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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Friday, September 7, 2018

“poetic licence”, = creativity and necessity of freedom of expression = A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression, be it a novel or a novella, an epic or an anthology of poems, a play or a playlet, a short story or a long one, an essay or a statement of description or, for that matter, some other form, has the right to exercise his liberty to the fullest unless it falls foul of any prescribed law that is constitutionally valid. It is because freedom of expression is extremely dear to a civilized society. = If books are banned on such allegations, there can be no creativity. Such interference by constitutional courts will cause the death of art. True it is, the freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. What is true to poetry is applicable to novels or any creative writing. It has to be kept uppermost in mind that the imagination of a writer has to enjoy freedom. It cannot be asked to succumb to specifics. That will tantamount to imposition. A writer should have free play with words, like a painter has it with colours. The passion of imagination cannot be directed. True it is, the final publication must not run counter to law but the application of the rigours of law has to also remain alive to the various aspects that have been accepted by the authorities of the Court. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. “ ― I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it” becomes the laser beam for guidance when one talks about freedom of expression.

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 904 OF 2018
N. Radhakrishnan      …Petitioner(s)
@ Radhakrishnan Varenickal
VERSUS
Union of India and others …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI
A writer or an author, while choosing a mode of expression,
be it a novel or a novella, an epic or an anthology of poems, a
play or a playlet, a short story or a long one, an essay or a
statement of description or, for that matter, some other form, has
the right to exercise his liberty to the fullest unless it falls foul of
any prescribed law that is constitutionally valid. It is because
freedom of expression is extremely dear to a civilized society.  It
holds it close to its heart and would abhorrently look at any step
taken to create even the slightest concavity in the said freedom. It
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may be noted here that we are in this writ petition, preferred
under Article 32 of the Constitution, dealing with creativity and
its impact and further considering the prayer for banning a book
on the foundation that a part of it is indecent and offends the
sentiments of women of a particular faith.  Having said this, we
would like to refer to two authorities highlighting the importance
of creativity and necessity of freedom of expression and how the
principle   of   pragmatic   realism   assures   the   said   creative
independence   as   civilization,   indubitably   a   progressive   one,
perceives   and   eagerly   desires   for   its   accentuated   protection,
nourishment and constant fostering. It is so because curtailment
of   an   author’s   right   to   freedom   of   expression   is   a   matter   of
serious concern.
2. In  Devidas   Ramachandra   Tuljapurkar   v.   State   of
Maharashtra and others1
, the Court, dealing with the meaning
of the words “poetic licence”, observed:­
“… it can never remotely mean a licence as used or
understood   in   the   language   of   law.   There   is   no
authority   who   gives   a   licence   to   a   poet.  These   are
words from the realm of literature. The poet assumes
his   own   freedom   which   is   allowed   to   him   by   the
fundamental concept of poetry. He is free to depart
from reality; fly away from grammar; walk in glory by
1 (2015) 6 SCC 1
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not following systematic metres; coin words at his own
will; use archaic words to convey thoughts or attribute
meanings;   hide   ideas   beyond   myths   which   can   be
absolutely   unrealistic;   totally   pave   a   path   where
neither  rhyme   nor  rhythm   prevail;   can   put   serious
ideas in satires, ifferisms, notorious repartees; take aid
of   analogies,   metaphors,   similes   in   his   own   style,
compare like “life with sandwiches that is consumed
everyday”   or   “life   is   like   peeling   of   an   onion”,   or
“society is like a stew”; define ideas that can balloon
into the sky never to come down; cause violence to
logic   at   his   own   fancy;   escape   to   the   sphere   of
figurative truism; get engrossed in the “universal eye
for   resemblance”,   and   one   can   do   nothing   except
writing a critical appreciation in his own manner and
according to his understanding. When a poet says “I
saw   eternity   yesterday   night”,   no   reader   would
understand the term “eternity” in its prosaic sense.
The Hamletian question has many a layer; each is free
to confer a meaning; be it traditional or modern or
individualistic. No one can stop a dramatist or a poet
or a writer to write freely expressing his thoughts, and
similarly   none   can   stop   the   critics   to   give   their
comments whatever its worth. One may concentrate
on   Classical   facets   and   one   may   think   at   a
metaphysical level or concentrate on Romanticism as
is understood in the poems of Keats, Byron or Shelley
or   one   may   dwell   on   Nature   and   write   poems   like
William   Wordsworth   whose   poems,   say   some,   are
didactic.   One   may   also   venture   to   compose   like
Alexander   Pope   or   Dryden   or   get   into   individual
modernism   like   Ezra   Pound,   T.S.   Eliot   or   Pablo
Neruda. That is fundamentally what is meant by poetic
licence.”
3. In Raj Kapoor and others v. State and others2
, Krishna
Iyer,   J.,   speaking   for   himself,   while   quashing   the   criminal
proceedings   initiated   against   the   petitioner   therein   for   the
2 (1980) 1 SCC 43
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production   of   the   film,   namely,   ‘Satyam,   Sivam,   Sundaram’,
observed:­
“12. … Jurisprudentially speaking, law, in the sense of
command to do or not to do, must be a reflection of the
community’s   cultural   norms,   not   the   State’s
regimentation   of   aesthetic   expression   or   artistic
creation.   Here   we   will   realise   the   superior
jurisprudential value of  dharma, which is a beautiful
blend   of   the   sustaining   sense   of   morality,   right
conduct,   society’s   enlightened   consensus   and   the
binding force of norms so woven as against positive
law in the Austinian sense, with an awesome halo and
barren autonomy around the legislated text is fruitful
area   for   creative   exploration.  But   morals   made   to
measure by statute and court is risky operation with
portentous impact on fundamental freedoms, and in
our constitutional order the root principle is liberty of
expression and its reasonable control with the limits of
‘public   order,   decency   or   morality’.   Here,   social
dynamics   guides   legal   dynamics   in   the   province   of
‘policing’ art forms.”
[Emphasis added]
4. The learned Judge further went on to say:­
“15. …   The   relation   between   Reality   and   Relativity
must   haunt   the   Court’s   evaluation   of   obscenity,
expressed in society’s pervasive humanity, not law’s
penal   prescriptions.   Social   scientists   and   spiritual
scientists will broadly agree that man lives not alone
by   mystic   squints,   ascetic   chants   and   austere
abnegation but by luscious love of Beauty, sensuous
joy   of   companionship   and   moderate   non­denial   of
normal demands of the flesh. Extremes and excesses
boomerang   although   some   crazy   artists   and   film
directors   do   practise   Oscar   Wilde’s   observation:
‘Moderation   is   a   fatal   thing.   Nothing   succeeds   like
excess’.
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16. All these add up to one conclusion that finality and
infallibility   are   beyond   courts   which   must   interpret
and administer the law with pragmatic realism, rather
than romantic idealism or recluse extremism.”
[Emphasis added]
5. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions in the beginning
as we intend to adjudicate the lis on the touchstone of “pragmatic
realism”.   When   we   say   “pragmatic   realism”,   it   has   to   be
understood   in   the   context   of   creativity,   for   the   present   Writ
Petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution seeks for
issue of an appropriate writ to ban the novel, namely, “Meesha”
meaning   Moustache   which   appeared   in   a   popular   Malayalam
weekly, “Mathrubhumi”, published from Kozikhode, Kerala and
circulated throughout the country and abroad.
6. It is averred by the petitioner that the said literary work is
insulting and derogatory to temple going women and it hurts the
sentiments of a particular faith/community. It is further asserted
that the portion of the book ‘Meesha’ which was published in
‘Mathrubhumi’ shows temple going women in bad light and it has
a disturbing effect on the community. 
7. It is contended that the editor of ‘Mathrubhumi’ has failed
in his duty by not editing or scrutinizing the portion of the book
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‘Meesha’ which was published in the weekly. It is put forth by the
petitioner that he has approached this Court singularly for the
protection of the legitimate interest of the women community.
The petitioner submits that such writings which have appeared
in   ‘Mathrubhumi’   are   not   a   manifestation   of   the   freedom   of
expression but are collusive efforts aimed at dividing the society,
for   such   imputations   are   discriminatory   against   women   and
threaten the very fabric of the society which embodies within
itself the virtues of pluralistic community, religion and gender
balance.   The   petitioner   avers   that   defamatory   and   degrading
publications which cater to perverted and communal minds need
to be checked and nipped in the bud as they have a tendency to
propel the general public to view the women community as mere
sexual and material objects which, in turn, denies the women
community their fundamental rights and also jeopardizes their
safety and well­being.
8. It   is   also   alleged   by   the   petitioner   that   the   impugned
incriminating  material  appearing in  ‘Mathrubhumi’ defiles the
places of worship and causes the public to look down upon them
with contempt and ridicule, whereas worshipping of deities by
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visiting the temples with purity of body and mind is an integral
part of the Hindu religion.
9. It is urged that the said publication in ‘Mathrubhumi’ has
the proclivity and potentiality to disturb the public order, decency
or morality and it defames the women community, all of which
are grounds for the State to impose reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2) on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and
expression. To buttress his stand, the petitioner has submitted
that after the publication of the incriminating material, women
visiting   temples   are   subjected  to   ridicule   and   embarrassment
through various social media platforms and instances such as
these are bound to have an adverse effect on the liberty, freedom
and empowerment of women.
10. The   petitioner   has   also   averred   that   if   such   a   work   of
literature is not checked, it may trigger a ‘Charlie Hebdo’ kind of
a backlash in our country and, therefore, it is necessary for this
Court to lay down guidelines to regulate and prohibit, those who
control/manage/publish   both   on   print   and   electronic   media
platforms, from publishing such insensitive, incriminating and
defamatory articles which could disrupt the peaceful co­existence
of various communities and religions in the country.
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11. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner has prayed to this
Court to issue a writ of Mandamus or any other writ/directions
to the Respondent No. 1, the Union of India, the Respondent No.
2, the State of Kerala and the Respondent No. 4, the Chief Editor
of   ‘Mathrubhumi’   weekly,   to   search   and   seize   all   copies   of
‘Mathrubhumi’ weekly volume­2 dated 11.07.2018 from all the
States and/or issue a writ of prohibition or any other directions
to the Respondents to prevent any further publication/circulation
of the novel titled ‘Meesha’ in the form of a book or in any other
form including the internet. The petitioner has also prayed to
issue   appropriate   directions   in   the   nature   of   mandamus   or
otherwise to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New
Delhi, to frame such guidelines as to prevent the recurrence of
such instances which have the tendency to cause threat to the
integrity of the society and the safety of women.
12. It may be noted here that when the Writ Petition was listed
on   02.08.2018,   this   Court,   before   issuing   notice,   deemed   it
appropriate to pass an order on the same date which reads as
follows:­
“Mr. M.T. George, learned counsel shall file within five
days hence the central theme of the book and the
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three chapters, which have been published in a weekly
newspaper, namely, Mathrubhumi.”
13. In pursuance of the aforesaid order of this Court, Mr. M.T.
George, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Chief Editor
of ‘Mathrubhumi’, the Respondent No. 4 herein, has filed the
translated copy of the central theme of the book ‘Meesha’ along
with an English translation of the three chapters of the novel.
14. A perusal of the central theme of ‘Meesha’ reveals that the
book is a narration which revolves back to the 19th century and
extends   to   the   present   times   with   Vavachan   alias   Meesha
(Moustache), Paviyam, Chella and Sita as its central characters.
Vavachan is one of the six children of Paviyam and Chella and
their   family   is   engaged   in   agriculture   for   a   living.   The   novel
begins with young Vavachan travelling in a boat with his father
for gathering fodder grass. On the way, Paviyam tries to steal a
bunch of raw bananas from a Pulaya (farm) but his attempt was
foiled   by   a   young   woman   of   the   household,   named,   Sita.
Vavachan at his young age is stunned and baffled when he sees
the half­naked body of Sita. After this rendezvous, a storm hits
and Paviyam, the father, along with his son Vavachan lose their
way. After the storm subsides and time passes, Vavachan comes
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across two men who tell him that the world was about to witness
a big war and they were going to Malaya (town) to escape a
famine.  Vavachan gets hooked with the idea of Malaya though he
had no idea as regards its location.
15. As the narration proceeds, Vavachan along with his family
lived in constant hunger. One day, a theatre group comes to their
village from Malabar. The proprietor of the theatre group needs
an actor with a big and ferocious moustache to play the role of a
policeman. But there was no one in the village who was sporting
a big moustache as it was considered as act of defiance especially
among   the   lower   castes.   The   proprietor   of   the   theatre   group
comes across Vavachan who had never shaven in his life and
sported thick hair and a beard. The proprietor gave Vavachan a
tonsure treatment, that is to say, he shaved his head but allowed
a ferocious Moustache (Meesha) to remain. Thereafter, Vavachan
was put on stage where he only has to scream twice bloodcurdling
‘daa’ (you).
16. In response, people got scared and ran away from the scene
and Vavachan’s moustache, which he refused to shave off even
after   the   show,   became   a   notorious   legend.   The   upper   caste
people   who   resented   Vavachan’s   Moustache   ascribed   to   him
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every   kind   of   crime,   even   though   he   was   innocent   and   just
wanted   to   go   to   Malaya   and   marry   the   girl,   Sita,   who   had
bedazzled   him   when   he   was   young   and   whom   he   had   seen
half­naked.
17. When the period of famine and hunger struck, Vavachan,
with armed men after him, fled from his village and hid in the
fields of Kuttanadan where labyrinthine canals and marshes saw
human presence only during the farming season. Gradually, with
the passage of time, Vavachan got immersed in the Kuttanadan
environment where he encountered the myths, legends, folklore
and superstitions ingrained among the people.
18. Paviyam and Chella, the parents of Vavachan, die without
seeing him. But after Chella’s death, he returns to his native
village and runs away with a book from Kalan and reads it fully.
The stories of (Meesha) Vavachan alias Moustache get etched in
the   region’s   sub­consciousness.   The   moustache   becomes   a
legend himself with super natural powers. The landlords and the
government become afraid that Meesha’s activities would hurt
the farming activities in Kuttanadan and they deploy a legendary
sub­inspector named Thanu Linga Nadar to deal with Meesha.
However,   at   that   time,   Kuttanadan   witnessed   a   deluge   and
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Nadar’s   mysterious   death   increased   Meesha’s   terror.
Subsequently, Meesha locks horns with a local strongman named
Karumathara Ittichan and rumors went around that Meesha was
killed in fight with Ittichan.
19. But Meesha had reached Kumarakom, an important place
in northern Kuttanadan, where an Englishman called Brenen
Sayip (Saheb) had installed a machine to pump out water from
the fields of Kuttanadan. Refusing to divulge the secret of the
machine, Brenen Saheb charges hefty amounts from the people.
Avarachan, a man interested in science, manages to steal the
secret with the help of Meesha. Meesha works as a help of Baker
Sayip who has vast fields and also conducts missionary work in
the region. There Meesha befriends a fisherman called Ouseph,
who was born to a Malayali woman from Baker Sayip’s father.
20. Baker   Sayip   is   a   well­known   crocodile   hunter   who   was
known   to   have   caused   the   extinction   of   crocodiles   in   the
Vembanad Lake. However, the last crocodile is after Baker for
revenge. In the end, it is Meesha who conquers the crocodile and
due to this feat of Meesha, Baker Sayip becomes his bête noire.
When Meesha realizes that Baker has turned against him, he
escapes from there along with Ouseph.
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21. Thereafter, Meesha comes across a prostitute, Kuttathi, who
had heard about the adventures of Meesha. One Kunjachan, the
son   of   the   lake   area’s   owner   troubles   Kuttathi   and   is   a   big
nuisance for her. Meesha slams Kunjachan as well. In return,
Kuttathi, with the assistance of one Narayanan, who also sports
a moustache, helps Meesha to find his childhood crush Sita.
Meesha   saves   Sita   from   a   robber   called   Katta   Pulavan.
Thereupon, Meesha asks Sita to accompany him, but Sita is
unwilling and refuses to submit herself to Meesha.
22. Thus,   Vavachan   alias   Meesha,   who   is   able   to   defeat
everyone in life, is defeated by a woman in the end.
23. Presently, we may refer to and quote the dialogue from the
book   “Meesha”   that   has   impelled   the   petitioner   to   move   this
Court in the instant writ petition. The English translation of the
dialogue appears at page twenty­six of the translated copy of the
three chapters submitted by Mr. M.T. George, learned counsel
appearing   for   the   Respondent   No.   4,   the   Chief   Editor   of   the
weekly ‘Mathrubhumi’. It reads thus:­
“Why do these girls take bath and put on their best
when they go to the temple?” a friend who used to
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join the morning walk until six months ago once
asked.
“To Pray”, I said.
“No”, he said. “Look carefully, why do they need to
put their best clothes in the most beautiful way to
pray? They are unconsciously proclaiming that they
are ready to enter into sex”, he said. I laughed.
“Otherwise,” he continued, “why do they not come to
the   temple   four   or   five   days   a   month?   They   are
letting people know that they are not ready for it.
Especially,   informing   those   Thirumenis   (Brahmin
priests) in the temple. Were they not the masters in
these matters in the past?”
24. The primary issue that emerges for consideration is whether
the aforesaid portion of the book ‘Meesha’ which the petitioner
asserts   to   be   derogatory   to   the   women   community   is   an
aberration of such magnitude which requires the intervention of
this Court on the ground that it has the potentiality to disturb
the public order, decency or morality and whether it defames the
women   community,   and,   therefore,   invites   imposition   of
reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 
25. For   deciding   this   question,   we   must   advert   to   the
fundamental idea behind art and literature and the liberalism
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associated with artistic expression. Literature symbolizes freedom
to   express   oneself   in   multitudinous   ways.   One   should   never
forget that only when creativity is not choked, it helps the society
to be able to accept the thoughts and ideas of a free mind. 
26. Literature can act as a medium to connect to the readers
only when creativity is not choked or smothered. The free flow of
the stream of creativity knows no bounds and imagination brooks
no limits. A writer or an artist or any person in the creative
sphere has to think in an unfettered way free from the shackles
that   may   hinder   his   musings   and   ruminations.   The   writers
possess the freedom to express their views and imagination and
readers too enjoy the freedom to perceive and imagine from their
own   viewpoint.   Sans   imagination,   the   thinking   process   is
conditioned.
27. Creative voices cannot be stifled or silenced and intellectual
freedom cannot be annihilated.   It is perilous to obstruct free
speech, expression, creativity and imagination, for it leads to a
state   of   intellectual   repression   of   literary   freedom   thereby
blocking free thought and the fertile faculties of the human mind
and eventually paving the path of literary pusillanimity. Ideas
have wings. If the wings of free flow of ideas and imagination are
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clipped, no work of art can be created.  The culture of banning
books directly impacts the free flow of ideas and is an affront to
the freedom of speech, thought and expression. Any direct or
veiled   censorship   or   ban   of   book,   unless   defamatory   or
derogatory to any community for abject obscenity, would create
unrest and disquiet among the intelligentsia by going beyond the
bounds of intellectual tolerance and further creating danger to
intellectual freedom thereby gradually resulting in "intellectual
cowardice" which is said to be the greatest enemy of a writer, for
it destroys the free spirit of the writer.  It shall invite a chilling
winter of discontent.  We must remember that we live not in a
totalitarian regime but in a democratic nation which permits free
exchange of ideas and liberty of thought and expression. It is only
by   defending   the   sacrosanct   principles   of   free   speech   and
expression or, to borrow the words of Justice Louis Brandeis,
"the freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think" and
by safeguarding the unfettered creative spirit and imagination of
authors, writers, artists and persons in the creative field that we
can preserve the basic tenets of our constitutional ideals and
mature as a democratic society where the freedoms to read and
write are valued and cherished.
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28. The aforesaid also calls from the readers and admirers of
literature and art to exhibit a certain degree of adherence to the
unwritten codes of maturity, humanity and tolerance so that the
freedom of expression reigns supreme and is not inhibited in any
manner. The flag of democratic values and ideals of freedom and
liberty has to be kept flying high at all costs and the Judiciary
must remain committed to this spirit at all times unless they
really and, we mean, really in the real sense of the term, run
counter to what is prohibited in law.  And, needless to emphasise
that prohibition should not be allowed entry at someone’s fancy
or view or perception.
29. In  Samaresh   Bose   and   another   v.   Amal   Mitra   and
another3
, the question that arose before this Court was whether
the accused persons had committed an offence under Section
292 IPC.  In the said case, an author had written a novel under
the caption ‘Prajapati’  which was published in ‘Sarodiya Desh’.
The contention before the trial court was that the novel was
obscene and both the accused persons, namely, the author and
the publisher had sold, distributed, printed and exhibited the
same.   The accused persons who faced trial stood convicted.
3 (1985) 4 SCC 289
18
Their conviction was affirmed by the High Court.   This Court,
while   dealing   with   the   issue   for   the   purpose   of   deciding   the
question of obscenity in any book, story or article, opined:­
“29. … The decision of the court must necessarily be
on an objective assessment of the book or story or
article as a whole and with particular reference to the
passages complained of in the book, story or article.
The court must take an overall view  of  the matter
complained of as obscene in the setting of the whole
work, but the matter charged as obscene must also be
considered by itself and separately to find out whether
it is so gross and its obscenity so pronounced that it is
likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to influence of this sort and into whose hands
the   book   is   likely   to   fall.   Though   the   court   must
consider the question objectively with an open mind,
yet   in   the   matter   of   objective   assessment   the
subjective attitude of the Judge hearing the matter is
likely   to   influence,   even   though   unconsciously,   his
mind and his decision on the question. A Judge with a
puritan and prudish outlook may on the basis of an
objective assessment of any book or story or article,
consider the same to be obscene. It is possible that
another Judge with a different kind of outlook may not
consider the same book to be obscene on his objective
assessment  of   the  very same  book.  The  concept  of
obscenity is moulded to a very great extent by the
social outlook of the people who are generally expected
to read the book. It is beyond dispute that the concept
of obscenity usually differs from country to country
depending   on   the   standards   of   morality   of
contemporary   society   in   different   countries.   In   our
opinion,   in   judging   the   question   of   obscenity,   the
Judge in the first place should try to place himself in
the position of the author and from the viewpoint of
the author the Judge should try to understand what is
it that the author seeks to convey and whether what
the author conveys has any literary and artistic value.
19
The   Judge   should   thereafter   place   himself   in   the
position of a reader of every age group in whose hands
the book is likely to fall and should try to appreciate
what kind of possible influence the book is likely to
have in the minds of the readers. …”
The Court, further analyzing the story of the novel, expressed
thus:­
“35. … If we place ourselves in the position of readers,
who are likely to read this book—and we must not
forget that in this class of readers there will probably
be   readers   of   both   sexes   and   of   all   ages   between
teenagers and the aged—we feel that the readers as a
class will read the book with a sense of shock and
disgust,   and   we   do   not   think   that   any   reader   on
reading this book would become depraved, debased
and encouraged to lasciviousness. It is quite possible
that   they   come   across   such   characters   and   such
situations in life and have faced them or may have to
face them in life. On a very anxious consideration and
after carefully applying our judicial mind in making an
objective assessment of the novel we do not think that
it can be said with any assurance that the novel is
obscene   merely   because   slang   and   unconventional
words have been used in the book in which there have
been emphasis on sex and description of female bodies
and there are the narrations of feelings, thoughts and
actions in vulgar language. Some portions of the book
may appear to be vulgar and readers of cultured and
refined taste may feel shocked and disgusted. Equally
in   some   portions,   the   words   used   and   description
given may not appear to be in proper taste. In some
places there may have been an exhibition of bad taste
leaving it to the readers of experience and maturity to
draw   the   necessary   inference   but   certainly   not
sufficient   to   bring   home   to   the   adolescents   any
suggestion which is depraving or lascivious.”
20
30. In   this   regard,   we   may   refer   with   profit   to   the
pronouncement in Bobby Art International and others v. Om
Pal   Singh   Hoon   and   others4
,   popularly   known   as  “Bandit
Queen case”.  The Court analysed the storyline, the humiliation
faced   by   the   female   child,   the   torment   faced   by   her   and,
eventually, the innocent woman becoming a dreaded dacoit and
observed that to appreciate the story, the character of the person
portrayed had to be viewed.  In that context, the Court held:­
“27. First, the scene where she is humiliated, stripped
naked, paraded, made to draw water from the well,
within the circle of a hundred men. The exposure of
her breasts and genitalia to those men is intended by
those who strip her to demean her. The effect of so
doing   upon   her   could   hardly   have   been   better
conveyed than by explicitly showing the scene. The
object of doing so was not to titillate the cinemagoer’s
lust but to arouse in him sympathy for the victim and
disgust for the perpetrators. The revulsion that the
Tribunal referred to was not at Phoolan Devi’s nudity
but at the sadism and heartlessness of those who had
stripped her naked to rob her of every shred of dignity.
Nakedness does not always arouse the baser instinct.
The reference by the Tribunal to the film ‘Schindler’s
List’ was apt. There is a scene in it of rows of naked
men and women, shown frontally, being led into the
gas chambers of a Nazi concentration camp. Not only
are they about to die but they have been stripped in
their   last   moments   of   the   basic   dignity   of   human
beings. Tears are a likely reaction; pity, horror and a
fellow­feeling   of   shame   are   certain,   except   in   the
pervert who might be aroused. We do not censor to
4 (1996) 4 SCC 1
21
protect the pervert or to assuage the susceptibilities of
the   over­sensitive.   ‘Bandit   Queen’   tells   a   powerful
human story and to that story the scene of Phoolan
Devi’s enforced naked parade is central. It helps to
explain why Phoolan Devi became what she did: her
rage and vendetta against the society that had heaped
indignities upon her.”
The aforesaid, as is evident, appreciates the agonies and
torture suffered by the protagonist and the nature of depiction of
the scenes on celluloid and lays down the principle not to be
guided by the sensitivity of a pervert viewer.   The principle of
assuagement is not to be taken recourse to so as to make the
idea of freedom of expression susceptible to suit the views and
perceptions   of   a   pervert   thinker   or   viewer.   Similarly,   while
reading a book, the setting, the constituents that constitute the
elements of the character and the purpose are to be kept in view.
31. In this context, reference to the view expressed in Viacom
18 Media Private Limited and others v. Union of India and
others5
 would be apposite.  In the said case, the challenge was to
the   ban   imposed   by   four   States   for   screening   the   movie
‘Padmaavat’. The Court quashed the notifications of banning on
the bedrock that the expression of an idea through the medium
of cinema which is a popular medium has its own status and the
5 (2018) 1 SCC 761
22
artistic expression should not be tinkered with. The Court went
on   to   observe   that   if   intellectual   prowess   and   natural   or
cultivated power of creation is inhibited without the permissible
facet of law, the concept of creativity would pave the path of
extinction; and when creativity dies, values of civilization corrode.
The Court, in the said context, reproduced a passage from an
order   in  Nachiketa   Walhekar   v.   Central   Board   of   Film
Certification6 which reads as under:­
“Be it noted, a film or a drama or a novel or a book is a
creation  of  art.   An  artist has  his  own  freedom to
express himself in a manner which is not prohibited in
law and such prohibitions are not read by implication
to crucify the rights of expressive mind. The human
history   records   that   there   are   many   authors   who
express their thoughts according to the choice of their
words,   phrases,   expressions   and   also   create
characters who may look absolutely different than an
ordinary man would conceive of.  A thought provoking
film should never mean that it has to be didactic or in
any   way   puritanical.     It   can   be   expressive   and
provoking   the   conscious   or   the   sub­conscious
thoughts   of   the   viewer.     If   there   has   to   be   any
limitation, that has to be as per the prescription in
law.”
32. In Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Union of
India   and   others7
, the issue before this Court was whether
screening of feature film, which incorporated a perception with
6 (2018) 1 SCC 778
7 2018 (4 ) SCALE 390
23
regard   to   a   particular   situation,   would   affect   the   trial   which
involved   the   petitioner,   the   society   or   the   exercise   of   “error
jurisdiction” of the appellate court. This Court negatived the said
contention and ruled that courts of law decide the lis on the basis
of   the   materials   brought   on   record   and   not   on   the   basis   of
imagination as projected in the language of the theatre or a script
on celluloid. The Court opined thus:­
“…there can be multitudinous modes, manners and
methods to express a concept. One may choose the
mode of silence to be visually eloquent and another
may use the method of semi melodramatic approach
that will have impact. It is the individual thought and
approach which cannot be curbed.”
And again:
“…the doctrine of sub­judice may not be elevated to
such an extent that some kind of reference or allusion
to a member of a society would warrant the negation of
the right to freedom of speech and expression which is
an   extremely   cherished   right   enshrined   under   the
Constitution.   The   moment   the   right   to   freedom   of
speech and expression is atrophied, not only the right
but also the person having the right gets into a semi
coma. We may hasten to add that the said right is not
absolute but any restriction imposed thereon has to be
extremely narrow and within reasonable parameters.
In the case at hand, we are obligated to think that the
grant of certificate by the CBFC, after consulting with
the   authorities   of   the   Army,   should   dispel   any
apprehension of the members or the society.”
24
33. It would usher in a perilous situation, if the constitutional
courts,   for   the   asking   or   on   the   basis   of   some   allegation
pertaining to scandalous effect, obstruct free speech, expression,
creativity and imagination. It would lead to a state of intellectual
repression of literary freedom. When we say so, we are absolutely
alive  to  the   fact  that   the  said   right   is  not   absolute   but  any
restriction   imposed   thereon   has   to   be   extremely   narrow   and
within the reasonable parameters as delineated by Article 19(2) of
the   Constitution.   Here,   we   may   remind   ourselves   of   the
expression   used   by   George   Orwell.   It   is   free   thinking   and
intellectual cowardice. Creative writing is contrary to intellectual
cowardice and intellectual pusillanimity.
34. Keeping   in   view   the   aforesaid   principles,   the   objections
raised as regards the contents of the novel and the language
used   which   is   reflected   in   the   dialogue   as   reproduced
hereinbefore are to be decided.  The grievance, as is reflectible,
pertains   to   derogatory   comments   on   women,   especially   when
they go to temple.  As stated earlier, it is the duty of the Court to
see whether such a dialogue was contrived to give rise to any
kind of sensuous situation or projection of a class to humiliate
them. A creative work has to be read with a matured spirit,
25
catholicity   of   approach,   objective   tolerance   and   a   sense   of
acceptability founded on reality that is differently projected but
not   with   the   obsessed   idea   of   perversity   that   immediately
connects one with the passion of didacticism or, for that matter,
perception   of   puritanical   attitude.   A   reader   should   have   the
sensibility   to   understand   the   situation   and   appreciate   the
character and not draw the conclusion that everything that is
written is in bad taste and deliberately so done to pollute the
young   minds.   On   the   contrary,   he/she   should   elevate
himself/herself as a co­walker with the author as if there is
social   link   and   intellectual   connect.     The   feeling   of   perverse
judging should be abandoned.  A creative writing is expectant of
empathetic reading.   It is not averse to criticism but certainly
does not tolerate unwarranted protest.  The author of “Wuthering
Heights” expects the readers to appreciate the morbidity that
surrounds the character of “Heathcliff”.  Similarly, the great poet
of “Nala Damayanti” desired the readers to enjoy the description
of the beauty of the princess appreciating the narrative but not to
engage in pervert thinking. 
35. One has to understand and appreciate the characteristics of
the character and the plots and sub­plots that are woven in the
26
story.  The character of Meesha as has been projected shows the
myriad experiences with different situations.  The situations, as
we find, can be perceived as certain sub­plots which evolved
around the fundamental characteristics of the protagonist.  The
theory of consistency of character as adopted by certain writers
seems to have been maintained in the narrative.  The situations
and the treatment of situations may be different but the basic
response of the protagonist remains unchanged.   All these, we
say, can be from one reader’s point of view.  To another reader, it
may   seem   that   the   sub­plots   have   been   enthusiastically
contrived to bring in tempting situations to draw the protagonist
in and to exposit chain reactions.  Appreciated from either point
of view, it cannot be denied that it is a manifestation of creativity.
The perception of a character which is in consonance with the
story invites empathetic readers to view him/her from a different
perspective.  A reader with mature sensibility would connect with
the plight of the protagonist or may distance himself/herself by
expressing the view that the projection is derogatory and hurtful
to a section of people.   He/she treats the novel as scandalous
and offensive. The Court is not to be swayed by any kind of
perception.  One may have a grave dislike towards a particular
27
manner of expression but that would not warrant for issue of a
mandamus from the Court to ban the book or the publication.
The language used in the dialogue cannot remotely be thought of
as obscene. The concept of defamation does not arise.  Nurturing
the idea that it is derogatory and hurtful to the temple going
women   would   tantamount   to   pyramiding   a   superstructure
without the infrastructure. 
36. If one understands the progression of character through
events and situations, a keen reader will find that beneath the
complex scenario, the urge is to defeat and to conquer and not to
accept a denial. Both the facets are in the realm of obsession and
the   author   allows   the   protagonist   to   rule   his   planet.   His
imagination   encircles   his   world.   A   reader   has   the   liberty   to
admire him or to sympathise.  Either way, the dialogue to which
the objection is raised is not an intrusion to create sensation. It
is   a   facet   of   projection   of   the   characters.   It   is,   in   a   way,
imaginative   reality   or   as   Pablo   Picasso   would   like   to   put   it,
“Everything   you   can   imagine   is   real”.     A   pervert   reader   may
visualise   absence   of   decency   or   morality   or   the   presence   of
obscenity but they are really invisible.
28
37. If books are banned on such allegations, there can be no
creativity.  Such interference by constitutional courts will cause
the death of art.  True it is, the freedom enjoyed by an author is
not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of
the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes
within the ambit and sweep of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
At that time, the Court should remember what has been said in
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram and others8 wherein, while
interpreting Article 19(2), this Court borrowed from the American
test of clear and present danger and observed:­
“45.   …   Our   commitment   of   freedom   of   expression
demands   that   it   cannot   be   suppressed   unless   the
situations   created   by   allowing   the   freedom   are
pressing and the community interest is endangered.
The   anticipated   danger   should   not   be   remote,
conjectural or far­fetched. It should have proximate
and direct nexus with the expression. The expression
of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the
public interest. In other words, the expression should
be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated
like the equivalent of a “spark in a power keg”.”
38. To apply the said litmus test, it is to be borne in mind that a
book should not be read in a fragmented manner.  It has to be
read as a whole.   The language used, the ideas developed, the
style  adopted, the manner in which the characters are portrayed,
8 (1989) 2 SCC 574
29
the   type   of   imagery   taken   aid   of   for   depiction,   the   thematic
subsidiary concepts projected and the nature of delineation of
situations have to be understood from an objective point of view.
There may be subjective perception of a book as regards its worth
and evaluation but the said subjectivity cannot be allowed to
enter into the legal arena for censorship or ban of a book.
39. Quite apart from the above, the creativity and the author’s
perception of the universe are to be borne in mind.  What is true
to poetry is applicable to novels or any creative writing.  It has to
be kept uppermost in mind that the imagination of a writer has
to enjoy freedom.   It cannot be asked to succumb to specifics.
That will tantamount to imposition. A writer should have free
play with words, like a painter has it with colours. The passion of
imagination cannot be directed. True it is, the final publication
must not run counter to law but the application of the rigours of
law has to also remain alive to the various aspects that have been
accepted by the authorities of the Court. The craftsmanship of a
writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective
perceptibility. 
40. It ought to be remembered that eventually, what the great
writer and thinker Voltaire had said   “ ― I may disapprove of what
30
you   say,   but   I   will   defend   to   the   death   your   right   to   say   it”
becomes   the   laser   beam   for   guidance   when   one   talks   about
freedom of expression. 
41. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the writ petition, being
devoid of merit, stands dismissed. However, there shall be no
order as to costs. 
…………………………….CJI
(Dipak Misra)
……………………………….J.
(A.M. Khanwilkar)
New Delhi;              ...………………….………..J.
September 05, 2018              (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)

Rizwan Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17th March, 2018 and which police remand was to enure till 23rd March, 2018. Further, without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued. = Reverting to the prayer for expunging the scathing observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police who was present in Court, 12 could not have given concession to release Rizwan Alam Siddique in the teeth of a judicial order passed by the Magistrate directing police remand until 23rd March, 2018. -The High Court ought not to have made scathing observations even against the Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his explanation on affidavit. - since no writ of habeas corpus could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till 23rd March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate.- In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate3 deprecated passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in expunging the observations made in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of the present case. - As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been released after the impugned judgment, the Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order has been set aside. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1124 OF  2018
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2846/2018)
The State of Maharashtra & Ors.      …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee     ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants have assailed the decision of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 21st March, 2018 in Writ
Petition No.1353 of 2018, whereby the High Court allowed the
writ petition preferred by the respondent, for issue of writ of
habeas   corpus   directing   the   appellants   to   produce   her
2
husband who, according to the respondent, was illegally and
unlawfully detained by the police in connection with FIR No.I31/2018.
3. The decision of the High Court is assailed essentially on
two counts. First, that no writ of habeas corpus could be
issued in respect of a person who was in police custody in
connection with a criminal case under investigation, pursuant
to   an   order   of   remand   passed   by   the   court   of   competent
jurisdiction. Second, in any case, the High Court should have
refrained   from   making   scathing   observations   against   the
concerned   police   officials   and   the   said   remarks   should   be
expunged.
4. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the filing of this appeal
are   that   on   24th  January,   2018,   a   secret   information   was
received by the local police that one Mukesh Pandian, who is a
private detective, was obtaining call detail records of different
people and was selling them in return for hefty amount of
money. The police caused the arrest of Mukesh Pandian and
sought call details of Vodafone Company. First Information
3
Report,   bearing   No.I­31/18   was   registered   against   Mukesh
Pandian   for   offences   punishable   under   Section   420   of   the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 66, 72 and 72(a) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000. During the investigation,
additional offences under Section 26 of the Indian Telegraphs
Act, 1885 and Sections 201, 171, 467, 468 and 120­B of IPC
were added. Later on, police arrested one Prasant Palekar and
found   various   mobile   chats   in   his   mobile   including   with
Rizwan Alam Siddique (husband of the respondent herein) and
other persons. The chat record collected by the police during
the investigation, between Rizwan Alam Siddique and Prasant
Palekar,   disclosed   that   Rizwan   Alam   Siddique   had   asked
Prasant   Palekar   for   call   details   record   of   the   wife   of   one
Nawazuddin   Siddique,   indicative   of   involvement   of   Rizwan
Alam Siddique in the commission of offence. As a result, a
notice was issued to Rizwan Alam Siddique on 14th February,
2018 under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in
response   to   which   he   informed   the   police   that   he   will   be
travelling till 21st  February, 2018 and will appear before the
4
police after 22nd  February, 2018. As assured, Rizwan Alam
Siddique visited the police station on 23rd February, 2018 for
recording of his statement. As the investigation progressed,
presence of Rizwan Alam Siddique was found to be necessary
by the Investigating Officer who, therefore, tried to get in touch
with him by sending messages on his mobile phone on 15th
March, 2018. Rizwan Alam Siddique responded to the said
messages and showed his willingness to  participate in the
investigation. However, according to the Investigating Officer
he did not cooperate with the police and for which reason, by
way of abundant precaution, on 16th  March, 2018 the police
issued notice under Section 41­A of Cr.P.C. which notice was
attempted to be served but refused by Rizwan Alam Siddique.
Further,   when   the   Investigating   Officer   along   with   his
subordinates went to the premises of Rizwan Alam Siddique to
serve the said notice, it transpired that Rizwan Alam Siddique
was destroying the evidence in his mobile phone as well as in
his   laptop   and,   therefore,   the   Investigating   Officer   took   a
conscious decision to arrest him by taking assistance from the
5
nearest   police   station   i.e.   Versova   Police   Station.   After   his
arrest, he was produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate on
17th  March,   2018   within   the   statutory   period.   The
jurisdictional  Magistrate  gave the  police custody  of Rizwan
Alam Siddique until 23rd  March, 2018     after recording his
satisfaction for such police remand.
5. The respondent, however, rushed to the High Court and
filed   a   writ   petition   on   18th/19th  March,   2018,   being   Writ
Petition   No.1353/2018   praying   for   a   direction   to   the
appellants (respondents in the writ petition) to produce her
husband   before   the   Court   and   to   justify   his   detention   in
accordance with procedure established by law. Further relief
claimed was to set her husband Rizwan Alam Siddique at
liberty.   The writ petition was moved on 20th  March, 2018
when the Court in its order recorded as follows:
“4. Mr.   Merchant   would   submit   that   once   this
notice is issued, then, in terms of sub­section (1), the
police   officer   was   satisfied   that   the   arrest   of   the
petitioner's   husband   is   not   required   and   that   the
matter falls under the provisions of sub­section (1) of
Section 41. He, therefore, was pleased to issue a notice
directing   the   petitioner's   husband   to   appear   before
him at such place as is specified in the notice.
6
5. The factual argument is that this notice is dated
16th March 2018 and it informs the husband of the
petitioner   to   appear   before   the   officer   signing   this
notice   on   17th   March   2018.   Mr.   Merchant   would
submit   that   sub­section   2   of   Section   41­A
contemplates issuance of such notice but such phrase
would have to be construed as “service or execution of
notice”, else sub­section 1 would be rendered otiose.
Therefore, until the person fails to comply with the
terms of notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the
police officer may, subject to such orders as may have
been passed by the competent Court in this behalf,
unable to arrest him for the offence mentioned in the
notice. If there was compliance with the notice by the
petitioner's   husband,   then,   no   question   arises,
according to Mr. Merchant, of presentation of such
petition, but it is the respondents' assertion that when
they  sought   to serve  this  notice   on the  petitioner's
husband, he refused. That is how the panchanama is
drawn.
6. Since Mr. Merchant says and on the basis of the
pleadings   in   the   petition,   that   there   was   a
panchanama drawn and a copy of which is at pages 41
and 42 of the paper book, we have carefully perused it.
It is in Marathi.
7. The whole panchanama has been perused with the
assistance of Mr. Yagnik, learned APP, who with all his
persuasive ability, could not find any sentence therein
to the effect that the petitioner's husband refused to
accept this notice when it was served on him at his
place of work/his office. In these circumstances and
particularly when the notice at page 42 also contains
below the signatures of panchas and the senior police
inspector, the signature of the accused, then, whether
it   is   a   signature   acknowledging   the   notice   and   it's
receipt or is it asserting, as is now stated across the
bar by Mr. Yagnik, his refusal. Once such a statement
is absent in the panchanama, then, we prima facie
find it very difficult to agree with Mr. Yagnik.
8. However, Mr. Yagnik prays for time to produce the
contemporaneous   record,   which   according   to   him,
would   indicate   that   the   noticee/husband   of   the
7
petitioner refused to accept the notice referable to and
styled as one under sub­section (1) of Section 41­A of
Cr.P.C. On a query as to where is the original record or
the contemporaneous record, the answer of Mr. Yagnik
is   that   today   in   the   ongoing   legislative   assembly
session,   there   is   a   query   and   which   has   to   be
answered by the concerned Minister and he requires
the original documents so also officer's presence in the
legislature secretariat. That is how the whole record
has been taken to the legislative assembly secretariat.
Mr. Yagnik, therefore, seeks time till tomorrow, which
is 21st March 2018 at 11.00 a.m.. We post this matter
tomorrow,   21st   March   2018   at   11.00   a.m.   only   to
enable Mr. Yagnik to produce such record and answer
the queries of the Court; else, all the consequences in
law shall follow.
9.   This   opportunity   is   granted   to   Mr.   Yagnik   only
because the document at pages 41 and 42 denotes
that not only the petitioner's husband was present at
his office but he and his staff handed over the articles
and details of his e­mail identity, mobile and related
information.   The   panchanama   records   that
preparation   of   the   same   had   commenced   at   20.10
hours and ended at 22.10 hours on 16th March 2018.
10. Stand over to 21st March 2018 at 11.00 a.m.”
6. Again, the matter was listed on 21st  March, 2018 when
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   perused   the   record
produced by the Public Prosecutor, including the entry in the
police diary, the remand report and other documents. It held
that the said record did not show necessary compliance of the
mandate of law before the arrest of Rizwan Alam Siddique.
8
After recording that finding, it went on to observe that such
arrest infringes the valuable right guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution and, therefore, acceded to the request of
the   respondent   to   set   Rizwan   Alam   Siddique   at   liberty
forthwith. At the same time, the High Court went on to make
scathing observations against the police officials as recorded
in   paragraphs   4­6   of   the   impugned   judgment,   which   read
thus:
“4. A brief hearing today resulted in Ms. Pai seeking
time to take instructions and after speaking to the
Deputy Commissioner of Police. At her request, the
matter was taken up at 1.00 p.m. and when it was
called   out,   on   instructions   from   the   Deputy
Commissioner of police, who is present in court, it is
stated   that   the   said   Deputy   Commissioner   has   no
objection to the petitioner being released, if so directed
by this court.
5. Once we have noted, in terms of our earlier order
and even at today's hearing that he is not obliging this
court by making any statement, then, he must admit
that he has taken law in his hands and he would
voluntarily proceed to release the petitioner's husband
from   custody.   This   was   the   expectation   from   this
police officer and if he had apologised genuinely and
bonafide and sought time to release the petitioner's
husband, we would not have directed any action to be
taken against him. However, he remains adamant and
persists that only if this court says that the petitioner's
husband   should   be   released,   he   would   have   no
objection to such release. He would bring now to the
court, the proceedings before the Magistrate and the
contents  of the remand report, which, according to
9
him, permit him to detain the petitioner's husband in
custody till 23rd March, 2018.
6. We do not think any assistance can be derived from
the entries in the diary or the remand proceedings. We
do   not   think   that   the   order   of   the   Magistrate
remanding the petitioner's husband to police custody
till 23rd March, 2018 can bind this court and if the
true and correct facts had been brought to the notice
of the concerned judicial officer, possibly, he would not
have passed the order on the request of this police
officer. Therefore, while we direct, after holding that
the petitioner's husband was unlawfully detained, his
release from the custody forthwith, we also direct the
superior police officials, particularly the functionary in
the   Department   of   Home,   Government   of   India   to
launch disciplinary proceedings and the petitioner and
her husband may initiate or file civil suit and criminal
prosecution against this police officer for taking the
law   in   his   hands.   Such   prosecution   shall   continue
uninfluenced by any proceedings that may be initiated
against the petitioner's  husband for having violated
the law.”
7.   Aggrieved by this decision, the appellants have filed the
present   appeal   on   two   counts,   as   already   indicated   in
paragraph 3 above. The respondent, on the other hand, has
supported the decision of the High Court and submits that the
appeal is devoid of merit. It is also brought to our notice that
Rizwan  Alam Siddique has already been  released after the
impugned judgment. In response to this submission, counsel
10
for the appellants would submit that the appellants are more
concerned about the scathing observations made by the High
Court against the  police officials and would  be more than
content if liberty is granted to the police to proceed against the
said Rizwan Alam Siddique in accordance with law.
8. We   have   heard   Mr.   Nishant   Ramakantrao
Katneshwarkar, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr.
C.A.   Sundaram,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the
respondent.
9. The question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus could
be maintained in respect of a person who is in police custody
pursuant   to   a   remand   order   passed   by   the   jurisdictional
Magistrate in connection with the offence under investigation,
this issue has been considered in the case of Saurabh Kumar
through his father Vs. Jailor, Koneila Jail and Anr.,
1
  and
Manubhai Ratilal Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.2
   It
is no more res integra. In the present case, admittedly, when
the writ petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was
1
 (2014) 13 SCC 436
2
 (2013) 1 SCC 314
11
filed by the respondent on 18th/19th March, 2018 and decided
by the High Court on 21st March, 2018 her husband Rizwan
Alam Siddique was in police custody pursuant to an order
passed   by   the   Magistrate   granting   his   police   custody   in
connection with FIR No.I­31 vide order dated 17th March, 2018
and which police remand was to enure till 23rd March, 2018.
Further,   without   challenging   the   stated   order   of   the
Magistrate, a writ petition was filed limited to the relief of
habeas corpus. In that view of the matter, it was not a case of
continued illegal detention but the incumbent was in judicial
custody  by  virtue  of  an  order  passed by  the  jurisdictional
Magistrate, which was in force, granting police remand during
investigation of a criminal case. Resultantly, no writ of habeas
corpus could be issued. 
10. Reverting   to   the   prayer   for   expunging   the   scathing
observations made in the impugned judgment, in particular
paragraphs 4­6, reproduced earlier, it is submitted that the
said observations were wholly unwarranted as the concerned
Deputy Commissioner of Police who was present in Court,
12
could   not   have   given   concession   to   release   Rizwan   Alam
Siddique   in   the   teeth   of   a   judicial   order   passed   by   the
Magistrate directing police remand until 23rd  March, 2018.
Moreover, it is evident that the High Court proceeded to make 
observations without giving any opportunity, whatsoever, to
the concerned police officials to explain the factual position on
affidavit. The writ petition was filed on 18th/19th March, 2018
and was moved on 20th  March, 2018 when the Court called
upon the Advocate for the appellants to produce the record on
the next day i.e. 21st March, 2018.  The impugned order came
to be passed on 21st March, 2018, notwithstanding the judicial
order of remand operating till 23rd  March, 2018.   The High
Court, in our opinion, should not have taken umbrage to the
submission made on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner of
Police that the respondent’s husband could be released if so
directed by the Court. As aforesaid, the DCP has had no other
option but to make such a submission. For, he could not have
voluntarily released the accused who was in police custody
pursuant to a judicial order in force. The High Court ought not
13
to   have   made   scathing   observations   even   against   the
Investigating Officer without giving him opportunity to offer his
explanation on affidavit.
11. Suffice it to observe that since no writ of habeas corpus
could be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the
High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of
the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order
passed   by   the   Magistrate   granting   police   custody   till   23rd
March, 2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in
that order of the Magistrate. In a somewhat similar situation,
this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and
Ors.   Vs.   N.M.T.   Joy   Immaculate3
  deprecated   passing   of
disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the
Investigating Officer and about the investigation done by them.
Accordingly,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   expunging   the
observations   made   in   paragraphs   4   to   6   of   the   impugned
judgment against the concerned police officials in the facts of
the present case.  
3
 (2004) 5 SCC 729
14
12. As aforesaid, even though this appeal succeeds, since the
respondent’s husband Rizwan Alam Siddique has already been
released   after   the   impugned   judgment,   the   Investigating
Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated
crime registered as FIR No.I­31/2018 strictly in accordance
with law and not merely because the impugned order has been
set aside.  We may not be understood to have expressed any
opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the respondent’s
husband or correctness of the charges levelled against him. 
13. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in the aforementioned
terms. 
.………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
        (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
September 05, 2018.

Contempt of court = not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. = the High Court took suo motu action as it was prima facie convinced that unauthorised construction was carried out in Sainik Farms despite the direction contained in order dated November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993. = The report of the Committee of advocates, however, was based on the site visit made in January, 2001 after a gap of more than 6 months from 7th June, 2000 and 3 months from 14th September, 2000 when the demolition was actually carried out. The factual position stated in the said report, therefore, may not be the actual position as obtained on the date of demolition i.e. 7th June, 2000 and 14th September, 2000. It is not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous persons clandestinely and without notice. The factual position stated in the reply affidavit filed by the appellant also reveals that continuous follow-up action was being taken in respect of unauthorised structures including those which were demolished. Furthermore, the appellant was transferred from the concerned ward w.e.f. 27th September, 2000 and any development or illegal activity unfolding after that date cannot 11 be attributed to the appellant. All these aspects have not been considered by the High Court. - In our opinion, it is not possible to hold that the demolition work undertaken on 7th June, 2000 and 14th September 2000 was not in conformity with the position reflected in the contemporaneous office submissions/record and photographs submitted by the appellant to his superior authority.- As a matter of fact, the appellant ought to succeed on the singular ground that the High Court unjustly proceeded against him without framing formal charges or furnishing such charges to him; and moreso because filing of affidavit by the appellant was supported by contemporaneous official record, which cannot be termed as an attempt to obstruct the due course of administration of justice. Accordingly, this appeal ought to succeed.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2006
R. S. Sehrawat … Appellant(s)
:Versus:
Rajeev Malhotra & Ors. …. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 19 (1) (b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, assails the judgment and
orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
at New Delhi in C.M. No.820 of 2001 in C.W.P. No.6734 of
2000 dated 1st June, 2001 and in R.A. No.6600 of 2001 in
C.W.P. No.6734 of 2000 dated 10th May, 2006 whereby the
appellant has been found guilty of filing false affidavit and
attempting to mislead the Court, thus committing contempt of
2
court by his acts which were of such a nature that they tended
to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. The
appellant has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of 30 (Thirty) days and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-
(Twenty Five Thousand Only). Review petition against the said
decision came to be dismissed on 10th May, 2006.
2. Briefly stated, the appellant was working as a Junior
Engineer in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). The writ
petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) had alleged that the
appellant and other officials, including police officials had, by
their act of commission and omission, first permitted the writ
petitioner to carry on unauthorised construction on the
property bearing Plot No.37-C measuring 834 square yards at
Asoka Avenue, Sainik Farms, New Delhi and later on
unilaterally demolished the said structure. This was the
grievance made in Civil Writ Petition No.6734 of 2000 filed by
respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 had prayed for taking
action against the appellant and other officials including police
officials involved in the alleged incident of demolition of the
3
structure. The Division Bench of the High Court adverting to
the direction issued in Public Interest Litigation bearing
C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993 dated November 3, 1997 restraining
unauthorised constructions in unauthorised colonies, issued
notice on 6th December, 2000 in the present writ petition to
the officers of the MCD and the police personnel who were
posted during the time the construction was raised on the plot
belonging to respondent No.1, to show cause as to why
proceedings for contempt of court should not be initiated
against them.
3. After receipt of notice, the appellant, as well as other
officials, filed their respective affidavits. The appellant filed his
detailed affidavit on 3rd January, 2001 inter alia pointing out
the primary responsibility of the officials who were expected to
comply with the directions issued on November 3, 1997 by the
High Court. As regards his role in the capacity of Junior
Engineer, the appellant asserted that he discharged the task
assigned to him from time to time by his superior officers and
submitted compliance reports to them in that behalf. He
4
further asserted that he had undertaken 14 major demolition
actions in Sainik Farms alone between 7th March, 2000 and
27th September, 2000 and razed these constructions to the
ground. It was asserted that the writ petitioner illegally
constructed the building at the same location inspite of the
demolition action taken on the earlier occasions. In support of
the contention that he had resorted to the demolition of
concerned structure, he placed reliance on the office
submission made by him to his superiors as well as the
photographs of the structures taken before and after the
demolition drive. The stand taken by the appellant was
contested by respondent No.1. To verify the factual position,
the High Court vide order dated 12th January, 2001 appointed
a Committee of advocates to inspect the site and submit a fact
finding report. That report was submitted to the High Court by
the Committee of advocates on 23rd January, 2001.
4. The High Court vide order dated 24th January, 2001 after
recording its prima facie opinion issued show cause notice to
the concerned officials including the appellant as to why they
5
should not be convicted and punished for contempt of court.
After the said order, the appellant filed a further affidavit
dated 8th February, 2001 and reiterated the stand taken in the
earlier affidavit as also explained the position of possibility of
reconstruction on the same location after the demolition was
done on 7th June, 2000 and 14th/15th September, 2000. The
appellant also relied on contemporaneous evidence such as
the report and photographs of the demolition. The High Court,
however, was not impressed by the explanation offered by the
appellant and proceeded to record finding of guilt against the
appellant for filing false affidavit on January 3, 2001. The
appellant preferred a review petition which was dismissed on
10th May, 2006. As a result, the appellant has challenged both
the orders by way of the present appeal.
5. The principal grievance of the appellant is that no proper
charge was framed and conveyed to the appellant. The first
show cause notice issued to the appellant in terms of order
dated 6th December, 2000 was presumably for non-compliance
of the direction given on November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441
6
of 1993; whereas the second show cause notice issued to the
appellant pursuant to order dated 24th January, 2001 was for
filing an incorrect and misleading affidavit dated 3rd January,
2001. The appellant had revealed the factual position in his
affidavit dated 3rd January, 2001 and further affidavit dated
8th February, 2001. The factual position stated in the said
affidavits has not been analysed by the High Court at all,
much less in its proper perspective. On the contrary, the High
Court, proceeded to record a finding of guilt, being swayed
away by the factual position recorded in the report submitted
by the Committee of advocates, completely overlooking the
plausible explanation offered by the appellant that the
unauthorised structure in question was demolished on 7th
June, 2000 and again on 14th/15th September, 2000. The
contemporaneous record regarding the extent of demolition in
the form of office submission, press reports and photographs
was also brought to the notice of the High Court. However,
that has been overlooked. The grievance of the appellant is
that in the affidavit dated 8th February, 2001 a specific
disclosure was made about the video recording done by news
7
channels and liberty to play the video clippings was sought
but the High Court did not deal with this request of the
appellant at all. The time period between the demolition and
the inspection by the Committee of advocates being quite
substantial, the possibility of reconstruction of the structures
in question could not be ruled out. However, the High Court
has not dealt with this aspect.
6. The respondent No.1 and the Amicus Curiae espousing
the cause of the respondent No.1, would, however, contend
that there is no error in the approach or the conclusion
recorded by the High Court.
7. We have heard Mr. Ashok Mathur advocate for the
appellant, Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel
appearing as amicus curiae and Mr. Ashok Kumar Panda,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
8. As noted earlier, action against the appellant and other
officials was initiated by the High Court in terms of order
8
dated 6th December, 2000. The relevant portion of the said
order reads thus:
“............
In the instant petition, unauthorized construction was
carried out in Sainik Farm which happens to be an
unauthorized colony. It is not disputed that the petitioner
started construction on Plot No.37C measuring 834 Sq. Yds.
At Ashoka Avenue, Sainki Farm, New Delhi, in July 2000.
The building was allowed to come up and when it was
nearing completion the same was demolished on 30.10.2000.
We fail to understand as to how the building activity could
be permitted/allowed from July 2000 till October 2000 when
order of this court dated November 3, 1997 was in force. It
prima facie appears to us that the building in question could
not have come up unless the concerned officers of the MCD
and the Police connived with the petitioner. The allegation of
the petitioner is that he paid bribes to various offices for
raising the construction. He has named those officers.
In the circumstances, we consider it appropriate to
issue notices to the following officers of the MCD and the
Police, who were posted during the time the construction
was raised on the plot in question, to show cause why
proceedings for contempt of court be not initiated against
them:
1. Mr. R.S. Sherawat (JE) MCD
2. Mr. U.S. Chowhan (JE) MCD
3. Mr. S.R. Bhardwaj, A.E. South zone Building Department
MCD.
4. Mr. Puran Singh Rawat, Baildar, MCD
5. Mr. Rakesh Baildar, MCD
6. Mr. Man Mohan, S.I. Chowki Incharge, Sainik Farms
7. Mr. V.K. Malhotra, Ex. Engineer MCD
8. Mr. Vir Singh, SHO.
The aforesaid officers are present and they accept notice.
They are granted two weeks time to file affidavits in reply to
the show cause notice. Pleadings in the writ petition be
completed before the next date.”
9
9. On a bare perusal of this order, it is evident that the High
Court took suo motu action as it was prima facie convinced
that unauthorised construction was carried out in Sainik
Farms despite the direction contained in order dated
November 3, 1997 in C.W.P. No.7441 of 1993. The order also
records that the show cause notice was accepted by the
officers present in Court. The appellant, like other officers,
filed his affidavit revealing the relevant facts concerning him
vide affidavit dated 3rd January, 2001. The appellant had
explained the factual position as to the action of demolition of
unauthorised structures in Sainik Farms during the relevant
period as per the task assigned to him by his superior officers
and reporting of that fact to his superiors by way of
contemporaneous office submission. The correctness of the
said contemporaneous office reports could not be and has not
been questioned or doubted as such. The reply affidavit makes
it amply clear that the Commissioner of the Corporation was
personally supervising the demolition work of unauthorised
constructions and, therefore, there was no reason to doubt the
10
contemporaneous record in the form of office submissions and
photographs reinforcing the fact of demolition. The report of
the Committee of advocates, however, was based on the site
visit made in January, 2001 after a gap of more than 6
months from 7th June, 2000 and 3 months from 14th
September, 2000 when the demolition was actually carried
out. The factual position stated in the said report, therefore,
may not be the actual position as obtained on the date of
demolition i.e. 7th June, 2000 and 14th September, 2000. It is
not unknown that such unauthorised structures could be and
were reconstructed overnight after the demolition work is
undertaken by the officials. That was done by unscrupulous
persons clandestinely and without notice. The factual position
stated in the reply affidavit filed by the appellant also reveals
that continuous follow-up action was being taken in respect of
unauthorised structures including those which were
demolished. Furthermore, the appellant was transferred from
the concerned ward w.e.f. 27th September, 2000 and any
development or illegal activity unfolding after that date cannot 
11
be attributed to the appellant. All these aspects have not been
considered by the High Court.
10. During the pendency of this appeal the appellant has
also brought on record a fact that he had faced departmental
action on the basis of same set of facts regarding his acts of
commission and omission for the following three charges:
“Shri R.S. Sehrawat while functioning as JE (B) in Building
Department, South Zone and remained incharge of the area
of Sainik Farm w.e.f. 07.03.2000 to 27.09.2000, committed
gross misconduct on the following counts:
1. He is connivance with the owner/builders allowed them to
carry out and complete the unauthorized construction in
P.Nos 37-C, 49, H-541, Sainik Farms unabatedly and did not
take effective action to stop/demolish the same at its
initial/ongoing stage.
2. He also did not book the said unauthorized construction in
Sainik Farm just to avoid demolition action u/s 343/344 of
the DMC Act.
3. He also submitted wrong affidavit in the High Court
mentioning therein that unauthorized construction in
P.No.49 and H-541, Sainik Farms were demolished but the
same were found still existing at site. Thus, he mislead the
Hon‟ble High Court.
He, thereby contravened Rule 3 (I) (i) (ii) & (iii) of the CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964 as made applicable to the employees
of the MCD.”
12
Notably, the appellant has been exonerated in the said enquiry
by a detailed report analysing all the official records
supporting the stand of the appellant.
11. Be that as it may, the law relating to contempt
proceedings has been restated in the case of Sahdeo Alias
Sahdeo Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others1
in paragraph 27 as follows:
“27. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that
the High Court has a power to initiate the contempt
proceedings suo motu for ensuring the compliance with the
orders passed by the Court. However, contempt proceedings
being quasi-criminal in nature, the same standard of proof is
required in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The
alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all
safeguards/rights which are provided in the criminal
jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. There must be
a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by
a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of
the said provision. The alleged contemnor is to be informed
as to what is the charge, he has to meet. Thus, specific
charge has to be framed in precision. The alleged contemnor
may ask the Court to permit him to cross-examine the
witnesses i.e. the deponents of affidavits, who have deposed
against him. In spite of the fact that contempt proceedings
are quasi-criminal in nature, provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”) and the
Evidence Act are not attracted for the reason that
proceedings have to be concluded expeditiously. Thus, the
trial has to be concluded as early as possible. The case
should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. There
must be clear and reliable evidence to substantiate the
allegations against the alleged contemnor. The proceedings

1 (2010) 3 SCC 705
13
must be concluded giving strict adherence to the statutory
rules framed for the purpose.”
We may usefully refer to two other decisions dealing with
the issue under consideration. In Muthu Karuppan,
Commissioner of Police, Chennai Vs. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi
and Anr.,
2 this Court observed thus:
“15. Giving false evidence by filing false affidavit is an evil
which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand.
Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered
expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent,
but there must be a prima facie case of „deliberate falsehood‟
on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied
that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge.”
“17. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in
nature, burden and standard of proof is the same as
required in criminal cases. The charges have to be framed as
per the statutory rules framed for the purpose and proved
beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the alleged
contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Law does not
permit imposing any punishment in contempt proceedings
on mere probabilities, equally, the court cannot punish the
alleged contemnor without any foundation merely on
conjectures and surmises. As observed above, the contempt
proceeding being quasi-criminal in nature require strict
adherence to the procedure prescribed under the rules
applicable in such proceedings.”

2
 (2011) 5 SCC 496
14
In Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. Vs. Syed Hasibur Rahaman
and Ors.,
3 this Court observed thus:
“14. The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed
at this juncture, viz., the burden of standard of proof. The
common English phrase „he who asserts must prove‟ has its
due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said
to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the
„standard of proof‟, be it noted that a proceeding under the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal,
and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a
criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be
established beyond reasonable doubt....”
12. In the present case, going by the material on record it is
not possible to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant had contributed to the reconstruction of the
unauthorised structure before or after 27th September, 2000.
Furthermore, the appellant was not served with any charges
muchless specific charge which he was expected to meet. Yet,
the final conclusion in the impugned judgment is that the acts
of the appellant tended to substantially interfere with the due
course of justice and amounted to committing criminal

3
 (2001) 3 SCC 739
15
contempt of court for having filed incorrect affidavit. The High
Court made no attempt to verify or examine the
contemporaneous record relied upon by the appellant in
support of his plea that the factual position stated in the
affidavit filed by him was borne out and reinforced from the
said record. The affidavit so filed cannot be termed as
incorrect or misleading by relying on the report of the
advocates‟ committee, which was prepared after a gap of 6
months from the date of first demolition (7th June, 2000) and 3
months from the second demolition (14th September, 2000).
13. The finding recorded by the High Court that the property
was not razed to the ground based on the report prepared in
January, 2001, therefore, is not the correct approach and is
manifestly wrong. The High Court ought to have tested the
authenticity and veracity of the contemporaneous record in
the form of office submissions, Misel Band register, office files,
notices, photograph and press reports etc. relied upon by the
appellant. It would be a different matter if the
contemporaneous record did not support the stand taken by
16
the appellant in the affidavits filed by him dated 3rd January,
2001 and 8th February, 2001 respectively. As a matter of fact,
the appellant has already faced departmental enquiry in which
the matter in issue has been exhaustively dealt with and the
plea taken by the appellant has been found to be correct.
14. Be that as it may, the appellant has been found guilty in
reference to the notice issued in terms of order dated 24th
January, 2001, the relevant portion whereof reads thus:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out in the
affidavit of Mr. R.S. Sehrawat, it is mentioned that property
Nos.49 and H-541 were demolished on 7th June, 2000 and
14th September, 2000 respectively. Mr. Awasthy has shown
photographs of these properties. From the photographs, it
appears that the properties are intact and were not
demolished, therefore we are prima facie of the opinion that
even Mr. Sehrawat has taken liberties with truth. Issue
notices to Mr. U.S. Chauhan and Mr. R.S. Sehrawat, Junior
Engineers, MCD, to show cause why they should not be
convicted and punished for contempt of Court. Let the
affidavits in response be filed by 6th February, 2001.”
15. In response to the second notice given to the appellant,
he filed a further affidavit dated 8th February, 2001 to urge as
under:
17
“3. That the deponent submits that the deponent had not
filed any false affidavit, nor did the deponent take liberties
with truth while filing the affidavit on 3.1.2001 before this
Hon‟ble Court. I state that in the order dated 24.1.2001, qua
the deponent it has been recorded that properties No.49 and
H-541, which were demolished by the deponent on 7.6.2000
and on 14.9.2000/15.9.2000 were not demolished as per the
report of the committee appointed by this Hon‟ble Court and
the photographs of these properties.
4. That the deponent submits that property No.49 was
demolished on 7.6.2000 and the photo copies of the
photographs of the existing building before demolition and
after demolition have already been filed by the deponent
along with the deponent‟s affidavit filed on 3.1.2001. The
deponent is filing photocopies of further photographs of the
demolished property. I further state that the press had prior
information for the demolition to be carried out at Sainik
Farms on 7.6.2000 and the press photographers and
reporters were at Sainik Farms. The photograph of the
demolished building at 49, Sainik Farm was taken by the
photographers of some news papers. The times of India,
edition dated 8.6.2000 showed the demolished structure.
This is independent evidence which corroborates the stand of
the deponent. I further state that the video team of the
Doordarshan video taped the demolition of 49 Sainik Farms
and the clippings were shown in the programme “Aaj Tak” on
7.6.2000 itself at 10 P.M. I crave indulgence of this Hon‟ble
Court to summon the video film from the Doordarshan
Authorities prepared for the programme Aaj Tak telecasted
on 7.6.2000. I state that the owner of the property has
reconstructed the same after its earlier demolition. I state
that as stated by me in the earlier affidavit filed by the
deponent, I was no longer assigned the work of Junior
engineer for Sainik Farms after 27.9.2000 and the structure
has been re-erected, only thereafter. I state that during my
tenure as Junior Engineer incharge of Sainik Farms only one
property was bearing No.49 Sainik Farms, which was
demolished by me.
5. That as regards property No. H-541, Sainik Farms, I
state that the committee report has not referred to the same.
However, 29.1.2001, I visited the site of the said property
and state that the said property has also been reconstructed
after the earlier demolition carried out by me. I state that the
reconstructed property is still in the process of finishing and
18
painting work is still going on in the property. I state that the
committee members should be requested by this Hon‟ble
Court to immediately report whether the buildings are in the
process of being painted or has been recently completed and
painted as the same would show and prove its
reconstruction. I have already filed the photographs showing
the demolished property by me along with my earlier
affidavit.
6. That I state that as already stated by me in my
affidavit filed before this Hon‟ble Court on 3.1.2001, the
Commissioner of the Corporation was weekly reviewing the
activities at Sainik Farms and the Zonal Engineer and the
Executive Engineer of the Zone were also personally
supervising the demolition operations carried out by me. The
reports of the said Zonal Engineer and Executive Engineers
should also be called.
7. That I state that I should be given an opportunity to
lead evidence of the press photographers, Doordarshan team
which video taped the demolitions on 7.6.2000 as also the
evidence of the Zonal Engineer and Executive Engineer to
prove that I had carried out the demolitions and have not
filed any affidavit nor have taken liberties with truth.”
16. This specific stand taken by the appellant has not been
considered by the High Court at all. The appellant made this
grievance in the review petition, but of no avail. In our opinion,
it is not possible to hold that the demolition work undertaken
on 7th June, 2000 and 14th September 2000 was not in
conformity with the position reflected in the contemporaneous
office submissions/record and photographs submitted by the
appellant to his superior authority.
19
17. As a matter of fact, the appellant ought to succeed on the
singular ground that the High Court unjustly proceeded
against him without framing formal charges or furnishing
such charges to him; and moreso because filing of affidavit by
the appellant was supported by contemporaneous official
record, which cannot be termed as an attempt to obstruct the
due course of administration of justice. Accordingly, this
appeal ought to succeed.
18. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and orders
passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi in C.M. No.820 of 2001 in C.W.P. No.6734 of 2000 dated
1st June, 2001 and in R.A. No.6600 of 2001 in C.W.P. No.6734
of 2000 dated 10th May, 2006 are quashed and set aside and
the show cause notices issued to the appellant pursuant to the
order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 6th
20
December, 2000 and dated 24th January, 2001 are hereby
dropped. Appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms.
…………………………….CJI.
 (Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
 (A.M. Khanwilkar)
New Delhi;
September 05, 2018.