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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Saturday, February 10, 2018

public interest litigation - non-implementation or tardy implementation of laws beneficial to voiceless (and sometimes silenced) children, particularly, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (the Act of 2000) and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (the JJ Act). = What can a citizen do if the State pays no attention to his or her fundamental or human or statutory right, nor takes serious interest in fulfilling its constitutional or statutory obligations? What if that citizen is a voiceless child or someone whose voice cannot be heard over the din of governance – for example, physically or mentally challenged persons, senior citizens, and other disadvantaged sections of society such as scheduled castes, tribals and several others? = Finally, we request and urge the Chief Justice of each High Court to seriously consider establishing child friendly courts and vulnerable witness courts in each district. Inquiries under the JJ Act and trials under other statutes such as the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, trials for sexual offences under the Indian Penal Code and other similar laws require to be conducted with a high degree of sensitivity, care and empathy for the victim. It is often said that the experience in our courts of a juvenile accused of an offence or the victim of a sexual offence is traumatic. We need to have some compassion towards them – even juveniles in conflict with law, since they are entitled to the presumption of innocence - and establishing child friendly courts and vulnerable witness courts is perhaps one manner in which the justice delivery system can respond to ease their pain and suffering. Another advantage of such child friendly courts and vulnerable witness courts is that they can be used for trials in which adult women are victims of sexual offences since they too are often traumatized by the not so friendly setting and environment in our courts.

 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 1 of 62

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 473 OF 2005
Sampurna Behura ....Petitioner
 Versus
 Union of India & Ors. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
 Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. What can a citizen do if the State pays no attention to his or
her fundamental or human or statutory right, nor takes serious
interest in fulfilling its constitutional or statutory obligations?
What if that citizen is a voiceless child or someone whose voice
cannot be heard over the din of governance – for example,
physically or mentally challenged persons, senior citizens, and
other disadvantaged sections of society such as scheduled castes,
tribals and several others? The aggrieved would perhaps approach
the judiciary (if he or she could and as a last resort) for the
enforcement of a human right. Should the judiciary take corrective
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 2 of 62

steps and be accused of ‗judicial activism‘ or overreach – or should
the cynics and skeptics have their day resulting in the grievance of
the voiceless and the disadvantaged remaining unheard and the
fundamental and human rights lying unaddressed?
2. These questions arise in the context of the virtual
non-implementation or tardy implementation of laws beneficial to
voiceless (and sometimes silenced) children, particularly, the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (the
Act of 2000) and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (the JJ Act). We record and acknowledge our
appreciation for the efforts of Sampurna Behura in highlighting
some of these issues by way of a Public Interest Litigation and to
learned counsel for the appearing parties in rendering assistance
enabling us to address some of these issues by not making these
proceedings adversarial, but a constructive effort for the benefit of
the children of our country. No one has any doubt that it is time for
the State to strongly and proactively acknowledge that even
children in our country have fundamental rights and human rights
and they need to be enforced equally strongly.
3. If Nelson Mandela is to be believed, ―Our children are our
greatest treasure. They are our future. Those who abuse them tear at
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 3 of 62

the fabric of our society and weaken our nation.‖
1 Our policy and
decision makers need to heed this advice and warning and
appreciate that they are not doing any favour to the children of our
country by caring for them – it is their constitutional obligation and
the social justice laws enacted by Parliament need to be effectively
and meaningfully enforced.
Background and Chief Justices Conferences
4. In a prescient understanding of child rights, the Chief Justices‘
Conference held in 2006 (presided by the Chief Justice of India
with participation by the Chief Justice of every High Court) the
following resolution was passed:
―a) That High Courts will impress upon the State
Governments to set up Juvenile Justice Boards, wherever
not set-up. The Chief Justices may nominate a High Court
Judge to oversee the condition and functioning of the
remand/observation homes established under the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
b) The Chief Justices of the High Courts will expedite the
matter with the respective State Governments for setting
up of Juvenile Justice Boards, wherever they have not yet
been set up.
c) The Chief Justices of the High Courts will nominate a
Judge to make periodical visits to Juvenile Homes,
wherever set up, and the learned Judge may suggest
remedial measures for the betterment of the conditions of
the juvenile homes and inmates.‖

1 Address by President Nelson Mandela at National Men's March, Pretoria on 22 November 1997
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5. The above resolution was passed almost six years after the Act
of 2000 came into force – meaning thereby that even about six
years after Parliament enacted a law for the benefit of children, the
State Governments had not taken steps to fulfill one basic
requirement of the law, that is, to set up Juvenile Justice Boards.
6. In 2009 the Chief Justices‘ Conference discussed the progress
made in setting-up of Juvenile Justice Boards and the resolution
passed in the Conference in 2006 was reiterated indicating that
little or no progress had still been made by the State Governments
in setting up Juvenile Justice Boards. So, almost a decade had gone
by without compliance by the State Governments of a basic
statutory obligation laid down by Parliament.
7. In 2013 the issue of strengthening the juvenile justice system
was again discussed at the Chief Justices‘ Conference and the
resolutions passed in 2006 and 2009 were reiterated. In addition,
the mandate of setting up Child Welfare Committees in all districts
was also emphasized to meet the requirements of children in need
of care and protection and to give full effect to the provisions of
the Act of 2000. It was the further resolved:
―It was further resolved that Juvenile Justice Committees,
as had been set up in the Delhi High Court, under the
guidance of the Chief Justice and senior judges and others
concerned with the welfare of juveniles and the working
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of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, be set up in all the High Courts to monitor the
implementation of the provisions of the Act in their true
spirit.
It was noticed that the State Governments had not taken
serious steps to establish and set-up the various Homes,
referred to in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, as amended in 2006 and the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. It
was noticed that the conditions in the Remand/
Observation Homes and Shelter Homes are not up to the
standard and a lot of improvement was required to make
these facilities meaningful, as envisaged under the above
Act and Rules. It was also noticed that After-care Homes
for adolescents passing into adulthood and, in particular
girls, have not been taken up seriously by the concerned
Authorities. The Chief Justices shall take up the matter
with the State Governments for improving the conditions
of the various Homes, referred to in the above Act and the
Rules, and to provide for permanent staff to run the said
establishments, as it was reported by some of the Chief
Justices that many of the employees of the Homes had
been working on an ad-hoc basis, even for as many as
fifteen years. The Chief Justices were requested to take up
the matter with the State Authorities to ensure that
services of such persons, who have been working on
ad-hoc basis, are regularised, if necessary, by creation of
posts.
Particular notice was taken of the fact that the provisions
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, had not yet been implemented in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir.‖
8. In 2015 the issue of strengthening the juvenile justice system
was once again discussed at the Chief Justices‘ Conference and the
following resolution passed:
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―Resolved that the High Courts shall continue to take all
steps necessary, including evolving ways to ensure greater
sensitivity, to effectively deal with cases in the field of
Juvenile Justice in their respective States. The High
Courts should ensure that constitution of Juvenile Justice
Boards and Child Welfare Committees are in place, that
visits are regularly made to the Juvenile Homes, Special
Homes, Observation Homes, Shelter Homes and Rescue
Centres etc. and that such homes are set up wherever they
have not already been set up. It shall also be ensured that
the requisite facilities are provided as per the Standards,
Rules, Policies and Guidelines in all such Homes/Centres.
The assistance of State Legal Services Authorities and
District Legal Services Authorities shall also be taken in
this regard.‖
9. Finally, in 2016 at the Chief Justices‘ Conference the
following resolution was passed:
―The Conference has noted the necessity for ensuring
institutional support for juveniles in conflict of law and
children in need of care and protection.
Resolved that:
(i) cases pending for a period in excess of one year be
disposed of on priority by the JJBs;
(ii) Juvenile Justice Committees of the High Courts
shall monitor the pendency and disposal of adoption cases
and applications for declaring children free for adoption on
a priority basis;
(iii) steps be taken to ensure that every district is
equipped with a Child Protection Unit, Special Juvenile
Police Unit, Observation Homes and Children Homes;
(iv) pending cases of orphaned, abandoned and
surrendered children be monitored by the Juvenile Justice
Committees of High Courts;
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(v) training and refresher training be imparted to
judicial officers;
(vi) vacancies in juvenile justice institutions be filled up
on a mission mode basis in three months; and
(vii) State Legal Services Authorities should actively
discharge their role.‖
10. At this stage, it may be mentioned that pursuant to the
resolutions passed in the Chief Justices‘ Conferences, every High
Court has constituted a Juvenile Justice Committee headed by a
judge of the High Court to take stock of and look into issues
concerning children. We may note that every High Court has
responded more than positively and each Juvenile Justice
Committee has brought about some improvements in the living
conditions in Homes and in the well-being and lives of many
children.
11. Appreciating that the judiciary has a constitutional obligation
to ensure that everybody acts in the best interests of the child, the
Chief Justice of India set up a Committee in the Supreme Court to
address the issues of effective implementation of the Act of 2000 –
such is the importance given by the judiciary to the rights of
children.
12. Notwithstanding nudging by the judiciary, judicial ‗activism‘
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and criticism of it, over the last decade or so, State Governments
and Union Territories have not fully complied with the provisions
of a law solemnly enacted by Parliament for the benefit of children.
In many instances, only cosmetic changes have been introduced at
the ground level with the result that voiceless children continue to
be subjects of official apathy. However, it must be acknowledged
that the Union of India through the Ministry of Women and Child
Development (for short MWCD) has taken some bold steps in
recognizing the rights of the children and giving them some
importance. Nevertheless, the overall picture relating to the
recognition of the rights of children and their realization is far from
satisfactory and remains gloomy as we continue to trudge along the
long and winding road.
Writ petition in Public Interest
13. Sampurna Behura, the petitioner before us, has done her
Masters in Sociology and was pursuing her Doctoral Thesis in the
same subject at the relevant time. She has been involved in
handling cases of child sexual abuse, street children and working
children and has also undertaken various studies on child rights.
14. Concerned with the plight of children in the country,
Sampurna Behura filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the
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Constitution drawing attention to several Articles of the
Constitution which impose primary responsibility on the State to
ensure that the needs of children are met and their basic human
rights are protected. The Articles in the Constitution referred to by
her include those in the Chapter on Directive Principles of State
Policy. She has also drawn attention to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 20th November, 1989. The Convention, to which
India is a signatory, emphasizes inter alia, securing the best
interests of the child, social reintegration of child victims etc.
15. She has also stated in the writ petition that the Act of 2000
was passed by Parliament bearing in mind various standards
prescribed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice, 1985 (the Beijing Rules), the United Nations
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty,
1990 and other relevant international instruments.
16. The main burden of the writ petition is the failure of State
Governments to implement various provisions of the Act of 2000
including, inter alia, the establishment of Child Welfare
Committees, Juvenile Justice Boards, Special Juvenile Police Units,
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establishment of appropriate Homes for children in need of care
and protection, improving the living conditions of juveniles in
conflict with law, medical facilities for children in the custody of
the State and several other human rights issues. It is on these broad
facts and averments that relief was prayed for in public interest.
17. The writ petition also drew attention to surveys and researches
conducted in 2004-2005 in various States but it is not necessary to
refer to them in any great detail, notwithstanding their significance
and importance, since they might have lost immediate relevance
with the passage of time.
18. The prayer in the Public Interest Litigation is to the effect that
the Chief Secretaries and the Directors General of Police and
Superintendents of Police of all the States should forthwith
implement the Act of 2000 in its true spirit.
19. There is also a prayer that all respondent States be directed to
provide basic amenities like nutritious food, proper and hygienic
accommodation, educational facilities, recreational facilities and
rehabilitation centres for juveniles in various Homes and to direct
the Collectors of each district to involve reputed NGOs in
implementing the orders of this Court.
20. The Act of 2000 has since been repealed and what is now in
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force is the JJ Act. The repeal of the Act of 2000 does not at all
change the sum and substance of the reliefs claimed in the Public
Interest Litigation. As such this petition though filed way back in
2005 is not infructuous, the issues raised being very much topical
and alive even today.
Proceedings in this Court
21. The writ petition was first taken up for consideration on 26th
September, 2005 when notices were issued to all the respondents
(Union of India and States). After service of notice (which itself
took about one year!) the matter was taken up on 3rd January, 2007
and it was observed that the prayer in the writ petition was for
forthwith implementation of the Act of 2000 in its true letter and
spirit and that the petition highlighted some provisions of the said
Act which had not been implemented despite a number of years
having elapsed. It was noted that the writ petition highlights the
horrible conditions in some Homes for children and that this was a
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. Under these
circumstances, the Court required detailed affidavits to be filed by
the respondent States through the Chief Secretary of each State.
22. Reference was made in the order dated 3rd January, 2007 to
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Sheela Barse II v. Union of India 2 which also dealt with
abandoned or destitute children lodged in various jails across the
country for ―safe custody‖. It was noted in that decision that the
National Policy for the Welfare of Children contained the
following preamble:
―The nation‘s children are a supremely important asset.
Their nurture and solicitude are our responsibility.
Children‘s programmes should find a prominent part in our
national plans for the development of human resources, so
that our children grow up to become robust citizens,
physically fit, mentally alert and morally healthy, endowed
with the skill and motivations needed by society. Equal
opportunities for development of all children during the
period of growth should be our aim, for this would serve
our large purpose of reducing inequality and ensuring
social justice‖.
23. The Court noted in that decision that if a child is a national
asset (as per the National Policy), it is the duty of the State to look
after the child with a view to ensuring full development of the
personality and that is why statutes dealing with children provide
that a child shall not be kept in jail. It was directed that on no
occasion should children be kept in jail and if a State Government
does not have sufficient accommodation in its remand homes or
observation homes for children, they should be released on bail
instead of being subjected to incarceration in jail.

2
(1986) 3 SCC 632
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24. It was also emphasized that Juvenile Courts should be set up
in each district and there must be a special cadre of Magistrates
who are suitably trained for dealing with cases against children.
Some other directions were also issued but they arise out of the
Childrens‘ Act and are presently not relevant. Reference was also
made in the order to Sheela Barse v. Union of India3 wherein this
Court reiterated its decision referred to above.
25. It was noted that Juvenile Justice Boards (for short ‗JJBs‘) and
Child Welfare Committees (for short ‗CWCs‘) under the Act of
2000 have been constituted in very few districts. It was also noted
that some observation homes are like prisons with uniformed or
armed police.
26. After a few subsequent hearings and completion of pleadings,
the Court impleaded the National Commission for Protection of
Child Rights (the NCPCR) by an order dated 14th February, 2011
and the National Legal Services Authority (for short ‗NALSA‘) by
an order dated 11th July, 2011. In the hearing on 19th August, 2011
quite a few suggestions were made by NALSA in respect of child
rights. We will consider these submissions at the appropriate stage.
27. During the course of hearing, the Court lamented the

3
(1988) 4 SCC 226
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confusion and uncertainty about the availability of statistics
relating to the number of juveniles in conflict with law in each
district and details of such children. This made it difficult to
make an effective plan for providing legal aid or providing
appropriate Homes. The State Legal Services Authorities were
therefore required to collect data and NALSA was required to
make data available to the Court for issuing further directions. The
Court also observed that CWCs and JJBs are not functional or not
constituted in every district. Accordingly the State Legal Services
Authorities were requested to coordinate with the appropriate
Department in the State Government to ensure that CWCs and
JJBs are established as per the Act of 2000.
28. Pursuant to the order dated 19th August, 2011 a detailed and
excellent Report was prepared by NALSA in three parts on the
existing facilities for implementation of the Act of 2000, with the
month and year of reporting being August 2011.
29. When the case was again taken up on 12th October, 2011 the
Court reiterated the importance of the directions passed on 19th
August, 2011 and also added focus to setting up Special Juvenile
Police Units under Section 63 of the Act of 2000. Directions were
given in this regard to the Home Department and the Director
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General of Police of all the States and Union Territories to ensure
that there is at least one police officer in every Police Station who
has the necessary aptitude and is given appropriate training and
orientation to function as a Juvenile or Child Welfare Officer.
The State Legal Services Authorities and NALSA were requested
to provide necessary training and orientation in phases to such
officers.
30. The Home Department and the Directors General of Police
were also directed to ensure that Special Juvenile Police Units are
set up in every district and city to coordinate and upgrade the
treatment of juveniles in conflict with law and children in need of
care and protection as required by sub-section (3) of Section 63 of
the Act of 2000.
31. When the case was taken up for consideration on 11th
September, 2015 by the Social Justice Bench of this Court, it was
noticed that the Union of India had filed affidavits on 31st July,
2015 and 9th September, 2015. From a reading of these affidavits, it
appeared that a large number of Homes were not registered under
the provisions of the Act of 2000. Since this was a matter of
concern (with a possibility of trafficking of children), the learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India was
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requested to look into the matter and he submitted that the Union
of India had initiated steps to ensure that the Homes run by NGOs
get registered under the Act of 2000 in a few months time.
32. Soon thereafter, the JJ Act was passed by Parliament and
brought into force on 15th January, 2016. The JJ Act brought in
several changes in the juvenile justice regime but the substratum of
the petition filed by Sampurna Behura remained unaffected.
33. Her PIL was taken up on 15th February, 2016 in the above
background and after hearing learned counsel for the parties and
going through various orders passed by this Court from time to
time, the following issues were identified as needing serious
consideration and deliberation:
1. Constitution of State Child Protection Society.
2. Constitution of State Commissions for the Protection
of Child Rights.
3. Establishment of Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) in
every district (if necessary more than one in some
districts) and their training.
4. Establishment of Child Welfare Committees (CWCs)
and their training.
5. Appointment of Probation Officers and their training.
6. Establishment of Special Juvenile Police Units in
every Police Station, their training and updating the
Police Training Manual.
7. Provision for legal aid lawyers and their training.
8. Proper selection of members of JJBs and CWCs.
9. Assessment of manpower requirements of JJBs and
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CWCs and filling up the vacancies.
10.Furnishing of on-line quarterly reports by the State
Governments.
11.Significance of Social Investigation Report.
12.Principal Magistrates should exclusively deal with
Juvenile Justice inquiries.
13.Registration of child care institutions.
14.Improvement of living conditions in government run
child care institutions.
15.Establishment of Juvenile Justice Fund.
34. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on 9th May, 2016 when the
learned Additional Solicitor General stated that the process of
collecting and updating information online was underway in
MWCD and was proceeding at a fast pace and that he expected it
to be completed very soon. He also stated that the names of
persons in various positions, such as members of JJBs and CWCs
would be placed on the website of MWCD so that it would be easy
to contact them whenever necessary. Learned Additional Solicitor
General stated that the assistance of the State Governments and the
Union Territories was required for completing the project.
Accordingly this Court directed the State Governments and the
Union Territories to render necessary assistance to the Union of
India for updating the information and keeping it updated from
time to time.
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35. As far as NALSA is concerned, it submitted on record a copy
of the Training Module for Legal Services Lawyers and Probation
Officers but it was suggested by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for NALSA that since the Modules were prepared on the
basis of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Rules, 2007 NALSA would conduct some pilot training
programmes to ascertain their efficacy and subsequently bring
them in line with the new Rules to be framed under the JJ Act.
36. In the hearing on 22nd August, 2016 the Union of India was
required to consider the feasibility of urgently providing computers
and internet connectivity to the Juvenile Justice Boards and Child
Welfare Committees.
37. The matter was again taken up on 17th February, 2017 by
which time considerable progress had been made by MWCD in the
online collection of information to the extent that a Central Level
Monitoring Format had been prepared which could easily be filled
up by the States and Union Territories for providing full
information which could be collated.
38. We also required, in addition to the collated information, that
the State Commission for Protection of Child Rights (SCPCR)
should be in place in every State and Union Territory. It may be
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mentioned that the SCPCR is a body constituted under the
provisions of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act,
2005 with a variety of functions as detailed in Section 13 of the
said Act.
39. On 5th April, 2017 and on 11th July, 2017 we noted the
information made available on the composition and constitution of
the SCPCRs and on an overall view of the matter it was found that
a large number of vacancies existed and that little or nothing was
being done by some of the State Governments to fill them up or to
show any urgency in respect of protection of the rights of children.
40. Subsequently, on 15th November, 2017 we required MWCD to
inform us of the amounts lying in the Juvenile Justice Fund in each
State and Union Territory.
41. With all this information available on record in some form or
the other, we heard the submissions of learned counsel for the
parties on 20th November, 2017 and reserved judgment.
42. We have gone into detail with regard to some of the more
important proceedings that have taken place in the matter from the
time when the Public Interest Litigation was instituted only to
highlight various dimensions to the problems faced by children and
the casual approach that most State Governments and Union
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Territories have towards the rights of children. It is easy to forget
that children also deserve dignified treatment and merely because
they have no voice in the affairs of State, it does not mean that they
are inconsequential members of society who can be compelled to
live in conditions that are uncomfortable (to say the least) and who
have little or no access to justice.
Affidavits filed by MWCD
43. During the progress of the case, MWCD filed a few status
reports and affidavits.
44. In an affidavit filed on 31st July, 2015 the status of an online
Central Level Monitoring System being implemented by MWCD
was indicated. Briefly, each State and Union Territory is given a
login ID and password to access the formats, feed data and submit
Reports to MWCD. Very broadly, the areas covered by the Reports
are Homes and Children, Open Shelters, Specialized Adoption
Agencies, Non-Institutional Care, Child Welfare Committees,
Juvenile Justice Boards and Service Delivery Structures. This is a
very forward-looking step and a major attempt to collect
information so that the JJ Act could be effectively implemented
and the planning process more structured rather than ad hoc.
45. MWCD filed another affidavit on 8th September, 2015 which
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indicated requests made to States and Union Territories to adhere
to the requirements of entering information in the software as
required by the Central Level Monitoring System. An indication
was given in the affidavit regarding the extent of compliance. For
the period 2014-15 it was stated that while most States and Union
Territories had provided the necessary information, as many as 7
States were not fully compliant. For the period 2015-16 most
States did not provide the necessary information. Those who did
were Assam, Union Territory of Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh,
Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Tripura.
46. MWCD filed a status report on 4th December, 2015 giving the
details of Child Care Institutions and their registration as well as
the availability of Probation Officers in the States and Union
Territories. Unfortunately, as per the affidavit the status was quite
unsatisfactory in the sense that not many Child Care Institutions
had been registered and there was a serious shortage of Probation
Officers. In a further affidavit of 12th February, 2016 MWCD
stated that steps were being taken for the registration of Child Care
Institutions and it also indicated the role of a Probation Officer in
the scheme of things.
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47. In yet another affidavit filed by MWCD on 29th March, 2016 a
factual response was given with regard to the 15 issues identified
by this Court on 15th February, 2015.
48. MWCD filed its final status report on 3rd May, 2016 in which
it was stated that some formats for information given in the Central
Level Monitoring System were added in view of the 15 issues
identified by this Court.
49. In the affidavit dated 11th January, 2017 it was disclosed by
MWCD that the availability and use of computers and peripherals
for juvenile justice issues was in quite a poor state. In fact,
complete information in this regard was not made available to
MWCD by the States and Union Territories.
50. In the final affidavit filed by MWCD it was disclosed that a
National Consultation was held on 26th September, 2017 and it
appears from a reading of the affidavit that there is considerable
improvement in the understanding of child rights and juvenile
justice issues by the participants, but there is still a lot to be done.
Unfortunately, the minutes of the National Consultation have not
been placed on record.
Information and data provided by NALSA
51. As far as NALSA is concerned, it had carried out a
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remarkable study and placed on record a three part Report on
issues pertaining to Juvenile Justice Boards, Child Welfare
Committees and Homes under the Act of 2000. Even though the
reports prepared by NALSA are extremely useful, since they are
now quite dated (with data upto August 2011) they are not being
referred to in any detail.
52. NALSA gave another Report on 20th July, 2015 in which it
was pointed out that a large number of inquiries are pending before
the JJBs. It was pointed out that in Uttar Pradesh alone there are
34,569 inquiries pending and in district Durg in Chhattisgarh, there
are 1883 inquiries pending before the JJBs. It was pointed out in
the report that many of the JJBs did not sit on a regular basis with
some sitting maybe once or twice a week. It was also pointed out
that in some places the distance between the Observation Home
and the JJB was considerable. It was submitted that there was a
need for Probation Officers who would deal exclusively with
juvenile justice issues.
53. At this stage, it may be mentioned that in May 2016 a
Training Module for Probation Officers was brought out by
NALSA. This Training Module has since been utilized by NALSA
and we have been given to understand that it has been found to be
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extremely useful and beneficial as a training guide.
Submissions made by the petitioner
54. On its part, the petitioner submitted a large number of steps
that need to be taken to improve the lives of children in Child Care
Institutions and enable them to live with dignity. Suggestions were
also given by the petitioner on 10th and 25th September, 2013 and
10th May, 2016 on several aspects of child rights and juvenile
justice. Most of these suggestions complement the suggestions
given by NALSA.
Discussion, suggestions and recommendations
(i) National and State Commissions for Protection of Child
Rights
55. Child related laws enacted by Parliament provide for two
extremely important policy and decision-making institutions in
respect of children and child rights, namely the NCPCR and the
SCPCRs. Similarly, two extremely important bodies have been
provided for at the ground or grass-roots level for implementation
of the JJ Act, namely the State Child Protection Society and the
District Child Protection Unit. In our opinion, if these institutions
and bodies perform their duties as required by the laws made by
Parliament, under the supervision and guidance of the concerned
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State Government and the Government of India, recognition and
enforcement of child rights could actually become a reality in our
country.
56. The Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005
provides for the Central Government constituting a body to be
known as the NCPCR at the national level and the State
Governments constituting a body to be known as the SCPCR at the
State level. The composition of the NCPCR is provided for in
Section 3 of the statute while a similar composition of the SCPCR
is provided for in Section 17 of the statute. Section 3 of the
Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act reads as follows:
―3. Constitution of National Commission for Protection
of Child Rights.—(1) The Central Government shall, by
notification, constitute a body to be known as the National
Commission for Protection of Child Rights to exercise the
powers conferred on, and to perform the functions
assigned to it under this Act.
(2) The Commission shall consist of the following
Members, namely:—
(a) a Chairperson who, is a person of eminence and has
done outstanding work for promoting the welfare of
children; and
(b) six Members, out of which at least two shall be women,
from the following fields, to be appointed by the Central
Government from amongst persons of eminence, ability,
integrity, standing and experience in,—
(i) education;
(ii) child health, care, welfare or child development;
(iii) juvenile justice or care of neglected or marginalized
children or children with disabilities;
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(iv) elimination of child labour or children in distress;
(v) child psychology or sociology; and
(vi) laws relating to children.
(3) The office of the Commission shall be at Delhi.‖
57. It is quite apparent that at the national level, the NCPCR is an
institution consisting of eminent persons and experts in their
respective fields. As such, they are expected to look at issues
concerning the welfare of children in the national perspective
taking into consideration the views of every SCPCR and other
stakeholders. At the State level, the SCPCR is an equally
significant body consisting of eminent persons and experts. They
are expected to take policy decisions for the benefit of the children
in their State, regardless of which State the children originally
belong to, for there might be children of one State who are in need
of care and protection but in a Child Care Institution of another
State.
58. The functions of the NCPCR and the SCPCR are more or less
the same except that one performs these functions at the national
level, while the other performs these functions at the State level.
Section 13 of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act,
2005 details the functions of the NCPCR and this reads as follows:
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―13. Functions of Commission.—(1) The Commission
shall perform all or any of the following functions,
namely:—
(a) examine and review the safeguards provided by or
under any law for the time being in force for the
protection of child rights and recommend measures for
their effective implementation;
(b) present to the Central Government, annually and at
such other intervals, as the Commission may deem fit,
reports upon the working of those safeguards;
(c) inquire into violation of child rights and recommend
initiation of proceedings in such cases;
(d) examine all factors that inhibit the enjoyment of rights
of children affected by terrorism, communal violence,
riots, natural disaster, domestic violence, HIV/AIDS,
trafficking, maltreatment, torture and exploitation,
pornography and prostitution and recommend appropriate
remedial measures;
(e) look into the matters relating to children in need of
special care and protection including children in distress,
marginalized and disadvantaged children, children in
conflict with law, juveniles, children without family and
children of prisoners and recommend appropriate remedial
measures;
(f) study treaties and other international instruments and
undertake periodical review of existing policies,
programmes and other activities on child rights and make
recommendations for their effective implementation in the
best interest of children;
(g) undertake and promote research in the field of child
rights;
(h) spread child rights literacy among various sections of
the society and promote awareness of the safeguards
available for protection of these rights through
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publications, the media, seminars and other available
means;
(i) inspect or cause to be inspected any juvenile custodial
home, or any other place of residence or institution meant
for children, under the control of the Central Government
or any State Government or any other authority, including
any institution run by a social organisation; where children
are detained or lodged for the purpose of treatment,
reformation or protection and take up with these
authorities for remedial action, if found necessary;
(j) inquire into complaints and take suo motu notice of
matters relating to,—
(i) deprivation and violation of child rights;
(ii) non-implementation of laws providing for protection
and development of children;
(iii) non-compliance of policy decisions, guidelines or
instructions aimed at mitigating hardships to and ensuring
welfare of the children and to provide relief to such
children,
or take up the issues arising out of such matters with
appropriate authorities; and
(k) such other functions as it may consider necessary for
the promotion of child rights and any other matter
incidental to the above functions.
(2) The Commission shall not inquire into any matter
which is pending before a State Commission or any other
Commission duly constituted under any law for the time
being in force.‖
59. It will be seen from the above that both the NCPCR and the
SCPCR have a range and variety of functions to perform and each
one of them entails a great deal of responsibility. We have been
given to understand that both the Government of India and the
State Governments have not been giving these bodies the freedom
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to decide on broad policy matters and indeed in some instances,
particularly relating to the SCPCR, vacancies have not been filled
up for several months. In fact, the NCPCR was compelled to file a
writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court for a
mandamus to the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and
the Union Territory of Chandigarh to fill up the vacancies of
members of the SCPCR.4 Unfortunately, at one point of time, even
the position of the Chairperson of the NCPCR was lying unfilled
for several months, until, on the directions of this Court, the
position was eventually filled up. We need hardly say that unless
the NCPCR and the SCPCRs are given due importance by the
Government of India and the State Governments and vacancies are
filled up in time, the enforcement of the rights of children will
remain on the back burner and any number of welfare schemes
formulated by the Government of India or by the State
Governments will remain unimplemented or their implementation
will remain sketchy and symbolic.
60. We hope and trust that those in authority and power in the
Government of India and in the State Governments appreciate the

4 Court on its own motion v. State of Punjab and The National Commission for the Protection of Child
Rights (NCPCR) v. The State of Haryana and Others, Decided on 9
th April, 2013 and reported as
MANU/PH/0599/2013
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importance of adhering to the provisions of the laws enacted by
Parliament and ensure that the NCPCR at the National level and
the SCPCR at the State level actually function and perform their
duties and recognize their responsibilities.
(ii) State Child Protection Society and the District Child
Protection Unit
61. In the absence of any clear-cut guidelines on who should be
appointed to these two bodies, the State Governments have found
an easy way out by appointing Government officials only and
leaving out members of civil society. In our opinion, the
constitution of the State Child Protection Society and the District
Child Protection Unit need serious consideration so that all
stake-holders, including the police and NGOs are actively involved
in the performance of the functions, duties and responsibilities of
these two bodies.
62. The functions of the State Child Protection Society and the
District Child Protection Unit are detailed in Rule 84 and Rule 85
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model
Rules, 2016 framed by the Government of India. [It may be noted
that some States have framed their independent Rules, but we are
not referring to them]. The functions are varied, extensive and
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geared to improve the living conditions of children through
different strategies and with the involvement of all stake-holders.
63. For the effective implementation of the JJ Act and the
policies laid down by the NCPCR and the SCPCRs, Section 106 of
the JJ Act provides for the constitution of a State-level Child
Protection Society and a District-level Child Protection Unit.
Section 106 of the JJ Act reads as follows:
―106. State Child Protection Society and District Child
Protection Unit.—Every State Government shall
constitute a Child Protection Society for the State and
Child Protection Unit for every District, consisting of such
officers and other employees as may be appointed by that
Government, to take up matters relating to children with a
view to ensure the implementation of this Act, including
the establishment and maintenance of institutions under
this Act, notification of competent authorities in relation to
the children and their rehabilitation and co-ordination with
various official and non-official agencies concerned and to
discharge such other functions as may be prescribed.‖
64. A perusal of the above provision broadly indicates that the
primary function of the State Child Protection Society and the
District Child Protection Unit is to ensure implementation of the JJ
Act. In addition, these bodies are obliged to ensure that the
institutions under the JJ Act are established and maintained,
competent authorities in relation to children and their rehabilitation
are in place and these two bodies are also required to coordinate
with Government officials as well as NGOs to discharge their
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wide-ranging functions. The involvement of civil society through
NGOs is a progressive step and these two bodies are expected to
take their assistance from time to time.
65. If these two bodies actually perform their duties,
responsibilities and functions in the manner expected of them, the
implementation of the JJ Act would no longer be an issue.
Unfortunately, we have been informed that these bodies are not
functioning in many places or in the manner in which they are
expected to and in several districts the District Child Protection
Unit has not even been constituted. We expect remedial steps to be
taken by all concerned.
(iii) Juvenile Justice Boards and Child Welfare Committees
66. With regard to the establishment of JJBs, we were given to
understand that most districts now have a JJB, but it is high time
that every district in every State must have a JJB. An exception
could perhaps be made, such as in some districts of Arunachal
Pradesh where there is perhaps no juvenile crime or, there could be
some districts where the number of inquiries are very few in which
event the JJB may appropriately schedule its sittings. Similarly, a
‗circuit JJB‘ could be considered if there are some adjacent
districts where the number of pending inquires is quite few.
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67. We have also been given to understand that the appointment
of some social workers as members of the JJB is not necessarily in
accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of the JJ Act. The
relevant provision in this regard reads as follows:
―4. Juvenile Justice Board :– 1. xxx xxx xxx
2. A Board shall consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Judicial Magistrate of First Class not being Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate
(hereinafter referred to as Principal Magistrate) with at
least three years experience and two social workers
selected in such manner as may be prescribed, of whom at
least one shall be a woman, forming a Bench and every
such Bench shall have the powers conferred by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) on a Metropolitan
Magistrate or, as the case may be, a Judicial Magistrate of
First Class.
3. No social worker shall be appointed as a member of the
Board unless such person has been actively involved in
health, education, or welfare activities pertaining to
children for atleast seven years or a practicing
professional with a degree in child psychology, psychiatry,
sociology or law.
4. xxx xxx xxx
5. The State Government shall ensure that induction
training and sensitization of all members including
Principal Magistrate of the Board on care, protection,
rehabilitation, legal provisions and justice for children, as
may be prescribed, is provided within a period of sixty
days from the date of appointment.
6. and 7. Xxx xxx xxx.‖
68. The selection of social workers as members of the JJB is
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required to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 88 read with Rule 87 of the Model Rules. It must be
appreciated that the appointment of social workers is serious
business, inasmuch as they bring their experience - practical and
professional - while conducting an enquiry under the JJ Act. This
becomes all the more important when it is appreciated that the
social workers can also conduct an enquiry independent of the
Principal Magistrate as provided for in Section 7 of the JJ Act.
However, the final disposition of the enquiry cannot be without the
Principal Magistrate as mandated in the proviso to sub-section (3)
of Section 7 of the JJ Act. There is therefore a heavy responsibility
on the social workers to make a meaningful contribution during the
course of an enquiry and also at the time of its disposition.
69. In this context, it is important to note that the training of the
Principal Magistrate as well as the social workers is extremely
important and this is provided for in Rule 89 of the Model Rules.
Unfortunately, the duration of training and the curriculum and
course have not yet formulated, and the nature of training given to
the Principal Magistrate and the social workers is somewhat ad hoc
and unstructured. The lack of meaningful and effective training
(and refresher courses) can have a vital impact on the ultimate
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disposition of an enquiry as also on the rehabilitation and
reintegration of a juvenile in conflict with law who is before the
JJB. Serious thought is required to be given to this not only from
the point of view of awareness of the law and child rights but also
from the point of view of sensitization of the JJBs, case
management and creation of a child friendly ambience and
environment within the JJB for a juvenile in conflict with law. It
appears to us that not much thought has been given to these aspects
of the functioning of the JJBs and that is perhaps the reason why a
very large number of inquiries are pending as mentioned above,
with the State of Uttar Pradesh topping the list.
70. On the functioning of the JJBs, it is worth referring to the
following passage from a decision of the Gauhati High Court in
Naisul Khatun v. State of Assam and Ors.5
―The second disturbing aspect of the case is that it appears
the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under section 4 of
the Act did not actually sit or assemble to deal with the
case of the juvenile. We say so because from the original
case records we find that all the order sheets passed in the
matter, including those refusing bail, to juvenile have all
been signed only by the Principal Magistrate of the
Juvenile Justice Board. There is nothing to suggest that the
two social worker members of the Board ever met to
consider the request of the juvenile's father to grant him
bail. This is rather unfortunate because the application of

5
2011 Cri LJ 326 = 2010 SCC Online Gau 225
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mind has to be by the Juvenile Justice Board and not only
by the Principal Magistrate.‖
71. The submissions made before us by learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as by learned counsel appearing for NALSA
suggest that the JJBs do not have daily sittings. Of course, this
would depend upon the number of inquiries pending before each
JJB, but clearly if there are a large number of inquiries pending, it
is the obligation of the JJB to sit on a daily basis so that the
enquiry is concluded within the time limit prescribed by the JJ Act.
It does not serve any purpose at all if an enquiry remains pending
for a considerable period of time - no one benefits by the delay in
the disposition of an enquiry. In this context, we may also add that
where a large number of inquiries are pending, it would be
worthwhile for the State Government and the High Court to
consider having more than one JJB. In Delhi, for instance, there are
as many as three JJBs functioning at any given point of time and
that is because of the large number of pending enquiries. Similar
steps can be taken by some of the other State Governments as well
as by the High Courts after evaluating and making an assessment
of the need for more than one JJB being established in a district.
72. During the course of hearing, we had emphasized the need
for a study to be conducted by the State Governments on whether
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there is adequate staff available with the JJBs. Unfortunately, the
response was rather poor and we were only told that there is
adequate staff available. It must be appreciated that a JJB is
virtually in the nature of a court, although it does not conduct a
trial, but only conducts an enquiry. Nevertheless, it does need
adequate staff to perform its functions in an efficient manner. The
JJB also has several administrative functions and they need due
attention so that there is effective coordination between the JJB,
the officials of the Observation Home, the police, the juvenile in
conflict with law and the parents of that juvenile and lawyers
representing the police as well as the juvenile in conflict with law.
These administrative duties need attention if the JJB is to function
effectively and a casual statement that the JJB has adequate staff,
though possibly correct, is neither here nor there considering the
requirements of the stake-holders who attend the enquiry before
the JJB.
73. In this context, it must also be mentioned that there is a dire
need to have quality legal aid lawyers who can assist juveniles in
conflict with law. This is an issue that must be taken up with all
earnestness by the State Legal Services Authority. Unless a child is
given adequate legal representation, it may impact his or her future,
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more so if the child in conflict with law is found guilty and placed
in a Special Home. On its part, NALSA has brought out a manual
for training of legal aid lawyers and we believe that it will be
extremely useful not only for legal aid lawyers who are
representing juveniles in conflict with law, but also for legal aid
lawyers generally. Similarly, prosecutors also need to be sensitized
and we hope that the State Governments will take necessary steps
to educate and train them keeping in mind the primary objective of
the JJ Act, which is to reintegrate a juvenile in conflict with law in
society and to rehabilitate that juvenile.
74. In the context of conducting an effective enquiry, the role of
a Probation Officer cannot be underestimated nor can we
underestimate the significance of an accurate Social Investigation
Report prepared by a Probation Officer. The duties of a Probation
Officer have been detailed in Rule 64 of the Model Rules and this
reads as follows:
―64. Duties of a Probation Officer. — (1) On receipt
of information from the Police or Child Welfare Police
Officer under clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of
the Act, without waiting for any formal order from the
Board, the Probation Officer shall inquire into the
circumstances of the child as may have bearing on the
inquiry by the Board and submit a social investigation
report in Form 6 to the Board.
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(2) The social investigation report should provide for
risk assessment, including aggravating and mitigating
factors highlighting the circumstances which induced
vulnerability such as traffickers or abusers being in the
neighbourhood, adult gangs, drug users, accessibility to
weapons and drugs, exposure to age inappropriate
behaviours, information and material.
(3) The Probation Officer shall carry out the directions
given by the Board and shall have the following duties,
functions and responsibilities:
(i) To conduct social investigation of the child in Form 6;
(ii) To attend the proceedings of the Board and the
Children‘s Court and to submit reports as and when
required;
(iii) To clarify the problems of the child and deal with
their difficulties in institutional life;
(iv) To participate in the orientation, monitoring,
education, vocational and rehabilitation programmes;
(v) To establish co-operation and understanding between
the child and the Person- in-charge;
(vi) To assist the child to develop contacts with family and
also provide assistance to family members;
(vii) To participate in the pre-release programme and help
the child to establish contacts which could provide
emotional and social support to the child after release;
(viii) To establish linkages with Probation Officers in
other Districts and States for obtaining social investigation
report, supervision and follow-up;
(ix) To establish linkages with voluntary workers and
organisations to facilitate rehabilitation and social
reintegration of children and to ensure the necessary
follow-up;
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(x) Regular post release follow-up of the child extending
help and guidance, enabling and facilitating their return to
social mainstreaming;
(xi) To prepare the individual care plan and post release
plan for the child;
(xii) To supervise children placed on probation as per the
individual care plan;
(xiii) To make regular visits to the residence of the child
under his supervision and places of employment or school
attended by such child and submit periodic reports as per
Form 10;
(xiv) To accompany children where ever possible, from
the office of the Board to the observation home, special
home, place of safety or fit facility as the case may be;
(xv) To evaluate the progress of the children in place of
safety periodically and prepare the report including
psycho-social and forward the same to the Children‘s
Court;
(xvi) To discharge the functions of a monitoring authority
where so appointed by the Children‘s Court;
(xvii) To maintain a diary or register to record his day to
day activities such as visits made by him, social
investigation reports prepared by him, follow up done by
him and supervision reports prepared by him;
(xviii) To identify alternatives of community services and
to establish linkages with voluntary sector for facilitating
rehabilitation and social reintegration of children; and
(xix) Any other task as may be assigned.‖
75. It is clear from a reading of the above provision that a
Probation Officer has a very important role to play in ensuring that
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a juvenile in conflict with law is given adequate representation and
a fair hearing before the JJB and the enquiry is conducted in a
manner that is conducive to the rehabilitation of the juvenile in
conflict with law. In this regard, the preparation of an individual
care plan and post release plan gain immense significance and a
Probation Officer has an important role to play in this.
76. Once again, it is of great importance that a Probation Officer
should be given adequate training, sensitization and awareness of
his or her duties and responsibilities. NALSA has made a
significant contribution in this regard by preparing a training
module for Probation Officers. We expect all the State
Governments as well as MWCD to ensure that training is given to
Probation Officers on the lines suggested by NALSA with
improvements being made in adult learning techniques, training
methodology, the curriculum and the course content in due course
of time.
77. The submissions made by learned counsel for all the parties
and our views and conclusions pertaining to the JJBs are equally
applicable to the CWCs and it is not necessary to repeat them.
However, it might be noted that it is not always necessary for the
State Legal Services Authority to appoint legal aid lawyers to assist
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the CWC - this would depend on a case to case basis and only as
an Amicus Curiae for the purpose of advising the CWC on a
question of law, should the need arise.
78. We were informed, somewhat unfortunately, that Child
Welfare Committees are sometimes treated as ‗second class bodies‘
and that payment of honorarium is not made to them on a regular
basis. In addition, they are compelled to hold their sittings in
buildings with very poor infrastructure facilities. This is a sad
commentary on the working of the JJ Act for which the full
responsibility rests on the shoulders of the concerned State
Governments who must remedy the situation.
(iv) Use of technology
79. The use of technology, both by the JJBs as well as by the
CWCs is extremely important and we are disheartened to note
from the affidavits and submissions made by MWCD that there is
an acute shortage of computers and peripherals with the JJBs and
CWCs. Technology is important not only for the effective
functioning of the JJBs and CWCs, but also to deal with issues that
would arise from time to time concerning the tracing and tracking
of missing children, the rescue of children working in hazardous
industries, trafficked children, children who leave the Child Care
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Institutions, victims of child sexual abuse and follow-up action,
among several other requirements. It is well-known that our
country is a technological power-house and if we are unable to take
advantage of the resources available with us and fully utilize the
benefits of technology through computers and the internet for the
benefit of children, our status as a technological power-house
would be in jeopardy and would remain only on paper. Data,
particularly of the magnitude of the kind that we are concerned
with, can be easily collected through the use of computers and the
internet. This would be of great assistance in planning and
management of resources and MWCD and others concerned with
child rights must take full advantage of this.
80. That apart, there can be no doubt that the use of computers
and peripherals would make an immense contribution to the
administrative functioning of the JJBs and CWCs. Both the
Government of India and the State Governments need to look into
this and provide necessary software and hardware to the JJBs and
the CWCs for obvious reasons. We were informed by learned
counsel that the Police authorities in Telangana and Andhra
Pradesh in consultation with the Juvenile Justice Committee of the
High Court have made considerable use of information and
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communication technology and we are of the view that innovative
steps must be encouraged. Similarly, the use of video conferencing
could also be considered in appropriate cases where some
inconvenience to the juvenile in conflict with law necessitates the
use of video conferencing facilities.
81. In the context of the use of technology, MWCD must be
complimented for bringing out an online Central Level Monitoring
System. We have been told by the learned Additional Solicitor
General that this online system is working rather effectively
although it would need upgrading from time to time as the months
go by. The unfortunate part is that there does not seem to be much
active cooperation extended by the State Governments in updating
the information on the Central Level Monitoring System. In one of
the affidavits filed by MWCD and adverted to above, it was stated
that while almost every State Government has filled up the relevant
information for the year 2014-15, but the response was rather
lukewarm with regard to the period 2015-16. Needless to say,
updating information is extremely important so that there can be
efficient planning which will ultimately lead to better management
of issues concerning children. We may mention that the State
Governments are required to fill up the information on the Central
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Level Monitoring System once a quarter and surely that cannot be
a difficult task.
(v) Role of Police
82. An extremely important stake-holder in the effective
implementation of the JJ Act is the local police. Section 107 of the
JJ Act mandates the appointment of a Child Welfare Police Officer
(for short ‗CWPO‘) and a Special Juvenile Police Unit (for short
‗SJPU‘) in each district. The SJPU must also include two social
workers having experience of work in the field of child welfare,
one of them being a woman. The responsibility for appointment
lies on the State Government. Section 107 of the JJ Act reads as
follows:
―107. Child Welfare Police Officer and Special Juvenile
Police Unit. — 1. In every police station, at least one
officer, not below the rank of assistant sub-inspector, with
aptitude, appropriate training and orientation may be
designated as the child welfare police officer to exclusively
deal with children either as victims or perpetrators, in
co-ordination with the police, voluntary and
non-governmental organisations.
2. To co-ordinate all functions of police related to children,
the State Government shall constitute Special Juvenile
Police Units in each district and city, headed by a police
officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of
Police or above and consisting of all police officers
designated under sub-section (1) and two social workers
having experience of working in the field of child welfare,
of whom one shall be a woman.
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3. All police officers of the Special Juvenile Police Units
shall be provided special training, especially at induction as
child welfare police officer, to enable them to perform their
functions more effectively.
4. Special Juvenile Police Unit also includes Railway
police dealing with children.‖
83. We have been given to understand by learned counsel for the
parties that many States have actually appointed CWPOs and set
up SJPUs. Unfortunately, their duties and responsibilities have not
been clearly identified but are generally stated in Rule 86 of the
Model Rules. We have also been given to understand that no
system of effective training for CWPOs and SJPUs has evolved
and many of them exist only symbolically and only because the
law requires them to exist. Since the duties and responsibilities of
the CWPOs and SJPUs have not been specified or identified, it is
high time in our opinion, that the Bureau of Police Research &
Development and the National Police Academy in consultation
with the State Police Academies identify the functions, duties and
responsibilities of the CWPOs and SJPUs. In this regard, we may
note that NALSA has prepared Guidelines for Training
Juvenile/Child Welfare Officers attached to every police station
and members of the Special Juvenile Police Unit. Perhaps this
could be a starting point for their training through the Bureau of
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Police Research & Development and the Police Academies.
84. The importance of training can be appreciated from the
allegations made before the Patna High Court in The Matter of
Letter of Sanat Kumar Sinha (Chief Co-ordinator), Bal Sakha v.
The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar
and Ors.6
It was alleged in that case that a child was handcuffed
by policemen in uniform during his transit from the Police Station
to the Civil Court for his appearance before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate. Additionally, it was alleged that contrary to the
provisions of the Act of 2000 the identity of the child was
disclosed. Of course, the Patna High Court took up the issue with
due seriousness but such a situation ought not to have occurred at
all and could have been avoided through proper training and
sensitization.
85. With regard to the Police generally, it was submitted that due
to the policy of rotation, it often happens that soon after a police
officer completes his or her training that officer is transferred out
to another department. This is a waste of effort and one of the ways
of resolving problems arising out of transfers is for every State
Police Academy to conduct regular training programmes under the

6 MANU/BH/0384/2008
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 48 of 62

guidance of senior police officials of the State and for the State
Government to optimally utilize the services of its officers.
86. Similarly, the Government of India is required to involve
Railway Police for dealing with children. No information or data is
forthcoming in this regard and learned counsel for the parties were
unable to assist us insofar as this aspect is concerned. We expect
the Government of India through the Railways to look into the
matter with some degree of urgency. We were told by learned
counsel that a large number of runaway children and children on
drugs are found in railway stations (and other places) working as
rag-pickers or performing other menial activities. It was submitted
before us that even otherwise, there is rampant drug abuse among
such children. Efforts must be made to establish de-addiction
centres especially for such children and also generally for juveniles
in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection.
(vi) Child Care Institutions
87. There is a lot to be said with regard to Child Care
Institutions. Many of them are housed in run-down buildings and
are hardly conducive to comfortable living even to a minimum
degree. State Governments must appreciate that they are not doing
any charity by putting up children in Child Care Institutions - they
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 49 of 62

are merely performing their statutory and constitutional obligations.
There is, therefore, an urgent need to make an evaluation and
assessment of all the Child Care Institutions in every State to
ascertain their condition, the infrastructure requirements and
staffing requirements. Children live in these Institutions, not
because they want to but because they have no other option, since
most of them are children in need of care and protection. The
obligation of society is to provide solace and comfort to these
children and adherence to the minimum standards of care. Model
Rules contain details for improved Child Care Institutions and their
requirements. The State Governments have merely to adhere to
these minimum requirements. The condition of some State
managed Child Care Institutions is best illustrated by the
observations made by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Court
on its own motion v. State of Punjab (supra) to the following
effect:
―….The sordid state of the said Observation Home
depicted that Observation Home at Sonepat had two
barracks and a front side courtyard with high walls. The
entry gate was similar to jail gate. The Home was having
no source of recreation facilities or playground for the
juveniles housed therein. The courtyard was filled with
stagnated water due to blockage of drainage system and
there was hardly any place for going out of barrack for
using courtyard. Enquiry revealed that there was no
arrangement for potable water. The bathrooms and kitchen
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 50 of 62

were also in deplorable condition. The Observation Home
was managed by a single teacher who, besides performing
job of a teacher, was also looking after the overall
administration of the Home. In this manner, no
meaningful education was being imparted to the children.
The Observation Home was found to be worse than a
prison. Observation Home at Hoshiarpur (Punjab) was
found to be no better with almost similar dilapidated
conditions…..‖
88. There are, of course, additional duties and responsibilities
obligated by the Constitution on the State Governments such as
providing education, health-care (both physical and psychological)
and adequate nutrition. These are huge areas that need to be looked
into with all sincerity by the bodies and institutions established
under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005
and the JJ Act. Concerned citizens like Sampurna Behura can only
highlight the systemic implementation lapses and flaws and hope
that the State Governments and the various bodies constituted
under statutes enacted by Parliament perform their duties and
functions. But, in such exceptional circumstances, the courts are
constitutionally obliged to issue a continuing mandamus in public
interest for implementation of the laws enacted by Parliament,
which is essentially the primary responsibility of the Executive. If
the Executive ignores the mandate of Parliament with continuing
callousness, it will only be to the detriment of the children of our
country.
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 51 of 62

89. In this context, we may add that MWCD has made
considerable efforts in ensuring that Child Care Institutions run
and managed by individuals and NGOs are registered in
accordance with the provisions of the JJ Act. We are quite
surprised that there has been some resistance to registration from
some institutions, as informed by the learned Additional Solicitor
General, and therefore we must make it clear that the law has to be
obeyed as long as it exists on the statute books. It might be
uncomfortable for those who manage some of these Child Care
Institutions, but registration is compulsory and in public interest to
ensure that minimum standards of care are maintained and the
children in those Institutions are well looked after. We may note
that occasionally there are allegations originating from Child Care
Institutions of trafficking and child sexual abuse, some of which
may be unverified, but to avoid any such shameful allegations it is
necessary that their registration, their management and functioning
are strictly monitored by the State Governments and by MWCD.
90. It was suggested by learned counsel that in all Child Care
Institutions, there should be a segregation of children in terms of
age and wherever applicable segregation based on the nature of the
offence allegedly committed so that the possibility of sexual abuse
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 52 of 62

or any other kind of violence is eliminated. Additionally, all such
institutions should be advised to provide vocational or continuing
education with a view to re-settling children in conflict with law
and children in need of care and protection by reintegrating and
mainstreaming them in society. All these are issues of serious
concern and need to be addressed by the State Governments and
SCPCRs.
91. It was emphasized that there should be adequate staff
available in all Child Care Institutions so that they are able to
perform their duties efficiently. It was also suggested that the
location of the JJBs and CWCs should be in close proximity of the
Child Care Institutions to avoid children having to travel long
distances for their appearance before these statutory bodies. All
these suggestions and recommendations made by learned counsel
are issues of concern and must be dutifully addressed by the State
Governments and the SCPCRs.
92. One of the submissions made with regard to Child Care
Institutions was that District Legal Services Authorities may make
unscheduled visits to them to ascertain whether they are in fact
functioning as they should. We are of opinion that this ‗Visitor‘
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 53 of 62

system is definitely worth implementing and we expect NALSA to
go ahead with the suggestion given. In fact, the Chief Justices
Conference in 2006 had specifically adverted to the appointment of
Visitors to Child Care Institutions and in the Chief Justices
Conference in 2013 and 2015 improving the living conditions in
Child Care Institutions was also adverted to. NALSA and the
District Legal Services Authorities must respect the views
expressed in the Chief Justices Conferences.
(vii) Juvenile Justice Fund
93. The JJ Act provides for the constitution of a Juvenile Justice
Fund. The learned Additional Solicitor General placed before us
figures relating to the contribution of the State Governments in the
Juvenile Justice Fund. We are quite distressed to note that some of
the State Governments have not even set up the Juvenile Justice
Fund while one or two State Governments have set up the Fund
with an embarrassing amount of only a few thousand rupees. We
wonder how the welfare of children can be looked after by these
State Governments with such a pittance in the kitty. Obviously,
these State Governments are not seriously concerned about the
welfare of children, which is a pity. This is yet another example of
official apathy to the rights of children and a cause for worry.
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 54 of 62

(viii) Evaluation and assessment
94. Finally, it would be appropriate if some sort of an evaluation
or social audit is carried out every six months for the next couple
of years to monitor and supervise the implementation of the JJ Act.
More than sufficient time has already elapsed since the Act of 2000
was enacted by Parliament and certainly the children of our
country deserve much better and cannot wait for another 15 or 16
years for the effective implementation of the JJ Act. Most of the
children who were born when the Act of 2000 was enacted are
nearing adulthood and many of them have not had the benefit of
the provisions of the Act of 2000. This mistake, a serious one at
that, cannot be repeated in the implementation of the JJ Act. It is
said that children are the future of the country and if they are not
looked after, it is the future of the country that is at stake.
Conclusions and Directions
95. Keeping in mind the concerns expressed by all learned
counsel and the need to invigorate the juvenile justice system in
the country, we are of the view that the following directions ought
to be given and we do so.
1.The Ministry of Women and Child Development in the
Government of India and the State Governments should
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 55 of 62

ensure that all positions in the NCPCR and the SCPRs are
filled up well in time and adequate staff is provided to these
statutory bodies so that they can function effectively and
meaningfully for the benefit of the children.
2. The NCPCR and the SCPCRs should take their duties,
functions and responsibilities with great earnestness keeping
in mind the faith reposed in them by Parliament. A position
in these statutory institutions is not a sinecure. These bodies
have a very significant and proactive role to play in
improving the lives of children across the country.
3. The State level Child Protection Societies and the District
level Child Protection Units have an enormous responsibility
in ensuring that the JJ Act is effectively implemented and
Child Care Institutions are managed and maintained in a
manner that is conducive to the well being of children in all
respects including nutrition, education, medical benefits,
skill development and general living conditions. These two
bodies would be well advised to take the assistance of NGOs
and civil society to ensure that the JJ Act serves the purpose
for which it is enacted by Parliament.
4. The State Governments must ensure that all positions in the
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 56 of 62

JJBs and CWCs are filled up expeditiously and in
accordance with the Model Rules or the Rules framed by the
State Government. Any delay in filling up the positions
might adversely impact on children and this should be
avoided.
5. The JJBs and CWCs must appreciate that it is necessary to
have sittings on a regular basis so that a minimal number of
inquiries are pending at any given point of time and justice is
given to all juveniles in conflict with law and social justice to
children in need of care and protection. This is a
constitutional obligation.
6. The NCPCR and the SCPCRs must carry out time-bound
studies on various issues, as deemed appropriate, under the
JJ Act. Based on these studies, the State Governments and
the Union Territories must take remedial steps.
7. In particular the NCPCR and the SCPCRs must carry out a
study for estimating the number of Probation Officers
required for the effective implementation of the JJ Act.
Based on this study, the State Government must appoint the
necessary number of Probation Officers. It must be
emphasised that the role of a Probation Officer is critical for
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 57 of 62

the rehabilitation and social reintegration of a juvenile in
conflict with law and due importance must be given to their
duties as postulated in the Model Rules and Rules, if any,
framed by the State Governments and the Union Territories.
8. The MWCD must continue to make creative use of
information and communication technology not only for the
purpose of collecting data and information but also for other
issues connected with the JJ Act such as having a database of
missing children, trafficked children and for follow up of
adoption cases etc. With the utilization of technology to the
fullest extent, administrative efficiency will improve
considerably, which in turn will have a positive impact on
the lives of children.
9. It is important for the police to appreciate their role as the
first responder on issues pertaining to offences allegedly
committed by children as well as offences committed against
children. There is therefore a need to set up meaningful
Special Juvenile Police Units and appoint Child Welfare
Police Officers in terms of the JJ Act at the earliest and not
only on paper. In this context, it is necessary to clearly
identify the duties and responsibilities of such Units and
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 58 of 62

Officers and wherever necessary, guidance from the
available expertise, either the National Police Academy or
the Bureau of Police Research and Development or NGOs
must be taken for the benefit of children.
10. The National Police Academy and State Police Academies
must consider including child rights as a part of their
curriculum on a regular basis and not as an isolated or
sporadic event.
11. The management of Child Care Institutions is extremely
important and State Governments and Union Territories
would be well advised to ensure that all such institutions are
registered so that children can live a dignified life in these
Institutions and issues of missing children and trafficking are
also addressed.
12. State Governments and Union Territories would be well
advised to appoint eminent persons from civil society as
Visitors to monitor and supervise the Child Care Institutions
in all the districts. This will ensure that the management and
maintenance of these Institutions are addressed. We have
no doubt that the State Legal Service Authorities and the
District Legal Service Authorities will extend full assistance
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 59 of 62

and cooperation to the government authorities in this venture
as well as to the Visitors.
13. The JJ Fund is a bit of an embarrassment with an absence of
an effective response from the State Governments and the
Union Territories. If financial resources are not made
available for the welfare of the children we shudder to think
what could be better utilization of the funds.
14. NALSA has done a remarkable job in collecting data and
information relating to the JJ Act, as evidenced by the three
part Report prepared by it. We request NALSA to carry
forward the exercise and complete a similar Report
preferably before 30th April, 2018 to assist all the policy
making and decision taking authorities to plan out their
affairs.
15. The importance of training cannot be over-emphasized. It is
vital for understanding and appreciating child rights and for
the effective implementation of the JJ Act. All authorities
such as JJBs and CWCs, Probation Officers, members of the
Child Protection Societies and District Child Protection
Units, Special Juvenile Police Units, Child Welfare Police
Officers and managerial staff of Child Care Institutions must
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 60 of 62

be sensitized and given adequate training relating to their
position. A very positive step has been taken in this regard
by NALSA and we expect the NCPCR with the assistance of
the SCPCRs to carry forward this initiative so that there is
meaningful implementation of the JJ Act.
16. Since the involvement of the State Governments and the
Union Territories is critical to child rights and the effective
implementation of the JJ Act, it would be appropriate if each
High Court and the Juvenile Justice Committee of each High
Court continues its proactive role in the welfare of children
in their State. To make the involvement and process more
meaningful, we request the Chief Justice of every High
Court to register proceedings on its own motion for the
effective implementation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 so that road-blocks if any,
encountered by statutory authorities and the Juvenile Justice
Committee of the High Court are meaningfully addressed
after hearing the concerned governmental authorities. A
copy of this judgment and order should be sent by the
Secretary General of this Court to the Registrar General of
each High Court for being placed before the Chief Justice of
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 61 of 62

every High Court for initiating suo motu proceedings.
96. Finally, we request and urge the Chief Justice of each High
Court to seriously consider establishing child friendly courts and
vulnerable witness courts in each district. Inquiries under the JJ
Act and trials under other statutes such as the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Prohibition of Child
Marriage Act, 2006, trials for sexual offences under the Indian
Penal Code and other similar laws require to be conducted with a
high degree of sensitivity, care and empathy for the victim. It is
often said that the experience in our courts of a juvenile accused of
an offence or the victim of a sexual offence is traumatic. We need
to have some compassion towards them – even juveniles in
conflict with law, since they are entitled to the presumption of
innocence - and establishing child friendly courts and vulnerable
witness courts is perhaps one manner in which the justice delivery
system can respond to ease their pain and suffering. Another
advantage of such child friendly courts and vulnerable witness
courts is that they can be used for trials in which adult women are
victims of sexual offences since they too are often traumatized by
the not so friendly setting and environment in our courts.
97. We record our appreciation for Sampurna Behura for
 W.P. (C) No.473 of 2005 Page 62 of 62

highlighting the issues raised in this Public Interest Litigation and
to learned counsel for the appearing parties in not making this an
adversarial proceeding, but a constructive effort for the benefit of
the children of our country.
98. The petition stands disposed of.
99. The Registry should list the matter on 13th March, 2018 for
directions after obtaining a response from the Registrar General of
each High Court.
 ...……………………J
 (Madan B. Lokur)

 .…………………....J
New Delhi; (Deepak Gupta)
February 9, 2018 

Insurance laws - accident claims - reduction of compensation - contributory negligence - not correct - whether the order of the High Court modified the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhari, on the finding that it was a case of “contributory negligence” and resultantly held that the claimants – injured were entitled to only 50% of the total compensation awarded to them including the enhanced compensation. = It is well settled that the nature of proof required in cases concerning accident claims is qualitatively different from the one in criminal cases, which must be beyond any reasonable doubts. The Tribunal applied the correct test in the analysis of the evidence before it. Notably, the High Court has not doubted the evidence of PW­7 as being unreliable nor has it discarded his version that the driver of the Maruti Car could not spot the parked Gas Tanker due to the flash lights of the oncoming traffic from the front side. Further, the Tribunal also adverted to the legal presumption against the driver of the Gas Tanker of having parked his vehicle in a negligent manner in the middle of the road. The Site Plan (Ext. P­45) reinforces the version of PW­7 that the Truck (Gas Tanker) was parked in the middle of the road but the High Court opined to the contrary without assigning any reason whatsoever. = We set aside the direction given by the High Court in paragraph 16 of the impugned judgment regarding deduction of 50% of the total compensation awarded to the claimants towards contributory negligence.

1
REPORTABLE
             
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7300­7309 OF 2016
ARCHIT SAINI AND ANR. ….   APPELLANTS
                       
:Versus:
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
LTD. AND ORS. ….RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. These appeals take exception to the judgment and order
dated 1st February, 2016 passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh in F.A.O. Nos.1179, 1180, 1181,
1182, 1183, 1318, 1452, 4596, 4597 & 4598 of 2013, whereby
the   High   Court   modified   the   award   passed   by   the   Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhari, on the
finding that it was a case of “contributory negligence” and
resultantly held that the claimants – injured were entitled to
2
only 50% of the total compensation awarded to them including
the enhanced compensation. 
2. The sole question raised in the present appeals is about
the  justness and tenability of the approach of the High Court
in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on the
factum   that   the   motor   accident   which   occurred   on   15th
December, 2011 at about 10.30 P.M. was due to parking of the
offending vehicle bearing No.HR­02­AF­8590 (Gas Tanker) in
the middle of the road in a negligent manner.
3. In the petition for compensation filed before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (for short, “the Tribunal”), it was
alleged that the accident was caused due to parking of the
offending Gas Tanker in the middle of the road without any
indicator or parking lights. The claimant examined the eyewitness
  Sohan   Lal   (PW­7)   who,   in   his   affidavit,   gave   an
account of the cause of accident in the following words: 
“… That on 15.12.2011 at about 10.30 P.M. I along with
P.H.G.   Ajit   Singh   was   present   near   Sanjha   Chulha
Dhaba,   on   the   National   Highway,   (which   leads   to
Jammu) in the area of Village Ajijpur, P.S. Sujanpur. At
that time all the traffic was diverted on the Eastern side
3
of the road, as the Western side of road was closed due
to construction work. In meantime, a Maruti Car No.HR02­K/0448
came from Jammu side (Madhopur side) and
struck against the back of the Gas Tanker as the driver
of   car   could   not   spot   the   parked   tanker   due   to
flash­lights of the oncoming traffic from front side.
Then we rushed towards the spot of accident, and
noticed that the said tanker was standing parked
in  middle   of   the   road,  without  any   indicators   or
parking   lights.   Due   to   the   accident   the   car   was
damaged extensively. The driver of the Car and a lady
sitting by his side, died at the spot. Two children, who
were on the rear seat of car were also injured.”
(emphasis supplied)
4. The   said   witness   was   cross­examined   by   the
respondents.   The   relevant   portion   of   his   cross­examination
reads thus:
“…We   were   standing   on   Dhaba   on   duty   with   our
motorcycle.   The   truck   was   standing   just   opposite   the
dhaba on the other side of the road. I was able to see the
truck at that time. There was no fog at that time. There
was lights on the dhaba and the truck was visible to me
due to light of dhaba. I was standing at the distance
about   70   ft.   from   the   truck   because   there   was   road
between me and the truck. I have heard the voice/sound
caused by the accident only then I noticed at the car
struck against the truck. I have not seen the car before
the accident, and only seen after the accident. I reached
the spot after hearing the sound of accident. I cannot tell
the speed of the car because I have not seen the car. The
4
road is about 88 ft. wide i.e. 44 ft. on each side with a
divider in between. The left portion of the truck was just
on the edge of the road towards the kucha portion.”
5. The   respondents   had   opposed   the   claim   petition   and
denied their liability but did not lead any evidence on the
relevant issue to dispel the relevant fact. The Tribunal after
analysing   the   evidence,   including   the   Site   Map   (Ext.P­45)
produced on record along with charge­sheet filed against the
driver   of   the   Gas   Tanker   and   the   arguments   of   the
respondents, answered issue No.1 against the respondents in
the following words: 
“21. Our own Hon’ble High Court in a case captioned
Lekhu Singh and other Vs. Udey Singh and others, (2007
4 PLR 507 held that while considering a claim petition,
the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry and act not as
criminal court so as to find whether the claimants have
established   the   occurrence   beyond   shadow   of   any
reasonable doubt. In the enquiry, if there is prima facie
evidence   of   the   occurrence   there   is   no   reason   to
disbelieve such evidence. The statements coupled with
the facts of registration of FIR and trial of the accused in
a criminal court are sufficient to arrive at a conclusion
that the accident has taken place. Likewise, in Kusum
Lata Vs. Satbir, 2011 (2) RCR © 379 (SC) Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that in a case relating to motor accident
claims, the claimants are not required to rove the case as
5
it is required to be done in a criminal trial. The Court
must   keep   this   distinction   in   mind.   Strict   proof   of   an
accident   caused   by   a   particular   bus   in   a   particular
manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants.
The claimants were merely to establish their case on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been
applied.
22. After considering the submissions made by both the
parties, I find that PW7 Sohan Lal eye­witness to the
occurrence   has   specifically   stated   in   his   affidavit   Ex.
PW7/A tendered in his evidence that on 15.12.2011 at
about   20.30   p.m.   he   alongwith   PHG   Ajit   Singh   was
present near Sanjha Chulha Dhaba on the National High
Way leads to Jummu. All the traffic of road was diverted
on the eastern side of the road on account of closure of
road on western side due to construction work. In the
meantime a Maruti car bearing No.HR­02­K­0448 came
from Jammu side and struck against the back of Gas
Tanker as the driver of the car could not spot the parked
tanker due to the flash lights of the oncoming traffic from
front side. Then they rushed towards the spot of accident
and noticed that the said tanker was standing parked in
the middle of the road without any indicators or parking
lights.
23.  The   statement   of   this   witness   clearly
establishes that this was the sole negligence on the
part of the driver of the gas tanker especially when
the accident was caused on 15.12.2011 that too at
about  10.30  p.m. which is generally  time of  pitch
darkness. In this way, the driver of the car cannot
be   held   in   any   way   negligent   in   this   accident.
Moreover, as per Rules 15 of the Road Regulations,
1989 no vehicle is to be parked on busy road.
6
24.   The arguments of learned counsel for respondent
that PW7 Sohan Lal has stated in his cross­examination
that there was no fog at that time and there were lights
on the Dhaba and the truck was visible to him due to
light of Dhaba and he was standing at the distance of 70
feet from the truck being road between him and the truck
and he noticed at the car when he heard voice/sound
caused by the accident  so the respondent no.1 is not at
all   negligent   in   this   accident  but   these   submissions
will   not   make   the   car   driver   to   be   in   any   way
negligent and cannot give  clean  chit to the driver
of   the   gas   tanker   because   there   is   a   difference
between the visibility of a standing vehicle from a
place where the person is standing and by a person
who   is  coming  driving  the  vehicle  because  due  to
flash lights of vehicles coming from front side the
vehicle coming from opposite side cannot generally
spot   the   standing   vehicle   in   the   road   that   too   in
nights time when there is neither any indicator or
parking   lights   nor   blinking   lights   nor   any   other
indication   given   on   the   back   of   the   stationed
vehicle,  therefore,  the  driver  of  the  car  cannot  be
held to be in any way negligent rather it is the sole
negligence on the part of the driver of the offending
Gas Tanker as held in Ginni Devi and others’ case
(2008   ACJ   1572),   Mohan   Lal’s   case   (2007   1   ACC
785 (Allahabad). It is not the case of the respondent
that the parking lights of the standing truck were
on  or  there  were  any  other   indication  n  the  back
side  of the vehicle standing on the road to enable
the  coming  vehicle  to see  the  standing  truck. The
other arguments of learned counsel for respondent
no.3   that   the   road  was   sufficient  wide   road  and
that   the   car   driver   could   have   avoided   the
accident,   so   the   driver   of   the   car   was   himself
negligent   in   causing   the   accident   cannot   be
accepted  when   it   has  already  been  held   that   the
7
accident has been caused due to sole negligence of
the  driver  of  the  offending  stationed  truck   in  the
busy   road.  The proposition of law laid down in Smt.
Harbans Kaur & others’s case (2010 4 PLR 422 (P&H)
and T.M. Chayapathi & another’s case (2005 IV ACC 61
(AP)  is not disputed at all but these authorities are not
helpful to the respondents being not applicable on the
facts and circumstances of the present case. Likewise,
non­examination of minor children of the age of 14 and 9
years who lost their father and mother in the accident
cannot be held to be in any way detrimental to the case
of the claimants when eye witness to the occurrence has
proved   the   accident   having   been   caused   by   the
negligence of   respondent no.1/driver of the offending
vehicle.
25. Moreover, in Girdhari Lal Vs. Radhey Sham and
others, 1993 (2) PLR 109, Sudama Devi and others
Vs.  Kewal  Ram  and  others,  2008  (1)  PLR  444  and
Pazhaniammal  and  others’s case (2012  ACJ 1370)
our   own  Hon’ble  High   Court   has   held   that   ‘it   is,
prima   facie   safe   to   conclude   in   claim   cases   that
the  accident   has   occurred   on  account   of   rash   or
negligent   driving   of   the   driver,   if   the   driver   is
facing   the   criminal   trial   on   account   of   rash   or
negligent driving.’
26.   Moreover,   the   respondent   no.1/driver   of   the
offending  vehicle  has not appeared in the witness
box   to   deny   the   accident   having   been   caused   by
him,   therefore,   I  am   inclined   to  draw  an  adverse
inference   against   the   respondent   no.1.   In   this
context,   I   draw   support   from   a   judgment   of   the
Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as
Bhagwanti   Devi   vs.   Krishan   Kumar   Sani   and
others,  1986   ACJ  331.    Moreover,   the   respondent
no.1   has   also   not   filed   any   complaint   to   higher
authorities   about   his   false   implication   in   the
8
criminal   case   so   it   cannot   be   accepted   that   the
respondent no.1 has been falsely implicated in this
case.
27.   In   view   of   above   discussion,   it   is   held   that   the
claimants have proved that the accident has been caused
by   respondent   no.1   by   parking   the   offending   vehicle
bearing No. HR­02­AF­8590 on the middle of the road in
a negligent manner wherein Vinod Saini and Smt. Mamta
Saini have been died  and claimants  Archit Saini  and
Gauri Saini have received injuries on their person. Sh.
Vinod Saini deceased who was driving ill fated car on
that day cannot be held to be negligent in any way.
Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of claimants.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. When the matter travelled to the High Court by way of
appeal for enhancement of compensation, while accepting the
claim   of   the   claimants­injured   for   giving   additional
compensation, the High Court overturned the finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal in relation to issue No.1 and opined
that it was a case of contributory negligence of the driver of
the Maruti Car which met with the accident. The High Court
answered the said issue in its judgment as can be discerned
from paragraphs 14 & 15, which read thus:
“14.  So   far  as  the  issue   of  contributory   negligence  is
concerned, it has come in the testimony of Sohan Lal,
PW­7,   that   the   tanker/offending   vehicle   was   parked
9
without   indicator   but   the   same   was   visible   from   a
distance of 70 ft. Moreover, a perusal of site plan Ex.P 45
reveals that the offending vehicle was not parked in the
middle of the road.
15. In view of the statement of PW­7 and site plan Ex.P45,
it is proved that the tanker/offending vehicle was
visible from a distance of 70 ft. and not parked in the
middle of the road. Therefore, in the concerned opinion of
this Court, it is a case of contributory negligence.”
7. In the present appeals, the moot question is whether the
High Court committed manifest error in reversing the  well
considered decision of the Tribunal on issue No.1 answered
against the respondents, instead concluding that it was a case
of 50% contributory negligence on the part of the deceased
driver of the Maruti Car. 
8. After having perused the evidence of PW­7, Site Map (Ext.
P­45) and the detailed analysis undertaken by the Tribunal,
we have no hesitation in taking the view that the approach of
the High Court in reversing the conclusion arrived at by the
Tribunal on issue No.1 has been very casual, if not cryptic and
perverse.  Indeed, the appeal before the High Court is required
to be decided on fact and law. That, however, would not permit
10
the   High   Court   to   casually   overturn   the   finding   of   fact
recorded by the Tribunal.  As is evident from the analysis done
by the Tribunal, it is a well considered opinion and a plausible
view. The High Court has not adverted to any specific reason
as to why the view taken by the Tribunal was incorrect or not
supported by the evidence on record.  It is well settled that the
nature of proof required in cases concerning accident claims is
qualitatively different from the one in criminal cases, which
must be beyond any reasonable doubts. The Tribunal applied
the   correct   test   in   the   analysis   of   the   evidence   before   it.
Notably, the High Court has not doubted the evidence of PW­7
as being unreliable nor has it discarded his version that the
driver of the Maruti Car could not spot the parked Gas Tanker
due to the flash lights of the oncoming traffic from the front
side.   Further,   the   Tribunal   also   adverted   to   the   legal
presumption against the driver of the Gas Tanker of having
parked his vehicle in a negligent manner in the middle of the
road. The Site Plan (Ext. P­45) reinforces the version of PW­7
that the Truck (Gas Tanker) was parked in the middle of the
11
road   but   the   High   Court   opined   to   the   contrary   without
assigning any reason whatsoever. In our view, the Site Plan
(Ext. P­45) filed along with the charge­sheet does not support
the finding recorded by the High Court that the Gas Tanker
was not parked in the middle of the road.  Notably, the High
Court has also not doubted the claimant’s plea that the Gas
Tanker/ offending vehicle was parked without any indicator or
parking lights. The fact that PW­7 who was standing on the
opposite side of the road at a distance of about 70 feet, could
see the Gas Tanker parked on the other side of the road does
not discredit his version that the Maruti Car coming from the
opposite side could not spot the Gas Tanker due to flash lights
of the oncoming traffic from the front side. It is not in dispute
that the road is a busy road. In the cross­examination, neither
has any attempt been made to discredit the version of PW­7
nor has any suggestion been made that no vehicle with flash
lights on was coming from the opposite direction of the parked
Gas Tanker at the relevant time. 
12
9. Suffice it to observe that the approach of the High Court
in   reversing   the   well   considered   finding   recorded   by   the
Tribunal on the material fact, which was supported by the
evidence on record, cannot be countenanced. 
10. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in setting aside the
said finding of the High Court. As a result, the appellants
would   be   entitled   to   the   enhanced   compensation   as
determined   by   the   High   Court   in   its   entirety   without   any
deduction towards contributory negligence.   In other words,
we restore the finding of the Tribunal rendered on issue No.1
against   the   respondents   and   hold   that   respondent   no.1
negligently parked the Gas Tanker/offending vehicle in the
middle of the road without any indicator or parking lights.
11. Accordingly,   we   affirm   the   enhanced   compensation
payable to the claimants as determined by the High Court in
paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:
“13.  In view of the above, the claimants­injured are held
entitled to the enhanced compensation of RS.2,80,000/­
[Rs.30,000/­ (enhancement towards ‘pain and suffering’)
+ Rs.20,000/­ (enhancement towards loss of studies) +
13
Rs.10,000/­   (enhancement   towards   special   diet)   +
RS.1,90,000/­ (enhancement towards ‘loss of love and
affection’)   +   Rs.30,000/­   (enhancement   towards
cremation and last rites)] as indicated above, which shall
be payable within a period of 45 days from the date of
receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, failing which,
the claimants­appellants shall also be entitled to interest
@ 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing the present
appeal till its realization.”
We   set   aside   the   direction   given   by   the   High   Court   in
paragraph 16 of the impugned judgment regarding deduction
of 50% of the total compensation awarded to the claimants
towards contributory negligence. 
12. The   appeals   are   allowed   in   the   aforementioned   terms
with no order as to costs.
 
.………………………….CJI.
        (Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
               (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
February 09, 2018.

Insurance laws - accident claims - future prospects - (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was 48 between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) In case the deceased was self­employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.” = whether the appellants seek further enhancement of compensation amount on the ground that the High Court has not provided for future prospects, while computing the compensation amount. = The compensation awarded by the High Court is enhanced from Rs.5,01,500/­ to Rs.6,74,300/­ [Rupees six lakh seventy four thousand three hundred only]. The respondent Transport Corporation is directed to deposit the entire award amount as indicated above with interest at 9% (nine percent) per annum less the amount already deposited if any, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and the appellants shall be entitled to the compensation in the proportion specified by the Tribunal.

1
REPORTABLE
       
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1754 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12416 of 2016)
Munusamy & Ors. ….   Appellants
                       
Versus
The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State  ….Respondent
Transport Corporation (Villupuram) Ltd.
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal   emanates   from   the   judgment   and   order
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   dated
16.04.2013   in   C.M.A.   No.2819   of   2012.   The   High   Court
allowed   the   prayer   for   grant   of   enhanced   compensation
amount   in   favour   of   the   appellants.   The   appellants   seek
further enhancement of compensation amount on the ground
2
that the High Court has not provided for future prospects,
while computing the compensation amount. The appellants
rely upon the recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Pranay Sethi and Ors.1
, to buttress their submission.
2. Before we deal with the grievance of the appellants, it is
apposite to reproduce the relevant extract of the impugned
judgment which reads thus:
“7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respondent
on the above submission.
8. In the absence of specific proof of employment, the
Tribunal rightly has taken the earning of the deceased at
Rs.4,000/­ per month and deducted 50% towards personal
expenses since the deceased were bachelors. However, the
proper multiplier to be adopted in the case must be 18, since
the deceased were 21 and 20 years respectively. A sum of
Rs.20,000/­ to each of the claimants towards loss of love
and   affection   and   a   further   sum   of   Rs.5,000/­   towards
transport expenses were granted.
9. Accordingly, in C.M.A. No.2819 of 2012 compensation
payable would be as follows:
(a) Loss of Dependency  Rs.4,32,000/­
(Rs.4,000/­×12×18)
(b) Loss of love and affection  Rs.   60,000/­
(c) Transport Rs.  5,000/­
(d) Funeral Rs.  2,000/­
1 AIR 2017 SC 5157
3
(e) Loss of estate Rs.  2,500/­
Total = Rs.5,01,500/­”
3. On perusal of the judgment under appeal, it is evident
that the High Court has not provided for future prospects
while computing the compensation amount under the head
‘loss of dependency’. The necessity to provide future prospects
has been expounded by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in  National   Insurance   Company   Ltd.  (supra).   It   will   be
useful to reproduce paragraph No.59 of the said judgment,
which reads thus: 
“59. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are
disposed   to   think   when   we   accept   the   principle   of
standardization, there is really no rationale not to apply
the said principle to the self­employed or a person who is
on a fixed 44 salary. To follow the doctrine of actual
income at the time of death and not to add any amount
with   regard   to   future   prospects   to   the   income   for   the
purpose   of   determination   of   multiplicand   would   be
unjust.   The   determination   of   income   while   computing
compensation has to include future prospects so that the
method will come within the ambit and sweep of just
compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act.
In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job
with   inbuilt   grant   of   annual   increment,   there   is   an
acceptable   certainty.   But   to   state   that   the   legal
representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary
would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for
the purpose of computation of compensation would be
inapposite.   It   is   because   the   criterion   of   distinction
4
between the two in that event would be certainty on the
one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive
that  the  comparative   measure  is  certainty   on  the   one
hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception
is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a selfemployed
  person;   and   that   apart   there   is   always   an
incessant effort to enhance one’s income for sustenance.
The   purchasing   capacity   of   a   salaried   person   on
permanent   job   when   increases   because   of   grant   of
increments and pay revision or for some other change in
service   conditions,   there   is   always   a   45   competing
attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get
better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person
who is self­employed is bound to garner his resources
and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same
facilities.   To   have   the   perception   that   he   is   likely   to
remain   static   and   his   income   to   remain   stagnant   is
contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude
which always intends to live with dynamism and move
and   change   with   the   time.   Though   it   may   seem
appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of
future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case
of   a   person   having   a   permanent   job,   yet   the   said
perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are
inclined   to   think   that   there   can   be   some   degree   of
difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or
applied  to in respect  of  the legal representatives  who
claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent
job than a person who is self­employed or on a fixed
salary. But not to apply the principle of standardization
on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would
tantamount   to   remaining   oblivious   to   the   marrows   of
ground reality. And, therefore, degree­test is imperative.
Unless the degree­test is applied and left to the parties to
adduce   evidence   to   establish,   it   would   be   unfair   and
inequitable.   The   degree­test   has   to   have   the   inbuilt
concept of 46 percentage. Taking into consideration the
cumulative   factors,   namely,   passage   of   time,   the
changing society, escalation of price, the change in price
index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of
5
life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of
the deceased towards future prospects and where the
deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where
the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years
would be reasonable.”
Again, in the concluding paragraph No.61 the Court observed
thus:
“61. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to
record our conclusions:­
* * *
(iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of
actual   salary   to   the   income   of   the   deceased   towards
future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent
job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made.
The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased
was 48 between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased
was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition
should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual
salary less tax. 
(iv) In case the deceased was self­employed or on a fixed
salary,   an  addition   of   40%   of   the   established   income
should be the warrant where the deceased was below
the   age   of   40   years.   An   addition   of   25%   where   the
deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and
10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to
60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of
computation. The established income means the income
minus the tax component.” 
4. On   03.03.2007,   the   deceased   (Palani),   who   was   only
around 21 years of age at the time, was riding a motorcycle
bearing Registration No. TN­22 AP 5092 along with his friend,
6
one   Haridass   as   a   pillion   rider,   from   Tambaram   to
Chengalpattu   on   GST   Road,   Maraimalai   Nagar,   opposite
Vikram   Hotel,   when   they   collided   with   a   bus   bearing
Registration No. TN­21 N 0943 belonging to the respondent
Transport   Corporation,   which   was   driven   in   a   rash   and
negligent manner. The deceased was unmarried and working
as   a   contract   worker   in   Hyundai   Car   Company,
Sriperumbudur.   Applying   the   dictum   of   the   Constitution
Bench   referred   to   above,   the   appellants   are   justified   in
insisting for grant of future prospects at the rate of 40% of the
established income. The High Court has held that the earning
of   the   deceased   at   the   relevant   time   can   be   taken   as
Rs.4,000/­ per month. The High Court did not provide 40%
towards future prospects on the established income of the
deceased. Thus, the monthly loss of dependency, in the facts
of the present case would be Rs.4,000 + 1,600 = Rs.5,600/­.
5. In other words, instead of amount awarded by the High
Court towards loss of dependency in the sum of Rs.4,32,000/­,
the same will stand modified to Rs.6,04,800/­ (Rupees six
7
lakh four thousand eight hundred only) along with interest at
the   rate   of   9%   (nine   percent)   per   annum.   We   are   not
disturbing the other directions given by the High Court in
respect of other heads.
6. Accordingly, the respondent Transport Corporation must
deposit   the   additional   amount   of   compensation   of
Rs.1,72,800/­  (Rupees one lakh seventy two thousand eight
hundred only) along with interest, as awarded in the preceding
paragraph, within a period of eight weeks from the date of
receipt of the copy of this judgment in the Court of Additional
District   &   Sessions   Judge,   Fast   Track   Court­IV,   Chennai
(Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chennai).
7. In   other   words,   the   compensation   payable   to   the
appellants would be as follows:
(a) Loss of Dependency  Rs.6,04,800/­
[Rs.5,600 – 50% of 5600)×12×18]
(b) Loss of love and affection  Rs.   60,000/­
(c) Transport Rs.   5,000/­
(d) Funeral Rs.   2,000/­
(e) Loss of estate Rs.   2,500/­
Total = Rs.6,74,300/­
8
8. As a result, the Appeal stands allowed. The compensation
awarded by the High Court is enhanced from Rs.5,01,500/­ to
Rs.6,74,300/­ [Rupees six lakh seventy four thousand three
hundred   only].   The   respondent   Transport   Corporation   is
directed to deposit the entire award amount as indicated above
with interest at 9% (nine percent) per annum less the amount
already deposited if any, within a period of eight weeks from
the   date   of   receipt   of   a   copy   of   this   judgment   and   the
appellants   shall   be   entitled   to   the   compensation   in   the
proportion   specified  by   the   Tribunal.   The   first   and   second
appellants   are   entitled   to   withdraw   the   amount   deposited
upon verification of due application and the share of the third
appellant (minor) shall be deposited in any of the nationalised
banks   till   she   attains   majority   and   the   second
claimant/mother is entitled to withdraw interest thereon once
in three months towards meeting the needs of the minor. Upon
turning 18, the minor appellant is entitled to withdraw her
respective share. 
9
9.      Accordingly,   the   appeal   is   allowed   in   the
aforementioned terms with no order as to costs. 
.………………………….CJI.
        (Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
               (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
February 09, 2018.

whether the High Court was right in applying multiplier 14 for determining compensation amount in a motor accident claim case in reference to the age of parents of the deceased whilst relying on the decision of this Court in Ashvinbhai Jayantilal Modi Vs. Ramkaran Ramchandra Sharma and Anr.1 = the appellants are justified in insisting for applying multiplier 18.- In Sarla Verma (supra), at paragraph­19 a twoJudge Bench dealt with this aspect in Step 2. To quote: “19.xxxx xxxxxx xxxx Step 2 (ascertaining the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked out for the accident having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to be age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased.”

1
   REPORTABLE
       
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7176 OF 2015
Sube Singh and Anr. ….   Appellants
                       
Versus
Shyam Singh (Dead) and Ors. ….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. The   sole   question   to   be   answered   in   this   appeal   is:
whether the High Court was right in applying multiplier 14 for
determining compensation amount in a motor accident claim
case in reference to the age of parents of the deceased whilst
relying   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Ashvinbhai
Jayantilal Modi Vs. Ramkaran Ramchandra Sharma and
Anr.1
?
2. Briefly stated, in a motor accident which occurred on
22.09.2009, Ajit Singh, who was at the relevant time 23 years
of age died. His parents, who were in the age group of 40 to 45
1 2015 (2) SCC 180
2
years,   filed   a   petition   claiming   compensation.   The   Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal held that the established income of
the   deceased  was  around   Rs.4,200/­   per  month   and  after
deduction of 50% as the deceased was unmarried, calculated
the same as Rs.2,100/­ per month.   Thereafter, it applied
multiplier 15, taking the age of the “parents of the deceased”
into consideration. This was challenged by the appellants by
way of an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh, being FAO No.330 of 2012 (O&M) which was
partly allowed in relation to other heads of compensation. As
regards multiplier applied for determination of loss of future
income,   the   High   Court   held   that   multiplier   14   will   be
applicable. For that, the High Court relied on the decision of
this Court of (Two Judge Bench) in  Ashvinbhai  Jayantilal
Modi  (supra).   Resultantly,   the   appellants   have   filed   the
present appeal, questioning the correctness of the conclusion
so reached by the High Court. 
3. According to the appellants, the correct multiplier to be
applied in the facts of the present case is 18, as the deceased
3
was only 23 years of age on the date of accident. To buttress
this submission, reliance is placed on the decision in  Sarla
Verma (Smt.) and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation
And Anr.2
. Reliance is also placed on the recent judgment of
this Court (Three Judge Bench) in the case of  Munna   Lal
Jain and Anr. Vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma and Ors.3
, which
has restated the legal position that multiplier should depend
on   the   age   of   the   deceased   and   not   on   the   age   of   the
dependents.
4. On the basis of the finding recorded by the Tribunal and
affirmed by the High Court, it is evident that the deceased was
23 years of age on the date of accident i.e. 22.09.2009. He was
unmarried   and   his   parents   who   filed   the   petition   for
compensation were in the age group of 40 to 45 years. The
High Court, relying on the decision in the case of Ashvinbhai
Jayantilal   Modi  (supra),   held   that   multiplier   14   will   be
applicable in the present case, keeping in mind the age of the
2 2009 (6) SCC 121
3 2015 (6) SCC 347
4
parents of the deceased. The legal position, however, is no
more  res integra.   In the case of  Munna   Lal   Jain  (supra)
decided by a three Judge Bench of this Court, it is held that
multiplier should depend on the age of the deceased and not
on the age of the dependants. We may usefully refer to the
exposition   in   paragraph   Nos.   11   and   12   of   the   reported
decision, which read thus:
“11. The remaining question is only on multiplier. The
High Court following Santosh Devi (supra), has taken 13
as the multiplier. Whether the multiplier should depend
on the age of the dependents or that of the deceased, has
been hanging fire for sometime; but that has been given a
quietus   by   another   three   Judge   Bench   decision   in
Reshma Kumar (supra). It was held that the multiplier is
to be used with reference to the age of the deceased. One
reason appears to be that there is certainty with regard
to   the   age   of   the   deceased   but   as   far   as   that   of
dependents is concerned, there will always be room for
dispute as to whether the age of the eldest or youngest or
even the average etc. is to be taken. To quote
“36.In   Sarla   Verma,   this   Court   has
endeavoured   to   simplify   the   otherwise
complex   exercise   of   assessment   of   loss   of
dependency   and   determination   of
compensation in a claim made under Section
166. It has been rightly stated in Sarla Verma
that the claimants in case of death claim for
the purposes of compensation must establish
(a)   age   of   the   deceased.   (b)   income   of   the
deceased; and (c) the number of dependents.
To   arrive   at   the   loss   of   dependency,   the
5
Tribunal   must   consider   (i)
additions/deductions to be made for arriving
at the income; (ii) the deductions to be made
towards the personal living expenses of the
deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be applied
with reference to the age of the deceased. We
do not think it is necessary for us to revisit
the   law   on   the   point   as   we   are   in   full
agreement with the view in Sarla Verma.”
12. In   Sarla   Verma   (supra),   at   paragraph­19   a   twoJudge
Bench dealt with this aspect in Step 2. To quote:
“19.xxxx xxxxxx  xxxx 
Step 2 (ascertaining the multiplier)
Having regard to the age of the deceased and
period   of   active   career,   the   appropriate
multiplier should be selected. This does not
mean  ascertaining  the  number   of  years  he
would   have   lived   or   worked   out   for   the
accident   having   regard   to   several
imponderables in life and economic factors, a
table of multipliers with reference to be age
has   been   identified   by   this   Court.   The
multiplier   should   be   chosen   from   the   said
table   with   reference   to   the   age   of   the
deceased.”
Considering the aforementioned principle expounded in Sarla
Verma  (supra), which has been affirmed by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Pranay   Sethi   and   Ors.4
,  the   appellants   are   justified   in
insisting for applying  multiplier  18. 
4 AIR 2017 SC 5157
6
5.   A priori, we direct the respondents to pay compensation by
applying 18 multiplier, instead of 14 applied by the High Court.
In other words, considering the amount of annual contribution
to the deceased’s family determined at Rs.37,800/­ and applying
multiplier   18,   the   compensation   would   work   out   to
Rs.6,80,400/­ (Rupees six lakh eighty thousand four hundred
only), instead of Rs. 5,29,200/­ determined by the High Court.
The amount of compensation under other heads determined by
the High Court in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment would
remain undisturbed. The rate of interest is, however, modified to
9% (nine percent) per annum instead of 6% per annum granted
by the Tribunal and High Court. The order passed by the High
Court stands modified to the aforementioned extent.
6.     Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in the aforementioned
terms with no order as to costs. 
.………………………….CJI.
        (Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
               (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
February 09, 2018.

Thursday, February 8, 2018

corporate laws - tax laws - claims the discount as a deduction from the total turnover while arriving at the taxable turnover under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act 2003 (‘the Act’) = The liability to pay tax is on the taxable turnover. Taxable turnover is arrived at after making permissible deductions from the total turnover. Among them are “all amounts allowed as discounts.” Such a discount must, however, be in accord with the regular trade practice of the dealer or the contract or agreement entered into in a particular case. The expression “the tax invoice or bill of sale issued in respect of the sales relating to such discount shows the amount allowed as such discount” is not happily worded. The words “in respect of the sales relating to such discount” cannot be construed to mean that the discount would be inadmissible as a deduction unless the tax invoice pertaining to the goods originally issued shows the discount. This is a matter of ascertainment The assessee must establish from its accounts that the discount relates specifically to the sales with reference to which it is allowed. In the first part of the proviso, Rule 3(2)(c) recognizes trade practice or, as the case may be, the contact or agreement of the dealer. The latter part which provides a methodology for ascertainment does not override the earlier part. Both must be construed together. Above all, it must be remembered that taxable turnover is turnover net of deductions. All trade discounts are allowable as permissible deductions. We accordingly allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court. We direct that in computing the taxable turnover for the relevant years, the appellant would be entitled to a deduction of the trade discount, following the parameters laid down in paragraph 40 of the judgment in Southern Motors (supra) and as explained above.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.357-367 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos 24249-24259 of 2014)
M/s Maya Appliances (P) Ltd now known as Preethi
Kitchen Appliances Pvt. Ltd. .....Appellant
Versus
Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors .....Respondents

J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1 The appellant manufactures home appliances such as mixer grinders, wet
grinders and gas stoves. According to the appellant, based on a regular trade
practice, it allows discounts to its distributors. These discounts may take the form
of a scheme discount or, as the case may be, a quantity discount. The appellant
claims the discount as a deduction from the total turnover while arriving at the
taxable turnover under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act 2003 (‘the Act’).
2
2 On 29 May 2010, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Bengaluru disallowed the quantity discount accorded by the appellant to its
distributors on the ground that the discount was not relatable to the sales effected
by the relevant tax invoices. The assessing authority held that the quantity discount
offered by the appellant could not be allowed under Rule 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka
Value Added Tax Rules 2005 (‘the Rules’). The period in question was 1 April 2006
to 31 March 2007, 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008 and 1 April 2008 to 31 March
2009.
3 On appeal, the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals – 1),
Bengaluru set aside the order of the assessing authority, holding that the quarterly
scheme discount given by the appellant was an allowable deduction since the
appellant had realized the consideration from the purchaser towards the sale of
goods after deducting the amount of discount and, VAT was charged only on the
net amount shown in the tax invoice after allowing the benefit of discount.
4 The order of the first appellate authority dated 12 October 2010 was revised
under Section 64 (1) of the Act by the Additional Commissioner on the ground that
the quarterly discount given by the appellant was in respect of the performance of
the previous quarter and not in respect of the sales offered under the same
invoices.
3
5 The appellant instituted Sales Tax Appeals before the High Court of
Karnataka. By a judgment dated 19 March 2014, a Division Bench of the Karnataka
High Court dismissed the appeals.
6 The case of the appellant is that it offers a quantity discount to its distributors
depending on their performance during the previous quarter. This is part of a
marketing/sales strategy under which the appellant allows a certain percentage as
a quarterly discount to its dealers on the basis of the sales turnover generated by
a dealer in every quarter of the financial year. The discount is given by the
appellant to its dealers in the sales invoices raised in the subsequent quarter. The
amount of the discount is deducted from the gross sale price and VAT is collected
and remitted on the net sale price. According to the appellant, the discount is
offered in the regular course of business and the amount which it receives towards
sales consideration is only the net amount exclusive of discount, on which VAT is
collected. Sales tax is leviable on the sale consideration received/receivable.
Section 2 (36) defines the expression ‘turnover’ as the aggregate amount for which
the goods are sold and the term ‘aggregate’ means the net amount for which the
goods are sold. The appellant claims that allowing a discount on the basis of the
quarterly performance of its dealers is only a measure adopted by it for the
computation of the discount. However, the discount is given in a sales bill and VAT
is collected on the net sale consideration after the deduction of the discount. The
High Court, it has been submitted, erred in rejecting the case of the appellant on
4
the ground that the discount is given in respect of the performance of the previous
quarter and not in respect of the sales transaction for which the invoice is raised.
The High Court, it has been submitted, has failed to notice that Section 2(36)
mandates that turnover be computed as the aggregate amount for which goods
are sold. It has been urged that deductions on account of trade discounts are given
under agreement; or under terms of sale or by established practice and should not
be disallowed only because they are not payable at the time of each invoice or
deducted, from the invoice price (Union of India v Bombay Tyre International
Ltd1
). Moreover, periodical discounts such as half yearly discounts cannot, by their
very nature, be shown on the face of each invoice as the discount is known only
at the end of the relevant period. Since the discount is known and understood at
the time of the removal of goods, though quantified later, it was held to be eligible
for deduction as held in Government of India v Madras Rubber Factory Ltd2
. In
sum and substance, the case of the appellant is that the sale price received by it
is the net amount exclusive of discount. It is understood at the time of the sale itself
that the customer would be entitled to a discount, the quantum being computed at
the end of the quarter. Hence, the real sale price charged by the appellant for
parting with the goods is the net amount exclusive of discount and hence the trade
discount given by the appellant cannot form a part of the sales turnover. Finally, it

1
(2005) 3 SCC 787
2
(1995) 4 SCC 349
5
has been urged that a literal construction of Rule 3 (2)(c) would render it
unworkable and practically impossible to implement.
7 On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that under
Rule 3 (2)(c) an amount which has been allowed as discount is permissible as a
deduction in computing the taxable turnover only if the tax invoice issued in respect
of the sales relating to such discount shows the amount allowed as discount. The
taxable event is the sale and the sale price has to be determined on the basis of
the tax invoice or sales bill issued at the time of sale from the seller to the
purchaser. The sale price cannot be altered or modified subsequent to the date of
issuance of the tax invoice or sales bill. According to the respondents, Rule 3 (2)(c)
makes it mandatory that only a discount reflected in the sales invoice is eligible for
deduction. Admittedly, the discounts shown in the invoices of the appellant were
not for sale but for the performance of the previous period of three to six months
before the date of the invoice. In the submission of the respondents, a harmonious
reading of Section 3, the charging section, along with the definition of ‘taxable
turnover’ in Section 2(34), ‘total turnover’ in Section 2(35) and ‘turnover’ in Section
2 (36) read with Rule 3(2)(c) would show that a performance-based discount,
issued at a much later date after assessing the performance of the dealer for a
given period would not fall within the purview of eligible discount. In order to arrive
at the taxable turnover under Rule 3(2)(c), the discount has to be shown in respect
of the sales in the tax invoice or the bill of sale.
6
8 Section 3 of the Act provides for the levy of tax. It provides that the tax shall
be levied on every sale of goods in the State by a registered dealer or a dealer
liable to be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Every such
dealer is under Section 4 liable to pay tax on his taxable turnover. The expression
‘turnover’ is defined in Section 2(36) thus:
“2(36). ‘Turnover’ means the aggregate amount for which goods
are sold or distributed or delivered or otherwise disposed of in any
of the ways referred to in clause (29) by a dealer, either directly or
through another, on his own account or on account of others,
whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, and includes the aggregate amount for which
goods are purchased from a person not registered under the Act
and the value of goods transferred or despatched outside the
State otherwise than by way of sale, and subject to such
conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed the amount for
which goods are sold shall include any sums charged for anything
done by the dealer in respect of the goods sold at the time of or
before the delivery thereof.
Explanation: The value of the goods transferred or despatched
outside the State otherwise than by way of sale, shall be the
amount for which the goods are ordinarily sold by the dealer or the
prevailing market price of such goods where the dealer does not
ordinarily sell the goods.”
The expression ‘taxable turnover’ is defined in Section 2(34) as follows:
“2(34) ‘Taxable turnover’ means the turnover on which a dealer
shall be liable to pay tax as determined after making such
deductions from his total turnover and in such manner as may be
prescribed, but shall not include the turnover of purchase or sale
in the course of interstate trade or commerce or in the course of
export of the goods out of the territory of India or in the course of
import of the goods into the territory of India and the value of
goods transferred or despatched outside the State otherwise than
by way of sale.”
7
The above definitions indicate that turnover is defined to mean the aggregate
amount for which goods are sold, distributed, delivered or otherwise disposed of.
The taxable turnover is computed after making such deductions from the total
turnover and in such manner as may be prescribed (‘total turnover’ is defined by
Section 2(35) to mean the aggregate turnover in all goods of a dealer at all places
of business in the States). In arriving at the taxable turnover, the statute
contemplates deductions, as prescribed, are to be made from the total turnover.
The liability to pay tax is on the taxable turnover. Taxable turnover is the net
amount that remains upon making deductions as prescribed from the turnover.
9 Rule 3 of the Rules provide for the determination of turnover. Clause (1) of
Rule 3 provide for the determination of the total turnover of a dealer. Clause (2)
provide for the determination of the taxable turnover. Taxable turnover is arrived
at by making the deductions which are stipulated in clause (2) from the total
turnover. Rule 3(2)(c) provides as follows:
“(2) The taxable turnover shall be determined by allowing the
following deductions from the total turnover:-
(c) All amounts allowed as discount:’
PROVIDED that such discount is allowed in accordance with the
regular practice of the dealer or is in accordance with the terms of
any contract or agreement entered into in a particular case 3
[and
the tax invoice or bill of sale issued in respect of the sales relating
to such discount shows the amount allowed as discount:.”

3
Inserted vide Noti. No. FD 124 CSL 2006, dt. 27-5-2006, w.e.f. 1-4-2006.
8
10 In Southern Motors v State of Karnataka4
, a Bench of two learned judges
of this Court considered the provisions of Rule 3(2)(c) of the Rules. In that case,
the appellant who was a registered dealer with a business in motor vehicles issued
tax invoices to its purchasers. After the sales were completed, credit notes were
issued to the customers granting them discounts. As a result, the appellant
retained only the net amount of the invoice less the discount reflected in the credit
notes. During the course of the assessment, the appellant was subjected to orders
of rectification, disallowing the deduction of post-sale discounts. This Court held
thus:
“28. It is a matter of common experience that in the present
contemporary competitive market, trade discounts not only are
dependent on variable factors but also might be strategically not
disclosable at the time of the original sale/purchase so as to be
coevally reflected in the tax invoice or the bill of sale, as the case
may be. The actual quantification of the trade discount, depending
on the nature of the trade and the related stipulations in any
contract with regard thereto, may be deferred till the happening of
a contemplated event, so much so that the benefit thereof is
extended at a point of time subsequent to that of the original
sale/purchase. That by itself, subject to proof of such regular trade
practice and the contract/agreement entered into between the
parties, would not render the trade discount otherwise legal and
acceptable, either non est or fictitious for evading tax liability. In
the above factual premise, the interpretation as sought to be
provided by the Revenue would evidently reduce Section
3(2)(c) to a dead letter, ineffective and unworkable and would
defeat the objective of permitting deductions from the total
turnover on account of trade discount.” (Id at page 485)
 (emphasis supplied)

4
(2017) 3 SCC 467
9
Relying on the earlier decisions of this Court, it was held that a trade discount ought
not to be disallowed merely on the ground that it is not payable at the time of each
invoice or deducted from the invoice price. In the of view of this Court :
“29…Perceptionally, if taxable turnover is to be comprised of
sale/purchase price, it is beyond one's comprehension as to why
the trade discount should be disallowed, subject to the proof
thereof, only because it was effectuated subsequent to the original
sale but evidenced by contemporaneous documents and reflected
in the relevant accounts.” (Id at page 485)
The Legislature, the Court held, would not be unaware of the prevalent practice of
offering trade discounts in commercial dispensations. In the view of the Court:
“38…To insist on the quantification of trade discount for deduction
at the time of sale itself, by incorporating the same in the tax
invoice/bill of sale, would be to demand the impossible for all
practical purposes and thus would be illogical, irrational and
absurd.” (Id at page 492)
This Court accordingly read down the first proviso to Rule 3(2)(c) in the following
manner:
“40. On an overall review of the scheme of the Act and the Rules
and the underlying objectives, in particular of Sections 29 and 30
of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules, we are of the considered
opinion that the requirement of reference of the discount in the tax
invoice or bill of sale to qualify it for deduction has to be construed
in relation to the transaction resulting in the final sale/purchase
price and not limited to the original sale sans the trade discount.
However, the transactions allowing discount have to be proved on
the basis of contemporaneous records and the final sale price
after deducting the trade discount must mandatorily be reflected
in the accounts as stipulated under Rule 3(2)(c) of the Rules. The
sale/purchase price has to be adjudged on a combined
consideration of the tax invoice or bill of sale, as the case may be,
along with the accounts reflecting the trade discount and the
10
actual price paid. The first proviso has thus to be so read down,
as above, to be in consonance with the true intendment of the
legislature and to achieve as well the avowed objective of correct
determination of the taxable turnover. The contrary interpretation
accorded by the High Court being in defiance of logic and the
established axioms of interpretation of statutes is thus
unacceptable and is negated.” (Id at page 493)
11 This view was rendered by a bench of two learned Judges, including one of
us (the learned Chief Justice). Having regard to the construction which has been
placed on the provisions of Rule 3(2)(c) of the Rules in Southern Motors (supra),
the judgment of the High Court in the present case is accordingly unsustainable.
12 The liability to pay tax is on the taxable turnover. Taxable turnover is arrived
at after making permissible deductions from the total turnover. Among them are
“all amounts allowed as discounts.” Such a discount must, however, be in accord
with the regular trade practice of the dealer or the contract or agreement entered
into in a particular case. The expression “the tax invoice or bill of sale issued in
respect of the sales relating to such discount shows the amount allowed as such
discount” is not happily worded. The words “in respect of the sales relating to such
discount” cannot be construed to mean that the discount would be inadmissible as
a deduction unless the tax invoice pertaining to the goods originally issued shows
the discount. This is a matter of ascertainment. The assessee must establish from
its accounts that the discount relates specifically to the sales with reference to
which it is allowed. In the first part of the proviso, Rule 3(2)(c) recognizes trade 
11
practice or, as the case may be, the contact or agreement of the dealer. The latter
part which provides a methodology for ascertainment does not override the earlier
part. Both must be construed together. Above all, it must be remembered that
taxable turnover is turnover net of deductions. All trade discounts are allowable as
permissible deductions.
13 We accordingly allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High
Court. We direct that in computing the taxable turnover for the relevant years, the
appellant would be entitled to a deduction of the trade discount, following the
parameters laid down in paragraph 40 of the judgment in Southern Motors (supra)
and as explained above. There shall be no order as to costs.
.................................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
.…...............................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
...................................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi
February 06, 2018