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Wednesday, May 2, 2018

The question for our consideration relates to the interpretation of Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and the meaning of the expression ‘clerical error’. The further question is whether a ‘clerical error’ can be corrected “at any time” or only within a reasonable time.= In our opinion, the correction sought to be made by the respondents is not a ‘clerical error’ and so the further question really does not arise. However, the expression “at any time’ cannot be interpreted to stretch over a period of 25 years, as in the present case. = we hold that the entire Survey No. 1009 was acquired by the APHB for a Housing Scheme. No parcel of land in Survey No.1009 was left out or not acquired. Compensation was paid for acquisition of the entire Survey No.1009. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that 20.18 acres of land in Survey No.1009 had not been acquired.We also hold that the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act was hopelessly delayed for which there is absolutely no explanation forthcoming. In addition, we hold that since third party rights have been created in the meanwhile under the Housing Scheme of the APHB and there is no way to put the clock back. The respondents ought to have been vigilant in pursuing their claim, assuming the claim was legitimate, but since they were not vigilant enough, they must suffer the consequences of their inaction.

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4632-4638 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.21856-21862 OF 2010)
Telangana Housing Board ......Appellant
versus
Azamunnisa Begum (Died) Thru. Lrs. & Ors. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
Leave granted.
1. The question for our consideration relates to the interpretation of
Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act,
1317 Fasli and the meaning of the expression ‘clerical error’. The further
question is whether a ‘clerical error’ can be corrected “at any time” or
only within a reasonable time.
2. In our opinion, the correction sought to be made by the respondents
is not a ‘clerical error’ and so the further question really does not arise.
However, the expression “at any time’ cannot be interpreted to stretch
over a period of 25 years, as in the present case. 
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Land Acquisition Proceedings
3. On 24th May, 1963 a notification was issued under the provisions
of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Land Acquisition
Act). The entire acquisition was of a few thousand acres comprising of
dozens of survey numbers. Amongst others, the acquisition included
survey nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 comprising of 1110.07 acres in
Kukatpally Village, Balanagar Mandal in Ranga Reddy District of
Andhra Pradesh. The entire acquisition was for the purpose of a Housing
Scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board (APHB) framed under
Section 22-A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1956.
4. As is evident, the area was extremely large but it is recorded in
paragraph 4 of the Land Acquisition Award that:
“The lands under acquisition were got surveyed by the Measuring
Circle Inspector of this office and were got checked by the G.D.
Inspector of Hyderabad District, and areas of the lands under
Acquisition were approved by the Land Record Assistant. The
Areas as approved after survey and check are adopted in this
Award.”
5. As far as Survey No. 1009 is concerned an area of 661.04 acres
was sought to be acquired. The notification does not indicate that only a
part of Survey No. 1009 was sought to be acquired. There was no
indication that 661.04 acres of land is only a part of the entire extent of
Survey No.1009. In fact, as suggested in the Award, the entire Survey
No. 1009 along with the entire survey nos. 1043 to 1065 (along with
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several dozen other survey numbers) were sought to be acquired by the
said notification.
6. In paragraph 29 (b) of the Land Acquisition Award it is further
stated:
“The Special Deputy Collector Patancheru has informed vide his
Lr. No.B1/341/67 dated 6.8.67 that he has acquired 5 acres 21
guntas out of survey number 1009 measuring 666.25 acres of
Kukatpally village. The area tallies on the spot hence an area 5
acres 21 guntas is deleted from the area of survey no.1009 of
Kukatpally and award is being passed for the balance area of
661.64 acres out of survey number 1009.”
7. At this stage, we may mention that an area of 5.21 acres in Survey
No. 1009 was earlier acquired for the Manjeera Water Works Department
and hence 661.04 acres was sought to be acquired by the said notification.
8. The acquisition proceedings concluded without any objection
having been raised by the respondents who were admittedly owners of the
land. An Award was passed by the Special Deputy Collector, Land
Acquisition, Andhra Pradesh Housing Board, Hyderabad on 10th June,
1968 and Survey No. 1009 was described in the Award as “dry lands full
of rocks unfit for cultivation and no cultivation is being done.”
9. On 24th June, 1968 the APHB took possession of all the acquired
lands including entire survey nos. 1009 and 1043 to 1065.
10. Dissatisfied with the award of compensation, the respondents filed
a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the claim
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petition it was stated that survey nos. 1009 and 1043 to 1065 comprise of
1121.17 acres. However, compensation was awarded only for 1104.26
acres (5.21 acres relating to Manjeera Water Works Department was not
included in this calculation). Accordingly, it was stated that “11 acres
and odd, they being the property of the claimant, it is not acquired and
they remain to be the property of the claimant.” It is significant to note
that the 11 acres and odd which was sought to be excluded from the
acquisition proceedings by the respondents was not specified or identified
inasmuch as the survey number of this un-acquired area was not stated or
earmarked by the claimants. It is much later that the respondents came to
the conclusion that the allegedly un-acquired 11 acres and odd was a part
of Survey No. 1009.
11. Be that as it may, the compensation was enhanced and ultimately,
settled by this Court sometime in 1992. We are not concerned with the
details of the compensation proceedings any further but have mentioned it
only for the purpose of indicating that:
i) The entire area of survey nos. 1009 and 1043 to 1065 was
acquired. The acquisition consisted of huge areas and
physical measurements were carried out, surveyed, checked
and approved as per the revenue records.
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ii) Possession of the entire land was taken by the APHB for a
Housing Scheme.
iii) Although the respondents made a submission that 11 acres
and odd was not acquired, this area was not identified or
specified as being a part of any particular survey number or
even earmarked.
Proceedings relating to Section 87 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land
Revenue Act, 1317 F.
12. On 7th December, 1993 the respondents moved an application
under the provisions of Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana
Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli (for short the Act). In the
application, it was stated that as per the revenue record pertaining to
Survey No. 1009 the land area is actually 672.14 acres and it incorrectly
shows the area less by 11.10 acres. It was stated in the application that
this area of 11.10 acres was in possession of the respondents. It is for the
first time in 1993 that 11.10 acres was attributed to Survey No. 1009.
Section 87 of the Act reads as follows:-
“Settlement Officer to correct clerical and other errors
admitted by all parties and application for correction of name
to be made within two years:
The Director of Settlements and on making over the settlement
records to the Collector, the Collector may, at any time, correct or
cause to be corrected any clerical error or errors admitted by the
party concerned.
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The aforesaid officer shall hear all applications made within two
years after the introduction of the settlement, for the correction of
any wrong entry of a pattadar’s name in the register referred to in
the preceding section and if satisfied about the error whether such
error has been made through negligence, fraud, or collusion shall
correct the same, notwithstanding that the party concerned does
not admit the error but no such application shall be entertained
after two years, unless reasonable cause is shown to the said
officer for the delay, and in such cases if any error is proved it
shall not be corrected without obtaining the sanction of the
Government.”
13. Acting on the application, the District Collector requested the
Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records for a survey of Survey No.
1009 and to fix the boundaries. The Assistant Director issued notice to
the APHB on 7th July, 1994 for the purposes of carrying out the survey
but according to the APHB the notice was not received. In our opinion,
the non-receipt of the notice is hardly of any relevance.
14. In any event, the Assistant Director submitted a Report on 5th
August, 1994 to the District Collector. In his Report, it was concluded
that the area of Survey No. 1009 was actually 687.03 acres. This
comprised of 661.04 acres (subject matter of consideration before us) and
5.21 acres earlier acquired for Manjeera Water Works Department.
Therefore, according to the Assistant Director there was an excess of
20.18 acres that had not been acquired. It was also noted that IDL was in
possession of some extent of Survey No. 1009. No specification or
details were provided of the area and location of the land in possession of
IDL.
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15. It is also significant to note that while the respondents had been
contending that there was an excess of 11.10 acres that had not been
acquired, the Assistant Director came to the conclusion that 20.18 acres
had not been acquired.
16. At this stage, we may take a slight diversion and refer to a Circular
dated 15th October, 1994 issued by the Commissioner of Survey,
Settlements and Land Records. This Circular concerns itself with Section
87 of the Act it seeks to explain a ‘clerical error’ that could be rectified.
17. The relevant portions of the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 are
paragraphs 4 and 5 and they read as follows:-
“Clarification: There is no time limit for entertaining clerical
errors, and District: Revenue Officer is competent to entertain
clerical errors. The time limit is prescribed only for errors other
than clerical errors. For rectification of errors other than clerical
errors condonation of delay is required, for which District:
Revenue Officer alone is competent. However the District:
Revenue Officer is not competent to carryout correction other
than clerical errors without the approval of the Commissioner,
Survey, Settlement and Land Records.
Clarification: Section 87 of the Land Revenue Act 1317 Fasli
does not provide definition of clerical errors and errors other than
clerical errors. The clerical errors are minor errors which do not
involve alteration in area, change of classification, or change of
name of the pattedar.
A few examples of errors, which come under the category of
clerical errors, are furnished below:-
a. Name of the Pattedar misspelt.
b. Inter-change of survey numbers.
c. Survey no. missing in the survey map.
d. Area is calculated wrongly though measurement on
ground and records support the correct area.
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Since the definition of clerical error and errors other than clerical
errors is not there in the Act, it is not proper to leave it to the
judgment of Assistant Director Survey and Land Records
whether particular survey error falls under the category of clerical
error or errors other than clerical error. Therefore, the Assistant
Director, Survey and Land Records shall send detailed technical
report to Director, Survey Settlement and Land Records,
regarding proposed error. This is purely a technical and nonstatutory
function. The report so sent shall be examined at
Directorate whether the error falls under the category of clerical
error or error other than clerical error and the fact will be
communicated to Assistant Director Survey and Land Records.
On obtaining clearance from the Directorate, the Assistant
Director shall send the file to District Revenue Officer to dispose
of the case at District Revenue Officers level under Section 87 of
the Land Revenue Act, if the error is a clerical error. If the error
is other than clerical error, the District Revenue Officer, shall
send proposals to Commissioner Survey Settlement and Land
Records duly condoning the delay as per rules for disposal of the
case by Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records,
under Section 87-A of Land Revenue Act 1317 fasli.”
18. In response to the application made by the respondents under
Section 87 of the Act and the Report given by the Assistant Director on
5
th August, 1994, the Director of Settlements, Survey and Land Records
wrote to the District Collector on 19th April, 1995 acknowledging that
there is no record of any actual measurement of Survey No. 1009 since it
is a large tract of land. He also stated that variation in calculating the area
apparently in view of the rocky nature of the land could be between 10%
and 30%. The fact that all the survey numbers had been measured, as
mentioned in the Award, was lost sight of.
19. Nevertheless, the Director stated that the measurement exercise
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undertaken by the Assistant Director is technically correct and the area of
Survey No. 1009 is actually 687.03 acres while the recorded area is
666.25 acres (which includes the land acquired for Manjeera Water
Works Department). Therefore, according to the Director the variation is
to the extent of 20.18 acres. The Director also expressed the opinion that
the measurement error falls within the category of ‘clerical error’ as
mentioned in the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 and necessary
corrective action ought to be taken.
20. It is not clear how the APHB learnt of the Report of the Assistant
Director and its acceptance by the Director but in any event, on 10th June,
1996 objections were raised by the APHB before the District Collector to
the Report and the decision to correct the revenue records.
21. On receipt of the objections, the District Collector referred the case
to the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records,
Hyderabad on 1st August, 1996 to consider rectification of the
measurement error.
22. On 15th September, 1997 the Commissioner directed the District
Revenue Officer to take action in terms of the Circular of 15th October,
1994 since there was a clerical error in terms of paragraph 5 of the
Circular. However, the Commissioner also directed that before passing
any orders under Section 87 of the Act the APHB should be heard.
23. It appears that the APHB was thereafter heard by the District
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Revenue Officer who then passed an order on 9th June, 1998 concluding
that in fact the area of Survey No. 1009 was 687.03 acres and that there
was an excess of 20.18 acres that had not been acquired. This was as
against the claim of the respondents that 11.10 acres had not been
acquired. The District Revenue Officer concluded that the APHB had no
right over the area of 20.18 acres and that necessary corrections in terms
of Section 87 of the Act should be made.
24. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the District Revenue
Officer which appears to have been accepted by the higher authorities the
APHB filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section
158 of the Act. This Section reads as follows:
“Appeal from order of Revenue Officer- (1) Except as
otherwise provided in this Act for any other law for the time
being in force, an appeal shall lie against any decision or order
passed by a Revenue Officer under this Act or any other law for
the time being in force, to his immediate superior officer whether
such decision or order may have been passed in the exercise of
original jurisdiction or on appeal.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana
Area) Board of Revenue Regulation, 1358 F., (Regulation LX of
1358F.) an appeal shall lie to the Government from any decision
or order passed by a Collector or Settlement Commissioner
except in the case of any decision or order passed by such officer
on second or third appeal.
(3) and (4) xxx xxxxxx
25. On 24th March, 1999 the Commissioner (Appeals) passed an ex
parte order in the appeal filed by the APHB for maintaining status quo.
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26. It appears that in spite of the status quo order passed by the
Commissioner (Appeals) the revenue records were corrected by issuing a
Supplementary Sethwar. Be that as it may, the respondents challenged
the ex parte order dated 24th March, 1999 by filing a writ petition in the
Andhra Pradesh High Court on 5th April, 1999. The writ petition was
numbered as the W.P. No. 7940 of 1999. Among the grounds taken by
the respondents, in the writ petition, was that the appeal filed by the
APBH was beyond time and an ex parte order ought not to have been
passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
27. On 10th August, 2000 the learned Single Judge hearing the writ
petition passed an interim order to earmark the land in possession of the
APHB and whether it is occupying 661.04 acres or more. In compliance
with the interim order, the Assistant Director gave a Report dated 23rd
June, 2001 to the effect that the area of Survey No. 1009 is 666.25 acres
including 5.21 acres with Manjeera Water Works Department. It is
important to note that the Assistant Director did not report that the area of
Survey No. 1009 was more than 666.25 acres. In other words, there was
a turn-around from the earlier decisions taken in this regard. It was
reported as follows:
“After fixing the boundaries as stated above the land available within
such boundaries surveyed with the help of theodolite (traverse
survey) and arrived the total area as Ac.666.25 gts. which is tallied
with the recorded area of survey no. 1009 as per survey records. The
survey work is concluded on 11.6.2001.
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The details of land showing physical features within survey no.1009
arrived after detailed survey are as under:-
1. Land under the possession of Housing Board Ac. Gts.
covered by built up area 288.00
2. Open land under possession of
Housing Board 358.04
3. Land left for Graveyard/Burial ground
by the Housing Board 15.00
______
661.04
4. Land under Manjeera Pipeline
(Water works Dept.) 5.21
 --------
 Total area of survey no. 1009 666.25
 ---------

A sketch of survey no. 1009 showing the above details is prepared
and submitted herewith.”
28. On 31st October, 2001 the learned Single Judge decided W.P. No.
7940 of 1999 and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to hear the appeal
and pass appropriate orders. In the meanwhile, status quo was directed
to be maintained.
29. Pursuant to the directions given by the learned Single Judge, the
Commissioner (Appeals) heard the appeal filed by APHB. By an order
dated 4th January, 2003 the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the view of
the District Revenue Officer dated 9th June, 1998 and dismissed the
appeal. The Commissioner (Appeals) was of opinion that:
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(i) Only 661.04 acres of land was acquired out of the larger area
in Survey No.1009;
(ii) The claim made by the respondents that 11.10 acres out of
Survey No.1009 was not acquired was not a belated claim;
(iii) The correction sought by the respondents in their claim
under Section 87 of the Act was the correction of a clerical
error under paragraph 5 (d) of the Circular dated 15th
October, 1994.
Proceedings before the learned Single Judge
30. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of its appeal by the
Commissioner (Appeals), a writ petition was filed by APHB in the
Andhra Pradesh High Court and that was numbered as W.P. No. 13927 of
2003.
31. A learned Single Judge of the High Court heard the writ petition
and by a judgment and order dated 19th April, 2005 allowed it and
quashed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
32. The learned Single Judge took the view that Section 87 of the Act
was not applicable to the case and as such the claim made by the
respondents was not maintainable. In addition, it was held that the claim
made by the respondents does not fall within the category of a ‘clerical
error’ and therefore the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 was also not
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applicable. The learned Single Judge made a reference to the failure of
the State and the respondents to produce the record prepared at the time
of survey which could have shown a wrong calculation of area. In this
regard it was held by the learned Single Judge as follows:
“Record prepared at the time of survey is not produced to show
that there is a wrong calculation of area, though the measurement
on ground and record support the correct area. So, entry
regarding extent of S.No.1009 cannot be said to have been made
wrongly due to a clerical mistake. By arriving at the area of a
particular survey number by conducting survey thereof only,
several decades after settlement, and without surveying the areas
in other survey numbers adjacent to that survey number, question
of the original entry in the settlement register was a wrong entry
as a clerical error or not cannot be determined. There is nothing
on record to show that lands in adjacent survey numbers of
S.No.1009 also were surveyed and as to what is the extent found
in such survey, and the extent noted in the settlement register.”
33. With regard to the contention that only 661.04 acres had been
acquired out of Survey No.1009, the learned Single Judge noted that a
declaration had been filed by and on behalf of the respondents under the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973. In that declaration there was nothing to suggest that
the respondents were holding excess land which would have been so had
the respondents been in possession of 11.10 acres. The learned Single
Judge observed as follows:-
“The contention of Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan and his heirs that
since they are in actual physical possession of the land of
Acs.11=10gts in S. No. 1009, even after acquisition by the
petitioner, and so they can make a claim cannot be countenanced
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because by the time A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973 (Act 1 of 1973) and the Urban Land
(Ceilings and Regulation) Act, 1976, came into force Mir
Fazeelath Hussain Khan, who originally filed the application
before the 3rd
 respondent, was alive, and had filed a declaration
under the Act 1 of 1973. He showed the total area covered by S.
Nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 belonging to him as Acs.1109-92 gts.
That extent was deleted from his holding as it was acquired and
by the order dated 09-12-1976, vide common order in
C.C.Nos.156 to 159/W/75 he was held to be holding 0.4083
standard holding in excess even after deleting of an extent of
Acs.1109.92 gts in S. Nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 of Kukatpally
village. If Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan really was in possession
of or was owning any extent over and above the area acquired by
the petitioner either in S. No. 1009 or 1043 to 1065, he would
have had to surrender that area also, because even without that
area being included in his holding he was found to be holding
land in excess of the ceiling area.”
...........................................
“So, it is clear that the family of Raisyar Jung was said to be
holding only land to the extent of Acs.349-63 cents in S.No.1007
but not any land in S. No. 1009. This extent of Acs.11-10 gts now
said to be in the possession of unofficial respondents was not
declared by them or their predecessors in the declaration under
Act 1 of 1973. Had Fazeelath Hussain Khan, who filed the
petition before the District Revenue Officer, or any of the
unofficial respondents or their predecessors-in-title, been in
possession of any extent of land in S. No. 1009 by 01.01.1975
they would have shown it in their declaration filed under Act 1 of
1973. But they did not do so. For that reason also the contention
of the unofficial respondents that they are in possession of some
land in S. No. 1009 and that the extent of S. No. 1009 is more
than that was acquired by the petitioner cannot be believed or
accepted.”
34. The learned Single Judge also dealt with the submission on behalf
of the respondents that the APHB had no locus standi to question the
order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). It was noted that the
APHB was a party to the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals)
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and therefore it was entitled to question the adverse order. Moreover,
when the authorities assume jurisdiction which they do not possess under
Section 87 of the Act and pass orders likely to affect the interests of the
APHB, a right accrues to the APHB to question such orders passed
without jurisdiction.
35. Since the learned Single Judge concluded that the orders passed by
the District Revenue Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) were
without jurisdiction, there was obviously no occasion to decide the
question whether the claim filed by the respondents was belated or not.
Proceedings before the Division Bench
36. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge on 19th April, 2005, writ appeals being W.A. No. 1311 of
2005 and W.A. No. 1781 of 2005 were filed by the respondents
challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge. By the
impugned judgment and order dated 25th September, 2009 the writ
appeals were allowed by the Division Bench and it is under these
circumstances that the present appeals are before us.
37. The High Court allowed the writ appeals primarily on two
submissions. It was held by the Division Bench that a report of the
survey authorities had confirmed that the area of land in Survey No. 1009
was more than 661.04 acres. Admittedly, only 661.04 acres had been
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acquired out of Survey No. 1009. Therefore, the APHB was entitled to
hold only 661.04 acres while the balance had not been acquired and
therefore the ownership remained with the respondents. According to the
Division Bench, there was a clerical error in the measurement area of
Survey No. 1009 and therefore paragraph 5(d) of the Circular dated 15th
October, 1994 was applicable and the authorities were entitled to correct
the calculation error.
38. The second ground given by the Division Bench was with
reference to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling
on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. In this context, it was held that
since the respondents were not holding the land, they could not have
made a declaration as envisaged under the provisions of the said Act and
in any event this was hardly of any relevance since Survey No. 1009
indicates that the area of that survey number was greater than 661.04
acres. However, what is of significance is the conclusion arrived at by
the Division Bench that the respondents were not in possession of 11.10
acres in Survey No. 1009. Possession of the entire Survey No. 1009 was
with the APHB.
Discussion
39. In our opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court has seriously
erred in setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge.
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40. It is quite clear to us that the APHB had acquired, in terms of the
Award dated 10th June, 1968 a couple of thousand acres of land covering
a few dozen survey numbers. The entire land was acquired and in view
of the large area of acquisition even if there was some error in describing
the area of a particular survey number, that would be inconsequential
given the overall acquisition and its purpose for a Housing Scheme under
Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act.
41. In addition, it is quite clear from the extracted passages in the
Award, that the entire land in Survey No.1009 was acquired by the
APHB. There cannot be any doubt in this regard, particularly since the
APHB also took possession of the entire Survey No.1009.
42. While it is correct that the respondents did submit in their claim
petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that 11 acres
and odd had not been acquired, there was absolutely no reference to any
survey number in which this 11 acres and odd was located. There was no
clear identification of the land, no boundaries were mentioned nor was
the land ear-marked in any manner and in fact even the exact
measurement was not mentioned. It appears to us that the respondents
were taking a potshot in the dark to somehow or the other retain
possession of some of the acquired land.
43. If the respondents were convinced that 11 acres and odd had not
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been acquired by the APHB in 1968 it is not understandable why no
follow up action taken by them. They had an option, perhaps, of
proceeding against the APHB for being in wrongful possession of 11
acres and odd owned by the respondents and they certainly had the option
of moving an application under Section 87 of the Act. The respondents
took neither of these steps on an urgent basis or any other step that might
have been available to them in law.
44. All that the respondents did was to wait for another 25 years and
then move an application under Section 87 of the Act sometime in 1993.
There was no change in the factual situation between 1968 and 1993
except construction having been made by the APHB in pursuance of its
Housing Scheme. The respondents have given absolutely no explanation
for filing an application under Section 87 of the Act after such an
enormous lapse of time. What has been submitted is that there is no time
limit for correcting a clerical error and that being so, the respondents
cannot be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches.
45. We are not in agreement with the respondents on any aspect of the
case. First of all we agree with the APHB that an accurate picture of the
area in terms of measurement of land in Survey No.1009 cannot be fully
relied upon after several decades and after construction having been
made. The records had originally indicated that Survey No.1009 consists
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 20 of 31
of 666.25 acres and we must proceed on that basis rather than assume the
correctness of a measurement carried out after several decades.
46. That the unexplained delay in measurement of the area cannot be
relied upon is also supported by the fact that even the revenue authorities
were not quite sure about the exact area of Survey No.1009. According
to the respondents, 11.10 acres had not been acquired but according to the
revenue authorities the entire area of Survey No.1009 was actually 687.03
acres with the result that 20.18 had not been acquired. In view of this
discrepancy, we are of opinion that surveys conducted post the
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be relied
upon. We have also noted that it has come on record that IDL was also in
possession of some parts of Survey No.1009. We must, therefore, accept
the fact that the entire Survey No.1009 was acquired by the APHB and
possession taken, regardless of its actual measurement and the alleged
non-acquisition of 11.10 acres is nothing but a red herring.
Consequently, the question of correcting a ‘clerical error’ with reference
to Section 87 of the Act does not arise.
A clerical error
47. In any event, it was contended by the respondents that a clerical
error was sought to be corrected in the measurement of the area of Survey
No.1009. It is not clear what the clerical error was. If the clerical error
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 21 of 31
was that the area of Survey No.1009 was not 661.04 acres or 666.25 acres
but actually 687.03 acres then the contention is self-defeating. This is
because the area of Survey No.1009 would then have to be read as 687.03
for all purposes and not 661.04 acres. The consequence of this correction
would be that the acquisition was of 687.03 acres and not of 661.04 acres.
48. That apart, the correction of the alleged clerical error does not give
rise to the argument that only 661.04 acres was acquired out of 687.03
acres. If the correction gives rise to an argument or contention, then it
ceases to be the correction of a clerical error but is really the correction of
a substantive error, which does not come within the purview of Section
87 of the Act.
49. Be that as it may, in M/s Tata Consulting Engineers v. Workmen1
Pathak, J. adverted to a clerical error and held in paragraph 20 of the
Report as follows:
“The jurisdiction given to the [Industrial] Tribunal by Rule 31
[Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957] is closely
circumscribed. It is only a clerical mistake or error which can be
corrected, and the clerical mistake or error must arise from an
accidental slip or omission in the award. An accidental slip or
omission implies that something was intended and contrary to
that intention what should not have been included has been
included or what should have been included has been omitted. It
must be a mistake or error amenable to clerical correction only. It
must not be a mistake or error which calls for rectification by
modification of the conscious adjudication on the issues
involved.”

1 1980 (Supp.) SCC 627
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 22 of 31
50. Similarly, a clerical error was discussed in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare
Lal.
2
 In paragraph 4 of the Report, reference was made to Master
Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa3
and it was held as follows:
“A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an
accidental slip or omission of the court. It represents that which
the court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face
of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument
or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation,
and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing.”
51. More recently, in Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (Dead) by Lrs. v.
State of Gujarat 4
it was held in paragraph 26 of the Report as follows:
“An arithmetical mistake is a mistake in calculation, while a
clerical mistake is a mistake of writing or typing error occurring
due to accidental slip or omissions or error due to careless
mistake or omission. In our considered opinion, substituting
different lands in place of the lands which have been notified by a
statutory notification under Sections 10(1), 10(3) and 10(5)
[Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976] cannot and
shall not be done by issuing a corrigendum unless the mandatory
requirements contained in the aforementioned sections is
complied with. A landholder cannot be divested from his land on
the plea of clerical or arithmetical mistake liable to be corrected
by issuing corrigendum.”
52. The Circular dated 15th October, 1994 clarifies a clerical error.
Some examples have been given and one clarification is to the effect that
a clerical error is where the area is calculated wrongly though
measurement on the ground and the records support the correct area.

2
(1981) 1 SCC 500
3AIR 1966 SC 1047
4
(2016) 4 SCC 531
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 23 of 31
This clause is sought to be relied upon by the respondents. It must be
appreciated in this case that there is no question of a calculation error
since no arithmetical error was committed as understood by this Court.
The area of Survey No.1009 was measured and it was found to be 666.25
acres (including the area acquired for Manjeera Water Works
Department). The survey by the Measuring Circle Inspector, the check
by the G.D. Inspector and approved by the Land Record Assistant clearly
indicate this. This was sought to be ‘corrected’ by the respondents by
claiming that the area of Survey No.1009 was much more. A calculation
error would be, in a situation such as the present, an error that would
appear on the face of the document or the revenue records, as the case
may be. If there is a need to carry out a survey and a re-survey, the error
cannot by any means, be described as a clerical error.
53. What makes the situation worse insofar as the respondents are
concerned is that according to them the error was to the extent of 11.10
acres but on a survey having been conducted, the error was said to be to
an extent of 20.18 acres. Surely, such a discrepancy cannot be described
as an accidental slip or a clerical mistake or a calculation error. It can
only be described as a major error which ought to have been rectified at
the appropriate time in 1968 when the Award was passed or soon
thereafter. To notice and make much ado about such an error after at
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 24 of 31
least 25 years cannot be understood as the correction of a clerical error.
54. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to K.P. Varghese v.
Income Tax Officer, Ernakulum and Another 5
to contend that the
Circular dated 15th October, 1994 is a contemporaneous exposition of the
true state of affairs as understood by the revenue authorities themselves
and if they believed that a ‘clerical error’ ought to be interpreted in the
manner described in the Circular, that interpretation must be accepted.
The following passage was referred to and relied upon:
“The rule of construction by reference to contemporanea
expositio is a well-established rule for interpreting a statute by
reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary
authority, though it must give way where the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has been succinctly
and felicitously expressed in Crawford on Statutory
Construction, (1940 Edn.) where it is stated in para 219 that
“administrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction
placed by administrative or executive officers charged with
executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is
overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as
practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless
entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive””.
55. Similarly, reference was also made to Desh Bandhu Gupta and
Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd.6The following passage
was relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents.
“The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute
or any other document by reference to the exposition it has
received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the

5 AIR 1981 SC 1922”
6 AIR 1979 SC 1049
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 25 of 31
same will not always be decisive of the question of construction
(Maxwell 12th ed. p. 268).”
56. It is no doubt true that the contemporaneous exposition of a
document must carry great weight but if that exposition is not in
consonance with the law laid down by the Courts, including this Court,
the exposition would not be relevant. We have made a reference to
several decisions which explain the meaning of a clerical error.The view
expressed in the Circular dated 15th October, 1994 particularly clause 5(d)
referred to and relied upon by the respondents does not come within the
four corners of the understanding of the expression clerical error by this
Court if it involves a survey and a re-survey as in this case. Therefore,
no reliance can be placed upon the contemporaneous exposition made by
the revenue authorities in the Circular dated 15th October, 1994.
57. We conclude that there was no clerical error in the measurement of
Survey No.1009 for all intents and purposes and that in any event, the
entire land in Survey No.1009 was acquired for the Housing Scheme of
the APHB.
Section 87 of the Act and delay in making a claim
58. We are also not satisfied with the delay by the respondents in
making a claim under Section 87 of the Act. The contention of the
respondents is that since there is no time limit specified for filing a claim
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 26 of 31
petition, they could have made a claim at any point of time, particularly
for correcting a clerical error.
59. It is now well settled that where no time-limit is specified,
whatever is required to be done should be within a reasonable period. In
Collector v. P. Mangamma7
it was held in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows:
“A reasonable period would depend upon the factual
circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any
empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority
considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not
has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and
relevant factors to decide that question.
In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha8
it was observed that
when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to
be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the
reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and
the nature of the order which was sought to be varied.........”.
Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational
according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or
immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.”
60. Similarly, in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing
Rao 9
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction where no time-limit is
specified was considered and it was held in paragraph 31 of the Report as
follows:
“To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is
frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain
forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless
uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law.

7
(2003) 4 SCC 488 at page 491
8
 (1969) 2 SCC 187
9
(2015) 3 SCC 695
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Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed
for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led
to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a
belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no
cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said
must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the
orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power
must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud.
Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not
extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the
exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud
upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.”
61. Finally in Basanti Prasad v. Chairman, Bihar School
Examination Board10 it was pointed out where third party rights are
likely to be affected, the courts decline to interfere but if there is a
necessity to interfere then the aggrieved person should be heard on
merits.
62. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, the claim
made under Section 87 of the Act was after a period of at least 25 years.
This can hardly be described as a reasonable period. There is no
explanation for the inordinate delay and to make matters worse, third
party interests have been created through a Housing Scheme developed
on the land in dispute or in any event on the surrounding land. After a
further lapse of 25 years it is not possible to put the clock back, even if
there is any reason to do so, which reason we cannot even visualise in this
case.

10(2009) 6 SCC 791
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Locus standi
63. It was submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the
APHB has no locus standi to raise any dispute with regard to the
measurement of Survey No.1009. We are not at all in agreement with
this submission. A tract of land measuring 11.10 acres out of Survey
No.1009 was sought to be taken away from the APHB which had
announced a Housing Scheme under Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh
Housing Board Act, 1956 and third party rights had also been created in
this regard. The primary responsibility of protecting the interests of the
beneficiaries of the Housing Scheme was that of the APHB and surely it
cannot be said under these circumstances that the APHB had no locus
standi to participate in the proceedings. In fact, even the revenue
authorities recognised the locus of the APHB in the order dated 15th
September, 1997. The Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land
Records, Hyderabad directed the District Revenue Officer to take action
in terms of the Circular of 15th October, 1994 but before passing any
orders under Section 87 of the Act, it was directed that the APHB should
be heard. We therefore reject the contention that the APHB had no locus
standi in the matter.
Interference on facts
64. The final submission of learned counsel for the respondents was
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that the revenue authorities had come a factual conclusion in their favour
and the High Court ought not to have interfered with the factual
conclusions and even this Court ought not to interfere with the factual
conclusions arrived at by the revenue authorities. In our opinion, the
revenue authorities had completely misdirected in law in reopening a
factual issue that had been settled way back in 1968 if not earlier and
there was no occasion for reopening that factual issue after a lapse of at
least 25 years. That being the position, it cannot be said that the courts
are precluded from interfering in a matter of determination of facts when
the authorities have completely misdirected themselves in law and
exercised jurisdiction which did not vest in them. We therefore also
reject this submission of the respondents.
Conclusion
65. To conclude, therefore, we hold that the entire Survey No. 1009
was acquired by the APHB for a Housing Scheme. No parcel of land in
Survey No.1009 was left out or not acquired. Compensation was paid for
acquisition of the entire Survey No.1009. The Division Bench of the
High Court erred in concluding that 20.18 acres of land in Survey
No.1009 had not been acquired.
66. We also hold that it is too simplistic on the part of the respondents
to contend that land in excess of 661.04 acres in Survey No.1009 was not
 C.A. Nos.______________/2018 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010) Page 30 of 31
acquired. This is certainly not so and the entire Survey No.1009 was
acquired. The submission in this regard is rejected.
67. We also hold that the claim made by the respondents under Section
87 of the Act was hopelessly delayed for which there is absolutely no
explanation forthcoming. In addition, we hold that since third party
rights have been created in the meanwhile under the Housing Scheme of
the APHB and there is no way to put the clock back. The respondents
ought to have been vigilant in pursuing their claim, assuming the claim
was legitimate, but since they were not vigilant enough, they must suffer
the consequences of their inaction.
68. We also hold that the proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land
Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 were of some
consequence but since the APHB has not relied upon the proceedings
under the said Act and learned counsel has only mentioned it in passing,
we do not intend to base our decision on the declaration made by the
respondents under the said Act.
69. We also hold that the APHB was directly and primarily affected by
the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act and
therefore had the locus standi to proceed before the Commissioner
(Appeals), the High Court and this Court.
70. In view of the above conclusions, the judgment and order passed
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by the Division Bench is set aside and the appeals filed by the Telangana
Housing Board are allowed. No costs.
 .............................................J
 (Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi; ...........................................J
May 1, 2018 (Deepak Gupta)

In our view, the two Courts below, therefore, were right in holding the appellant guilty of commission of the offences in question by properly appreciating the ocular evidence of the prosecution witness notwithstanding the death of the co-accused, which was of no relevance for deciding the involvement of the appellant in commission of crime.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1498 OF 2010
Murugan ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Tamil Nadu ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the accused against the
final judgment and order dated 25.04.2007 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in
Criminal Appeal No. 804 of 2006 whereby the High
Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
appellant(Accused) and confirmed the order dated
02.08.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Namakkal (Fast Track Court) in Sessions
1
Case No.5 of 2006 convicting the appellant under
Sections 364 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and
sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for 7 years under Section 364 IPC and to pay a fine
of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple imprisonment for one month
and imprisonment for life under Section 302/34 IPC
and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- in default of payment
of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for
two months. The sentences would run
concurrently.
2. In order to appreciate the issues arising in the
case, it is necessary to set out the prosecution case
in detail:
3. One person by name "Kumar" (since dead) was
the uncle of a girl "Geetha". At the relevant time,
Geetha was in sixth standard. Kumar was married
but living separately from his wife. Kumar and
2
Geetha were living in the one locality at a short
distance. Kumar had developed liking for Geetha
and wanted to marry her.
4. Murugan (father of Geetha) was not agreeable
to the Kumar's proposal to marry Geetha.
Murugan(Geetha’s father) used to say that Kumar
had already ruined the life of his wife and now he
wanted to ruin his daughter's life also. Kumar, on
the other hand, used to threaten Geetha that one
day he would kidnap her and marry her.
5. It is the case of prosecution, that on
01.12.2002 afternoon, Kumar went to the house of
Geetha and demanded "Chili" to cook mutton. At
that time, Geetha was alone in the house. When
Geetha refused him to give Chili, Kumar entered
into the house and took Chili of his own and left the
house saying that one day, he would kidnap her
and rape her.
3
6. On the same day at around 10 P.M., Kumar
along with Murugan(appellant), who is his cousin
brother (his aunt's son) went to Geetha’s house and
invited Murugan(Geetha’s father) for a drink and
non-veg. dinner at his house. Murugan(Geetha’s
father) accepted the invitation and went along with
both of them to Kumar's house.
7. When Murugan(Geetha’s father) did not
return home, Geetha (PW-1) alone went to Kumar's
house at around 11 P.M. to find out as to why her
father has not returned so far and what was he
doing in Kumar's house for such a long time. On
reaching there, she, however, found that trio
(Kumar, Murugan and the appellant) were sitting in
the room on one iron cot and were dining together.
The trio told Geetha that her father - Murugan
would be coming shortly. Thereafter Geetha
returned to her house.
4
8. Since Murugan did not return home till next
day morning, Geetha (PW-1) and her mother Saroja
(PW-2) went early morning to Kumar's house to find
out why Murugan has not returned so far to his
house. The front door of the Kumar's house was
closed. Both of them, therefore, pushed the front
door and on opening, they found that Murugan's
dead body was lying in the room near iron cot with
many injuries on his body.
9. It is this incident which gave rise to filing of
FIR dated 02.12.2002 (Ex-P-18) by Geetha (PW-1) in
PS Jedarpalayam, which was registered as Crime
No. 224 of 2002 under Sections 302/364/34 of IPC.
The police then started investigation, visited the
house of Kumar, prepared Mahazar (Ex.P-13),
drawn rough sketch (Ex.P-19), took photographs,
prepared inquest report, recorded the statements of
witnesses, conducted post-mortem of the dead body
(Ex.P-4) and recovered the articles (M.O. 5 and 12 ).
5
10. The police then on 03.12.2002 arrested
Kumar, who confessed his guilt. His confessional
statement was accordingly recorded (Ex.P-15).
Thereafter the police recovered weapon used in the
crime (Aruval-MO-14) and the blood stained green
shirts at his instance from his father's house. It was
then followed by the appellant's arrest on the same
day.
11. The police, on completing the investigation,
filed the charge sheet against Kumar and the
appellant herein for commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 364 and 302/34 of IPC.
The case was then committed to the Additional
Sessions Judge, Namakkal for trial (Sessions Trial
No. 5/2006).
12. Before the trial could begin, the main accusedKumar
died. The trial against him, therefore, stood
abated whereas it continued against the co-accused
6
–appellant herein. The appellant, however, abjured
the guilt.
13. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution
examined 12 witnesses, marked 20 exhibits and
produced 15 material objects. In the proceedings
under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), the
appellant was asked to explain the circumstances
appearing against him but he denied the charges
including the circumstances without offering any
explanation.
14. By order dated 02.08.2006, the Additional
Sessions Judge held the charges proved against the
appellant and accordingly convicted him for
commission of the offences punishable under
Sections 364 and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC
and awarded life imprisonment under Section 302
IPC and seven years under Section 364 and a fine
amount of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs.1000/- respectively.
7
15. The appellant felt aggrieved by his conviction
and the sentences awarded by the Additional
Sessions Judge and filed appeal in the High Court.
16. By impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of
the Additional Sessions Judge, which has given rise
to filing of the appeal by way of special leave by the
accused –Murugan in this Court.
17. Heard Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, learned
counsel for the appellant and Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna,
learned counsel for the respondent.
18. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in the appeal.
19. We have perused the evidence with a view to
find out whether the approach, reasoning and
conclusion arrived at by the two Courts below are
legally sustainable or not.
8
20. It is a settled principle of law that when the
Courts below have recorded concurrent findings
against the accused person which are based on due
appreciation of evidence, this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution of India would be slow to interfere
in such concurrent findings and would not appreciate
the evidence de novo unless it is prima facie shown
that both the Courts below did not either consider the
relevant piece of evidence or there exists any perversity
or/and absurdity in the findings recorded by both the
Courts below etc.
21. We, however, made endeavour to peruse the
evidence with a view to find out as to whether the
concurrent findings of both the Courts below have
any kind of infirmity or/and whether the concurrent
findings are capable of being legally and factually
sustainable or need to be reversed. Having gone
through the evidence, we are of the view that the
findings are legally and factually sustainable in law.
9
22. In our considered opinion, the two Courts
below have rightly held that the appellant's
conviction was based on circumstantial evidence
which, in this case, the prosecution was able to
prove it by adducing evidence. In other words, we
also find that the prosecution was able to prove the
chain of circumstances/events appearing against
the appellant without any break therein and hence
the appellant’s conviction deserves to be upheld.
23. On perusal of the evidence, we find that the
prosecution examined three witnesses (PW-1, PW-2
and PW-3) to prove material circumstances and the
chain of events against the appellant which first
included the motive behind the commission of the
crime followed by the manner in which the incident
took place leading to the death of Murugan.
24. The motive, according to the prosecution, was
that Kumar had a grudge against the deceased
because he was not agreeable to the Kumar's
10
proposal to marry his daughter-Geetha. This was
proved with the evidence of PWs-1, 2 and 3. It was
believed by the two Courts below and, in our
opinion, rightly.
25. The prosecution then proved that the appellant
along with Kumar had gone to the house of the
deceased for inviting him for dinner at Kumar's
house on the same night. The deceased accepted
the invitation and went to Kumar's house to have
dinner with Kumar and the appellant.
26. It was then proved that Geetha (PW-1) had
gone to Kumar's house at around 11 P.M. to see
why her father did not return to his house and on
reaching there, she found all the three sitting on
iron cot and were having dinner. As per post
mortem report, it was proved that Murugan died
between 11 P.M. and 12 P.M. the same night.
27. In our opinion, when the appellant was sitting
in the company of the deceased (Murugan) till 11
11
P.M. along with Kumar in his house and had dinner
with Murugan and Kumar and immediately
thereafter Murugan died, the appellant in
cross-examination of PWs-1,2 and 3 was not able to
elicit anything to discredit the evidence of the
abovesaid three witnesses and to disprove the
circumstances deposed against him.
28. That apart, in our opinion, it was necessary for
the appellant to have explained the aforementioned
circumstances appearing against him in the
proceedings under Section 313 of the Code. The
appellant, however, failed to explain any
circumstances and denied his involvement in the
crime.
29. We find from the evidence eight circumstances
appearing against the appellant. These
circumstances are: First motive was against the
deceased due to his not agreeing to the proposal of
marriage of Kumar with his daughter; Second, the
12
appellant and Kumar, both being the cousins, knew
each other very well; Third, both went together to
the house of the deceased to invite him for a dinner
at Kumar’s house; Fourth, all the three had dinner
together at Kumar’s house; Fifth, Murugan died
immediately after dinner; Sixth, Kumar gave his
confessional statement; Seventh, recovery of
weapon and cloths at the instance of Kumar; and
Eighth, the dead body was found lying near iron cot
where Murugan(deceased) had last dinner with
Kumar and the appellant.
30. In our view, the aforementioned eight
circumstances do constitute a chain of events
against the appellant and lead to draw a strong
conclusion against the appellant and Kumar for
having committed the murder of Murugan.
31. In our view, it clearly establishes that both
(Kumar and the appellant) had a common intention
to eliminate Murugan. In our view, there could be
13
no other person other than the appellant and
Kumar, who committed the crime in question.
32. A theory of "accused last seen in the
company of the deceased" is a strong
circumstance against the accused while
appreciating the circumstantial evidence. In such
cases, unless the accused is able to explain properly
the material circumstances appearing against him,
he can be held guilty for commission of offence for
which he is charged. In this case, it was rightly held
by the two Courts below against the appellant and
we find no good ground to disturb this finding.
33. We are not impressed by the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant when she argued
that Kumar (main accused) having died without
facing the trial, the present appellant is entitled for
a clean acquittal because nothing now survives
against the appellant after Kumar's death for
14
appellant’s prosecution. We do not agree with this
submission.
34. In our view, death of Kumar was of no
significance so far as the appellant’s prosecution is
concerned. The reason being that this was a case of
common intention of the two accused persons to
eliminate Murugan and the appellant was one of the
accused persons, who was found actively
participating in the crime till last along with the
other accused, who died.
35. In our view, the two Courts below, therefore,
were right in holding the appellant guilty of
commission of the offences in question by properly
appreciating the ocular evidence of the prosecution
witness notwithstanding the death of the
co-accused, which was of no relevance for deciding
the involvement of the appellant in commission of
crime.
15
36. We, therefore, find no good ground to take a
different view than what is taken by the two Courts
below and concur with their reasoning and
conclusion with our additional reasoning elaborated
above.
37. The appeal is thus found to be devoid of any
merit. It fails and is accordingly dismissed.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
May 02, 2018
16

INCOME TAX = order of block assessment = Therefore, the income assessable in block assessment under Chapter XIV-B is the income not disclosed but found and determined as the result of search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132-A of the Act.The power of survey has been provided under Section 133A of the IT Act. Therefore, any material or evidence found/collected in a Survey which has been simultaneously made at the premises of a connected person can be utilized while making the Block Assessment in respect of an assessee under Section 158BB read with Section 158 BH of the IT Act. The same would fall under the words “and such other materials or information as are available with the Assessing Officer and relatable to such evidence” occurring in Section158 BB of the Act. In the present case, the Assessing Officer was justified in taking the adverse material collected or 11 found during the survey or any other method while making the Block Assessment.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10164 of 2010
 Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai ….Appellant(s)
 Versus
S. Ajit Kumar
 …. Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APEAL NO. 10917 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4449 OF 2015
CIVIL APEAL NO. 5255 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10165 OF 2010
J U D G M E N T
R.K. Agrawal, J.
1) This appeal has been filed against the impugned
judgment and order dated 22.11.2006 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Tax Case (Appeal) No. 2620
of 2006 whereby the Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed
by the appellant herein while upholding the decision passed
1
by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”)
dated 28.04.2006. Along with this appeal, other appeals are
also tagged. Since the moot question in all these appeals is
same, all these appeals would stand disposed off through this
common judgment.
Brief facts:-
Civil Appeal No. 10164 of 2010
2) In order to appreciate the facts of the present case in the
appropriate manner, purpose would be served if we mention
the facts in a summarized way which is as under:-
a) The appellant herein is the Revenue whereas the
respondent is the assessee.
b) A search was conducted by the officers of the Income
Tax Department in the premises of the assessee on
17.07.2002 which was concluded on 21.08.2002. On the same
date, there was a survey in the premises of Elegant
Constructions and Interiors Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
‘M/s. ECIL’) - the builder and interior decorator who
constructed and decorated the house of the assessee at
Valmiki Nagar.
2
c) Pursuant to the same, the fact that the assessee having
engaged the above contractor for construction of the house
came out. At the same time, from the survey in the builder’s
premises, the fact of the assessee having paid Rs 95,16,000/-
to M/s ECIL in cash was revealed which was not accounted
for.
d) The Assessing Officer, vide order dated 31.08.2004, after
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case,
completed the block assessment and, inter alia, held that the
said amount is liable to tax as undisclosed income of the block
period.
e) Being aggrieved with the order dated 31.08.2004, the
assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income
Tax (Appeals). Learned CIT (Appeals), vide order dated
15.02.2005, held that it was due to the search action that the
Department had found that the assessee had engaged the
services of M/s. ECIL. Hence, the order of block assessment
was upheld.
f) Being dissatisfied, the assessee brought the matter before
the Tribunal by way of an appeal. The Tribunal, vide order
3
dated 28.04.2006, set aside the decisions of the Assessing
Officer and learned CIT (Appeals) and allowed the appeal.
g) Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal before the
High Court. The High Court, vide order dated 22.11.2006,
dismissed the appeal.
3) Consequently, the Revenue has filed this instant appeal
before this Court.
4) Heard the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel
for the parties and perused the relevant records of the case
placed before us.
Point(s) for consideration:-
5) The short point for consideration which arises in this appeal
is as to whether in the light of present facts and
circumstances of the instant case, the material found in the
course of survey in the premises of the builder could be used
in Block Assessment of the assessee?
Rival contentions:
6) At the outset, learned senior counsel for the Revenue
contended that the High Court failed to consider that the
information gathered as a result of search is not the details of
4
appointment of interior decorator rather it is information
regarding the cash payments made over and above the
cheques payments and not accounted by the assessee.
Further, it was also contended that it is the standard practice
in the Department that when a search takes place in the case
of an assessee, many related business premises are
simultaneously covered under survey. Learned senior counsel
further contended that though it is called a survey, it is very
much part of the search process and the inquiry and
investigation is one process. This is to be distinguished from
the surveys which are stand-alone surveys, totally
unconnected to any search. In order to substantiate his claim,
learned senior counsel has referred to a decision of this Court
in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and Another vs.
Hotel Blue Moon (2010) 3 SCC 259 and contended that the
impugned decision of the High Court is liable to be set aside.
7) Per contra, it is submitted by learned senior counsel for
the assessee that the High Court rightly dismissed the appeal
of the appellant after placing reliance on the decision of the
Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. G.K.
5
Senniappan 284 ITR 220. It was also submitted that the fact
of cash payment found in survey conducted at the premises of
M/s ECIL does not fall within the ambit of Block Assessment.
Learned senior Counsel has relied upon the following
decisions, viz., Commissioner of Income Tax vs. S. Ajit
Kumar (2008) 300 ITR 152 (Mad.), Commissioner of Income
Tax vs. N.K. Laminates Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 211 (All.),
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bimal Auto Agency (2009)
314 ITR 191 (Gauhati), Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Khushlal Chand Nirmal Kumar (2003) 263 ITR 77 (MP),
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Dr. Rattan Kumar Singh
(2013) 357 ITR 35 (All.), Commissioner of Income Tax,
Chennai vs. S. V. Sreenivasan (2017) SCC Online 17211
(Mad.), Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Pinaki Misra
(2017) 392 ITR 347 (Delhi), Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
R.M.L. Mehrotra (2010) 320 ITR 403 (All.), Sree Meenakshi
Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (1957)
21 ITR 28 (S.C.), Commissioner of Income Tax vs. P.V.
Kalyanasundaram (2007) 294 ITR 49 (S.C.), Commissioner
of Income Tax vs. Smt. Anita Chouhan (2008) 296 ITR 691
6
(M.P.) and Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab vs. Indian
Wollen Textiles Mills (1964) 51 ITR 291. Learned senior
counsel finally submitted that in view of the above decisions,
this appeal deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.
Discussion:-
8) In the present case, the period for Block Assessment is
01.04.1996 to 17.07.2002. Section 153A of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (for brevity “the IT Act”) provides the procedure for
completion of assessment where a search is initiated under
Section 132 of the IT Act or books of account or other
documents or any asset are requisitioned under Section 132A
of the IT Act.
9) It is a cardinal principle of law that in order to add any
income in the block assessment, evidence of such must be
found in the course of the search under Section 132 of the IT
Act or in any proceedings simultaneously conducted in the
premises of the assessee, relatives and/or persons who are
connected with the assessee and are having
transaction/dealings with such assessee. In the present case,
the moot question is whether the fact of cash payment of Rs
7
95.16 lakhs can be added under the head of the undisclosed
income of the assessee in block assessment.
10) In the instant case, the office and residential premises of
the assessee searched on 17.07.2002 and finally concluded on
21.08.2002. During the course of search, certain evidence
were found which showed that the assessee had indulged in
understatement of his real income relating to the block period
from 01.04.1996 to 17.07.2002. Consequently, a notice dated
25.02.2003, under Section 158BC of the IT Act, was issued to
the assessee and he was asked to file block assessment. In
reply to such notice, the assessee filed return on 11.08.2003,
admitting the undisclosed income as “NIL”.
11) In the present case, it is admitted position that the cost
of investment was disclosed to the Revenue in the course of
return filed by the assessee. The assessee also disclosed the
detail of transaction between the assessee and M/s ECIL in
the assessment year 2001-2002. However, he had not
disclosed the payment of Rs. 95,16,000/- in cash made to
M/s. ECIL.
8
12) The method of calculating the undisclosed income of the
block period is provided under Section 158BB of the IT Act. It
would be appropriate to re-produce the relevant part of
Sections 158BB and 158 BH of the IT Act which is as follows:
“158BB. Computation of undisclosed income of the
block period.-(1) The undisclosed income of the block
period shall be the aggregate of the total income of the
previous year failing within the block period computed,
in accordance with the provisions of this Act, on the
basis of evidence found as a result of search or
requisition of books of account or other documents
and such other materials or information as are
available with the Assessing Officer and relatable
to such evidence, as reduced by the aggregate of the
total income , or, as the case may be, as increased by
the aggregate of the losses of such previous year
determined……

158BH. Application of other provisions of this Act –
Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, all other
provisions of this Act shall apply to assessment made
under this Chapter.”
(Emphasis supplied by us)
13) On a perusal of the above provision, it is evident that for
the purpose of calculating the undisclosed income of the block
period, it can be calculated only on the basis of evidence found
as a result of search or requisition of books of accounts or
other documents and such other materials or information as
are available with the Assessing Officer and relatable to such
9
evidence. Section 158BB has prescribed the boundary which
has to be followed. No departure from this provision is allowed
otherwise it may cause prejudice to the assessee. Needless to
say that it is the cannon of tax law that it should be
interpreted strictly.
14) However, Section 158BH of the IT Act has made all other
provisions of the IT Act applicable to assessments made under
Chapter XIVB except otherwise provided under this Chapter.
Chapter XIV B of the IT Act, which relates to Block
Assessment, came up for consideration before this Court in
Hotel Blue Moon (supra) wherein it has been held as under:
“18. Chapter XIV-B provides for an assessment of the
undisclosed income unearthed as a result of search without
affecting the regular assessment made or to be made. Search
is the sine qua non for the block assessment. The special
provisions are devised to operate in the distinct field of
undisclosed income and are clearly in addition to the regular
assessments covering the previous years falling in the block
period. The special procedure of Chapter XIV-B is intended
to provide a mode of assessment of undisclosed income,
which has been detected as a result of search. It is not
intended to be a substitute for regular assessment. Its scope
and ambit is limited in that sense to materials unearthed
during search. It is in addition to the regular assessment
already done or to be done. The assessment for the block
period can only be done on the basis of evidence found as a
result of search or requisition of books of accounts or
documents and such other materials or information as are
available with the assessing officer. Therefore, the income
assessable in block assessment under Chapter XIV-B is the
income not disclosed but found and determined as the result
10
of search under Section 132 or requisition under Section
132-A of the Act.
28. Section 158-BH provides for application of the other
provisions of the Act. It reads:
“158-BH. Application of other provisions of this Act.-
Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, all other
provisions of this Act shall apply to assessment
made under this Chapter.”
This is an enabling provision, which makes all the
provisions of the Act, save as otherwise provided, applicable
for proceedings for block assessment. The provisions which
are specifically included are those which are available in
Chapter XIV-B of the Act, which includes Section 142 and
sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 143.”

15) The power of survey has been provided under Section
133A of the IT Act. Therefore, any material or evidence
found/collected in a Survey which has been simultaneously
made at the premises of a connected person can be utilized
while making the Block Assessment in respect of an assessee
under Section 158BB read with Section 158 BH of the IT Act.
The same would fall under the words “and such other
materials or information as are available with the Assessing
Officer and relatable to such evidence” occurring in
Section158 BB of the Act. In the present case, the Assessing
Officer was justified in taking the adverse material collected or
11
found during the survey or any other method while making the
Block Assessment.
16) In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the
considered opinion that the decisions relied upon by learned
senior counsel for the assessee do not lay down the correct
law.
17) In the result, all the appeals succeed and are allowed.
The impugned orders are set aside and the orders passed by
the Assessing Officer making the Block Assessment are
restored. However, the parties shall bear their own cost.
…….....…………………………………J.
 (R.K. AGRAWAL)
 …….…………….………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 2, 2018.
12

It is only for schools seeking CBSE affiliation that it is prescribed that the number of students should not be less than 300. We do not see how, if the number of students is less than 300, it will detract from the quality of education imparted to the students. In other words, the requirement of a minimum strength of 300 students is a completely arbitrary figure arrived at by Kerala and which has no rational nexus with quality education or the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws. In the absence of any material on record justifying the fixation of a minimum of 300 students in a school seeking an NOC for affiliation to the CBSE, we must hold the requirement as arbitrary and we do so.

SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 1 of 13
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS. 18475-18476 OF 2013
State of Kerala & Anr. …..Petitioners
Vs.
Mythri Vidya Bhavan English M. Sch. & Ors. …..Respondents
WITH
SLP(C) Nos. 4531-4532/2014, SLP(C) No.
4530/2014, SLP(C) Nos. 23142-23146/2013, SLP(C)
Nos.23138-23140/2013, SLP(C) Nos. 29655-
29658/2013, SLP(C) Nos. 29781-29783/2013,
SLP(C) Nos. 29560-29561/2013, SLP(C) Nos.
33438-33439/2013, SLP(C) Nos. 29660-29662/2013,
SLP(C) Nos. 83-86/2014, SLP(C) Nos. 31934-
31936/2013, SLP(C) Nos. 79-80/2014, SLP(C) No.
39339/2013, SLP(C) No. 37208/2013, SLP(C) Nos.
76-77/2014, SLP(C) No. 81/2014, SLP(C) No.
82/2014, SLP(C) Nos. 4534-4536/2014
JUDGMENT
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The fundamental right to free and compulsory education to all
children between the age of 6 and 14 years postulates good quality
education and not just education for the sake of providing education.
Regulation of such education is permissible by law and not by
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 2 of 13
executive fiat. Unfortunately, in this batch of petitions, the State of
Kerala seeks to impose its authority over schools that provide
apparently quality education, which is perceived to be a threat to the
public education system in the State.
2. The challenge by the State of Kerala in this batch of petitions is
to the judgment and order dated 14th September, 2012 passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. In our opinion, all these
petitions deserve to be dismissed.
Brief background
3. Without going into any great detail into the history (which is
replete with litigation – as if schools have nothing better to do) leading
up to these petitions, it needs to be said that the affiliation of schools by
the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) is governed by its
Affiliation Bye-laws. Clause 3(i) of the Bye-laws mandates formal
prior recognition by the State/Union Territory Government.
Additionally, the application for affiliation should be forwarded by the
State Government or there should be a No Objection Certificate (NOC)
to the effect that the State Government has no objection to the
affiliation of the school with the CBSE.
4. Apparently with this in mind, the State of Kerala issued certain
guidelines on 13th June, 2007 limiting consideration of applications for
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 3 of 13
grant of an NOC to 5 northern districts in the State. The Government
Order (G.O.) was challenged by the management of some schools and
it was set aside by the High Court.
5. Against the decision rendered by the High Court, petitions for
special leave to appeal were filed by Kerala which were taken up for
consideration on 18th July, 2011. By that time, Kerala had come out
with a new policy dated 10th June, 2011 which made the petitions
infructuous. The relevant extract of the order passed by this Court on
18th July, 2011 reads as follows:
“Delay condoned.
The State Government has filed these SLPs challenging the
order of the High Court directing consideration of the
applications filed by the respondents for grant of ‘no objection
certificate’ for seeking affiliation with Central Board of
Secondary Education (for short ‘CBSE’) for a new
institution/existing institutions. The State Government had
earlier rejected the request with reference to the Policy of the
State Government then in force.
When the matter came up today, both sides submitted
that the State Government has now made a new Policy
contained in G.O.(MS) No.137/2011/G. Edn. dated 10.6.2011
which reads as under:
“Government are pleased to accord sanction for issuing
No Objection Certificate for getting CBSE/ICSE
affiliation to schools, which totally fulfils the norms and
conditions prescribed by CBSE/ICSE and having own
land and basic facilities.
Further guidelines will be issued by the Department in
due course.”
In view of the said Policy, it is submitted that these
SLPs by the State Government have become infructuous as the
State Government will have to consider the applications of the
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 4 of 13
respondents with reference to the said new Policy dated
10.6.2011 and pass appropriate orders within three months
from today.
It is needless to say that if the respondents-applicants
are aggrieved by any order passed on such consideration, they
will be entitled to challenge the same in accordance with law.
 …………….”
6. It is significant to note that the last line of the G.O. dated 10th
June, 2011 stated that further guidelines would be issued by the
concerned department in due course.
7. These further guidelines as postulated by the G.O. dated 10th
June, 2011 came to be issued on 7th October, 2011. These (new)
guidelines were not supplementary but a completely extra set of
guidelines that prescribed norms for the grant of an NOC to new
schools for affiliation to CBSE and for existing schools for renewal of
affiliation under the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws. According to learned
counsel for the schools, this was quite unexpected and unnecessary
8. Be that as it may, the management of several schools objected to
some of the guidelines. The objections were to the following
guidelines:
“iv. The institution should have minimum 3 acres of land, out
of which at least 2 acres shall be in the actual location where
the school is functioning in a contiguous manner. It should
have adequate playground also. There should be a library and
adequate number of laboratories.
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 5 of 13
vi. The medium of instruction must be English. However
Malayalam will be compulsorily taught as a paper with a
prescribed text book and a proper academic evaluation as
instructed by State Government from time to time.
viii. The school shall appoint only qualified and eligible staff
and must pay the salary and allowances and other benefits to
the employees of the school. Employees in the CBSE/ICSE
school shall be offered the same pay scales as in Government
Schools for equivalent categories. The pay shall start at the
minimum of the scale and employees shall be eligible for DA
and increments as is allowed in Government Schools from time
to time.
xiv. The school should have been in existence for a period of
five years as on the date of application for NOC and should
have at least 300 students in its rolls. The UIID enrolment
should be completed and UIID numbers of the students
enrolled in the school shall be furnished.”
9. These guidelines were challenged by some schools by way of
writ petitions in the High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court heard the writ petitions challenging the G.O. of 7th October, 2011
and by an interim order passed on 20th April, 2012 stayed the operation
of guidelines (iv) and (xiv).
10. Kerala filed a writ appeal challenging the order of the learned
Single Judge and upon hearing learned counsel, the Division Bench
was of the view that the decision in the writ appeal would render all the
pending writ petitions before the learned Single Judge infructuous.
Therefore, with the consent of all the parties to the litigation, it was
decided that all the writ petitions and the writ appeal should be heard
by the Division Bench so that there is some finality to the dispute.
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 6 of 13
11. By the impugned judgment and order dated 14th September,
2012, the High Court struck down clause (iv) and (xiv) of the
guidelines dated 7th October, 2011 and it is under these circumstances
that the present petitions have been filed by Kerala and taken up for
consideration.
12. At the outset, we may note that although initially four guidelines
were under challenge before the learned Single Judge but before us it
was stated by learned counsel for school managements that they do not
press the challenge to guidelines (vi) and (viii). We are, therefore,
concerned only with guidelines (iv) and (xiv) pertaining to a school
seeking affiliation requiring minimum 3 acres of land and a minimum
300 enrolled students.
Requirement of minimum 3 acres of land
13. According to Kerala, a school seeking an NOC for affiliation to
the CBSE must have 3 acres of land out of which 2 acres should be
contiguous and in the actual location of the school. We have not been
shown any basis for this mandate, applicable to all schools across the
board.
14. On the other hand, the CBSE appears to have done its homework
in framing the Affiliation Bye-laws and making a realistic assessment
of the requirements of schools depending on their location.
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 7 of 13
15. In Chapter IV of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (for short
‘KER’), we have been informed by learned counsel for Kerala that it is
provided that Upper Primary Schools with or without Lower Primary
Section (that is up to and including Standard V and VI), the land
requirement (as informed) is 1.2 to 2 hectares (3 to 5 acres); for
Secondary Schools the land requirement is 1.2 to 2 hectares (3 to 5
acres) and for Higher Secondary Schools the land requirement is 1.2
hectares (3 acres). Hence the minimum requirement is of 3 acres of
land. However, the KER provides that every school should normally
have a minimum site area as indicated above.
16. Contrast this with the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws. Under these
Bye-laws, the minimum land requirement varies from location to
location. The requirement generally for an educational institution to
apply to the CBSE for affiliation is that the school must have 2 acres of
land but there are certain exceptions. For example, in cities with a
population exceeding 25 lakhs the land should not be less than 1 acre
with adequate building and arrangement with other
institution/organization for imparting physical and health education and
for conducting games to the satisfaction of the CBSE. In hilly areas, the
land should not be less than 1 acre and the norms as prescribed by the
Planning Commission would be applicable for determining hilly areas.
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 8 of 13
17. Similarly, in schools located within the Municipal limit of the
capital cities, islands, North Eastern States and Jammu & Kashmir the
minimum land requirement shall be 1 acre. In other words, the CBSE
has introduced a degree of flexibility depending upon the location of
the school. Unfortunately, Kerala has not even thought of providing
any such flexibility. It appears to us that the rigid requirement of
Kerala indicates that it is imposed upon the schools that seek affiliation
with the CBSE only with a view to unnecessarily burden them with an
onerous and arbitrary condition, since Kerala believes it has the
authority to do so.
18. Keeping all this in mind, we had required Kerala by an order dated
6
th December, 2016 to inform us the number of schools run by the State
Government or aided by the State Government or affiliated with the State
Board that do not comply with the guidelines of 7th October, 2011. In
response, Kerala filed an evasive affidavit to the effect that since the
guidelines do not apply to such schools, there is no compulsion on such
schools to comply with them. This is remarkable – guidelines are framed
by Kerala for application by schools other than those run by the State
Government or aided by the State Government or affiliated with the State
Board. There is no reason given for this distinction drawn by Kerala
which appears to be completely arbitrary.
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 9 of 13
19. It was submitted on behalf of Kerala that nevertheless the State
Government was well within its rights and authority to provide for a
minimum of 3 acres of land for the grant of an NOC. While this may be
so, the requirement must have some rational basis but we are unable to
find any such rational basis. Even in the counter affidavit filed before
the learned Single Judge it is stated by Kerala that restrictions have
been placed on CBSE schools to prevent their mushrooming growth
which would affect the public education system in the State. No details
have been given for arriving at this conclusion. But the very fact that
there is a mushroom growth of CBSE schools is an indication that the
public education system in Kerala as managed by the State Government
leaves something to be desired in terms of the quality of the education.
How does the restriction imposed by Kerala benefit the children of the
State?
20. As mentioned above, the CBSE has done its homework well and
has taken a pragmatic view of the requirement of land. We can take
judicial notice of the fact that in metropolitan and capital cities as well
as in hilly areas, it would be difficult to get 3 acres of land or even 2
acres of land. Similarly, due to the terrain it would perhaps be difficult
to get adequate land in the North Eastern region of the country as well
as in Jammu & Kashmir. This realism deserves to be contrasted with
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 10 of 13
non-realistic inflexibility of Kerala which too has some hilly areas
where perhaps it might be difficult to find 3 acres of land. It is this lack
of pragmatism and arbitrary rigidity that has weighed with the High
Court as well as with us in coming to the conclusion that guideline (iv)
requiring a minimum of 3 acres of land for obtaining an NOC for
getting affiliation in accordance with the Affiliation Bye-laws of the
CBSE is arbitrary and was deservedly struck down by the High Court.
Minimum enrolment of 300 students
21. The second challenge is with reference to the minimum strength
of students being 300 in a school that seeks affiliation with the CBSE in
terms of guideline (xiv).
22. At this stage, it may be mentioned that in Queen Mary Public
School v. State of Kerala1
the High Court held that the requirement of
500 students on the rolls for affiliation of the school from Standard I to
Standard X is contrary of the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws and is not
rational or sustainable. Notwithstanding this, Kerala has insisted on the
number of students on the rolls being at least 300 for the issuance of an
NOC. Since there is no such requirement under the CBSE Affiliation
Bye-laws - this is merely an unwarranted imposition by Kerala on
school managements.

1
(2007) 4 KLT 706
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 11 of 13
23. The question of affiliation with the CBSE would arise only when
the school reaches at least Standard VI. In this regard, clause 15.1(a) of
Chapter III of the Affiliation Bye-laws is relevant and this provides as
follows:
“15.1.(a) The schools fulfilling the norms of Affiliation given
in Chapter-II may apply ‘On-line’ to the Board for approval of
Middle Class Syllabus/provisional affiliation for secondary/
upgradation of Senior Secondary Classes on the prescribed
from alongwith prescribed fee given in Appendix II before 30th
June of the Year preceding the year in which Class VI/IX/XI as
the case may be is proposed to be started. Application Forms,
procedural details and Affiliation Bye-Laws for submission of
applications ‘on line’ are available on the Boards website
www.cbse.nic.in. Application submitted by post or by any
other means will not be processed.
All the applications which are received by CBSE on or before
30th June every year may be processed together within a period
of six months thereof. The order of granting or refusing the
affiliation shall be communicated to the applicants on or before
31st December of that year.”
24. The High Court took the view that progressive stages of
affiliation has a rational basis while the prescription of having a
minimum of 300 students for obtaining an NOC does not have any such
basis. Again, we do not find any reason for this requirement in the
counter affidavit filed by Kerala in the High Court except that it has the
authority to make such a prescription.
25. The illustration given by the High Court in this regard is
apposite. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2009 (the RTE Act) requires a student-teacher ratio of 30:1. A
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 12 of 13
school having 30 children in one class and having one division will
have only 180 students upto and including Standard VI. Such a school
cannot, therefore, obtain provisional affiliation for secondary or senior
secondary classes. Actually, such a school would not be eligible for
affiliation till Standard X when it has 300 students – and it can never
reach that stage since Standard IX and X can be started only if the
school has CBSE affiliation. Kerala is, therefore, expecting an
impossibility from such schools that strictly conform to the provisions
of the RTE Act.
26. On the other hand, under the KER the minimum effective
strength per standard in Lower Primary/Upper Primary and High
Schools is 25 students (it would now have increased to 30 students). It
is only for schools seeking CBSE affiliation that it is prescribed that the
number of students should not be less than 300. We do not see how, if
the number of students is less than 300, it will detract from the quality
of education imparted to the students. In other words, the requirement
of a minimum strength of 300 students is a completely arbitrary figure
arrived at by Kerala and which has no rational nexus with quality
education or the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws.
27. According to learned counsel for Kerala, if a school does not
have a minimum of 300 students, it would be difficult for that school to
SLP (Civil) Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013 etc. etc. Page 13 of 13
pay the required wages of the staff and the teachers except by charging
exorbitant fees. There is no material on record to substantiate such a
conclusion and it is based merely on the ipse dixit of the State. In the
absence of any material on record justifying the fixation of a minimum
of 300 students in a school seeking an NOC for affiliation to the CBSE,
we must hold the requirement as arbitrary and we do so.
28. Another issue raised by the management of schools is with
regard to the compulsory unique identification (UID) for enrolment of
students. We leave this issue open, as suggested by learned counsel, to
await the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court which is
presently seized of the requirement of UID.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these petitions
which are accordingly dismissed. The interim applications stand
disposed of.
..………………………J
(Madan B. Lokur)
 New Delhi .……………………J
May 2, 2018 ( Deepak Gupta )