corporate laws – insurance laws- motor accident claims = Driving licence not valid at the time of accident -expired before the accident and was not renewed within the prescribed period = the insured did not hold a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. The Tribunal absolved the insurer for that reason. The insurer was, however, directed to pay the compensation awarded to the claimant and to recover it from the owner of the offending motor cycle. - Section 15 of the Act does not empower the authorities to reject an application for renewal only on the ground that there is a break in validity or tenure of the driving licence has 5 lapsed, as in the meantime the provisions for disqualification of the driver contained in Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 will not be attracted, would indisputably confer a right upon the person to get his driving licence renewed. In that view of the matter, he cannot be said to be delicensed and the same shall remain valid for a period of thirty days after its expiry.” The following conclusion has been recorded in summation in the judgment:: “(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish “breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident.The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not 6 fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case”. - the owner did not depose in evidence and stayed away from the witness box. He produced a licence which was found to be fake. Another licence which he sought to produce had already expired before the accident and was not renewed within the prescribed period. It was renewed well after two years had expired. The appellant as owner had evidently failed to take reasonable care (proposition (vii) of Swaran Singh) since he could not have been unmindful of facts which were within his knowledge. In the circumstances, the direction by the Tribunal, confirmed by the High Court, to pay and recover cannot be faulted.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 2103 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C ) No 22630 of 2015)
SINGH RAM ..Appellant
VERSUS
NIRMALA AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 In a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act
1988, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), Yamunanagar at
Jagadhri found that the insured did not hold a valid driving licence at the time
of the accident. The Tribunal absolved the insurer for that reason. The insurer
was, however, directed to pay the compensation awarded to the claimant and
to recover it from the owner of the offending motor cycle. The High Court dealt
with three appeals: one filed by the claimant seeking enhancement of
compensation, a second by the insurance company and the third by the owner
REPORTABLE
2
cum driver of the offending vehicle. The High Court held that in view of the
decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Swaran Singh1
, the
Tribunal was correct in directing the insurer to pay the compensation and to
recover it from the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle. The present
appeal has been filed by the owner and driver. The only point which has been
urged in support of the appeal is that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in
fastening the liability on him by granting a right of recovery to the insurer.
3 The accident took place on 22 March 2010. The deceased Sunil Kumar
was riding a motor cycle bearing Registration No HR-04B-4673. The Tribunal
found that the accident was caused as a result of the rash and negligent act of
the appellant. This finding of fact has not been disturbed by the High Court.
The deceased was employed as a sweeper in Haryana Roadways and was
engaged on a salary of Rs 11,928 per month. The Tribunal allowed future
prospects of 50%, the deceased being just short of 36 years of age. After
deducting an amount representing one-fourth of the earnings for personal
expenses, the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 15. The total compensation was
computed at Rs 24,15,420 to which the Tribunal added an amount of Rs 20,000
under conventional heads. However, the Tribunal held that the financial
assistance which the heirs of the deceased would receive over a period of 12
years from the employee (amounting to Rs 16,16,112) would have to be
deducted from the compensation. After making the deduction, the Tribunal

1
(2004) 3 SCC 297
3
awarded an amount of Rs. 8,19,500 together with interest at 7.5 per cent per
annum from the date of the claim petition. The High Court has enhanced the
compensation to Rs 16,04,912.
4 Special Leave Petition (C ) No 7737 of 2015 filed by the claimant, which
was connected to this appeal, has been dismissed on 8 February 2018.
5 In the present appeal by the owner cum driver of the offending motor
cycle, the submission is that in view of the decision of a Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court in Swaran Singh (supra), the insurer ought not to have
been absolved. Hence the direction to the insurer to pay and recover the
compensation from the appellant should, it has been urged, be modified to
fasten a joint and several liability on the insurer.
6 Before we advert to the decision in Swaran Singh (supra) a brief
reference to the facts as they emerge from the decision of the Tribunal is
necessary. Initially before the Tribunal the appellant produced a driving licence
issued by the Motor Vehicles Department, Agra (Exh.R-1). The driving licence
was found to be fake. The statement of the Senior Assistant in the office of the
RTO, Agra was that Exh.R-1 had not been issued by the office. The Tribunal
noted that the witness had proved the report (Exh.R-2) issued by the
department and concluded that the licence was fake. Faced with this situation,
the appellant attempted to prove that he held a valid driving licence issued by
4
the licencing authority at Jagadhri to drive a motor cycle. The Tribunal rejected
the application filed by the appellant for producing additional evidence. The
Tribunal noted that even otherwise, the licence which was issued by the
licencing authority, Jagadhri for a tractor and car was valid only until 29 August
2009. The accident took place on 22 March 2010. The licence was renewed
on 28 November 2011 more than two years after it had expired. On these facts,
the Tribunal observed that on the date of the accident, the appellant was not
holding a valid and effective driving licence nor was there any evidence to
indicate that the licence was sought to be renewed as required in law, within 30
days of its expiry. The Tribunal also observed that the appellant did not hold a
valid licence to drive a motor cycle. On these grounds, the insurer was
absolved. The High Court has confirmed the direction of the Tribunal to pay
and recover.
7 In Swaran Singh (supra), this Court held that the holder of a driving
licence has a period of thirty days on its expiry, to renew it:
“45. Thus, a person whose licence is ordinarily renewed in
terms of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed
thereunder, despite the fact that during the interregnum
period, namely, when the accident took place and the date
of expiry of the licence, he did not have a valid licence, he
could during the prescribed period apply for renewal thereof
and could obtain the same automatically without undergoing
any further test or without having been declared unqualified
therefor. Proviso appended to Section 14 in unequivocal
terms states that the licence remains valid for a period of
thirty days from the day of its expiry.
46. Section 15 of the Act does not empower the authorities
to reject an application for renewal only on the ground that
there is a break in validity or tenure of the driving licence has 
5
lapsed, as in the meantime the provisions for disqualification
of the driver contained in Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24
will not be attracted, would indisputably confer a right upon
the person to get his driving licence renewed. In that view of
the matter, he cannot be said to be delicensed and the same
shall remain valid for a period of thirty days after its expiry.”
The following conclusion has been recorded in summation in the judgment::
“(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of
the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained
in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to
have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by
the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or
disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time,
are not in themselves defences available to the insurer
against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its
liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the
insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise
reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the
policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or
one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time.
(iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid
their liability must not only establish the available defence(s)
raised in the said proceedings but must also establish
“breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden
of proof wherefor would be on them.
(v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the
said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the
part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding
holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to
drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be
allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the
said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence
is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to
the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the
policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and
the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences
available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.
(vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken
reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence
produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not 
6
fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be
determined in each case”.
8 In the present case it is necessary to note, as observed by the Tribunal,
that the owner did not depose in evidence and stayed away from the witness
box. He produced a licence which was found to be fake. Another licence which
he sought to produce had already expired before the accident and was not
renewed within the prescribed period. It was renewed well after two years had
expired. The appellant as owner had evidently failed to take reasonable care
(proposition (vii) of Swaran Singh) since he could not have been unmindful of
facts which were within his knowledge.
9 In the circumstances, the direction by the Tribunal, confirmed by the High
Court, to pay and recover cannot be faulted. The appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws – insurance laws- motor accident claims = Disability was not permanent - reduced the compensation = The Doctor admitted that the disability certificate indicated a tick mark on the word ‘permanent’ by mistake. He further stated that the disability in the present case was likely to improve. we find merit in the contention that the claim for compensation on the basis that the disability was permanent was clearly not established. There was no basis to award an amount of Rs. 20,75,700/-. The Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs. 2,09,622/- towards medical expenses. We accept the figure of an annual loss of income of Rs. 79,877/-. The disability being of a temporary nature, we award compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs towards loss of income. We allow compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs towards trauma, pain and suffering. In addition, the claimant is entitled to medical expenses of Rs. 2,09,622. We are of the view that the endsof justice would be met by directing a payment of Rs. 9,10,000/- . The claimant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the petition. The insurer shall deposit the compensation along with interest before the Tribunal within twelve weeks which shall be disbursed to the claimant on proper identification.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7181 OF 2015
ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE .....APPELLANT
CO. LTD.

 Versus
AJAY KUMAR MOHANTY & ANR. .....RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1879 OF 2016
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1 In a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, arising out of a disability sustained by the claimant as a result of a motor
accident, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 22,85,322/-. The High Court
in an appeal filed by the insurer reduced the compensation to Rs. 12,00,000/-
2
Interest was reduced from 7.5 per cent per annum to 7.0 per cent. The only
reasoning contained in support of the order of the High Court reads as
follows:
“Considering the grounds taken in appeal and the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view
the findings of the learned Tribunal given in the impugned award
with regard to the quantum of compensation amount awarded
and the basis on which the same has been arrived at, I feel, the
interest of justice would be best served, if the awarded
compensation amount of Rs. 22,85,322/- is modified and
reduced to Rs. 12,00,000/-. The award of interst @ 7.5% per
annum is also modified and reduced to 7% only. Accordingly, the
claimant is entitled to the modified compensation amount of Rs.
12,00,000/- along with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of
filing of the Claim application. The impugned award is modified
to the said extent.”
2 Ex-facie, there has been no application of mind by the High Court to the
evidence on the record and to the relevant facts and circumstances. The
above extract cannot be regarded as the expression of a reasoned view.
Ordinarily, we would have remitted the case back to the High Court for a fresh
determination. However, we are inclined not to do so in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice which delay in itself is likely to occasion. The accident
took place on 25 April 2009 when the appellant was 32 years of age. The
judgment of the Tribunal was rendered on 26 February 2014. The High Court
delivered its judgment on 15 April 2015. Leave was granted by this Court on 25
February 2016. Hence, we have heard the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the contesting parties on merits and proceed to resolve the dispute
so as to render finality to the case.
3
3 The accident in question took place on 25 April 2009 when the claimant
was proceeding from Keonjhar to Badbil. The vehicle fell over a bridge of NH
215. The claimant was rescued by the villagers and was shifted to hospital for
treatment. He suffered from a fracture to the left elbow and femur. The Tribunal
entered a finding of fact that the evidence of the claimant remained unshaken
and that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent act of the driver of
the vehicle. The vehicle was insured with ICICI Lombard General Insurance
Company Ltd. (the insurer).
4 While assessing the claim for compensation, the Tribunal noted the
evidence of PW2, the Doctor who had issued a disability certificate to the
claimant. The Doctor opined that the disability was temporary and not
permanent. It appears that an admission was elicited during the course of the
cross-examination to the effect that he had made certain interpolations in the
disability certificate without the consent or knowledge of the CDMO. The
Tribunal held that whether the disability was permanent or temporary, it was
duty bound to make an assessment. From the income tax returns of the
claimant for 2007, 2008 and 2009, the Tribunal observed that his annual
income would work out to Rs. 1,45,231/-. The Tribunal thereafter observed that
the annual income was Rs. 2,62,372/-. The Tribunal however accepted the
evidence of the claimant which placed his income at a lower amount of Rs.
2,22,000/- annually on the basis of the evidence of the claimant that as a BClass
contractor, he was earning Rs. 18,500/- per month. The Tribunal applied
4
a multiplier of 17 per cent. Treating the disability to be 55 per cent, on the basis
of the certificate of the District Medical Board, Bhadrak, the Tribunal computed
the compensation at Rs. 20,75,700/-. In addition, an amount of Rs. 2,09,622/-
was awarded on account of medical expenses. A total quantum of Rs.
22,85,322/- was awarded.
5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the insurer submits that the
order of the Tribunal is contradictory and contrary to the weight of the
evidence. The error has been compounded by the failure of the High Court to
attribute reasons. Counsel submits that the Tribunal proceeded on the
manifestly erroneous basis that the claimant suffered a permanent disability. It
was urged that the evidence of PW 2, the doctor, indicates that the disability
certificate was unauthorizedly interpolated by him. The admissions of the
doctor in the course of his evidence that the injury was of a temporary nature
and was likely to improve have been ignored. Moreover, it has been submitted
that the judgment of the Tribunal, especially paragraph 10, would indicate that
the Tribunal has committed serious and apparent errors of computation and
there is an internal inconsistency in its reasoning.
6 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant
submits that while PW 2 admits having interpolated the disability certificate,
this should in fact weigh in favour of the claimant as the nature of the
interpolation would indicate. Like the insurer, the claimant also has a
5
grievance in regard to the fact that the order of the High Court is not reasoned.
However, what the claimant submits is that there was no justification for the
High Court to reduce the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
7 On perusing the order of the Tribunal, we find merit in the contention of
the insurer that while calculating the income in paragraph 10 of its order, the
Tribunal has committed an error of computation. The Tribunal has on the basis
of the income tax returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009 arrived at an average
income of Rs. 1,45,231/-. However, the Tribunal has thereafter noted that the
average income comes to Rs. 2,62,372/-. Ultimately, the Tribunal proceeds on
the annual income of Rs. 2,22,000/- on the basis of the testimony of the
claimant that he was earning Rs. 18,500/- per month. This is contradictory. In
our view, on the basis of the finding of the Tribunal that the average income of
the claimant for the previous three years was Rs. 1,45,231/-, it would be
necessary to take into account the evidence of PW2 that the disability is to the
extent of 55 per cent. In other words, the loss of earning as a result of the
aforesaid disability would work out to Rs. 79,877/- per year.
8 In arriving at the quantification of compensation, we must be guided by
the well-settled principle that compensation can be granted both on account of
permanent disability as well as loss of future earnings, because one head
relates to the impairment of the person’s capacity and the other to the sphere
of pain and suffering on account of loss of enjoyment of life by the person
himself.
6
9 In Sri Laxman @ Laxman Mourya v Divisional Manager, Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd1
, this Court held thus:
“The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if the victim of an
accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then efforts
should always be made to award adequate compensation not
only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the pain,
suffering and trauma caused due to accident, loss of earnings
and victim’s inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities,
which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to
the accident.”

In Govind Yadav v New India Insurance Company Limited2
, this Court after
referring to the pronouncements in R.D. Hattangadi v Pest Control (India)
(P) Ltd.3
 , Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences v Prasanth S. Dhananka4
,
Reshma Kumari v Madam Mohan5
, Arvind Kumar Mishra v New India
Assurance Co. Ltd.6
, Raj Kumar v Ajay Kumar7
 held thus:
“18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar
Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Raj Kumar v. Ajay
Kumar must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts
in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the
victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or
temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent
disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate
compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but
also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life
and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the
disability caused due to the accident.” (Id at page 693)
1 2011 (12) SCALE 658
2 (2011) 10 SCC 683
3 (1951) 1 SCC 551
4 (2009) 6 SCC 1
5 (2009) 13 SCC 422
6 (2010) 10 SCC 254
7 (2011) 1 SCC 343
7
These principles were reiterated in a judgment delivered by one of us (Justice
Dipak Misra, as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Subulaxmi v MD Tamil
Nadu State Transport Corporation8
.
10 In the present case, the evidence of PW2 Dr Umakanta Jena indicates
that he had initially, before issuing the disability certificate, examined the
shoulder joint, elbow joint and left femur as per the discharge certificate. The
discharge certificate indicated that the injuries sustained were grievous in
nature. The Doctor initially placed a tick mark over the word ‘permanent’.
However, subsequently he made an interpolation by cutting the word
‘permanent’ and “not likely to improve”. The evidence of the Doctor is
reproduced below, insofar as it is material:
“4) The disability is temporary but not permanent. The disability
is likely to improve. The disability certificate is the original one.
By mistake, I gave a tick mark on the word “permanent”. Per day
about one hundred disability certificates are issued. So, I
committed this wrong. I have not mentioned which documents I
verified prior to issuance of this disability certificate. There is
nothing in the certificate to show that there was nailing.
Particularly in this case, the disability may improve. Any fracture
of extremity will cause disability. I cannot give any authority to
the opinion of my above sentence.
5) It is not a fact that the percentage of disability has been made
by me being gained over by the injured and that there was no
disability. It is not a fact that being gained over by the injured I
gave this disability certificate.
TO COURT:-
Q. No. 1:- Whether the certificate issued by you is
creating confusion?
Ans; Yes.
Q. No. 2: Whether you will be paid T.A. and D.A.
from State Exchequer for your mistake?
Ans:, No, I should be paid.
8 (2012) 10 SCC 177
8
Q. No. 3:- Whether my attendance in the court is a
govt. duty or C.L.?
Ans: For my mistake I should take C.L.
Q. No. 4:- Can you explain why you interpolated
the certificate which was signed by 4
doctors including CDMO, Bhadrak?
Ans: I cannot explain.
Q. No. 5:- Was not it desirable to obtain the
consent of other three doctors before
cutting and putting tick mark and making
interpolation on an already prepared
public document?
Ans: I should have obtained the consent and
signature of all other signatories before
interpolating the document.”
11 The doctor has admitted to having made an interpolation in the disability
certificate. The above evidence indicates that the disability is temporary and
not permanent. The Doctor admitted that the disability certificate indicated a
tick mark on the word ‘permanent’ by mistake. He further stated that the
disability in the present case was likely to improve.
12 Having regard to all these facts and circumstances, we find merit in the
contention that the claim for compensation on the basis that the disability was
permanent was clearly not established. There was no basis to award an
amount of Rs. 20,75,700/-. The Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs.
2,09,622/- towards medical expenses. We accept the figure of an annual loss
of income of Rs. 79,877/-. The disability being of a temporary nature, we award
compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs towards loss of income. We allow compensation
of Rs. 2 lakhs towards trauma, pain and suffering. In addition, the claimant is
entitled to medical expenses of Rs. 2,09,622. We are of the view that the ends
9
of justice would be met by directing a payment of Rs. 9,10,000/- . The claimant
shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of
the filing of the petition. The insurer shall deposit the compensation along with
interest before the Tribunal within twelve weeks which shall be disbursed to the
claimant on proper identification.
13 For the above reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court. Both the appeals are disposed of in terms of the directions
issued above. There shall be no order as to costs.
............................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ……......................................
...J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]

….............................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi
March 06, 2018

corporate laws - insurance laws- motor accident claims = lost complete sensation below the abdomen. - considered as 100% disability - As a result of the multiple fractures sustained by him, the appellant has lost complete sensation below the abdomen. Evidently he cannot work any more as load man. In these circumstances, the assessment of disability at 70 per cent is incorrect. On a realistic view of the matter, the nature of the disability must be regarded as being complete. In the circumstances, we find no reason or justification for the deduction of an amount of Rs 2,91,600 by the Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs 6,80,400). The amount so deducted must be restored and is rounded off to Rs 3,00,000. Moreover we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition. The appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation granted by the Tribunal by an amount of Rs 3,00,000. The appellant would be entitled to interest @ 9 per cent per annum, on the total amount of compensation

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 3152 OF 2017
S. THANGARAJ ..Appellant
VERSUS
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. REP.BY
THE BRANCH MANAGER ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 The claim arises out of a disability sustained as a result of a motor
accident. The Tribunal granted compensation to the claimant in the amount of
Rs 11,27,359 together with interest at 12 per cent per annum. The High Court
has simply reduced the interest awarded by the Tribunal to 7.5 per cent per
annum while maintaining the award of compensation. The claimant is in appeal.
REPORTABLE
2
3 The accident took place on 1 August 2004. The appellant was 26 years
old at the time of the accident. The accident took place when the appellant was
a pillion rider on a motor cycle ridden by one Edwin. As the motor cycle was
proceeding from Marthandam, a lorry bearing Registration No.TN 69 Z 2979
dashed against it. The lorry thereafter dashed against an electric pole and
collided with a residential property resulting in the death of an occupant of the
house. The appellant sustained serious injuries in the accident. The injuries
have been described in the evidence of PW 4, the doctor at the hospital where
the appellant was treated. The appellant sustained a fracture in his spinal cord,
right leg and right hip bone. As a result of the accident the appellant has no
sensation or movement in his legs. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of PW
4 and observed thus:
“Moreover PW 4 the doctor has stated in his evidence that
below the abdomen of the petitioner, there is no movement
and sensation in two legs…”
The Tribunal determined the disability at 70%, on the basis of medical opinion.
The Tribunal computed the compensation payable to the appellant on account
of the loss of income occasioned by the disability at Rs 9,72,000. However, on
the basis of the opinion of the doctor that the disability was to the extent of 70
per cent, the net amount was determined at Rs 6,80,400. After taking into
account the medical and other expenses, the Tribunal awarded a total
compensation of Rs 11,27,359 together with interest of 12 per cent per annum. 
3
4 Before the High Court, the insurer filed an appeal against the award of
the Tribunal. The appellant filed cross objections. The High Court has reduced
the interest component from 12 per cent per annum to 7.5 per cent per annum.
5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the
High Court has not assessed the compensation in a correct manner. There
was – it has been urged – no justification to compute the disability at 70 per
cent. The appellant was at the relevant time a load man engaged by a building
contractor. The nature of the disability involves a complete loss of sensation in
both the legs. Hence, it would not be possible for him to work as a load man.
Moreover it was urged that there was no justification to reduce the award of
interest to 7.5 per cent per annum and the award of the Tribunal on interest
should be maintained.
6 On the other hand it has been urged on behalf of the insurer that the High
Court was justified in maintaining the award of compensation since it was urged
on behalf of the appellant-claimant at the hearing before the High Court that the
Tribunal had granted just and reasonable compensation. Learned counsel
supported the judgment of the High Court.
7 Having perused the order passed by the High Court, we are not in
agreement with the submission of the insurer that there was a concession on
the part of the appellant before the High Court which must bind him. The
4
statement made by counsel for the appellant before the High Court was on
whether the Tribunal had granted just and reasonable compensation. Whether
in fact the compensation which has been granted is just and reasonable cannot
hence be construed as a matter of concession and it would not preclude the
appellant from raising a contest in these proceedings.
8 On perusing the record it is evident that the injuries sustained by the
appellant are indeed of a serious nature. As a result of the multiple fractures
sustained by him, the appellant has lost complete sensation below the
abdomen. Evidently he cannot work any more as load man. In these
circumstances, the assessment of disability at 70 per cent is incorrect. On a
realistic view of the matter, the nature of the disability must be regarded as
being complete. In the circumstances, we find no reason or justification for the
deduction of an amount of Rs 2,91,600 by the Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs
6,80,400). The amount so deducted must be restored and is rounded off to Rs
3,00,000. Moreover we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to interest
at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition.
9 The appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation
granted by the Tribunal by an amount of Rs 3,00,000. The appellant would be
entitled to interest @ 9 per cent per annum, on the total amount of
compensation (instead and in substitution of 7.5% per annum awarded by the
5
High Court). The differential amount shall be paid over to the appellant within a
period of eight weeks from today. There shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws - insurance laws - Motor Accident Claims = what is the Light Motor Vehicle & Light Motor Vehicle driving Licence is enough - “Light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in Section 2(21) read with Sections 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act 54 of 1994.” (Id at page 709) ; A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a roadroller, “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg and holder of a driving licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under Section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54 of 1994 and 28-3-2001 in the form.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 240 OF 2017
JAGDISH KUMAR SOOD ..Appellant
VERSUS
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.
AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal allowed a claim for compensation
filed by the third respondent. The claim arose from the death of the husband of
the claimant on 4 January 2009 as a result of an accident caused by a collision
with an offending truck. The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs 4,08,000
together with interest at 6 per cent per annum. In an appeal filed by the third
respondent the High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs 8,04,000.
Interest @ 7.5 per cent per annum was awarded on the enhanced
compensation.
REPORTABLE
2
2 The Tribunal absolved the insurer on the ground that the vehicle involved
in the accident was a Light Goods Vehicle. The driver had a licence to drive
the Light Motor Vehicle. The Tribunal held that in the absence of a specific
authorization to drive a transport vehicle, the liability could not be fastened on
the insurer. The Tribunal directed the insurer to pay in the first instance and
allowed it to recover the compensation from the driver and the owner. The
present appeal has been filed by the owner.
3 The High Court, while enhancing the compensation did not interfere with
the order of the Tribunal absolving the insurer.
4 The issue which arises before the Court is not res integra and is covered
by a judgment of a three Judges of this Court in Mukund Dewangan v Oriental
Insurance Company Limited1
in which it has been inter alia held as follows:
“60.1. “Light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of
the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight
prescribed in Section 2(21) read with Sections 2(15) and
2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the
definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment
Act 54 of 1994.” (Id at page 709)
“60.2. A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle
weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be
a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a
roadroller, “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500
kg and holder of a driving licence to drive class of “light
motor vehicle” as provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent
to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle

1
(2017) 14 SCC 663
3
weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or
tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight” of which does not
exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement
on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light
motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued
under Section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after
Amendment Act 54 of 1994 and 28-3-2001 in the form.” (Id
at page 710)
5 Having regard to the above position, the Civil Appeal will have to be
allowed.
6 The appeal is allowed, the order of the Tribunal absolving the insurer
shall accordingly stand set aside. The liability shall jointly and severally be
fastened on the insurer, in addition to the owner and driver. There shall be no
order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws - Banking Laws - Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) - Education Loan- Dwelling on Section 60 of the Transfer of the Property Act, this Court held that the right of redemption is available to a mortgagor unless it stands extinguished by an act of parties. The right of the mortgagor to redeem the property survives until there has been a transfer of the mortgagor’s interest by a registered instrument of sale. - the appellant failed to comply with the provisions of Section 13(8). The statute mandates that it is only where the dues of the secured creditor are tendered together with costs, charges and expenses before the date fixed for sale or transfer that the secured asset is not to be sold or transferred.= The stay was extended till 28 March 2016 by which date the appellant was to deposit an amount of Rs 7,00,000. The balance was required to be deposited by 30 April 2016. While appellant deposited an amount of Rs 7,00,000 with the bank, he failed to deposit the balance in accordance with the provisions of Section 13(8). The sale was confirmed, a sale certificate was issued and a registered sale deed was executed on 12 April 2016. The appellant failed to ensure compliance with Section 13(8). The right to redemption stands extinguished on the execution of the registered sale deed. ; The appellant, is however, entitled to a refund of his deposit of Rs 7,00,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit till payment. The bank has in its counter affidavit stated that it was at all times ready and willing to do so. The bank shall refund this amount of Rs 7,00,000 with interest at 9% per annum within 8 weeks. For the above reasons, save and except for the above direction to refund Rs 7,00,000 with interest, we find no merit in the appeal.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 000148 OF 2018
(@ Special Leave Petition (C )No 26428 of 2016)
DWARIKA PRASAD ..Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The appellant was a guarantor to a loan sanctioned for educational
purposes to one Jitendra Kumar. Under the letter of sanction dated 20 June
2009, there was a ‘repayment holiday’ of 24 months (comprised of a grace
period of 12 months and an additional 12 months) or six months after the
borrower obtained a job, whichever was earlier. Repayment was to commence
from 20 June 2011. In order to secure the liability, the appellant created an
equitable mortgage in respect of an immovable property bearing Khasra
Nos.185, 186 and 188, Central Doon, Dehradun. At the request of the
appellant, the period prescribed for repayment was extended by two periods
REPORTABLE
2
each of six months (29 June 2011 to 20 December 2011 and again upto 30
June 2012). The loan was not repaid. The account was classified as a nonperforming
asset on 3 September 2013. Corporation bank (the second
respondent) which had disbursed the loan initiated proceedings by issuing a
recall notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI
Act’) on 12 September 2013. Neither was a representation made nor was any
money deposited. The bank took symbolic possession on 14 February 2015.
The property was put to e-auction on 30 March 2015. No bid was received. A
second e-auction was scheduled on 30 January 2016. After the bank received
one bid in response to the auction, the appellant initially proposed to deposit
the amount of Rs 2,00,000 as against the dues of Rs.36 lakhs. This was not
acceptable. The proceedings before the DRT were listed on 1 February 2016
during the course of which the appellant stated that he would move a
redemption application within three days. The proceedings were adjourned to
4 February 2016. No stay was granted on the confirmation of the sale. The
sale was confirmed on 2 February 2016. The appellant moved a redemption
proposal on 3 February 2016. During the pendency of the proceedings before
the DRT, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court (Writ
(C ) 10877 of 2016). The following order was passed on 15 March 2016 by a
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner upon instructions states
that the petitioner is ready and wiling to deposit the entire loan
amount within a month. He further submits that on or before
28.3.2016 the petitioner will deposit Rs. 7,00,000/- and the
3
remaining amount as may be intimated by the Bank would be
deposited on or before 30.4.2016
Put up this case as a fresh case on 28.3.2016. By the said date
the petitioner will fill a supplementary affidavit annexing proof
of receipt of deposit of Rs. 7,00,000/- with the respondent
Bank.
The execution of the sale deed will remain stayed till
28.3.2016”
From the record it is not in dispute that the appellant paid the amount of Rs
7,00,000 by demand drafts of the State Bank of India. However, on 28 March
2016 the attention of the court was drawn to the fact that the appellant had
already initiated proceedings before the DRT. The objection raised by the bank
to the maintainability of the writ petition being noted, the appellant sought leave
to withdraw the writ petition and to pursue the proceedings initiated by him
before the DRT. Hence, on 28 March 2016, the following order was passed:
“Sri Shashi Dhar Sahai, learned counsel for the respondentBank
on the basis of instructions has brought to our notice that
petitioner who is a guarantor to the loan has already initiated
proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow for
the same relief which is being claimed in the writ petition and
same cause of action. An application for temporary relief has
also been moved before the Debt Recovery Tribunal,
Lucknow, which is pending.
Learned counsel for the petitioner when confronted with the
aforesaid facts sought leave of the Court to permit withdrawal
of the writ petition with the liberty to pursue before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal.
Prayer made is allowed.
Writ petition stands dismissed as withdrawn.”
4
After the dismissal of the writ petition, the sale certificate was issued on 5 April,
2016 in favour of the auction purchaser. After the confirmation of the sale the
bank executed a registered sale deed against the receipt of a total consideration
of Rs 54,41,500. The auction purchasers (respondent nos 3 and 4) took
possession of the property.
2 The appellant filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court
contending that since he was ready and willing to clear the outstanding dues of
the bank, he has a right of redemption to the mortgaged property and that the
auction sale without considering his offer for redemption was illegal and void.
The Division Bench of the High Court rejected the writ petition, placing reliance
on the provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. The High Court held
that the exercise of the right of redemption is permissible before the execution
of the sale in favour of the auction purchaser. In this view, once the sale was
complete and was registered, it was not open to the appellant to exercise the
equity of redemption. The High Court has relied on the judgment of this Court
in Mathew Varghese v M. Amritha Kumar1
.
3 The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that
prior to the confirmation of the sale, the appellant voluntarily offered to defray
an amount of Rs 36,00,000 towards claim of the bank and indicated his
willingness to make an initial deposit of Rs 6,00,000. Though before the DRT

1
(2014) 5 SCC 610
5
the bank had on 1 February 2016 stated that the appellant should apply for
redemption, when the application was moved on 3 February 2016 it was
arbitrarily rejected. Thereafter in pursuance of the order of the High Court dated
15 March 2016, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs 7,00,000 and was ready
to deposit the balance within 30 days, the time stipulated in the order dated 15
March 2016. Hence it was urged that there was no reason or justification for
the bank to issue a certificate of sale on 12 April 2016. The fact that the
appellant did not obtain an interim order before the DRT was not a circumstance
within his control and the appellant demonstrated his willingness by making a
part payment of Rs 7,00,000.
4 On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the bank
and for the auction purchasers supported the order of the High Court. It was
urged that despite moving the DRT, the appellant sought relief before the
Allahabad High Court in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. After
the High Court passed an order on 15 March 2016 recording the statement that
the appellant would deposit an amount of Rs 7,00,000 by 28 March 2016 and
the balance by 30 April 2016 the writ petition was withdrawn on 28 March 2016
with liberty to pursue the proceedings before the Tribunal. At no stage did the
Tribunal interdict the issuance of a certificate of sale. The sale certificate was
issued and was followed by the registration of the sale deed in April 2016. The
bank had advertised the proposed sale by auction and followed all requisite
procedure under law. The appellant failed to comply with the provisions of
6
Section 13(8). Having failed to do so, the appellant cannot assert an equity of
redemption upon the completion of the sale and the registration of the sale
deed.
5 Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act provides as follows:
“(8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all
costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered
to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for
sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or
transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step shall
be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured asset.”
These provisions have fallen for interpretation before this Court in Mathew
Varghese (supra). Dwelling on Section 60 of the Transfer of the Property Act,
this Court held that the right of redemption is available to a mortgagor unless it
stands extinguished by an act of parties. The right of the mortgagor to redeem
the property survives until there has been a transfer of the mortgagor’s interest
by a registered instrument of sale. Applying these principles in the context of
the SARFAESI Act this Court held as follows:
“39. When we apply the above principles stated with
reference to Section 60 of the T.P. Act in respect of a
secured interest in a secured asset in favour of the secured
creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the
relevant Rules applicable, under Section 13(1), a free hand
is given to a secured creditor to resort to a sale without the
intervention of the Court or Tribunal. However, under
Section 13(8), it is clearly stipulated that the mortgagor, i.e.
the borrower, who is otherwise called as a debtor, retains
his full right to redeem the property by tendering all the
dues to the secured creditor at any time before the date
fixed for sale or transfer. Under Sub-section (8) of Section
13, as noted earlier, the secured asset should not be sold
7
or transferred by the secured creditor when such tender is
made by the borrower at the last moment before the sale
or transfer. The said Sub-section also states that no further
step should be taken by the secured creditor for transfer or
sale of that secured asset. We find no reason to state that
the principles laid down with reference to Section 60 of the
T.P. Act, which is general in nature in respect of all
mortgages, can have no application in respect of a secured
interest in a secured asset created in favour of a secured
creditor, as all the above-stated principles apply in all fours
in respect of a transaction as between the debtor
and secured creditor under the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act”.
6 In the present case, the appellant failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 13(8). The statute mandates that it is only where the dues of the secured
creditor are tendered together with costs, charges and expenses before the date
fixed for sale or transfer that the secured asset is not to be sold or transferred.
The appellant was aware of the proceedings initiated by the bank for asserting
its right to recover its dues by selling the property. The appellant moved the
DRT in Securitization Application 176 of 2015. During the pendency of those
proceedings, orders were passed by the Tribunal on 1 February 2016 and 3
February 2016. The appellant moved the Allahabad High Court which by its
order dated 9 March 2016 restrained the bank and the auction purchaser from
executing the sale deed until 15 March 2016. The stay was extended till 28
March 2016 by which date the appellant was to deposit an amount of Rs
7,00,000. The balance was required to be deposited by 30 April 2016. While
appellant deposited an amount of Rs 7,00,000 with the bank, he failed to deposit
the balance in accordance with the provisions of Section 13(8). Even after the
writ proceedings before the High Court was withdrawn, the appellant did not
8
deposit the balance due together with the costs, charges and expenses. The
sale was confirmed, a sale certificate was issued and a registered sale deed
was executed on 12 April 2016. The appellant failed to ensure compliance with
Section 13(8). The right to redemption stands extinguished on the execution of
the registered sale deed. This is also the view which has been expressed in the
judgment in Mathew Varghese (supra).
7 The appellant, is however, entitled to a refund of his deposit of Rs
7,00,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit till payment.
The bank has in its counter affidavit stated that it was at all times ready and
willing to do so. The bank shall refund this amount of Rs 7,00,000 with interest
at 9% per annum within 8 weeks. For the above reasons, save and except for
the above direction to refund Rs 7,00,000 with interest, we find no merit in the
appeal. The appeal shall accordingly stand disposed of. There shall be no order
as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018