where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated 28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent Act was made out.; Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”= The common thread that runs through the aforesaid pronouncements of this Court is – in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated 28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent Act was made out. 15. In the circumstances, in our considered view, the order passed by the appellate court was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8256-8257 OF 2018
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.24615-24616 of 2017)
M/s Alagu Pharmacy & Ors. ……Appellants
Versus
N. Magudeswari ..…. Respondent
JUDGMENT
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated
29.03.2016 in Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No.586 of 2016 as well as
against the order dated 02.12.2016 in Review Petition No.89 of 2016 in said
2
Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No.586 of 2016 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai.
3. The appellants 2 to 4 are doing business in the name and style of M/s
Alagu Pharmacy i.e. the appellant No.1. The appellants claim to be tenants
in the suit property owned by the respondent herein since 1998. On or about
22.02.2012 a lease agreement was entered into, which according to the
appellants was signed by the respondent, extending/renewing the period of
lease. On 13.11.2013 and 07.12.2013 the respondent had issued legal
notices calling upon the appellants to vacate the suit property alleging inter
alia that the lease agreement dated 22.02.2012 was not signed by the
respondent and was a forged document, to which reply was given by the
appellants on 17.01.2014. On 17.01.2014 itself a complaint (Exh.P-10) was
lodged by the respondent alleging commission of forgery. According to the
appellants, on 20.01.2014 the respondent alongwith her husband and some
henchmen tried to evict the appellants which attempt was successfully
resisted by the appellants. In the circumstances, O.S. No.135 of 2014 was
filed by the appellants on 21.01.2014 seeking relief of permanent injunction
against the respondent from interfering with their peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property save and except by due process of law. After
3
hearing the appellants, an ad interim injunction was granted by the District
Munsif, Coimbatore.
4. It appears that on 29.01.2014 a compromise (Exh.P-11) was entered
into between the appellants and the respondent. It is the case of the
appellants that they were summoned to the police station in connection with
the complaint lodged by the respondent (Exh.P-10) and under the pressure
employed by the police, said Exh. P-11 was entered into. Soon thereafter an
Eviction Petition i.e. R.C.O.P. No.29 of 2014 was filed by the respondent
before the Principal Rent Controller-cum-District Munsif, Coimbatore for
eviction of the appellants. It is the case of the appellant that they were again
asked to appear before the police on 27.03.2014 and under the pressure
exerted by the police a compromise deed was entered into under which the
appellants agreed to vacate the suit property. Said compromise deed was
presented before the Court on 28.03.2014 and following order was passed
by the Rent Controller and Principal District Munsif, Coimbatore:
“Petition dated 08.02.2014 filed under Section 10(2)(ii)(a),
10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act, 1960 and the petitioner filed this petition against the
respondents to vacate the premises and to deliver the vacant
possession of the petition mentioned property more fully
described hereunder in the schedule and cost of this petition.
4
This petition coming on this day for hearing before me in
the presence of Thiru. M. Sanjaiyan, Advocate for petitioner
and of Thiru. Somasundaram, Advocate for respondent. Both
parties filed compromise memo and both parties present and
this day this Court doth order direct as follows:
1. That the respondents be and are hereby granted
time upto 31.10.2015 to vacate the petition
mentioned property and to handover the vacant
possession of the same to the petitioner/landlord
and
2. That the respondents are hereby directed to pay
the present monthly rent of Rs.19080/- pm to the
petitioner/landlord till the date of delivery of
possession of the property (i.e. upto 31.10.2015)
by way of cheque; and
3. That in case of default to do so by the
respondents, the petitioners are entitled to take
appropriate action through court of law against the
respondents.
4. The compromise petition do form part of this final
order, and
5. That there be no order as to cost.”
5. On 07.10.2015, a letter was sent by the respondent calling upon the
appellants to vacate the premises by 31.10.2015 in terms of the aforesaid
compromise decree. On 07.12.2015, an appeal being R.C.A. (CFR)
No.31591 of 2015 was filed by the appellants before the Principal
Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore against the aforesaid compromise decree
5
dated 28.03.2014. Along with said appeal IA No.465 of 2015 was also
preferred seeking condonation of delay of 604 days in filing said appeal.
6. The respondent having contested the matter, said IA No.465 of 2015
was taken up for consideration by the appellate court. It was submitted on
behalf of the appellants that they were pressurized into signing the
compromise deed and said compromise was brought about because of
pressure exerted by the police. Reliance was placed on complaint Exh.P-10
by the respondent and compromise letter Exh.P-11 dated 29.01.2014. On
the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that there were
numerous occasions for the appellants to raise a grievance that the
compromise in question was brought about by coercion and yet no such
objection was ever raised. It was, therefore, submitted that the delay of 604
days in preferring the appeal ought not to be condoned.
7. The appellate court by its Order dated 19.01.2016 accepted said IA
No.465 of 2015 and condoned the delay subject to payment of Rs.2000/- by
the appellants to the respondent. It was observed by the appellate court as
under:
6
“8. The main contention of the respondent is compromise
made before the trial court with free will and now the
respondent is tried to drag on the matter and preventing the
respondent from enjoying the fruit source of the compromise
decree. On the side of respondent Ex.R1 and R4 marked.
Ex.R1 compromise memo; R2 document for already received
the certified copy of fair and final order; R3 letter from the
respondent to the petitioner; R4 postal acknowledgement. On
perusal of respondent side documents to disprove the facts of
Ex.P-10 and Ex.P-11 no documents have been filed. The
landlord-tenant relationship is admitted. The allegations made
by the respondent against the petitioners is lease deed dated
22.02.2012 is forged one and complaint has been given to the
police regarding the forged documents and the petitioners
themselves come to the agreement they are undertake to vacate
the petition mentioned property, there is no police threat or
complaint or coercion by the police or by the respondent. In
order to consider the documents filed by the petitioners Ex.P-10
is the police complaint, prepared by the respondent
Magudeswari against the 2nd petitioner/appellant. In the
complaint the allegations made against the 2nd petitioner is that
there is life threat to the respondents and the lease deed has
been created by the 2nd petitioner by forging the signature of the
respondent and requesting the police to take proper legal action
against the 2nd petitioner. Once the written complaint filed
before the police mentioning the name of the accused, if the
police finds it is true for that police have to register FIR against
the accused and proceed with the investigation as per law. But
on perusing of Exh.P-11 compromise letter dated 29.01.2014
between the respondent and the 2nd petitioner addressing to the
inspector of police, City Crime Branch. In continuation the
RCOP has been filed and memo of compromise filed,
compromise decree has been passed. As stated above the duty
of the police is only to register the case against the accused and
proceed against the accused for the offence committed for the
crime, they are not entitled to make any compromise against the
crime unless and until it is provided by law and further before
when compromise arrived at court, the previous compromise
has been arrived at police station. From Ex.P-11 itself there
7
arises suspicion whether the petitioner has put into any force or
any threat to make the compromise before the court. Hence
from the above discussions there is a police force with regard to
file the compromise regarding RCOP 29/14 and previously
compromise letter has been arrived before the police. Hence
there is a suspicion arises petitioner must be put into any threat
or coercion at the time of filing the compromise memo in
RCOP and now the petitioner filed the petition to condone the
delay of 604 days. Hence from the above discussions it is clear
the petitioners have explained the delay of 604 days in filing the
appeal and the explanation submitted by the petitioners is
acceptable one.”
8. The aforesaid order was challenged by the respondent by preferring
Civil Revision Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Madras which
Revision Petition was allowed by the High Court vide its orders dated
29.03.2016. It was observed by the High Court as under:
“5. There are two courses open to the tenants. One is that the
tenants would have stated before the Court which recorded the
compromise that the compromise was out of compulsion or
coercion on the part of the police during enquiry of the
complaint preferred by the landlady. In that case, the Court
which recorded the compromise would have dealt with that
issue. That is not the case here. When that is not the case, it is
far fetched for the appellate court to come to a conclusion that
the tenants might have been put into coercion or force before
entering into the compromise. It is equally probable that in
order to get the closure of complaint, the tenants would have
opted to enter into a compromise and thereafter, the tenants are
put forth an allegation of invalidity of compromise. Even if the
tenants had some difficulty in expressing themselves before the
trial court, the appeal would have been filed immediately after
the compromise decree, if there had been any vitiating factors
8
while entering into the compromise. But, the appeal had not
been filed in time. Therefore, the conduct of the tenants would
only indicate the procrastinating approach in dealing with their
case.”
9. The appellants preferred a review petition which was rejected by the
High Court on 02.12.2016. This appeal challenges the correctness of both
the orders passed by the High Court. We heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned
Senior Advocate for the appellants and Mr. S. Thananjayan, learned
Advocate appearing for the respondent.
10. The order passed by the appellate court shows that compromise
Exh.P-11 was brought about on 29.01.2014 that is even before the eviction
petition was filed by the respondent. Further, said compromise Exh.P-11
was addressed to the Inspector of Police, City Crime Branch. The appellate
court had further observed that complaint Exh.P-10 and compromise Exh.P11
were not disputed by the respondent and no document in rebuttal was
filed. The complaint (Exh.P-10) proceeds on a premise that the lease deed
dated 22.02.2012 was a forged document and there was no relationship of
landlord-tenant between the parties. Yet an eviction petition was filed,
seeking eviction of the appellants under the concerned Rent Act. There is an
inherent contradiction in the stand adopted by the Respondent. In the
9
circumstances, the assertion made by the appellants that pressure was
exerted through the police and they were compelled to enter into
compromise is prima facie acceptable. In Ajad Singh v. Chatra and
Others1
, compromise recorded in Police Station inter alia was not found to
be acceptable by this Court and the matter was remanded. It was observed,
“…..the appellate court ought to have taken note of the fact that the said
compromise was recorded in the Police Station and during the pendency of
the suit.” It is true that there was a delay of 604 days in filing the appeal, but
in cases where there is reasonable doubt that police may have forced a party
to enter into compromise, the process of Court ought to weigh in favour of a
party who alleges to be victim of such pressure. It may be pertinent to note
that the order passed by the High Court does not even deal with this aspect
nor was any submission made that the assessment made by the appellate
court was in any way incorrect or imperfect.
11. Further, eviction petition was filed seeking eviction of the appellants
under Section 10(2)(ii)(a), 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1960. Said Sections are as under:
1
 (2005) 2 SCC 567 (para 8)
10
“10(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to
the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller,
after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the application, is satisfied-
…….
 (ii) that the tenant has after the 23rd October 1945
without the written consent of the landlord-
(a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the
entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease
does not confer on him any right to do so, or
…..
 .….
 (3) …….
 (c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a
building, whether residential or non-residential, may,
notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a),
apply to the Controller for an order directing any
tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building to put the landlord in
possession thereof, if he requires additional
accommodation for residential purposes or for
purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the
case may be.”
12. The eviction in terms of the aforesaid provisions can be ordered only
if the concerned Rent Controller or Court is satisfied that the ground seeking
eviction is made out. It has been held by this Court that unless and until
ground seeking eviction in terms of the concerned Rent Act is not made out,
11
no eviction of a tenant can be ordered, even if the parties had entered into a
compromise. For example, in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri2
 this Court
considered its earlier decisions in three cases as under:-
“20. There are three decisions of this Court which require to be
considered. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass3
 a decree
for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between the
parties, was held, by this Court, to be a nullity as contravening
Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
The facts therein were as follows:
“The tenant and the son of the landlord referred the
disputes between them to arbitration. The landlord was
not a party to this agreement. The arbitrators passed an
award whereunder the tenant was to give vacant
possession of the premises in favour of the landlord
within a particular time. This award was made a decree
of court. The landlord, who was neither a party to the
award nor to the proceedings, which resulted in the
award being made a decree of court, applied for eviction
of the tenant on the basis of the award. The tenant
resisted execution by raising various objections under
Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of the
objections was that the decree for eviction based upon the
award was a nullity as being opposed to the Delhi and
Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. This Court held that the
decree directing the tenant to deliver possession of the
premises to the landlord was a nullity, as it was passed in
contravention of Section 13(1) of the relevant statute.
After quoting the sub-section, this Court further held that
the decree for eviction passed according to an award, in a
proceeding to which the landlord was not a party and
without the court satisfying itself that a statutory ground
of eviction existed, was a nullity and cannot be enforced
2
 (1973) 1 SCC 761
3
 (1969) 2 SCR 432
12
in execution. It will be seen from this decision that the
decree was held to be a nullity because the landlord was
not a party thereto, and also because the court had not
satisfied itself that a ground for eviction, as required by
the statute, existed. This decision is certainly an authority
for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to
satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been
made out by a landlord. How exactly that satisfaction is
to be expressed by the court or gathered from the
materials, has not been laid down in this decision, as this
court was not faced with such a problem.”
21. In Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K.L. Bansal4
the question again
rose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity of a
decree passed for eviction on compromise. The plaintiff therein
filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds—
(a) the premises were required for their own use; and
(b)the tenant had committed default in payment of
rent.
22. The tenant filed a written statement denying both these
allegations. He disputed the claim of the landlord regarding his
requiring the premises for his own use bona fide and also the
fact of his being in arrears. When the pleadings of the landlord
and the tenant were in this state, both parties filed a
compromise memo in and by which they agreed to the passing
of a decree of eviction against the tenant. Representations to the
same effect were also made by the counsel for both parties. The
court passed the following order:
“In view of the statement of the parties’ counsel
and the written compromise, a decree is passed in
favour of the plaintiff against the defendant.”
The tenant did not vacate the premises within the time
mentioned as per the compromise memo. On the other hand,
4
 (1969) 1 SCC 59
13
he filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil
Procedure Code pleading that the decree is void as being in
contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi statute. The High
Court held that the decree was a nullity, as the order was
passed solely on the basis of the compromise without
indicating that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in
Section 13 existed. Following the decision in Bahadur
Singh this Court upheld the order of the High Court. Here
again, it will be seen that the manner in which the court’s
satisfaction is to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt
with.
23. A similar question came up again before this Court in
Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal5
. The landlord filed an application
for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had sublet the
premises without obtaining his consent in writing. Subletting,
without the consent of the landlord in writing, was one of the
grounds, under Section 13(1) of the Delhi statute entitling a
landlord to ask for eviction. The tenant denied the allegation
that he had sublet the premises. Both the landlord and the tenant
entered into a compromise and the court, after recording the
same, passed the following order:
“As per compromise, decree for ejectment and for Rs
165 with proportionate costs is passed in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendant. The parties shall
be bound by the terms of the compromise. The terms
of the compromise be incorporated in the decree sheet....”
24. As the tenant did not surrender possession of the properties
within the time mentioned in the compromise memo, the
landlord levied execution. It was resisted by the tenant on
various grounds one of which was that the decree for eviction
was a nullity, being in contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi
Statute. This contention was accepted by the execution court, as
well as by the High Court. This Court, after a reference to the
5
 (1970) 3 SCC 181
14
provisions of Section 13, held that a decree for recovery of
possession can be passed only if the court concerned is satisfied
that one or other of the grounds mentioned in the section is
established. This Court, further observed:
“From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no
stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to
the question whether the alleged subletting is true or
not. Order made by it does not show that it was
satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken
place, nor is there any other material on record to
show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the
record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis
of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That
being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court
was not competent to pass the impugned decree.
Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a
nullity.”
13. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and
Others6
it was stated:-
“17. It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act and the
Madras Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the
Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground
which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant
Sections of those statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory
mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not travel beyond the
statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13, and to the
parties that they shall not contract out of those statutory
grounds, is inherent in the public policy built into the statute
(Bombay Rent Act).
6
 (1974) 1 SCC 242
15
18. In Rasiklal Chunilal case, a Division Bench of the Gujarat
High Court has taken the view that in spite of the fact that there
is no express provision in the Bombay Rent Act prohibiting
contracting out, such a prohibition would have to be read by
implication consistently with the public policy underlying this
welfare measure. If we may say so with respect, this is a correct
approach to the problem.
19. Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of the
Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which
permeates the entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no
escape from the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is
not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum
or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors
the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the
statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua
non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under these
provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such
jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which,
according to the legislative mandate, it could not do.
….
22. The mere fact that Order 23 Rule 3, of the Code of Civil
Procedure is applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the
Bombay Rent Act, does not remove that fetter on the Rent
Court or empower it to make a decree for eviction de hors the
statute. Even under that provision of the Code, the Court, before
ordering that the compromise be recorded, is required to satisfy
itself about the lawfulness of the agreement. Such lawfulness or
otherwise of the agreement is to be judged, also on the ground
whether the terms of the compromise are consistent with the
provisions of the Rent Act.
….
27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle
that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree,
there was some material before the Court, on the basis of
which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the
16
existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed
that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction
though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would
be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence
recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be
in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the
compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are
by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in
pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58
of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or
before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than
evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are
fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a
waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the
foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand,
evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as
evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be
shown to be wrong.”
14. The common thread that runs through the aforesaid pronouncements
of this Court is – in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no
eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if
parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that
count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated
28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent
Act was made out.
15. In the circumstances, in our considered view, the order passed by the
appellate court was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference
17
on part of the High Court. We, therefore, allow the present appeals and
restore the order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the appellate court in IA
No.465 of 2015. The appeal shall now be heard on merits and disposed of in
accordance with law. Since there was delay of more than 600 days on part
of the appellants, we direct that the appellants shall pay costs of Rs.50,000/-
to the respondent which shall be over and above that already imposed by the
appellant court and shall be made over within six weeks from this Judgment.
The appeals stand allowed in the aforesaid terms.
..………………………J.
(Abhay Manohar Sapre)
 ..………………………
J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
August 14, 2018.

We, therefore, direct all Legal Services Authorities/Committees in every State to extend similar such facility in every criminal case wherever the accused is lodged in jail. They shall extend the facility of video conferencing between the counsel on one hand and the accused or anybody in the know of the matter on the other, so that the cause of justice is well served.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 6740 of 2018
(Diary No.20446 of 2018)
Imtiyaz Ramzan Khan ……Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra ..…. Respondent
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 6747 of 2018
(Diary No.21026 of 2018)
Ramhit Patel ….. Petitioner
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh …. Respondent
JUDGMENT
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Though these two special leave petitions are completely unconnected
but they present one common feature and as such we propose to deal with
these two special leave petitions by this common Judgment.
2. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.________ (D.No.20446 of 2018) of
2018 challenges the decision dated 30.08.2013 of the High Court of
2
Judicature at Bombay dismissing Criminal Appeal No.986 of 2005 preferred
by the petitioner and thereby affirming his conviction for the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life.
The prosecution principally relied on the testimony of two eye witnesses,
namely, PWs 3 and 5 whose evidence was found by the High Court to be
worthy of reliance and completely unblemished. The decision rendered by
the High Court, in our view, does not call for interference and as such we
dismiss this special leave petition.
3. In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No._______ (Diary No.21026 of
2018) of 2018 the decision dated 17.02.2014 passed by the High Court of
Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No.850 of 2009 is under
challenge. The High Court by its judgment and order affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner under Section 302 IPC and his sentence of
imprisonment for life. Though the defence of sudden fight was taken on
behalf of the petitioner, the High Court on detailed analysis rejected said
theory and found the petitioner guilty of the offence in question. Having
gone through the matter, we see no reason to take a different view and as
such we dismiss this special leave petition.
3
4. We now come to the common feature between these two matters. Mr.
Shikhil Suri, learned Advocate appeared for the accused in both the matters.
On pervious dates letters were circulated by the learned Advocate appearing
for the petitioners that the matters be adjourned so as to enable the counsel
to make arrangements for conducting video conferencing with the concerned
accused. The letter further stated that this exercise was made mandatory as
per the directions of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. This
Court readily agreed and adjourned the matters. On the adjourned date, we
enquired from Mr. Shikhil Suri, learned Advocate whether he could
successfully get in touch with the concerned accused. According to the
learned Advocate he could not get in touch with the accused in the first
matter but could speak with his sister whereas in the second matter he could
have video conference with the accused.
5. In our view such a direction on part of the Supreme Court Legal
Services Committee is quite commendable and praiseworthy. Very often we
see that the learned Advocates who appear in matters entrusted by the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, do not have the advantage of
having had a dialogue with either the accused or those who are in the know
of the details about the case. This at times seriously hampers the efforts on
part of the learned Advocates. All such attempts to facilitate dialogue
4
between the counsel and his client would further the cause of justice and
make legal aid meaningful. We, therefore, direct all Legal Services
Authorities/Committees in every State to extend similar such facility in
every criminal case wherever the accused is lodged in jail. They shall
extend the facility of video conferencing between the counsel on one hand
and the accused or anybody in the know of the matter on the other, so that
the cause of justice is well served.
…………………..……J.
(Abhay Manohar Sapre)
…………………..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
August 14, 2018

When the trial court which is in possession of the case records recorded a finding that there is no order of the Magistrate showing the production of the contraband before the 8 court and acquitted the accused on that basis, in our view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the said order of acquittal.= while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 9 (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” The same principles were reiterated in number of judgments viz. Jugendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 6 SCC 297, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sajivan and Others (2010) 1 SCC 529, Bhaskar Ramappa Madar and others v. State of Karnataka (2009) 11 SCC 690, Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 and other judgments.= Considering the case in hand, the findings of the trial court cannot be said to be ‘distorted conclusions’ warranting interference. Based on the oral evidence of Joginder Singh (PW-2) and Harbhajan Singh (PW-3), the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal and the conviction of the appellant under Section 18 of the NDPS Act cannot be sustained.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2182 OF 2010
MOHINDER SINGH ...Appellant
Versus
THE STATE OF PUNJAB ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 30.06.2010
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
Criminal Appeal No.199-DBA of 2002 in and by which the High
Court reversed the judgment of acquittal of the appellant/accused
and convicted him under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) and sentenced him
to undergo ten years imprisonment.
2. Briefly stated case of the prosecution is that on 30.04.1998,
Joginder Singh, SI, Police Station Sadar Ludhiana (PW-2) along
with other police officials was checking the vehicles on the bridge of
1
Gill Canal towards the side of village Gill. Meanwhile, at about
7.00-7.30 pm, appellant Mohinder Singh came on his
scooter No.PB-10B-2413. A signal was given to stop the scooter
and the appellant/accused stopped his scooter. It was suspected
that some contraband substance was being carried in the bag.
Appellant/accused was informed of his right of search before a
Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Joginder Singh (PW-2) called
Gurjit Singh, DSP (PW-4) and the bag carried by the
appellant/accused was searched in his presence and the substance
bag was found to be “opium”. On weighment, it was found to be 7
kilos and 40 gms. Two samples from the recovered “opium”, each
weighing 20 gms were taken and sealed separately having
monogram ‘JS’ and ‘GS’ and taken into possession vide recovery
memo Ext.-PE. Case property along with two samples was
deposited with Baldev Singh MHC (PW-5). Next day i.e. on
01.05.1998, the case property as well as the sample parcels were
produced before the Area Magistrate who is said to have initialled
the case property and the sample parcels. The sample parcels
were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and subjected to
chemical analysis and the contents were found to be “opium” in FSL
report vide Ext.-P1. After completion of the investigation, charge
sheet was filed against appellant under Section 18 of the NDPS Act.
2
3. To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has
examined Constable Hardev Singh (PW-1), SI Joginder Singh
(PW-2), ASI Harbhajan Singh (PW-3), DSP Gurjit Singh (PW-4) and
Baldev Singh, MHC (PW-5). The appellant was examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. to explain the incriminating evidence
circumstance appearing in the prosecution evidence and he denied
all of them.
4. The trial court acquitted the appellant inter alia on the ground
that there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The
trial court further held that no order of the Magistrate was proved to
show that the case property was produced before the court, was
brought in evidence to show that the seal of the sample sent to FSL
tallied with the seal of the contraband, and it cannot thus be said
that the evidence regarding such production of case property before
the Magistrate was trustworthy. Being aggrieved by the acquittal,
the State has preferred appeal before the High Court.
5. Placing reliance upon State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh
(1998) 2 SCC 724, the High Court held that recovery of contraband
from a bag/attache which the accused was carrying in his hands,
would not amount to search of person and as such Section 50 of
the NDPS Act will not apply. Based on the evidence of SI Joginder
3
Singh (PW-2) and Harbhajan Singh (PW-3), the High Court held
that the case property parcels of the samples and the samples
having the seals of ‘JS’ and ‘GS’ were duly produced before the
Magistrate and on those findings, the High Court reversed the order
of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 18 of the
NDPS Act and sentenced him to undergo ten years imprisonment.
Being aggrieved, the appellant/accused has preferred this appeal.
6. Mr. Harkesh Singh, learned counsel for the appellant inter-alia
submitted that since the contraband alleged to have been seized
from the accused was not produced before the trial court, conviction
of the appellant cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for the
appellant placed reliance upon Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 5 SCC 123 to contend that where
the narcotic drug or the psychotropic substance seized from the
possession of the accused is not produced before the Magistrate
and when there is no evidence to connect the forensic science
report with the drug or the substance that was seized from the
possession of the accused in such a case the conviction of the
appellant/accused is not sustainable.
4
7. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that from the oral
evidence of SI Joginder Singh (PW-2) and ASI Harbhajan Singh
(PW-3), the production of the contraband seized from the accused
before the court has been proved by the prosecution. It was
submitted that the evidence and materials on record amply proves
the production of the contraband along with the sample packets
before the Magistrate. It was submitted that the trial court was not
right in acquitting the accused and the High court rightly set aside
the acquittal and the impugned judgment does not warrant any
interference.
8. We have considered the submissions and perused the
impugned judgment, evidence and other materials on record. We
have also taken pains to look into the original records that were
called for from the trial court.
9. On behalf of the appellant, contention was raised as to the
non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act to submit that the
safeguards stipulated under Section 50 were not complied with. In
the present case, the appellant was carrying the contraband-about
seven Kilos of “opium” in the bag which he was carrying in the
scooter. Carrying the contraband in the scooter/bag cannot be said
5
to be ‘by the person’ necessitating compliance of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act for personal search. Reference in this regard can be
made to the decision in State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4
SCC 350.
10. So far as the contention regarding production of the
contraband seized from the accused, in his evidence, Harbhajan
Singh (PW-3) stated that on 01.05.1998, he produced the sample
parcels and the case property parcels with the seal and the sample
seals before the Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana and the Magistrate
has recorded the seals tallied with the specimen impression.
Harbhajan Singh (PW-3) further stated that after return of the
samples and the parcels from the court, the same were lodged by
him to the Malkhana on 01.05.1998 itself. Baldev Singh (PW-5) the
then Malkhana in charge though orally stated about the deposit of
the contraband in the Malkhana, but Baldev Singh (PW-5) has not
produced Register No.19 maintained in the Malkhana to show the
relevant entry in Register No.19 as to deposit of the case property in
the Malkhana. Oral evidence of Harbhajan Singh (PW-3) and
Baldev Singh (PW-5) as to the deposit of the contraband seized
from the accused with Malkhana is not corroborated by the
documentary evidence namely the entry in Register No.19.
6
11. After referring to the oral evidence of Joginder Singh (PW-2)
and Harbhajan Singh (PW-3), the trial court in para (14) of its
judgment has recorded the finding that no order of the Magistrate to
prove the production of the contraband before the Magistrate was
available on the file. After recording such observation, the trial court
held that the oral evidence regarding production of the case
property before the Magistrate was not trustworthy and not
acceptable. In the absence of the order of the Magistrate showing
that the contraband seized from the accused was produced before
the Magistrate, the oral evidence adduced that the contraband was
produced before the Magistrate cannot form the basis to record the
conviction.
12. For proving the offence under the NDPS Act, it is necessary
for the prosecution to establish that the quantity of the contraband
goods allegedly seized from the possession of the accused and the
best evidence would be the court records as to the production of the
contraband before the Magistrate and deposit of the same before
the Malkhana or the document showing destruction of the
contraband.
13. In Vijay Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 14 SCC
527, this Court reiterated the necessity of production of contraband
7
substances seized from the accused before the trial court to
establish that the contraband substances seized from the accused
tallied with the samples sent to the FSL. It was held that mere oral
evidence to establish seizure of contraband substances from the
accused is not sufficient. It was held as under:-
“10. On the other hand, on a reading of this Court’s judgment in
Jitendra v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 562, we find that this Court
has taken a view that in the trial for an offence under the NDPS Act,
it was necessary for the prosecution to establish by cogent
evidence that the alleged quantities of the contraband goods were
seized from the possession of the accused and the best evidence
to prove this fact is to produce during the trial, the seized materials
as material objects and where the contraband materials alleged to
have been seized are not produced and there is no explanation for
the failure to produce the contraband materials by the prosecution,
mere oral evidence that the materials were seized from the
accused would not be sufficient to make out an offence under the
NDPS Act particularly when the panch witnesses have turned
hostile. Again, in Ashok v. State of M.P. (2011) 5 SCC 123, this
Court found that the alleged narcotic powder seized from the
possession of the accused was not produced before the trial court
as material exhibit and there was no explanation for its nonproduction
and this Court held that there was therefore no evidence
to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized
from the possession of the appellant.”
14. The High Court appears to have gone by the oral evidence of
Joginder Singh (PW-2) and Harbhajan Singh (PW-3) that the
contraband allegedly seized from the accused was produced before
the Magistrate. When the trial court which is in possession of the
case records recorded a finding that there is no order of the
Magistrate showing the production of the contraband before the
8
court and acquitted the accused on that basis, in our view, the High
Court ought not to have interfered with the said order of acquittal.
15. In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court will not interfere
unless there are substantial and compelling reasons to reverse the
order of acquittal. The mere fact that on reappreciation of evidence
the appellate court is inclined to arrive at a conclusion which is at
variance with the trial court, the same cannot be the reason for
interference with the order of acquittal. After referring to various
judgments in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka
(2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court summarised the general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an
appeal against the order of acquittal and held as under:-
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court
while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach
its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very
strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring
mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court
to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
9
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed
and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should
not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
The same principles were reiterated in number of judgments viz.
Jugendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 6 SCC 297,
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sajivan and Others (2010) 1 SCC
529, Bhaskar Ramappa Madar and others v. State of Karnataka
(2009) 11 SCC 690, Chandrappa and others v. State of
Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 and other judgments.
16. Considering the case in hand, the findings of the trial court
cannot be said to be ‘distorted conclusions’ warranting interference.
Based on the oral evidence of Joginder Singh (PW-2) and
Harbhajan Singh (PW-3), the High Court ought not to have
interfered with the order of acquittal and the conviction of the
appellant under Section 18 of the NDPS Act cannot be sustained.
17. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 18
of the NDPS Act and the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him
10
is set aside and this appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted
of the charge.
.…….…………...………J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
…………….……………J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
…………….……………J.
 [NAVIN SINHA]
New Delhi;
August 14, 2018
11

When the doctor has given opinion that the suicide cannot be ruled out and the death of the deceased could have been due to suicide which was accepted by the High Court; when the High Court has a view which is a plausible view, we find no good ground to take a different view. After appreciating the oral evidence and medical evidence, the High Court acquitted the accused.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1496 of 2013
STATE OF KARNATAKA ...APPELLANT(S)
 VERSUS
SRINIVASA ...RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI,J.
1. The appeal by the State of Karnataka is against
the acquittal of respondent-accused under section 302
IPC
2. Case of the prosecution is that A-1 was
allegedly having illicit relationship with second
accused (since dead). On account of which there was
alteration between A-1 (respondent) and the deceased
Rajashree (wife) and the accused no. 1 is alleged to
have strangulated the deceased to death. Relying upon
the medical evidence (PW-7) and the evidence of PW-8
(father of the deceased), the trial Court convicted
respondent no.1 under section 302 IPC and also
sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
3. Insofar as the second accused, the trial court
convicted her under Section 201 IPC and sentenced her
to undergo three years imprisonment. (Since accused
2
no. 2 – Padmavathi is dead, Criminal Appeal No. 1497
of 2013 of accused no. 2 – Padmavathi has already
been abated vide Court’s order dated 03.05.2016).
4. A-1 was running a power loom on the ground
floor of his house and the first floor was used for
his residence. The second accused was employed in the
power loom and was residing in the second floor. PW-8
and PW-9 (father and mother of the deceased) have
spoken about illicit relationship of A-1 and A-2 and
that illicit relationship led to frequent quarrel
between A-1 and the deceased- Rajashree. PW-5 opened
the door and found that the deceased hanging with the
telephone cable wire. On the date of occurrence –
05.01.2001 at about 4.30 p.m. the informant- P.W-8
(father of the deceased) got the information that the
deceased committed suicide. On the date of occurrence
05.01.2001 the deceased was found dead by hanging.
Based on the medical evidence and the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, the trial court convicted the
accused.
5. The High Court acquitted the accused mainly on
the basis of evidence of PW-7 (Doctor) who conducted
the post-mortem. In the cross examination, PW-7
(Doctor) has stated that it could be a case of suicide
as the ligature mark was not found on the neck. The
High Court in extenso referred to the evidence of PW-7
who stated that the ligature mark is anti-mortem in
3
nature and that if the death is caused by
strangulation and the body if put in hanging posture
there is every possibility of another ligature mark
around the neck. The P.M. report does not disclose the
presence of ligature mark around the neck. Based on
the evidence of PW-7 (Doctor), the High Court arrived
at conclusion that the “medical evidence does not
conclusively establish that it is a case of homicidal
death” and that the accused is entitled to benefit of
doubt.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the State of
Karnataka though made elaborate submissions on the
evidence of PW-8 and PW-9 -parents of the deceased and
also the medical evidence, we are unable to
countenance the submissions. When the doctor has given
opinion that the suicide cannot be ruled out and the
death of the deceased could have been due to suicide
which was accepted by the High Court; when the High
Court has a view which is a plausible view, we find
no good ground to take a different view. After
appreciating the oral evidence and medical evidence,
the High Court acquitted the accused. In view of
above, we do not find any compelling reason or
substantial ground to interfere with the order of
acquittal.
4
7. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
….......................J.
[ R. BANUMATHI]
…......................J.
[VINEET SARAN]
NEW DELHI
14TH AUGUST, 2018 

PW-25, Bishamber @ Bishamber Dayal, was kept in illegal detention by the appellants at Police Station, Dharuhera, from 07.10.1992 to 10.10.1992. It is alleged that the said Bishamber was subjected to custodial torture by the appellants.

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No(s). 283/2014
BHAGWAN DASS & ANR. Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA Respondent(s)
WITH
Criminal Appeal No(s). 284-285/2014
BISHAMBER DAYAL Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
BHAGWAN DASS AND ANR. ETC. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Criminal Appeal No.283 of 2014:
(1) Being aggrieved by the conviction under Sections 326, 331,
343 and 346 I.P.C. and the sentence of imprisonment of two
years imposed upon them, the appellants - Bhagwan Dass and
Magan Singh have preferred this appeal.
(2) The appellants, Bhagwan Dass and Magan Singh, were working
as Sub-Inspector/SHO and Assistant Sub-Inspector respectively
at the relevant point of time. The allegations against the
appellants is that PW-25, Bishamber @ Bishamber Dayal, was kept
in illegal detention by the appellants at Police Station,
Dharuhera, from 07.10.1992 to 10.10.1992. It is alleged that
the said Bishamber was subjected to custodial torture by the
appellants. After considering the evidence adduced by the
2
prosecution, including evidence of PW-24, Ram Pal, brother of
Bishamber Dayal and PW-26, Mahavir, the trial court acquitted
the appellants of all the charges framed against the
appellants. On appeal, the High Court has reversed the order
of acquittal and convicted the appellants as aforesaid.
(3) We have heard Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellants, and Mr. Deepak Thukral,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State. In spite
of notice, there was no representation for the victim-Bishamber
who has filed a separate appeal, Criminal Appeal NO(s).284-285
of 2014.
(4) Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain submitted that the occurrence was of
the year 1992 and the appellants, after acquittal recorded by
the trial court, also attained the age of superannuation.
Learned senior counsel further submitted that it was not
controverted by learned counsel appearing for the State that
the Victim, Bishamber, has been given government job and
presently working in the office of the District Commissioner at
Rewari. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the
appellant, Bhagwan Dass, as of now is 80 year old and the
second appellant, Magan Singh, is more than 70 years. He
further submitted that the appellants have already undergone
imprisonment of about fifteen months and prayed for leniency.
(5) Considering the facts and circumstance of the case and
having regard to the fact that the occurrence was of the year
1992, interest of justice would be met by reducing the
imprisonment of two years to the period already undergone by
3
the appellants. Ordered accordingly.
(6) The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
(7) We make it clear that the reduction of sentence is in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and the
same may not be treated as precedent.
Criminal Appeal NO(s).284-285 of 2014 :
In view of order passed in Criminal Appeal NO.283 of 2014,
these appeals shall also stand disposed of.
..........................J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
..........................J.
 (VINEET SARAN)
NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 14, 2018.