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Friday, April 13, 2018

“Paramparya Vaidyas’ - Conclusion: 19) In our country, the numbers of qualified medical practitioners have been much less than the required number of such persons. The scarcity of qualified medical practitioner was previously quite large since there were very few institutions imparting teaching and training to Doctors, Vaidyas, Hakims etc. The position has now changed and there are quite a good number of medical colleges imparting 25 education in various streams of medicine. No doubt, now there are a good numbers of such institutions training qualified medical practitioners at number of places. The persons having no recognized and approved qualifications, having little knowledge about the indigenous medicines, are becoming medical practitioners and playing with the lives of thousands and millions of people. Some time such quacks commit blunders and precious lives are lost. 20) The government had been vigilant all along to stop such quackery. A number of unqualified, untrained quacks are posing a great risk to the entire society and playing with the lives of people without having the requisite training and education in the science from approved institutions. The Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953 as well as the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 were also enacted on the similar lines. Every practitioner shall be deemed to be a practitioner registered under the Act if at the commencement of this Act, his name stands entered in the appropriate register maintained under the said Act and every certificate of registration issued to every such practitioner 26 shall be deemed to be a certificate of registration issued under this Act. But in the present case, the appellants herein have failed to show that they possessed requisite recognized qualification for registration entitling them to practice Indian system of medicines or their names have been entered in the appropriate registers after the commencement of this Act. 21) In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was right in dismissing the petitions filed by the appellants herein. Consequently, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. Interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

1
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 897 OF 2009
Kerala Ayurveda Paramparya Vaidya Forum .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Kerala and Others .... Respondent(s)
 WITH
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 898 OF 2009
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 899-900 OF 2009
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 901 OF 2009
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 902 OF 2009
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 903 OF 2009
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 904 OF 2009
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 905 OF 2009
 J U D G M E N T
R.K. Agrawal, J.
1) The above appeals have been filed against the judgment
and order dated 08.01.2003 passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in O.P. No. 24109 of
2
2001 and connected matters whereby the High Court had
dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants herein.
2) Brief facts:
(a) In the State of Kerala, a number of persons are practicing
in Sidha/Unani/Ayurveda system of medicine called as
“Paramparya Vaidyas’ and passing their knowledge and
experience to their descendants by way of training and
practice. Normally, almost all the descendants in the family
get training in the same field and adopt this as a profession
and means of livelihood.
(b) Kerala Ayurveda Paramparya Vaidya Forum (in short ‘the
Forum’) – the appellant herein is an association of
‘Paramparya Vaidyas’ in Travancore-Cochin, registered under
the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable
Societies Registration Act, 1955. The main objective of the
Forum is the welfare of its members and to render assistance
for practice in indigenous medicines.
(c) Pursuant to the enactment of the Travancore-Cochin
Medical Practitioners Act, 1953 (in short ‘the Act’), the
3
‘Paramparya Vaidyas’ were debarred from practicing
modern/homoeopathic/ayurvedic/siddha/unani-tibbi
medicines unless registered under the Act. Subsequently,
three Central Acts, viz., The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956,
The Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 and the
Homoeopathy Central Council Act, 1973 with regard to
modern medicine, indigenous medicine and homoeopathic
medicine respectively came into force.
(d) Being aggrieved by the enactment of the Act, Akhila
Kerala Parambarya Vaidya Federation as well as the persons
practicing as ‘Paramparya Vaidyas’ filed a number of petitions
before the High Court. Learned single Judge of the High
Court, taking note of an affidavit filed by the State Government
stating that the question of granting registration to practice
medicines to the ‘Paramparya Vaidyas’ can be considered at
the time of enactment of Kerala Medical Practitioners Bill, by
order dated 17.06.1997 in O.P. No. 118 of 1991 and other set
of petitions, disposed of the original petitions while directing
the State Government to have a serious consideration of the
circumstances expeditiously.
4
(e) Several petitions were filed before the High Court by the
‘Paramparya Vaidyas’ claiming that the methods had been in
vogue for a considerable long period of time. The Division
Bench of the High Court, vide order dated 08.01.2003
dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants herein.
(f) Aggrieved by the order dated 08.01.2003, the appellants
have preferred these appeals by way of special leave.
3) Heard the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel
for the parties and perused the records. Since a common
question of law and facts arise in these appeals, they are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
Point(s) for consideration:-
4) The sole point for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the persons who do not fulfill the prescribed
qualification and are not duly registered under the relevant
Statute, be permitted to practice as ‘Paramparya Vaidyas’?
Rival Submissions:
5) Learned senior counsel for the appellants contended
before this Court that in the State of Kerala, a large number of
5
persons are practicing in Sidha/Unani/Ayurveda system of
medicines known as ‘Paramparya Vaidyas’, which are in vogue
for a long time. They have acquired knowledge and experience
from their gurus and parents and by continued practice over a
long period of time they have acquired the requisite expertise.
After the enactment of the Act, Section 38 empowered the
State Government to regulate the qualifications and to provide
for the registration of practitioners of modern medicine. It
took within its ambit the homeopathic and indigenous systems
of medicine as well. Learned senior counsel further contended
that due to the promulgation of the Act, the appellants, who
were not registered under the Act, were prevented from
practicing as ‘Paramparya Vaidyas’. Learned senior counsel
further contended that unlike modern systems, medicines for
each patient is being prepared after diagnosing the patient
according to his requirement considering his age, place, etc.
and there is no side effect in the treatment by these systems of
medicines. Finally, it was stressed upon by learned senior
counsel for the appellants that it is the custom that was
developed in the community that the ‘Vaidyas’ practicing in
6
these systems must pass their knowledge and heredity to
another in the family. So as a custom of the community, the
existing vaidyas have to preserve their old and indigenous
systems to retain their heredity and custom. It was also
contended that so many vaidyas practicing Ayurveda, Siddha,
Unani Tibbi had applied to the government for licence in
compliance of the provisions of the Act but the State
Government did not take any positive steps with regard to the
same instead the police and other authorities have been
harassing them for practicing in respective system of
medicines without obtaining licence or exemption as per the
provision to Section 38 of the Act.
6) He further contended that the High Court, therefore,
erred in approaching the issue on the basis that after the
coming into force of the Act only those persons who were
possessing recognized qualification have the right to practice
medicine. He further contended that it is settled law that any
mandatory prohibition has to be in express or unambiguous
terms and the alleged prohibition under Section 38 is to be
understood in the context of Section 32 of the Act.
7
7) Per contra, learned counsel for the State contended that
there are several persons in the State of Kerala practicing
Indian System of Medicine without any qualification or
registration which is in flagrant violation of Section 38 of the
Act and Section 17 of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act,
1970 (in short ‘the IMCC Act’). It was further stressed upon
that this unauthorized practice is a great threat to the health
and life of the people of the State as the practitioners are
producing alcoholic preparations and such preparations are
being misused without any licence or registration in the guise
of prescribing Indian System of Medicines. Learned counsel
further submitted that the IMCC Act does not take into
account the traditional practitioners or paramparya vaidyas.
The concept and practice of medicine by tradition was not
recognized by the Parliament at the time of the enactment of
the IMCC Act. It was further submitted that the Parliament
did not give any option to any person to commence practice
and continue to practice Indian System of Medicines without
proper qualification and registration as provided under the
IMCC Act and the only exemption is under Section 17(3)(c) of
8
the said Act which provides that a person who had been
practicing Indian System of Medicine for five (5) years at the
commencement of the IMCC Act could continue to practice
provided there has been no State Register maintained in that
State.
8) Learned counsel further submitted that the modus
operandi of such practitioners in the State is to register an
Association under the Societies Registration Act or the
Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies
Registration Act, with an object to enroll members and to issue
certificates in order to enable them to practice Indian System
of Medicine in the guise of ‘Paramparya Vaidyas’. Learned
counsel for the State further contended that in most of these
cases, there is no tradition or paramparayam for any of the
members of such registered Association and most of them
continue in the field of practice with bogus certificates, degrees
and diplomas. Learned counsel finally contended that the
bogus practitioners, without having requisite qualification and
registration, should not be allowed to play with the lives of the
9
people and to practice the Indian System of Medicine in the
State of Kerala.
Discussion:
9) Traditional or indigenous systems of medicine like
Ayurveda/Sidhha/Unani-Tibbi have largely evolved out of
sporadic and random processes of research and discovery
attributable to various self styled practitioners of these
systems of medicines. With a view to bring about an organized
development of these systems and standardize the mode of
treatment by the practitioners of these systems, legislations
have been framed by both the State Governments as well as
the Central Government. The legislative field for framing
legislation on these aspects is relatable to Entry 26, List III of
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. On these
lines, the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953
was enacted with an object to regulate the qualifications and
provide for the registration of practitioners of modern medicine
10
and to enact a law relating to medical practitioners generally
in the State of Travancore-Cochin.
10) With this background, it is relevant to reproduce Section
17 of the IMCC Act as well as Sections 23 and 38 of the Act
which are as under:-
The Indian Medical Central Council Act, 1970
17. Rights of persons possessing qualifications included
in Second, Third and Fourth Schedules to be enrolled. –
(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, any
medical qualification included in the Second, Third or
Fourth Schedule shall be sufficient qualification for
enrolment on any State Register of Indian Medicine.
(2) Save as provided in section 28, no person other than a
practitioner of Indian medicine who possesses a recognized
medical qualification and is enrolled on a State Register or
the Central Register of Indian Medicine,-
(a) shall hold office as Vaid, Siddha, Hakim or [physician or
Amchi or] any other office (by whatever designation called) in
Government or in any institution maintained by a local or
other authority;
(b) shall practice Indian medicine in any State;
(c) shall be entitled to sign or authenticate a medical or
fitness certificate or any other certificate required by any law
to be signed or authenticated by a duly qualified medical
practitioner;
(d) shall be entitled to give evidence at any inquest or in any
court of law as an expert under section 45 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), on any matter relating to
Indian Medicine.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (2) shall affect,-
(a) the right of a practitioner of Indian medicine enrolled on a
State Register of Indian Medicine to practise Indian medicine
in any State merely on the ground that, on the
commencement of this Act, he does not possess a recognized
medical qualification;
11
(b) the privileges (including the right to practice any system
of medicine) conferred by or under any law relating to
registration of practitioners of Indian medicine for the time
being in force in any State on a practitioner of Indian
medicine enrolled on a State Register of Indian Medicine;
(c) the right of a person to practise Indian medicine in a
State in which, on the commencement of this Act, a State
Register of Indian Medicine is not maintained if, on such
commencement, he has been practicing Indian medicine for
not less than five years;
(d) the rights conferred by or under the Indian Medical
Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956)[including the right to
practice medicine as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the
said Act], on persons possessing any qualifications included
in the Schedules to the said Act.
(4) Any person who acts in contravention of any provision of
sub-section (2) shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
 Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953
23. Eligibility for registration.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections(2) and (5).-
(i) every holder of a recognised qualification and
every practitioner holding appointment under
the Government at the commencement of this
Act, and
(ii) every person who, within the period of one year
or such other longer period as may be fixed by
the Government from the date on which this Act
come into force, proves to the satisfaction of the
appropriate council that he has been in regular
practice as a practitioner for a period of not less
than five years preceding the first day of April,
1953.
shall be eligible for registration under this Act:
Provided however that no practitioner
shall be registered under clause (ii) after the
expiration of one year, or such other longer
period as may be fixed by the Government, from
the date on which this Act come into force.
(2) Applicants for registration under clause (ii) of
sub-section (1) shall produce a certificate in Form I as
12
set forth in the schedule. The certificate shall be from
an officer of the Revenue Department not below the
rank of a Tahsildar or any other person authorized by
the Government in this behalf.
(3) The Government may, after consulting the appropriate
council, permit the registration of any person who
shall furnish to such council proof that he is
possessed of a medication degree, diploma or
certificate of any University, medical school or college
approved by such council other than those mentioned
in the Schedule.
(4) The Government shall have power to direct the
registration of any practitioner who, at the time of
registration under this section, is employed in a
hospital, asylum, infirmary, clinic surgery, lying in
hospital, sanatorium, nursing home, dispensary,
vaidyasala or dharmasala managed by any corporate
body:
Provided however that no such practitioner shall
be registered under this sub-section after the
expiration of one year, or such other longer period as
may be fixed by the Government, from the date on
which this Act comes into force.
(5) No person shall be eligible for registration under
sub-section (1), sub-section (3), or sub-section (4) if he
is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in
clause (a) to (e) of Section 7.
38. Persons not registered under this Act, etc., not to
practice.- No person other than (i) a registered practitioner
or (ii) a practitioner whose name is entered in the list of
practitioners published under Section 30 or (iii) a
practitioner whose name is entered in the list mentioned in
Section 25 shall practice or hold himself out, whether
directly or by implication, as practising modern medicine,
homoeopathic medicine or ayurvedic medicine, siddha
medicine or unani tibbi and no person who is not a
registered practitioner of any such medicine shall practise
any other medicine unless he is also a registered practitioner
of that medicine:
Provided that the Government may, by notification in the
Gazette, direct that this section shall not apply to any person
or class or persons or to any specified area in the State
13
where none of the three classes of practitioners mentioned
above carries on medical practice:
Provided further that this section shall not apply to a
practitioner eligible for registration under this Act who, after
having filed the application for registration, is awaiting the
decision of the appropriate council or of the Government in
case of appeal:
Provided also that this section shall not apply to a
practitioner eligible for registration under this Act until the
period prescribed for application under Section 23 expires.
11) As per the statement of objects and reasons of the IMCC
Act, the Central Council was to evolve uniform standards of
education and registration of practitioners of the indigenous
systems of medicine and for that purpose a Register was to be
maintained under the IMCC Act in order to ensure that
medicine is not to be practiced by those who are not qualified.
The IMCC Act does not contemplate any exemption from the
provisions in the Act regarding qualification or registration of
practitioners in the various branches of indigenous medicine,
viz., ayurveda, siddha, unani etc. However, Section 17(3)(c) of
the IMCC Act has a provision for protecting persons who had
been practicing Indian system of Medicine for at least five
years as on the date of commencement of the Act. Such
persons could continue their practice provided there had been
14
no State Register maintained in the State on the
commencement of the IMCC Act.
12) In Dr. Mukhtiar Chand and Others vs. State of
Punjab and Others (1998) 7 SCC 579, this Court has held as
under:-
“17. Before adverting to these questions, it would be useful
to notice various systems of medicine in vogue in India and
the statutes regulating them:
The systems of medicines generally prevalent in India
are Ayurveda, Siddha, Unani, Allopathic and
Homoeopathic. In the Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani
systems, the treatment is based on the harmony of the
four humours, whereas in the Allopathic system of
medicine, treatment of disease is given by the use of a
drug which produces a reaction that itself neutralizes
the disease. In Homoeopathy, treatment is provided by
the like.
18. Of the medical systems that are in vogue in India,
Ayurveda had its origin in 5000 BC and is being practised
throughout India but Siddha is practised in the
Tamil-speaking areas of South India. These systems differ
very little both in theory and practice. The Unani system
dates back to 460-370 BC but that had come to be practised
in India in the 10th century AD (Park: Textbook of Preventive
and Social Medicine, 15th Edn., pp. 1 & 2). Allopathic
medicine is comparatively recent and had its origin in the
19th century.
42. Here it may be necessary to refer to the development of
law with regard to Indian medicine. In the pre-constitutional
era, each province of India was having its own enactment
regulating the registration and practice in Indian medicines
like the United Provinces Indian Medicine Act, 1939, the
Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Act, 1949, etc.
After the coming into force of the Constitution, many State
legislations were enacted to regulate the practise of Indian
medicine, Ayurvedic and Unani like the Punjab Ayurvedic
15
and Unani Practitioners Act, 1963, etc. However, on the
model of the 1956 Act, Parliament enacted the Indian
Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 (for short “the 1970
Act”). The schemes and provisions of the 1970 Act and the
1956 Act are analogous. “Indian medicine” is defined in
Section 2(e) of the Act to mean the system of Indian medicine
commonly known as Ashtang Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani
Tibb whether supplemented or not by such modern advances
as the Central Council may declare by notification from time
to time. In Section 2(j), the expression “State Register of
Indian Medicine” is defined to mean a register or registers
maintained under any law for the time being in force in any
State regulating the registration of practitioners of Indian
medicine. The Act contemplates having separate committees
for Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani medicines. Section 17
enables, inter alia, the persons who possess medical
qualifications mentioned in the Second, Third or Fourth
Schedule to be enrolled on any State Register of Indian
Medicine. A perusal of the Second, Third and Fourth
Schedules shows that they contain both integrated medicine
as well as other qualifications. So a holder of a degree in
integrated medicine is entitled to be enrolled under Section
17 of the 1970 Act. Section 22 authorises the Central
Council to prescribe the minimum standards of education in
Indian medicine required for granting recognized medical
qualifications by universities, Boards or medical institutions
in India. The Central Council is enjoined to maintain the
Central Register of Indian Medicine containing the
particulars mentioned therein and Section 25 lays down the
procedure for registration in the Central Register of Indian
Medicine. The counterpart of Section 15 of the 1956 Act is
Section 17 of the 1970 Act. We shall quote it here:
“17. (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in
this Act, any medical qualification included in the
Second, Third or Fourth Schedule shall be sufficient
qualification for enrolment on any State Register of
Indian Medicine.
(2) Save as provided in Section 28, no person other than a
practitioner of Indian medicine who possesses a recognised
medical qualification and is enrolled on a State Register or
the Central Register of Indian Medicine,—
(a) shall hold office as vaid, siddha, hakim or physician or
any other office (by whatever designation called) in
Government or in any institution maintained by a local
or other authority;
16
(b) shall practise Indian medicine in any State;
(c) shall be entitled to sign or authenticate a medical or
fitness certificate or any other certificate required by
any law to be signed or authenticated by a duly
qualified medical practitioner;
(d) shall be entitled to give evidence at any inquest or in
any court of law as an expert under Section 45 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on any matter relating to
Indian medicine.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (2) shall affect,—
(a) the right of a practitioner of Indian medicine enrolled
on a State Register of Indian Medicine to practise
Indian medicine in any State merely on the ground
that on the commencement of this Act, he does not
possess a recognised medical qualification;
(b) the privileges (including the right to practise any
system of medicine) conferred by or under any law
relating to registration of practitioners of Indian
medicine for the time being in force in any State on a
practitioner of Indian medicine enrolled on a State
Register of Indian Medicine;
(c) the right of a person to practise Indian medicine in a
State in which, on the commencement of this Act, a
State Register of Indian Medicine is not maintained if,
on such commencement, he has been practising
Indian medicine for not less than five years;
(d) the rights conferred by or under the Indian Medical
Council Act, 1956 [including the right to practise
medicine as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 of the
said Act], on persons possessing any qualifications
included in the Schedules to the said Act.
(4) Any person who acts in contravention of any provision of
sub-section (2) shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
A perusal of the provisions extracted above shows that
sub-section (1) prescribes qualifications considered sufficient
for enrolment on any State Register of Indian Medicine.
Sub-section (2) ordains that all persons except those who
possess a recognised medical qualification and are enrolled
on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian
Medicine, are prohibited from doing any of the acts
mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of that sub-section.
17
Sub-section (3), however, carves out an exception to the
prohibition contained in sub-section (2). Clause (a) thereof
saves the right to practice of any medical practitioner of
Indian medicine who was not having recognised medical
qualification on the date of the commencement of the 1970
Act but who was enrolled on a State Register to practise that
system of medicine; clause (b) protects the privileges which
include the right to practise any system of medicine which
was conferred by or under any law relating to registration of
practitioners of Indian medicine for the time being in force in
any State on a practitioner of Indian medicine who was
enrolled on a State Register of Indian Medicine; clause (c)
saves the right of a person to practise Indian medicine in a
State in which no State Register of Indian Medicine was
maintained at the commencement of that Act provided he
has been practising in Indian medicine for not less than five
years before the commencement of the Act and clause (d)
protects the rights conferred by or under the 1956 Act
including the right to practise modern medicine possessing
any qualification included in that Act. In other words, under
clause (d) the right to practise modern scientific medicine in
all its branches is confined to only such persons who
possess any qualification included in the Schedules to the
1956 Act. In view of this conclusion, it matters little if the
practitioners registered under the 1970 Act are being
involved in various programmes or given postings in
hospitals of allopathic medicine and the like.
43. It will be appropriate to notice that the 1970 Act also
maintains a similar distinction between a State Register of
Indian Medicine and the Central Register of Indian Medicine.
Whereas the State Register of Indian Medicine is maintained
under any law for the time being in force in any State
regulating the registration of practitioners of Indian
medicine, the Central Register of Indian Medicine has to be
maintained by the Central Council under Section 23 of that
Act. For a person to be registered in the Central Register,
Section 25 enjoins that the Registrar should be satisfied that
the person concerned was eligible under that Act for such
registration. Keeping this position in mind, if we read Section
17(3)(b), it becomes clear that the privileges which include
the right to practise any system of medicine conferred by or
under any law relating to registration of practitioners of
Indian medicine for the time being in force in any State on a
practitioner of Indian medicine enrolled on a State Register
18
of Indian Medicine, are not affected by the prohibition
contained in sub-section (2) of Section 17.”
Section 23 of the Act provides for eligibility conditions for
registration of medical practitioners. Under sub-Section (1), a
holder of a recognized qualification or holding appointment
under the government at the commencement of the Act and
every other practitioner who has been in regular practice for 5
(five) years preceding 1st April, 1953, if applies within one year
have been made eligible for registration. However, by Section
38 of the Act, persons not registered under the Act have been
prohibited from practicing various types of medicines. The
first proviso empowers the State Government to exempt any
person or class of persons from undergoing registration. It is
also evident that the Government of Kerala had granted
exemption to some traditional practitioners like those who
belonged to the renowned Ashtavaidya families.
13) The capacity to diagnose the disease would depend upon
the fact as to whether the practitioner had the necessary
professional skill to do so. Acquisition of professional skill is
again a regulated subject and the measure thereof is the
19
possession of a prescribed Diploma or Degree awarded by a
recognized Institution. What one might enquire with regard to
the right to practice medicine in the light of the above is as to
whether the appellants are equipped with such a professional
qualification. The answer is, obviously, in the negative, as
admittedly, the appellants do not possess any prescribed
Diploma or Degree from a recognized institution for that
purpose. Even a person who has acquired the prescribed
Diploma or Degree from a recognized institution would not be
entitled to practice medicine unless he is so registered under
the provisions of the IMCC Act.
14) In Dr. A.K. Sabhapathy vs. State of Kerala and
Others 1992 Supp (3) SCC 147, the provisions of Section 38 of
the Act and Sections 15 and 21 of the Indian Medical Council
Act, 1956 came up for consideration before this Court wherein
it was held as under:-
“16. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view of the
High Court that the Central Act does not lay down the
qualifications for registration of a medical practitioner. We
may in this context refer to sub-section (1) of Section 15
which postulates the holding of a recognised medical
qualification by a person for being registered in the State
Medical Register so as to entitle to practise modern scientific
medicine in the State and sub-section (1) of Section 21
20
which provides that the Indian Medical Register that is
required to be maintained by the Medical Council of India
shall contain the name of persons who are for the time being
enrolled in the State Medical Register and who possess any
of the recognised medical qualifications. These provisions
contemplate that a person can practise in allopathic system
of medicine in a State or in the country only if he possesses
a recognised medical qualification. Permitting a person who
does not possess the recognised medical qualification in the
allopathic system of medicine would be in direct conflict with
the provisions of the Central Act. We are, therefore, of the
view that the first proviso to Section 38 of the State Act
insofar as it empowers the State Government to permit a
person to practise allopathic system of medicine even though
he does not possess the recognised medical qualifications for
that system of medicine is inconsistent with the provisions of
Sections 15 and 21 read with Sections 11 to 14 of the
Central Act. The said proviso suffers from the vice of
repugnancy insofar as it covers persons who want to practise
the allopathic system of medicine and is void to the extent of
such repugnancy. Practitioners in allopathic system of
medicine must, therefore, be excluded from the scope of the
first proviso and it must be confined in its application to
systems of medicines other than the allopathic system of
medicine. We, however, wish to make it clear that we have
not considered the impact of the provisions contained in the
Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 and the
Homoeopathy Central Council Act, 1973 on the provisions of
the said proviso to Section 38 of the State Act.”
Even though the impact of the provisions of the IMCC Act was
not considered but the provision of Section 17 of the IMCC Act
also provides for recognition of medical qualification included
in Second, Third and Fourth Schedules to be sufficient
qualification for enrolment on any State Register of Indian
Medicine. Thus the same principles as had been laid down in
21
Dr. A.K. Sabhapathy (supra), as reproduced above, will also
apply.
15) In the case of Delhi Pradesh Registered Medical
Practitioners vs. Director of Health, Delhi Administration
Services and Others (1997) 11 SCC 687, this Court has held
as under:-
“5. We are, however, unable to accept such contention of Mr
Mehta. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Indian Medicine
Central Council Act, 1970, in our view, only envisages that
where before the enactment of the said Indian Medicine
Central Council Act, 1970 on the basis of requisite
qualification which was then recognised, a person got
himself registered as medical practitioner in the disciplines
contemplated under the said Act or in the absence of any
requirement for registration such person had been practising
for five years or intended to be registered and was also
entitled to be registered, the right of such person to practise
in the discipline concerned including the privileges of a
registered medical practitioner stood protected even though
such practitioner did not possess requisite qualification
under the said Act of 1970. It may be indicated that such
view of ours is reflected from the Objects and Reasons
indicated for introducing sub-section (3) of Section 17 in the
Act. In the Objects and Reasons, it was mentioned:
“[T]he Committee are of the opinion that the existing
rights and privileges of practitioners of Indian
Medicine should be given adequate safeguards. The
Committee, in order to achieve this object, have added
three new paragraphs to sub-section (3) of the clause
protecting (i) the rights to practise of those
practitioners of Indian Medicine who may not, under
the proposed legislation, possess a recognised
qualification subject to the condition that they are
already enrolled on a State Register of Indian Medicine
on the date of commencement of this Act, (ii) the
privileges conferred on the practitioners of Indian
22
Medicine enrolled on a State Register, under any law
in force in that State, and (iii) the right to practise in a
State of those practitioners who have been practising
Indian Medicine in that State for not less than five
years where no register of Indian Medicine was
maintained earlier.”
As it is not the case of any of the writ petitioners that they
had acquired the degree in between 1957 (sic 1967) and
1970 or on the date of enforcement of provisions of Section
17(2) of the said Act and got themselves registered or
acquired right to be registered, there is no question of getting
the protection under sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the said
Act. It is to be stated here that there is also no challenge as
to the validity of the said Central Act, 1970. The decision of
the Delhi High Court therefore cannot be assailed by the
appellants. We may indicate here that it has been submitted
by Mr Mehta and also by Ms Sona Khan appearing in the
appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 6167 of 1993
that proper consideration had not been given to the standard
of education imparted by the said Hindi Sahitya Sammelan,
Prayag and expertise acquired by the holders of the aforesaid
degrees awarded by the said institution. In any event, when
proper medical facilities have not been made available to a
large number of poorer sections of the society, the ban
imposed on the practitioners like the writ petitioners
rendering useful service to the needy and poor people was
wholly unjustified. It is not necessary for this Court to
consider such submissions because the same remains in the
realm of policy decision of other constitutional functionaries.
We may also indicate here that what constitutes proper
education and requisite expertise for a practitioner in Indian
Medicine, must be left to the proper authority having
requisite knowledge in the subject. As the decision of the
Delhi High Court is justified on the face of legal position
flowing from the said Central Act of 1970, we do not think
that any interference by this Court is called for. These
appeals therefore are dismissed without any order as to
costs.”
16) It would be relevant to quote the following decision in Dr.
Sarwan Singh Dardi vs. State of Punjab and Others AIR
1987 P&H 81 wherein it was held as under:-
23
“12. In view of the clear provision in the two Central Acts,
namely, S. 15, sub-sec. (2)(b) of 1956 Act and S. 17 sub-sec.
(2)(b) of 1970 Act, no person who is not qualified in the
system of Modern Medicine and is not registered as such,
either in the State Register or the Central Register, is entitled
to practice modern system of medicine. Same is the case
regarding right to practice the system of Indian medicine
namely, that no person who is not possessed of requisite
qualification envisaged in the 1970 Act or a like legislation
by a State Legislature and is registered as such is entitled to
practice the system of Indian medicine.”
17) Similarly, in Ishaq Husain Razvi vs. State of U.P. and
Others AIR 1993 All. 283 it was held as under:-
“10….No doubt the Indian Medicines Central Council may
further include degrees and diplomas of other recognized
Universities and Institutions in the schedule of the Act, for
registration as Ayurvedic/Unani Tibbi medical practitioners.
The petitioner has failed to show that he possessed requisite
recognized qualification for registration entitling him for
practicing in Ayurvedic system of medicines….”
18) In our country, the qualified practitioners are much less
than the required number. Earlier, there were very few
Institutions imparting teaching and training to the Doctors,
Vaidyas and Hakimis but the situation has changed and there
are quite a good number of Institutions imparting education in
indigenous medicines. Even after 70 years of independence,
the persons having little knowledge or having no recognized or
approved qualification are practicing medicine and playing
24
with the lives of thousands and millions of people. The right
to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade
or business is no doubt a fundamental right guaranteed under
the Constitution. But that right is subject to any law relating
to the professional or technical qualification necessary for
practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation or
trade or business. The regulatory measures on the exercise of
this right both with regard to the standard of professional
qualifications and professional conduct have been applied
keeping in view not only the right of the medical practitioners
but also the right to life and proper health care of persons who
need medical care and treatment.
Conclusion:
19) In our country, the numbers of qualified medical
practitioners have been much less than the required number
of such persons. The scarcity of qualified medical practitioner
was previously quite large since there were very few
institutions imparting teaching and training to Doctors,
Vaidyas, Hakims etc. The position has now changed and there
are quite a good number of medical colleges imparting
25
education in various streams of medicine. No doubt, now
there are a good numbers of such institutions training
qualified medical practitioners at number of places. The
persons having no recognized and approved qualifications,
having little knowledge about the indigenous medicines, are
becoming medical practitioners and playing with the lives of
thousands and millions of people. Some time such quacks
commit blunders and precious lives are lost.
20) The government had been vigilant all along to stop such
quackery. A number of unqualified, untrained quacks are
posing a great risk to the entire society and playing with the
lives of people without having the requisite training and
education in the science from approved institutions. The
Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953 as well as
the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 were also
enacted on the similar lines. Every practitioner shall be
deemed to be a practitioner registered under the Act if at the
commencement of this Act, his name stands entered in the
appropriate register maintained under the said Act and every
certificate of registration issued to every such practitioner
26
shall be deemed to be a certificate of registration issued under
this Act. But in the present case, the appellants herein have
failed to show that they possessed requisite recognized
qualification for registration entitling them to practice Indian
system of medicines or their names have been entered in the
appropriate registers after the commencement of this Act.
21) In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court was right in dismissing the
petitions filed by the appellants herein. Consequently, the
appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. Interlocutory
applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly. However, the
parties are left to bear their own costs.
…...…………….………………………J.
 (R.K. AGRAWAL)
……..…....…………………………………J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 13, 2018. 

whether an Umpire has to hear the matter de novo on a Reference or from the stage of disagreement between the Arbitrators?

1
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3776 OF 2018
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 558 OF 2014)
M/s Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. .... Appellant(s)
Versus
M/s Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R.K. Agrawal, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) The present appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 22.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi
at New Delhi in FAO (OS) No. 211 of 2007 whereby a Division
Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
appellant herein while upholding the order dated 17.04.2007
passed by learned single Judge of the High Court.
2
3) Brief facts:
(a) The appellant Company-M/s Oswal Woolen Mills Ltd.
and the respondent Company-M/s Oswal Agro Mills Limited
are Companies incorporated under the Companies Act and are
carrying on the business of manufacturing and trading of
vegetable oils, soaps, chemicals, petrochemicals, woolen and
related products.
(b) Both the parties entered into an agreement dated
30.03.1982 in terms whereof the appellant Company
appointed the respondent Company as its agent in accordance
with the Handbook of Import Export Procedure, 1981-82 in
order to advice, assist and guide the appellant Company to
import materials under the REP licences for a CIF value of Rs.
1,85,95,100/- only with remuneration at the rate of 5% (per
cent) of the CIF value of the goods imported along with all
costs/expenditure incurred.
(c) Out of the total value of the materials to be imported
under the licences, the materials to the value of Rs.
1,16,00,800/- only could be imported and the material CIF
3
value of Rs. 69,94,300/- could not be imported by the
respondent-Company in the absence of the REP licences of the
said value which resulted in breach of contract.
(d) Both the parties took legal recourse and the High Court,
on an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1940 (in short ‘the Act’) referred the dispute
to Arbitration of two Arbitrators. After completion of the
arbitration proceedings before the Arbitrators, the arbitrators,
could not reach to a consensus on the Award in terms of the
Minutes of the Meeting held on 19.02.1999 and the matter
was referred to the Umpire.
(e) The appellant-Company moved an application dated
29.01.2000 before the Umpire seeking commencement of de
novo proceedings. On 31.01.2000, the said application was
dismissed as untenable. Learned Umpire, passed an award
dated 21.02.2000, in favour of the respondent-Company to the
tune of Rs. 64,65,782/- along with the interest at the rate of
18% (per cent) with effect from 01.11.1991 till the date of
realization. 
4
(f) Being aggrieved by the Award dated 21.02.2000, the
appellant Company filed objections before the High Court
under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act which was registered as
IA No. 803 of 2001 in CS (OS) No. 795-A/2000. Learned
single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated
17.04.2007, substantially rejected the objections to the Award
and made a Rule of the Court with slight modifications.
Learned single Judge also observed that the
appellant-Company failed to satisfy that there was any serious
endeavour for getting the evidence recorded again before the
Umpire and waived the right of de novo trial by conduct.
(g) Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned
single Judge of the High Court, the appellant-Company
preferred an appeal being FAO (OS) No. 211 of 2007 before a
Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, vide
judgment and order dated 22.10.2013, dismissed the appeal.
(h) Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 22.10.2013,
the appellant-Company has preferred this appeal by way of
special leave before this Court. 
5
4) Heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel
for the appellant-Company and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned
senior counsel for respondent-Company and perused the
records.
Point(s) for consideration:-
5) The only point for consideration before this Court is
whether an Umpire has to hear the matter de novo on a
Reference or from the stage of disagreement between the
Arbitrators?
Rival contentions:-
6) Learned senior counsel for the appellant-Company
contended that the Division Bench erred in interpreting the
scope of Article 4 to Schedule 1 of the Act to mean that the
Umpire has to hear the Reference only from the stage at which
the Arbitrators disagreed and not de novo. Learned senior
counsel while relying upon Article 4 to Schedule I of the Act
contended that de novo proceedings are essential when the
Arbitrators have disagreed and the Umpire is appointed to
decide the dispute. He further contended that when Umpire
enters into Reference “in lieu of Arbitrators” he steps in the
6
shoes of the Arbitrators and has the same duties as that of
Arbitrators. Accordingly, the Umpire cannot depart from the
requirement that an arbitrator should personally record the
evidence on which he is to rely for the purpose of giving his
decision. The Umpire cannot refuse to hear the witness again;
and if on request of a party for the same, fails to do so, the
Award would be bad for misconduct.
7) Learned senior counsel further contended that the
Division Bench has simply affirmed the findings of learned
single Judge on the question of waiver, damages ought to be
awarded, without appreciating the contentions advanced
especially when it was established from the documents on
record that the appellant-Company had never waived its right
of de novo hearing but had been insisted throughout before
the Umpire to start proceedings de novo. For the purpose, the
appellant-Company placed reliance on communication dated
24.05.1999 and 12.01.2000 addressed to the Umpire and the
application dated 29.01.2000 filed for de novo hearing of the
matter.
7
8) Arguing next with respect to damages granted to the
respondent-Company, it was contended by learned senior
counsel that under the first agreement, goods were to be
imported and 5% commission was to be paid. Therefore, to
award damages for the goods not processed and not delivered
because the same were not imported under the first agreement
is untenable. Learned senior counsel finally contended that
learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench erred in law
and interference by this Court is sought for in the matter.
9) Per contra, learned senior counsel for the
respondent-Company strenuously submitted that the
application filed by the appellant-Company is misconceived,
not maintainable and the relief sought is vague. The
application was moved when the hearing before the Umpire
had already started and the claimant had concluded his
arguments. The very first application for the same was filed
on 29.01.2000 in spite of the fact that the first hearing before
the Umpire took place on 24.04.1999 which got dismissed by a
detailed order categorically recording that the Umpire cannot
sit over or review the order of the Arbitrators which was
8
unanimous and the application was a belated application with
mala fide intentions.
10) Learned senior counsel further submitted that the
understanding and interpretation of Article 4 has to be in
consonance with reason and logic, meaning thereby, the stage
at which the Arbitrators disagree would be the stage at which
the Umpire commences upon and proceeds with the reference.
Therefore, the Umpire is not duty bound to record the same
evidence all over again, more so, when both the parties were
given ample opportunities for presenting their case. Learned
senior counsel further submitted that the Umpire, vide Award
dated 21.02.2000, has categorically noted that the
appellant-Company unduly delayed the proceedings and has
specifically mentioned the dates wherein no appearance was
put in by the other side which resulted in waiver by conduct.
Therefore, the plea of de novo proceedings is erroneous and
against the settled legal proposition of law. Learned senior
counsel finally submitted that there was no irregularity in the
reasoned orders passed by learned single Judge and the
9
Division Bench of the High Court and no interference is sought
for by this Court in the matter.
Discussion:-
11) The first and the foremost point that arises for
consideration is whether in a case where the matter has been
referred to the Umpire owing to disagreement between the
Arbitrators, the Umpire has to confine himself only to hear the
issues on which the arbitrators disagreed or he has to hear the
matter afresh. Further, what does the word de novo hearing
means? By virtue of Section 3 of the Act, unless otherwise
agreed, the provisions of the First Schedule are deemed to be
incorporated in the arbitration agreement. In this view of the
matter, it is necessary to scrutinize Article 4 of the First
Schedule of the Act as the same relates to the matter in
controversy which reads as under:-
“4. If the arbitrators have allowed their time to expire
without making an award or have delivered to any party to
the arbitration agreement or to the umpire a notice in writing
stating that they cannot agree, the, umpire shall forthwith
enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators.”
10
12) From a bare perusal of the above, it is clear that an
Umpire enters on a Reference “in lieu of the Arbitrators” and
the Act does not contemplate any distinction with regard to
the conduct of proceedings by the Arbitrators or the Umpire.
It is an undeniable fact that on reference of the matter to the
Umpire, the Arbitrators become functus officio. The Umpire
takes upon himself the exclusive authority of determining the
disputes. He takes the place of Arbitrators, as the expression
“in lieu of the Arbitrators” conveys. Unless there is an
agreement to the contrary, defining or demarcating the powers
of the Umpire, he is expected to discharge the same functions
as Arbitrators with all the attendant powers, duties and
obligations.
13) Either going by the very nature of functions entrusted to
the Umpire or by the provisions of the First Schedule, it is
crystal clear that there is no qualitative difference between the
Arbitrators and the Umpire with regard to the methodology
and modalities to be adopted for reaching a just and fair
conclusion. It is trite to say that an Arbitrator is bound to
observe the principles of natural justice and conform to the
11
fundamentals of judicial procedure. It is his duty to afford a
reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned. However, it
would also be illogical to contend that the Umpire has to start
de novo ipso facto. The very essence of the law of arbitration is
to settle the matter efficiently in a time bound manner. Hence,
when the Umpire enters upon a Reference and replaces the
arbitrators, he is needed to review the evidence and
submissions only on those matters about which the
arbitrators have disagreed unless either party applies for the
rehearing of the evidence of the parties or their witnesses. The
Umpire can surely go through the evidence recorded by the
previous arbitrators but without being influenced by the
opinion expressed by them in that regard and even the notes
taken by previous arbitrators can be relied if there exist
special provisions in the agreement permitting him to do so.
However, if the party makes an application for de novo
hearing, the Umpire is bound to allow the same, subject to the
condition that the application is made at the earliest and the
applicant is not using it as last armory to turn the case
around. An objection on the ground that the Umpire has not
12
reheard the evidence may be waived by the conduct of the
parties; the evidence already recorded before the previous
arbitrator would remain valid and it would not be open for the
parties to get the same recorded afresh later on. It is a well
settled proposition that where a party seeking to impeach an
Award has made no application to the Umpire for rehearing of
the evidence, the same would generally operate as a waiver by
conduct.
14) Having said that the Umpire is bound to hear the matter
de novo on an application filed by the parties, subject to the
satisfaction of other necessary conditions in accordance with
the law of arbitration and before examining whether the
conduct of the appellant-Company amounts to waiver or not,
it is necessary to examine the meaning of the word de novo
hearing before the Umpire to whom the matter is referred in
case of disagreement between the Arbitrators. Learned senior
counsel for the appellant-Company contends that hearing a
matter de novo means the matter is to be started afresh i.e.,
from the very point from where the arbitrators had started. In
other words, it would mean that the matter brought on record:
13
pleadings, evidence; before the arbitrators at the first instance
would become nullity i.e., the proceedings including
statements of claim, reply to claims and counter claims,
statements and cross-examinations of witnesses before the
Arbitrators have no significance. The ascertained point in
dispute and the well known position of the parties would go in
vain and the Umpire should start again with the same process.
An inevitable outcome of the same is that a party is allowed to
overcome the lacuna in the evidence already recorded before
the previous arbitrators. Further, it would give an unnecessary
option to the dishonest litigant to obliterate the evidence
already recorded which would have adverse effect on them.
Further, the witnesses to be examined afresh is a glaring
anomaly that would ensue that the witnesses may not be
available or might give a totally different version or a version
inconsistent with their previous version, owing to the fact of
faded memories. Such an interpretation of the word de novo
trial would result in undue hardship to the parties and will
defeat the very purpose of the Act and render arbitration
ineffective.
14
15) Hence, firstly, the word de novo hearing should be given
a purposive interpretation and it should be understood as a
fresh hearing of the matter on the basis of pleadings, evidence
and documents on record. If the party wants to re-examine a
witness or objects to the documents admitted, the Umpire is to
hear the parties and decide the application in the interest of
justice.
16) Having held that the a party do have a right to call for de
novo hearing subject to the waiver of the same by conduct,
now comes the question whether in fact and circumstances of
the present case the conduct of the appellant-Company
amounts to waiver or not. It was contended that the
appellant-Company has from the very beginning of the hearing
before the Umpire had demanded de novo trial of the matter
and in support of that it relied upon the communication dated
24.05.1999, 12.01.2000 addressed to the Umpire and
application dated 29.01.2000 filed for de novo hearing of the
matter.
15
17) However, having perused the records, it was found that
the very first communication dated 24.05.1999, on which the
appellant-Company has relied upon is a letter written to the
Umpire with regard to the pending proceedings in the said
matter before the High Court and the application that is filed
before the High Court to which the appellant-Company was
referring to in the said letter was an application filed under
Section 5 of the Act for the dispute relating to quantum of fee
of the Umpire. Though the appellant-Company in the said
letter made a note with regard to the de novo hearing of the
matter but the same seems to be an additional armory that
the appellant is putting behind its back as it hasn’t demanded
de novo trial of the said matter neither in the communication
nor thereafter in the proceedings. The appellant-Company next
referred to communication dated 12.01.2000 but the same is
also with regard to the pending proceedings before the High
Court. It is only on 29.01.2000 that the appellant-Company
has filed an application for de novo hearing of the case i.e., at
a stage where the final arguments on the side of the
respondent-Company have been finished and the date was
16
fixed for final argument from the side of appellant-Company. If
the appellant-Company was serious in its endeavor that it
should get an opportunity to get the evidence recorded afresh,
an application could easily have been filed before starting the
proceedings before the Umpire. It is only from oblique
references that the appellant-Company seeks to derive such
intent. This aspect is clearly an afterthought which arose
during the culmination of the proceedings before the Umpire.
Further, even the sum and substance of the highly belated
application dated 29.01.2000 for commencement of
proceedings de novo clearly shows that it was not asking for
re-hearing/re-recording of the evidence but was actually
requesting for review of the order of the two Arbitrators
especially for re-examination of Shri K.L. Jain. It is the case of
the appellant-Company that the Arbitrators were wrong in
permitting production of some other witness, by name, Shri
Vijay Gupta instead of Shri K.L Jain. From the above, there is
no doubt that the conduct of the appellant-Company amounts
to waiver and the application filled on 29.01.2000 is nothing
17
but trying a last armory to turn the case around. The Umpire
was right in dismissing the said application.
18) Learned senior counsel for the appellant-Company
contended on merits of the case, however, the law is well
settled with regard to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of
the courts to interfere with an arbitration award as has been
settled in a catena of judgments of this Court and it would be
sufficient to quote Ravindra Kumar Gupta and Company vs.
Union of India (2010) 1 SCC 409 wherein it was held as
under:-
“9. The law with regard to scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of
the courts to interfere with an arbitration award has been settled
in a catena of judgments of this Court. We may make a reference
here only to some of the judgments. In State of Rajasthan v. Puri
Construction Co. Ltd. this Court observed as follows:
“26. The arbitrator is the final arbiter for the dispute
between the parties and it is not open to challenge the award on
the ground that the arbitrator has drawn his own conclusion or
has failed to appreciate the facts. In Sudarsan Trading Co. v.
Govt. of Kerala it has been held by this Court that there is a
distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction
should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of
the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. One has to
determine the distinction between an error within the
jurisdiction and an error in excess of the jurisdiction. Court
cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or
fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted
contrary to the bargain between the parties. (emphasis in
original) Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid is a
decision within the competency of the arbitrator. By purporting
to construe the contract the court cannot take upon itself the
18
burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and as
such beyond jurisdiction. If on a view taken of a contract, the
decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded is a
possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the
award cannot be examined by the court. Where the reasons
have been given by the arbitrator in making the award the court
cannot examine the reasonableness of the reasons. If the
parties have selected their own forum, the deciding forum must
be conceded the power of appraisement of evidence. The
arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity
of evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the
task of being a Judge on the evidence before the arbitrator.”
19) In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Jagan Nath
Ashok Kumar and Another (1987) 4 SCC 497, it was held by
this Court that appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is
ordinarily never a matter which the court questions and
considers. It may be possible that on the same evidence, the
court may arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived
at by the arbitrator but that by itself is no ground for setting
aside the award.
20) Following the above judgments, we are of the opinion
that the question of whether the claims were tenable or not are
based on the contract and which of them had to be granted
were within the exclusive domain of the Arbitrators. In this
case, the Award considered the totality of circumstances, and
weighed the relevant facts on balance while proceeding to
19
award damages. The award does not disclose a manifestly
erroneous approach; nor does it omit to consider and apply
legal principles to the facts presented before the Arbitrators.
21) In view of the above discussion, we do not find any
infirmity or error in the approach and judgments passed by
the courts below. There is no merit in this appeal and the
appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
...…………….………………………J.
 (R.K. AGRAWAL)
.…....…………………………………J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 13, 2018. 

when the observation made by the Division Bench on this issue, which led to dismissal of their appeal, does not appear to be correct being contrary to the record of the case. - liable to be set aside and is remanded for fresh disposal

1
 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3778 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.36272 of 2016]
Hemraj Chandrakar & Anr. .. Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. .. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal arises from the final judgment and
order dated 28.09.2016 passed by the High Court of
Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in W.A. No.467 of 2016
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein
and upheld the order dated 08.04.2016 passed by
2
the Single Judge in Writ Petition (c) No.696 of 2016
by which the writ petition filed by the appellants
herein was dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches.
3) In order to appreciate the short legal issue
involved in the appeal, few relevant facts, which lie in
a narrow compass, need to be mentioned
herein-below.
4) The appellants are the writ petitioners before
the High Court.
5) Challenging the land acquisition proceedings,
the appellants filed petition being Writ Petition (C)
No.696/2016 before the High Court.
6) The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed
the writ petition by order dated 08.04.2016 on the
ground of delay and laches. Since the writ petition
was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, no
ground of challenge raised by the writ petitioners
3
(appellants herein) was gone into by the Single
Judge.
7) The writ petitioners felt aggrieved and filed
intra-court appeal before the Division Bench. By
impugned judgment, the Division Bench dismissed
the appeal and upheld the order of the Single Judge
with the following observations contained in Para 4 of
the judgment:
“4. We have perused the record of the writ
petition and in the writ petition there is not
a single averment that the possession of the
land has not been taken. In the writ petition,
there is no averment much less any proof of
the fact that this land has been taken over.
Therefore, we have no reason to discard clear
cut finding given by the learned Single Judge
that the land has been used for development
of Naya Raipur. Therefore, we find no merit
in the appeal, which is accordingly
dismissed.”
8) It is against this judgment, the appellants (writ
petitioners) felt aggrieved and filed this appeal by way
of special leave before this Court.
4
9) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
inclined to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned
judgment and remand the case to the Division Bench
for deciding Writ Appeal No.467 of 2016 afresh in
accordance with law.
10) The need to remand the case to the Division
Bench of the High Court has arisen because from the
perusal of Para 4 of the impugned judgment quoted
supra, we find that the Division Bench observed,
“there is not a single averment that the possession of
the land has not been taken. In the writ petition, there
is no averment much less any proof of the fact that this
land has been taken over”.
11) Learned counsel for the appellants (writ
petitioners), however, pointed out, by referring to the
prescribed Column No.3 (particulars of the
cause/order against which the petition is made) of
5
the writ petition, Para 4 of the application for grant of
interim relief dated 29.02.2016 filed along with the
writ petition, and paras 1.1, 1.20, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.7 of
the writ appeal memo that the writ petitioners have
made specific averments in these paras that they are
in possession of the land in question.
12) Learned counsel, therefore, contended that the
observation made by the Division Bench on this
issue, which led to dismissal of their appeal, does not
appear to be correct being contrary to the record of
the case.
13) In our opinion, in the light of the averments
made by the writ petitioners in the aforementioned
paras, as detailed above, which seem to have escaped
the attention of the Division Bench, the impugned
judgment needs to be set aside.
14) We, therefore, consider it just and proper to
remand the case to the Division Bench of the High
6
Court and request the Division Bench to decide the
writ appeal afresh in accordance with law.
15) We, however, leave all the questions including
the maintainability of the writ petition on any other
grounds open for its decision. Indeed, it is for the
Division Bench to decide the issues, while deciding
the writ appeal, uninfluenced by any of our
observations made in this judgment.
16) In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. Impugned
judgment is set aside. The appeal is restored to its
original number before the Division Bench of the
High Court for its disposal in accordance with law.
………………………………..J
(R.K. AGRAWAL)
 ..………………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
New Delhi,
April 13, 2018

Or.7 rule 11 [d] read with Or.2, rule 2 - plaint was rejected as the plaintiff not obtained permission while withdrawing earlier suit for filing a fresh suit = if the order granting permission to withdraw the suit under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the Code does not specifically mention the fact of granting liberty to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit, whether filing of fresh suit would be hit by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code? = held that filing of the second suit is not hit by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code and is maintainable for being tried on merits. = we cannot concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court which wrongly allowed the application filed by respondent No.2 (defendant No.2) under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code and, in consequence, dismissed the appellants’ (plaintiffs’) suit as being barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The application filed by respondent No.2 (defendant No.2) under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is dismissed.

1
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3777 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.13256 of 2014]
Sucha Singh Sodhi (D) Thr. LRs. .. Appellant(s)
Versus
Baldev Raj Walia & Anr. .. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal arises from the final judgment and
order dated 18.02.2014 passed by the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No.353 of 2012 whereby
2
the Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the
appeal filed by the appellants herein and upheld the
judgment and order dated 08.05.2012 passed by the
Additional District Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in
Suit No.135 of 2008 by which the suit of the
appellants was dismissed by taking recourse to the
powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”).
3) In order to appreciate the short legal issue
involved in the appeal, few relevant facts, which lie in
a narrow compass, need to be mentioned
hereinbelow.
4) Appellants are the plaintiffs whereas the
respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out of
which this appeal arises.
3
5) On 11.10.1996, Sucha Singh(original plaintiff)
since dead and now being represented by his legal
representatives (appellant Nos.1 to 4 herein) filed a
suit being Civil Suit No.705/1996 against respondent
No.1 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Delhi. The
suit was filed only for grant of permanent injunction.
6) The plaint was founded on the allegations, inter
alia, that respondent No.1 was the owner of the
house, i.e., basement and half of the first floor of the
premises in plot No.1, Gali No.9 situated at Sanwar
Nagar Post Office Raipur Khurd, New Delhi, as
detailed in the plaint (Annexure-P-2) (hereinafter
referred to as “the suit premises”). Respondent No.1,
on 27.02.1996, agreed to sell the suit premises to
Sucha Singh (Plaintiff) for Rs.11,50,000/- and out of
the total amount, Sucha Singh paid a sum of
4
Rs.2,00,000/- by way of advance to respondent No.1
by cheque.
7) It was further averred that Sucha Singh was
placed in possession of the suit premises in
February, 1996. It was alleged that in May, 1996
respondent No.1 demanded more money from Sucha
Singh pursuant to which Sucha Singh further paid
Rs.36,000/- in cash to respondent No.1.
8) It was alleged that on 10.10.1996, respondent
No.1 threatened to dispossess Sucha Singh from the
suit premises and made unsuccessful attempt to
dispossess him with the help of henchmen (Para 13
of the plaint).
9) It is on this cause of action, Sucha Singh filed a
civil suit for permanent injunction on 11.10.1996
against respondent No.1 in relation to the suit
5
premises restraining him from interfering with his
possession over the suit premises.
10) Respondent No.1 filed the written statement,
inter alia, alleging therein that he has already
transferred the suit premises to respondent No.2
herein and, therefore, the remedy of plaintiff-Sucha
Singh, if any, would be to file a civil suit for specific
performance of the agreement against respondent
No.1 but not in prosecuting the suit for permanent
injunction.
11) On 27.11.1998, Sucha Singh (plaintiff) made a
statement in the Court that he wants to withdraw the
civil suit. He also made a statement that he is
withdrawing the civil suit with a view to file
proceedings before the competent forum to claim
appropriate relief against respondent No.1.
6
12) The Trial Court, on 27.11.1998, allowed the
original plaintiff (Sucha Singh) to withdraw the civil
suit and passed the following order:
“It is submitted by the counsel for plaintiff
that he wants to withdraw the suit from this
court to be filed before the appropriate
forum. Counsel for defendant has no
objection for withdrawal of the suit by the
plaintiff, however asking for cost incurred.
Statements of both the parties have been
recorded separately. Parties shall be bound
by their statements as their undertakings in
the court.
I have perused the records of the file and
statements of both the parties. The plaintiff
is allowed to withdraw the suit subject to
cost of Rs.500/- to be paid to the defendant.
Cost paid in the court. After completion file
be consigned to Record Room.”
 (ARCHANA SINHA)
 CIVIL JUDGE, DELHI.
 27.11.1998. ”

13) On 25.02.1999, Sucha Singh, filed civil suit
No.54 of 1999 (Re-numbered as Suit No.135 of 2008)
in the Court of Additional District Judge, Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi against respondent No.1 for specific
7
performance of the agreement dated 27.02.1996. In
Para 13, the plaintiff stated the facts for constituting
the accrual of cause of action for filing the suit for
specific performance of the agreement.
14) Respondent No.2 i.e. the alleged subsequent
purchaser filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10
of the Code to become a party (defendant) in the suit.
The application was allowed and respondent No.2
was arrayed as defendant No. 2.
15) Both the respondents (defendants No.1 and 2)
filed their written statement and denied the plaintiff's
claim on various grounds on facts and in law.
Respondent No.2 also filed an application under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code for rejection of the
plaint.
16) It was, inter alia, alleged that the suit in
question (specific performance of agreement) is hit by
8
the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code because
the relief of specific performance, which is claimed in
the present suit could be and ought to have been
claimed by the plaintiff - Sucha Singh in the
previously instituted suit which he had filed for
permanent injunction. It was contended that
non-claiming of relief of specific performance of the
agreement in the previously instituted suit though
available to the plaintiff for being claimed on the
cause of action pleaded in the previous suit would
attract the bar contained in Order 2 Rule 2 of the
Code to the subsequently instituted civil suit wherein
a relief of specific performance of agreement is
claimed and, therefore, such suit cannot be now tried
on merits.
17) During the pendency of the suit, Sucha Singh
died on 04.08.2000 and his legal representatives
9
(appellants herein) were brought on record as
plaintiffs to continue the lis. The appellants
(plaintiffs) opposed the application filed by defendant
No.2 (respondent No.2 herein) and contended that
the suit for specific performance of agreement is
maintainable and not barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the
Code.
18) The Trial Court, however, by order dated
08.05.2012 allowed respondent No.2's application
and, in consequence, dismissed the appellants’ suit
holding that it is barred by the provisions of Order 2
Rule 2 of the Code. In other words, the Trial Court
held that the plaintiffs ought to have claimed the
relief of specific performance of the agreement in the
previous suit, which was filed by Sucha Singh
(original plaintiff) for permanent injunction because
10
according to the Trial Court such relief was available
for being claimed when the first suit was filed.
19) The plaintiffs felt aggrieved and filed appeal
before the High Court of Delhi. By impugned
judgment, the High Court while concurring with the
reasoning and the conclusion of the Trial Court
dismissed the appeal. Against the said judgment, the
plaintiffs felt aggrieved and have filed the present
appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
20) Heard Mr. Bhim Sain Jain, learned counsel for
the appellants, Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior
counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Pramod Dayal,
learned counsel for respondent No.2.
21) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside
the judgment and order of the High Court and the
11
Trial Court, dismiss the application filed by
respondent No.2 (defendant No. 2) under Order 7
Rule 11 of CPC and restore the civil suit No.54 of
1999 (re-numbered as Suit No.135/2008) filed by the
appellants herein against the respondents out of
which this appeal arises for being tried on merits in
accordance with law.
22) In our considered opinion, the Trial Court and
the High Court erred in allowing the application filed
by respondent No.2 under Order 7 Rule 11 of the
Code and thereby erred in dismissing the suit as
being barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of
the Code by taking recourse to the provisions of
Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. In our opinion, the
provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code are not
attracted to the facts of this case and, therefore, civil
12
suit should not have been dismissed as being barred
under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.
23) Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code reads as under:
“2. Suit to include the whole claim – (1)
Every suit shall include the whole of the
claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make
in respect of the cause of action, but a
plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his
claim in order to bring the suit within the
jurisdiction of any Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim –
Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of,
or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of
his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in
respect of the portion so omitted or
relinquished.”
24) Order 2 Rule 2(1) of the Code provides that
every suit shall include the whole of the claim, which
the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the
cause of action. Liberty is, however, granted to the
plaintiff to relinquish any portion of his claim with a
view to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any
Court.
13
25) It is clear from the reading of Order 2 Rule (1) of
the Code that whenever the plaintiff files a suit on
the basis of a cause of action pleaded in the plaint,
he is under a legal obligation to include and claim all
the reliefs against the defendant, which have accrued
to him on the cause of action pleaded by him in his
plaint. In other words, if on the basis of cause of
action pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint, he is
entitled to claim two reliefs, namely, “A” and “B”
against the defendant(s), then he is under an
obligation to claim both “A” and “B” reliefs together in
the suit. Order 2 Rule 2(1) of the Code enables the
plaintiff to relinquish any portion of his relief with a
view to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any
Court.
26) Order 2 Rule 2(2) of the Code, however, provides
that where a plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally
14
relinquishes, any portion of his claim/relief in his
suit, then in such event, he shall not be allowed
afterwards to sue in respect of the claim/relief so
omitted or/and relinquished by him in his suit. In
other words Rule 2(2) does not permit the plaintiff to
file second suit to claim the omitted or/and
relinquished relief.
27) In our opinion, the sine qua non for invoking
Order 2 Rule 2(2) against the plaintiff by the
defendant is that the relief which the plaintiff has
claimed in the second suit was also available to the
plaintiff for being claimed in the previous suit on the
causes of action pleaded in the previous suit against
the defendant and yet not claimed by the plaintiff.
28) Therefore, we have to examine the question as
to whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim a relief
of specific performance of agreement in the previous
15
suit on the basis of cause of action pleaded by the
plaintiff in the previous suit against the
respondents/defendants in relation to suit property.
29) In other words, the question that arises for
consideration is whether Sucha Singh (original
plaintiff) could claim the relief of specific performance
of agreement against the respondents/defendants in
addition to his claim of permanent injunction in the
previously instituted suit?
30) Our answer to the aforementioned question is in
favour of the plaintiffs (appellants) and against the
defendants(respondents). In other words, our answer
to the aforementioned question is that the plaintiff
could not claim the relief of specific performance of
agreement against the defendants along with the
relief of permanent injunction in the previous suit for
the following reasons.
16
31) First, the cause of action to claim a relief of
permanent injunction and the cause of action to
claim a relief of specific performance of agreement are
independent and one cannot include the other and
vice versa.
32) In other words, a plaintiff cannot claim a relief
of specific performance of agreement against the
defendant on a cause of action on which he has
claimed a relief of permanent injunction.
33) Second, the cause of action to claim
temporary/permanent injunction against the
defendants from interfering in plaintiff's possession
over the suit premises accrues when defendant No.1
threatens the plaintiff to dispossess him from the suit
premises or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in
relation to the suit premises. It is governed by Order
39 Rule 1 (c) of the Code which deals with the grant
17
of injunction. The limitation to file such suit is three
years from the date of obstruction caused by the
defendant to the plaintiff (See – Part VII Articles 85,
86 and 87 of the Limitation Act).
34) On the other hand, the cause of action to file a
suit for claiming specific performance of agreement
arises from the date fixed for the performance or
when no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has
noticed that performance is refused by the defendant.
The limitation to file such suit is three years from
such date (See – Part II Article 54 of the Limitation
Act).
35) Third, when both the reliefs/claims namely, (1)
Permanent Injunction and (2) Specific Performance of
Agreement are not identical, when the causes of
action to sue are separate, when the factual
ingredients necessary to constitute the respective
18
causes of action for both the reliefs/claims are
different and lastly, when both the reliefs/claims are
governed by separate articles of the Limitation Act,
then, in our opinion, it is not possible to claim both
the reliefs together on one cause of action.
36) This Court in Rathnavathi & Another vs.
Kavita Ganashamdas (2015 (5) SCC 223) had the
occasion to examine this very question on somewhat
similar facts in detail. This Court after taking into
account the earlier decisions of this Court which
dealt with this question held in Paras 22 to 31 that
bar contained in Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code on such
facts is not attracted against the plaintiff so as to
disentitle him from filing the subsequent suit to claim
specific performance of agreement against the
defendants in relation to the suit property.
19
37) We apply the law laid down in the case of
Rathnavathi (supra) and hold that the suit filed by
the original plaintiff for specific performance of
agreement against the respondents (defendants) is
not barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code and is held
maintainable for being tried on merits.
38) This takes us to examine another question as to
whether in the absence of any permission/liberty
granted by the Trial Court to the plaintiff at the time
of withdrawing the previous suit filed for permanent
injunction, the plaintiff was entitled to file the suit for
specific performance of agreement against the
defendants in relation to the suit property?
39) In our considered opinion, this question does
not now survive for consideration in the light of what
we have held above. In any event, keeping in view the
law laid down by this Court in Gurinderpal vs.
20
Jagmittar Singh (2004) 11 SCC 219, the question is
answered against the respondents.
40) In somewhat similar facts, the question arose
before this Court in Gurinderpal’s case (supra),
namely, if the order granting permission to withdraw
the suit under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the Code does
not specifically mention the fact of granting liberty to
the plaintiff to file a fresh suit, whether filing of fresh
suit would be hit by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code?
41) This Court (three Judge Bench), speaking
through Justice R.C. Lahoti (as His Lordship then
was), held that filing of the second suit is not hit by
Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code and is maintainable for
being tried on merits. This is what this Court held in
Para 6:
“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties, we are satisfied that the judgment of
the High Court as also of the first appellate
court cannot be sustained to the extent to
21
which the bar enacted under Order 2 Rule 2
CPC has been applied. The provisions of
Order 2 Rule 2 CPC bar the remedy of the
plaintiff-appellant and, therefore, must be
strictly construed. The order of the trial
court dated 15-6-1994 passed in the earlier
suit, extracted and reproduced hereinabove,
has to be read in the light of the statement of
the plaintiff-appellant recorded by the court
on that very date. The plaintiff-appellant had
clearly stated that he was seeking leave to
withdraw the suit with the liberty of filing a
fresh suit. The trial court recorded that the
suit was being dismissed as withdrawn “in
view of the statement of the plaintiff”. A
conjoint reading of the order of the court and
the statement of the plaintiff, clearly
suggests that the suit was dismissed as
withdrawn because the plaintiff wanted to file
a fresh suit, obviously wherein the plaintiff
would seek the decree of specific
performance and not of a mere injunction as
was prayed for in the suit which was sought
to be withdrawn. In the subsequent suit, the
first appellate court was not right in forming
an opinion that liberty to file the fresh suit
was not given to the plaintiff in the order
dated 15-6-1994. That finding of the first
appellate court ought not to have been
sustained by the High Court.”

42) Applying the aforementioned principle of law to
the case at hand, we find that the original plaintiff
(Sucha Singh), in clear terms, had stated in the
22
previous suit that he wants to withdraw the suit
because he wants to file appropriate proceedings
before the competent forum in relation to the subject
matter of the suit. The Trial Court recorded his
statement on 27.11.1998 and allowed withdrawal of
the suit.
43) In our considered opinion, reading of the
statement of the original plaintiff (Sucha Singh)
coupled with the permission granted by the Court to
withdraw the suit satisfies the requirement of Order
23 Rule 1 (3) of the Code. It certainly enabled the
plaintiff to file a fresh suit, namely, the civil suit for
claiming specific performance of the agreement
against the defendants. In our view, the Court was
entitled to take into consideration the statement
made by the original plaintiff (Sucha Singh) for
withdrawing the suit and filing it afresh and his
23
statement could be made a part of the order for
granting permission to withdraw the civil suit and file
a fresh suit as was held in the case of Gurinderpal
(supra).
44) In our view, therefore, this submission urged by
the learned counsel for the respondents has no merit.
45) Learned counsel for respondent No.2 (defendant
No.2) then addressed the Court on the merits of the
suit. We are afraid, we cannot go into any question
relating to the merits of the controversy involved in
the suit. It is for the Trial Court to now proceed to
try the suit on merits and decide the suit in
accordance with law.
46) In view of the foregoing discussion, we cannot
concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived
at by the Trial Court and the High Court which
wrongly allowed the application filed by respondent
24
No.2 (defendant No.2) under Order 7 Rule 11 of the
Code and, in consequence, dismissed the appellants’
(plaintiffs’) suit as being barred by the provisions of
Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.
47) As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is
accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment is set
aside. The application filed by respondent No.2
(defendant No.2) under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code
is dismissed.
48) The civil suit (No.54/99 re-numbered as
135/2008) filed by the appellants against the
respondents is held maintainable. It is accordingly
restored to its original file for being tried on merits
and in accordance with law.
49) The Trial Court is directed to decide the civil
suit on merit expeditiously and preferably within one
25
year without being influenced by any of our
observations.
………………………………..J
(R.K. AGRAWAL)
 ..………………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
New Delhi,
April 13, 2018

quashed - the criminal proceedings - despite of conviction and pending of appeal =maintainability of a criminal prosecution/proceeding instituted under Section 199(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) alleging commission of offences under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) against the Hon’ble Chief 2 Minister of the State of Madhya Pradesh. = The very initiation of the prosecution has been found by us to be untenable in law. Merely because the trial is over and has ended in the conviction of the appellant and the matter is presently pending before the High Court in appeal should not come in the way of our interdicting the same. The requirements of justice would demand that we carry our conclusions to its logical end by invoking our special and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. - Consequently, we allow this appeal; quash the impugned prosecution/proceedings registered and numbered as Sessions Session Trial No.573 of 2014; and set aside the order dated 17th November, 2017 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial No.573 of 2014 convicting the accused appellant under Section 500 IPC and 19 sentencing him as aforesaid. The appeal pending before the High Court against the order dated 17th November, 2017 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial No.573 of 2014 shall also stand closed in terms of the present order.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) 547 OF 2018
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(CRIMINAL] NO.6064 OF 2017]
K.K. MISHRA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
& ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. By the order impugned, the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh has negatived the challenge
made by the appellant to the maintainability
of a criminal prosecution/proceeding
instituted under Section 199(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) alleging commission
of offences under Sections 499 and 500 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred
to as “IPC”) against the Hon’ble Chief
2
Minister of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The
complaint has been filed by the Public
Prosecutor on 24th June, 2014 before the
District & Sessions Judge, Bhopal (Madhya
Pradesh) after receipt of sanction from the
Competent Authority of the State Government
on the very same day i.e. 24th June, 2014.
3. At the very outset, we deem it
necessary to put on record that during the
pendency of the present proceedings the
prosecution against the accused appellant has
been concluded by the learned Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, Bhopal, Madhya
Pradesh by judgment and order dated 17th
November, 2017 in Sessions Trial No.573 of
2014. The accused appellant has been found
guilty of the commission of the offence
punishable under Section 500 IPC and,
accordingly, he has been sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for two years with fine
of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand). We
3
are told at the Bar that an appeal against
the said order is presently pending before
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the
accused appellant is presently on bail.
4. At this stage, we would like to
recapitulate our order dated 5th January, 2018
reiterating that, notwithstanding the
conviction of the accused appellant, this
Court would like to consider the question of
the validity of the very initiation of the
prosecution against the appellant.
5. While Section 499 IPC defines and
deals with the offence of defamation,
punishment for the said offence is provided
by Section 500 IPC. In the present case, the
alleged offence of defamation against the
Hon’ble Chief Minister of the State of Madhya
Pradesh, according to the prosecution, has
been committed by the accused appellant on
account of certain statements made with
regard to the Hon’ble Chief Minister in the
4
course of a Press Conference that the
appellant had addressed as a Chief
Spokesperson of the Indian National Congress,
Madhya Pradesh organized on 21st June, 2014 at
the MP Congress Committee, 1461 Indra Bhawan
Shivaji Nagar, Bhopal.
6. Though a reading of the transcript of
the Press Conference, which has been placed
on record, may indicate a reference to the
Hon’ble Chief Minister in respect of several
acts and events, for the purposes of the
present case we will, necessarily, have to
confine ourselves to only three statements
allegedly made in the Press Conference with
reference to the Hon’ble Chief Minister. This
is because in the order granting
sanction/permission dated 24th June, 2014 for
filing of a complaint under Section 199 (2)
Cr.P.C. it is only the aforesaid three
statements which have been taken note of as
being defamatory and, therefore, taken
cognizance for purpose of grant of
5
sanction/permission under Section 199(2) of
the Cr.P.C. The aforesaid three statements
mentioned in the order dated 24th June, 2014
granting sanction/permission are as follows:
 “1. 19 amongst the Transport
Inspection appointed in Madhya
Pradesh are from the in-laws
house Gondiya (Maharashtra) of
Chief Minister Shivraj Singh
Chouhan.
2. Conversation has been made with
the accused persons of the Vyapam
Scam from the mobile of Sanjay
Chouhan son of Phoolsingh
Chouhan-Mama of the Chief
Minister Sh. Shivraj Singh
Chouhan.
3. Conversation has been made from
the Chief Minister’s house by an
influential woman through 139
phone calls with the accused of
Vyapam Scam Nitin Mahendra,
Pankaj Trivedi, Lakshmikant
Sharma.”
7. Section 199(2) Cr.P.C. provides for a
special procedure with regard to initiation
of a prosecution for offence of defamation
committed against the constitutional
functionaries and public servants mentioned
6
therein. However, the offence alleged to
have been committed must be in respect of
acts/conduct in the discharge of public
functions of the concerned functionary or
public servant, as may be. The prosecution
under Section 199 (2) Cr.P.C. is required to
be initiated by the Public Prosecutor on
receipt of a previous sanction of the
Competent Authority in the State/Central
Government under Section 199 (4) of the Code.
Such a complaint is required to be filed in a
Court of Sessions that is alone vested with
the jurisdiction to hear and try the alleged
offence and even without the case being
committed to the said court by a subordinate
Court. Section 199(2) Cr.P.C. read with
section 199(4) Cr.P.C., therefore, envisages
a departure from the normal rule of
initiation of a complaint before a Magistrate
by the affected persons alleging the offence
of defamation. The said right, however, is
saved even in cases of the category of
7
persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 199 Cr.P.C. by sub-section (6)
thereof.
8. The rationale for the departure from
the normal rule has been elaborately dealt
with by this Court in a judgment of
considerable vintage in P.C. Joshi and
another vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh1
[paragraph 9]. The core reason which this
Court held to be the rationale for the
special procedure engrafted by Section 199(2)
Cr.P.C. is that the offence of defamation
committed against the functionaries mentioned
therein is really an offence committed
against the State as the same relate to the
discharge of public functions by such
functionaries. The State, therefore, would
be rightly interested in pursuing the
prosecution; hence the special provision and
the special procedure.
1 AIR 1961 SC 387
8
P.C. Joshi (supra), however,
specifically dealt with the provisions of
Section 198B of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (“old Code”) which are pari
materia with the provisions of Section 199 of
the Cr.P.C. (“new Code”).
9. The above would require the Court to
consider as to whether the statements made by
the accused appellant in the Press Conference
which have been taken note of in the order
dated 24th June, 2014 granting sanction/
permission can legitimately be said to be
attributable or connected with the discharge
of public functions of the office of the
Hon’ble Chief Minister. In other words,
whether the said statements have any
reasonable nexus with the discharge of
Official duties by the Hon’ble Chief
Minister.
9
10. The problem of identification and
correlation of the acts referred to in an
allegedly defamatory statement and those
connected with the discharge of public
functions/official duties by the holder of
the public office is, by no means, an easy
task. The sanction contemplated under Section
199(4) Cr.P.C. though in the opposite context
i.e. to prosecute an offender for offences
committed against a public servant may have
to be understood by reference to the sanction
contemplated by Section 197 Cr.P.C. which
deals with sanction for prosecution of a
public servant. There is a fair amount of
similarity between the conditions precedent
necessary for accord of sanction in both
cases though the context may be different,
indeed, the opposite. While dealing with the
requirement of sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C. this Court in Urmila Devi vs. Yudhvir
 Singh2 had taken the following view which may
have some relevance to the present case.
2 (2013) 15 SCC 624
10
“59. The expression “official duty”
would in the absence of any statutory
definition, therefore, denote a duty
that arises by reason of an office or
position of trust or authority held
by a person. It follows that in every
case where the question whether the
accused was acting in discharge of
his official duty or purporting to
act in the discharge of such a duty
arises for consideration, the court
will first examine whether the
accused was holding an office and, if
so, what was the nature of duties
cast upon him as holder of any such
office. It is only when there is a
direct and reasonable nexus between
the nature of the duties cast upon
the public servant and the act
constituting an offence that the
protection under Section 197 CrPC may
be available and not otherwise. Just
because the accused is a public
servant is not enough. A reasonable
connection between his duties as a
public servant and the acts
complained of is what will determine
whether he was acting in discharge of
his official duties or purporting to
do so, even if the acts were in
excess of what was enjoined upon him
as a public servant within the
meaning of that expression under
Section 197 of the Code.”
11. If the allegedly defamatory
statements, already extracted, in respect of
which sanction has been accorded to the
Public Prosecutor to file the complaint
11
against the appellant under Section 199 (2)
Cr.P.C. by the order dated 24th June, 2014 are
to be carefully looked into, according to us,
none of the said statements, even if admitted
to have been made by the appellant, can be
said to have any reasonable connection with
the discharge of public duties by or the
office of the Hon’ble Chief Minister. The
appointment of persons from the area/place to
which the wife of the Hon’ble Chief Minister
belongs and the making of phone calls by the
relatives of the Hon’ble Chief Minister have
no reasonable nexus with the discharge of
public duties by or the office of the Hon’ble
Chief Minister. Such statements may be
defamatory but then in the absence of a nexus
between the same and the discharge of public
duties of the office, the remedy under
Section 199(2) and 199(4) Cr.P.C. will not be
available. It is the remedy saved by the
provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 199
Cr.P.C. i.e. a complaint by the Hon’ble Chief
12
Minister before the ordinary Court i.e. the
Court of Magistrate which would be available
and could have been resorted to.
12. There is yet another dimension to the
case. In Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of
 India3 one of the grounds on which the
challenge to the constitutional validity of
Section 499 and 500 IPC was sustained by this
Court was the understanding that Section
199(2) and 199(4) Cr.P.C. provide an inbuilt
safeguard which require the Public Prosecutor
to scan and be satisfied with the materials
on the basis of which a complaint for
defamation is to be filed by him acting as
the Public Prosecutor. In this regard, an
earlier decision of this Court in Bairam
Muralidhar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh4 while
dealing with Section 321 Cr.P.C. (i.e.
Withdrawal from prosecution) was considered
by this Court and it was held as follows:
3 (2016) 7 SCC 221
4 (2014) 10 SCC 380
13
“…It is ordinarily expected that
the Public Prosecutor has a duty to
scan the materials on the basis of
which a complaint for defamation is
to be filed. He has a duty towards
the court. This Court in Bairam
Muralidhar Vs. State of A.P [(2014)
10 SCC 380] while deliberating on
Section 321 CrPC has opined that
the Public Prosecutor cannot act
like a post office on behalf of the
State Government. He is required
to act in good faith, peruse the
materials on record and form an
independent opinion. It further
observed that he cannot remain
oblivious to his lawful obligations
under the Code and is required to
constantly remember his duty to the
court as well as his duty to the
collective. While filing cases
under Sections 499 and 500 IPC, he
is expected to maintain that
independence and not act as a
machine.”
(underlining is ours)
13. In the proceedings before the learned
trial Court, the Public Prosecutor who had
presented the complaint under Section 199(2)
Cr.P.C. was cross-examined on behalf of the
accused appellant. From the relevant extract
of the cross-examination of the Public
Prosecutor, which is quoted below, it is
clear to us that the Public prosecutor had
14
admitted the absence of any scrutiny by him
of the materials on which the prosecution is
sought to be launched. In fact, the Public
Prosecutor had gone to the extent of
admitting that he had filed the complaint
against the accused appellant on the orders
of the State Government. The relevant
extract of the cross-examination of the
Public Prosecution is as under:
 xxx 7.3.2015
“47. It is correct to say that I have
not given any proposal in capacity
of public prosecutor to the
Government that I want to file a
complaint against Shri K.K. Mishra
in connection with giving
defamatory statement. It is
correct to say that I have filed
the present case in the official
capacity of Public Prosecutor. It
is correct to say that I have not
filed the present complaint on
behalf of the Government
(Volunteered to say) that I have
filed the above case being a Public
Prosecutor. It is correct to say
that on the order of the
Government, I have filed the
complaint. If the Government had
not directed me, then, I would not
have filed a complaint as a Public
Prosecutor. 
15
48. xxxxxxxxxx
49. xxxxxxxxxx
50. Before receiving the permission, I
have not seen any document and did
not consider whether complaint has
to be filed or not. It is correct
to say that I have not submitted
any document in connection with
this fact that Jagdish Devda was a
Minister in the Government of
Madhya Pradesh and Shri Shivraj
Singh Chouhan was positioned as
Hon’ble Chief Minister of
Government of Madhya Pradesh on the
date of Press Conference
(Voluntarily state that) the
accused himself, while addressing
Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan as Chief
Minister, has made all the
allegations.
51. It is correct to say that before
filing the complaint, I have not
given any legal notice to the
accused in connection with this
fact that whether objections were
raised against the Hon’ble Chief
Minister in Press Conference or
not.”
14. The testimony of the Public
Prosecutor in his cross-examination
effectively demonstrates that the wholesome
requirement spelt out by Section 199(2) and
16
199(4) Cr.P.C., as expounded by this Court in
Subramanian Swamy (supra), has not been
complied with in the present case. A Public
Prosecutor filing a complaint under Section
199 (2) Cr.P.C. without due satisfaction that
the materials/allegations in complaint
discloses an offence against an Authority or
against a public functionary which adversely
affects the interests of the State would be
abhorrent to the principles on the basis of
which the special provision under Section
199(2) and 199(4) Cr.P.C. has been structured
as held by this Court in P.C. Joshi (supra)
and Subramanian Swamy (supra). The public
prosecutor in terms of the statutory scheme
under the Criminal Procedure Code plays an
important role. He is supposed to be an
independent person and apply his mind to the
materials placed before him. As held in
Bairam Muralidhar case supra)
“……He cannot remain oblivious to his
lawful obligations under the Code.
He is required to constantly remember
17
his duty to the court as well as his
duty to the collective.”
In the present case, the press meet was
convened by the appellant on 21.06.2014. The
government accorded sanction to the public
prosecutor to file complaint under Section
500 IPC against the appellant on 24.06.2014.
As seen from the records, the complaint was
filed by the public prosecutor against the
appellant on the very same day i.e.
24.06.2014. The haste with which the
complaint was filed prima facie indicates
that the public prosecutor may not have
applied his mind to the materials placed
before him as held in Bairam Muralidhar case
(supra). We, therefore, without hesitation,
take the view that the complaint is not
maintainable on the very face of it and would
deserve our interference.
15. On the conclusions that have been
reached by us, as indicated above, the
conviction of the accused appellant and the
18
sentence imposed would not have any legs to
stand. The very initiation of the
prosecution has been found by us to be
untenable in law. Merely because the trial
is over and has ended in the conviction of
the appellant and the matter is presently
pending before the High Court in appeal
should not come in the way of our
interdicting the same. The requirements of
justice would demand that we carry our
conclusions to its logical end by invoking
our special and extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India. Consequently, we allow this appeal;
quash the impugned prosecution/proceedings
registered and numbered as Sessions Session
Trial No.573 of 2014; and set aside the order
dated 17th November, 2017 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Prevention of
Corruption Act, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh in
Sessions Trial No.573 of 2014 convicting the
accused appellant under Section 500 IPC and
19
sentencing him as aforesaid. The appeal
pending before the High Court against the
order dated 17th November, 2017 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Prevention of
Corruption Act, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh in
Sessions Trial No.573 of 2014 shall also
stand closed in terms of the present order.
Bail bond, if any shall stand discharged
accordingly.
16. The appeal is allowed in the above
terms.
......................, J
[RANJAN GOGOI]
......................, J
 [R. BANUMATHI]
......................, J
 [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 13, 2018.