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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Thursday, February 1, 2018

mandatory order permitting the respondent- plaintiff to cast his vote in the election scheduled today. = the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to permit the voter to vote in an election is, prima facie, not tenable. - we are obliged to say that the Court below should not have passed an order of mandatory injunction while the election process was on.

CA 820/2018 @ SLP(C) 35288/2017
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 820/2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No. 35288/2017)
SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION & ORS.           Appellants
                                VERSUS
NRIPENDRA NATH BAIN                            Respondent
O R D E R
Leave granted.
Heard   Mr.   Vikas   Singh,   learned   senior   counsel
alongwith   Mr.   Vikram   Yadav,   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants   and   Mr.   Nripendra   Nath   Bain,   respondent-in-
person.
The   present   appeal   by   special   leave   calls   in
question   the   legal   propriety   of   the   order   dated   12.12.2017
by which the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Patiala House
Court,   New   Delhi   in   Title   Suit   No.   C.S.   2603/2017   had
passed   an   order   of   injunction   without   ascribing   any   reason
to   permit   the   respondent   to   cast   his   vote   in   the   election
of   the   Supreme   Court   Bar   Association.     This   Court   on
13.12.2017 had passed the following order:-
�Heard   Mr.   Gaurav   Bhatia,   learned   counsel   for
the   petitioners   and   Mr.   Nripendra   Nath   Bain,
respondent-in-person.
Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioners and respondent-in-person and keeping in
view   the   urgency   of   the   matter,   we   entertain   this
petition   and   direct   stay   of   the   order   dated
12.12.2017   passed   by   the   Civil   Judge   (Senior

CA 820/2018 @ SLP(C) 35288/2017
2
Division)   at   Patiala   House   Court,   New   Delhi   in
Title   Suit   No.   C.S.   2603   of   2017   whereby   it   has
passed a mandatory order permitting the respondent-
plaintiff   to   cast   his   vote   in   the   election
scheduled today.
We   are   passing   this   order   as   no   reasons   have
been   ascribed   and   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Civil
Court   to   permit   the   voter   to   vote   in   an   election
is, prima facie, not tenable.
Matter be listed in the third week of January,
2018.�
We   have   been   apprised   that   the   election   is   over.
In view of the aforesaid, the mandatory order passed by the
learned trial Judge has lost its force.  That apart, we are
obliged   to   say   that   the   Court   below   should   not   have   passed
an order of mandatory injunction while the election process
was   on.     We   may   hasten   to   add,   we   have   not   expressed   any
opinion with regard to the maintainability of the suit.  It
is   open   to   the   respondent   to   raise   the   issue   of
maintainability before the trial Court.
The   appeal   is   allowed   to   the   extent   indicated
above.  There shall be no order as to costs.
..................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
....................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
....................J.
[Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud]
New Delhi;
January 22, 2018.

CA 820/2018 @ SLP(C) 35288/2017
3
ITEM NO.10                COURT NO.1                SECTION XIV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 35288/2017
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 12-12-2017
in CS No. 2603/2017 passed by the Ld. Court of Civil Judge (Senior
Division) at Patiala House Court, New Delhi)
SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION & ORS.               Petitioners
                                VERSUS
NRIPENDRA NATH BAIN                                Respondent
(RESPONDENT-IN-PERSON)
Date : 22-01-2018 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
         HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
For Petitioners
                    Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vikrant Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Avnish Pandey, AOR
                 
For Respondent
                   
           UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
Let   the   preamble   of   the   Record   of   Proceedings
dated 13.12.2017 be corrected.
The   appeal   is   allowed   to   the   extent   indicated   in
the signed order.
   (Deepak Guglani)      (H.S. Parasher)
 Court Master Assistant Registrar
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Tuesday, January 30, 2018

exparte decree obtained by paper publication - appeal allowed by High court - confirmed by Apex court = neither the report of the bailiff nor the order of the Trial Court indicate that a copy of the summons was affixed in a conspicuous place on the court house and at the house where the defendant was known to have last resided. The High Court held that there was a breach of the provisions of Order V Rule 20 (1) of the CPC. The High Court observed that the order of the Trial Court permitting substituted service was cryptic and that the Court had not recorded its satisfaction that the defendant was keeping out of the way to avoid service or that the summons could not be served in the ordinary manner for any other reason. - “An appeal against an ex parte decree in terms of Section 96(2) of the Code could be filed on the following grounds: (i) the materials on record brought on record in the ex parte proceedings in the suit by the plaintiff would not entail a decree in his favour; and (ii) the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing.” A defendant against whom an ex-parte decree is passed has two options: The first is to file an appeal. The second is to file an application under Order IX Rule = The defendant can take recourse to both the proceedings simultaneously. The right of appeal is not taken away by filing an application under Order IX Rule 13. But if the appeal is dismissed as a result of which the ex-parte decree merges with the order of the Appellate Court, a petition under Order IX Rule 13 would not be maintainable. When an application under Order IX Rule 13 is dismissed, the remedy of the defendant is under Order XLIII Rule 1. However, once such an appeal is dismissed, the same contention cannot be raised in a first appeal under Section 96. The three Judge bench decision in Bhanu Kumar Jain has been followed by another bench of three Judges in Rabindra Singh v Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab2 and by a two Judge bench in Mahesh Yadav v Rajeshwar Singh3 . In the present case, the original defendant chose a remedy of first appeal under Section 96 and was able to establish before the High Court, adequate grounds for setting aside the judgment and decree.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 71 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP(C) No.5847 of 2017]
M/S NEERJA REALTORS PVT LTD ..Appellant
VERSUS
JANGLU (DEAD) THR. LR. ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 The present appeal is from the judgment of a Single Judge at the
Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. While allowing
a first appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment and order of the Civil
Judge (Senior Division) at Nagpur which had decreed a suit for specific
performance instituted by the appellant, ex-parte.
3 The subject matter of the suit for specific performance is an agreement
dated 15 July 2006 entered into by the appellant with the original defendant in
REPORTABLE
2
respect of agricultural land admeasuring 1.66 Hectares (4.07 acres) situated in
Mauza-Sondapar, Tahsil Hingna, District Nagpur. The total consideration
payable under the agreement was Rs 13,04,391 out of which an amount of Rs
3,26,000 was recorded to have been paid. The balance of Rs 9,78,391 was to
be paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed.
4 On 30 June 2007, Shobha, who is the daughter of the original respondent
instituted a suit (Old Regular Suit No 726/2007 which was renumbered as
Regular Suit No 269/2008) against her father and the appellant for partition,
possession and for declaratory and injunctive reliefs in relation to the land. In
that suit the plaintiff claimed that her father was in dire financial need and had
obtained a loan from the appellant and that as security, the appellant got certain
documents executed. According to the plaintiff, the agreement was vitiated by
fraud and misrepresentation and the land being ancestral property, the
agreement was not binding on her. The original defendant entered appearance
and disclosed his residential address in a proceeding under Order VIII Rule 11
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘the CPC’). The appellant also filed her
written statement. The suit was dismissed on 8 July 2010 on the ground that
the land belonged to the original defendant and that the plaintiff had no right,
title and interest.
5 On 5 February 2011, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance
(Suit 184 of 2011) of the agreement to sell dated 15 July 2006. On 9 February
3
2011, the Trial Court issued notice to the original defendant for settlement of
issues. It appears that summons were issued on two occasions to the original
defendant but were returned unserved. On 11 April 2011, the bailiff submitted
a report stating that when he went to serve the defendant, he was informed by
persons residing in the village that he had left the premises two years earlier
and was residing elsewhere. The summons were returned since the defendant
was not residing at the address given therein.
6 The appellant filed an application for substituted service under Order V
Rule 20 (1-A) of the CPC on 2 September 2011. The Trial Court allowed the
application on the same day in terms of the following order:
“Issue S/S to deft. u/o 5 R 29 (1-A) of CPC at the expense of the
Plaintiff.”
7 The appellant claims to have effected substituted service by publication
in the Marathi daily Lokmat. On 29 November 2011, the Trial Court passed the
following order:
“Deft. served on public notice in daily news paper Lokmat on
04.10.2011 but he remained absent. Suit proceeded ex parte
against the defendant. Suit proceeded ex parte against the Deft.”
8 The suit was decreed on 13 June 2014 and the appellant was directed to
deposit the balance consideration of Rs 9,78,391 within one month.
4
9 The appellant claims to have deposited the amount on 17 July 2014.
10 On 12 September 2014, the original defendant filed a first appeal under
Section 96 of the CPC before the High Court. He died on 21 August 2015. The
appellant submitted an application for bringing his legal representatives on
record. The application was eventually allowed on 23 September 2016.
11 The High Court by its judgment dated 7 July 2015 held that neither the
report of the bailiff nor the order of the Trial Court indicate that a copy of the
summons was affixed in a conspicuous place on the court house and at the
house where the defendant was known to have last resided. The High Court
held that there was a breach of the provisions of Order V Rule 20 (1) of the
CPC. The High Court observed that the order of the Trial Court permitting
substituted service was cryptic and that the Court had not recorded its
satisfaction that the defendant was keeping out of the way to avoid service or
that the summons could not be served in the ordinary manner for any other
reason. Moreover, the serving officer had not followed the procedure stipulated
in Order V Rule 17 where the defendant was not found to reside at the place
where he was last residing. The Court noted that besides the service to be
effected through the bailiff, the summons were not sent to the defendant at the
address furnished by the plaintiff by registered post, with acknowledgment due.
The High Court also found that the Trial Judge had ignored the provisions of
5
Chapter III of the Civil Manual issued by the High Court on the Appellate side
for guidance of Civil Courts and officers subordinate to it.
12 On behalf of the appellant, it has been submitted that the High Court has
misconstrued the provisions of Order V Rule 20. According to the appellant,
Order V Rule 20 allows an option to either affix the notice at the court premises
coupled with affixation at the home of the defendant or by any other mode
including publication in a newspaper. In the present case, service of summons
was effected on the original defendant by publication in the newspaper on 4
October 2011. Hence, it was urged that there was no further requirement to
affix the summons at the court premises and at the house of the original
defendant. Moreover, it was urged that the order of the Trial Court was not
cryptic and the report of the bailiff clearly indicated that the original defendant
was not residing at the address submitted by the appellant because of which
the summons were returned.
13 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the
findings of the High Court in the first appeal are borne out from the record and
are in accordance with law. Hence no interference is warranted in the present
proceedings.
14 The record before the Court would indicate that the Trial Court by its order
dated 9 February 2011 directed the issuance of summons to the original
6
defendant, returnable on 15 March 2011. In pursuance of the order, summons
were issued on 4 March 2011. The report of the bailiff dated 11 April 2011
indicates that the summons were returned unserved and the bailiff was
informed that the original defendant had left the premises nearly two years
earlier and resided elsewhere.
15 Order V Rules 17 provides as follows:
“17. Procedure when defendant refuses to accept service, or cannot be
found.- Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as
aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgment, or where the serving
officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the
defendant, who is absent from his residence at the time when service is
sought to be effected on him at his residence and there is no likelihood
of his being found at the residence within a reasonable time and there is
no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, nor
any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall
affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous
part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain, and shall then return the original
to the court from which it was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or
annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the
circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the
person (if any) by whom the house was identified and ‘whose presence
the copy was affixed.”
Evidently as the report of the bailiff indicates, he was unable to find the
defendant at the address which was mentioned in the summons. The report of
the bailiff does not indicate that the summons were affixed on a conspicuous
part of the house, at the address mentioned in the summons. There was a
breach of the provisions of Order V Rule 17. When the application for
substituted service was filed before the Trial Court under Order V Rule 20, a
7
cryptic order was passed on 2 September 2011. Order V Rule 20 requires the
Court to be satisfied either that there is reason to believe that the defendant is
keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service or that for any other
reason, the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. Substituted
service is an exception to the normal mode of service. The Court must apply its
mind to the requirements of Order V Rule 20 and its order must indicate due
consideration of the provisions contained in it. Evidently the Trial Court failed to
apply its mind to the requirements of Order V Rule 20 and passed a mechanical
order. Besides this, as observed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court,
the Trial Judge ignored the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Civil
Manual issued by the High Court on its appellate side for the guidance of civil
courts and officers subordinate to it. Paragraphs 33 to 36 of Chapter III are
extracted below:
“33. In addition to the service to be effected through a bailiff, a
summons may also be sent to the defendant, to the address given
by the plaintiff, by registered post, prepaid for acknowledgement,
provided there is a regular daily postal service at such place.
34. Rules as to service of summons are contained in rules 9 to 30
of Order V. Care should be taken to see that bailiffs follow those
rules as well as the instructions given in the Bailiffs’ Manual.
35. It is the duty of the serving officer to follow the procedure and
take all the steps laid down in rule 17 of Order V. He has no
discretion for not taking the necessary steps, when the conditions
laid down in the said rule are fulfilled.
36. It is for the Court to determine whether the service is good or
bad. In determining whether the service is good or not, the attention
of Courts is drawn to the necessity of strictly following the provisions
of the Civil Procedure Code as to the service of processes.
Ordinarily, service should not be considered sufficient unless all the
requirements of the law in that behalf are fulfilled. The object of the
service is to inform a party of the proceedings in due time. When
8
from the return of a serving officer it appears that there is no
likelihood that a process will come to the knowledge of the party in
due time, or a probability exists that it will not so come to his
knowledge, the service should not be considered to be proper. The
law contemplates that the primary method of service should be
tendering or delivering a copy of the process to the party personally,
in case in which it may be practicable to do so. It is the duty of the
serving officer to make all proper efforts to find the party, with a view
to effect personal service. If it be not possible after reasonable
endeavour to find the party, then only the service may be made on
an adult male member of the family residing with him.”
The submission that under Order V Rule 20, it was not necessary to affix a copy
of the summons at the court house and at the house where the defendant is
known to have last resided, once the court had directed service by publication
in the newspaper really begs the question. There was a clear breach of the
procedure prescribed in Order V Rule 17 even antecedent thereto. Besides, the
order of the Court does not indicate due application of mind to the requirement
of the satisfaction prescribed in the provision. The High Court was, in these
circumstances, justified in coming to the conclusion that the ex-parte judgment
and order in the suit for specific performance was liable to be set aside.
16 In Bhanu Kumar Jain v Archana Kumar1
, a Bench of three Judges of
this Court has held that :
“An appeal against an ex parte decree in terms of Section 96(2) of
the Code could be filed on the following grounds:
(i) the materials on record brought on record in the ex parte
proceedings in the suit by the plaintiff would not entail a
decree in his favour; and

1
(2005) 1 SCC 787
9
(ii) the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing.”
A defendant against whom an ex-parte decree is passed has two options: The
first is to file an appeal. The second is to file an application under Order IX Rule
13. The defendant can take recourse to both the proceedings simultaneously.
The right of appeal is not taken away by filing an application under Order IX
Rule 13. But if the appeal is dismissed as a result of which the ex-parte decree
merges with the order of the Appellate Court, a petition under Order IX Rule 13
would not be maintainable. When an application under Order IX Rule 13 is
dismissed, the remedy of the defendant is under Order XLIII Rule 1. However,
once such an appeal is dismissed, the same contention cannot be raised in a
first appeal under Section 96. The three Judge bench decision in Bhanu
Kumar Jain has been followed by another bench of three Judges in Rabindra
Singh v Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab2 and by a two Judge
bench in Mahesh Yadav v Rajeshwar Singh3
. In the present case, the original
defendant chose a remedy of first appeal under Section 96 and was able to
establish before the High Court, adequate grounds for setting aside the
judgment and decree.

2
(2008) 7 SCC 663
3
(2009) 2 SCC 205
10
17 For the above reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment
and order of the High Court. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
January 29, 2018

Saturday, January 27, 2018

amendment of plaint - after 9 years of the suit - trial not commenced - allowed = suit for specific performance - After a period of about nine years - to add compensation in case specific performance was not allowed, and a figure of Rs. 50,00,000/- plus Rs. 15,00,00,000/- for mental agony etc. was claimed in the proposed amendment. - Both the Bombay City Civil Court as well as the High Court have dismissed the amendment filed on the ground that there was no reason as to why such amendment was not made earlier, and as to why it was not claimed in the original plaint. = After the judgment of this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India, (2003) 1 SCC 49 / (2005) 6 SCC 344 it is difficult to say that an amendment, which is otherwise innocuous and does not fall foul of any of the well settled parameters of disallowing amendments, should not be allowed, and, if necessary, on payment of costs. We feel that the amendment should, therefore, be allowed. We have also been informed that evidence has yet to be taken.

1
ITEM NO.5               COURT NO.12               SECTION IX
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s)   for   Special   Leave   to   Appeal   (C)   No(s).
25471-25472/2015
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  23-03-2015
in   RP   No.   31/2015   31-10-2014   in   WP   No.   8750/2014   23-03-2015   in   WP
No. 8750/2014 passed by the High Court Of Judicature At Bombay)
NARAIN HINGORANI & ANR                              Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
HARISH KISHINCHAND CHANDNANI                        Respondent(s)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 25360-25361/2015 (IX)
Date : 22-01-2018 These petitions were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Adv.
                   Mr. Jatin Zaveri, AOR
Mr. Neel Kamal Mishra, Adv.                 
For Respondent(s)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Nobody appears on behalf of the respondent, through served.
A   suit   for   specific   performance   was   filed   on   30.04.2004.
After a period of about nine years, a Chamber Summons was moved on
03.05.2013 to add compensation in case specific performance was not
allowed,   and   a   figure   of   Rs.   50,00,000/-   plus   Rs.   15,00,00,000/-
for mental agony etc. was claimed in the proposed amendment. 
Both   the   Bombay   City   Civil   Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court
have dismissed the amendment filed on the ground that there was no
reason as to why such amendment was not made earlier, and as to why
it was not claimed in the original plaint.

2
After   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Salem   Advocate   Bar
Association,   T.N.   vs.   Union   of   India,   (2003)   1   SCC   49   /   (2005)   6
SCC   344   it   is   difficult   to   say   that   an   amendment,   which   is
otherwise   innocuous   and   does   not   fall   foul   of   any   of   the   well
settled   parameters   of   disallowing   amendments,   should   not   be
allowed, and, if necessary, on payment of costs.
We feel that the amendment should, therefore, be allowed.   We
have also been informed that evidence has yet to be taken.
In   this   view   of   the   matter,   we   allow   the   plaintiff   to   amend
the   plaint   in   accordance   with   the   Chamber   Summons   moved,   but   on
payment of costs of Rs.10,000/-.
The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
(R. NATARAJAN)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  COURT MASTER 

Divorce – on amicable settlement of parties – lived separately from 2013 - Divorce - transfer petition - the parties appear before the Supreme Court Mediation Centre on 13.5.2017. -The learned Mediator has recorded the settlement, which has been arrived at between the parties. - The settlement agreement reads as follows:- Because of disputes and differences both the parties started residing separately since June, 2013. - the parties have resolved all the dispute amicably in relation to the marriage and have been left with no claims against each other whatsoever or their respective family members. - We have perused the settlement agreement. Accepting the said settlement, we direct that the parties shall abide by the terms and conditions incorporated in the settlement agreement. - In the course of hearing, learned counsel for the parties submitted that this Court may grant divorce. - In view of the aforesaid, we think it appropriate to direct that the marriage between the parties stands dissolved on consent. - We appreciate the efforts made by the learned Mediator to convince the parties and make them arrive at the settlement.

TP(C) 106/2017
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 106/2017
KAVI SHARMA @ KAVITA SHARMA                  Petitioner
                                VERSUS
SAURABH SHUBHAM                              Respondent
O R D E R
This Court vide order dated 18.4.2017 had directed
the   parties   to   appear   before   the   Supreme   Court   Mediation
Centre   on   13.5.2017.     Thereafter,   they   appeared   and   the
mediation   proceedings   continued.     The   learned   Mediator   has
recorded   the   settlement,   which   has   been   arrived   at   between
the parties.  The settlement agreement reads as follows:-
�SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This   Settlement   Agreement   is   entered   into
between   petitioner-wife,   Ms.   Kavi   Sharma   @   Kavita
Sharma,   D/o   Shri   Moti   Lal   Sharma,   R/o   Surajgarh,
P.O.   &   P.S.   Surajgarh,   Distt.   Jhunjhnoo,
Rajasthan,   presently   at   Flat   No.   65,   Mahipath
Jujarki,   Jaipur,   Distt.   Jaipur,   Rajasthan   and
respondent-husband, Mr. Saurabh Shubham, S/o Prof.
Sudesh   Mehta,   R/o   Bye   Pass   Road,   near   Kashi
Nagari,   P.O.   Sudna,   P.S.   Daltonganj,   Distt.
Palamau, Jharkhand.
The   marriage   between   the   petitioner-wife   and
the respondent-husband was solemnized as per Hindu
rites   and   customs   on   17.1.2006   at   Jaipur,
Rajasthan.     Because   of   disputes   and   differences
both the parties started residing separately since
June, 2013.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated
18.4.2017   was   pleased   to   refer   the   matter   to   the
Supreme Court Mediation centre.

TP(C) 106/2017
2
Comprehensive   mediation   sessions   were   held
with   the   parties   separately   and   jointly   in
presence   of   their   respective   counsels   on
13.5.2017,   25.5.2017,   9.6.2017   and   today   i.e.   on
7.7.2017.
Both   the   parties   hereto   have   settled   their
dispute in following manner:-
1. That the respondent-husband will withdraw O.S.
No.   55   of   2016   under   Section   13   H.M.A.   pending   in
the   principal   Judge,   Family   Court   Palamau   at
Daltonganj filed by him.
2. That   it   is   agreed   between   the   parties   that
they   shall   jointly   pray   for   treating   divorce
petition   O.S.   No.   55   of   2016   as   divorce   petition
with   mutual   consent   before   the   Hon'ble   Supreme
Court at the time of next date of hearing invoking
the   inherent   power   under   Article   142   of   the
Constitution   of   India   and   for   grant   of   divorce   by
mutual   consent   as   both   the   parties   are   staying
separately since last 4 years and there is no hope
for   reunion/reconciliation.     In   case   this   Hon'ble
Court   declines   the   above   prayer   then   the   parties
shall   file   petition   for   mutual   divorce   before   the
competent   Court   Palamau   at     Daltonganj,   Jharkhand
within   one   month   from   the   disposal   of   the   present
Transfer Petition.
3. The   petitioner-wife   is   not   taking   any   amount
towards   full   and   final   settlement   of   all   her
claims towards alimony, maintenance (past, present
and   future),   Stridhan,   belongings   and   any   other
claim   whatsoever.     However,   all   rights   of   the
minor   son   qua   the   respondent-father   shall   remain
intact.
4. That the respondent-husband will pay a minimum
amount   of   Rs.10,000/-   (Rupees   Ten   Thousand   Only)
per month for the maintenance of their minor child
namely   Sakshya   Shubham   aged   about   8   years   on   or
before   every   10 th
  of   the   Month   which   shall   start
from   July,   2017   and   he   will   also   pay   any   further
amount which occurs on account of education of the
child.  For this purpose Bank account of the minor
child shall be opened by the petitioner-wife under
her   guardianship   and   the   account   number   should   be
communicated   to   the   respondent-husband   within   15
days   of   the   opening   of   the   same.     However,   the
amount of maintenance of month of July, 2017 shall

TP(C) 106/2017
3
be deposited in August, 2017 alongwith the payment
of Rs.10,000/- of month of August, 2017 subject to
the   above   intimation   of   Bank   Account   by   the
petitioner.
5. The   respondent-husband   shall   have   visitation
right of the minor child namely Sakshya Shubham on
weekends   and   any   other   duration   that   the   parties
may   mutually   agree   with   the   prior   intimation   to
the petitioner.
6. In   summer   vacation   of   the   school,   the
respondent-husband   shall   have   visitation   rights
for   15   days   of   the   summer   vacation   with   prior
intimation to the petitioner-wife.   The respondent
can take child with him with the prior intimation.
7. That   the   petitioner   and   the   respondent   have
agreed   that   none   of   them   or   their   family   members
or   anyone   involved   in   any   of   the   cases   related   to
this   matrimonial   alliance   will   initiate   any   other
legal   action   or   complaint   against   each   other   or
against the family members of each other or anyone
involved with respect to this matrimonial dispute.
8. That in case there is any other case/complaint
pending before any Court/Authority filed by any of
the   parties   involved   in   any   of   the   case   filed   or
their   family   members   apart   from   cases   detailed   in
the   present   agreement   with   regard   to   matrimonial
dispute   shall   be   withdrawn   by   the   respective
parties   within   4   weeks   from   the   signing   of   this
agreement.
9. Subject   to   the   aforesaid   terms,   the   parties
have resolved all the dispute amicably in relation
to   the   marriage   and   have   been   left   with   no   claims
against   each   other   whatsoever   or   their   respective
family members.
10. By   signing   this   Agreement   the   parties   hereto
solemnly   state   and   affirm   that   they   have   no
further   claims   or   demands   against   each   other   or
their   families   and   all   the   disputes   and
differences   have   been   amicably   settled   by   the
parties hereto through the process of mediation.
11. The   parties   undertake   to   abide   by   the   terms
and   conditions   set   out   in   the   above   mentioned
Agreement,   which   have   been   arrived   without   any
coercion, duress or collusion and undertake not to
raise any dispute whatsoever henceforth.

TP(C) 106/2017
4
11. The contents of this settlement-agreement have
been   explained   to   all   the   parties   through   their
respective counsels.�
We   have   perused   the   settlement   agreement.
Accepting   the   said   settlement,   we   direct   that   the   parties
shall abide by the terms and conditions incorporated in the
settlement agreement.
In   the   course   of   hearing,   learned   counsel   for   the
parties submitted that this Court may grant divorce.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   we   think   it   appropriate
to   direct   that   the   marriage   between   the   parties   stands
dissolved   on   consent.     We   appreciate   the   efforts   made   by
the   learned   Mediator   to   convince   the   parties   and   make   them
arrive at the settlement.
The   transfer   petition   is   accordingly   disposed   of.
Pending   interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   also   stand
disposed of.
..................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
....................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
....................J.
[Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud]
New Delhi;
January 16, 2018.

TP(C) 106/2017
5
ITEM NO.17                 COURT NO.1                 SECTION XVI-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 106/2017
KAVI SHARMA @ KAVITA SHARMA                        Petitioner
                                VERSUS
SAURABH SHUBHAM                                    Respondents
(FOR STAY APPLICATION  ON IA 1/2017)
Date : 16-01-2018 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
         HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
For Petitioner
                    Mr. Aditya Singh, AOR
Mr. Rajiv Dalal, Adv.
                 
For Respondent
                    Mr. Sureshan P., AOR
                   
           UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The   transfer   petition   is   disposed   of   in   terms   of
the signed order.
Pending   interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   also
stand disposed of.
   (Deepak Guglani)      (H.S. Parasher)
 Court Master Assistant Registrar
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (for short, the 'Act') - This suit has been filed by the plaintiff � State of Odisha seeking the following reliefs inter alia by way of injunction against the contesting defendant no.1 � State of Chhattisgarh : = It is clear that the above statement made by the Minister is with reference to this very dispute and the Ministry has concluded that the disputes cannot be resolved by negotiations. We, therefore, have no hesitation in directing that the Central Government shall issue appropriate notification in the Official Gazette and constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal for adjudication of the water dispute between the parties herein within a period of one month from today. Accordingly, the plaint in Original Suit No.1 of 2017 is returned to the plaintiff for its presentation and adjudication by the Water Disputes Tribunal to be newly constituted by the Central Government. We order accordingly. With the aforesaid directions, the instant suit is disposed of as having returned to the plaintiff for its presentation to the Water Disputes Tribunal.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SUIT NO.1 OF 2017
State of Odisha ....Plaintiff
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.      ....Defendants
O R D E R
This suit has been filed by the plaintiff � State of
Odisha seeking the following reliefs  inter alia  by way of
injunction   against   the   contesting   defendant   no.1   �   State
of Chhattisgarh :
(a) Grant   an   injunction   restraining   Defendant
No.1,   its   servants   and   agents   from   continuing
with   the   construction   and   operation   of   the   six
ongoing   industrial   barrages   namely   Samoda,
Seorinarayan,   Basantpur,   Mirouni,   Saradiha   and
Kalma,   pending   constitution   of   the   Tribunal   as
sought in the complaint dated 21.11.2016 filed by
the   Plaintiff   for   resolution   of   the   water
disputes   in   respect   of   waters   of   the   Mahanadi
Basin;
(b) Grant   an   injunction   restraining   Defendant
No.1,   its   servants   and   agents   from   continuing
with   the   construction   and   operation   of   seven
ongoing   projects   for   utilization   of   2.95   MAF   of

2
water   annually   viz.,   Kelo,   Arpa-Bhaisajhar
Barrage,   Sondhur,   Rajiv   Samodanisda   Diversion
Project,   Phase-II,   Mongra   Barrage,   Ph-II
Sukhanalla   barrage   and   Ghumariya   Nalla   Barrage,
pending constitution of the Tribunal as sought in
the   complaint   dated   21.11.2016   filed   by   the
Plaintiff for resolution of the water disputes in
respect of waters of the Mahanadi Basin;
(c) Grant   an   injunction   restraining   Defendant
No.1, its servants and agents from taking up any
projects  against  the  category  of  future  projects
mentioned   in   the   letter   dated   27.08.2016   of   the
State   of   Chhattisgarh   in   ANNEXURE   P-1,   pending
constitution   of   the   Tribunal   as   sought   in   the
complaint dated 21.11.2016 filed by the Plaintiff
for   resolution   of   the   water   disputes   in   respect
of waters of the Mahanadi Basin. 
Union   of   India   is   defendant   no.2   and   the   States   of
Madhya   Pradesh,   Maharashtra   and   Jharkhand   are   proforma
defendant   nos.3,   4   and   5   respectively,   in   the   instant
Suit.
Having   regard   to   the   provisions   of   the   Inter-State
River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (for short, the 'Act'), a
submission   was   made   before   us   that   it   would   be
appropriate   to   refer   the   matter   to   a   Water   Disputes
Tribunal   under   the   said   Act.   We   were   then   informed   that
such   a   Tribunal   has   not   been   constituted   so   far.   From
time   to   time,   adjournments   were   sought   in   the   matter   on
behalf   of   Defendant   No.2   �   Union   of   India   to   report   the

3
stage  at  which  the  matter  pertaining  to  the  constitution
of   Water   Disputes   Tribunal,   rests.   We   find   that   no   such
Tribunal   is   constituted   till   date   by   the   Central
Government.
Mr.   Atmaram   N.S.   Nadkarni,   learned   Additional
Solicitor General appearing for Defendant No.2 � Union of
India, submits that the Water Disputes Tribunal could not
be   constituted   because   one   of   the   disputing   States   did
not come forward to resolve the disputes by negotiations.
Therefore,   according   to   Mr.   Nadkarni,   learned
Additional   Solicitor   General   appearing   for   Defendant
No.2,   the   Central   Government   has   not   come   to   the
conclusion   that   the   dispute   cannot   be   settled   by
negotiations, as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act.
Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing
for   the   plaintiff,   has   pointed   out   a   statement   made   by
the   Minister   of   State   for   Water   Resources,   River
Development   and   Ganga   Rejuvenation,   on   the   floor   of   the
Rajya   Sabha,   Parliament   of   India,   to   the   following
effect:
�The   Negotiation   Committee   held   two   meetings
on 28.02.2017 and 22.05.2017 and submitted its
report   in   which   it   is   mentioned   that   any
further   meetings   of   this   Committee   would   not
be fruitful as there had been no participation
from complainant State i.e. State of Odisha in
both   the   meetings.   Accordingly,   the   Ministry
concluded   that   the   dispute   cannot   be   resolved
by   negotiation   and   it   has   been   decided   to
constitute   a   Tribunal   for   adjudication   of   the
dispute. Draft Cabinet Note in this regard has
been prepared.

4
It   is   clear   that   the   above   statement   made   by   the
Minister   is   with   reference   to   this   very   dispute   and   the
Ministry   has   concluded   that   the   disputes   cannot   be
resolved by negotiations. 
We,   therefore,   have   no   hesitation   in   directing   that
the   Central   Government   shall   issue   appropriate
notification   in   the   Official   Gazette   and   constitute   a
Water   Disputes   Tribunal   for   adjudication   of   the   water
dispute between the parties herein within a period of one
month   from   today.   Accordingly,   the   plaint   in   Original
Suit   No.1   of   2017   is   returned   to   the   plaintiff   for   its
presentation   and   adjudication   by   the   Water   Disputes
Tribunal   to   be   newly   constituted   by   the   Central
Government.
We order accordingly.  
With   the   aforesaid   directions,   the   instant   suit   is
disposed   of   as   having   returned   to   the   plaintiff   for   its
presentation to the Water Disputes Tribunal. 
Needless to mention that questions of all reliefs as
may be allowed to the parties, are left open.
....................J
[S. A. BOBDE]
....................J
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 23, 2018.

5
ITEM NO.10               COURT NO.7               SECTION XVII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Original Suit No.1/2017
STATE OF ODISHA                                    Plaintiff(s)
                                VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.                       Defendants
(IA   No.60623/2017-PERMISSION   TO   FILE   ADDITIONAL   DOCUMENTS 
FOR  [APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 2/2017
and   IA   No.134950/2017-CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION   and   IA
No.7781/2018-XTRA)
Date : 23-01-2018 This Suit was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S.P. Mishra, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Mohan V. Katarki, Adv.
Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Karan Lahiri, Adv.
Ms. Parul Shukla, Adv.
Mr. Abhinav Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. Raghav Dwivedi, Adv. 
                    Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Nitin Sonkar, Adv.
                    Mr. Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, AOR
Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.
Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, AOR
Mr. Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni, ASG
Mrs. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Wasim A. Qadri, Adv.
Mrs. Swarupma Chaturvedi, Adv.
                    Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR
               
                    Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh, AOR 
Mr. Mohd. Waquas, Adv.

6
Mr. Aditya Pratap Singh, Adv.
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The instant suit is disposed of as having returned to the
plaintiff, in terms of the signed order.
Pending   interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   stand
disposed of.
(SANJAY KUMAR-II)                          (INDU KUMARI POKHRIYAL)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  ASST.REGISTRAR
(Signed Order is placed on the file)