BDA - The scheme which was framed was so much benevolent scheme that 40% of the 55% of the land reserved for the residential purpose was to be given to the landowners at their choice and they were also given the choice to obtain the compensation, if they so desire, under the provisions of the LA Act. Thus, it was such a scheme that there was no scope for any exclusion of the land in the ultimate final notification.= the matter cannot be left at the mercy of unscrupulous authority of the 24 BDA, the State Government or in the political hands. Considering the proper development and planned development of Bangalore city, let the Government issue a final notification with respect to the land which has been notified in the initial notification and there is no question of leaving out of the land in the instant case as option has been given to land owners to claim the land or to claim the compensation under the relevant LA Act which may be applicable in the case.

 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7661­63 OF 2018
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.10216­10218/2018]
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
& ANR.  … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.  … RESPONDENTS
WITH
C.A. No.7664/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10219/2018, C.A. Nos…
7750­58/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10186­10194/2018,   C.A.
Nos.7759­61/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10182­10184/2018, C.A.
NO.7762/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10168/2018, C.A. Nos.7668­
69/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10198­10199/2018, C.A. Nos.7791­
92/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10339­10340/2018,   C.A.
NO.7801/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10329/2018,   C.A.
NO.7743/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10097/2018, C.A. Nos.7666­
67/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10196­10197/2018,   C.A.
NO.7742/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10098/2018,   C.A.
NO.7803/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10327/2018,   C.A.
NO.7763/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10181/2018, C.A. Nos.7795­
98/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10332­10335/2018,   C.A.
1
NO.7665/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10195/2018, C.A. Nos.7799­
7800/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10330­10331/2018,   C.A.
NO.7749/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10169/2018, C.A. Nos.7670­
7736/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10100­10166/2018,   C.A.
Nos.7744­45/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10173­10174/2018, C.A.
NO.7764/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10179/2018,C.A.
NO.7802/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10328/2018,   C.A.
NO.7794/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10338/2018,   C.A.
NO.7765/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10178/2018,   C.A.
NO.7813/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10316/2018, C.A. Nos.7810­
12/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10318­10320/2018, C.A. Nos.7805­
06/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10324­10325/2018,   C.A.
NO.7804/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10326/2018,   C.A.
NO.7814/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10317/2018, C.A. Nos.7807­
09/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10321­10323/2018,   C.A.
NO.7790/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10275/2018,   C.A.
NO.7767/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10283/2018, C.A. Nos.7787­
89/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10313­10315/2018, C.A. Nos.7784­
86/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10288­10290/2018,   C.A.
NO.7768/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10311/2018, C.A. Nos.7815­
17/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10280­10282/2018,   C.A.
NO.7741/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10202/2018,   C.A.
NO.7771/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10287/2018,   C.A.
NO.7793/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10310/2018,   C.A.
NO.7738/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10204/2018,   C.A.
NO.7773/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10274/2018,   C.A.
NO.7770/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10309/2018,   C.A.
NO.7737/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10208/2018,   C.A.
2
NO.7769/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10312/2018,   C.A.
NO.7740/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10206/2018,   C.A.
NO.7739/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   10205/2018,   C.A.
NO.7772/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10262/2018, C.A. Nos.7746­
48/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10209­10211/2018, C.A. Nos.7774­
83/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.   10263­10272/2018,   C.A.
NO.7766/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 10273/2018, C.A. NO.7976­
89/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.21100­13/2018   @   Diary
No.15906/2018, C.A. NO.7968­75/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No.21092­
99/2018   @   DiaryNo.15877/2018,   C.A.   NO.7954­67/2018   @
S.L.P.   (C)   No.21078­99/2018   @   Diary   No.15938/2018,   C.A.
NO.7934­53/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.21058­77/2018   @   Diary
No.15857/2018,   C.A.   NO..7929­33/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)
No.21053­57/2018   @Diary   No.15872/2018,   C.A.   NO.7918­
28/2018@   S.L.P.(C)   Nos.   21042­52/2018@Diary
No.15866/2018, C.A. NO.7908­17/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No.21032­
41/2018 @Diary No.15900/2018, C.A. NO.7889­7907/2018 @
S.L.P.   (C)   No.21012­30/2018   @   Diary   No.15952/2018,   C.A.
NO.7818­88/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No.20940­21010/2018 @Diary
No.15928/2018,   C.A.   NO.7993/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.
16905/2018, C.A. Nos.8015­16/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 16930­
31/2018, C.A. NO.8004/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 16914/2018,
C.A.   NO.7994­8000/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   Nos.16906­12/2018,
C.A.   NO.8005/2018   @   S.L.P.   (C)   No.   16915/2018,   C.A.
NO.8003/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 16913/2018, C.A. Nos.8001­
02/2018 @ S.L.P. (C) Nos.16917­18/2018, C.A. NO.8006/2018
@ S.L.P. (C) Nos.16916/2018 and C.A. Nos.8007­14/2018 @
S.L.P. (C) Nos.16919­26/2018.
3
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. The   Bangalore   Development   Authority   (for   short,   “the
BDA”) has questioned the orders passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court dismissing writ appeals vide judgment and
order dated 28.04.2017, confirming the order passed by the
Single Bench.   The appeals have also been filed against the
orders of the Single Bench directly before this Court as Division
Bench has already dismissed the writ appeals arising out of the
same scheme/orders. 
4. The   BDA   is   Town   Planning   Authority   for   the   city   of
Bangalore, State of Karnataka and a notified developer.   It is
entrusted   with   the   task   of   preparation   of   city   development
schemes   and   its   execution.     Section   15   of   the   Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 (for short referred to as “the
BDA Act”) confers power to draw up the development schemes.
Section 16 of the BDA Act provides for the particulars to be
4
included in the development scheme. The same is required to
be published in terms of provisions contained in Section 17 of
the   BDA   Act   in   the   official   gazette   and   in   the   manner
prescribed   therein.     On   30.12.2008   the   BDA   published   a
scheme and notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act for
the formation of the layout at as "Dr. K. Shivaram Karanth
Layout” including link roads.
5. The scheme was approved by Government of Karnataka
vide its orders dated 3.12.2008.  45% of the land covered under
the scheme was to be used for the civic amenities, playgrounds,
roads   etc.,   and   the   residential   sites   would   be   formed   by
utilizing  the  remaining  55%  of  the   land.    Out  of  this  55%
developed residential area  i.e.  40% of 55% will be offered as
compensation to the farmers as specified in the scheme and the
remaining 60% of 55% will be the share of BDA. The farmers
were also given the option to accept either the developed eligible
residential   land   or   opt   for   compensation   as   per   the   Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the LA Act”).   Notice to that
effect was thereby given to all concerned in accordance with the
provisions of sub­Sections 1 and 3 of Section 17 of the BDA Act
and in accordance with Section 36 of the BDA Act. The Special
5
Land   Acquisition   Officer,   Bangalore   Development   Authority,
Bangalore, his staff, and workmen were authorized to exercise
the powers conferred under Section 4(2) of the LA Act and
section 52 of the BDA Act.  Objections were also invited from
the   interested   persons   to   be   filed   within   30   days   of   the
publication of the notification. It was also mentioned that any
sale,   mortgage,   assignment,   exchange   or   otherwise   of   any
layout or improvements  made therein without sanction of the
Deputy   Commissioner   (Land   Acquisition),   Bangalore
Development Authority, Bangalore after the date of publication
of the notification shall under Section 24 of the LA Act be
disregarded by the Officer assessing compensation  for such
parts of the said lands as will be finally acquired. 
6. The BDA has to consider the objections to the preliminary
notification and submit them to the Government as required
under the BDA Act. Under section 18(3) of the BDA Act it is for
the Government to sanction the scheme and under Section 19
of   the   said   Act,   it   is   for   the   Government   to   make   a   final
declaration and publication.
7. The   BDA   received   a   large   number   of   objections.   State
Government also issued a direction to withdraw the acquisition
6
of the land to the extent of 257 acres and 20 guntas from
various   villages.     Representations   for   deletion   were   also
favourably considered for 446 acres and 7 guntas of the land.
In the year 2012, with regard to the withdrawal of acquisition of
446   acres   and   7   guntas,   and   action   of   State   Government
questions   were   raised   in   the   Assembly   and   the   State
Government ultimately ordered an inquiry to be held in the
year 14.11.2012 and yet another inquiry was ordered by the
State   Government   into   the   matter   pertaining   to   the   same
acquisition on 19.01.2013. 
8. The   writ   petitions   were   then   filed   on   the   ground   that
Government and the BDA had not taken any steps to issue a
final notification or to develop the land for the last 5 years.  The
BDA refused to give permission to develop the land on the
ground of preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA
Act.   Thus, right to enjoy the property has been taken away
without finalizing the acquisition.   It was submitted that the
preliminary notification shall be deemed to have lapsed.  Now,
Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land
Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013   has
come into force.   Therefore, it was urged that the impugned
7
notification issued under Section 17(1) and 17(3) of the BDA
Act was liable to be quashed, and a prayer was made to direct
the respondents to give permission to develop the land.
9. It was contended on behalf of the BDA that while the Land
Acquisition Officer was considering the representations under
Sections   18(3)   of   the   BDA   Act,   the   State   Government   has
directed the BDA to withdraw to the extent of 270 guntas of
land from various villages.   In view of the large number of
representations filed under Section 18(1) of the BDA Act, time
has been consumed.  Ultimately deletion of 446 acres 7 guntas
of land was favourably considered. In the meanwhile, the Board
of BDA ordered an in­house inquiry to consider the findings of
the   Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer   regarding   exclusion   of
land.   The State Government also initiated  suo moto  inquiry
vide Government Order dated 24.11.2012 and 19.1.2013 and
constituted   a   Committee   consisting   of   Additional   Chief
Secretary   and   Development   Commissioner,   based   on   the
newspaper   reports   and   questions   raised   at   the   Assembly
pertaining   to   illegal   and   discriminatory   proposals   for
withdrawal/deletion of the land from the acquisition.   It was
learnt that the Committee has completed the inquiry and issue
8
was before the State Government.  In view of the pendency of
the inquiry report before the State Government and in view of
the practical difficulty, final notification under Section 19 of the
BDA Act could not be issued on time. 
10. It   was   also   contended   by   the   BDA   that   notice   dated
3.5.2014 was issued to the landowners as there was the need
for fresh inquiry.  Therefore, the further process would be taken
pursuant to the notification.   Thus, it was contended by the
BDA that no interference was called for in the writ petitions.
11. The   Single   Bench   allowed   the   writ   application   and
quashed   the   notification   with   respect   to   the   lands   of   the
appellants. The Single Judge in Writ Petition No.9640 of 2014
decided   on   26th  November   2014   along   with   other   writ
applications has observed that the Division Bench of the High
Court in the case of  H.N. Shivanna and Ors. vs the State of
Karnataka, Department of Industries and Commerce, Bangalore,
and Anr. (2013) 4 KCCR 2793 (DB) considering similar aspect
held   that,   even   though   under   Karnataka   Industrial   Area
Development Act, no time limit has been prescribed, the period
9
of two years would be appropriate for the purpose of completing
acquisition. The Single Judge observed that:
“8. On the legal position as to whether the
provisions as contained in the Land Acquisition
Act insofar as the time period as fixed therein for
passing   the   final   notification   and   the   award
thereof   could   be   imported   into   the   BDA   Act
which   has   been   raised   by  the   respondents,   a
detailed consideration would not be necessary.
This is due to the fact that the Hon'ble Division
Bench of this Court while considering the matter
in the case of Sri H.N. Shivanna and Others vs.
State of Karnataka, Department of Industries and
Commerce,   Bangalore   and   Another  reported   in
2013   (4)   KCCR   2793   (DB)   has   elaborately
considered this aspect of the matter while taking
note of the acquisition process which was being
done under the KIAD Act wherein also no time
limit has been prescribed.  The Hon'ble Division
Bench having accepted the position that there is
no time limit fixed under the special enactment
has   also   taken   into   consideration   the
observations   made   by   the   Hon'ble   Supreme
Court   in   the   earlier   cases   under   different
circumstances   and   has   declared   the   position
that even though a time frame is not fixed in the
special enactment under which the acquisition is
being   made,   the   reasonableness   of   the   delay
should be considered in the facts of a case and
in that circumstance, a decision is to be taken,
but unreasonable delay would not be permitted.
While stating so, the Hon'ble Division bench has
also   kept   in   view   the   fact   that   the   Land
Acquisition Act prescribes a specific time frame
even for the enactments, roughly the period of
two years would be appropriate.  Hence, on the
legal aspect, the said decision would settle the
issue.  In the light of the judgment as rendered
by the Hon'ble Division Bench, the explanation
10
as put forth in the instant case needs to be taken
into consideration.”
12. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the writ appeal
was filed before the Division Bench, which has been dismissed.
The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   writ   appeal,
observed thus:
“3. Being   aggrieved   by   the   order
Dt.26.11.2014   passed   by   the   Hon’ble   Learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition No.9640/ 2014 the
appellants beg to prefer this appeal.
4. It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   the
respondent no.2 who was the appellant, filed the
writ   petition   challenging   the   Preliminary
notification issued by the Bangalore Development
Authority   for   the   formation   of   the   “Dr.   K.
Shiarama Karanth Layout”.
5. The Petitioner was amongst the notified
Khatedars   of   Sy.   No.15   of   and   Sy.No.31   of
Veerasagara Village, Yelahanka Hobli,  Bangalore
North Taluk, Bangalore.   It was contended that
after issuance of the Preliminary notification by
the   Bangalore   Development   Authority   for   the
formation of the layout no steps have been taken
by the Bangalore Development Authority for the
completion of the acquisition proceedings.  It was
contended that their right to enjoy the property
has   been   curtailed   by   the   issuance   of   the
Notification   by   the   Bangalore   Development
Authority.   It was contended that the action of
Bangalore   Development   Authority   in   not
proceeding further amounts to an abandonment
of   the   acquisition   proceedings   and   hence   the
preliminary Notification was sought to be quashed
11
in so far as the property of the petitioner was
concerned."
13. Aggrieved by the  aforesaid decisions, the  appeals  have
been preferred by the BDA in this Court.  The decisions of the
Division Bench in H.N. Shivanna (supra) has been followed by
the Single Judge.
14. The BDA in the appeals has urged that decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court interpreting the provisions of
Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 has been totally
ignored and overlooked.  This Court has decided the same issue
in Offshore Holdings Private Limited v. Bangalore Development
Authority and Others (2011) 3 SCC 139, after consideration of
the previous judgments of this Court in Munithimmaiah v. State
of Karnataka  (2002) 4 SCC 326 and  Bondu Ramaswamy v.
Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2010) 7 SCC 129.  It
was held that the BDA Act is a self­contained code and the time
frame of two years provided under Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act is not applicable to the BDA Act.   The High
Court has failed to consider the judgment. This Court has held
that the period of five years as prescribed under Section 27 of
12
the   BDA   Act   start   from   the   date   of   publication   of   the
declaration under sub­Section (1) of Section 19 of the BDA Act
in the Official Gazette.  The High Court has grossly erred in law
in holding otherwise.  The learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the BDA has relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of
this Court in the case of Offshore Holdings (supra).  The High
Court has totally ignored the said decision and had flouted the
same.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no
delay as a large number of objections were filed.   The Land
Acquisition Officer considered deletion of certain land in an
illegal manner.  The Government had also issued a direction in
regard to approx. 257 acres of the land.  Ultimately, there was
a question raised about the proposed exclusion of the land in
an illegal manner, in the Assembly and the State Government
has ordered an inquiry in the year 2012.  Yet another inquiry
was ordered in January, 2013.  The in­house inquiry was also
conducted by the BDA and ultimately notice was issued in May
2014   that   the   entire   matter   has   to   be   considered   afresh.
Thereafter, the writ petitions were filed to quash the initial
notification and the notification was illegally quashed by the
High Court.  Writ appeals were also dismissed.  They have also
13
been illegally dismissed by a laconic order without considering
the decision of this Court and also the facts and circumstances.
The   land   was   required   for   the   planned   development   of
Bangalore city.   Thus, the impugned orders are liable to be
quashed.
15. It was contended on behalf of the landowners that there
was   undue   delay   in   completion   of   the   land   acquisition
procedure, as for more than five years the final notification was
not issued.  The writ petitions were filed.  There was an undue
delay, even if the period of two years of time frame provided
under   the   LA   Act,   does   not   apply   for   issuance   of   final
notification under Section 19, there cannot be undue delay in
taking the steps. The acquisition could not have been kept in
lurch for such an unreasonable period as done in the instant
case.  Thus, the High Court was fully justified in quashing the
final notification. When no time has been fixed under the BDA
Act to complete the issuance of final notification under Section
19, it would not mean that with an unreasonable delay such
steps can be taken, as there was restraint put upon the owners
by issuance of initial notification under Section 17.   Right to
enjoyment of the property could not have been denied for an
14
unreasonable period.  As there was a proposal to exclude the
land,   and   after   High   Court   has   quashed   the   preliminary
notification,   certain   developments   have   been   made   and   the
property   has   exchanged   hands.     Thus,   it   would   not   be
appropriate to interfere in the matter owing to the delay on the
part of the BDA in approaching before the High Court as well as
this Court.
16. First, we take up the question as to whether the High
Court   was   legally   justified   on   merits   in   quashing   the
preliminary   notification   issued   under   Section   17.     The
Constitution Bench of this Court in  Offshore Holdings (supra)
has decided the question affirmatively. The BDA has issued
preliminary   notification   for   acquisition   of   the   lands.   Nonfinalization
of the acquisition proceedings resulted in the filing
of the writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka by the
owners in the year 1987. Certain lands were de­notified and the
permission which was granted earlier was withdrawn.  The denotification
of the land was also withdrawn.  It was urged that
the timeframe which was prescribed under section 6 and 11A of
the LA Act would form an integral part of the BDA Act.  This
15
Court   considered   the   scheme   under   the  BDA   Act  and   has
observed thus:
“33. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
which provide for timeframe for compliance and
the   consequences   of   default   thereof,   are   not
applicable to acquisition under the BDA Act. They
are Sections 6 and 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act. As per Section 11A, if the award is not made
within   a   period   of   two   years   from   the   date   of
declaration   under   Section   6,   the   acquisition
proceedings   will   lapse.   Similarly,   where
declaration   under   Section   6   of   this   Act   is   not
issued   within   three   years   from   the   date   of
publication of notification under Section 4 of the
Land   Acquisition   Act   [such   notification   being
issued   after   the   commencement   of   the   Land
Acquisition   (Amendment   and   Validation)
Ordinance, 1967 but before the commencement of
Central Act 68 of 1984] or within one year where
Section 4 notification was published subsequent
to the passing of Central Act 68 of 1984, no such
declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Land
Acquisition   Act   can   be   issued   in   any   of   these
cases.
xxx xxx xxx
35. Be that as it may, it is clear that the BDA
Act is a self­contained code which provides for all
the   situations   that   may   arise   in   planned
development of an area including acquisition of
land for that purpose. The scheme of the Act does
not admit any necessity for reading the provisions
of Sections 6 and 11A of the Land Acquisition Act,
as part and parcel of the BDA Act for attainment
of its object. The primary object of the State Act is
to carry out planned development and acquisition
is a mere incident of such planned development.
The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, where
the land is to be acquired for a specific public
16
purpose   and   acquisition   is   the   sum   and
substance of that Act, all matters in relation to
the acquisition of land will be regulated by the
provisions of that Act. The State Act has provided
its own scheme and provisions for acquisition of
land.
xxx xxx xxx
50. Applying the above principle to the facts of the
case in hand, it will be clear that the provisions
relating to acquisition like passing of an award,
payment of compensation and the legal remedies
available under the Central Act would have to be
applied to the acquisitions under the State Act
but the bar contained in Sections 6 and 11A of
the Central Act cannot be made an integral part of
the State Act as the State Act itself has provided
specific time­frames under its various provisions
as well as consequences of default thereto. The
scheme, thus, does not admit such incorporation.
xxx xxx xxx
55. The principle stated in Munithimmaiah's case
(supra) that the BDA Act is a self­contained code,
was   referred   with   approval   by   a   three   Judge
Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Bondu
Ramaswamy   (supra).   The   Court,   inter   alia,
specifically discussed and answered the questions
whether the provisions of Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act will apply to the acquisition under
the BDA Act and if the final declaration under
Section 19(1) is not issued within one year of the
publication of the notification under Section 17(1)
of the BDA Act, whether such final declaration
will be invalid and held as under:
“79.   This   question   arises   from   the
contention raised by one of the appellants
that the provisions of Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the LA Act", for short)
will apply to the acquisitions under the BDA
Act and consequently if the final declaration
17
under Section 19(1) is not issued within one
year   from   the   date   of   publication   of   the
notification under Sections 17(1) and (3) of
the BDA Act, such final declaration will be
invalid. The appellants' submissions are as
under: the notification under Sections 17(1)
and (3) of the Act was issued and gazetted
on   3­2­2003   and   the   declaration   under
Section 19(1) was issued and published on
23­2­2004. Section 36 of the Act provides
that the acquisition of land under the BDA
Act   within   or   outside   the   Bangalore
Metropolitan Area, shall be regulated by the
provisions of the LA Act, so far as they are
applicable. Section 6 of the LA Act requires
that no declaration shall be made, in respect
of any land covered by a notification under
Section 4 of the LA Act, after the expiry of
one year from the date of the publication of
such notification under Section 4 of the LA
Act. As the provisions of the LA Act have
been made applicable to acquisitions under
the   BDA   Act,   it   is   necessary   that   the
declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA
Act   (which   is   equivalent   to   the   final
declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act)
should also be made before the expiry of one
year   from   the   date   of   publication   of
notification under Sections 17(1) and (3) of
the BDA Act [which is equivalent to Section
4(1) of the LA Act].
80. The BDA Act contains provisions
relating to acquisition of properties, up to
the stage of publication of final declaration.
The   BDA   Act   does   not   contain   the
subsequent provisions relating to completion
of the acquisition, that is, issue of notices,
enquiry and award, vesting of land, payment
of   compensation,   principles   relating   to
determination of compensation, etc. Section
36 of the BDA Act does not make the LA Act
18
applicable in its entirety, but states that the
acquisition   under   the   BDA   Act,   shall   be
regulated by the provisions, so far as they
are   applicable,   of   the   LA   Act.   therefore   it
follows   that   where   there   are   already
provisions in the BDA Act regulating certain
aspects   or   stages   of   acquisition   or   the
proceedings   relating   thereto,   the
corresponding provisions of the LA Act will
not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA
Act.   Only   those   provisions   of   the   LA   Act,
relating   to   the   stages   of   acquisition,   for
which there is no provision in the BDA Act,
are   applied   to   the   acquisitions   under   the
BDA Act.
81.   The   BDA   Act   contains   specific
provisions   relating   to   preliminary
notification and final declaration. In fact the
procedure up to final declaration under the
BDA   Act   is   different   from   the   procedure
under   the   LA   Act   relating   to   acquisition
proceedings   up   to   the   stage   of   final
notification. therefore, having regard to the
scheme for acquisition under Sections 15 to
19   of   the   BDA   Act   and   the   limited
application of the LA Act in terms of Section
36 of the BDA Act, the provisions of Sections
4 to 6 of the LA Act will not apply to the
acquisitions under the BDA Act. If Section 6
of the LA Act is not made applicable, the
question of amendment to Section 6 of the
LA   Act   providing   a   time­limit   for   issue   of
final declaration, will also not apply.”
We may notice that, in the above case, the
Court declined to examine whether the provisions
of Section 11A of the Central Act would apply to
the   acquisition   under   the   BDA   Act   but
categorically stated that Sections 4 and 6 of the
Central Act were inapplicable to the acquisition
under the BDA Act.
19
xxx xxx xxx
123. Accepting   the   argument   of   the   appellant
would certainly frustrate the very object of the
State law, particularly when both the enactments
can   peacefully   operate   together.   To   us,   there
appears   to   be   no   direct   conflict   between   the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the
BDA Act. The BDA Act does not admit reading of
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act into its scheme as it is bound to debilitate the
very object of the State law.  The Parliament has
not enacted any law with regard to development
the competence of which, in fact, exclusively falls
in   the   domain   of   the   State   Legislature   with
reference to Entries 5 and 18 of List II of Schedule
VII.
124. Both   these   laws   cover   different   fields   of
legislation   and   do   not   relate   to   the   same   List,
leave apart the question of relating to the same
Entry.  Acquisition   being   merely   an   incident   of
planned   development,   the   Court   will   have   to
ignore it even if there was some encroachment or
overlapping. The BDA Act does not provide any
provision in regard to compensation and manner
of acquisition for which it refers to the provisions
of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act.   There   are   no
provisions in the BDA Act which lay down detailed
mechanism   for   the   acquisition   of   property,   i.e.
they are not covering the same field and, thus,
there is no apparent irreconcilable conflict. The
BDA Act provides a specific period during which
the   development   under   a   scheme   has   to   be
implemented   and   if   it   is   not   so   done,   the
consequences   thereof   would   follow   in   terms   of
Section 27 of the BDA Act. None of the provisions
of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act   deals   with
implementation   of   schemes.   We   have   already
answered   that   the   acquisition   under   the   Land
Acquisition Act cannot, in law, lapse if vesting has
taken place. therefore, the question of applying
20
the   provisions   of   Section   11A   of   the   Land
Acquisition Act to the BDA Act does not arise.
Section 27 of the BDA Act takes care of even the
consequences   of   default,   including   the   fate   of
acquisition,   where   vesting   has   not   taken   place
under Section 27(3). Thus, there are no provisions
under the two Acts which operate in the same
field and have a direct irreconcilable conflict.
125. Having said so, now we proceed to record our
answer   to   the   question   referred   to   the   larger
Bench as follows:
For the reasons stated in this judgment, we
hold that the BDA Act is a self­contained code.
Further, we hold that provisions introduced in
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Central Act
68 of 1984, limited to the extent of acquisition
of   land,   payment   of   compensation   and
recourse to legal remedies provided under the
said   Act,   can   be   read   into   an   acquisition
controlled by the provisions of the BDA Act but
with a specific exception that the provisions of
the   Land   Acquisition   Act   in   so   far   as   they
provide   different   time   frames   and
consequences   of   default   thereof,   including
lapsing of acquisition proceedings ,cannot be
read into the BDA Act. Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act being one of such provisions
cannot be applied to the acquisitions under the
provisions of the BDA Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. This Court has emphasized that the primary object of the
BDA Act is to  carry  out planned development.  The State Act
has provided its own scheme. The time constraints of the land
acquisition   are   not   applicable   to   the   BDA   Act.   Making
21
applicable   the   time   frame   of   Section   11A   of   LA   Act   would
debilitate very object of the BDA Act.  It is apparent that the
decision of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench is
directly juxtaposed to the decision of Five Judge Bench of this
Court   in  Offshore   Holdings  (supra)   in   which   precisely   the
question involved in the instant cases had been dealt with.  By
indirect method by making applicable the time period of two
years of 11A of LA Act mandate of BDA Act has been violated.
However, it is shocking that various decisions have been taken
into consideration particularly by the Single Judge, however,
whereas the decision that has set the controversy at rest, has
not  even  been noticed even by the Single Judge or by the
Division Bench. If this is the fate of the law of the land laid
down by this Court that too the decision by the Constitution
Bench, so much can be said but to exercise restraint is the best
use of the power.   Least said is better, the way in which the
justice has been dealt with and the planned development of
Bangalore  city   has   been   left   at   the  mercy  of   unscrupulous
persons of Government and the BDA.
18. It is apparent from the fact that the Single Judge has
relied upon the decision in  H.N. Shivanna (supra) in which it
22
was   observed   by   the   Division   Bench   that   scheme   to   be
completed in 2 years otherwise it would lapse.  It was precisely
the question of time period which was dwelt upon and what
was   ultimately   decided   by   this   Court   in  Offshore   Holdings
(supra) has been blatantly violated by the Single Judge and
that too in flagrant violation of the provisions and intendment
of the Act.
19. It is also apparent from the facts and circumstances of the
case that there were a large number of irregularities in the
course   of   an   inquiry   under   Section   18(1)   of   the   BDA   Act.
Government had nothing to do with respect to the release of the
land at this stage, as the stage of final notification had not
reached   but   still   the   landowners   in   connivance   with   the
influential   persons,   political   or   otherwise,   managed   the
directions in respect of 251 acres of the land and Special Land
Acquisition Collector also considered exclusion of 498 acres of
the land against which the question was raised in the Assembly
and eyebrows were raised in public domain. Two inquiries were
ordered on 24.11.2012 and 19.1.2013 by the State Government
and based upon that inquiry, it was ordered and a public notice
was issued on 3rd  May, 2014 that the BDA will consider the
23
entire matter afresh.  In the aforesaid backdrop of the facts, the
writ petitions came to be filed, it would not be termed to be the
bona fide litigation, but was initiated having failed in attempt to
get the land   illegally excluded at the hands of Special Land
Acquisition Collector and the State Government and after the
inquiries held in the matter and the notice was issued to start
the proceedings afresh.   At this stage, the writ petitions were
filed.  In the aforesaid circumstances, it was not at all open to
the High Court to quash the preliminary notification issued
under Section 17, as the land owners, State Government and
BDA were responsible to create a mess in the way of planned
development of the Bangalore city.
20. The scheme which was framed was so much benevolent
scheme   that   40%   of   the   55%   of   the   land   reserved   for   the
residential purpose was to be given to the landowners at their
choice   and   they   were   also   given   the   choice   to   obtain   the
compensation, if they so desire, under the provisions of the LA
Act. Thus, it was such a scheme that there was no scope for
any exclusion of the land in the ultimate final notification.
21. It is apparent from the  circumstances that the matter
cannot be left at the mercy of unscrupulous authority of the
24
BDA,   the   State   Government   or   in   the   political   hands.
Considering the proper development and planned development
of Bangalore city, let the Government issue a final notification
with respect to the land which has been notified in the initial
notification and there is no question of leaving out of the land
in the instant case as option has been given to land owners to
claim the land or to claim the compensation under the relevant
LA Act which may be applicable in the case.
22. It was contended on behalf of the landowners that certain
developments have taken place after the orders were passed
regarding exclusion of the land and when Section 27 provides a
limitation   of   five   years   after   final   notification,   in   case
development was not undertaken within five years, even the
final scheme would lapse. Thus, the principle enunciated in
Section 27 should be followed by this Court with respect to the
lapse of preliminary notification as well. We find that there is a
vast   difference   in   the   provisions   and   action   to   be   taken
pursuant   to   the   preliminary   notification   and   the   final
notification under Section 19. In the instant case, the facts
indicated that it was in the interest of the public, landowners,
BDA and State Government. The scheme had prior approval of
25
State Government however at the cost of public interest yet
another   scheme   was   sought   to   be   frustrated   by   powerful
unforeseen hands and the issuance of final notification had
been delayed. Three inquiries were ordered, two by the State
Government and one by the BDA as the release of the land was
being proposed in an illegal manner. Hue and cry has been
raised about their illegalities in the Assembly as well as in the
public. Thus, for the delay, owners cannot escape the liability,
they  cannot  take  the  advantage  of  their  own   wrong  having
acted in collusion with the authorities. Thus, we are of the
considered   opinion   that   in   the   facts   of   the   case   the   time
consumed would not adversely affect the ultimate development
of Bangalore city. The authorities are supposed to carry out the
statutory mandate and cannot be permitted to act against the
public   interest   and   planned   development   of   Bangalore   city
which was envisaged as a statutory mandate under the BDA
Act. The State Government, as well as Authorities under the
BDA Act, are supposed to cater to the need of the planned
development which is a mandate enjoined upon them and also
binding on them. They have to necessarily carry it forward and
no dereliction of duty can be an escape route so as to avoid
26
fulfilment of the obligation enjoined upon them. The courts are
not   powerless   to   frown   upon   such   an   action   and   proper
development cannot be deterred by continuing inaction. As the
proper   development   of   such   metropolitan   is   of   immense
importance,   the   public   purpose   for   which   the   primary
notification was issued was in order to provide civic amenities
like laying down roads etc. which cannot be left at the whim or
mercy of the concerned authorities. They were bound to act in
furtherance thereof. There was a clear embargo placed while
issuing the notification not to create any charge, mortgage,
assign, issue or revise any improvement and after inquiry, it
was clear that the notice had been issued in May, 2014, thus,
no   development   could   have   been   made   legally.   Notification
dated 3rd  May, 2014 was issued that re­inquiry was necessary
in the matter.  The development made, if any, would be at the
peril of the owners and it has to give way to larger welfare
schemes and the individual interest and cannot come in the
way of the larger public interest. The acquisition was for the
proper   and   planned   development   that   was   an   absolute
necessity for the city of Bangalore.
27
23. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in condoning
the delay. Though, it is apparent that the authorities had come
with certain delay, in the certain matters and the writ appeals
were   also  filed  belatedly   with   the   delay  in   the   High   Court,
however,   considering   the   provisions   of   the   scheme   and   the
method   and   manner   wrong   has   been   committed,   it   has
compelled us not only to condone the delay but also to act in
the matter so as to preserve the sanctity of the legal process
and decision of this Court in Offshore Holdings (supra).
24. We, therefore, direct the State Government as well as the
BDA to proceed further to issue final notification without any
further delay in the light of the observations made in the order.
The   impugned   orders   passed   by   the   Single   Judge   and   the
Division Bench are hereby quashed and set aside. The scheme
and notification under Section 17  of the BDA Act  are hereby
upheld with the aforesaid directions.
25.  As noticed above, the Land Acquisition Officer proposed
exclusion of 251 acres of land from acquisition on being asked
by   the   Government   after   the   preliminary   notification   was
issued. The Land Acquisition Officer, has considered another
28
498   acres   of   land   to   be   excluded   from   being   acquired.   In
connection   to   this,   several   questions   were   raised   in   the
Karnataka   Legislative   Assembly,   as   a   result   of   which   two
inquiries   were   ordered   by   the   State   Government   i.e   on
24.11.2012 and 19.01.2013.  However, result of the inquiry is
not forthcoming. Further, it appears that the exclusion of the
lands   from   acquisition   was   proposed   in   connivance   with
influential persons; political or otherwise.  We are of the view
that the BDA and the State Government have to proceed with
the acquisition of these lands.  We are also of the view that it is
just and proper to hold an inquiry for fixing the responsibility
on the officials of the BDA and the State Government for trying
to exclude these lands from acquisition.
26.   Therefore,   we   appoint   Hon'ble   Mr.   Justice   K.N.
Keshavanarayana, former Judge of the Karnataka High Court
as the Inquiry Officer for fixing the responsibility on the officials
of the BDA and the State Government who were responsible for
the aforesaid.   The Commissioner, BDA is hereby directed to
consult Inquiry Officer and pay his remuneration. Further, we
direct BDA to provide appropriate secretarial assistance and
logistical support to the Inquiry Officer for holding the inquiry.
29
In   addition,   we   authorize   the   Inquiry   Officer   to   appoint
requisite staff on temporary basis to assist him in the inquiry
and to fix their salaries. Further, the BDA is directed to pay
their salaries.  The State Government and the BDA are directed
to   produce   the   files/documents   in   relation   to   the   aforesaid
lands before the Inquiry Officer within a period of four weeks
from today.  We request the Inquiry Officer to submit his report
to this Court as expeditiously as possible.
27. The State Government and the BDA are further directed to
proceed   with   the   acquisition   of   the   aforementioned   lands
without excluding land from acquisition and submit a report to
this Court the steps taken by them in this regard within a
period of three months from today.
28. In addition, it was submitted at the Bar that several cases
where similar orders of exclusion in relation to lands notified
for acquisitions for the formation of ‘Dr. K. Shivarama Karantha
Layout’ have been passed by the High Court and that BDA has
failed   to   challenge   those   orders   in   connivance   with   the
landowners and influential persons.  We hereby direct the BDA
to challenge all such orders/seek review of the said orders in
30
accordance   with   law   within   a   period   of   three   months   from
today.
29. The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms leaving
the parties to bear their own costs. 
..……………………J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi; ….………………...J.
August 3, 2018. (S. Abdul Nazeer)
31

The identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code which obliges the investigating agency to hold or confers a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. = As a general rule, identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. The purpose of identification test is only 13 to help the investigating agency as to whether the investigation into the offence is proceeding in a right direction or not. In our view, non­identification of the appellant by any prosecution witness would not vitiate the prosecution case. It is evident from the confessional statement of the accused that at the time of occurrence he and another accused Rampati Manjhi were guarding outside the informant’s house while other accused were committing dacoity inside. We do not think that there is any justification to the argument that as none of the prosecution witnesses could be able to identify the appellant, he cannot be termed as accused. In our view, such nonidentification would not be fatal to the prosecution case in the given facts and circumstances.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1333 of 2009
RAJU MANJHI      APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR           RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 3rd August,
2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 447 of 2001, whereby the High
Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused—appellant
herein and upheld the order of conviction and sentence passed
by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gaya.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case as culled out from the case
of prosecution are that in the intervening night of 11th and 12th
2
January,   1999   a   group   of   assailants   consisting   10   to   12
persons including the appellant herein, all aged between 20 to
25 years, barged into the house of one Kamdeo Singh of the
village Banbareya, P.S. Moffasil, District Gaya and decamped
with golden ornaments, pants and cash. In the protest by the
inmates   of   the   house,   the   assailants   caused   injuries   to
Kamdeo Singh, his father­in­law Kameshwar Singh, son Niraj
Kumar (PW2), wife Sita Devi and daughter­in­law Reena Devi.
The stolen items include golden bangle, golden rings, cash of
Rs.5,000/­ and altogether the worth of stolen property would
be Rs.25,000/­. At about 2 am in the night, Kamdeo Singh
lodged a complaint with the Moffasil police, on the basis of
which   a   case   under   Section   395/412,   IPC   was   registered
against unknown persons. Zamil Ashgar (PW10)—Officer incharge
  of   the   Muffasil   P.S.   took   up   the   investigation   and
rushed to the place of occurrence. He recorded statement (Ext.
4) of Kamdeo Singh (PW3), prepared injury reports in respect
of the inmates of the house and sent them to hospital for
treatment. As the injured Kameshwar Singh had succumbed
3
to the injuries, charged under Section 396, IPC was replaced
for the offence under Section 395, IPC against the accused. In
the course of further investigation, police arrested some of the
accused,  recorded   their   statements,   recovered   some  money
from them. Out of the six accused persons charged with the
offence, one Rameshwari Manjhi @ Umeshwari Manjhi has
been declared as absconder. The accused pleaded not guilty
and claimed to have been implicated falsely, therefore, wanted
to be tried.
3. At the trial, the prosecution in support of its case examined as
many   as   eleven   witnesses.   Relying   upon   the   incriminating
material as well as depositions and confessional statements of
the accused, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the
prosecution   could   prove   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the trial Court convicted the
accused for the offence punishable under Section 396, IPC
and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life
and also to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/­ each, failing which to
4
further   suffer   rigorous   imprisonment   for   a   period   of   six
months.
4. All   the   aggrieved   accused   persons,   including   the   appellant
herein, carried the matter by way of separate appeals before
the High Court. By an elaborate judgment which is impugned
herein,   the  High   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   affirming  the
conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court. That is
how the accused Raju Manjhi is in appeal before us.
5. At  the  outset, we  would  like  to  record that  whenever  this
appeal came up for hearing before us, learned counsel for the
appellant   remained   absent.   Therefore,   in   the   interest   of
justice,   we   directed   the   Supreme   Court   Legal   Services
Committee   to   appoint   an   advocate   to   defend   the   case   of
appellant. In accordance therewith, Ms. Nidhi, learned counsel
appeared and argued on behalf of the appellant.
6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties on
either side and carefully perused the material available on
record.
5
7. A specific argument has been put forward on behalf of the
appellant that though there was no concrete proof to establish
the participation of the appellant in the alleged crime, the trial
Court as well as the High Court believed the prosecution story
on flimsy grounds and convicted him. Merely on the basis of
prosecution story that when the police raided the house of
appellant, he was available in the house and an amount of
Rs.400/­   has   been   recovered   from   his   possession,   the
appellant   cannot   be   stamped   as   an   accused   and   being
involved in the crime. As a matter of fact, there was no act of
dacoity   or   burglary   took   place   on   the   alleged   place   of
occurrence in which the accused—appellant was a participant.
Moreover, the appellant was not identified by any witness in
the   test   identification   parade   and   also   in   the   Court.   This
circumstance itself points at the innocence of the appellant.
The case was fastened against the accused out of enmity and
it   is   with   the   connivance   of   the   informant   and   I.O.   who
dragged the accused into the alleged crime. The recovery made
by the police, of a petty amount of Rs.400/­ from the house of
6
the appellant could not be an incriminating factor. One cannot
claim it to be the looted money connecting him to the crime,
more so when there was no claim for such money by the
informant or any other prosecution witness. Even the alleged
confessional statement of the appellant, cannot be given legal
validity as it was not made before a Magistrate.  Particularly
when the trial Court itself expressed doubt on the genuineness
of   the   confessional   statement   as   the   alleged   confessional
statements   of   other   accused   were   also   under   the   same
handwriting and drawn by the police, they cannot be taken
into account.
8. It is further case of the appellant that the prosecution could
not prove the motive of the appellant in committing the crime.
There was no injury report brought on record in respect of
PWs 1, 2 and 3 who were stated to have sustained injuries in
the occurrence when the I.O. said to have drawn their injury
reports. There were so many latches on the part of prosecution
and the appellant herein had no criminal antecedents, yet the
Courts below without taking into account the importance of all
7
these circumstances simply believed the prosecution story and
held   the   appellant   guilty   of   the   offence.   Therefore,   the
impugned judgment calls for the interference of this Court and
deserves to be set aside.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State of
Bihar supported the view taken by the Courts below.   He
submitted that there was enough material on record which
clearly establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.   There   was   credible   evidence   available   on   record   to
believe that the appellant was a party to the accused group
and was guarding at the entrance of the victim’s house when
the other participants were on the spree of ransacking the
households of the victim. The statement of confession recorded
at the instance of the accused—appellant not only proves his
guilt but also led to the discovery of new facts in the case. It
helped the I.O. for the recovery of incriminating material and
looted cash from his house. The accused—appellant had by
participating in the crime, shared the looted articles and there
8
is no bar to validate his confessional statement under the
provisions of Indian Evidence Act.
10. Having heard learned counsel on either side we have given our
intense consideration to the facts and circumstances of the
case and taken note of the analysis adopted by the Courts
below   in   reaching   to   the   conclusion.   First   and   foremost,
considering the primary contention advanced on behalf of the
appellant that there was no instance of alleged dacoity on the
time and place of occurrence wherein the accused was a party,
we find from the deposition of Reena Devi (PW1), daughter­inlaw
of the informant that on the intervening night of 11th and
12th January, 1999 on hearing some disturbance, she woke up
and found the assailants armed with sticks, looting articles in
the house. When she tried to resist, they assaulted her and
took away her ornaments including golden bangle and a chain
and also tried to snatch her child. A brief case of her husband
Neeraj Kumar (PW2) containing clothes and cash of Rs.5,200/­
has also been stolen. Altogether the worth of stolen property
would be Rs.25,000/­. In that commotion, hearing her hue
9
and cry her father­in­law—PW3 (informant) and mother­in­law
came there who objected the assailants and they too were
assaulted by the accused.
11. Corroborating   the   statement   of   PW1,   PW2—Neeraj   Kumar,
stated that the accused caused injuries to Kameshwar Singh
due   to   which   he   fell   down   on   the   ground   and   later   on
succumbed to the injuries in the hospital. The evidence of
PW3—informant also on the same lines as that of PWs 1 and
2.   According   to   Zamil   Asghar—the   Investigating   Officer
(PW10),   on   receiving   information   about   the   occurrence   of
dacoity, the FIR (Ext.5) was registered and thereafter he visited
the place of occurrence and recorded the statement of the
informant and other inmates of the house and sent the injured
to Piligrim Hospital, Gaya for their treatment.  Upon knowing
that the alleged assailants were at Mohalla Balapar where they
were consuming wine, he proceeded to that place and then
rushed   to   the   house   of   main   accused   Munna   Manjhi   and
apprehended   him   at   Samitee   Bhawan.   On   his   confession
about the commission of the offence and disclosure of the
10
names of other assailants, the I.O. raided the houses of other
accused and apprehended them. He categorically stated that
the appellant herein has made confessional statement which
was   prepared   by   him   (Ext.   7/1).   He   has   also   visited   one
orchard   belonging   to   Kamal   Jain   situated   near   Jag   Jiwan
College and from there he recovered two bloodstained wooden
pieces (sticks) under Exts. III and III/1 allegedly used in the
crime and also seized polythene wine bags under Exts. I to
I/V, besides recovering money from the possession of accused
in   the   denomination   of   Rs.100   x   3   and   Rs.   50   x   4.   The
evidence   of   other   prosecution   witnesses   and   also   the
confessionals   statements   of   accused   assailants   and   the
recoveries made by the police substantiate the act of dacoity
took place at the house of the informant and the injuries
sustained by the inmates.
12. The other ground urged on behalf of the appellant is that the
so   called   confessional   statement   of   the   appellant   has   no
evidentiary   value   under   law   for   the   reason   that   it   was
extracted from the accused under duress by the police.  It is
11
true, no confession made by any person while he was in the
custody   of   police   shall   be   proved   against   him.   But,   the
Evidence Act provides that even when an accused being in the
custody   of   police   makes   a   statement   that   reveals   some
information leading to the recovery of incriminating material or
discovery of any fact concerning to the alleged offence, such
statement can be proved against him. It is worthwhile at this
stage to have a look at Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
27.   How   much   of   information   received   from
accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any
fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
information received from a person accused of any
offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of
such   information,   whether   it   amounts   to   a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered may be proved.
13. In   the   case   on   hand,   before   looking   at   the   confessional
statement   made   by   the   accused—appellant   in   the   light   of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, may be taken into fold for
limited   purposes.   From   the   aforesaid   statement   of   the
appellant, it is clear that he had explained the way in which
the accused committed the crime and shared the spoils. He
disclosed the fact that Munna Manjhi was the Chief/Head of
12
the team of assailants and the crime was executed as per the
plan made by him. It is also came into light by his confession
that the accused broke the doors of the house of informant
with the aid of heavy stones and assaulted the inmates with
pieces of wood (sticks). He categorically stated that he and
Rampati   Manjhi   were   guarding   at   the   outside   while   other
accused were committing the theft. The recoveries of used
polythene pouches of wine, money, clothes, chains and bangle
were   all   made   at   the   disclosure   by   the   accused   which
corroborates his confessional statement and proves his guilt.
Therefore, the confessional statement of the appellant stands
and satisfies the test of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
14. As regards the claim of appellant that non­identification of the
accused   by   the   witness   would   not   substantiate   the
prosecution   case,   admittedly   no   prosecution   witness   has
identified the accused—appellant which does not mean that
the prosecution case against the accused is on false footing.
As   a   general   rule,   identification   tests   do   not   constitute
substantive evidence. The purpose of identification test is only
13
to help the investigating agency as to whether the investigation
into the offence is proceeding in a right direction or not. In our
view, non­identification of the appellant by any prosecution
witness would not vitiate the prosecution case. It is evident
from the confessional statement of the accused that at the
time of occurrence he and another accused Rampati Manjhi
were   guarding   outside   the   informant’s   house   while   other
accused were committing dacoity inside. We do not think that
there is any justification to the argument that as none of the
prosecution witnesses could be able to identify the appellant,
he   cannot   be   termed   as   accused.   In   our   view,   such   nonidentification
would not be fatal to the prosecution case in the
given facts and circumstances.
15. The identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation,
and   there   is   no   provision   in   the   Code   which   obliges   the
investigating   agency   to   hold   or   confers   a   right   upon   the
accused to claim, a test identification parade. They do not
constitute   substantive   evidence   and   these   parades   are
essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to
14
hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible
the   evidence   of   identification   in   Court.   The   weight   to   be
attached to such identification should  be a matter for the
Courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence
of identification even without insisting on corroboration [See :
Kanta   Prashad  v.  Delhi   Administration,  1958 CriLJ 698
and Vaikuntam Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 1340].
16. Moving on to the other limb of argument advanced on behalf of
the appellant that the accused—appellant had no motive and
the Courts below have failed to consider the fact that the
evidence on record is not sufficient to establish motive of the
accused. Undoubtedly, ‘motive’ plays significant role in a case
based on circumstantial evidence where the purpose would be
to establish this important link in the chain of circumstances
in order to connect the accused with the crime. But, for the
case on hand, proving motive is not an important factor when
abundant   direct   evidence   is   available   on   record.   The
confessional   statement   of   the   appellant   itself   depicts   the
15
motive   of   the   team   of   accused   in   pursuit   of   which   they
committed  the  robbery  at  the  house  of  informant   and  the
appellant being part of it.
17. It is also clear from the statement of the accused—appellant
that the inmates of the house suffered injuries at the hands of
the accused party as they had beaten them with the pieces of
wood (sticks) and created terror among them. The recovery of
bloodstained sticks from the orchard of Kamal Jain and the
FSL report (Ext.X) proves the circumstance with no manner of
doubt. Another facet of the case as portrayed by the appellant
in his defense is that the informant implicated the appellant in
the   crime   with   the   connivance   of   I.O.   due   to   old   enmity.
However, we do not find any evidence or material on record in
support of such claim made by the appellant. On the other
hand, not only by the recovery of Rs.400/­ from the house of
appellant   his   participation   stands   proved,   with   the   other
incriminating evidence available on record.
16
18. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case we have no hesitation to
conclude that the prosecution has proved the case against the
accused—appellant   beyond   all   reasonable   doubts.   We,
therefore,   find   no   infirmity   or   illegality   in   the   impugned
judgment passed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal
preferred by the accused being bereft of any substance, the
same stands dismissed.
…………......................J.
 (N.V. RAMANA)
..................................J.
        (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI,
August 02, 2018.

regularisation of daily wage or contract workers on different posts = Regularisation Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation like misconduct etc.

REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7423-7429 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 19832-19838 OF 2017)
 Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Etc. ....Appellants
versus
 The State of Jharkhand & Ors. Etc. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated
17th November, 2016 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Jharkhand in a batch of writ petitions relating to the regularisation of
daily wage or contract workers on different posts. The writ petitioners
(now appellants) were denied the benefit of regularisation in view of the
provisions of the Jharkhand Sarkar ke Adhinasth Aniyamit Rup se Niyukt
Ewam Karyarat Karmiyo ki Sewa Niyamitikaran Niyamawali, 2015
(hereinafter referred to as the Regularisation Rules).
3. The admitted position is that the appellants are irregularly
appointed employees of the State Government. They sought
 C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 1 of 7
regularisation of their status on the ground that they had put in more than
10 years of service and were therefore entitled to be regularised. The
High Court took the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and
Ors.1
did not permit their regularisation since they had not worked for 10
years on the cut-off date of 10th April, 2006 when the Constitution Bench
rendered its decision. According to the High Court, the Regularisation
Rules provided a one-time measure of regularisation of the services of
irregularly appointed employees based on the cut-off date of 10th April,
2006 in terms of the judgment of the Constitution Bench. Therefore,
since the appellants had not put in 10 years of service they could not be
regularised.
4. The appellants had contended before the High Court that the State
of Jharkhand was created only on 15th November, 2000 and therefore no
one could have completed 10 years of service with the State of Jharkhand
on the cut-off date of 10th April, 2006. Therefore, no one could get the
benefit of the Regularisation Rules which made the entire legislative
exercise totally meaningless. The appellants had pointed out in the High
Court that the State had issued Resolutions on 18th July, 2009 and 19th
July, 2009 permitting the regularisation of some employees of the State,
who had obviously not put in 10 years of service with the State.
1(2006) 4 SCC 1
 C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 2 of 7
Consequently, it was submitted that the appellants were discriminated
against for no fault of theirs and in an irrational manner.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having considered
the decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) as well as the
subsequent decision of this Court explaining Umadevi (3) in State of
Karnataka and Ors. v. M.L. Kesari and Ors.2
, we are of the view that
the High Court has erred in taking an impractical view of the directions in
Umadevi (3) as well as its consideration in Kesari.
6. The decision in Umadevi (3) was intended to put a full stop to the
somewhat pernicious practice of irregularly or illegally appointing daily
wage workers and continuing with them indefinitely. In fact, in
paragraph 49 of the Report, it was pointed out that the rule of law
requires appointments to be made in a constitutional manner and the State
cannot be permitted to perpetuate an irregularity in the matter of public
employment which would adversely affect those who could be employed
in terms of the constitutional scheme. It is for this reason that the concept
of a one-time measure and a cut-off date was introduced in the hope and
expectation that the State would cease and desist from making irregular
or illegal appointments and instead make appointments on a regular basis.
7. The concept of a one-time measure was further explained in Kesari
in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Report which read as follows:
2 (2010) 9 SCC 247
 C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 3 of 7
“9. The term “one-time measure” has to be understood in its
proper perspective. This would normally mean that after the
decision in Umadevi (3), each department or each instrumentality
should undertake a one-time exercise and prepare a list of all
casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working
for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and
tribunals and subject them to a process verification as to whether
they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite
qualification for the post and if so, regularise their services.
10. At the end of six months from the date of decision
in Umadevi (3), cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual
employees were still pending before courts. Consequently,
several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the
one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some
government departments or instrumentalities undertook the onetime
exercise excluding several employees from consideration
either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or
due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who
were entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of the decision
in Umadevi (3), will not lose their right to be considered for
regularisation, merely because the one-time exercise was
completed without considering their cases, or because the sixmonth
period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) has expired.
The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad
hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of continuous
service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of any
interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the
one-time exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3), but did not
consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the
benefit of para 53 of Umadevi (3), the employer concerned
should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the one-time
exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all
the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of para
53 of Umadevi (3), are so considered.
11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi
(3) is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more
than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any
interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision
in Umadevi (3) was rendered, are considered for regularisation in
view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the
departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of
employing persons on daily-wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long
periods and then periodically regularise them on the ground that
they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the
 C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 4 of 7
constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and
appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons
who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the
date of decision in Umadevi (3)] without the protection of any
interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing
the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for
regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken
such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision
in Umadevi (3) or that such exercise was undertaken only in
regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the
right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above
directions in Umadevi (3) as a one-time measure.”
8. The purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi (3) was
therefore two-fold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in
the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those who had been
irregularly appointed in the past. The fact that the State of Jharkhand
continued with the irregular appointments for almost a decade after the
decision in Umadevi (3) is a clear indication that it believes that it was all
right to continue with irregular appointments, and whenever required,
terminate the services of the irregularly appointed employees on the
ground that they were irregularly appointed. This is nothing but a form of
exploitation of the employees by not giving them the benefits of
regularisation and by placing the sword of Damocles over their head. This
is precisely what Umadevi (3) and Kesari sought to avoid.
9. If a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting the spirit of the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3), is to be taken into
consideration then no irregularly appointed employee of the State of
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Jharkhand could ever be regularised since that State came into existence
only on 15th November, 2000 and the cut-off date was fixed as 10th April,
2006. In other words, in this manner the pernicious practice of
indefinitely continuing irregularly appointed employees would be
perpetuated contrary to the intent of the Constitution Bench.
10. The High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand ought to have
considered the entire issue in a contextual perspective and not only from
the point of view of the interest of the State, financial or otherwise – the
interest of the employees is also required to be kept in mind. What has
eventually been achieved by the State of Jharkhand is to short circuit the
process of regular appointments and instead make appointments on an
irregular basis. This is hardly good governance.
11. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularisation
Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they
have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the
Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service
rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should
be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation
like misconduct etc.
12. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set
aside in view of our conclusions. The State should take a decision within
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four months from today on regularisation of the status of the appellants.
13. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
14. We may add that that it would be worthwhile for the State of
Jharkhand to henceforth consider making regular appointments only and
dropping the idea of making irregular appointments so as to short circuit
the process of regular appointments.
 ………………………J.
 (Madan B. Lokur)

 New Delhi; .……………………..J.
 August 01, 2018 (Deepak Gupta)
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