LAW FOR ALL

Friday, August 31, 2018

Sec.307 IPC - the victim has sustained a grievous injury on a vital portion of the body, i.e. the head, which was fractured. The doctor has opined that the injury was life threatening. Hence, in our considered opinion, the High Court was too lenient in 9 imposing the sentence of six days only which was the period already undergone by the accused in confinement

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 959 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3509 of 2016
The State of Rajasthan ..Appellant
Versus
Mohan Lal & Another ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
Leave granted.
2. Judgment dated 25.05.2015 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench in Appeal No.215 of
1992 is questioned in this appeal by the State with the
prayer for enhancement of sentence. By the impugned
judgment, the High Court has confirmed the judgment and
order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court,
Sambharlake in Sessions Case No.14/1992 for the offences
2
under Sections 325 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
but has reduced the sentence from 3 years’ rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- for the offences under
Section 325, IPC and 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs. 250/- under Section 323, IPC to the period
already undergone.
3. The accused (respondent herein) was charged with and tried
for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 326, 447,
323 and 341, IPC. The learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Sambharlake, by the judgment dated 19.05.1992 in
Sessions Case No. 14/1992 convicted the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 325 and 323, IPC. The
Sessions Court imposed a sentence of 3 years’ rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- for the offences under
Section 325, IPC; and 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs. 250/- was imposed for the offence under Section
323, IPC. On appeal by the convicted accused, the High
Court of Judicature at Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench confirmed
the judgment of conviction but reduced the sentence to the
period of imprisonment already undergone by the accused.
By then, the accused had undergone 6 days’ imprisonment
3
only. Being aggrieved by the meagre sentence, the State is
before us as an appellant praying for enhancement of
sentence.
4. The case of the prosecution in brief is that due to old enmity
relating to a land dispute, one Kapurchand was assaulted
by the accused; one Phoolchand who intervened in the fight
also sustained an injury because of the assault by the
accused. As mentioned supra, the accused was tried for the
offences under Sections 307 and 326, IPC apart from other
offences, but was convicted for the offences under Sections
325 and 323, IPC.
5. During the course of the trial, the informant (PW1), the
injured Kapurchand (PW2) and the second injured
Phoolchand (PW5) were examined, apart from other
witnesses, including the doctor who treated the injured. The
trial court has found the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 5
consistent, cogent, reliable and trustworthy and proceeded
to convict the accused. The doctor fully supported the case
of the prosecution. The medical records, including the
evidence of the Doctor, conclusively prove that injury no.1
sustained by PW2-Kapurchand was a grievous injury, in as
4
much as Kapurchand sustained a fracture of the right
parietal bone.
6. It is clear from the judgment of the High Court that though
the accused had filed an appeal questioning his conviction
and sentence before the High Court, during the course of
arguments he did not press the appeal filed against the
judgment of conviction, praying only for reduction of
sentence. The High Court decided the Criminal Appeal
accepting such request, and reduced the sentence to the
period already undergone. However, as a matter of fact, as
mentioned supra, the accused had, by then, been in
confinement only for 6 days.
7. Since the accused has not filed further appeal and as this
appeal has been filed by the State praying for enhancement
of sentence, we have decided this appeal confining ourselves
to the sentence to be imposed.
8. The Medical Officer of the authorized Primary Health
Centre, Kishangarh Renwal, examined the injuries
sustained by the two injured, viz. Kapurchand and
Phoolchand. While Phoolchand had sustained only one
injury of a simple nature, which was inflicted by a blunt
object, Kapurchand had sustained two injuries, out of
5
which one was simple and the other was serious. Therefore,
Kapurchand was advised to undergo an X-ray. The X-ray
report (Exhibit-P4) revealed that his right parietal bone was
fractured. The medical report (Exhibit-P1) discloses the
injury no.1 as grievous in nature. The Medical Officer has
given his opinion in Exhibit-P5 that the injury no.1 was
life-threatening.
9. The High Court simply brushed aside the aforementioned
material facts and sentenced the accused to the period
already undergone by him, which is only 6 days in this case.
In our view, the Trial Court and the High Court have taken
a lenient view by convicting the accused for offences under
Sections 325 and 323, IPC. Absolutely no reasons, much
less valid reasons, are assigned by the High Court to impose
the meagre sentence of 6 days. Such imposition of sentence
by the High Court shocks the judicial conscience of this
Court.
10.Currently, India does not have structured sentencing
guidelines that have been issued either by the legislature or
the judiciary. However, the Courts have framed certain
guidelines in the matter of imposition of sentence. A Judge
6
has wide discretion in awarding the sentence within the
statutory limits. Since in many offences only the maximum
punishment is prescribed and for some offences the
minimum punishment is prescribed, each Judge exercises
his discretion accordingly. There cannot, therefore, be any
uniformity. However, this Court has repeatedly held that
the Courts will have to take into account certain principles
while exercising their discretion in sentencing, such as
proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation. In a
proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess the
seriousness of an offence in order to determine the
commensurate punishment for the offender. The
seriousness of an offence depends, apart from other things,
also upon its harmfulness.

11.This Court in the case of Soman Vs. State of Kerala
[(2013) 11 SCC 382] observed thus:
“27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing
decisions on various different rationales – most
prominent amongst which would be
proportionality and deterrence.
27.2. The question of consequences of criminal
action can be relevant from both a
proportionality and deterrence standpoint.
27.3. Insofar as proportionality is concerned,
the sentence must be commensurate with the
seriousness or gravity of the offence.
7
27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging
seriousness of the offence is the consequences
resulting from it.
27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may
still be properly attributed to the offender if
they were reasonably foreseeable. In case of
illicit and underground manufacture of liquor,
the chances of toxicity are so high that not only
its manufacturer but the distributor and the
retail vendor would know its likely risks to the
consumer. Hence, even though any harm to
the consumer might not be directly intended,
some aggravated culpability must attach if the
consumer suffers some grievous hurt or dies as
result of consuming the spurious liquor.”
12.The same is the verdict of this Court in Alister Anthony
Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 648]
wherein it is observed thus:
“84. Sentencing is an important task in the
matters of crime. One of the prime objectives of
the criminal law is imposition of appropriate,
adequate, just and proportionate sentence
commensurate with the nature and gravity of
crime and the manner in which the crime is
done. There is no straitjacket formula for
sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The
courts have evolved certain principles: the twin
objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence
and correction. What sentence would meet the
ends of justice depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and the court must
keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive
for the crime, nature of the offence and all
other attendant circumstances.”
13.From the aforementioned observations, it is clear that the
principle governing the imposition of punishment will
8
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
However, the sentence should be appropriate, adequate,
just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and
gravity of the crime and the manner in which the crime is
committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime,
nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances
have to be borne in mind while imposing the sentence. The
Court cannot afford to be casual while imposing the
sentence, inasmuch as both the crime and the criminal are
equally important in the sentencing process. The Courts
must see that the public does not lose confidence in the
judicial system. Imposing inadequate sentences will do more
harm to the justice system and may lead to a state where
the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and
resorts to private vengeance.

14.In the matter at hand, it is proved that the victim has
sustained a grievous injury on a vital portion of the body,
i.e. the head, which was fractured. The doctor has opined
that the injury was life threatening. Hence, in our
considered opinion, the High Court was too lenient in
9
imposing the sentence of six days only which was the period
already undergone by the accused in confinement.
15.Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances,
and as it is brought to our notice that the parties have
forgotten their differences and are living peacefully since 25
years, we impose a sentence of 6 months’ rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty
Five Thousand) against the accused. While doing so, we
have taken into consideration the aggravating as well as
mitigating factors under the facts of this case.
16.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The accused (respondent
herein) is imposed with a sentence of 6 months’ rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty
Five Thousand) for the offences under Section 325, IPC. In
case of default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo
further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. In case the
fine is deposited by the convicted accused, the same shall
be disbursed in favour of the injured PW2, viz. Kapurchand
as compensation. The accused/respondent be taken into
custody forthwith to serve out the sentence. However, he is
entitled to the benefit of set-off of the period already
10
undergone in confinement by him. The judgment of the High
Court is modified accordingly.
.................................................J.
(N. V. RAMANA)
.................................................J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
New Delhi;
August 01, 2018.

Sections 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’), Section 19(1) read with Section 21(1) of POCSO Act and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act.= Appellant no. 1 is a 66 years’ old lady who is a Gynecologist and had conducted the delivery. Appellant no. 2 is a Paediatrician who had attended to the baby of the victim after the delivery. Appellant no. 3, is a 69 years’ old Hospital Administrative. She is roped-in in that capacity though she did not attend to the victim or the baby.- It is not the case of the prosecution that these appellants had any knowledge about the alleged rape of the victim allegedly committed by accused No. 1 at any time earlier. In fact, they did not come into picture before 7th February, 2017 when the victim was brought to the hospital. However, the charge against these appellants is primarily on account of purported commission of an act under Sections 19(1) of POCSO Act.= Evidence should be such which should at least indicate grave suspicion. Mere likelihood of suspicion cannot be the reason to charge a person for an offence.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 961 OF 2018
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 3712 OF 2018]
DR. SR. TESSY JOSE AND OTHERS .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF KERALA .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K.SIKRI, J.
After hearing this matter on 1st August, 2018, following order
was passed:
“Leave granted.
We have heard the arguments.
We are informed that the trial is in progress today
before the trial court. Since, there is not enough time to
dictate the judgment, we are allowing this appeal so that
the decision is conveyed to the trial court. Reasons to
follow.
A copy of this order may be provided to the counsel
for the parties.”
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 1 of 8
2. We are now stating our reasons which led us to allow the appeal
of the appellants.
3. First Information Report under the provisions of Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (For short, POCSO Act)
has been registered in which charge sheet has been filed and the
case registered as Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 is pending
before the Special Judge, Ernakulam. The appellants herein are
arrayed as accused nos. 3, 4 and 5. Insofar as the appellants are
concerned, allegations against them are under Sections 201 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’),
Section 19(1) read with Section 21(1) of POCSO Act and Section
75 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that accused no. 1 had
raped the victim when she was a minor in the year 2016. As a
result, she became pregnant. As per victim’s mother, when the
victim started complaining about pain in her stomach, thinking it
to be some problem related to stomach, she brought her to the
hospital where the appellants were working, on 7th February,
2017. It was found that the victim was in advance stage of
pregnancy. In fact, soon after she was brought to the hospital,
she went into labour. She delivered the child. Insofar as the
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 2 of 8
appellants are concerned, their role is that they attended to the
victim. Appellant no. 1 is a 66 years’ old lady who is a
Gynecologist and had conducted the delivery. Appellant no. 2 is
a Paediatrician who had attended to the baby of the victim after
the delivery. Appellant no. 3, is a 69 years’ old Hospital
Administrative. She is roped-in in that capacity though she did
not attend to the victim or the baby.
5. It is not the case of the prosecution that these appellants had any
knowledge about the alleged rape of the victim allegedly
committed by accused No. 1 at any time earlier. In fact, they did
not come into picture before 7th February, 2017 when the victim
was brought to the hospital. However, the charge against these
appellants is primarily on account of purported commission of an
act under Sections 19(1) of POCSO Act. This Section reads as
under:
“Section 19 (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, any person (including
the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this
Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an
offence has been committed, he shall provide such
information to—
(a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or
(b) the local police.
(2) Every report given under sub-section(I) shall be--
(a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing;
(b) be read over to the informant;
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 3 of 8
(c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the
Police Unit.
(3) Where the report under sub-section (I) is given by a
child, the same shall be recorded under Section (2) in a
simple language so that the child understands contents
being recorded.
(4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not
understood by the child or wherever it is deemed
necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such
qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as
may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails
to understand the same.
(5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is
satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been
committed is in need of care and protection. then, it shall,
after recording the reasons in writing make immediate
arrangement to give him such care and protection
(including admitting the child into shelter home or to the
nearest hospital) within twenty-four hours of the report, as
may be prescribed.
(6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall,
without unnecessary delay but within a period of twentyfour
hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare
Committee and the Special Court or where no Special
Court has been designated, to the Court of Session,
including need of the child for care and protection and
steps taken in this regard.
(7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or
criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the
purpose of sub-section (1).”
6. As is clear from the aforesaid provision, a person who had an
apprehension that an offence under the said Act is likely to be
committed or has knowledge that such an offence had been
committed would be required to provide such information to the
relevant authorities.
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 4 of 8
7. Thus, what is alleged against the appellants is that they had the
knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed
and, therefore, they were required to provide this information to
the relevant authorities which they failed to do.
8. After going through the record and hearing the counsel for the
parties, we are of the opinion that no such case is made out even
as per the material collected by the prosecution and filed in the
Court. The statement of the mother of the victim was recorded by
the police. The statement of the victim was also recorded. They
have not stated at all that when the victim was brought to the
hospital, her mother informed the appellants that she had been
raped by the accused no. 1 when she was a minor. Admittedly,
the victim was pregnant and immediately went into labour. In
these circumstances, it was even the professional duty of
Appellant No. 1 to attend to her and conduct the delivery, which
she did. Likewise, after the baby was born, the Appellant No. 2
as a Paediatrician performed her professional duty.
9. The entire case set up against the appellants is on the basis that
when the victim was brought to the hospital her age was recorded
as 18 years. On that basis appellants could have gathered that at
the time of conception she was less than 18 years and was, thus,
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 5 of 8
a minor and, therefore, the appellants should have taken due
care in finding as to how the victim became pregnant. Fastening
the criminal liability on the basis of the aforesaid allegation is too
far fetched. The provisions of Section 19(1), reproduced above,
put a legal obligation on a person to inform the relevant
authorities, inter alia, when he/she has knowledge that an offence
under the Act had been committed. The expression used is
“knowledge” which means that some information received by
such a person gives him/her knowledge about the commission of
the crime. There is no obligation on this person to investigate
and gather knowledge. If at all, the appellants were not careful
enough to find the cause of pregnancy as the victim was only 18
years of age at the time of delivery. But that would not be
translated into criminality.
10. The term “knowledge”has been interpreted by this Court in AS
Krishnan and Others v. State of Kerala1
to mean an awareness
on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind.
Further, a person can be supposed to know only where there is a
direct appeal to his senses. We have gone through the medical
records of the victim which were referred by Mr. Basant R., Senior
Advocate for the appellants. The medical records, which are
1 (2004) 11 SCC 576
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 6 of 8
relied upon by the prosecution, only show that the victim was
admitted in the hospital at 9.15 am and she immediately went into
labour and at 9.25 am she gave birth to a baby. Therefore,
appellant no. 1 attended to the victim for the first time between
9.15 am and 9.25 am on 7th February, 2017. The medical records
of the victim state that she was 18 years’ old as on 7th February,
2017. Appellant no. 1 did not know that the victim was a minor
when she had sexual intercourse.
11. Appellant no. 2 had not even examined the victim and was not in
contact with the victim. As per the medical records relied upon by
the prosecution, the baby was attended to by appellant no. 2 at
5.30 pm on 7th February, 2017. He advised that the baby be
given to the mother. Therefore, appellant no. 2 had no occasion
to examine/treat the victim.
12. Appellant no. 3 had not come in contact with the victim or the
baby at all. Being the administrator of the hospital it was not
possible for her to be aware of the details of each patient.
Considering that the victim was brought to the said hospital for
the first time on 7th February, 2017, it would not be possible for
appellant no. 3 to be aware of the circumstances surrounding the
admission of the victim.
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 7 of 8
13. The knowledge requirement foisted on the appellants cannot be
that they ought to have deduced from circumstances that an
offence has been committed.
14. Accordingly, we are of the view that there is no evidence to
implicate the appellants. Evidence should be such which should
at least indicate grave suspicion. Mere likelihood of suspicion
cannot be the reason to charge a person for an offence.
Accordingly, these appeals are allowed and the proceedings
against the appellants in the aforesaid Sessions Case No. 460 of
2017 are hereby quashed.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 01, 2018.
Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 [ @SLP(Crl.) No. 3712 of 2018] Page 8 of 8

Thursday, August 2, 2018

The intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson by the venting of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud playing of the tape recorder = On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can safely be concluded that the occurrence took place in the heat of the moment and the assault was made without premeditation at the spur of time. The fact that the Appellant may have rushed to his house across the road and returned with a sword, is not sufficient to infer an intention to kill, both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the single assault by the Appellant, coupled with the duration of the entire episode for 1½ to 2 minutes. Had there been any intention to do away with the life of the deceased, 4 nothing prevented the Appellant from making a second assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away. The intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson by the venting of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud playing of the tape recorder. But in the nature of weapon used, the assault made in the rib cage area, knowledge that death was likely to ensue will have to be attributed to the Appellant. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the Appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and are satisfied that it deserves to be altered to Section 304 PartII I.P.C. It is ordered accordingly.

NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.545 OF 2011
DEEPAK ....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(NOW UTTARAKHAND) ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The Appellant assails the reversal of his acquittal, and
consequent conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. sentencing
him to life imprisonment.
2. On 27.08.1993 at about 8.30 a.m., irked by the loud
noise of the tape recorder being played by the deceased in
1
his house, the Appellant had a verbal altercation with the
deceased which culminated in a single sword blow by the
Appellant in the rib cage area of the deceased.
3. The M.L.C. of the injured was done at 8.45 a.m. by
PW.8 Dr. S.K. Prabhakar who found an incised wound of
2½ cm x 2 cm. The injured was deceased the same day.
The post mortem was done the same day at 3.30 p.m. by
PW5 Dr. P.K. Bhatnagar, who found
“Punctured wound 2 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep
just above upper border of the left lower rib on
lateral side of chest 9 cm away from umbilicus
at 2 O’clock position with surgical dressing”.
4. The Trial Court granted the benefit of doubt to the
Appellant. The High Court on reappreciation of the
evidence, particularly the testimony of PW4 Omwati, an
injured witness, and other eyewitnesses PW1 Babu Ram,
PW2 Ram Kumar and PW3 Kalu Ram, convicted the
Appellant.
2
5. We have considered the submissions made
respectively on behalf of the parties. The trial court has laid
exaggerated emphasis, by erroneous appreciation of
evidence, on minor omissions and contradictions in the
evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 so as to doubt the
veracity of the entire prosecution case without any
discussion of the injured eye witness PW4. The High Court
upon reappreciation of the evidence has correctly held that
the evidence of PW4 stands corroborated by the other three
prosecution witnesses.
6. It is manifest from the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses that the Appellant and the deceased lived
opposite each other across the road. Their houses were
separated by a distance of approximately 2025 feet by the
road inbetween. The genesis of the occurrence was the
3
loud playing of a tape recorder in the house of the
deceased, objected to by the Appellant. A verbal argument
ensued. The Appellant rushed across to his house, came
back with a sword and delivered a single blow to the
deceased in the rib cage area and then ran away
threatening to see him later. The entire altercation is stated
to have lasted for 1½ to 2 minutes.
7. On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can
safely be concluded that the occurrence took place in the
heat of the moment and the assault was made without premeditation
at the spur of time. The fact that the Appellant
may have rushed to his house across the road and returned
with a sword, is not sufficient to infer an intention to kill,
both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the
single assault by the Appellant, coupled with the duration
of the entire episode for 1½ to 2 minutes. Had there been
any intention to do away with the life of the deceased,
4
nothing prevented the Appellant from making a second
assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away.
The intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson
by the venting of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud
playing of the tape recorder. But in the nature of weapon
used, the assault made in the rib cage area, knowledge that
death was likely to ensue will have to be attributed to the
Appellant.
8. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are unable to sustain the
conviction of the Appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and are
satisfied that it deserves to be altered to Section 304 PartII
I.P.C. It is ordered accordingly. Considering the period of
custody undergone after his conviction, we alter the
sentence to the period of custody already undergone. The
Appellant may be released forthwith if not required in any
other case.
5
9. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with the
aforesaid modification of the conviction and sentence.
…………...................J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
…………...................J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
…………...................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 01, 2018
6

the regularisation of daily wage or contract workers on different posts.= Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularisation Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation like misconduct etc. - We may add that that it would be worthwhile for the State of Jharkhand to henceforth consider making regular appointments only and dropping the idea of making irregular appointments so as to short circuit the process of regular appointments.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7423-7429 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 19832-19838 OF 2017)
Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Etc. ....Appellants
versus
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. Etc. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated
17th November, 2016 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Jharkhand in a batch of writ petitions relating to the regularisation of
daily wage or contract workers on different posts. The writ petitioners
(now appellants) were denied the benefit of regularisation in view of the
provisions of the Jharkhand Sarkar ke Adhinasth Aniyamit Rup se Niyukt
Ewam Karyarat Karmiyo ki Sewa Niyamitikaran Niyamawali, 2015
(hereinafter referred to as the Regularisation Rules).
3. The admitted position is that the appellants are irregularly
appointed employees of the State Government. They sought
C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 1 of 7
regularisation of their status on the ground that they had put in more than
10 years of service and were therefore entitled to be regularised. The
High Court took the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and
Ors.1
did not permit their regularisation since they had not worked for 10
years on the cut-off date of 10th April, 2006 when the Constitution Bench
rendered its decision. According to the High Court, the Regularisation
Rules provided a one-time measure of regularisation of the services of
irregularly appointed employees based on the cut-off date of 10th April,
2006 in terms of the judgment of the Constitution Bench. Therefore,
since the appellants had not put in 10 years of service they could not be
regularised.
4. The appellants had contended before the High Court that the State
of Jharkhand was created only on 15th November, 2000 and therefore no
one could have completed 10 years of service with the State of Jharkhand
on the cut-off date of 10th April, 2006. Therefore, no one could get the
benefit of the Regularisation Rules which made the entire legislative
exercise totally meaningless. The appellants had pointed out in the High
Court that the State had issued Resolutions on 18th July, 2009 and 19th
July, 2009 permitting the regularisation of some employees of the State,
who had obviously not put in 10 years of service with the State.
1(2006) 4 SCC 1
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Consequently, it was submitted that the appellants were discriminated
against for no fault of theirs and in an irrational manner.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having considered
the decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) as well as the
subsequent decision of this Court explaining Umadevi (3) in State of
Karnataka and Ors. v. M.L. Kesari and Ors.2
, we are of the view that
the High Court has erred in taking an impractical view of the directions in
Umadevi (3) as well as its consideration in Kesari.
6. The decision in Umadevi (3) was intended to put a full stop to the
somewhat pernicious practice of irregularly or illegally appointing daily
wage workers and continuing with them indefinitely. In fact, in
paragraph 49 of the Report, it was pointed out that the rule of law
requires appointments to be made in a constitutional manner and the State
cannot be permitted to perpetuate an irregularity in the matter of public
employment which would adversely affect those who could be employed
in terms of the constitutional scheme. It is for this reason that the concept
of a one-time measure and a cut-off date was introduced in the hope and
expectation that the State would cease and desist from making irregular
or illegal appointments and instead make appointments on a regular basis.
7. The concept of a one-time measure was further explained in Kesari
in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Report which read as follows:
2 (2010) 9 SCC 247
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“9. The term “one-time measure” has to be understood in its
proper perspective. This would normally mean that after the
decision in Umadevi (3), each department or each instrumentality
should undertake a one-time exercise and prepare a list of all
casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working
for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and
tribunals and subject them to a process verification as to whether
they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite
qualification for the post and if so, regularise their services.
10. At the end of six months from the date of decision
in Umadevi (3), cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual
employees were still pending before courts. Consequently,
several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the
one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some
government departments or instrumentalities undertook the onetime
exercise excluding several employees from consideration
either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or
due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who
were entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of the decision
in Umadevi (3), will not lose their right to be considered for
regularisation, merely because the one-time exercise was
completed without considering their cases, or because the sixmonth
period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) has expired.
The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad
hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of continuous
service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of any
interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the
one-time exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3), but did not
consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the
benefit of para 53 of Umadevi (3), the employer concerned
should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the one-time
exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all
the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of para
53 of Umadevi (3), are so considered.
11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi
(3) is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more
than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any
interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision
in Umadevi (3) was rendered, are considered for regularisation in
view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the
departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of
employing persons on daily-wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long
periods and then periodically regularise them on the ground that
they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the
C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 4 of 7
constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and
appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons
who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the
date of decision in Umadevi (3)] without the protection of any
interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing
the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for
regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken
such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision
in Umadevi (3) or that such exercise was undertaken only in
regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the
right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above
directions in Umadevi (3) as a one-time measure.”
8. The purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi (3) was
therefore two-fold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in
the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those who had been
irregularly appointed in the past. The fact that the State of Jharkhand
continued with the irregular appointments for almost a decade after the
decision in Umadevi (3) is a clear indication that it believes that it was all
right to continue with irregular appointments, and whenever required,
terminate the services of the irregularly appointed employees on the
ground that they were irregularly appointed. This is nothing but a form of
exploitation of the employees by not giving them the benefits of
regularisation and by placing the sword of Damocles over their head. This
is precisely what Umadevi (3) and Kesari sought to avoid.
9. If a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting the spirit of the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3), is to be taken into
consideration then no irregularly appointed employee of the State of
C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 5 of 7
Jharkhand could ever be regularised since that State came into existence
only on 15th November, 2000 and the cut-off date was fixed as 10th April,
2006. In other words, in this manner the pernicious practice of
indefinitely continuing irregularly appointed employees would be
perpetuated contrary to the intent of the Constitution Bench.
10. The High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand ought to have
considered the entire issue in a contextual perspective and not only from
the point of view of the interest of the State, financial or otherwise – the
interest of the employees is also required to be kept in mind. What has
eventually been achieved by the State of Jharkhand is to short circuit the
process of regular appointments and instead make appointments on an
irregular basis. This is hardly good governance.
11. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularisation
Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they
have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the
Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service
rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should
be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation
like misconduct etc.
12. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set
aside in view of our conclusions. The State should take a decision within
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four months from today on regularisation of the status of the appellants.
13. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
14. We may add that that it would be worthwhile for the State of
Jharkhand to henceforth consider making regular appointments only and
dropping the idea of making irregular appointments so as to short circuit
the process of regular appointments.
………………………J.
(Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi; .……………………..J.
August 01, 2018 (Deepak Gupta)
C.A. Nos.7423-7429 of 2018 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 19832-19838 of 2017) Page 7 of 7

enhancement of sentence=the victim has sustained a grievous injury on a vital portion of the body, i.e. the head, which was fractured. The doctor has opined that the injury was life threatening. Hence, in our considered opinion, the High Court was too lenient in imposing the sentence of six days only which was the period already undergone by the accused in confinement. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The accused (respondent herein) is imposed with a sentence of 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) for the offences under Section 325, IPC. In case of default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. In case the fine is deposited by the convicted accused, the same shall be disbursed in favour of the injured PW2, viz. Kapurchand as compensation. The accused/respondent be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentence. However, he is entitled to the benefit of set-off of the period already

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