the tribunal but held that going by the stand taken
by the appellant throughout the proceeding and the
contemporaneous documents Exhs. P2 to P5, nowhere was
it mentioned that the appellant was travelling in a trailer
attached to the tractor. The evidence, however, is
unambiguous that the appellant travelled in the tractor
which was insured only for agriculture purposes and not for
carrying goods. No additional insurance was taken in
6
respect of the trailer rather presence of trailer is not shown
or demonstrated in any of the documents and there was no
evidence to demonstrate that the tractor was attached to a
trailer. The tractor could accommodate only one person
namely the driver of the tractor and none else.
7. On that finding, the High Court concluded that the
appellant travelled in the tractor in breach of policy terms
and conditions and therefore, the Insurance Company
cannot be made liable to compensate the owner or the
claimant. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the
respondent No.2 was allowed by the High Court and the
insurer came to be absolved from the liability to pay
compensation. While dealing with the appeal for
enhancement of the compensation amount filed by the
appellant, the High Court noted that the amount arrived at
by the tribunal was just and proper and reckoned all the
mandatory heads of compensation. As a result, it concluded
that the appellant was not entitled for enhanced
compensation.
7
8. The appellant has assailed the said common judgment
and order of the High Court by these appeals. We have
heard Ms. Kanika for the appellant and Ms. Rekha Chandra
Sekhar for the respondent No.2 (insurer). Both the courts
have accepted the case of the appellant that the motor
accident occurred on 23rd February, 2010 at about 8:30
a.m. in which the appellant suffered grievous injuries due to
the rash and negligent driving of the driver of tractor.
Further, both courts have determined permanent disability
of 60% to the whole body suffered by the appellant in the
accident.
9. The High Court, however, found in favour of
respondent No.2 (insurer) that the appellant travelled in the
tractor as a passenger which was in breach of the policy
condition, for the tractor was insured for agriculture
purposes and not for carrying goods. The evidence on record
unambiguously pointed out that neither was any trailer
insured nor was any trailer attached to the tractor. Thus, it
would follow that the appellant travelled in the tractor as a
passenger, even though the tractor could accommodate only
one person namely the driver. As a result, the Insurance
8
Company (respondent No.2) was not liable for the loss or
injuries suffered by the appellant or to indemnify the owner
of the tractor. That conclusion reached by the High Court,
in our opinion, is unexceptionable in the fact situation of
the present case.
10. At the same time, however, in the facts of the present
case the High Court ought to have directed the Insurance
Company to pay the compensation amount to the claimant
(appellant) with liberty to recover the same from the tractor
owner, in view of the consistent view taken in that regard by
this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swarna
Singh & Ors.1, Mangla Ram Vs. Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd.2
, Rani & Ors. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. &
Ors.3 and including Manuara Khatun and Others Vs.
Rajesh Kumar Singh And Others.
4 In other words, the
High Court should have partly allowed the appeal preferred
by the respondent No.2. The appellant may, therefore,
succeed in getting relief of direction to respondent No.2
Insurance Company to pay the compensation amount to the

1 (2004) 3 SCC 297
2 (2018) 5 SCC 656
3 2018 (9) SCALE 310
4 (2017) 4 SCC 796
9
appellant with liberty to recover the same from the tractor
owner (respondent No.1).
11. Reverting to the issue regarding the determination of
compensation amount by the tribunal and as affirmed by
the High Court, we find that the tribunal had taken into
account all the relevant aspects and provided for just and
proper compensation amount for different heads as are
permissible. The High Court, therefore, was justified in not
disturbing the said conclusion of the tribunal. We affirm the
view so taken by the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal
preferred by the appellant for enhancement of compensation
amount does not warrant interference.
12. We may place on record that the appellant did make
an unsuccessful attempt to persuade us to take a view that
the permanent disability should be reckoned as 67% to the
whole body. However, after going through the evidence of
the doctor who had treated the appellant and the medical
records, we find that the assessment made by the tribunal
about the extent of permanent disability at 60% to the
whole body seems to be a possible view. We are not inclined
10
to disturb the said finding and also because it has been
justly affirmed by the High Court, being concurrent finding
of fact. Accordingly, the claim of the appellant for
enhancement of compensation amount does not merit
interference.
13. In view of the above, the appeals are partly allowed to
the extent of directing the respondent No.2 (Oriental
Insurance Company Ltd.) to pay the compensation amount
determined by the tribunal and affirmed by the High Court
to the appellant in the first place and with liberty to recover
the same from the owner of the offending tractor
(respondent No.1) in accordance with law.
14. The appeals are disposed of in the aforementioned
terms with no order as to costs.
 ……………………………...CJI.
 (Dipak Misra)
…..…….…………………..….J.
 (A.M. Khanwilkar)
New Delhi;
September 05, 2018. 

Whether in a given case, the Collector has transgressed the limits of his own jurisdiction is a matter which can be addressed in a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. = In view of the above, the ground urged by the appellant that the Collector ought to have enquired into the validity of the signatures of 10 members, who subsequently filed affidavits stating that their signatures were obtained by fraud, had been justly negatived by the High Court. Hence, the impugned judgment does not warrant any interference.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623 OF 2018
Smt. Kavita …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
The State of Uttar Pradesh through
Secretary & Ors. ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 3rd August, 2017, passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.27912 of 2017, whereby
the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ
petition filed by the appellant for challenging the no confidence
motion notice issued under Section 15 of The U.P. Kshettra
2
Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (for short,
“the Act”).
2. A Notice was issued by the Collector/District Magistrate,
Bulandshahar, U.P., dated 15th June, 2017 on the basis of
requisition given by 32 members out of 59 members of the
Kshettra Panchayat, expressing no confidence against the
appellant who was the Block Pramukh of Kshettra Panchayat,
Lakhawati at the relevant time. The notice had fixed the
meeting date as 1st July, 2017 i.e. on the 17th day from the
date of notice. The appellant challenged the said notice by way
of a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad on two
counts. First, that the Collector had failed to hold an enquiry
into the validity of signatures of 10 members, who
subsequently filed affidavits stating that their signatures were
obtained by fraud. Second, that there was no clear 15 days’
notice as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 15 of
the Act. The Division Bench, after considering the factual
position emanating from the record before it, negatived both
3
the contentions and eventually dismissed the writ petition filed
by the appellant vide the impugned judgment.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has approached this
Court raising the self-same two grounds urged before the High
Court, for challenging the validity of the no confidence motion
notice dated 15th June, 2017. The respondents have supported
the reasons recorded by the High Court and would contend
that both the grounds urged by the appellant are devoid of any
merit.
4. We have heard Mr. Aditya Ranjan, learned counsel for
the appellant.
5. Reverting to the second contention that there was no
clear 15 days’ notice, this aspect has been considered by the
High Court on the basis of record before it, revealing that the
appellant had refused/avoided to receive the notice personally
and hence it was sent by post. The High Court also found that
the appellant had failed to produce any material on record to
show that the notice was dispatched after the 17th day and
4
that on the appellant’s own admission in the writ petition, it
was evident that the objection to the said notice was taken on
the 16th day itself relating to signatures of few members who
had signed the notice. This was a strong circumstance to belie
the tall claim of the appellant. Taking an overall view of the
matter, the High Court noted that the issue involved a
disputed question of fact and could not be decided in writ
jurisdiction. At the same time, the High Court took note of the
fact that the meeting was duly conducted as scheduled in
terms of the stated notice and the no confidence motion was
passed by a majority, against the appellant. We, therefore, find
no reason to depart from the conclusion recorded by the High
Court for rejecting the challenge that no clear 15 days’ notice
was given as claimed by the appellant. Accordingly, this
contention must fail and is rejected.
6. As aforesaid, since the stated notice has already been
acted upon and the no confidence motion has been passed
against the appellant by majority, no further enquiry into the
grounds urged by the appellant is warranted. Be that as it
5
may, even the first ground urged by the appellant has been
justly negatived by the High Court following the exposition of
the Full Bench of the same High Court in Smt. Sheela Devi
Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.,
1 which decision adverts to the
dictum of another Full Bench decision of the same High Court
in Mathura Prasad Tewari Vs. Assistant District
Panchayat Officer, Faizabad.
2
 In the impugned judgment,
the Division Bench has reproduced paragraph 23 of the Full
Bench decision in Sheela Devi, (supra) which reads thus:
“23. For these reasons, we have come to the
conclusion that where a notice is delivered to the
Collector under sub-section (2) of Section 15, the
Collector has the discretion to determine whether the
notice fulfills the essential requirements of a valid
notice under sub-section (2). However, consistent with
the stipulation of time enunciated in sub-section (3) of
Section 15 of convening a meeting no later than thirty
days from the date of delivery of the notice and of
issuing at least a fifteen days' notice to all the elected
members of the Kshettra Panchayat, it is not open to
the Collector to launch a detailed evidentiary
enquiry into the validity of the signatures which
are appended to the notice. Where a finding in
regard to the validity of the signatures can only be
arrived at in an enquiry on the basis of evidence
adduced in the course of an evidentiary hearing at

1
 AIR 2015 All. 65
2
 1966 ALJ 612
6
a full-fledged trial, such an enquiry would be
outside the purview of Section 15. The Collector
does not exercise the powers of a Court upon
receipt of a notice and when he transmits the
notice for consideration at a meeting of the elected
members of the Kshettra Panchayat. Hence, it
would not be open to the Collector to resolve or enter
findings of fact on seriously disputed questions such
as forgery, fraud and coercion. However, consistent
with the law which has been laid down by the Full
Bench in Mathura Prasad Tewari's case, it is open to
the Collector, having due regard to the nature and
ambit of his jurisdiction under sub-section (3) to
determine as to whether the requirements of a valid
notice under sub-section (2) of Section 15 have been
fulfilled. The proceeding before the Collector under
sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1961 is more
in the nature of a summary proceeding. The Collector
for the purpose of Section 15, does not have the
trappings of a Court exercising jurisdiction on the
basis of evidence adduced at a trial of a judicial
proceeding. Whether in a given case, the Collector has
transgressed the limits of his own jurisdiction is a
matter which can be addressed in a challenge under
Article 226 of the Constitution. We clarify that we have
not provided an exhaustive enumeration or list of
circumstances in which the Collector can determine
the validity of the notice furnished under sub-section
(2) in each case and it is for the Collector in the first
instance and for the Court in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, if it is moved, to determine as to
whether the limits on the power of the Collector have
been duly observed.”
(emphasis supplied)
7
7. Notably, this Court in the case of Kiran Pal Singh Vs.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (in C.A. No.2622 of 2018
decided on 17th May, 2018)
3 has had an occasion to explicate
on the purport of Section 15(2) of the Act. In paragraph 15 of
this decision the Court observed thus:
“15. To appreciate the controversy, we have to understand
the scheme engrafted under Section 15 of the Act.
Subsection (2) of Section 15 provides that a written notice of
intention to make the motion in such form as may be
prescribed, signed by at least half of the total number of
elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat for the time
being together with a copy of the proposed motion, shall be
delivered in person, by any one of the members signing the
notice, to the Collector having jurisdiction over the Kshettra
Panchayat. Subsection (3) requires the Collector to convene a
meeting. At this stage, the jurisdiction that the Collector
has is only to scan the notice to find out whether it
fulfills the essential requirements of a valid notice. The
exercise of the said discretion, as we perceive, has to be
summary in nature. There cannot be a detailed inquiry
with regard to the validity of the notice. We are obliged to
think so as subsection (3) mandates that a meeting has to be
convened not later than 30 days from the date of delivery of
the notice and further there should be at least 15 days’
notice to be given to all the elected members of the Kshettra
Panchayat. The Collector, therefore, should not assume
power to enter into an arena or record a finding on
seriously disputed questions of facts relating to fraud,
undue influence or coercion. His only duty is to
determine whether there has been a valid notice as
contemplated under Subsection (2) of Section 15. His
delving deep to conduct a regular inquiry would frustrate
the provision. He must function within his own limits
and leave the rest to be determined in the meeting.”
 (emphasis supplied)

3
 2018 (7) SCALE 605
8
8. In view of the above, the ground urged by the appellant
that the Collector ought to have enquired into the validity of
the signatures of 10 members, who subsequently filed
affidavits stating that their signatures were obtained by fraud,
had been justly negatived by the High Court. Hence, the
impugned judgment does not warrant any interference. As no
other contention has been urged, the appeal must fail.
9. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to
costs.
.………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
 (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
 (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
September 05, 2018.

whether Section 50(1) was required to be complied with when charas was recovered only from the bag of the appellant and no charas was found on his person = From Exhibit-3, it can be discerned that the appellant was informed of his legal right to be searched in the presence of a magistrate or a gazetted officer. The appellant opted for the latter alternative. Exhibit-4 is a record of the events after the arrival of PW-4 on the scene. After the arrival of PW-4, the appellant was once again asked by him, whether he wished to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. This was the second option which was presented to him. When he reiterated his desire to be searched before a gazetted officer, PW-4 inquired of the appellant whether he wished to search PW-2 before his own search was conducted by PW-2. The appellant agreed to search PW-2. Only the personal belongings of PW-2 were found by the appellant. It was only after this that a search of the appellant was conducted and charas recovered. Before the appellant’s search was conducted, both PW2 and PW-4 on different occasions apprised the appellant of his legal right to be searched either in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. The options given by both PW-2 and PW-4 were unambiguous. Merely because the appellant was given an option of searching PW-2 before the latter conducted his search, would not vitiate the search.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 459 OF 2017
SK RAJU @ ABDUL HAQUE @ JAGGA .....APPELLANT

Versus
STATE OF WEST BENGAL .....RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud
1 The present appeal, by special leave, is directed against a judgment
dated 19 February 2016 of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The
High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant by the Additional Sessions
Judge (“ASJ”) and Special Court under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act 1985 (“the Act”). On 15 February 2014, the ASJ had convicted
the appellant of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Act. The
2
appellant was sentenced to 14 years of rigorous imprisonment and directed to
pay a fine of Rs 1,40,000.
2 The facts of the case are as follows. On 15 November 2011, SubInspector
Prasanta Kr. Das, Narcotics Cell, DD (PW-2) received information that
a drug dealer would be in the vicinity of Tiljala Falguni Club, 138B/1, Picnic
Garden Road, near Tiljala Police Station to supply narcotic drugs in the
afternoon. PW-2 sought permission from the Assistant Commissioner of Police,
Anti-Narcotics Department, DD to organize a raid (Exhibit-2). Permission was
granted by the superior officer on the same day and a raiding team consisting
of PW-2 and others reached the spot at about 12.50 pm. At around 1.40 pm,
the source of the information pointed out to the appellant who was coming along
Picnic Garden Road. The appellant was intercepted and detained immediately
by the raiding party in front of Falguni Club. The appellant was informed about
the reasons for his detention and the identities of the raiding party were
disclosed to him. Subsequently, the appellant also disclosed his identity to the
raiding party. PW-5 was one of the two independent witnesses who agreed to
be a witness to this search. The appellant was informed about his legal right to
be searched either in the presence of a magistrate or a gazetted officer (Exhibit3).
The appellant opted for being searched by a gazetted officer. A gazetted
officer, Inspector Joysurja Mukherjee (“PW-4”), arrived on the scene at about
3.20 pm. He provided the appellant with a “second option”. The appellant was
asked by PW-4 whether he wished to be searched in the presence of a gazetted
3
officer or a magistrate (Exhibit-4). Once again, the appellant consented to be
searched in the presence of a gazetted officer. PW-4 then inquired of the
appellant whether he wanted to search PW-2 before the latter would carry out
his search. The appellant agreed to search PW-2 before his own search was
carried out by PW-2. No narcotic substance was recovered from the person of
PW-2. PW-2 recovered nineteen “deep brown / blackish broken rectangular
sheets” from a black polythene packet which was inside a biscuit colour jute
bag, which the appellant was carrying in his right hand. The sheets were tested
by PW-2 on the spot with the help of a test kit. The substance was found to be
charas. The substance was also weighed using a weighing scale. The appellant
was found to be in possession of 1.5 kilograms of charas. Cash amounting to
Rs. 2,400/- was recovered from the trouser of the appellant.
3 Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that there was noncompliance
with Section 42 of the Act. After PW-2 was intimated about the
appellant’s arrival, he sought permission from the Assistant Commissioner of
Police, Anti-Narcotics Department. Upon receipt of the letter of permission from
the Assistant Commissioner, PW-2 proceeded to the place of the occurrence.
PW-2 admitted in his cross-examination that he was aware of the gravity of the
need for compliance with Section 42. However, apart from a letter seeking
permission to act on the information which was addressed to a superior officer,
he did not (it was urged) diarise it elsewhere. Learned counsel urged that PW2
had not complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 42, as a result
4
of which the trial stood vitiated. He has relied on the following decisions of this
Court to buttress the submission: Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v State of
Gujarat (“Mansuri”),
1 Directorate of Revenue v Mohammed Nisar Holia
(“Holia”)2 and State of Rajasthan v Jagraj Singh (“Jagraj”).3
4 Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that Section 50 has also
not been complied with. According to him, not only was the bag of the appellant
searched, but a search of the person of the appellant also resulted in the
recovery of cash in the amount of Rs. 2,400/- from the left pocket of his trouser.
Hence, it was urged by the learned counsel that though Section 50 was
mandatorily required to be complied with, there was a breach of observance.
Since the appellant was merely given an ‘option’ by PW-2 and PW-4 to be
searched before a gazetted officer and was not informed that it was his legal
right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a magistrate, the search was,
it was urged, vitiated. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellant has
relied on the following judgments of this Court: Myla Venkateswarlu v State of
Andhra Pradesh (“Venkateswarlu”),
4 State of Rajasthan v Parmanand
(“Parmanand”)5 and Namdi Francis Nwazor v Union of India (“Namdi”).
6
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentState
has supported the judgment of the High Court and the legality of the

1
(2000) 2 SCC 513.
2
(2008) 2 SCC 370.
3
(2016) 11 SCC 687.
4
(2012) 5 SCC 226.
5
(2014) 5 SCC 345.
6
(1998) 8 SCC 534.
5
conviction. He argued that since the search was carried out in a public place,
this case falls solely within the ambit of Section 43 and compliance with Section
42 was not necessary. Learned counsel for the respondent-State also urged
that Section 50 is not attracted when the search involves the search of a bag or
an article belonging to a person.
5 Section 42 of the Act deals with the power of entry, search, seizure and
arrest without warrant or authorization. It reads thus:
“42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant
or authorisation.—
(1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon,
sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise,
narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other
department of the Central Government including para-military
forces or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by
general or special order by the Central Government, or any
such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy
or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or
any other department of a State Government as is empowered
in this behalf by general or special order of the State
Government, if he has reason to believe from personal
knowledge or information given by any person and taken down
in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or
controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable
under this Act has been committed or any document or other
article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such
offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or
other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally
acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or
forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is kept or concealed in
any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between
sunrise and sunset,—
(a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or
place;
(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any
obstacle to such entry;
(c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the
manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or
6
conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to
confiscation under this Act and any document or other article
which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the
commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish
evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is
liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of
this Act; and
(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any
person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any
offence punishable under this Act:
Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture
of manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or
controlled substances granted under this Act or any rule or
order made thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an
officer not below the rank of sub-inspector:
Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that
a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without
affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility
for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such
building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between
sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief.
(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing
under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under
the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a
copy thereof to his immediate official superior.”
Section 43 of the Act confers powers on the empowered officer to seize a
substance and arrest a suspect in a public place. It provides thus:
“43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place.— Any officer
of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 may—
(a) seize in any public place or in transit, any narcotic drug or
psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of
which he has reason to believe an offence punishable under
this Act has been committed, and, along with such drug or
substance, any animal or conveyance or article liable to
confiscation under this Act, any document or other article which
he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the
commission of an offence punishable under this Act or any
document or other article which may furnish evidence of
holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for
seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act;
(b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to
believe to have committed an offence punishable under this
7
Act, and if such person has any narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance or controlled substance in his possession and such
possession appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any
other person in his company.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the
expression “public place” includes any public
conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place intended for use
by, or accessible to, the public.” [Emphasis supplied]
6 We are unable to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for
the appellant that Section 42 is attracted to the facts of the present case. In
State of Punjab v Baldev Singh (“Baldev Singh”),
7 Chief Justice Dr A S
Anand speaking for a Constitution Bench of this Court, held:
“The material difference between the provisions of Section 43
and Section 42 is that whereas Section 42 requires
recording of reasons for belief and for taking down of
information received in writing with regard to the
commission of an offence before conducting search and
seizure, Section 43 does not contain any such provision and
as such while acting under Section 43 of the Act, the
empowered officer has the power of seizure of the article
etc. and arrest of a person who is found to be in
possession of any Narcotic Drug or Psychotropic
Substances in a public place where such possession
appears to him to be unlawful.” [Emphasis supplied]
In Narayanaswamy Ravishankar v Assistant Director, Directorate of
Revenue Intelligence,
8 a three judge Bench of this Court considered whether
the empowered officer was bound to comply with the mandatory provisions of
Section 42 before recovering heroin from the suitcase of the appellant at the
airport and subsequently arresting him. Answering the above question in the
negative, the Court held:

7
(1999) 6 SCC 172.
8
(2002) 8 SCC 7.
8
“In the instant case, according to the documents on record
and the evidence of the witnesses, the search and seizure
took place at the airport which is a public place. This being so,
it is the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act which would
be applicable. Further, as Section 42 of the NDPS Act was not
applicable in the present case, the seizure having been
effected in a public place, the question of non-compliance, if
any, of the provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act is wholly
irrelevant.”
In Krishna Kanwar (Smt) Alias Thakuraeen v State of Rajasthan,
9 a two
judge Bench of this Court considered whether a police officer who had prior
information was required to comply with the provisions of Section 42 before
seizing contraband and arresting the appellant who was travelling on a
motorcycle on the highway. Answering the above question in the negative, the
Court held:
“Section 42 comprises of two components. One relates to the
basis of information i.e.: (i) from personal knowledge, and (ii)
information given by person and taken down in writing. The
second is that the information must relate to commission
of offence punishable under Chapter IV and/or keeping or
concealment of document or article in any building,
conveyance or enclosed place which may furnish
evidence of commission of such offence. Unless both the
components exist Section 42 has no application. Subsection
(2) mandates, as was noted in Baldev Singh case that
where an officer takes down any information in writing under
sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the
proviso thereto, he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his
immediate official superior. Therefore, sub-section (2) only
comes into operation where the officer concerned does the
enumerated acts, in case any offence under Chapter IV has
been committed or documents etc. are concealed in any
building, conveyance or enclosed place. Therefore, the
commission of the act or concealment of document etc.
must be in any building, conveyance or enclosed place.”
[Emphasis supplied]

9
(2004) 2 SCC 608; Rajendra v State of M.P ., (2004) 1 SCC 432.
9
7 An empowered officer under Section 42(1) is obligated to reduce to
writing the information received by him, only when an offence punishable under
the Act has been committed in any building, conveyance or an enclosed place,
or when a document or an article is concealed in a building, conveyance or an
enclosed place. Compliance with Section 42, including recording of information
received by the empowered officer, is not mandatory, when an offence
punishable under the Act was not committed in a building, conveyance or an
enclosed place. Section 43 is attracted in situations where the seizure and
arrest are conducted in a public place, which includes any public conveyance,
hotel, shop, or other place intended for use by, or accessible to, the public.
8 The appellant was walking along the Picnic Garden Road. He was
intercepted and detained immediately by the raiding party in front of Falguni
Club, which was not a building, conveyance or an enclosed place. The place of
occurrence was accessible to the public and fell within the ambit of the phrase
“public place” in the explanation to Section 43. Section 42 had no application.
9 The cases relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant will also not
apply in the context of the facts before us. In Mansuri, an auto-rickshaw driver
was intercepted by police personnel. Four gunny bags of charas were
recovered from the auto-rickshaw. The police officer who had prior information
about transportation of some narcotic substance, had neither taken down the
information before carrying out the seizure and arrest, nor apprised his superior
10
officer. He contended that the action taken by him was under Section 43 and
not Section 42. Rejecting the argument of the State, this Court held that
compliance with Section 42 was required as the auto-rickshaw was a private
vehicle and not a public conveyance as contemplated under Section 43.
Similarly, in Jagraj, contraband was recovered from a jeep which was
intercepted by police personnel on a public road after receiving prior
information. The police officer who had received the information, admitted to not
taking it down in writing, contending that Section 43 would be applicable.
Rejecting the argument of the State, this Court held that the jeep which was
intercepted, was not a public conveyance within the meaning of Section 43 and
compliance with Section 42(1) was therefore mandatory. In Holia, Mandrax
tablets were recovered from the hotel room of the respondent. The information
was not reduced to writing by the officer who had first received the information.
The State claimed that compliance with Section 42 was not required as the hotel
was a public place. Rejecting the submission of the State, this Court held that
while a hotel is a public place, a hotel room inside it is not a public place. This
Court held thus:
“Section 43, on plain reading of the Act, may not attract the
rigours of Section 42 thereof. That means that even subjective
satisfaction on the part of the authority, as is required under
sub-section (1) of Section 42, need not be complied with, only
because the place whereat search is to be made is a public
place. If Section 43 is to be treated as an exception to Section
42, it is required to be strictly complied with … It is also
possible to contend that where a search is required to be
made at a public place which is open to the general public,
Section 42 would have no application but it may be
another thing to contend that search is being made on
prior information and there would be enough time for
compliance of reducing the information to writing,
11
informing the same to the superior officer and obtain his
permission as also recording the reasons therefore
coupled with the fact that the place which is required to be
searched is not open to public although situated in a
public place as, for example, room of a hotel, whereas
hotel is a public place, a room occupied by a guest may
not be. He is entitled to his right of privacy. Nobody, even
the staff of the hotel, can walk into his room without his
permission. Subject to the ordinary activities in regard to
maintenance and/or housekeeping of the room, the guest is
entitled to maintain his privacy.” [Emphasis supplied]
There is hence no substance in the first submission.
10 Section 50 of the Act deals with conditions under which search of persons
shall be conducted. It states:
“50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be
conducted.—
(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about
to search any person under the provisions of section 41,
section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires,
take such person without unnecessary delay to nearest
Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in
section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person
until he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the
Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any
such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground
for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall
direct that search be made.
(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.
(5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has
reason to believe that it is not possible to take the person to be
searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without
the possibility of the person to be searched parting with
possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or
controlled substance or article or document, he may, instead
of taking such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer or
Magistrate, proceed to search the person as provided under
12
section100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974).
(6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the
officer shall record the reasons for such belief which
necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send
a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.”
According to Section 50(1), an empowered officer should necessarily inform the
suspect about his legal right, if he so requires, to be searched in the presence
of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. In Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v State
of Gujarat (“Vijaysinh”),
10 a Constitution Bench of this Court interpreted
Section 50 thus:
“The mandate of Section 50 is precise and clear, viz. if the
person intended to be searched expresses to the authorised
officer his desire to be taken to the nearest gazetted officer or
the Magistrate, he cannot be searched till the gazetted officer
or the Magistrate, as the case may be, directs the authorised
officer to do so … In view of the foregoing discussion, we are
of the firm opinion that the object with which right under Section
50(1) of the NDPS Act, by way of a safeguard, has been
conferred on the suspect, viz. to check the misuse of power, to
avoid harm to innocent persons and to minimise the allegations
of planting or foisting of false cases by the law enforcement
agencies, it would be imperative on the part of the empowered
officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his
right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate.
We have no hesitation in holding that in so far as the obligation
of the authorised officer under Sub-section (1) of Section 50 of
the NDPS Act is concerned, it is mandatory and requires a
strict compliance. Failure to comply with the provision would
render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the
conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis of the
recovery of the illicit article from the person of the accused
during such search. Thereafter, the suspect may or may not
choose to exercise the right provided to him under the said
provision … We are of the opinion that the concept of
“substantial compliance” with the requirement of Section 50 of
the NDPS Act introduced and read into the mandate of the said
Section in Joseph Fernandez (supra) and Prabha Shankar
Dubey (supra) is neither borne out from the language of Sub-

10 (2011) 1 SCC 609.
13
section (1) of Section 50 nor it is in consonance with the dictum
laid down in Baldev Singh's case (supra).”
The principle which emerges from Vijaysinh is that the concept of “substantial
compliance” with the requirement of Section 50 is neither in accordance with
the law laid down in Baldev Singh, nor can it be construed from its language.
[Reference may also be made to the decision of a two judge Bench of this Court
in Venkateswarlu]. Therefore, strict compliance with Section 50(1) by the
empowered officer is mandatory. Section 50, however, applies only in the case
of a search of a person. In Baldev Singh, the Court held “on its plain reading,
Section 50 would come into play only in the case of a search of a person as
distinguished from search of any premises, etc.” In State of Himachal Pradesh
v Pawan Kumar (“Pawan Kumar”),
11 a three judge Bench of this Court held
that the search of an article which was being carried by a person in his hand, or
on his shoulder or head, etc., would not attract Section 50. It was held thus:
“In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying
a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was
carried like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is
not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the
word “person” occurring in Section 50 of the Act …After the
decision in Baldev Singh, this Court has consistently held that
Section 50 would only apply to search of a person and not to
any bag, article or container, etc. being carried by him.”
In Parmanand, on a search of the person of the respondent, no substance was
found. However, subsequently, opium was recovered from the bag of the
respondent. A two judge Bench of this Court considered whether compliance

11 (2005) 4 SCC 350.
14
with Section 50(1) was required. This Court held that the empowered officer
was required to comply with the requirements of Section 50(1) as the person of
the respondent was also searched. [Reference may also be made to the
decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in Dilip v State of Madhya
Pradesh]
12. It was held thus:
“Thus, if merely a bag carried by a person is searched without
there being any search of his person, Section 50 of the NDPS
Act will have no application. But if the bag carried by him is
searched and his person is also searched, Section 50 of the
NDPS Act will have application.”
Moreover, in the above case, the empowered officer at the time of conducting
the search informed the respondent that he could be searched before the
nearest Magistrate or before the nearest gazetted officer or before the
Superintendent, who was also a part of the raiding party. The Court held that
the search of the respondent was not in consonance with the requirements of
Section 50(1) as the empowered officer erred in giving the respondent an option
of being search before the Superintendent, who was not an independent officer.
It was held thus:
“We also notice that PW 10 SI Qureshi informed the
respondents that they could be searched before the nearest
Magistrate or before the nearest gazetted officer or before PW
5 J.S. Negi, the Superintendent, who was a part of the raiding
party. It is the prosecution case that the respondents informed
the officers that they would like to be searched before PW 5
J.S. Negi by PW 10 SI Qureshi. This, in our opinion, is again a
breach of Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. The idea behind
taking an accused to the nearest Magistrate or the nearest
gazetted officer, if he so requires, is to give him a chance of
being searched in the presence of an independent officer.
Therefore, it was improper for PW 10 SI Qureshi to tell the

12 (2007) 1 SCC 450.
15
respondents that a third alternative was available and that they
could be searched before PW 5 J.S. Negi, the Superintendent,
who was part of the raiding party. PW 5 J.S. Negi cannot be
called an independent officer. We are not expressing any
opinion on the question whether if the respondents had
voluntarily expressed that they wanted to be searched before
PW 5 J.S. Negi, the search would have been vitiated or not.
But PW 10 SI Qureshi could not have given a third option to
the respondents when Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act does not
provide for it and when such option would frustrate the
provisions of Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. On this ground
also, in our opinion, the search conducted by PW 10 SI Qureshi
is vitiated.”
The question which arises before us is whether Section 50(1) was required to
be complied with when charas was recovered only from the bag of the appellant
and no charas was found on his person. Further, if the first question is answered
in the affirmative, whether the requirements of Section 50 were strictly complied
with by PW-2 and PW-4.
11 As evidenced by Exhibit-3, a first option was given to the appellant. PW2
informed him that it was his legal right to be searched either in the presence
of a magistrate or in the presence of a gazetted officer. The appellant was then
asked to give his option by indicating whether he wanted to be searched by a
magistrate or a gazetted officer. The appellant indicated that he wanted the
search to be carried out in the presence of a gazetted officer. When PW-4
arrived, he was introduced to the detainee as a gazetted officer. As evidenced
by Exhibit-4, PW-4 then gave the appellant a second option. He inquired of him
again, whether he wanted to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer
or in the presence of a magistrate. The appellant reiterated his desire to be
16
searched in the presence of a gazetted officer. Before the search of the
appellant commenced, the gazetted officer asked the appellant whether he
wanted to search PW-2 before his own search was carried out by PW-2. The
appellant agreed to search PW-2 before the latter carried out his search. On
conducting the search, only personal belongings of PW-2 were found by the
appellant. On the search of the appellant in the presence of the gazetted officer,
a biscuit colour jute bag was recovered from the appellant, and Rs. 2,400/- cash
in the denomination of 24 notes of Rs. 100/- each was found in the left pocket
of the appellant’s trouser. When the bag was opened, a black polythene cover
containing nineteen rectangular broken sheets of a blackish / deep brown colour
weighing 1.5 kilograms was recovered. The sheets were tested and were found
to be charas.
PW-2 conducted a search of the bag of the appellant as well as of the
appellant’s trousers. Therefore, the search conducted by PW-2 was not only of
the bag which the appellant was carrying, but also of the appellant’s person.
Since the search of the person of the appellant was also involved, Section 50
would be attracted in this case. Accordingly, PW-2 was required to comply with
the requirements of Section 50(1). As soon as the search of a person takes
place, the requirement of mandatory compliance with Section 50 is attracted,
irrespective of whether contraband is recovered from the person of the detainee
or not. It was, therefore, imperative for PW-2 to inform the appellant of his legal
right to be searched in the presence of either a gazetted officer or a magistrate.
17
From Exhibit-3, it can be discerned that the appellant was informed of his legal
right to be searched in the presence of a magistrate or a gazetted officer. The
appellant opted for the latter alternative. Exhibit-4 is a record of the events after
the arrival of PW-4 on the scene. After the arrival of PW-4, the appellant was
once again asked by him, whether he wished to be searched in the presence of
a gazetted officer or a magistrate. This was the second option which was
presented to him. When he reiterated his desire to be searched before a
gazetted officer, PW-4 inquired of the appellant whether he wished to search
PW-2 before his own search was conducted by PW-2. The appellant agreed to
search PW-2. Only the personal belongings of PW-2 were found by the
appellant. It was only after this that a search of the appellant was conducted
and charas recovered. Before the appellant’s search was conducted, both PW2
and PW-4 on different occasions apprised the appellant of his legal right to be
searched either in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate. The
options given by both PW-2 and PW-4 were unambiguous. Merely because the
appellant was given an option of searching PW-2 before the latter conducted
his search, would not vitiate the search. In Parmanand, in addition to the option
of being searched by the gazetted officer or the magistrate, the detainee was
given a ‘third’ alternative by the empowered officer which was to be searched
by an officer who was a part of the raiding team. This was found to be contrary
to the intent of Section 50(1). The option given to the appellant of searching
PW-2 in the case at hand, before the latter searched the appellant, did not vitiate
the process in which a search of the appellant was conducted. The search of
18
the appellant was as a matter of fact conducted in the presence of PW-4, a
gazetted officer, in consonance with the voluntary communication made by the
appellant to both PW-2 and PW-4. There was strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 50(1) as stipulated by this Court in Vijaysinh.
12 As we have already held that Section 50 was attracted in the present
case, we do not need to decide on the applicability of Namdi to the facts of the
present case. We have held that Section 50 was complied with. Having regard
to the above position, we do not find any merit in the appeal.
13 The Criminal Appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed.
...………............................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]

...…….…...............................................J
 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
.….……….............................................J
 [INDIRA BANERJEE]
New Delhi;
September 05, 2018.

whether the appellants are bound to implement the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission in respect of the respondent/employees. = We make it clear that in case Appellant No.1 has extended the benefit of the pay revision Regulations of 2001, despite the exclusion in the Notification dated 27.04.2006, to those employees where the prerevised pay scales had not been applied, the respondent/employees belonging to the Rewa Society will not be discriminated. 5. As far as implementation of recommendations of Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions are concerned, there cannot be any dispute. The benefits will be extended to the employees of the REC Societies with effect from the date the benefits of the Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions have been given to the employees of Appellant No.1. If there is any arrears to be paid in this regard, the same shall be paid within three months from today.

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 9146-9148/2018
(ARISING FROM SLP(C) No(s).5285-5287/2016)
M.P. POORVA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITARAN CO. LTD. & ORS. APPELLANT(s)
 VERSUS
UMA SHANKAR DWIVEDI RESPONDENT(s)
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The moot question is whether the appellants are
bound to implement the recommendations of the Fifth
Pay Commission in respect of the
respondent/employees. According to the learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants, the
respondent belongs to Rewa Society, where the
recommendations of Fifth Pay Commission had not been
implemented and Appellant No.1 extended the benefit
to the employees coming from those societies, where
the benefit of Fifth Pay Commission had been
implemented. There cannot be any dispute that the
employees who have been absorbed shall be governed by
the terms of absorption.
3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants invited our attention to the Notification
dated 27.04.2006, wherein it has been specifically
1
mentioned that the pay revision of 2001 of the
appellant No.1 will not be applicable to employees of
Rural Electrification Cooperative Societies absorbed
in the service of Appellant No.1, to whom the prerevised
pay scales were not applicable. However, the
learned counsel appearing for the respondent
submitted that despite such exclusion, the benefit
has been extended to the employees of the societies
where the pre-revised pay scales were not applicable.
4. We make it clear that in case Appellant No.1 has
extended the benefit of the pay revision Regulations
of 2001, despite the exclusion in the Notification
dated 27.04.2006, to those employees where the prerevised
pay scales had not been applied, the
respondent/employees belonging to the Rewa Society
will not be discriminated.
5. As far as implementation of recommendations of
Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions are concerned,
there cannot be any dispute. The benefits will be
extended to the employees of the REC Societies with
effect from the date the benefits of the Sixth and
Seventh Pay Commissions have been given to the
employees of Appellant No.1. If there is any arrears
to be paid in this regard, the same shall be paid
within three months from today.
6. The impugned orders will stand clarified to the
above extent and the appeals are disposed of.
2
7. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
8. There shall be no orders as to costs.
.......................J.
 [KURIAN JOSEPH]
.......................J.
 [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 05, 2018.
3