whether the application was filed beyond the period of six months Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 =. According to the appellants, the copy of the Award was not supplied and, therefore, the appellants could not furnish the details of the objections with regard to the Award in the application for reference. - appellants had filed an application for reference on 24.07.1999. To the extent relevant, the request reads as follows:- “Kindly refer our case in the joint name of Shahid Jamal & Durwesh to reference court u/s. 18. Also please refer the case Shahid Jamal & M.A. Trading Co. and another in the name of Durwesh Najaf & MAT FAB International to reference court u/s. 18 and deposit the award amount u/s 31 sub section (2) part V.” - the appellants had accepted the compensation under protest on the point of sufficiency of the compensation and having made a specific request for reference under Section 18 on 24.07.1999, which indisputably is within six months, we are of the view that this is a case where the request under Section 18 of the Act made on 24.07.1999 should be treated as a proper application

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1349/2018
(ARISING FROM SLP (C) NO. 20203 OF 2012)
SHAHID JAMAL & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
 VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The High Court, as per the impugned order,
declined to grant an order in favour of the
appellants for reference under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) for
enhancement of compensation, on the ground that the
application was filed beyond the period of six
months.
3. To refer to the undisputed facts, though the
Award was passed on 31.03.1999, the compensation was
paid only on 07.04.1999. There is no dispute that
the same was received under protest. According to
the appellants, the copy of the Award was not
supplied and, therefore, the appellants could not
furnish the details of the objections with regard to
the Award in the application for reference.
1
4. Be that as it may, it is not in dispute that the
appellants had filed an application for reference on
24.07.1999. To the extent relevant, the request
reads as follows:-
“Kindly refer our case in the joint name
of Shahid Jamal & Durwesh to reference court
u/s. 18. Also please refer the case Shahid
Jamal & M.A. Trading Co. and another in the
name of Durwesh Najaf & MAT FAB International
to reference court u/s. 18 and deposit the
award amount u/s 31 sub section (2) part V.”
5. It seems that there was a communication dated
25.09.1999 from the Land Acquisition Officer to the
appellants. The letter reads as follows:-
“Please accept the reference of your
letter dated 07.06.1999, 24.07.1999 and
25.08.1999, under which it has been mentioned
that for the construction of the project of
Ahmadpur Phulwaria Phase-1 of Bhadohi
Industrial Development Authority the
information of the declared Award regarding
the acquired land from the village Lakhanpur
alias Abhayanpur has not been made available.
Regarding this you have been informed that
notice under section 12(2) was sent on
31.03.1999 regarding declaring the Award, on
which you refused to sign. You demanded the
copy of the Award at the time of receiving
the amount of compensation on 07.04.1999 and
even the photo copy of the Award was made
available to you, but on the receiving
register you did not sign, rather by making
2
unnecessary correspondence the certified copy
of the Award is being demanded. From your
said act it seems that you are trying to take
advantage of the time limit (time barred) by
hook or by crook after enclosing with your
application the judicial precedents of the
Hon'ble Courts, which is improper. Even then
according to your desire the so-called photo
copy of the Award is sent after enclosing.”
6. It may be specifically noted that the said letter
dated 25.09.1999 is, in any case, within six months’
period, as required under Section 18(2) of the Act
(as amended in the State of U.P.).
7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State
points out that a proper application stating the
grounds for reference has been made only on
30.12.1999, which is beyond the prescribed period of
six months. It is submitted that under Section
18(2), the application for reference should contain
the grounds for reference and, therefore, only an
application with the grounds can be taken as a proper
application for reference.
8. In the impugned judgment the High Court has taken
note of the fact that the appellants had come to know
about the Award on 07.04.1999 when the compensation
was received and hence, the application dated
30.12.1999 under Section 18 of the Act was beyond
time and thus the writ petition was dismissed.
3
9. Having regard to the factual matrix we have
referred to above, and having heard the learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants as well
as the learned senior counsel appearing for the
State, we find that the High Court has unfortunately
missed a crucial point on facts. As can be seen from
the extracted portion of the application dated
24.07.1999 there is a specific request for reference
under Section 18 of the Act. It is not in dispute
and it is borne out from the records also as seen by
the High Court the compensation was received only
under protest with regard to the sufficiency of the
compensation. It is also seen from the communication
from the Land Acquisition Officer to the appellants
dated 25.09.1999, on which date the time under
Section 18 had not expired, that certified copy of
the Award had not been furnished to the appellants.
However, a photocopy of the Award was given, which
the appellants were not inclined to acknowledge.
10. Having regard to the fact that the appellants had
accepted the compensation under protest on the point
of sufficiency of the compensation and having made a
specific request for reference under Section 18 on
24.07.1999, which indisputably is within six months,
we are of the view that this is a case where the
request under Section 18 of the Act made on
24.07.1999 should be treated as a proper application.
4
It may also have to be seen that before rejection the
grounds had also been furnished after receipt of the
certified copy of the Award. Ordered accordingly.
11. However, having regard to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, we are of the view that
we should also invoke our jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution of India and pass certain
further orders for doing complete justice between the
parties regarding the interest from 07.04.1999, the
date when the appellants received the compensation,
till the filing of this special leave petition on
29.06.2012 in the interest of any enhancement.
Accordingly, for the said period, in the event of any
enhancement, the appellants shall not be entitled to
any interest.
12. The appeal is disposed of, as above.
13. Needless to say that this order is confined only
to the statutory benefit of interest and all other
benefits, which the appellants are free to claim when
the reference under Section 18 of the Act is
considered on merits. We also direct the Land
Acquisition Collector to make a reference within four
weeks from today and the Reference Court shall
dispose of the same within three months thereafter.
The parties are free to take all available
contentions before the Reference Court.
5
14. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
15. There shall be no orders as to costs.
.........................J.
 [KURIAN JOSEPH]
.........................J.
 [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 30, 2018
6

whether the contesting respondents herein, i.e. National Fertilizers Limited and Gas Authority of India Limited, are liable to pay external development charges to the appellant— Municipal Council as per its demand? = the contesting respondents are not liable to pay any amount in the form of external development fee as demanded by the appellants.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No(s). 2511/2011
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, RAGHOGARH & ANR. …Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
NATIONAL FERTILIZER LTD. & ORS. …Respondent(s)
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 2512/2011
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, RAGHOGARH & ANR. …Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
GAS AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED & ORS. …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. These two Appeals arise out of a common Judgment
2
passed on 3rd August, 2007 in First Appeal Nos.1 of 1996 and 175
of 1995, respectively, by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench
at Gwalior.
2. The short question that arises for our consideration in
these appeals is whether the contesting respondents herein, i.e.
National Fertilizers Limited and Gas Authority of India Limited, are
liable to pay external development charges to the appellant—
Municipal Council as per its demand?
3. Both the contesting respondents in these appeals were
allotted forest lands within the municipal limits of the appellant
Council. Subsequently, the respondents were served with a notice
calling upon them to deposit external development charges @
Rs.5/- per sq. meter in consonance with Government of Madhya
Pradesh, Housing and Environment Department, Notification No.
F.3-39/32/85, dated 28-11-1985. Raising objections, respondents
challenged the notices by filing Civil Suits before the District Judge,
Guna, Madhya Pradesh contending that they are Central
Government entities and would not come under the purview of the
said Notification and hence sought declaration and permanent
injunction restraining the appellant from demanding external
3
development fee from them.
4. The District Judge, Guna by separate judgments dated
11th October, 1995 decreed the Suits in favour of respondents and
declared that the defendants (appellant and proforma respondents
herein) jointly or severally have no right to recover amount by name
of external development fee and no amount shall be recovered from
the plaintiffs (respondents herein) in the form of external
development fee.
5. Against the said judgment of the District Judge, the
appellant moved the High Court by way of First Appeals challenging
the decree that the Suit has been filed before expiry of period of
notice under Section 80, CPC and no Suit is maintainable against
the Municipal Council without notice under Section 319 of the
Municipalities Act. The other stand taken by the appellant was that
since the plaintiffs are avoiding recovery of external development
fee, therefore, without payment of ad valorem court fee suit ought to
have been dismissed or the trial Court should have rejected the
plaint for insufficient payment of court fee.
6. The Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated
4
12th May, 2005 allowed the First Appeals and set aside the decree
passed by the trial Court. The High Court, however, without giving
its opinion on the merits, held that both the Suits have not been
properly valued and notice issued was not one under Section 80,
CPC and Suits as filed were not maintainable. In the absence of
notice under Section 319 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act,
Suit against Municipal Council is not maintainable.
7. The contesting respondents herein challenged aforesaid
judgment of the High Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 3502 and 3503 of
2006 before this Court. By order dated 21st November, 2006 this
Court opined that having regard to the fact that the State of M.P.
did not prefer any appeal against the judgment and decree passed
by the learned trial Judge, the Division Bench of the High Court
went wrong in holding that the suit was barred under Section 80,
CPC. So far as the non-maintainability of the suit for want of notice
under Section 319 of the M.P. Municipalities Act is concerned,
neither any such plea was taken in the written statement nor any
issue was raised before the trial Court by the Municipal Council.
Therefore, it was held that the Division Bench of the High Court
was wrong in holding that the Suit was not maintainable. This
Court, accordingly, set aside the judgment passed by the High
5
Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for
consideration of the first appeals on merit.
8. The High Court, after considering the matter on merits,
by the judgment impugned herein, formed the opinion that the trial
Court did not commit any error in declaring that the appellant
Municipal Council had no authority under law to charge external
development cost and thereby affirmed the judgment of the trial
Court and dismissed the appeals of the Municipal Council.
Aggrieved thereby, the said Municipal Council is in appeal before
us.
9. The case put forward on behalf of the appellant Municipal
Council is that it is a statutory body providing various amenities
and necessities to the general public residing in its area limits.
Relying on Order No.F./3-39/32/85 dated 28-11-1983 of Housing
and Environment Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, it
is stated that the areas where there is a Municipal Committee or
Municipal Corporation, the internal development work of colonies
by House Construction Societies and individual persons will be
done in supervision of respective Municipal Committee or Municipal
Corporation. For that all the activities pertaining to maintenance,
6
civil amenities, development work and construction require heavy
expenditure. About Rs.5 lakhs per month is the electricity bill to
maintain the streetlights and to run pump houses. Nearly Rs.25
lakhs per annum are the vehicle maintenance charges, Rs.50 lakhs
for supply of water and pipeline maintenance and about Rs.25
lakhs for sanitation and Rs.2 crores per year is required for
maintenance, construction and development of roads. In view
thereof, in accordance with the prevailing rules, the externational
development fee @ Rs.5/- per. Sq.m. has been legally charged on
the contesting respondents and they are liable to make payment.
But, unfortunately the trial Court committed legal error and
declared that the defendants (appellant and proforma respondents
herein) jointly or severally have no right to recover amount by name
of external development fee from the plaintiffs (respondents herein)
and the same view has been affirmed by the High Court. The entire
development activity in the Municipality, Rahograh has come to
standstill and it is therefore necessary for this Court to set aside the
impugned judgment.
10. On behalf of contesting respondents, it is contended that
the contesting respondents are not private entities, nor colonizers.
The ownership of the institutions lies with the Government of India
7
in whose control the day to day activities of the institutions are run.
The institutions being totally secured, no outsider can enter the
Company premises without prior permission. As regards the
maintenance, cleanliness, electricity, roads and safeguarding
environment in the entire area is being done by the institutions and
therefore they are not binding on the demands of Municipal Council
for making payment of external development charges. The Courts
below have thoroughly examined the issue in clear legal view and
only thereafter rendered the judgment in their favour and therefore
there is no occasion for this Court to exercise the power under
Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere in these appeals.
11. Having heard learned counsel on either side, we have also
given our thoughtful consideration to various Government of
Madhya Pradesh Orders including the first and foremost Order on
the issue in question viz., No. 2681/1677/32, dated 6th July, 1978
for levying internal development charges. The subsequent Order No.
2997/C.R.129/32/Bhopal, dated 27th July, 1978 provides certain
relaxations regarding the mode of payment of the amount required
to be deposited under original order dated 6th July, 1978. The next
one is the Order No. F.3-39/32/85 dated 28th November, 1983 on
levying external development fee @ Rs.5/- per sq. mtr.
8
12. It is clearly noticeable from the aforementioned
Government Orders that they are meant for housing construction
societies, colonizers and individual persons where the internal
developmental works of the colonies are done by the respective
house construction society, colonizers or individual persons. In the
same way, if any colonizer, house construction society or individual
person constructs a colony under the supervision of Municipal
Committee or Municipal Corporation, as the case may be, Rs.5/-
per sq. mtr. towards external development charges are applicable.
While so, in the case on hand, the contesting respondents are
neither colonizers nor house construction societies or individuals.
The dwelling units developed by them are for their employees only
and not meant for sale or for letting out on rent. Apparently, the
construction of dwelling units and the residential areas developed
by the contesting respondents are done by the contesting
respondents i.e. Government entities being Public Sector
Undertakings with the investment of Central Government.
13. For all the aforementioned reasons we do not see any
error in the impugned judgment. In our opinion, the trial Court as
well as the High Court considered all the relevant issues in their
9
true spirit and came to the right conclusion that the contesting
respondents are not liable to pay any amount in the form of
external development fee as demanded by the appellants. The
appeals fail and therefore stand dismissed devoid of merit without
any order as to costs.
...................................J.
 (N.V. RAMANA)
 ...................................J.
 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI,
JANUARY 30, 2018.

accident claim = Insurance law - corporate laws- only issue which was raised by the insurer was in regard to the award of future prospects to the extent of 30 per cent. =Since the deceased was 42 years of age, an addition of 25% on the ground of future prospects would be warranted instead of 30% computed by the Tribunal.- The Tribunal has held that the annual income of the deceased (on the basis of the income tax returns for 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13) would be Rs 1,81,500. Adding a component of 25% for future prospects, the income would stand at Rs 2,26,875. Deducting an amount of one fourth towards personal expenses, the loss of dependency per annum works out to Rs 1,70,156. Applying a multiplier of 14, the total loss of dependency would work out to Rs 23,82,187. The Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs 3,14,335 towards medical expenses. An addition of Rs 70,000 would be required to be made in terms of the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra) on account of the conventional heads of loss of estate (Rs 15,000), loss of consortium (Rs 40,000) and funeral expenses (Rs 15,000). Hence, the total compensation is quantified at Rs 27,66,522 on which the claimants would be entitled to interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the filing of the claim petition. The apportionment shall be carried out in terms of the award of the Tribunal. We order accordingly.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 000767 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.23086 of 2016)
RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD ..Appellant
VERSUS
SHALU SHARMA AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The present appeal arises from the judgment of a Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court in an appeal against an award of the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal (MACT).
2 Narinder Sharma died in an accident which occurred on 14 September
2013. The accident involved a motor vehicle which was insured against third
party risks by the appellant. The dependents filed a claim for compensation
before the MACT. The Tribunal held that the accident was caused due to the
negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. Compensation of Rs 30,26,810
REPORTABLE
2
was awarded together with interest at 9 per cent per annum. The Tribunal
factored in a component of 30 per cent towards the loss of future prospects in
assessing the compensation.
3 The High Court has observed that the only issue which was raised by the
insurer was in regard to the award of future prospects to the extent of 30 per
cent. The deceased was conducting his own business in the name and style of
M/s Mahak Cable Networks at East Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi. He was 42 years
old on the date of the accident. According to the appellant, the increase in his
gross total income as shown in the income tax returns for 2010-11, 2011-12
and 2012-13 would not justify the award of future prospects, or at least to that
extent. The High Court negatived the submission of the insurer and held that
having due regard to the progressive increase in the income of the deceased,
the award of future prospects by the Tribunal could not be faulted.
4 The judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in National
Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi1 settles the issue. The deceased
was self-employed. In such a case, future prospects cannot be denied. The
grant must be in accordance with the following principle set down in the
judgment:
“(iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary,
an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant
where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of

1
(2017) 13 SCALE 12
3
25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years
and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60
years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation.
The established income means the income minus the tax
component.”
Since the deceased was 42 years of age, an addition of 25% on the ground of
future prospects would be warranted instead of 30% computed by the Tribunal.
5 The Tribunal has held that the annual income of the deceased (on the
basis of the income tax returns for 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13) would be
Rs 1,81,500. Adding a component of 25% for future prospects, the income
would stand at Rs 2,26,875. Deducting an amount of one fourth towards
personal expenses, the loss of dependency per annum works out to Rs
1,70,156. Applying a multiplier of 14, the total loss of dependency would work
out to Rs 23,82,187. The Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs 3,14,335 towards
medical expenses. An addition of Rs 70,000 would be required to be made in
terms of the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra) on account of the conventional
heads of loss of estate (Rs 15,000), loss of consortium (Rs 40,000) and funeral
expenses (Rs 15,000). Hence, the total compensation is quantified at
Rs 27,66,522 on which the claimants would be entitled to interest @ 9% p.a.
from the date of the filing of the claim petition. The apportionment shall be
carried out in terms of the award of the Tribunal. We order accordingly.
4
6 When the Special Leave Petition was entertained by this Court, the
following order was passed on 12 August 2016:
“Issue notice.
Since the objection in this special leave petition is mainly to
enhancement of the income of the deceased by 30% as prospective
earning capacity, the petitioner shall deposit 75% of the awarded
amount along with interest accrued thereupon before the Tribunal,
within six weeks.
If such deposit is made within the stipulated time, execution
proceedings against the petitioner shall remain stayed.
The amount so deposited, shall be released to the respondent
forthwith.”
The appellant shall deposit the balance computed in terms of the present
judgment within a period of eight weeks before the Tribunal which shall be
disbursed to the claimants upon due verification. If the amount withdrawn by the
claimants in terms of the order of this Court dated 12 August 2016 exceeds the
amount to which they are entitled under the present judgment, no recoveries shall
be made. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to
costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
February 02, 2018

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act - After Teja Singh died, his name was substituted by Appellant Harbhajan Kaur (since deceased) by the Supervisor Qanoongo since he found her to be in possession of the land - with out publicity - challenged - The High Court held that though Para 423 of the Land Records Manual authorizes the Supervisor Qanoongo to make entry of possession in remarks column but it shall be done after full publicity about his visit. In this case, neither publicity was done nor notice was given to the legal heirs of Teja Singh and, therefore, both the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director, Consolidation were justified in quashing the entries made in favour of the present appellants - We are in agreement with the aforesaid findings to the extent that Supervisor Qanoongo could not have made entries in favour of the appellants without giving public notice and without giving notice to the legal heirs of Teja Singh. The dispute is as to which of the parties is in possession of the land. The High Court erred in directing that the names of both the parties should be removed. This could not have been done. Therefore, the direction of the High Court that the entry of possession cannot continue in favour of either of the parties is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Supervisor Qanoongo, who after hearing both the sides, shall decide as to who is in legal possession of the land in dispute and thereafter make relevant entry in the revenue records.

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1497 OF 2018
(@SLP (C) NO(S).5278 OF 2014)
Jagtar Singh & Ors. …. Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & Ors. … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 29.07.2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 3791 of 2001
whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioners was
dismissed.
2
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the land,
which is the subject matter of dispute, was earlier shown in
possession of one Teja Singh and entry in this behalf was
reflected in Varg-4 of the revenue record. After Teja Singh
died, his name was substituted by Appellant Harbhajan Kaur
(since deceased) by the Supervisor Qanoongo since he found
her to be in possession of the land. Jagir Singh and Karnail
Singh, sons of Teja Singh, filed objections under the U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming that after the death of
their father, they being the sons continued to be in possession
of the land and their name should have been recorded in the
revenue record. These objections were dismissed. However,
on appeal being filed by the sons, the Settlement Officer,
Consolidation set aside the order passed by the Consolidation
Officer and directed that the names of Jagir Singh and
Karnail Singh be recorded in the revenue records. Revision
filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation was
dismissed and thereafter, the writ petition was filed.
3
4. The High Court held that though Para 423 of the Land
Records Manual authorizes the Supervisor Qanoongo to make
entry of possession in remarks column but it shall be done
after full publicity about his visit. In this case, neither
publicity was done nor notice was given to the legal heirs of
Teja Singh and, therefore, both the Settlement Officer and the
Deputy Director, Consolidation were justified in quashing the
entries made in favour of the present appellants. The High
Court went on to hold as follows:
“In the impugned orders passed by the S.O.C.
and D.D.C., so far as the finding that the
Supervisor Qanoongo has no right to correct the
entry in revenue record, which is already in
existence, is concerned, this finding is affirmed,
but so far as the direction given to enter the
names of Karnail Singh and Jagir Singh on the
land in dispute is concerned, the same is
quashed and it is held that the entry of
petitioners and the respondents cannot
continue in revenue record after consolidation
and it is directed that entry of Varg-4 be deleted
from the land in question of both the parties,
petitioners as well as the respondents.”
5. We are in agreement with the aforesaid findings to the
extent that Supervisor Qanoongo could not have made entries
in favour of the appellants without giving public notice and
4
without giving notice to the legal heirs of Teja Singh. The
dispute is as to which of the parties is in possession of the
land. The High Court erred in directing that the names of
both the parties should be removed. This could not have
been done. Therefore, the direction of the High Court that the
entry of possession cannot continue in favour of either of the
parties is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Supervisor
Qanoongo, who after hearing both the sides, shall decide as to
who is in legal possession of the land in dispute and
thereafter make relevant entry in the revenue records.
6. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Pending
applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
………………………..J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
…………………………J.
(Deepak Gupta)
New Delhi
February 02, 2018

rent control case - failed to prove the shop is in dilapidated condition - no eviction order = The appellant filed eviction petitions against the respondents before the Rent Controller, Bahadurgarh, under Section 13 of the Act on the ground that the shops which are built up on mud had become unsafe, inhabitable and were in dilapidated condition = the Rent Controller discussed the expert evidence led by both the parties and after detailed examination of both the reports, he formed an opinion that the appellant was not able to prove that the shops were in a dilapidated condition - do not find any merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed - However, if the condition of the premises, as of today, is dilapidated and the appellant is correct in his submission that the Chhajja of the premises had fallen down in the year 2012, it would be open to the appellant to file a fresh petition on the aforesaid ground as these events would furnish a fresh cause of action to the appellant..

1
NON REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 480 of 2018
SURINDER .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NAND LAL .....RESPONDENT(S)
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 481 of 2018
A N D
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 482 of 2018
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
These matters were listed for hearing on January 18, 2019. The
counsel for the respondents did not appear though the matters were
passed over once and were called again for the second time. In these
circumstances, we heard the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and reserved the judgment. However, in order to give an
2
opportunity, this Court granted one week’s time to the respondents to file
their written submissions. Even when more than one week has lapsed,
no written submissions have been filed by the respondents. In these
circumstances, we have ourselves perused the entire record while
considering the submissions of the appellant’s counsel.
2) The appellant herein is the owner of the premises situated in Main
Bazar, Old Najafgarh Road, Bahadurgarh, Haryana. In these premises
few shops were constructed in mid 1960s1
 by the father of the appellant
and one shop each was let out by the respondents in these appeals.
The premises are governed by the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) as per which
tenants can be evicted only on certain specified grounds. One of the
grounds for eviction is that the premises let out is in dilapidated condition
and cannot be repaired/reconstructed without evicting the tenant. The
appellant filed eviction petitions against the respondents before the Rent
Controller, Bahadurgarh, under Section 13 of the Act on the ground that
the shops which are built up on mud had become unsafe, inhabitable
and were in dilapidated condition. The Rent Controller was pleased to
dismiss the eviction petitions after recording a finding that tenanted
premises were not in a dilapidated condition. The appeal was preferred
by the appellant against the orders of the Rent Controller before the
1 Though respondents had disputed the year of construction and according to
them construction was carried out 30-40 years ago only.
3
Additional District Judge-cum-Appellate Authority under the Act. These
appeals were also dismissed. Thereafter, the appellant filed revision
petitions, which have also been dismissed by the High Court. Identical
orders are passed dismissing these revision petitions and the operative
portion of order dated July 09, 2015 passed by the High Court in the
revision petitions is as follows:
“In the present case, petitioner had sought ejectment of
respondent No.1 from the shop in question on the ground that
it had been rendered unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
In this regard, petitioner examined his expert. Respondent
No.1 also examined his expert to establish that the premises
in question was fit for human habitation. The Courts below
after going through the reports of the expert and the
photographs, placed on record, came to the conclusion that
the premises in question was fit for human habitation. In fact,
the shop in question had not been got repaired by the
petitioner.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, no
ground for interference with the finding of fact arrived at by
the Courts below, is made out.”
3) The learned counsel for the appellant has made twofold submissions. In
the first place, it was argued that during the course of the trial, the
appellant had placed on record the report of an expert, viz., an Engineer
who was also examined as PW-3. He also filed an affidavit stating that
he had carried out physical inspection of the shop and gave a detailed
report dated March 10, 2006, which was exhibited as Exhibit P-2. The
condition mentioned by him finds mention at pages 29 and 30 in
paragraph 19 of the judgment dated April 30, 2010 of the trial court.
4
Relying on that report, learned counsel for the appellant argued that it
speaks volumes about the state of existing construction and clearly
shows that the shop in question is in a dilapidated condition. It states
that cracks have been developed in the superstructure walls, RCC slabs
of the stairs, roof projection. It also mentions that cement plaster has
been eroded at some places leaving the bricks in the walls as naked and
the naked walls have been eroded leaving their joints and coming out of
the superstructure walls due to sudden dampness, efflorescence in walls
caused by wash/waste water drains passing along with the rear walls of
the shop. It also states that the roof projection deflected and cracks
developed may cause heavy damage due to sudden collapse at any
time. It also states that floor level of the shop is lower than the existing
main road level, thus, attracting dampness from rain water and dry
weather flow. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, no
doubt, the respondents had also examined a retired Engineer as RW-4,
who had filed his affidavit and his report was accepted as R-1.
However, the report filed by RW-4 did not discuss the conditions of the
shops and it only mentioned about the photographs of the roof and
flooring which was taken with the help of a digital camera and the report
also mentioned about Chhajja in the front side stating it to be in a good
condition. He, thus, submitted that the findings of the courts below were
totally perverse which relied upon the report of RW-4 and ignored the
5
report of PW-3.
4) Second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the
subsequent events which happened fortified the report of PW-3
inasmuch as in the year 2012, when the appeal of the appellant was
pending before the Additional District Judge-cum-Appellate Authority, the
Chhajja had fallen down. This event, according to him, proves that the
premises are in dilapidated condition and unsafe for habitation. He
submitted that even when this fact was brought to the notice of the
Appellate Authority as well as the High Court, these courts have not
taken note of this subsequent development, though they were supposed
to look into the same. On this ground also it was argued that the
findings of the courts below are perverse.
5) In his judgment dated April 30, 2010, the Rent Controller discussed the
expert evidence led by both the parties and after detailed examination of
both the reports, he formed an opinion that the appellant was not able to
prove that the shops were in a dilapidated condition. Discussion on this
aspect runs as follows:
“23. In the opinion of the court, the petitioners have not been
able to prove that the shop is in dilapidated condition. On
perusal of photographs Ex.R3, it is evident that the roof of the
shop has been consisting of wooden battons. It has come in
the cross-examination of PW2 Surender that ever since the
shop has been let out to the respondent, they have never
bothered to get the same repaired or white-washed. Their
own witness of petitioners PW4 Parveen Kumar has also
6
stated in the cross-examination that the shop of Nand Lal
from outside is in good condition. He also stated that
between his shop and the shop of Varinder no other shops is
there and the stairs of his shop are broken and had cracks but
the remaining shop is fine. PW3 Sunil stated in his cross
examination all the four shops where the construction at the
same time. Since PW4 Parveen stated in his
cross-examination that except four stairs his shop is fine and
that all the shops were constructions together, it is improbable
that one shop is about to fall being dilapidated and the other
shop is fine. Beside this, PW1 Sh.R.Punia has stated in his
cross-examination that he has not mentioned in the report the
size of the plaster which has eroded from the walls and at
what places.”
6) Thus, after examining the expert witnesses who are produced by both
sides, the Rent Controller returned the aforesaid findings, which findings
were approved by the Appellate Authority as well in its judgment dated
September 17, 2012. We find that the view taken was plausible view
which cannot be considered as perverse. The revisionary jurisdiction of
the High Court is limited and, therefore, it rightly observed that no
ground for interference with the finding of fact arrived at by the courts
below was made out.
7) Insofar as the contention of the appellant based on alleged subsequent
event is concerned, except arguing that it was taken before the appellate
court as well as the High Court, no material is produced to support this
submission. Grounds of appeal filed before the Appellate Authority or
the copy of the revision petition has not been placed on record.
Moreover, judgments of the Appellate Authority as well as the High Court
7
do not reflect that such a contention was raised before the said courts.
In the absence thereof, the alleged subsequent event cannot be taken
into consideration.
8) We, therefore, do not find any merit in these appeals which are
accordingly dismissed.
However, if the condition of the premises, as of today, is
dilapidated and the appellant is correct in his submission that the
Chhajja of the premises had fallen down in the year 2012, it would be
open to the appellant to file a fresh petition on the aforesaid ground as
these events would furnish a fresh cause of action to the appellant.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 01, 2018.