LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Monday, February 12, 2018

service matter - promotion - absence of allegations that Junior promoted - his claim not maintainable now - It is also not correct that persons promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral were below him in that merit. This claim of the appellant stands disproved by the documents produced by the respondents. It is also pertinent to point out that all those who were promoted were senior to the appellant and it is not a case where any junior has superseded the appellant. These are the considerations which influence us not to interdict the conclusion arrived by the AFT. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the AFT.= The work record of the appellant shows that he is a very good officer. It also reflects that from time to time he has been given important assignments which he has been able to accomplish and discharge to the satisfaction of his superiors. It is because of these reasons he has earned commendations insofar as performance of his duties is concerned. - he has proved to be a useful officer to the Navy. Such a person deserves to get what is legitimately due to him. We, therefore, hope that the respondents would keep in mind the aforesaid factors and give him the promotion in his turn without delaying the same and his promising career would not be put in jeopardy.

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1843 of 2018
(@ Diary No. 36081 of 2017)
COMMODORE P.K. BANERJEE .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Leave to appeal granted.
2) This appeal is preferred by Commodore P.K. Banerjee under Section 32
of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Act’) questioning the correctness and legality of the judgment and order
dated September 14, 2017 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal (for
short ‘AFT’) in O.A. No. 392 of 2014 and order dated December 10,
2017 in M.A. No. 1219 of 2017 filed in O.A. No. 392 of 2014 passed by
the AFT.
3) Vide Order dated September 14, 2017, the AFT has dismissed the O.A.
No. 392 of 2014 which was instituted by the appellant questioning the
2
gradings given to him in Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of some of
the years recorded by his superiors which, according to him, had
adversely affected his career progression by denying him the promotion
to the next rank, i.e. Rear Admiral in Indian Navy. Insofar as the Order
dated October 12, 2017 passed in M.A. No. 1219 of 2017 in O.A. No.
392 of 2014 is concerned, by means of this Order, the AFT has rejected
leave to appeal the judgement dated September 14, 2017.
4) The appellant claims that right from his initial training of Cadet days
through the junior and middle rank appointments till promotion to the
rank of Captain on August 30, 2004 has always been amongst the top
few in his batch. Litmus Test for any Naval Officer is his Sea Command
of a warship and the appellant happens to be the only officer in his entire
‘original batch’ who commanded the most premium ships in every rank
(as a Lt. Cdr., Commander and Captain) with distinction, and without
any incidents/accidents.
5) The appellant also claimed that being at the top of his batch, the
appellant got command of the most premium and at that time, the latest
Talwar class ship, INS Tabar in December, 2007 and performed
outstandingly in this command as well. Even in the Sea Board Merit List
in mid, 2007, the appellant was at the top of his batch that resulted in his
getting command of INS Tabar, but things went wrong after this Sea
Command of the appellant. However, very severe Adverse Remarks
3
inserted by the appellant’s Reviewing Officer (RO) in the ACR in 2009,
that were not communicated by the RO as per Navy Rules, and in total
contradiction to the Report rendered by the Initiating Officer (IO) quietly
brought an end to the promising career of the appellant who was not
even aware of such illegalities (that resulted in the appellant becoming
the last officer in Overall Order of Merit (OOM) amongst his original
batch who commanded ships in the rank of Captain) until the appellant
missed his promotion to the rank of Rear Admiral in Promotion Board
01/2012 in April 2012.
6) It is the case of the appellant that as the Commanding Officer of INS
Tabar – a frontline stealth warship of Western Naval Command, the
appellant was deployed in the Gulf of Aden in end October 2008. This
was the appellant’s fourth command of a warship in his career, the last,
i.e., the third command being of INS Kulish – a frontline warship of the
Indian Navy where the ship was nominated as the best performing ship
of the Eastern Fleet earning an excellent Report in 2004 from his then
Fleet Commander FOCEF (Initiating Officer) who wrote in the ACR – “A
professional and extremely effective CO who ran one of the best ships
of the Fleet”. This ACR was backed up by the Appellant’s then
Reviewing Officer, the FOCINC Eastern Naval Command who wrote —
“The ship has done very well under command of Benerjee”.
7) On October 27, 2008, INS Tabar returned to Mumbai after patrolling duty
4
in the Persian Gulf and was deployed for anti-piracy operations off the
coast of Somalia at one day’s notice after Diwali on October 29, 2008.
The appellant boasts about the fact that 10 other major warships were in
the harbour and in prime operational state and could have been
deployed for the task but were not, speaks about the trust the Indian
Navy had on the Commanding Officer and crew of INS Tabar. The
anti-piracy operation was the first instance where the Indian Navy would
be operating in International waters far away from the country and in
hostile environment. The ship proceeded with despatch to the
operational area and within a month’s patrol duty, managed to save the
Indian merchant ship MV Jag Arnav and a Saudi Arabian merchant ship
MV NCC Tihama on November 11, 2008 from getting hijacked by Somali
Pirates and neutralised a suspect pirate mother vessel to great
accolades all over.
8) Stating further about his laudable work, the appellant states that the
performance of the ship was also lauded by the Indian Navy and the
Fleet Commander (Western Fleet) in his Reporting as the appellant’s IO
in the ACR (10.12.2007 to 28.11.2008) gave an Outstanding Report and
recommended the appellant for the most prestigious Second Sea
Command reserved only for the best Commanding Officers of the Fleet.
The new Fleet Commander who had also overseen INS Tabar’s maiden
anti-piracy operations off Somalia as the Deputy of the FOC-in-C,
5
Western Naval Command in the capacity of RO’s Chief of Staff of
Headquarters Western Naval Command recommended the appellant for
the award of a gallantry award Shaurya Chakra. The appellant’s ship
INS Tabar was at sea for over 200 days in 2008 without a single
incident/accident or mishap, in contrast to what Indian Navy Ships
actually perform.
9) According to the appellant, he is dismayed to find that despite all of the
above, when INS Tabar returned to Mumbai after its anti-piracy mission,
not even the customary debrief was conducted by the FOCINC (Flag
Officer Commanding-in-Chief) West or the CNS (Chief of the Naval
Staff) of the operation (a standard operating procedure in the Navy),
even when this was a first of its kind operation for the Navy. On the face
of it, the Reviewing Officer (‘RO’) personally complimented the ship
captained by the appellant on November 19, 2008 (almost at the end of
the deployment) in a Signal stating “that was well executed, you have
done the WNC and Navy proud”, yet less than two months later the RO
in the ACR pertaining to the very same operational deployment in Gulf of
Aden and in the period in which an outstanding report was given by the
IO, wrote vague, unsubstantiated adverse remarks in Section V of the
appellants ACR, stating – “On more than one occasion during this
deployment, the officer displayed indecisiveness and had to be backseat
driven” and “I would not rate Banerjee an operational guy, best suited for
6
desk assignments”— These remarks did not cite any incident which
illustrated these adverse remarks and were at total variance to IO’s
Outstanding Remarks. The RO also simultaneously downgraded the
Numerical Gradings in the ACR given by the IO — by 0.3 marks each in
PQ (Performance Qualities) and in PP (Promotion Potential) i.e., a total
of 0.6 marks.
10) The grievance of the appellant is that breaking all rules of
communication of Adverse Remarks to the Reportee (Appellant), the RO
sent the ACR to the Senior Reviewing Officer, i.e., CNS for his report.
The CNS himself, instead of following laid down rules and procedures
for communication of Adverse Remarks and returning the ACR to the
RO, commented that the ship had performed poorly and agreed with the
RO’s remarks by writing, “A poor report from an operational ship by the
RO — at some variance with the IO’s remarks. ....Going by the RO’s
judgments, the officer deserves 7.5/7.6”, thus, abetting the illegal act of
the RO.
11) These adverse remarks and the consequential numerical
downgrading were not communicated to the appellant in contravention
of para 0410(d) of Navy Order (Special) 05/2005, as well as the settled
position of law this Hon’ble Court has reiterated in Dev Dutt v. Union of
India and Others1
 , then in Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar v. Union of India and
others2
 and again in Prabhu Dayal Khandelwal v. Chairman, U.P.S.C. &
1 (2009) 8 SCC 725
2 (2009) 16 SCC 146
7
Ors.3
12) The appellant also asserts that in all subsequent postings also he
performed exceptionally well and in each and every case where the IO,
RO or SRO did not have access to the appellant’s dossier (previous
ACR’s), they gave the appellant outstanding reports. Yet, the Next
Senior Reviewing Officer (‘NSRO’)/CNS, who had access to the
appellant’s dossier, numerically downgraded the ACR having been
influenced by the previous ACR’s numerical downgrading.
13) The appellant has endeavoured to demonstrate the same by
stating his gradings given by different officers, i.e., from IO to RO to
SRO/NSRO with his own remarks, in a tabulated form which is as under:
SL. Rank Appoint
ment
Period
of
Report
Gradin
g
(P.P./P.
Q.)
IO
RO
SRO/N
SRO
ACR
REMA
RKS
Profile
1. Captain Comma
nding
OfficerINS
Tabar
10.12.2
007
To
28.11.2
008
7.7/7.8 7.4/7.5 7.5/7.6 IO
rated
highest
among
st over
a
dozen
Fleet
Captain
s,
recom
mende
d for
Second
Sea
Comma
nd
reserve
d for
the
best,
Adverse Remarks
resulted in fixing
faultily arrived
profile at 7.5/7.6
3 (2015) 14 SCC 427
8
and for
prestigi
ous
NDC
Course.
RO
inserte d
Severe
Advers e
Remark
s and
not
commu
ni-cate
d as
per
Rules.
His
exact
Remark
s – “On
more
than
one
occasio n
during
this
deployment,
the
officer
display
ed
inde-cis
iveness
and
had to
be
backse
atdrive
n” & “I
would
not rate
Banerje
e and
operati
onal
guy,
best
suited
for best
assignments”
at total
varianc
e to
IO’s
Remark
9
s
SRO/N
SRO
wrote –
“A
poor
report
from
an
operati
onal
ship by
the RO
—at
some
varianc
e with
the
IO’s
remark
s...Goi
ng by
the
RO’s
judgm
ents.
The
officer
deserv
es
7.5/7.6

2. Cmde Princip
al
Director
Naval
TYraini
ng
(PDNT)
in NHQ
02.01.2
009
To01.0
6.2009
7.6/7.6
(Here
IO had
access
to the
appella
nts
dossier
7.6/7.6 7.6/7.6 IO was
custodi
an of
Dossier
s,
Appella
nts
Appoint
er and
Membe
r
Secreta
ry of
Promoti
on
Boards,
knew
the
Thresh
olds.
He
gave
Numeri
cal
Gradin
gs in
tune
with
7.6/7.6
10
Faulty
Profile
– he
did not
factor
the
actual
task
delivere
d
3. Cmde Naval
Adviser
, High
Commi
ssion
London
31.08.2
009
To
28.02.2
010
8.0/8.0
(1st CR
In
London )
--
(no
RO)
7.9/7.9 7.6/7.7 IO to
SRO –
Outstan
ding
Report
by
DCNS
was
brought
down
by
NSRO/
CNS to
match
with
Faulty
Profile.
SRO/C
NS
wrote –
“Concu
r with
pen
picture.
Howev
er, the
numeri
cal
assess
ment is
too
high
and
has
been
modera
ted
keeping
the
profile
in
perspe
ctive
This is
despite
the fact
the
Head of
Mission ,
7.6/7.7
11
London
had
Report
ed on
me on
IN
Form
475-D
for the
same
period
and
sent it
directly
to the
SRO/D
CNS –
thus
making
SRO’s
Reporti
ng
more
objectiv
e and
without
any
bias of
previou s
knowle
dge of
the
applica
nt.
4. Cmde 01.03.2
010
To
08.08.2
010
7.9/
7.9
7.7/
7.7`
All
subseq
uent
CRs of
NA
London
that
were
rated
excelle
nt by
SRO
were
downgr
aded
by the
same
CNS to
match
with the
faulty
profile
– all
becaus
e of the
uncom
muicate
7.7/7.7
12
d
Advers e
Remark
s in
ACR of
INS
Tabar
in 2008
that
was
against
Rule in
Navy
and
illegal
In 475
D ACR
by
Head of
Mission ,
London
quantifi
ed with
13
attribut
es in
2010
and
direct
First
Hand
inputs
of Head
of
Mission
availabl
e with
SRO/D
CNS
for
each
period
of ACR
Reporti
ng
5. Cmde 09.08.2
010
To
04.02.2
011
` 7.0/ 7.9 7.7/
7.7
7.7/7.7
6. Cmde 01.03.2
011
To
7.8/
7.8
7.7/
7.8
7.7/7.8
13
27.01.2
012
NOTE : It is very clear from that the uncommunicated Adverse Remarks in
2007-2008 ACR of INS Tabar by the RO not lowered in Appellants profile, but it had
a direct cascading effect on all his subsequent ACRs.”
14) That analogy that is sought to be drawn by the appellant is that
severe adverse remarks which were given by his RO for the
period10.12.2007 to 28.11.2008 had a cascading effect in future as well
inasmuch as though his IOs, who had been giving very high grading,
each time the same is toned down and downgraded by the SRO/NSRO,
influenced by the adverse remarks recorded in his ACR for the period
10.12.2007 to 28.11.2008.
15) After seeking departmental redressal by making grievances to the
higher authorities for expunging the severe adverse remarks and for
upgrading his ACRs which did not result in any positive outcome, the
appellant approached the AFT in the form of OA No. 392 of 2014. The
AFT after hearing the matter finally agreed with the submission of the
appellant insofar as it pertained to the adverse remarks for the period
10.12.2007 to 28.11.2008, and expunged the said adverse remarks.
However, a partial relief only to the aforesaid extent is granted by the
AFT and the other reliefs which were sought in respect of numerical
grading given to the appellant for the subsequent period have been
declined with the observations that adverse remarks for the aforesaid
14
period had no bearing on the numerical grading given for the period
thereafter and it did not have any adverse effect while considering his
case for next higher rank. The discussion is encapsulated in para 18 of
the judgement which was reads as under:
“18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the original records. We are of the opinion that the
applicant’s impugned Annual Confidential Report for the period
10.12.2007 to 28.11.2008 has ‘Adverse Remarks’ in the pen
picture by the Reviewing Officer (Respondent no. 5) in the form
of comments like ‘indecisive’ ‘back seat driver’ and ‘not an
operational guy’ and, therefore, the same should have been
communicated to the Ratee in accordance with the provisions
of Navy order 5/2005. Since it has not been done, the same
thus needs to be set aside and the applicant is entitled a fresh
consideration for promotion to the rank of Rear Admiral. We
have also perused the reports of the period 29.08.2009 to
30.09.2012 and find (sic.) that these have been
initiated/reviewed by different Initiating, Reviewing and Senior
Reviewing Officers and are in consonance with the ratee’s
profile before and after that period. The argument that one
particular confidential report has affected all successive reports
by all Initiating and Reviewing Officers does not stand its
ground and is dismissed as mere apprehensions of the
applicant. It is clear from the records of No. 1 Selection Board
held in 2012, 2013 and 2014 produced before us in which the
applicant was screened, that he has not been empanelled
purely on his comparative merit in these boards. The applicant
trying to clean up his entire profile since 2008 when the
impugned adverse report was endorsed by the Reviewing
Officer in his confidential report cannot be allowed. It is,
however, opined that the Indian Navy should have a relook at
their appraisal/moderation system, especially when the
Reporting Officers from other services/organisations have been
involved in assessing the ratee’s as Initiating/Reviewing
Officers. We also feel that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction into
adjudicating on who should get gallantry/distinguished awards,
nor do we intend delving into the same.”


16) Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, made a very passionate plea, with all vehemence at his
15
command, to the effect that the aforesaid approach of the AFT was
clearly erroneous inasmuch as recording of adverse remarks for the
period 10.12.2007 to 28.11.2008 had definite cascading effect insofar as
reports of later period from 29.08.2009 to 30.09.2012 is concerned. He
submitted that the manner in which ACRs were recorded was clear
evidence to demonstrate the official biasness of SRO/NSRO, went by
the so-called pen-picture and kept on downgrading the ACR of the
appellant even when, on an independent assessment of appellant’s
work and conduct in those periods by I.O., all the I.Os. had given the
appellant higher numerical grading. Therefore, the AFT could not
dismiss the argument of the appellant by terming it as ‘mere
apprehensions of the applicant’. In order to demonstrate the same, Mr.
Bhushan pointed out the following features from the table already
reproduced above:
(a)Insofar as period of 02.01.2009 to 01.06.2009 is concerned,
numerical grading of 7.6/7.6 is occasioned because of the reasons
that the IO who had given this grading was influenced by appellant’s
dossier which was in his possession, though he was not supposed to
peep into that. Otherwise, for subsequent periods, I.Os./R.Os. had
given much higher grading.
(b)For the period from 31.08.2009 to 28.02.2010, I.O. had given
outstanding report by giving marks of 8.0/8.0 and even the SRO
16
recorded the grading of 7.9/7.9. Likewise, for subsequent period, i.e.,
01.03.2010 to 08.08.2010 and 09.08.2010 to 04.02.2011, SRO had
given the grading of 7.9/7.9 in each of these periods. However, in
respect of all the aforesaid three periods, NSRO downgraded the
appellant by lowering the marks to 7.6/7.7, 7.7/7.7 and 7.7/7.7
respectively. This was done in spite of the fact that NSRO concurred
with the pen-picture/profile of the appellant. However, only on the
ground that numerical assessment was too high could not be a valid
excuse to lower it down by taking umbrage of the so-called
moderation and recording that it “has been moderated keeping the
profile in perspective”.
(c) Mr. Bhushan also submitted that the appellant had been an
outstanding officer who always earned high commendation and
praise for his outstanding performance from the very beginning and
even in earlier years, i.e., period prior to 10.12.2007, he had been
earning outstanding grading. Therefore, there was no reason for the
AFT, argued the learned counsel, to maintain the aforesaid final rating
recorded by the NSRO and it should have been brought at par with
that of SRO.
17) Proceeding on that basis, related submission of Mr. Bhushan was
that even in the merit list prepared for promotion to the higher rank, the
aforesaid lowering down of the grading had adverse impact thereupon.
17
The appellant, who was at number 1 in the merit list of 2007 was slipped
down to the position at No. 22 which resulted in denial of promotion of
the appellant to the post of Rear Admiral. It was submitted that all the
officers who were promoted to the said post by the Promotion Board in
January, 2012 were below in merit in the year 2007 and they stole
march over the appellant because of lowering down his numerical
grading during aforesaid period. He pointed out that the Promotion
Board examines the ACR of the last five years and on the basis of his
ACRs of the aforesaid period, his ACR average came down to 15.32.
He further pointed out that if the marks given by SRO during the
aforesaid period are taken into consideration, instead of NSRO, the ACR
average of the appellant for the aforesaid period would be 15.70 and in
this manner he would rank on the top of the merit list, which he
demonstrated from the following table:
“The Order of Merit (OOM) worked out at present for Appellant’s Batch including 5%
Value Judgement Marks awarded by Promotion Board 01/2012 (page 178 of
Annexure A-18 of Petition) is as follows:
Sl. No. NAME* ACR
AVERAG
E OUT
OF
(9+9=18
MARKS)
WEIGHTE
D
ACT
MARKS
(95%)
VALUE
JUDGEM
ENT
MARKS
WEIGHT
ED
AVERAG
E
ORDER
OF
MERIT
(OOM)
REMARK
S
1. Officer 1 15.57 82.18 4.5 86.68 1 *Serials
1 to 8
promoted
to Rear
Admiral
by the
Promotio
n Board
01/2012
in May
2012.
2. Officer 2 15.52 81.91 4.4 86.31 2
18
3. Officer 3 15.50 81.81 4.3 86.11 3
4. Officer 4 15.50 81.81 4.3 86.11 4
5. Officer 5 15.49 81.75 4.3 86.05 5
6. Officer 6 15.47 81.65 4.3 85.95 6
7. Officer 7 15.44 81.49 4.3 85.79 7
8. Officer 8 15.40 81.28 4.4 85.68 8
9. Officer 9 15.41 81.33 4.1 85.43 9 #The
ACR
Average
Marks of
Appellant
in Sl.10
is worked
out by
average
of his
SRO/NS
RO
(CNS)
marks
from
Annexur
e A-4
(Pages
58-59):1
5.1+15.2
+15.3+15
.4+15.4+
15.5
=91.9
divided
by
6=15.32
10. Appellant
(Earlier)
15.31# 80.86 3.1 83.96 22
Revised ACR Average Marks of 15.70 obtained in Para 1 above inserted in the Original PB
01/2012 results in Fresh OOM of Appellant
10A. Appellant
(Fresh)
15.70 82.86 4.5@ 87.36 Ahead of
OOM
This
jump in
Appellant
’s
Revised
OOM to
No. 1, is
also in
tune with
Captain’s
Sea
Board
Merit List
of Batch
in
mid-2007
, after
which his
career
was
destroye
d due to
illegal
uncomm
unicated
Adverse
19
Remarks
by
RO/SOR
in
Impugne
d ACR.
@ In reality, the appellant could have received higher than 4.5 marks in 5% Value
Judgment by PB Members if the Gallantry Award and associated recognition legitimately
due in preceding 5 years before PB 01/2012, during his Sea Command of INS Tabar in
Impugned Act, which were deliberately denied by the RO (just to remain in sync with his
“Now Illegal” Adverse Remarks that have since been admitted by Navy at last, and finally
expunged by Hon’ble AFT).
18) Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the respondents, refuted the aforesaid submissions and defended
the order of the AFT on the ground that the AFT had formed a correct
opinion after perusal of the original records, which fact is specifically
recorded in the impugned order. His submission was that even if the
adverse remark in the report for the period December 10, 2007 to
November 28, 2008 was expunged, it had no bearing on the final ACRs
recorded for the subsequent period by NSRO. To buttress this
submission, the learned ASG argued that fundamental premise/ basis on
which the case was built by the appellant, itself was wrong. In this
behalf, he pointed out the following factors:
a) The ACRs of the appellant for the period prior to the year 2007 were
not Outstanding/Excellent or with higher numerical grading as
contended by him. In support, he produced the ACR record of the
appellant right from January 01, 1986 and submitted that the overall
record of the appellant would show that he was getting the same kind
of grading which was given to him for the disputed period.
20
b) It was also wrong on the part of the appellant to state that in the Merit
List of the year 2007 the appellant was placed at S.No.1. The
learned ASG produced Weighted Merit List – First Sea Command
Merit of 2007, as per which the appellant was placed at S.No.5.
c) In the Promotion Board 2/04 (Aug 04), which was constituted for
promotions from Cdr. to Captain and as per which the appellant was
selected for the said post, his rank was No.9 and as on that date, as
per OOM (Weighted Merit), he was at No.11.
Therefore, his claim that he was always getting top rank in
the Merit List was not factually correct.
d) Mr. Maninder Singh refuted the appellant’s submission that for the
period January 02, 2009 to June 01, 2009 giving grading of 7.6/7.6 by
the IO was for the reason that he had access to the dossier of the
appellant, by referring to the instructions for rendering Confidential
Reports of the Naval Officers issued Vide Navy Order (Special)
05/2005 which, inter alia, provided as under:
“0405. Performance in Appointment. An officer is to be
assessed in the appointment actually held by him/her during
the period under report and, as far as possible, in comparison
with other officers of same rank and seniority. The
assessment should not be influenced by any incident
prior to the period of the report.”
His submission was that the aforesaid instructions are strictly
adhered to and, therefore, the IO could not have seen the ACR
record of the appellant for the earlier period and it was nothing but
21
figment of imagination of the appellant.
19) According to the learned ASG, the real reason for giving specific
grading by the NSRO was that he had moderated the same keeping in
mind the overall profile of the appellant, which is specifically recorded as
well, as admitted by the appellant himself. It was argued that this
moderation is done as per Chapter 25 of the Regulations for the Navy,
1965 Part-I, which contains unique system of ‘Performance Appraisal
Review Board’ (PARB). As per Navy Instructions 20/90 regarding the
said Chapter, amended on January 01, 2000, the provision regarding
PARB reads thus:
“Performance Appraisal Review – (1) All reports on Noval
Officers of the rank of Lt. Cdr. and Cdr. will undergo a
‘Performance Appraisal Review Board’ (PARB) with a view to
analyse instances of wide deviation from their previous overall
career profile. The reporting/reviewing officers will be
required to support very high/low marking in the remarks
column. While reviewing the reports at Naval Headquarters,
numerical grades may be suitably moderated on the
recommendations of the PARB with the approval of the Chief
of the Naval Staff so as to bring them in tune with officers’
demonstrated past performance. CNS will lay down detailed
guidelines to be followed for this purpose.
(2) A similar review of the records of all naval officers of the
rank of Capt. And above will be undertaken and gradings
suitably moderated by the Chief of the Naval Staff as Senior
Reviewing Officer/Next Senior Reviewing Officer.”
20) Based on the aforesaid, contention of the learned ASG was that
the purpose of PARB is to analyse instances of wide deviation from their
22
previous overall career profile. Thus, wherever it is found that the
Reporting/Review Officer has given a very high or very low grading, as
compared to the previous overall career profile, PARB recommends
such ranking to be suitably moderated with the approval of the Chief of
the Naval Staff so as to bring them in tune with Officers’ demonstrated
past performance. According to him, keeping in view the overall profile,
the grading was, thus, moderated by NSRO, who was nonelse but the
Chief of the Naval Staff himself. There was no question of doubting his
bona fides nor such a case was pleaded by the appellant.
21) Insofar as promotion of the appellant to the rank of Rear Admiral is
concerned, he submitted that the case of the appellant was considered
by the Promotion Board No.1A (X/GS)/2012 for the first time as Fresh
Look case along with all his batch mates of Select List Year 2004. He
could not make the grade being much below the threshold. He was
reconsidered by subsequent two Promotion Boards as R-1 and R-2 case
by Promotion Board 1A(X/GS)/2013 and Promotion Board
1A(X/GS)/2014. However, the officer could not be empanelled due to
his lower overall comparative merit vis-a-vis those selected. Aggrieved
by this, the appellant had put up representations, i.e. Redressal of
Grievance (ROG) dated August 22, 2012 against his non-promotion,
which was examined by the Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defene
(Navy), Redressal and Complaint Advisory Board (RACAB) and
23
disposed of by the Chief of the Naval Staff) vide reply letter No.
RS/7831/ROG/ OA&R/12 dated January 31, 2013. The appellant had
preferred his 2nd ROG dated October 18, 2013 on similar issues which
was examined at the Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence
(Navy) and Competent Authority of Ministry of Defence had disposed of
the same vide Ministry of Defence letter No. 93/US(P)/D(N-II)/2014
dated October 07, 2014 and forwarded vide IHQ MoD (N) letter
RS/7869/ROG/HD/OA&R/13 dated October 10, 2014. His 3rd ROG
dated January 16, 2017 directly addressed to the Defence Secretary
and the Minister of Defence had also been examined and was found to
be devoid of merit and was rejected by the Ministry of Defence vide
Order No. 93/US(P)/ D(N-II)/2014 dated November 29, 2017 and
forwarded by IGQ MoD (N) letter RS/7831/ROG/OA&R/12 dated
December 06, 2017. It was, thus, argued that the grievance of the
appellant as regards his non-promotion has been considered by the
Competent Authority on three different occasions and the same was
rejected as he had lower comparative merit.
22) Therefore, argued the learned ASG, that going by the overall
profile of the appellant, the AFT has rightly held that no prejudice is
caused to the appellant.
23) After considering the respective submissions and going through
the records produced before us, we find the order of the AFT without
24
blemish and there is no justification to interfere with the same. The AFT
has rightly held that one particular adverse report (which stands
expunged) has not affected the succeeding Reports.
24) No doubt, for the periods from January 02, 2009 to January 27,
2012, the appellant has been given higher numerical grading by the IO
and even by the NSRO. However, the NSRO moderated the same
keeping in mind the overall profile of the appellant. We have gone
through the ACRs of the appellant and find force in the submission of the
respondents in this behalf as the ACRs of the disputed period recorded
by NSRO are in tune with the ACRs of the appellant recorded in the
previous years. It is to be kept in mind that for the period in question,
the appellant was on deputation and there may be a possibility of
recording higher grading by the IOs during that period. It is significant to
mention that for the earlier period even the IOs have not given such high
grading. System of PARB which is unique to Navy has been introduced
precisely for achieving such moderation. The Chief of the Naval Staff, in
his capacity of SRO/NSRO, is competent to undertake review of
Confidential Report gradings of Captain/Cmde. and above rank officers
for moderation of grades, if required. This is provided in NI 01/2000,
contents of which are reproduced as under:
“(i) All reports on Naval Officers of the rank of Lt. Cdr. and
Cdr. will undergo a ‘Performance Appraisal Review’ at Naval
Headquarters by a Performance Appraisal Review Board
(PARB) with a view to analyse instance of wide deviations
from their previous overall career profile. The reporting/
25
reviewing officers will be required to support very high/ low
markings in the remarks column. While reviewing the reports
at Naval Headquarters, numerical grades may be suitably
moderated on the recommendations of the PARB with the
approval of the Chief of the Naval Staff so as to bring them in
tune with officers’ demonstrated past performance. CNS will
lay down detailed guidelines to be followed for this purpose.
(ii) A similar review of the reports of all naval officers of the
rank of Capt. and above will be undertaken and gradings
suitably moderated by the Chief of the Naval Staff as Senior
Reviewing Officer/Next Senior Reviewing Officer.”
25) No doubt, the appellant is a good officer, which can be seen from
his performance, commendations which he earned from time to time and
the coveted postings which he has been given. However, his assertion
that prior to 2009 he was at No.1 in the Merit List is not correct.
26) It is also not correct that persons promoted to the rank of Rear
Admiral were below him in that merit. This claim of the appellant stands
disproved by the documents produced by the respondents. It is also
pertinent to point out that all those who were promoted were senior to
the appellant and it is not a case where any junior has superseded the
appellant. These are the considerations which influence us not to
interdict the conclusion arrived by the AFT. We are, therefore, not
inclined to interfere with the judgment of the AFT.
27) At the same time, before we part, we deem it necessary to make
some observations.
28) The work record of the appellant shows that he is a very good
officer. It also reflects that from time to time he has been given
26
important assignments which he has been able to accomplish and
discharge to the satisfaction of his superiors. It is because of these
reasons he has earned commendations insofar as performance of his
duties is concerned. May be he has nurtured the impression that he is
the best, and that is not factually correct. However, it also cannot be
denied that he has proved to be a useful officer to the Navy. Such a
person deserves to get what is legitimately due to him. We, therefore,
hope that the respondents would keep in mind the aforesaid factors and
give him the promotion in his turn without delaying the same and his
promising career would not be put in jeopardy.
29) The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 12, 2018.

when the main offence under sec.498 A was acquitted - consequential offience under sec.201 not maintainable on ground of not giving intimation of unnatural death and as such no postmortem was conducted = the mere fact that the deceased allegedly died an unnatural death could not be sufficient to bring home a charge under Section 201 of the IPC. Unless the prosecution was able to establish that the accused person knew or had reason to believe that an offence has been committed and had done something causing the offence of commission of evidence to disappear, he cannot be convicted. = The appellant has been acquitted of the offence under Section 498A by the High Court, and rightly so.- There is no such allegation against the appellant. The last rites of the deceased were performed in the presence of the members of her family. They had no suspicion at that time of the commission of any offence. The private complaint was lodged after more than three months. There is no charge under Section 202 of the IPC of intentionally omitting to give information of the unnatural death to the police. It is also not the case of the complainant that he had requested for post-mortem of the body and that intimation should have been given to the police before the last rites were performed.- in the above facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the Sessions Court is not justified in convicting the appellant under Section 201 of the IPC and the High Court maintaining the same. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 201 of the IPC is set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 265-266 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) Nos. 1815-1816 of 2016)
DINESH KUMAR KALIDAS PATEL ... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF GUJARAT ... RESPONDENT (S)
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.:
Leave granted.
2. The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Judge,
Mehsana (State of Gujarat) for offences under Sections 498A
and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to
as “the IPC”). A sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment
and a penalty of Rs.1,000/- with a default sentence of three
months was awarded under Section 498A and six months and
1
REPORTABLE
Rs.500/- with a default sentence of one month for the offence
under Section 201 of the IPC.
3. This is a case where the appellant’s wife committed
suicide by hanging. The incident took place on 26.12.1990. The
information was conveyed to the family of the deceased. The
father and brother of the deceased, who is a doctor by
profession, attended the last rites. After more than three
months, the father of the deceased filed a complaint before the
Judicial Magistrate at Kadi on 01.04.1991. The same was
investigated, and the appellant was charged under Sections
304B, 306, 498A and 201 read with Section 120B of the IPC and
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Along with the
appellant, seven other persons also faced the trial. By
judgment dated 12.09.1995, the Sessions Judge convicted the
appellant under Sections 498A and 201 of the IPC but acquitted
the seven others.
4. The appeals filed in 1995 were heard in the year 2015
and, as per the impugned judgment, the appellant was
acquitted of the offence under Section 498A of the IPC but
conviction under Section 201 of the IPC was maintained. Thus
aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.
2
5. Heard learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and
learned Counsel appearing for the State.
6. Several contentions have been raised on merits. That
apart, the appellant has also raised a question of law as to
whether the conviction under Section 201 of the IPC could have
been maintained while acquitting him of the main offence
under Section 498A of the IPC.
7. Learned Counsel have placed reliance on the decisions of
this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab1
, Smt.
Kalawati and Ranjit Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh2
,
and Suleman Rehiman Mulani and another v. State of
Maharashtra3
.
8. In Palvinder Kaur (supra), this Court held as follows:
“14. In order to establish the charge under Section
201 of the Indian Penal Code, it is essential to prove
that an offence has been committed, — mere
suspicion that it has been committed is not sufficient,
— that the accused knew or had reason to believe
that such offence had been committed and with the
requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the
offender from legal punishment causes the evidence
thereof to disappear or gives false information
respecting such offences knowing or having reason
to believe the same to be false.”
1 AIR 1952 SC 354
2 AIR 1953 SC 131
3 AIR 1968 SC 829
3
The conviction in this case was ultimately set aside on the
aforementioned legal position and the facts.
9. The Constitution Bench decision in Kalawati (supra) may
not be of much assistance in this case since the facts are
completely different. The co-accused was convicted under
Section 302 of the IPC for the main offence, and in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of that case, this Court deemed it fit to
convict Kalawati only under Section 201 of the IPC.
10. Relying on Palvinder Kaur (supra), this Court in
Suleman Rehiman (supra), made the following observation:
“6. The conviction of Appellant 2 under Section
201 IPC depends on the sustainability of the
conviction of Appellant 1 under Section 304-A IPC. If
Appellant 1 was rightly convicted under that
provision, the conviction of Appellant 2 under Section
201 IPC on the facts found cannot be challenged. But
on the other hand, if the conviction of Appellant 1
under Section 304-A IPC cannot be sustained, then,
the second appellant’s conviction under Section 201
IPC will have to be set aside, because to establish the
charge under Section 201, the prosecution must first
prove that an offence had been committed not merely
a suspicion that it might have been committed — and
that the accused knowing or having reason to believe
that such an offence had been committed, and with
the intent to screen the offender from legal
punishment, had caused the evidence thereof to
disappear. The proof of the commission of an offence
4
is an essential requisite for bringing home the offence
under Section 201 IPC — see the decision of this
Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab.”
It is necessary to note that the reason for acquittal under
Section 201 in the above case was that there was no evidence
to show that the rash and negligent act of appellant No.1
caused the death of the deceased. Hence, the court acquitted
appellant No. 2 under Section 201. The observation at
paragraph 6 has to be viewed and analysed in that background.
11. In Ram Saran Mahto and another v. State of Bihar4
,
this Court discussed Kalawati (supra) and Palvinder Kaur
(supra). It has been held at paragraphs-13 to 15 that conviction
under the main offence is not necessary to convict the offender
under Section 201 of the IPC. To quote:
“13. It is not necessary that the offender
himself should have been found guilty of the main
offence for the purpose of convicting him of
offence under Section 201. Nor is it absolutely
necessary that somebody else should have been
found guilty of the main offence. Nonetheless, it is
imperative that the prosecution should have
established two premises. The first is that an
offence has been committed and the second is
that the accused knew about it or he had reasons
to believe the commission of that offence. Then
and then alone the prosecution can succeed,
provided the remaining postulates of the offence
are also established.
4
(1999) 9 SCC 486
5
14. The above position has been well stated
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in
1952, in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab:
“In order to establish the charge
under Section 201, Penal Code, it is
essential to prove that an offence has
been committed, — mere suspicion that
it has been committed is not sufficient
— that the accused knew or had reason
to believe that such offence had been
committed and with the requisite
knowledge and with the intent to screen
the offender from legal punishment
causes the evidence thereof to
disappear or gives false information
respecting such offences knowing or
having reason to believe the same to be
false.”
15. It is well to remind that the Bench gave a
note of caution that the court should safeguard
itself against the danger of basing its conclusion
on suspicions however strong they may be. In
Kalawati v. State of H.P a Constitution Bench of
this Court has, no doubt, convicted an accused
under Section 201 IPC even though he was
acquitted of the offence under Section 302. But
the said course was adopted by this Court after
entering the finding that another accused had
committed the murder and the appellant
destroyed the evidence of it with full knowledge
thereof. In a later decision in Nathu v. State of U.P.
this Court has repeated the caution in the
following words: (SCC p. 575, para 1)
“Before a conviction under Section
201 can be recorded, it must be shown
to the satisfaction of the court that the
accused knew or had reason to believe
that an offence had been committed
and having got this knowledge, tried to
screen the offender by disposing of the
dead body.”
6
12. In V.L. Tresa v. State of Kerala5
, this Court has
discussed the essential ingredients of the offence under Section
201 of the IPC at paragraph 12:
“12. Having regard to the language used, the
following ingredients emerge:
(I) committal of an offence;
(II) person charged with the offence
under Section 201 must have the
knowledge or reason to believe that the
main offence has been committed;
(III) person charged with the offence
under Section 201 IPC should have caused
disappearance of evidence or should have
given false information regarding the main
offence; and
(IV) the act should have been done
with the intention of screening the offender
from legal punishment.”
13. In Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra6
, this Court
discussed Kalawati (supra), Palvinder Kaur (supra),
 Suleman Rehiman (supra) and V.L. Tresa (supra) among
others. The essential ingredients for conviction under Section
201 of the IPC have been discussed at paragraph 18:
“18. The first paragraph of the section
contains the postulates for constituting the offence
while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe
three different tiers of punishments depending
upon the degree of offence in each situation. To
5
 (2001) 3 SCC 549
6
(2007) 7 SCC 502
7
bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, the
ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of
an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence
under Section 201 must have the knowledge or
reason to believe that an offence has been
committed; (iii) person charged with the said
offence should have caused disappearance of
evidence; and (iv) the act should have been done
with the intention of screening the offender from
legal punishment or with that intention he should
have given information respecting the offence,
which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain
that the intent to screen the offender committing
an offence must be the primary and sole aim of
the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in
order to bring home an offence under Section 201
IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must
be on record cogent evidence to prove that the
accused knew or had information sufficient to lead
him to believe that the offence had been
committed and that the accused has caused the
evidence to disappear in order to screen the
offender, known or unknown.”
In Sou Vijaya @ Baby v. State of Maharashtra7
, though this
Court held that the decision in V.L. Tresa (supra) was of no
assistance to the State in the particular facts, it re-iterated that
“there is no quarrel with the legal principle that
notwithstanding acquittal with reference to the offence under
Section 302 IPC, conviction under Section 201 is permissible, in
a given case.”
7
(2003) 8 SCC 296
8
14. The decisions in Sou Vijaya (supra) and V.L. Tresa
(supra) were noticed in State of Karnataka v. Madesha8
.
While the appeal of the State was dismissed, this Court in
unmistakeable terms held that:
“9. It is to be noted that there can be no dispute that
Section 201 would have application even if the main
offence is not established in view of what has been
stated in V.L. Tresa and Sou. Vijaya cases…”
15. Thus, the law is well-settled that a charge under Section
201 of the IPC can be independently laid and conviction
maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to establish
that an offence had been committed, the person charged with
the offence had the knowledge or the reason to believe that the
offence had been committed, the said person has caused
disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance has
been done with the intention of screening the offender from
legal punishment. Mere suspicion is not sufficient, it must be
proved that the accused knew or had a reason to believe that
the offence has been committed and yet he caused the
evidence to disappear so as to screen the offender. The
offender may be either himself or any other person.
8
(2007) 7 SCC 35
9
16. Having thus analysed the legal position, we shall revert to
the factual matrix and see whether the conviction in the facts
and circumstances of the case under Section 201 of the IPC
could be sustained.
17. An analysis of the judgment of the Sessions Judge in this
context would be quite relevant. At paragraph-16, having
analysed the facts and having referred to the minute details of
the alleged commission of the offence, the court has entered
the following finding:
“16....In this manner this entire case suggest that
the behaviour of the accused no. 1 was very
suspicious. He has not undertaken the process for
the PM of the dead body. He has not declared the
facts before the police and the last rites of the
dead body have been performed before the
maternal family reaches from Ahmedabad. In this
manner, while considering the facts on record I
come at a conclusion that the accused no. 1 has
failed in his duty as a husband. The husband has
kept the wife in a bungalow and has most of the
time remained away from her. This is very
torturing and harassing for a wife. Thus as per my
opinion it is proved by the prosecution on the basis
of the facts on record and especially the chit at 0-1
that there was mental harassment upon the
deceased Lila, from the side of the accused no.1.
The fact remains that the accused no.1 has not
informed the police even though an unnatural
death has occurred and the last rites have also
been performed without performing the
post-mortem and without informing the police.
Thus as per my opinion the accused no. 1 is prima
10
facie guilty of the crime under section 498(a) and
201 of the IPC and therefore the prosecution has
proved the case partly in affirmation.”
18. The High Court, in appeal, however, took the view that the
appellant was not liable to be convicted under Section 498A of
the IPC. However, his conviction under Section 201 of the IPC
was liable to be maintained. To quote:
“5... We have re-appreciated and re-evaluated the
evidence on the touchstone of the latest decisions
of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Taking into
consideration the fact that the complaint was
lodged almost after a period of four months of the
incident in question, the fact remains is that no
post mortem was performed of the deceased.
Even if the case of defence is accepted, it was a
premature and unnatural death and therefore the
mandatory requirements under the law, at least to
inform the police of the death and to get the post
mortem of the deceased done, were not fulfilled.
Admittedly, nothing has come on record to show
that the post mortem was carried out and/or the
police complaint was immediately filed.
Considering the said aspect, we have all reasons
to believe that the offence is made out under
section 201 of the IPC. However, so far as offence
punishable under Section 498A of the IPC is
concerned, we believe the contention of Mr.
Anandjiwala, learned senior advocate for the
accused No.1, that almost after a period of four
months, the complaint was lodged and there is
nothing on record to substantiate the case of the
prosecution qua cruelty being perpetrated to the
deceased for want of dowry and on the contrary,
the accused No.1 had helped the father of the
deceased and gave Rs.1 lakh. Under the
circumstances, we are of the opinion that the
learned trial judge has rightly convicted the
11
accused No.1 for the offence punishable under
Section 201 of the IPC, however, has committed
an error in holding conviction of the accused No.1
for the offence punishable under Section 498A of
the IPC and same is not sustainable.”
19. Thus, the only ground for maintaining the conviction under
Section 201 of the IPC is that the appellant did not give
intimation to the police of the unnatural death and that no
post-mortem was conducted.
20. We are afraid, the High Court is not justified in maintaining
the conviction under Section 201 only on the ground that no
communication was given to the police and that the
post-mortem had not been performed. The Trial Court has taken
note of the fact that the father of the deceased and her brother
(who is a doctor) had attended the last rites of the deceased
and neither of them had any complaint or suspicion at that time
of the commission of any offence. The Sessions Court has also
taken note of the suicide note left by the deceased wherein she
had taken the entire blame on herself. Yet the court has taken
the view, from the consideration we have extracted from
paragraph-16 of the Sessions court judgment, that the
deceased might have been in a state of depression having
remained alone for most of the time and it amounted to torture.
12
The appellant has been acquitted of the offence under Section
498A by the High Court, and rightly so. The prosecution has
also not been able to satisfy the ingredients under Section 201
of the IPC. Neither the Sessions Court nor the High Court has
any case that there is any intentional omission to give
information by the appellant to the police. It is also to be noted
that prosecution has no case under Section 202 of the IPC
against the appellant.
21. As held by this Court in Hanuman and others v. State
of Rajasthan9
, the mere fact that the deceased allegedly died
an unnatural death could not be sufficient to bring home a
charge under Section 201 of the IPC. Unless the prosecution
was able to establish that the accused person knew or had
reason to believe that an offence has been committed and had
done something causing the offence of commission of evidence
to disappear, he cannot be convicted.
22. There is no such allegation against the appellant. The last
rites of the deceased were performed in the presence of the
members of her family. They had no suspicion at that time of
the commission of any offence. The private complaint was
lodged after more than three months. There is no charge under
9 1994 Supp (2) SCC 39
13
Section 202 of the IPC of intentionally omitting to give
information of the unnatural death to the police. It is also not
the case of the complainant that he had requested for
post-mortem of the body and that intimation should have been
given to the police before the last rites were performed.
23. In the above facts and circumstances, we are of the view
that the Sessions Court is not justified in convicting the
appellant under Section 201 of the IPC and the High Court
maintaining the same. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.
The conviction of the appellant under Section 201 of the IPC is
set aside.
..........................J.
 (KURIAN JOSEPH)
...……………………J.
(AMITAVA ROY)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 12, 2018.
14

service laws = “Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to Employees, 2002”The said Scheme of 2002 was challenged = Ex-employees like the respondents–writ petitioners were excluded from the purview of the scheme. = “Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to Employees, 2002” was introduced in the year 2002. Considerable time has elapsed in the meantime. The Scheme of 2002 was applicable only to regular/serving employees and not to ex-employees.= no legal right can be understood to have been vested in the respondents – writ petitioners under the Scheme of 2002- how the appellant can be compelled to grant any long-term lease of the official quarters in the RSP to the respondents – writ petitioners who are its ex-employees. Such subsequent facts and developments that have taken place during the interregnum would certainly be material in moulding the relief(s) and answering the issues arising before this Court.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1834 OF 2018
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.34336 OF 2009]
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA
LTD. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
CHOUDHARY TILOTAMA DAS
& ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1835 OF 2018
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.2564 OF 2010]
JUDGMENT
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
SLP(C) NO.34336 OF 2009
1. Leave granted.
2. In the year 1999, to be precise on 12th
February, 1999, the Rourkela Steel Plant
(hereinafter referred to as “RSP”)
introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme,
1999 covering employees who had served for
2
a minimum of 15 years or who are above 40
years of age. Thereafter by Circular
dated 9th August, 1999 the RSP floated
another scheme called “Scheme for
Allotment of Quarters to Ex-employees
Separating under the SAIL VRS Scheme,
1999”. Under the said Scheme of 1999,
employees of the RSP who were allotted
official quarters were allowed to occupy
such quarters on licence basis for a
period of 22 (twenty two) months following
their leaving the RSP/Company on the basis
of voluntary retirement.
3. The respondents, 53 (fifty three) in
number, were allotted quarters by the RSP
and had opted for voluntary retirement
under the Scheme. Accordingly, they were
allowed to retain the official quarters
for a period of 22 (twenty two) months
which period was extended. Thereafter, the
RSP came up with another Scheme called
“Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to
3
Employees, 2002”. This was on 22nd July,
2002. The said Scheme of 2002
contemplated allotment of houses/flats on
long term lease basis (33 years) to
serving employees. Ex-employees like the
respondents–writ petitioners were excluded
from the purview of the scheme.
4. The said Scheme of 2002 was challenged
in a writ petition before the High Court
of Orissa which was instituted way back in
the year 2002. As it would appear from
the pleadings of the parties before the
High Court, while the appellant – Steel
Authority of India Limited, at that point
of time, had pressed for the inclusion of
the ex-employees within the framework of
the said Scheme of 2002, the State
Government took the stand that such an
action may invite public criticism. No
affidavit was, however, filed by the State
Government. By the impugned judgment and
order dated 7th September, 2009 the writ
4
petition in question was closed/disposed
of by the following operative direction:
“In view of such, we dispose
of this writ petition with a
direction to the O.P. - SAIL
Authorities to consider the case
of the petitioners for allotment
of quarters, which are in their
occupation, on long term
sub-lease basis, in terms of the
Circular dated 22.7.2002 in
Annexure-5. We further direct
that in the event the quarters
are allotted to the petitioners
on long term sub-lease basis, the
cost of such quarters shall be
computed at the rate at which it
was prevalent at the time when
the Scheme came into force, along
with interest thereon @ 9% per
annum and the same shall be paid
by the petitioners. Apart from
that the petitioners are also
liable to pay the unpaid house
rent, electricity duty, water
charges, if any, along with the
aforesaid cost. However, there
shall be no charge of penal rent
from the petitioners.
We make it clear that this
order only relates to those
petitioners, who are presently in
occupation of the quarters.
The writ petition as well as
Misc. Case Nos. 842/2002,
3924/2003 & 354/2006 is also
disposed of accordingly.”
5
5. Aggrieved, the Steel Authority of
India Limited has filed the present appeal
before this Court.
6. We have heard Shri Ranjit Kumar,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant – Steel Authority of India Ltd.,
Shri Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondents–writ
petitioners and Shri Shibashish Misra,
learned counsel for the State of Odisha.
7. Though several grounds including the
authority of SAIL to grant a sub lease as
directed by the High Court has been urged,
the case of the appellant in the appeal
before us is primarily based on subsequent
facts which have been brought on record by
means of an additional affidavit dated 22nd
January, 2018. In the aforesaid additional
affidavit dated 22nd January, 2018 it has
been stated that the RSP, a unit of Steel
Authority of India Limited (SAIL), had an
6
initial production capacity of 2 (two)
million tons per annum which was expanded
and the plant modernized to reach a target
production of 4.2 million tons per annum.
This was at an overall cost of Rs.13684
crores and was completed in the year 2013.
In the said additional affidavit dated 22nd
January, 2018 it has been further stated
that the SAIL is now engaged in the
process of enhancing the annual capacity
of the RSP to 7.5 million tons per annum
for which a huge infrastructural
investment will have to be made running
into almost Rs. 2.6 million crores. It is
further stated by the appellant in the
said additional affidavit dated 22nd
January, 2018 that keeping in mind that
the optimum number of employees per
million ton of production should be 3200,
once the production capacity is raised to
7.5 million tons the RSP will have about
24000 employees. It is contended that the
entire township of Rourkela is established
7
and maintained by the RSP itself which is,
therefore, required to provide additional
accommodation to various Government
Agencies like Police, Revenue Officers,
Government employees, employees of
Government School/Colleges, Banks, Public
Sector Undertakings (PSUs), etc. In the
said additional affidavit dated 22nd
January, 2018, the appellant has further
stated that as per the directive received
from the Union Cabinet Secretariat
long-term lease is presently prohibited.
It is further stated that presently the
available quarters are about 19916 of
which about 18300 quarters are already
occupied by the employees/ex-employees and
various other employees of the State
Government, PSUs, etc. It is further
stated that about 250-300 quarters are in
a dilapidated condition. The remaining/
vacant quarters would be required not only
to house the in-coming employees but also
various Agencies that would be working at
8
the site in connection with the
expansion/modernization plans. On the
strength of the aforesaid statements and
the official correspondences/decisions
enclosed in this regard to the additional
affidavit dated 22nd January, 2018 the
appellant submits that the order of the
High Court should be appropriately
interfered with.
8. Shri Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondents –
writ petitioners has disputed the
statements made by the appellant in the
additional affidavit dated 22nd January,
2018 and has drawn the attention of the
Court to the reply of the respondent to
the said additional affidavit dated 22nd
January, 2018 filed by the appellant. The
learned counsel for the respondents–writ
petitioners, apart from contesting the
various statements made in the additional
affidavit dated 22nd January, 2018 filed by
9
the appellant, has submitted that the RSP
is a loss making concern and admittedly is
reducing its workforce. It is claimed that
huge number of vacant quarters are
available and even if the production
capacity of the RSP is enhanced to 7.5
million tons there would still be surplus
of accommodation/quarters.
9. The respondents-writ petitioners have
brought on record a Circular dated 23rd
August, 2017 by which applications have
been invited for allotment of one room/1
BR(L.T) quarters on licence basis for a
period of 33 (thirty three) months. Such
applications have been invited from
employees, ex-employees of the RSP who
would be separating from the RSP/Company.
The said fact, according to the
respondents – writ petitioners, has belied
the claim made by the appellant – Steel
Authority of India Limited.
10
10. Insofar as the State of Odisha is
concerned, Shri Shibashish Misra, learned
counsel appearing for the State of Odisha
has taken a stand that the appellant –
Steel Authority of India Limited is free
to take its decision in the matter subject
to the conditions of lease under which the
land has been allotted to the Steel
Authority of India Limited.
11. We have considered the matter.
12. “Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to
Employees, 2002” was valid for a period of
three months. The operation of it had not
been extended. Under the said Scheme of
2002, ex-employees, to which category the
respondents–writ petitioners belong, were
not vested with any right for
consideration of their cases for allotment
on long-term lease. In fact, the lease
deed between the State of Orissa and Steel
Authority of India Limited makes it very
11
clear that the lands can be used only for
the Steel plant and for the purposes
ancillary thereto and that the Steel
Authority of India Limited shall not use
the land for any other purpose except with
the previous sanction of the Government.
13. “Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to
Employees, 2002” was introduced in the
year 2002. Considerable time has elapsed
in the meantime. The Scheme of 2002 was
applicable only to regular/serving
employees and not to ex-employees. In the
long period of interval that has been
occasioned by the pendency of the present
litigation the very basis for introduction
of the Scheme of 2002 has changed and the
facts now stated in the additional
affidavit dated 22nd January, 2018 of the
appellant – Steel Authority of India
Limited would indicate that today any
long-term lease of quarters
built/maintained by the RSP is not
12
feasible. In fact, according to the
appellant – Steel Authority of India
Limited, there would be a shortage of
accommodation/quarters in the immediate
future and, perhaps, new constructions
will have to be raised to meet the
increasing demand for accommodation on
account of increase of production levels
of the RSP.
14. In a situation where no legal right
can be understood to have been vested in
the respondents – writ petitioners under
the Scheme of 2002 and operation of the
said Scheme of 2002 today is not
considered feasible or necessary by the
appellant on account of the reasons stated
in the additional affidavit dated 22nd
January, 2018, as noticed herein above, we
do not see how the appellant can be
compelled to grant any long-term lease of
the official quarters in the RSP to the
respondents – writ petitioners who are its
13
ex-employees. Such subsequent facts and
developments that have taken place during
the interregnum would certainly be
material in moulding the relief(s) and
answering the issues arising before this
Court.
15. Consequently and in the light of the
above we are of the view that no relief
can be afforded to the respondents–writ
petitioners, at this point of time.
Consequently, we allow this appeal; set
aside the order of the High Court but at
the same time we direct that the
respondents–writ petitioners (53 in
number) or their legal heirs, as may be,
be allowed to remain in occupation of the
quarters for a period of 33 (thirty three)
months with effect from today, on the
expiry of which they will handover vacant
and peaceful possession of the said
accommodation/quarter to the competent
authority of the RSP.
14
16. The appeal, consequently, is disposed
of in the above terms.
S.L.P.(C) NO.2564 OF 2010
17. Leave granted.
18. The appeal is disposed of in terms of
the judgment/order passed in Civil appeal
arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.34336 of 2009.
.................,J.
 (RANJAN GOGOI)
.................,J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 12, 2018

Corporate law- E- Tenders - the bid uploaded was invalid as such did not press the ‘freeze button’ to complete the bid process - failure of the party can not be set at right by High court giving an opportunity - high court order is set aside = “Whether the data uploaded by the respondent - bidder – Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited, receipt of which was not acknowledged on account of his alleged failure to press the ‘Freeze Button’, is irretrievably lost by this time and cannot be retrieved under any circumstance?” = where the NIC which had developed the portal had stated before the Court on affidavit that retrieval of the documents even jointly with Maharashtra Housing Development Authority is not feasible or possible. That apart, lack of any timely response of the first respondent when the system had failed to generate an acknowledgement of the bid documents in a situation where the first respondent claims to have pressed the ‘freeze button’; the generation of acknowledgements in respect of other bidders and the absence of any glitch in the technology would strongly indicate that the bid submitted by the first respondent was not a valid bid and the directions issued by the High Court in favour of the first respondent virtually confers on the said respondent a second opportunity which cannot be countenanced.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1836 OF 2018
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.28570 OF 2017]
MAHARASHTRA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHAPOORJI PALLONJI & COMPANY
PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant – Maharashtra
Housing Development Authority through its
Chief Officer issued e-Tender notice
inviting proposals for the work of
“Technical designing, coordination and
construction for rehabilitation/sale/
commercial/amenities along with
construction of habitable temporary
transit camps and other various works in
2
respect of redevelopment project”. The
bidders were to submit their bids in two
stages i.e. technical and financial. They
were required to comply with the
experiences and other conditions mentioned
in the Request for
Qualification-cum-Request for Proposal (RFQ
cum RFP) document. The last date for
submission of on-line bid was fixed on 17th
May, 2017 which was subsequently extended
from time to time and lastly extended upto
1300 hours of 27th July, 2017.
3. According to the first respondent
– writ petitioner, it had uploaded its
technical and financial bid at about 1216
hours on 27th July, 2017 on the website of
the appellant. The first respondent –
writ petitioner claimed that though it had
pressed the ‘freeze button’, it could not
get an acknowledgement of the bid
submitted. Thereafter, correspondences
were entered into/exchanged between the
3
first respondent and the appellant
whereafter the first respondent was
referred to National Informatics Centre
(NIC) which had designed and maintained
the e-portal on which bids were submitted.
As the NIC took the view that the absence
of acknowledgement of the submission of
the bid by the first respondent – writ
petitioner was on account of its omission
to press the ‘freeze button’ and as there
was no technical glitch in the system,
amply demonstrated by the acknowledgements
generated in favour of other bidders, the
first respondent – writ petitioner was not
entitled to any consideration of its
otherwise defective bid. This had led to
the filing of writ petition out of which
this appeal has arisen wherein the High
Court of Bombay by the impugned judgment
dated 28th September, 2017 had issued the
following directions:
“15. In the aforesaid
facts and circumstances, we
issue directions to the NIC to
4
access the files containing the
bid documents of the petitioners
and transfer and/or make it
available to respondent no.2
MHADA which would decrypt the
said files and consider the bid
documents of the petitioners as
a “valid bid” with the
assistance of the NIC and open
the technical bid of the
petitioners forthwith since we
are conscious of the fact that
the learned counsel for the
MHADA had made a statement
before us on 07.08.2017 that the
technical evaluation of the bids
is going on and in any case we
do not intend to stall the
project. If the petitioners
bid satisfies the technical
conditions, his financial bid
can be considered along with the
other three bidders who are
already in the fray.”
4. It is the aforesaid directions
that have been assailed in this appeal by
the Maharashtra Housing Development
Authority.
5. We have heard Shri Dushyant A.
Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellant, Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
5
first respondent – writ petitioner and
Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni, learned ASG
appearing for the NIC.
6. The matter lies within a short
compass. The first issue that arises for
a decision is whether the bid document(s)
uploaded by the first respondent – writ
petitioner can be retrieved or is
irretrievably lost. The second issue is
- assuming the bid document(s) submitted
by the first respondent is retrievable,
whether the first respondent would be
entitled to a consideration of the bids
submitted by it on merits as has been
directed by the High Court.
7. To answer the first issue this
Court by order dated 18th January, 2018 has
directed the NIC to file an affidavit to
answer the following query:
“Whether the data uploaded by
the respondent - bidder –
Shapoorji Pallonji & Company
Private Limited, receipt of
6
which was not acknowledged on
account of his alleged failure
to press the ‘Freeze Button’,
is irretrievably lost by this
time and cannot be retrieved
under any circumstance?”
8. Pursuant to the aforesaid order
dated 18th January, 2018 the NIC has filed
an affidavit dated 23rd January, 2018
wherein it has been stated that the data
uploaded by the first respondent cannot be
retrieved by the NIC and Maharashtra
Housing Development Authority jointly or
severally under any circumstances in the
present e-Tendering system with prevailing
Government of India Guidelines. In
paragraph 7 of the aforesaid affidavit
dated 23rd January, 2018 the NIC has also
stated as under:
“7. As far as NIC is
concerned it cannot access the
invalid bid documents since it
has neither the keys nor the
approved process to download
the same pertaining to any
packet/envelop/cover. Even
though keys are available with
Maharashtra Housing
Development Authority
7
(Petitioner), but even with
that keys the bid documents
cannot be retrieved at this
time as the bid opening event
has already been concluded.
Thus bid documents cannot be
retrieved under any
circumstances from the
e-Tendering system.”
9. The above apart, in the counter
affidavit filed by the NIC it has been
stated that the bid uploaded by the first
respondent was invalid as the
representative(s) of the said respondent
did not press the ‘freeze button’ which
alone would have completed the bid
process. In this regard, the NIC has
further stated that on 27th July, 2017
there was no problem in the server during
the relevant time period and as many as
427 bid documents (pertaining to other
tenders) were uploaded between 1200 hours
to 1300 hours on the said date i.e. 27th
July, 2017. The NIC in its affidavit has
further stated that if the first
respondent had uploaded the documents at
8
1216 hours on 27th July, 2017 and it had
not received the bid submission
acknowledgement it still had 44 minutes to
contact the NIC for help which help was
not sought. In this regard, the NIC has
further stated that the first respondent –
bidder had participated in e-Tendering in
Maharashtra Government portal earlier and
thus it was familiar with the entire
process.
10. If the NIC, which had developed
the e-portal in which bids were to be
submitted and maintenance and upkeep of
which was its responsibility, had stated
in its affidavit what has been indicated
above, we do not see how the repeated
statements made on behalf of the first
respondent that the bid documents can
still be retrieved, if required by
traveling beyond the Government of India
guidelines, should commend to us for
acceptance. The opinion rendered in this
9
regard by the consultant of the first
respondent Mr. Arun Omkarlal Gupta on
which much stress and reliance has been
placed by the first respondent could
hardly be determinative of the question in
a situation where the NIC which had
developed the portal had stated before the
Court on affidavit that retrieval of the
documents even jointly with Maharashtra
Housing Development Authority is not
feasible or possible. That apart, lack of
any timely response of the first
respondent when the system had failed to
generate an acknowledgement of the bid
documents in a situation where the first
respondent claims to have pressed the
‘freeze button’; the generation of
acknowledgements in respect of other
bidders and the absence of any glitch in
the technology would strongly indicate
that the bid submitted by the first
respondent was not a valid bid and the
directions issued by the High Court in
10
favour of the first respondent virtually
confers on the said respondent a second
opportunity which cannot be countenanced.
11. In the above view of the matter,
we are inclined to take the view that the
High Court was not correct in issuing the
directions extracted above as contained in
paragraph 15 of the impugned
judgment/order dated 28th September, 2017.
The same are, therefore, interfered with.
The appeal is allowed accordingly.
....................,J.
 (RANJAN GOGOI)
....................,J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 12, 2018

Saturday, February 10, 2018

legal remedies - advocates and Bar council elections etc., By means of present application, the applicant, who is enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Delhi, seeks a direction to the effect that his name be included in the electoral list for the reason that he had submitted all the requisite documents within time. However, we find that the applicant had not provided the copies of the original documents as a result of which his name was not included in the electoral roll. = We have given our thoughtful consideration to the plea raised by the applicant. In our view, no ground has been made out for directing the Bar Council of Delhi to include the name of the applicant in the electoral roll. The application is rejected accordingly. ; By means of this application, the applicant, who is practicing as an advocate and is enrolled with the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh seeks a direction to conduct elections and direct the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council and Telangana State Bar Council to conduct election as per the scheduled declared by this Court. = It appears that the Bar Council of Telangana has not yet come into existence and therefore, the election in the State Bar Council of Telangana has not been fixed.In view of the above, in the present facts and circumstances, we do not find any reason to direct the BCI to hold election for the State Bar Council of Telangana. The application is rejected.

1

 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 126 OF 2015
Ajayinder Sangwan and Ors. .... Petitioner(s)
Versus
Bar Council of Delhi & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
O R D E R
R.K. Agrawal, J.
1) A bunch of Interlocutory Applications for
clarification/impleadment/direction/intervention/ appropriate
orders/modification, in the lead matter, has been filed after the
order passed by this Court on 14.12.2017, is being disposed of
by this common order.
2) Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
IA Nos. 14049, 14055, 14059 and 14062 of 2018
2
3) The contention of learned counsel for the applicants is
that learned Advocate General for the State of Tamil Nadu,
who is ex-officio member of the State Bar Council, has written
a letter dated 15.01.2018 expressing apprehension on his
ability to conduct free and fair elections to the State Bar
Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. It was also brought to
the attention of this Court the order dated 23.01.2018 passed
by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court wherein the
court had come to the conclusion for appointment of a neutral
committee of retired Judges either of the Supreme Court of
India or of the Madras High Court to oversee the election.
However, the court did not pass any order as the matter was
pending before this Court.
4) In the application for directions filed on behalf of the BCI
dated 23.01.2018, it has been stated that the
Tribunal/Committees have been constituted to oversee the
elections to be held by the respective State Bar Councils. So
far as the elections to be held for the Bar Council to the State
of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry is concerned, the Committee
constituted by the BCI consists of the following persons,
3
namely, Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.K. Gupta, former Chief Justice
of the Jharkhand High Court, Hon’ble Mr. Justice T.
Sudanthiram, former Judge, Madras High Court and Hon’ble
Mr. Justice V.D. Gyani, former Judge, Madhya Pradesh High
Court. The aforementioned Committee has been entrusted to
look into the affairs of the elections to the State Bar Council of
Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. The Committee consists of
retired Chief Justice/Judges of various High Courts and we do
not find any good ground to constitute any another Committee
in its place.
5) For the reasons mentioned above, the interlocutory
applications are accordingly dismissed.
IA Nos. 9727 and 7520 of 2018
6) By these two applications, the applicants, who are
practicing advocates in the State of Kerala seek impleadment
as also modification of the election schedule finalized by the
BCI.
7) In view of the application for directions filed on behalf of
the BCI on 23.01.2018, the election schedule for the State of
Kerala has been fixed and the date of election is notified as
4
25.03.2018. Learned counsel appearing for the applicants
contended that the day of election though being Sunday, is a
festival day celebrated in the State and therefore, it would not
be possible for the majority of the voters to cast their vote. A
request was made to pre-pone the date of election from
25.03.2018 to 18.03.2018.
8) Considering the special facts and circumstances of the
case, we pre-pone the date of election for Bar Council of Kerala
from 25.03.2018 to 18.03.2018, however, rest of the election
schedule, as finalized by the BCI, will remain the same. The
applications are disposed of accordingly.
IA Nos. 11955 and 11959 of 2018
9) By the above two applications, the applicants seek a
direction to the BCI and the Bar Council of Maharashtra &
Goa to permit the advocates of these States, who are on the
electoral rolls, to cast their vote at New Delhi. Further, all the
applicants hail from Maharashtra and Goa and have settled in
Delhi for the purpose of legal practice. A reference has been
invited to the Resolution passed by the BCI wherein the BCI
has requested learned Secretary General of this Court to
5
consider providing sufficient space to enable the advocates
who are registered with different State Bar Councils and are
on the electoral lists of the respective State Bar Councils to
cast their votes at New Delhi itself. However, no response has
been received by the BCI so far.
10) Owing to the election schedule having already been
finalized, we do not find any ground to permit the applicants
or the advocates who are practicing at New Delhi to cast their
votes at New Delhi instead of their respective States.
IA No. 12811 of 2018
11) The present application has been filed by the Bar Council
of Rajasthan seeking rescheduling of the date of election from
28.03.2018 to 05.04.2018 on the ground that the Rajasthan
High Court has holidays from 24.03.2018 to 01.04.2018 and
all the members who are practicing in the High Court would
not be able to exercise their franchise owing to holidays in the
Court. We do not find any good ground to defer the date of
election on the pretext of holidays as it would not be proper for
us to reschedule the election which has already been fixed for
28.03.2018. The application is, therefore, rejected.
6
IA No. 14854 of 2018
12) By means of present application, the applicant, who is
enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Delhi, seeks a
direction to the effect that his name be included in the
electoral list for the reason that he had submitted all the
requisite documents within time. However, we find that the
applicant had not provided the copies of the original
documents as a result of which his name was not included in
the electoral roll.
13) We have given our thoughtful consideration to the plea
raised by the applicant. In our view, no ground has been
made out for directing the Bar Council of Delhi to include the
name of the applicant in the electoral roll. The application is
rejected accordingly.
IA No. 13749 of 2018
14) By means of this application, the applicant, who is
practicing as an advocate and is enrolled with the Bar Council
of Andhra Pradesh seeks a direction to conduct elections and
direct the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council and Telangana State
7
Bar Council to conduct election as per the scheduled declared
by this Court.
15) In the application for directions filed on behalf of the Bar
Council of India dated 23.01.2018, we find that the election
schedule for the State of Andhra Pradesh has been fixed by
the BCI, however, there is no mention of the election schedule
for the State of Telangana. It appears that the Bar Council of
Telangana has not yet come into existence and therefore, the
election in the State Bar Council of Telangana has not been
fixed.
16) In view of the above, in the present facts and
circumstances, we do not find any reason to direct the BCI to
hold election for the State Bar Council of Telangana. The
application is rejected.
...…………….………………………J.
 (R.K. AGRAWAL)
.…....…………………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 5, 2018.