when recovery proved - non examination of other witness is of no consequences =The recovery of the atlas cycle on the confession of the appellant, identified by PW­7 as belonging to him, as also the recovery of the milk can on the same basis with the name of PW­7 inscribed on it with nail polish and the fact that the appellant was absconding after the occurrence till his arrest on 16.09.2007 7 are additional incriminating factors which complete the links in the chain of circumstances. The recovery having been proved by PW­7, the failure to examine the other seizure witness, Kheda, is of no consequence.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1892 OF 2017
SATPAL .........APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA .....RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The appellant assails his conviction under Section 302 read
with Section 201 I.P.C., by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar
in case No.54­SC (RBT) of 2008, affirmed by the High Court,
based on the last seen theory.
2. PW­7, Krishan Kumar lodged an F.I.R. on 11.09.2007 with
regard to his missing nephew, the deceased Kapil Kumar who was
thirteen   years   old.   The   deceased   had   gone   to   the   village   the
previous evening at about 6:00 PM to deliver milk to customers.
The   witness   and   his   relative   PW­9,   Richhpal   had   seen   the
1
deceased with the appellant at about 9:00 PM on the Khairpur
Road, Sarangpur, going on a bicycle together. The deceased did
not return home at night. His dead body was found the next
morning lying concealed in a heap of dry fodder in the fields of
Subhash.   The appellant was stated to have had an altercation
with the deceased a few days ago with regard to payment of milk.
The disclosure by the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act after his arrest, led to recovery of the atlas bicycle belonging
to PW­7, and the milk can with the name of the witness inscribed
on it.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellant assailing the conviction,
submitted   that   the   dead   body   was   found   at   a   considerable
distance from where he was last seen with the deceased and in
the opposite direction.   It is highly unlikely that the appellant
would have carried the dead body for the long distance.   The
recovery is planted, as the second seizure witness Kheda had not
been examined.  The appellant would not have hidden the bicycle
and the milk can near his own house to facilitate his implication.
The story of the milk can and an altercation few days earlier in
2
Court, were improvements as no such statement had been made
by PW­7 in the FIR or statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
4. There was a contradiction between the evidence of PW­7 and
PW­9 with regard to intimation given to the Sarpanch at night
itself.  There was also a contradiction between the statement of
the two witnesses with regard to time when the dead body was
discovered   and   the   police   reached   the   spot.     There   was   no
evidence with regard to the bicycle as belonging to PW­7.   The
father of the deceased, PW­8, Subhash had come to the village in
the morning itself looking for his son which is suggestive that the
deceased was missing since earlier creating doubts about the last
seen theory.  Alternately, if the deceased was missing since the
previous night, the conduct of PW­7 in not informing PW­8 at
night itself was highly unnatural.  PW­7 and PW­9 were thus not
reliable   witnesses.     To   sustain   a   conviction   on   basis   of
circumstantial evidence, it was necessary that all links in the
chain of circumstances must be complete leading to the only
hypothesis for guilt of the accused.  If there were any missing link
in the chain of circumstances and the possibility of innocence
cannot   be   ruled   out,   the   benefit   of   doubt   must   be   given   by
3
acquittal.  Any recovery on basis of confession, under Section 27
of the Evidence Act, cannot form the basis for conviction. 
5. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the deceased
was last seen with the appellant the previous night at about 9.00
PM going on a bicycle and did not return at night.  The dead body
was found next morning in the vicinity of the area they were last
seen together.   The post­mortem conducted on 12.09.2007 at
2:15 PM estimates the time elapsed since death as 24­36 hours
and which coincides with when the deceased was last seen with
the appellant.  Motive for the crime existed.  The conduct of the
appellant   in   absconding   after   the   occurrence   is   also   an
incriminating factor against him.  PW­7 had identified the bicycle
as belonging to him and the milk can had his name inscribed on
it. 
6. We   have   considered   the   respective   submissions   and   the
evidence on record.  There is no eye witness to the occurrence but
only circumstances coupled with the fact of the deceased having
been last seen with the appellant.   Criminal jurisprudence and
4
the   plethora   of   judicial   precedents   leave   little   room   for
reconsideration of the basic principles for invocation of the last
seen theory as a facet of circumstantial evidence.   Succinctly
stated, it may be a weak kind of evidence by itself to found
conviction upon the same singularly.  But when it is coupled with
other circumstances such as the time when the deceased was last
seen with the accused, and the recovery of the corpse being in
very close proximity of time, the accused owes an explanation
under   Section   106   of   the   Evidence   Act   with   regard   to   the
circumstances under which death may have taken place. If the
accused offers no explanation, or furnishes a wrong explanation,
absconds,   motive   is   established,   and   there   is   corroborative
evidence available inter alia in the form of recovery or otherwise
forming a chain of circumstances leading to the only inference for
guilt of the accused, incompatible with any possible hypothesis of
innocence, conviction can be based on the same.  If there be any
doubt or break in the link of chain of circumstances, the benefit
of doubt must go to the accused.  Each case will therefore have to
be examined on its own facts for invocation of the doctrine.
5
7. Both PW­7 and PW­9 have consistently stated having seen
the deceased going with the appellant on a bicycle at 9.00 PM the
previous evening.   The deceased did not return home at night.
The appellant was also not to be found at home.  The corpse of
the deceased was recovered the next morning hidden in a heap of
fodder in the fields.  The FIR was lodged promptly on 11.09.2007
naming the appellant as a suspect.  An FIR is not to be read as
an encyclopedia requiring every minute detail of the occurrence to
be mentioned therein.   The absence of any mention in it with
regard to the previous altercation, or the presence of the milk
can, cannot affect its veracity so as to doubt the entire case of the
prosecution.   The   altercation   suffices   to   establish   motive.   The
appellant has not led any evidence regarding his not being in the
company of the deceased or that they had subsequently parted
ways.   The   appellant   has   not   led   any   evidence,   despite   his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he would do so, why he
did not return home at night or his whereabouts otherwise. PW­8,
father   of   the   deceased,   was   informed   in   the   morning   of
11.09.2007  by   PW­7  after  which   he   came   to  the  village.   The
6
deceased was a thirteen year old hardly in a position to resist the
appellant.  We see no reason why the two witnesses being related
to the deceased would depose falsely and shield the real offender,
especially when the appellant has not given any reason or led any
evidence for his false implication. 
8. The post­mortem was done on 12.09.2007 at about 2:15 PM
by PW­12, Dr. Sunil Gambhir opining that death was due to
strangulation by manual throttling.  The time elapsed since death
has been estimated as 24 to 36 hours.  The witness has deposed
that death could be estimated to have occurred at about 10.00
PM on 10.09.2007.  The body has been recovered in the vicinity of
where the deceased was last seen with the appellant.   The fact
that it may be in the opposite direction is hardly relevant.
9.    The recovery of the atlas cycle on the confession of the
appellant, identified by PW­7 as belonging to him, as also the
recovery of the milk can on the same basis with the name of PW­7
inscribed on it with nail polish and the fact that the appellant was
absconding  after  the   occurrence  till   his  arrest   on   16.09.2007
7
are additional incriminating factors which complete the links in
the chain of circumstances.  The recovery having been proved by
PW­7, the failure to examine the other seizure witness, Kheda, is
of no consequence. 
10. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we
find no reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellant.
11. The appeal is dismissed.
………………………………….J.
 (Kurian Joseph)
………………………………….J.
 (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)
.……….………………………..J.
   (Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
May 01, 2018
8

seven circumstances set out by the High Court for holding the appellants guilty cannot be faulted with = Chandra Bhawan Singh-the appellant herein was the first to lodge the FIR about the incident wherein he stated that Satyawati has committed suicide. Apparently, this fact proves that first, he was present in the house where Satyawati was found dead and second, he falsely stated that Satyawati committed suicide because he wanted to divert the attention of the police from the reality. - both the accused (appellants herein) in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 failed to give any explanation when asked about the circumstances in which the incident occurred in their house. When the incident admittedly occurred in their house, the appellants were required to explain the circumstances in which Satyawati died. They, however, failed to give any explanation. We also find that Tribuhuwan Singh said that he was not present in the house at the time of the occurrence and on that day he was in Allahabad. He also failed to adduce any evidence to prove this fact.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 654 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.7049 of 2014)
Chandra Bhawan Singh ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Uttar Pradesh ….Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 655 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 7664 of 2014)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are filed by the accused persons
against the final judgment and order dated 20.05.2014
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in Criminal Appeal No.1114 of 1986 whereby the High
1
Court dismissed the appeal in respect of the
appellants-accused and affirmed the judgment and
order dated 07.05.1986 passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Fatehpur in Sessions Trial No. 291 of
1984.
3. In order to appreciate the issues involved in the
appeals, it is necessary to set out the facts of the case.
4. Four persons, namely, (1) Tribhuwan Singh
(appellant), (2) Chandra Bhawan Singh (appellant) (3)
Smt. Makoi Devi and (4) Jwala Singh were prosecuted
for committing murder of one lady by name
"Satyawati".
5. The Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehpur by his
judgment dated 07.05.1986 in Sessions Trial No. 291
of 1984 acquitted one accused-Jwala Singh but
convicted the remaining three accused. Tribhuwan
Singh was convicted under Section 302/34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
2
“IPC”) and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for
life and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- in default of
payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year. Smt. Makoi Devi was
convicted under Section 302/34 IPC and was
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Chandra
Bhawan Singh was convicted under Section 32/34 IPC
and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life
and further convicted under Section 201 IPC and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five
years. All the sentences of Chandra Bhawan Singh
would run concurrently.
6. The aforementioned three-convicted accused felt
aggrieved of their respective conviction and sentence
awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge filed appeal
in the High Court. The High Court, by impugned
judgment, allowed the appeal in respect of one
accused – Smt. Makoi Devi and accordingly acquitted
3
her from the charges leveled against her but dismissed
the appeal in respect of remaining two accused
persons, namely, (1) Tribhuwan Singh and (2)
Chandra Bhawan Singh and accordingly confirmed
their conviction and the sentence awarded by the
Additional Sessions Judge.
7. The remaining two accused felt aggrieved by their
respective conviction and award of sentence filed
separate special leave petitions in this Court.
8. So far as SLP(Crl.) No. 7049 of 2014 is
concerned, it is filed by Chandra Bhawan Singh
whereas SLP(Crl.) No. 7664 of 2014 is concerned, it is
filed by Tribhuwan Singh.
9. In both these special leave petitions, the
challenge is to the impugned judgment of the High
Court, which has confirmed their conviction and
sentence.
10. In short, the case of the prosecution is as under:
4
11. All the four accused named above are the
members of one family. Smt. Makoi Devi is the mother
of Tribhuwan Singh and Chandra Bhawan Singh. In
other words, Tribhuwan Singh and Chandra Bhawan
Singh are real brothers being the two sons of Smt.
Makoi Devi.
12. The deceased-Satyawati was the wife of
Tribhuwan Singh. Their marriage was performed in the
year 1981. Satyawati stayed in her matrimonial home
with her husband for 8 days and then returned to her
parents’ house.
13. It is the case of the prosecution that the members
of Satyawati in-laws family, which included the four
accused named above, were harassing her while she
was staying in her in-laws house for not bringing any
dowry in her marriage. The family members had been
demanding "motor cycle" in dowry. Due to constant
harassment given to her by the aforementioned four
5
accused persons, it had become unbearable for her to
stay in the house and, therefore, she returned to her
parents’ house and started living with her parents.
14. On 15.03.1984, Jwala Singh and Chandra
Bhawan Singh went to Satywati's parents’ house and
brought Satyawati back to her in-laws house. On
18.03.1984 (after 3 days), Satyawati was found dead
in her in-laws house. She died due to gun shot
injuries.
15. Chandra Bhawan Singh-the elder brother of
Tribhuwan Singh lodged a FIR in the Police Station,
Kishanpur on the same day, i.e., 18.03.1984,
informing therein that Satyawati committed suicide in
the house by gun shot injuries and that her dead body
was lying in the courtyard of the house. One FIR was
also lodged by village Pradhan. It was registered as FIR
No. 30/1984 (GD No. 14/84) at PS Kishanpur. The
brother of the deceased-Rajender (PW-1) lodged the
6
FIR on the same day stating therein that all the four
accused named above have killed his sister because of
non-fulfillment of their demand for dowry.
16. On 19/20.04.1984, all the four accused persons
were arrested. In the investigation, the police recovered
the Gun at the instance of Tribhuwan Singh from his
house, which was alleged to be used in commission of
the offence. The post mortem of the dead body was
performed which disclosed that Satyawati was
murdered. The police then made further investigation,
collected evidence, obtained ballistic report from the
experts and recorded the statements of the accused
persons and other witnesses.
17. On 09.06.1984 the police filed Challan. The case
was committed to the Additional Sessions Judge,
Fatehpur for trial. The Additional Sessions Judge
framed charges against the four accused persons for
commission of the offences punishable under Sections
7
302/34 and 201 of IPC read with Section 4 of the DP
Act. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove
their case.
18. By order dated 07.05.1986, the Additional
Sessions Judge acquitted Jwala Singh finding no
evidence against him but convicted Tribhuwan Singh
(husband), Smt. Makoi Devi (mother-in-law) and
Chandra Bhawan Singh (brother-in-law) and
sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment for
killing Satyawati.
19. Thribhuwan Singh, Smt Makoi Devi and Chandra
Bhawan Singh felt aggrieved and filed appeal in the
High Court at Allahabad against their conviction and
sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge.
20. By impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by Tribhuwan Singh and
Chandra Bhawan Singh and accordingly upheld their
conviction and sentence. However, the High Court
8
acquitted Smt. Makoi Devi (mother-in-law) from all the
charges finding no evidence against her.
21. It is against this judgment, the accused
Tribhuwan Singh and Chandra Bhawan Singh have
filed the present two appeals by way of special leave in
this Court.
22. So far as acquittal of Jwala Singh and Smt.
Makoi Devi is concerned, it has attained finality
because the State did not file any appeal in the High
Court and nor in this Court.
23. Heard Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel
for the appellants(accused) and Mr. Ratnakar Dash,
learned senior counsel for the respondent(State).
24. Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel for the
appellants(accused) while assailing the legality and
correctness of the impugned judgment contended that
firstly, the conviction of both the appellants, though
9
concurrent in nature, is neither factually and nor
legally sustainable.
25. In the Second place, he contended that since the
entire case of prosecution is founded on circumstantial
evidence, it was necessary for the prosecution to have
adduced evidence to prove the complete chain of
events. Learned counsel contended that there is no
evidence much less sufficient evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the chain of events leading to the
guilt of committing the murder of Satyawati by the
appellants and hence the conviction is bad in law.
26. In the third place, learned counsel to support his
second submission took us through the evidence with
a view to show that chain of events to prove the guilt
qua the appellants is not established.
27. In the fourth place, learned counsel contended
that the circumstances appearing in the case from the
10
evidence would show that Satyawati committed
suicide.
28. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent
(State) supported the reasoning and the conclusion
arrived at by both the Courts below and prayed for
dismissal of the appeals calling for no interference in
the concurrent findings of both the Courts below.
29. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no
merit in the appeals.
30. In our opinion, both the Courts below properly
appreciated the evidence and came to a right
conclusion that the appellants were responsible for
commission of the offence of murder of Satyawati.
31. It is a settled principle of law that when the
Courts below have recorded concurrent findings
against the accused persons which are based on due
appreciation of evidence, this Court under Article 136
11
of the Constitution of India would be slow to interfere
in such concurrent findings and secondly would not
appreciate the evidence de novo unless it is prima facie
shown that both the Courts below did not either
consider the relevant piece of evidence or there exists
any perversity or/and absurdity in the findings
recorded by both the Courts below etc.
32. We, however, made endeavour to peruse the
evidence with a view to find out as to whether the
concurrent findings of both the Courts below have any
kind of infirmity or/and whether the concurrent
findings are capable of being legally and factually
sustainable in law or need to be reversed. Having gone
through the evidence, we are of the view that the
findings are legally and factually sustainable.
33. We find that there is evidence to prove the factum
of demand of dowry. Rajender(PW-1) is the real
brother of the deceased. He was the complainant. His
12
evidence was rightly relied on by the two Courts below
for holding that the appellants were persistently
making a demand of dowry (motor cycle) from
Satyawati and her family members and they used to
harass her for such cause. The testimony of PW-1 is
natural and consistent having no material
contradiction, we, therefore, find no justification to
disbelieve it. The same deserves to be accepted.
34. So far as the story of suicide set up by the
appellants is concerned, it is, in our view, wholly
unbelievable on the evidence brought on record.
35. First, it is not possible rather difficult for a
person to commit suicide by using DBBL Gun; Second,
it has come in evidence that there were as many as 7
gun shot injuries noticed on the body of Satyawati. In
our view, It is not possible for a person to commit
suicide by firing seven gun shots one after the other on
his/her body with the use of DBBL Gun in hands.
13
However, one can commit suicide by firing one shot
with a pistol. Such was, however, not the case of the
appellants.
36. Coming to the involvement of the appellants in
commission of the offence, we find that the High Court
relied on the following circumstances appearing
against the appellants for holding them guilty of
commission of the offence of murder of Satyawati.
These circumstances are extracted hereinbelow:
“Here prosecution has discharged its part
of the burden by leading evidence of which it
was capable by substantiating the fact (i) that
there has been demand of dowry (ii) deceased
has been taken to her in laws house (iii) at the
time of death, deceased has been staying with
her in laws and appellants are the inmates of
the house (iv) death in question has taken
place inside the house (v) injuries caused
clearly reflects that it is case of murder (vi)
story of suicide set up by appellant No.3 was
not at all supported by medical evidence (vii)
DBBL gun has been used in the commission of
offence and once chain of events are clearly
linked up then in view of Section 106 of
Evidence Act, as young bride in question has
been killed inside the house, then there is
corresponding burden on the inmates of the
house to give cogent explanation as to how the
crime was committed. The inmates of the
house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet
14
and offering no explanation on the supposed
premise that the burden to establish its case
lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is
no duty at all on an accused to offer any
explanation. The principle is that when an
incriminating circumstance is put to the
accused and said accused does not offer any
explanation which on the face of it is found
false or untrue, then the same becomes
additional link in the chain of circumstances
to make it complete.”
37. In our considered opinion, the aforementioned
seven circumstances set out by the High Court for
holding the appellants guilty cannot be faulted with.
These seven circumstances do establish the chain of
events and being directly connected with the incident
in question, establish the involvement of the
appellants in commission of the offence beyond
reasonable doubt. In our opinion, the test laid down
to prove the guilt by circumstantial evidence in this
case is fully satisfied by the aforementioned seven
circumstances against the appellants.
38. That apart, we also find from the evidence that
Chandra Bhawan Singh-the appellant herein was the
15
first to lodge the FIR about the incident wherein he
stated that Satyawati has committed suicide.
Apparently, this fact proves that first, he was present
in the house where Satyawati was found dead and
second, he falsely stated that Satyawati committed
suicide because he wanted to divert the attention of
the police from the reality. As held above, no evidence
was led to prove that it was a case of suicide.
39. We also find that both the accused (appellants
herein) in their statements recorded under Section 313
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 failed to give any
explanation when asked about the circumstances in
which the incident occurred in their house. When the
incident admittedly occurred in their house, the
appellants were required to explain the circumstances
in which Satyawati died. They, however, failed to give
any explanation.
16
40. We also find that Tribuhuwan Singh said that he
was not present in the house at the time of the
occurrence and on that day he was in Allahabad. He
also failed to adduce any evidence to prove this fact.
41. We are, therefore, of the considered view that
both the Courts below rightly held the appellants
guilty for commission of the offence in question and,
therefore, we find no good ground to take a different
view than what is taken by the two Courts below.
42. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
fail and are accordingly dismissed.
 ………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


 …...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
May 01, 2018
17

arbitration - Jurisdiction of India courts -challenged the legality, validity and correctness of the award made by the arbitrators in respondent's favour in one international commercial arbitration proceeding between the appellant (Union of India) and the respondent (foreign company).= In our opinion, though, the question regarding the “seat” and “venue” for holding arbitration proceedings by the arbitrators arising under the Arbitration Agreement/International Commercial Arbitration Agreement is primarily required to be decided keeping in view the terms of the arbitration agreement itself, but having regard to the law laid down by this Court in several decisions by the Benches of variable strength as detailed above, and further taking into consideration the aforementioned submissions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and also keeping in view the issues involved in the appeal, which frequently arise in International Commercial Arbitration matters, we are of the considered view that this is a fit case to exercise our power under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court 12 Rules, 2013 and refer this case (appeal ) to be dealt with by the larger Bench of this Court for its hearing We, accordingly direct the Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting the appropriate Bench for hearing and disposal of this appeal.

 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPERAL NO. 4628 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.31356 of 2016]
Union of India .. Appellant(s)
Versus
Hardy Exploration and Production
(India) INC .. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal arises from the final judgment and
order dated 27.07.2016 passed by the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No.59 of 2016 whereby the
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
appeal filed by the Union of India (appellant herein)
1
challenging the order dated 09.07.2015 passed by
the Single Judge in OMP No.693 of 2013 and order
dated 20.01.2016 in Review Petition No.400 of 2015
in OMP No.693 of 2013.
3) In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in the appeal, few relevant facts, which lie in a
narrow compass, need to be stated hereinbelow.
4) This appeal arises out of the proceedings (OMP
693/2013) filed by the appellant (Union of India)
against the respondent-Company under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) wherein the
appellant had challenged the legality, validity and
correctness of the award made by the arbitrators in
respondent's favour in one international commercial
arbitration proceeding between the appellant (Union
of India) and the respondent (foreign company).
2
5) The respondent contested the appellant's
application by raising several objections. One such
preliminary objection, which went to the root of the
application, was in relation to the maintainability of
appellant's application filed under Section 34 of the
Act in Courts in India.
6) According to the respondent, the Indian Courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's
application filed under Section 34 of the Act to
challenge the legality and correctness of an award in
question.
7) The Single Judge by order dated 09.07.2015
upheld the respondent's preliminary objection and
held that keeping in view the terms of the agreement
in question coupled with the law laid down by this
Court in several decisions governing the issues
arising in the case, Indian Courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the
3
appellant under Section 34 of the Act to question the
legality and correctness of the award in question and
accordingly dismissed the appellant's application as
being not maintainable in Indian Courts.
8) Since the appellant's application was dismissed
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Indian
Courts, the Single Judge did not consider it
necessary to decide the issues arising in the case on
the merits.
9) The appellant (Union of India) felt aggrieved by
the order of the Single Judge, filed appeal under
Section 37(2) of the Act before the Division Bench of
the High Court at Delhi.
10) By impugned judgment, the Division Bench
concurred with the reasoning and the conclusion
arrived at by the Single Judge and held that the
Indian Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain the
appellant's application under Section 34 of the Act to
4
question the legality of award rendered in
international commercial arbitration proceedings.
11) It is against this order, the Union of India felt
aggrieved and has filed the present appeal by special
leave in this Court.
12) Heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the appellant and Dr. Abhishek
Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the
respondent.
13) At the outset, we may state that Mr. Tushar
Mehta, learned ASG appearing for the appellant
(Union of India) and Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent
very ably presented their respective arguments in
support of their case. The arguments indeed lasted
for few months in intervals with lucidity.
14) In their submissions, both the learned senior
counsel argued on almost every issue, which has
5
arisen in the appeal directly, indirectly and even
remotely.
15) Learned counsel, in support of their
submissions, cited almost every decision of this
Court including English Courts decisions which dealt
with the subject and the issues arising in this case
and made sincere attempt to either distinguish
or/and place reliance on them to show how and why
these decisions apply to the facts of the case at hand
or how and why they do not apply.
16) Learned counsel for the parties mainly cited
these cases:
Foreign Cases: Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A.
vs. Compania Internacional De Seguros Del Peru
(1988) (1) Lloyd's Law Reports 116, Hiscox vs.
Outhwaite (1992) 1 AC 562, Union of India vs.
McDonnell Douglas Corpn. (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Law
Rep. 48, C vs. D (2007) EWCA Civ 1282 (CA), C vs. D
6
(2008) 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep 239, Braes of Doune Wind
Farm (Scotland) Limited vs. Alfred McAlpine
Business Services Limited (2008) EWHC 426 (TCC),
Shashoua and Ors. vs. Sharma (2009) EWHC 957
(Comm.), Sulamerica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A.
& Ors. vs. Enesa Engenharia SA & Ors., (2012)
EWCA Civ 638, (1) Enercon GMBH (2) Wobben
Properties GMBH vs. Enercon (India) Ltd. (2012)
EWHC 3711 (Comm), Govt. of India vs. Petrocon
India Ltd. (2016) SCC Online MYFC 35.
Indian Cases: National Thermal Power Corporation
vs. Singer Co. And Ors. (1992) 3 SCC 551,
Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. vs ONGC Ltd.
and Ors. (1998) 1 SCC 305, Sundaram Finance Ltd.
vs. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479, Bhatia
International vs. Bulk Trading S.A. and Anr.(2002)
4 SCC 105, Venture Global Engineering vs. Satyam
Computer Services Ltd. & Anr. (2008) 4 SCC 190,
7
Indtel Technical Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. W.S. Atkins
Rail Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 308, Bank of India & Anr.
vs. K. Mohan Das & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 313,
Citation Infowares Ltd. vs. Equinox Corporation
(2009) 7 SCC 220, State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs.
Ferro Concrete Construction (P) Ltd. (2009) 12
SCC 1, Videocon Industries Limited vs. Union of
India and Anr. (2011) 6 SCC 161, Dozco India
Private Ltd. vs. Doosan Infracore Co. Limited
(2011) 6 SCC 179, Yograj Infrastructure Limited
vs. Ssang Yong Engineering and Construction Co.
Limited (2011) 9 SCC 735, Bharat Aluminium
Company vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services INC (2012) 9 SCC 552, Enercon (India)
Ltd. & Ors. vs. Enercon GMBH & Anr. (2014) 5 SCC
1, Reliance Industries Limited and Anr. Union of
India (2014) 7 SCC 603, Harmony Innovation
Shipping Ltd. vs. Gupta Coal India Ltd. & Anr.,
8
(2015) 9 SCC 172, Union of India vs. Reliance
Industries and Ors.(2015) 10 SCC 213, Bharat
Aluminum Company vs. Kaiser Aluminum
Technical Services INC (2016) 4 SCC 126, Eitzen
Bulk A/S & Ors. vs. Ashapur Minechem Ltd. &
Anr. (2016) 11 SCC 508, Imax Corporation vs
E-City Entertainment(India) Pvt. Ltd. (2017) 5 SCC
331, Roger Shashoua and Ors. vs. Mukesh Sharma
& Ors., 2017 (14) SCC 722.
17) The argument of both the learned senior
counsel mainly centered around to one question
which, in our opinion, does arise in the appeal,
namely, when the arbitration agreement specify the
“venue” for holding the arbitration sittings by the
arbitrators but does not specify the “seat”, then on
what basis and by which principle, the parties have
to decide the place of “seat” which has a material
bearing for determining the applicability of laws of a
9
particular country for deciding the post award
arbitration proceedings.
18) Several other ancillary questions connected with
the main question were also urged by the learned
senior counsel with the aid of law laid down in the
aforementioned cases and the terms of the
arbitration agreement in question.
19) Learned counsel for the parties also addressed
the Court by pointing out that some decisions which
have bearing over the questions arising in this appeal
have been rendered by the Constitution Bench, some
by Three Judge Bench and remaining by the Two
Judge Bench.
20) One of the arguments of Dr. Singhvi, learned
senior counsel was that the decision rendered by
Three Judge Bench in the case of Sumitomo Heavy
Industries Ltd. vs. ONGC Ltd. & Others (supra) on
which great reliance was placed by Mr. Tushar
10
Mehta, learned ASG has lost its efficacy, though
approved by another recent decision of Three Judge
Bench in Bharat Aluminum Company vs. Kaiser
Aluminum Technical Services INC (supra), for the
reason that it was rendered under the Arbitration
Act, 1940 which now stands repealed by Arbitration
Act, 1996 and secondly, it was rendered in relation to
Section 9 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and
Enforcement) Act, 1961 which also now stands
repealed by 1996 Act.
21) It was his submission that while approving the
ratio of Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. (supra)
these two factors which have some relevance on its
efficacy do not seem to have been examined in the
case of Bharat Aluminum Company (supra) .
22) Dr. Singhvi also urged that what is the effect of
UNCITRAL Model Law, when they are made part of
the arbitration agreement for deciding the question of
11
“seat” has also not been so far decided in any of the
earlier decisions.
23) In our opinion, though, the question regarding
the “seat” and “venue” for holding arbitration
proceedings by the arbitrators arising under the
Arbitration Agreement/International Commercial
Arbitration Agreement is primarily required to be
decided keeping in view the terms of the arbitration
agreement itself, but having regard to the law laid
down by this Court in several decisions by the
Benches of variable strength as detailed above, and
further taking into consideration the aforementioned
submissions urged by the learned counsel for the
parties and also keeping in view the issues involved
in the appeal, which frequently arise in International
Commercial Arbitration matters, we are of the
considered view that this is a fit case to exercise our
power under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court
12
Rules, 2013 and refer this case (appeal ) to be dealt
with by the larger Bench of this Court for its hearing.
24) It is for this reason, we refrain from recording
our findings on any of the issues arising in the
appeal and leave the questions/issues to be dealt
with by the appropriate larger Bench.
25) We, accordingly direct the Registry to place the
matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
for constituting the appropriate Bench for hearing
and disposal of this appeal.
.………………………………..J
(R.K. AGRAWAL)
 ..………………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
New Delhi,
May 01, 2018
13

The question for our consideration relates to the interpretation of Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and the meaning of the expression ‘clerical error’. The further question is whether a ‘clerical error’ can be corrected “at any time” or only within a reasonable time.= In our opinion, the correction sought to be made by the respondents is not a ‘clerical error’ and so the further question really does not arise. However, the expression “at any time’ cannot be interpreted to stretch over a period of 25 years, as in the present case. = we hold that the entire Survey No. 1009 was acquired by the APHB for a Housing Scheme. No parcel of land in Survey No.1009 was left out or not acquired. Compensation was paid for acquisition of the entire Survey No.1009. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that 20.18 acres of land in Survey No.1009 had not been acquired.We also hold that the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act was hopelessly delayed for which there is absolutely no explanation forthcoming. In addition, we hold that since third party rights have been created in the meanwhile under the Housing Scheme of the APHB and there is no way to put the clock back. The respondents ought to have been vigilant in pursuing their claim, assuming the claim was legitimate, but since they were not vigilant enough, they must suffer the consequences of their inaction.

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4632-4638 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.21856-21862 OF 2010)
Telangana Housing Board ......Appellant
versus
Azamunnisa Begum (Died) Thru. Lrs. & Ors. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
Leave granted.
1. The question for our consideration relates to the interpretation of
Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act,
1317 Fasli and the meaning of the expression ‘clerical error’. The further
question is whether a ‘clerical error’ can be corrected “at any time” or
only within a reasonable time.
2. In our opinion, the correction sought to be made by the respondents
is not a ‘clerical error’ and so the further question really does not arise.
However, the expression “at any time’ cannot be interpreted to stretch
over a period of 25 years, as in the present case. 
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Land Acquisition Proceedings
3. On 24th May, 1963 a notification was issued under the provisions
of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Land Acquisition
Act). The entire acquisition was of a few thousand acres comprising of
dozens of survey numbers. Amongst others, the acquisition included
survey nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 comprising of 1110.07 acres in
Kukatpally Village, Balanagar Mandal in Ranga Reddy District of
Andhra Pradesh. The entire acquisition was for the purpose of a Housing
Scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board (APHB) framed under
Section 22-A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1956.
4. As is evident, the area was extremely large but it is recorded in
paragraph 4 of the Land Acquisition Award that:
“The lands under acquisition were got surveyed by the Measuring
Circle Inspector of this office and were got checked by the G.D.
Inspector of Hyderabad District, and areas of the lands under
Acquisition were approved by the Land Record Assistant. The
Areas as approved after survey and check are adopted in this
Award.”
5. As far as Survey No. 1009 is concerned an area of 661.04 acres
was sought to be acquired. The notification does not indicate that only a
part of Survey No. 1009 was sought to be acquired. There was no
indication that 661.04 acres of land is only a part of the entire extent of
Survey No.1009. In fact, as suggested in the Award, the entire Survey
No. 1009 along with the entire survey nos. 1043 to 1065 (along with
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several dozen other survey numbers) were sought to be acquired by the
said notification.
6. In paragraph 29 (b) of the Land Acquisition Award it is further
stated:
“The Special Deputy Collector Patancheru has informed vide his
Lr. No.B1/341/67 dated 6.8.67 that he has acquired 5 acres 21
guntas out of survey number 1009 measuring 666.25 acres of
Kukatpally village. The area tallies on the spot hence an area 5
acres 21 guntas is deleted from the area of survey no.1009 of
Kukatpally and award is being passed for the balance area of
661.64 acres out of survey number 1009.”
7. At this stage, we may mention that an area of 5.21 acres in Survey
No. 1009 was earlier acquired for the Manjeera Water Works Department
and hence 661.04 acres was sought to be acquired by the said notification.
8. The acquisition proceedings concluded without any objection
having been raised by the respondents who were admittedly owners of the
land. An Award was passed by the Special Deputy Collector, Land
Acquisition, Andhra Pradesh Housing Board, Hyderabad on 10th June,
1968 and Survey No. 1009 was described in the Award as “dry lands full
of rocks unfit for cultivation and no cultivation is being done.”
9. On 24th June, 1968 the APHB took possession of all the acquired
lands including entire survey nos. 1009 and 1043 to 1065.
10. Dissatisfied with the award of compensation, the respondents filed
a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the claim
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petition it was stated that survey nos. 1009 and 1043 to 1065 comprise of
1121.17 acres. However, compensation was awarded only for 1104.26
acres (5.21 acres relating to Manjeera Water Works Department was not
included in this calculation). Accordingly, it was stated that “11 acres
and odd, they being the property of the claimant, it is not acquired and
they remain to be the property of the claimant.” It is significant to note
that the 11 acres and odd which was sought to be excluded from the
acquisition proceedings by the respondents was not specified or identified
inasmuch as the survey number of this un-acquired area was not stated or
earmarked by the claimants. It is much later that the respondents came to
the conclusion that the allegedly un-acquired 11 acres and odd was a part
of Survey No. 1009.
11. Be that as it may, the compensation was enhanced and ultimately,
settled by this Court sometime in 1992. We are not concerned with the
details of the compensation proceedings any further but have mentioned it
only for the purpose of indicating that:
i) The entire area of survey nos. 1009 and 1043 to 1065 was
acquired. The acquisition consisted of huge areas and
physical measurements were carried out, surveyed, checked
and approved as per the revenue records.
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ii) Possession of the entire land was taken by the APHB for a
Housing Scheme.
iii) Although the respondents made a submission that 11 acres
and odd was not acquired, this area was not identified or
specified as being a part of any particular survey number or
even earmarked.
Proceedings relating to Section 87 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land
Revenue Act, 1317 F.
12. On 7th December, 1993 the respondents moved an application
under the provisions of Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana
Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli (for short the Act). In the
application, it was stated that as per the revenue record pertaining to
Survey No. 1009 the land area is actually 672.14 acres and it incorrectly
shows the area less by 11.10 acres. It was stated in the application that
this area of 11.10 acres was in possession of the respondents. It is for the
first time in 1993 that 11.10 acres was attributed to Survey No. 1009.
Section 87 of the Act reads as follows:-
“Settlement Officer to correct clerical and other errors
admitted by all parties and application for correction of name
to be made within two years:
The Director of Settlements and on making over the settlement
records to the Collector, the Collector may, at any time, correct or
cause to be corrected any clerical error or errors admitted by the
party concerned.
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The aforesaid officer shall hear all applications made within two
years after the introduction of the settlement, for the correction of
any wrong entry of a pattadar’s name in the register referred to in
the preceding section and if satisfied about the error whether such
error has been made through negligence, fraud, or collusion shall
correct the same, notwithstanding that the party concerned does
not admit the error but no such application shall be entertained
after two years, unless reasonable cause is shown to the said
officer for the delay, and in such cases if any error is proved it
shall not be corrected without obtaining the sanction of the
Government.”
13. Acting on the application, the District Collector requested the
Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records for a survey of Survey No.
1009 and to fix the boundaries. The Assistant Director issued notice to
the APHB on 7th July, 1994 for the purposes of carrying out the survey
but according to the APHB the notice was not received. In our opinion,
the non-receipt of the notice is hardly of any relevance.
14. In any event, the Assistant Director submitted a Report on 5th
August, 1994 to the District Collector. In his Report, it was concluded
that the area of Survey No. 1009 was actually 687.03 acres. This
comprised of 661.04 acres (subject matter of consideration before us) and
5.21 acres earlier acquired for Manjeera Water Works Department.
Therefore, according to the Assistant Director there was an excess of
20.18 acres that had not been acquired. It was also noted that IDL was in
possession of some extent of Survey No. 1009. No specification or
details were provided of the area and location of the land in possession of
IDL.
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15. It is also significant to note that while the respondents had been
contending that there was an excess of 11.10 acres that had not been
acquired, the Assistant Director came to the conclusion that 20.18 acres
had not been acquired.
16. At this stage, we may take a slight diversion and refer to a Circular
dated 15th October, 1994 issued by the Commissioner of Survey,
Settlements and Land Records. This Circular concerns itself with Section
87 of the Act it seeks to explain a ‘clerical error’ that could be rectified.
17. The relevant portions of the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 are
paragraphs 4 and 5 and they read as follows:-
“Clarification: There is no time limit for entertaining clerical
errors, and District: Revenue Officer is competent to entertain
clerical errors. The time limit is prescribed only for errors other
than clerical errors. For rectification of errors other than clerical
errors condonation of delay is required, for which District:
Revenue Officer alone is competent. However the District:
Revenue Officer is not competent to carryout correction other
than clerical errors without the approval of the Commissioner,
Survey, Settlement and Land Records.
Clarification: Section 87 of the Land Revenue Act 1317 Fasli
does not provide definition of clerical errors and errors other than
clerical errors. The clerical errors are minor errors which do not
involve alteration in area, change of classification, or change of
name of the pattedar.
A few examples of errors, which come under the category of
clerical errors, are furnished below:-
a. Name of the Pattedar misspelt.
b. Inter-change of survey numbers.
c. Survey no. missing in the survey map.
d. Area is calculated wrongly though measurement on
ground and records support the correct area.
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Since the definition of clerical error and errors other than clerical
errors is not there in the Act, it is not proper to leave it to the
judgment of Assistant Director Survey and Land Records
whether particular survey error falls under the category of clerical
error or errors other than clerical error. Therefore, the Assistant
Director, Survey and Land Records shall send detailed technical
report to Director, Survey Settlement and Land Records,
regarding proposed error. This is purely a technical and nonstatutory
function. The report so sent shall be examined at
Directorate whether the error falls under the category of clerical
error or error other than clerical error and the fact will be
communicated to Assistant Director Survey and Land Records.
On obtaining clearance from the Directorate, the Assistant
Director shall send the file to District Revenue Officer to dispose
of the case at District Revenue Officers level under Section 87 of
the Land Revenue Act, if the error is a clerical error. If the error
is other than clerical error, the District Revenue Officer, shall
send proposals to Commissioner Survey Settlement and Land
Records duly condoning the delay as per rules for disposal of the
case by Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records,
under Section 87-A of Land Revenue Act 1317 fasli.”
18. In response to the application made by the respondents under
Section 87 of the Act and the Report given by the Assistant Director on
5
th August, 1994, the Director of Settlements, Survey and Land Records
wrote to the District Collector on 19th April, 1995 acknowledging that
there is no record of any actual measurement of Survey No. 1009 since it
is a large tract of land. He also stated that variation in calculating the area
apparently in view of the rocky nature of the land could be between 10%
and 30%. The fact that all the survey numbers had been measured, as
mentioned in the Award, was lost sight of.
19. Nevertheless, the Director stated that the measurement exercise
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undertaken by the Assistant Director is technically correct and the area of
Survey No. 1009 is actually 687.03 acres while the recorded area is
666.25 acres (which includes the land acquired for Manjeera Water
Works Department). Therefore, according to the Director the variation is
to the extent of 20.18 acres. The Director also expressed the opinion that
the measurement error falls within the category of ‘clerical error’ as
mentioned in the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 and necessary
corrective action ought to be taken.
20. It is not clear how the APHB learnt of the Report of the Assistant
Director and its acceptance by the Director but in any event, on 10th June,
1996 objections were raised by the APHB before the District Collector to
the Report and the decision to correct the revenue records.
21. On receipt of the objections, the District Collector referred the case
to the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records,
Hyderabad on 1st August, 1996 to consider rectification of the
measurement error.
22. On 15th September, 1997 the Commissioner directed the District
Revenue Officer to take action in terms of the Circular of 15th October,
1994 since there was a clerical error in terms of paragraph 5 of the
Circular. However, the Commissioner also directed that before passing
any orders under Section 87 of the Act the APHB should be heard.
23. It appears that the APHB was thereafter heard by the District
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Revenue Officer who then passed an order on 9th June, 1998 concluding
that in fact the area of Survey No. 1009 was 687.03 acres and that there
was an excess of 20.18 acres that had not been acquired. This was as
against the claim of the respondents that 11.10 acres had not been
acquired. The District Revenue Officer concluded that the APHB had no
right over the area of 20.18 acres and that necessary corrections in terms
of Section 87 of the Act should be made.
24. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the District Revenue
Officer which appears to have been accepted by the higher authorities the
APHB filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section
158 of the Act. This Section reads as follows:
“Appeal from order of Revenue Officer- (1) Except as
otherwise provided in this Act for any other law for the time
being in force, an appeal shall lie against any decision or order
passed by a Revenue Officer under this Act or any other law for
the time being in force, to his immediate superior officer whether
such decision or order may have been passed in the exercise of
original jurisdiction or on appeal.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana
Area) Board of Revenue Regulation, 1358 F., (Regulation LX of
1358F.) an appeal shall lie to the Government from any decision
or order passed by a Collector or Settlement Commissioner
except in the case of any decision or order passed by such officer
on second or third appeal.
(3) and (4) xxx xxxxxx
25. On 24th March, 1999 the Commissioner (Appeals) passed an ex
parte order in the appeal filed by the APHB for maintaining status quo.
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26. It appears that in spite of the status quo order passed by the
Commissioner (Appeals) the revenue records were corrected by issuing a
Supplementary Sethwar. Be that as it may, the respondents challenged
the ex parte order dated 24th March, 1999 by filing a writ petition in the
Andhra Pradesh High Court on 5th April, 1999. The writ petition was
numbered as the W.P. No. 7940 of 1999. Among the grounds taken by
the respondents, in the writ petition, was that the appeal filed by the
APBH was beyond time and an ex parte order ought not to have been
passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
27. On 10th August, 2000 the learned Single Judge hearing the writ
petition passed an interim order to earmark the land in possession of the
APHB and whether it is occupying 661.04 acres or more. In compliance
with the interim order, the Assistant Director gave a Report dated 23rd
June, 2001 to the effect that the area of Survey No. 1009 is 666.25 acres
including 5.21 acres with Manjeera Water Works Department. It is
important to note that the Assistant Director did not report that the area of
Survey No. 1009 was more than 666.25 acres. In other words, there was
a turn-around from the earlier decisions taken in this regard. It was
reported as follows:
“After fixing the boundaries as stated above the land available within
such boundaries surveyed with the help of theodolite (traverse
survey) and arrived the total area as Ac.666.25 gts. which is tallied
with the recorded area of survey no. 1009 as per survey records. The
survey work is concluded on 11.6.2001.
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The details of land showing physical features within survey no.1009
arrived after detailed survey are as under:-
1. Land under the possession of Housing Board Ac. Gts.
covered by built up area 288.00
2. Open land under possession of
Housing Board 358.04
3. Land left for Graveyard/Burial ground
by the Housing Board 15.00
______
661.04
4. Land under Manjeera Pipeline
(Water works Dept.) 5.21
 --------
 Total area of survey no. 1009 666.25
 ---------

A sketch of survey no. 1009 showing the above details is prepared
and submitted herewith.”
28. On 31st October, 2001 the learned Single Judge decided W.P. No.
7940 of 1999 and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to hear the appeal
and pass appropriate orders. In the meanwhile, status quo was directed
to be maintained.
29. Pursuant to the directions given by the learned Single Judge, the
Commissioner (Appeals) heard the appeal filed by APHB. By an order
dated 4th January, 2003 the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the view of
the District Revenue Officer dated 9th June, 1998 and dismissed the
appeal. The Commissioner (Appeals) was of opinion that:
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(i) Only 661.04 acres of land was acquired out of the larger area
in Survey No.1009;
(ii) The claim made by the respondents that 11.10 acres out of
Survey No.1009 was not acquired was not a belated claim;
(iii) The correction sought by the respondents in their claim
under Section 87 of the Act was the correction of a clerical
error under paragraph 5 (d) of the Circular dated 15th
October, 1994.
Proceedings before the learned Single Judge
30. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of its appeal by the
Commissioner (Appeals), a writ petition was filed by APHB in the
Andhra Pradesh High Court and that was numbered as W.P. No. 13927 of
2003.
31. A learned Single Judge of the High Court heard the writ petition
and by a judgment and order dated 19th April, 2005 allowed it and
quashed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
32. The learned Single Judge took the view that Section 87 of the Act
was not applicable to the case and as such the claim made by the
respondents was not maintainable. In addition, it was held that the claim
made by the respondents does not fall within the category of a ‘clerical
error’ and therefore the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 was also not
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applicable. The learned Single Judge made a reference to the failure of
the State and the respondents to produce the record prepared at the time
of survey which could have shown a wrong calculation of area. In this
regard it was held by the learned Single Judge as follows:
“Record prepared at the time of survey is not produced to show
that there is a wrong calculation of area, though the measurement
on ground and record support the correct area. So, entry
regarding extent of S.No.1009 cannot be said to have been made
wrongly due to a clerical mistake. By arriving at the area of a
particular survey number by conducting survey thereof only,
several decades after settlement, and without surveying the areas
in other survey numbers adjacent to that survey number, question
of the original entry in the settlement register was a wrong entry
as a clerical error or not cannot be determined. There is nothing
on record to show that lands in adjacent survey numbers of
S.No.1009 also were surveyed and as to what is the extent found
in such survey, and the extent noted in the settlement register.”
33. With regard to the contention that only 661.04 acres had been
acquired out of Survey No.1009, the learned Single Judge noted that a
declaration had been filed by and on behalf of the respondents under the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973. In that declaration there was nothing to suggest that
the respondents were holding excess land which would have been so had
the respondents been in possession of 11.10 acres. The learned Single
Judge observed as follows:-
“The contention of Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan and his heirs that
since they are in actual physical possession of the land of
Acs.11=10gts in S. No. 1009, even after acquisition by the
petitioner, and so they can make a claim cannot be countenanced
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because by the time A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973 (Act 1 of 1973) and the Urban Land
(Ceilings and Regulation) Act, 1976, came into force Mir
Fazeelath Hussain Khan, who originally filed the application
before the 3rd
 respondent, was alive, and had filed a declaration
under the Act 1 of 1973. He showed the total area covered by S.
Nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 belonging to him as Acs.1109-92 gts.
That extent was deleted from his holding as it was acquired and
by the order dated 09-12-1976, vide common order in
C.C.Nos.156 to 159/W/75 he was held to be holding 0.4083
standard holding in excess even after deleting of an extent of
Acs.1109.92 gts in S. Nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 of Kukatpally
village. If Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan really was in possession
of or was owning any extent over and above the area acquired by
the petitioner either in S. No. 1009 or 1043 to 1065, he would
have had to surrender that area also, because even without that
area being included in his holding he was found to be holding
land in excess of the ceiling area.”
...........................................
“So, it is clear that the family of Raisyar Jung was said to be
holding only land to the extent of Acs.349-63 cents in S.No.1007
but not any land in S. No. 1009. This extent of Acs.11-10 gts now
said to be in the possession of unofficial respondents was not
declared by them or their predecessors in the declaration under
Act 1 of 1973. Had Fazeelath Hussain Khan, who filed the
petition before the District Revenue Officer, or any of the
unofficial respondents or their predecessors-in-title, been in
possession of any extent of land in S. No. 1009 by 01.01.1975
they would have shown it in their declaration filed under Act 1 of
1973. But they did not do so. For that reason also the contention
of the unofficial respondents that they are in possession of some
land in S. No. 1009 and that the extent of S. No. 1009 is more
than that was acquired by the petitioner cannot be believed or
accepted.”
34. The learned Single Judge also dealt with the submission on behalf
of the respondents that the APHB had no locus standi to question the
order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). It was noted that the
APHB was a party to the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals)
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 16 of 31
and therefore it was entitled to question the adverse order. Moreover,
when the authorities assume jurisdiction which they do not possess under
Section 87 of the Act and pass orders likely to affect the interests of the
APHB, a right accrues to the APHB to question such orders passed
without jurisdiction.
35. Since the learned Single Judge concluded that the orders passed by
the District Revenue Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) were
without jurisdiction, there was obviously no occasion to decide the
question whether the claim filed by the respondents was belated or not.
Proceedings before the Division Bench
36. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge on 19th April, 2005, writ appeals being W.A. No. 1311 of
2005 and W.A. No. 1781 of 2005 were filed by the respondents
challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge. By the
impugned judgment and order dated 25th September, 2009 the writ
appeals were allowed by the Division Bench and it is under these
circumstances that the present appeals are before us.
37. The High Court allowed the writ appeals primarily on two
submissions. It was held by the Division Bench that a report of the
survey authorities had confirmed that the area of land in Survey No. 1009
was more than 661.04 acres. Admittedly, only 661.04 acres had been
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 17 of 31
acquired out of Survey No. 1009. Therefore, the APHB was entitled to
hold only 661.04 acres while the balance had not been acquired and
therefore the ownership remained with the respondents. According to the
Division Bench, there was a clerical error in the measurement area of
Survey No. 1009 and therefore paragraph 5(d) of the Circular dated 15th
October, 1994 was applicable and the authorities were entitled to correct
the calculation error.
38. The second ground given by the Division Bench was with
reference to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling
on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. In this context, it was held that
since the respondents were not holding the land, they could not have
made a declaration as envisaged under the provisions of the said Act and
in any event this was hardly of any relevance since Survey No. 1009
indicates that the area of that survey number was greater than 661.04
acres. However, what is of significance is the conclusion arrived at by
the Division Bench that the respondents were not in possession of 11.10
acres in Survey No. 1009. Possession of the entire Survey No. 1009 was
with the APHB.
Discussion
39. In our opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court has seriously
erred in setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge.
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 18 of 31
40. It is quite clear to us that the APHB had acquired, in terms of the
Award dated 10th June, 1968 a couple of thousand acres of land covering
a few dozen survey numbers. The entire land was acquired and in view
of the large area of acquisition even if there was some error in describing
the area of a particular survey number, that would be inconsequential
given the overall acquisition and its purpose for a Housing Scheme under
Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act.
41. In addition, it is quite clear from the extracted passages in the
Award, that the entire land in Survey No.1009 was acquired by the
APHB. There cannot be any doubt in this regard, particularly since the
APHB also took possession of the entire Survey No.1009.
42. While it is correct that the respondents did submit in their claim
petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that 11 acres
and odd had not been acquired, there was absolutely no reference to any
survey number in which this 11 acres and odd was located. There was no
clear identification of the land, no boundaries were mentioned nor was
the land ear-marked in any manner and in fact even the exact
measurement was not mentioned. It appears to us that the respondents
were taking a potshot in the dark to somehow or the other retain
possession of some of the acquired land.
43. If the respondents were convinced that 11 acres and odd had not
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been acquired by the APHB in 1968 it is not understandable why no
follow up action taken by them. They had an option, perhaps, of
proceeding against the APHB for being in wrongful possession of 11
acres and odd owned by the respondents and they certainly had the option
of moving an application under Section 87 of the Act. The respondents
took neither of these steps on an urgent basis or any other step that might
have been available to them in law.
44. All that the respondents did was to wait for another 25 years and
then move an application under Section 87 of the Act sometime in 1993.
There was no change in the factual situation between 1968 and 1993
except construction having been made by the APHB in pursuance of its
Housing Scheme. The respondents have given absolutely no explanation
for filing an application under Section 87 of the Act after such an
enormous lapse of time. What has been submitted is that there is no time
limit for correcting a clerical error and that being so, the respondents
cannot be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches.
45. We are not in agreement with the respondents on any aspect of the
case. First of all we agree with the APHB that an accurate picture of the
area in terms of measurement of land in Survey No.1009 cannot be fully
relied upon after several decades and after construction having been
made. The records had originally indicated that Survey No.1009 consists
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 20 of 31
of 666.25 acres and we must proceed on that basis rather than assume the
correctness of a measurement carried out after several decades.
46. That the unexplained delay in measurement of the area cannot be
relied upon is also supported by the fact that even the revenue authorities
were not quite sure about the exact area of Survey No.1009. According
to the respondents, 11.10 acres had not been acquired but according to the
revenue authorities the entire area of Survey No.1009 was actually 687.03
acres with the result that 20.18 had not been acquired. In view of this
discrepancy, we are of opinion that surveys conducted post the
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be relied
upon. We have also noted that it has come on record that IDL was also in
possession of some parts of Survey No.1009. We must, therefore, accept
the fact that the entire Survey No.1009 was acquired by the APHB and
possession taken, regardless of its actual measurement and the alleged
non-acquisition of 11.10 acres is nothing but a red herring.
Consequently, the question of correcting a ‘clerical error’ with reference
to Section 87 of the Act does not arise.
A clerical error
47. In any event, it was contended by the respondents that a clerical
error was sought to be corrected in the measurement of the area of Survey
No.1009. It is not clear what the clerical error was. If the clerical error
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 21 of 31
was that the area of Survey No.1009 was not 661.04 acres or 666.25 acres
but actually 687.03 acres then the contention is self-defeating. This is
because the area of Survey No.1009 would then have to be read as 687.03
for all purposes and not 661.04 acres. The consequence of this correction
would be that the acquisition was of 687.03 acres and not of 661.04 acres.
48. That apart, the correction of the alleged clerical error does not give
rise to the argument that only 661.04 acres was acquired out of 687.03
acres. If the correction gives rise to an argument or contention, then it
ceases to be the correction of a clerical error but is really the correction of
a substantive error, which does not come within the purview of Section
87 of the Act.
49. Be that as it may, in M/s Tata Consulting Engineers v. Workmen1
Pathak, J. adverted to a clerical error and held in paragraph 20 of the
Report as follows:
“The jurisdiction given to the [Industrial] Tribunal by Rule 31
[Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957] is closely
circumscribed. It is only a clerical mistake or error which can be
corrected, and the clerical mistake or error must arise from an
accidental slip or omission in the award. An accidental slip or
omission implies that something was intended and contrary to
that intention what should not have been included has been
included or what should have been included has been omitted. It
must be a mistake or error amenable to clerical correction only. It
must not be a mistake or error which calls for rectification by
modification of the conscious adjudication on the issues
involved.”

1 1980 (Supp.) SCC 627
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50. Similarly, a clerical error was discussed in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare
Lal.
2
 In paragraph 4 of the Report, reference was made to Master
Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa3
and it was held as follows:
“A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an
accidental slip or omission of the court. It represents that which
the court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face
of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument
or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation,
and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing.”
51. More recently, in Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (Dead) by Lrs. v.
State of Gujarat 4
it was held in paragraph 26 of the Report as follows:
“An arithmetical mistake is a mistake in calculation, while a
clerical mistake is a mistake of writing or typing error occurring
due to accidental slip or omissions or error due to careless
mistake or omission. In our considered opinion, substituting
different lands in place of the lands which have been notified by a
statutory notification under Sections 10(1), 10(3) and 10(5)
[Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976] cannot and
shall not be done by issuing a corrigendum unless the mandatory
requirements contained in the aforementioned sections is
complied with. A landholder cannot be divested from his land on
the plea of clerical or arithmetical mistake liable to be corrected
by issuing corrigendum.”
52. The Circular dated 15th October, 1994 clarifies a clerical error.
Some examples have been given and one clarification is to the effect that
a clerical error is where the area is calculated wrongly though
measurement on the ground and the records support the correct area.

2
(1981) 1 SCC 500
3AIR 1966 SC 1047
4
(2016) 4 SCC 531
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This clause is sought to be relied upon by the respondents. It must be
appreciated in this case that there is no question of a calculation error
since no arithmetical error was committed as understood by this Court.
The area of Survey No.1009 was measured and it was found to be 666.25
acres (including the area acquired for Manjeera Water Works
Department). The survey by the Measuring Circle Inspector, the check
by the G.D. Inspector and approved by the Land Record Assistant clearly
indicate this. This was sought to be ‘corrected’ by the respondents by
claiming that the area of Survey No.1009 was much more. A calculation
error would be, in a situation such as the present, an error that would
appear on the face of the document or the revenue records, as the case
may be. If there is a need to carry out a survey and a re-survey, the error
cannot by any means, be described as a clerical error.
53. What makes the situation worse insofar as the respondents are
concerned is that according to them the error was to the extent of 11.10
acres but on a survey having been conducted, the error was said to be to
an extent of 20.18 acres. Surely, such a discrepancy cannot be described
as an accidental slip or a clerical mistake or a calculation error. It can
only be described as a major error which ought to have been rectified at
the appropriate time in 1968 when the Award was passed or soon
thereafter. To notice and make much ado about such an error after at
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 24 of 31
least 25 years cannot be understood as the correction of a clerical error.
54. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to K.P. Varghese v.
Income Tax Officer, Ernakulum and Another 5
to contend that the
Circular dated 15th October, 1994 is a contemporaneous exposition of the
true state of affairs as understood by the revenue authorities themselves
and if they believed that a ‘clerical error’ ought to be interpreted in the
manner described in the Circular, that interpretation must be accepted.
The following passage was referred to and relied upon:
“The rule of construction by reference to contemporanea
expositio is a well-established rule for interpreting a statute by
reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary
authority, though it must give way where the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has been succinctly
and felicitously expressed in Crawford on Statutory
Construction, (1940 Edn.) where it is stated in para 219 that
“administrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction
placed by administrative or executive officers charged with
executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is
overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as
practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless
entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive””.
55. Similarly, reference was also made to Desh Bandhu Gupta and
Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd.6The following passage
was relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents.
“The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute
or any other document by reference to the exposition it has
received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the

5 AIR 1981 SC 1922”
6 AIR 1979 SC 1049
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 25 of 31
same will not always be decisive of the question of construction
(Maxwell 12th ed. p. 268).”
56. It is no doubt true that the contemporaneous exposition of a
document must carry great weight but if that exposition is not in
consonance with the law laid down by the Courts, including this Court,
the exposition would not be relevant. We have made a reference to
several decisions which explain the meaning of a clerical error.The view
expressed in the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 particularly clause 5(d)
referred to and relied upon by the respondents does not come within the
four corners of the understanding of the expression clerical error by this
Court if it involves a survey and a re-survey as in this case. Therefore,
no reliance can be placed upon the contemporaneous exposition made by
the revenue authorities in the Circular dated 15th October, 1994.
57. We conclude that there was no clerical error in the measurement of
Survey No.1009 for all intents and purposes and that in any event, the
entire land in Survey No.1009 was acquired for the Housing Scheme of
the APHB.
Section 87 of the Act and delay in making a claim
58. We are also not satisfied with the delay by the respondents in
making a claim under Section 87 of the Act. The contention of the
respondents is that since there is no time limit specified for filing a claim
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 26 of 31
petition, they could have made a claim at any point of time, particularly
for correcting a clerical error.
59. It is now well settled that where no time-limit is specified,
whatever is required to be done should be within a reasonable period. In
Collector v. P. Mangamma7
it was held in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows:
“A reasonable period would depend upon the factual
circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any
empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority
considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not
has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and
relevant factors to decide that question.
In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha8
it was observed that
when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to
be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the
reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and
the nature of the order which was sought to be varied.........”.
Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational
according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or
immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.”
60. Similarly, in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing
Rao 9
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction where no time-limit is
specified was considered and it was held in paragraph 31 of the Report as
follows:
“To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is
frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain
forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless
uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law.

7
(2003) 4 SCC 488 at page 491
8
 (1969) 2 SCC 187
9
(2015) 3 SCC 695
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Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed
for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led
to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a
belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no
cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said
must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the
orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power
must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud.
Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not
extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the
exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud
upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.”
61. Finally in Basanti Prasad v. Chairman, Bihar School
Examination Board10 it was pointed out where third party rights are
likely to be affected, the courts decline to interfere but if there is a
necessity to interfere then the aggrieved person should be heard on
merits.
62. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, the claim
made under Section 87 of the Act was after a period of at least 25 years.
This can hardly be described as a reasonable period. There is no
explanation for the inordinate delay and to make matters worse, third
party interests have been created through a Housing Scheme developed
on the land in dispute or in any event on the surrounding land. After a
further lapse of 25 years it is not possible to put the clock back, even if
there is any reason to do so, which reason we cannot even visualise in this
case.

10(2009) 6 SCC 791
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Locus standi
63. It was submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the
APHB has no locus standi to raise any dispute with regard to the
measurement of Survey No.1009. We are not at all in agreement with
this submission. A tract of land measuring 11.10 acres out of Survey
No.1009 was sought to be taken away from the APHB which had
announced a Housing Scheme under Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh
Housing Board Act, 1956 and third party rights had also been created in
this regard. The primary responsibility of protecting the interests of the
beneficiaries of the Housing Scheme was that of the APHB and surely it
cannot be said under these circumstances that the APHB had no locus
standi to participate in the proceedings. In fact, even the revenue
authorities recognised the locus of the APHB in the order dated 15th
September, 1997. The Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land
Records, Hyderabad directed the District Revenue Officer to take action
in terms of the Circular of 15th October, 1994 but before passing any
orders under Section 87 of the Act, it was directed that the APHB should
be heard. We therefore reject the contention that the APHB had no locus
standi in the matter.
Interference on facts
64. The final submission of learned counsel for the respondents was
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that the revenue authorities had come a factual conclusion in their favour
and the High Court ought not to have interfered with the factual
conclusions and even this Court ought not to interfere with the factual
conclusions arrived at by the revenue authorities. In our opinion, the
revenue authorities had completely misdirected in law in reopening a
factual issue that had been settled way back in 1968 if not earlier and
there was no occasion for reopening that factual issue after a lapse of at
least 25 years. That being the position, it cannot be said that the courts
are precluded from interfering in a matter of determination of facts when
the authorities have completely misdirected themselves in law and
exercised jurisdiction which did not vest in them. We therefore also
reject this submission of the respondents.
Conclusion
65. To conclude, therefore, we hold that the entire Survey No. 1009
was acquired by the APHB for a Housing Scheme. No parcel of land in
Survey No.1009 was left out or not acquired. Compensation was paid for
acquisition of the entire Survey No.1009. The Division Bench of the
High Court erred in concluding that 20.18 acres of land in Survey
No.1009 had not been acquired.
66. We also hold that it is too simplistic on the part of the respondents
to contend that land in excess of 661.04 acres in Survey No.1009 was not
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acquired. This is certainly not so and the entire Survey No.1009 was
acquired. The submission in this regard is rejected.
67. We also hold that the claim made by the respondents under Section
87 of the Act was hopelessly delayed for which there is absolutely no
explanation forthcoming. In addition, we hold that since third party
rights have been created in the meanwhile under the Housing Scheme of
the APHB and there is no way to put the clock back. The respondents
ought to have been vigilant in pursuing their claim, assuming the claim
was legitimate, but since they were not vigilant enough, they must suffer
the consequences of their inaction.
68. We also hold that the proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land
Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 were of some
consequence but since the APHB has not relied upon the proceedings
under the said Act and learned counsel has only mentioned it in passing,
we do not intend to base our decision on the declaration made by the
respondents under the said Act.
69. We also hold that the APHB was directly and primarily affected by
the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act and
therefore had the locus standi to proceed before the Commissioner
(Appeals), the High Court and this Court.
70. In view of the above conclusions, the judgment and order passed
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by the Division Bench is set aside and the appeals filed by the Telangana
Housing Board are allowed. No costs.
 .............................................J
 (Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi; ...........................................J
May 1, 2018 (Deepak Gupta)

In our view, the two Courts below, therefore, were right in holding the appellant guilty of commission of the offences in question by properly appreciating the ocular evidence of the prosecution witness notwithstanding the death of the co-accused, which was of no relevance for deciding the involvement of the appellant in commission of crime.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1498 OF 2010
Murugan ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Tamil Nadu ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the accused against the
final judgment and order dated 25.04.2007 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in
Criminal Appeal No. 804 of 2006 whereby the High
Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
appellant(Accused) and confirmed the order dated
02.08.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Namakkal (Fast Track Court) in Sessions
1
Case No.5 of 2006 convicting the appellant under
Sections 364 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and
sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for 7 years under Section 364 IPC and to pay a fine
of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple imprisonment for one month
and imprisonment for life under Section 302/34 IPC
and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- in default of payment
of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for
two months. The sentences would run
concurrently.
2. In order to appreciate the issues arising in the
case, it is necessary to set out the prosecution case
in detail:
3. One person by name "Kumar" (since dead) was
the uncle of a girl "Geetha". At the relevant time,
Geetha was in sixth standard. Kumar was married
but living separately from his wife. Kumar and
2
Geetha were living in the one locality at a short
distance. Kumar had developed liking for Geetha
and wanted to marry her.
4. Murugan (father of Geetha) was not agreeable
to the Kumar's proposal to marry Geetha.
Murugan(Geetha’s father) used to say that Kumar
had already ruined the life of his wife and now he
wanted to ruin his daughter's life also. Kumar, on
the other hand, used to threaten Geetha that one
day he would kidnap her and marry her.
5. It is the case of prosecution, that on
01.12.2002 afternoon, Kumar went to the house of
Geetha and demanded "Chili" to cook mutton. At
that time, Geetha was alone in the house. When
Geetha refused him to give Chili, Kumar entered
into the house and took Chili of his own and left the
house saying that one day, he would kidnap her
and rape her.
3
6. On the same day at around 10 P.M., Kumar
along with Murugan(appellant), who is his cousin
brother (his aunt's son) went to Geetha’s house and
invited Murugan(Geetha’s father) for a drink and
non-veg. dinner at his house. Murugan(Geetha’s
father) accepted the invitation and went along with
both of them to Kumar's house.
7. When Murugan(Geetha’s father) did not
return home, Geetha (PW-1) alone went to Kumar's
house at around 11 P.M. to find out as to why her
father has not returned so far and what was he
doing in Kumar's house for such a long time. On
reaching there, she, however, found that trio
(Kumar, Murugan and the appellant) were sitting in
the room on one iron cot and were dining together.
The trio told Geetha that her father - Murugan
would be coming shortly. Thereafter Geetha
returned to her house.
4
8. Since Murugan did not return home till next
day morning, Geetha (PW-1) and her mother Saroja
(PW-2) went early morning to Kumar's house to find
out why Murugan has not returned so far to his
house. The front door of the Kumar's house was
closed. Both of them, therefore, pushed the front
door and on opening, they found that Murugan's
dead body was lying in the room near iron cot with
many injuries on his body.
9. It is this incident which gave rise to filing of
FIR dated 02.12.2002 (Ex-P-18) by Geetha (PW-1) in
PS Jedarpalayam, which was registered as Crime
No. 224 of 2002 under Sections 302/364/34 of IPC.
The police then started investigation, visited the
house of Kumar, prepared Mahazar (Ex.P-13),
drawn rough sketch (Ex.P-19), took photographs,
prepared inquest report, recorded the statements of
witnesses, conducted post-mortem of the dead body
(Ex.P-4) and recovered the articles (M.O. 5 and 12 ).
5
10. The police then on 03.12.2002 arrested
Kumar, who confessed his guilt. His confessional
statement was accordingly recorded (Ex.P-15).
Thereafter the police recovered weapon used in the
crime (Aruval-MO-14) and the blood stained green
shirts at his instance from his father's house. It was
then followed by the appellant's arrest on the same
day.
11. The police, on completing the investigation,
filed the charge sheet against Kumar and the
appellant herein for commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 364 and 302/34 of IPC.
The case was then committed to the Additional
Sessions Judge, Namakkal for trial (Sessions Trial
No. 5/2006).
12. Before the trial could begin, the main accusedKumar
died. The trial against him, therefore, stood
abated whereas it continued against the co-accused
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–appellant herein. The appellant, however, abjured
the guilt.
13. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution
examined 12 witnesses, marked 20 exhibits and
produced 15 material objects. In the proceedings
under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), the
appellant was asked to explain the circumstances
appearing against him but he denied the charges
including the circumstances without offering any
explanation.
14. By order dated 02.08.2006, the Additional
Sessions Judge held the charges proved against the
appellant and accordingly convicted him for
commission of the offences punishable under
Sections 364 and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC
and awarded life imprisonment under Section 302
IPC and seven years under Section 364 and a fine
amount of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs.1000/- respectively.
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15. The appellant felt aggrieved by his conviction
and the sentences awarded by the Additional
Sessions Judge and filed appeal in the High Court.
16. By impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of
the Additional Sessions Judge, which has given rise
to filing of the appeal by way of special leave by the
accused –Murugan in this Court.
17. Heard Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, learned
counsel for the appellant and Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna,
learned counsel for the respondent.
18. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in the appeal.
19. We have perused the evidence with a view to
find out whether the approach, reasoning and
conclusion arrived at by the two Courts below are
legally sustainable or not.
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20. It is a settled principle of law that when the
Courts below have recorded concurrent findings
against the accused person which are based on due
appreciation of evidence, this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution of India would be slow to interfere
in such concurrent findings and would not appreciate
the evidence de novo unless it is prima facie shown
that both the Courts below did not either consider the
relevant piece of evidence or there exists any perversity
or/and absurdity in the findings recorded by both the
Courts below etc.
21. We, however, made endeavour to peruse the
evidence with a view to find out as to whether the
concurrent findings of both the Courts below have
any kind of infirmity or/and whether the concurrent
findings are capable of being legally and factually
sustainable or need to be reversed. Having gone
through the evidence, we are of the view that the
findings are legally and factually sustainable in law.
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22. In our considered opinion, the two Courts
below have rightly held that the appellant's
conviction was based on circumstantial evidence
which, in this case, the prosecution was able to
prove it by adducing evidence. In other words, we
also find that the prosecution was able to prove the
chain of circumstances/events appearing against
the appellant without any break therein and hence
the appellant’s conviction deserves to be upheld.
23. On perusal of the evidence, we find that the
prosecution examined three witnesses (PW-1, PW-2
and PW-3) to prove material circumstances and the
chain of events against the appellant which first
included the motive behind the commission of the
crime followed by the manner in which the incident
took place leading to the death of Murugan.
24. The motive, according to the prosecution, was
that Kumar had a grudge against the deceased
because he was not agreeable to the Kumar's
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proposal to marry his daughter-Geetha. This was
proved with the evidence of PWs-1, 2 and 3. It was
believed by the two Courts below and, in our
opinion, rightly.
25. The prosecution then proved that the appellant
along with Kumar had gone to the house of the
deceased for inviting him for dinner at Kumar's
house on the same night. The deceased accepted
the invitation and went to Kumar's house to have
dinner with Kumar and the appellant.
26. It was then proved that Geetha (PW-1) had
gone to Kumar's house at around 11 P.M. to see
why her father did not return to his house and on
reaching there, she found all the three sitting on
iron cot and were having dinner. As per post
mortem report, it was proved that Murugan died
between 11 P.M. and 12 P.M. the same night.
27. In our opinion, when the appellant was sitting
in the company of the deceased (Murugan) till 11
11
P.M. along with Kumar in his house and had dinner
with Murugan and Kumar and immediately
thereafter Murugan died, the appellant in
cross-examination of PWs-1,2 and 3 was not able to
elicit anything to discredit the evidence of the
abovesaid three witnesses and to disprove the
circumstances deposed against him.
28. That apart, in our opinion, it was necessary for
the appellant to have explained the aforementioned
circumstances appearing against him in the
proceedings under Section 313 of the Code. The
appellant, however, failed to explain any
circumstances and denied his involvement in the
crime.
29. We find from the evidence eight circumstances
appearing against the appellant. These
circumstances are: First motive was against the
deceased due to his not agreeing to the proposal of
marriage of Kumar with his daughter; Second, the
12
appellant and Kumar, both being the cousins, knew
each other very well; Third, both went together to
the house of the deceased to invite him for a dinner
at Kumar’s house; Fourth, all the three had dinner
together at Kumar’s house; Fifth, Murugan died
immediately after dinner; Sixth, Kumar gave his
confessional statement; Seventh, recovery of
weapon and cloths at the instance of Kumar; and
Eighth, the dead body was found lying near iron cot
where Murugan(deceased) had last dinner with
Kumar and the appellant.
30. In our view, the aforementioned eight
circumstances do constitute a chain of events
against the appellant and lead to draw a strong
conclusion against the appellant and Kumar for
having committed the murder of Murugan.
31. In our view, it clearly establishes that both
(Kumar and the appellant) had a common intention
to eliminate Murugan. In our view, there could be
13
no other person other than the appellant and
Kumar, who committed the crime in question.
32. A theory of "accused last seen in the
company of the deceased" is a strong
circumstance against the accused while
appreciating the circumstantial evidence. In such
cases, unless the accused is able to explain properly
the material circumstances appearing against him,
he can be held guilty for commission of offence for
which he is charged. In this case, it was rightly held
by the two Courts below against the appellant and
we find no good ground to disturb this finding.
33. We are not impressed by the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant when she argued
that Kumar (main accused) having died without
facing the trial, the present appellant is entitled for
a clean acquittal because nothing now survives
against the appellant after Kumar's death for
14
appellant’s prosecution. We do not agree with this
submission.
34. In our view, death of Kumar was of no
significance so far as the appellant’s prosecution is
concerned. The reason being that this was a case of
common intention of the two accused persons to
eliminate Murugan and the appellant was one of the
accused persons, who was found actively
participating in the crime till last along with the
other accused, who died.
35. In our view, the two Courts below, therefore,
were right in holding the appellant guilty of
commission of the offences in question by properly
appreciating the ocular evidence of the prosecution
witness notwithstanding the death of the
co-accused, which was of no relevance for deciding
the involvement of the appellant in commission of
crime.
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36. We, therefore, find no good ground to take a
different view than what is taken by the two Courts
below and concur with their reasoning and
conclusion with our additional reasoning elaborated
above.
37. The appeal is thus found to be devoid of any
merit. It fails and is accordingly dismissed.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
May 02, 2018
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