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Saturday, January 27, 2018

whether Smt. Lakshmi is a fictitious person or not. If she is not a fictitious person, she would be in the region of about 97 years of age and we have no idea whether she is still alive. Similarly, we have no idea whether Shri V. Sreeramulu, her General Power of Attorney is alive or not since no one has put in appearance on their behalf. Prima facie , on going through the records of the case and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, it does appear to us that Smt. Lakshmi was a fictitious person. Even her General Power of Attorney Shri V. Sreeramulu could not produce her as is evident from the proceedings for contempt being CCC (Criminal) No.12 of 2006. Under the circumstances, since it appears that the civil suit filed by Smt. Lakshmi being a non-existent person was based on a complete fraud, the decree granted in her favour is set aside.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1303 OF 2008

ST. ANN�S EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY ...APPELLANT(s)
                           VERSUS
LAKSHMI & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(s)
O R D E R
  We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   in
respect   of   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   20 th
January,   2004   passed   by   a   learned   Single   Judge   of   the
Karnataka High Court in RFA No.846 of 1999 as well as the
order  dated  22 nd
  November,  2005  in  Review  Petition  No.510
of 2005.
  The proceedings arise out of a civil suit having been
filed   by   Smt.   Lakshmi   through   her   General   Power   of
Attorney, Shri V. Sreeramulu.
  One   of   the   issues   framed   in   the   civil   suit   was
whether   Smt.   Lakshmi   is   a   fictitious   person   or   not.
There was no final determination in this regard either by
the   Trial   Court   or   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   (High
Court).
  As   far   as   the   present   appeal   is   concerned,   it   may
only   be   stated   that   the   suit   was   for   a   decree   seeking
permanent   injunction   against   the   appellant   (St.   Ann�s
Educational   Society)   in   respect   of   10   acres   of   land   in

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Survey   No.27   in   Village   Kowdenahalli,   Bangalore.     While
the   civil   suit   filed   by   Smt.   Lakshmi   was   dismissed,   the
First   Appellate   Court   (High   Court)   decreed   the   suit   in
her favour.
  It is under these circumstances that the appellant is
now before us.
  In   the   present   appeal,   Smt.   Lakshmi   has   been   served
through her General Power of Attorney Shri V. Sreeramulu.
Neither of them has put in appearance in this Court.  
  When   Smt.   Lakshmi   filed   the   suit,   she   was   about   60
years of age in 1989.  In the normal course, Smt. Lakshmi
would now be about 97 years of age.
  As   far   as   Shri   V.   Sreeramulu   is   concerned,   he   was
about   80   years   of   age   when   certain   proceedings   for
contempt   being   CCC   (Criminal)   No.12   of   2006   were
initiated   against   him   by   the   Karnataka   High   Court   in
2009.   He would, therefore, be in the region of 87 years
of age today.
  We   have  no   idea  whether   Smt.  Lakshmi   is  a   fictitious
person   or   not.     If   she   is   not   a   fictitious   person,   she
would   be   in   the   region   of   about   97   years   of   age   and   we
have no idea whether she is still alive.  
  Similarly,   we   have   no   idea   whether   Shri   V.
Sreeramulu, her General Power of Attorney is alive or not
since no one has put in appearance on their behalf.

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  Prima facie , on going through the records of the case
and   after   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   it
does   appear   to   us   that   Smt.   Lakshmi   was   a   fictitious
person.     Even   her   General   Power   of   Attorney   Shri   V.
Sreeramulu   could   not   produce   her   as   is   evident   from   the
proceedings   for   contempt   being   CCC   (Criminal)   No.12   of
2006.
  Under   the   circumstances,   since   it   appears   that   the
civil   suit   filed   by   Smt.   Lakshmi   being   a   non-existent
person  was  based  on  a  complete  fraud,  the  decree  granted
in her favour is set aside.
  We may note that insofar as the grant of the land to
the   appellant   is   concerned,   that   has   been   found   against
the   appellant   right   up   to   this   Court   in   SLP(C)   No.1519-
1520 of 2003 decided on 31 st
 March, 2003.
  We are informed that the appellant has preferred some
writ   petition   which   is   pending   in   the   Karnataka   High
Court   being   W.P.   No.23158   of   2008.     We   do   not   make   any
comment   or   any   observations   with   regard   to   these
proceedings. 
  It   is   also   brought   to   our   notice   by   learned   counsel
for the appellant that the civil suit being OS No.4709 of
2010   has   been   filed   by   the   appellant   in   the   City   Civil
Court,   Bangalore   for   relief   of   permanent   injunction
restraining   the   State   of   Karnataka   from   interfering   with
the appellant�s possession of the suit scheduled property

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without following due process of law.
  It   is   submitted   that   an   injunction   has   been   granted
in favour of the appellant on 1 st
 October, 2011.
  In   this   context,   we   may   note   that   all   proceedings
with   regard   to   the   grant   of   the   land   to   the   appellant
have   attained   finality   against   the   appellant   by   the
dismissal   of     SLP(C)   No.1519-1520   of   2003   filed   by   the
appellant in this Court.
  This may be taken note of by the High Court and Civil
Court as well.
  The appeal stands disposed of.


.............................J.
  (MADAN B. LOKUR)
.............................J.
  (DEEPAK GUPTA)
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 23, 2018

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ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.4               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).1303/2008
ST. ANN�S EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY                      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
LAKSHMI & ANR.                                     Respondent(s)
Date : 23-01-2018 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv.
Mr. K. Parameshwar, Adv.
Mr. George Thomas, Adv.
Mr. R. Sathish, AOR
Hamsini Shankar, Adv.
Mr. Ishwar Mohanty, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s)
                   Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Parikshit P. Angadi, Adv.
Mr. Md. Apzal Ansari, Adv.
As per appearance slip
                   
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R
The appeal stands disposed of.
  Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
  (SANJAY KUMAR-I)                 (KAILASH CHANDER)
     AR-CUM-PS                          COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Order XXXII, Rules 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14 of the Code (as amended in Karnataka State Not only, is there no provision for appointment of next friend by the Court, but the permission of the Court is also not necessary.



                                                              REPORTABLE


                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                            CIVIL APPEAL NO.  22969  OF 2017


     Nagaiah and another                                      ..Appellants

                                              Versus

     Smt. Chowdamma (dead) By Lrs.
     and another                                              ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1.The judgment dated 08.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular Second Appeal No. 1102 of 2004 is called in question in this appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiffs. Signature Not Verified
2. Digitally signed by SARITA PUROHIT Brief facts leading to this appeal are: Original Suit No. 228 Date: 2018.01.09 17:21:11 IST Reason: of   1989   was   filed   by   the   appellants   herein   (plaintiffs   1   and   2  respectively   in   the   suit)   praying   for   a   declaration   that   the   suit schedule   property   is   the   joint  property  of  the  appellants  along   with their   father   Kempaiah   (defendant   no.1   in   the   suit/respondentno.2herein) and that they are entitled to 2/3rd share in the said property; that the sale deed executed by the father¬Kempaiah (defendant no.1 in the   suit/respondent   no.2   herein)   in   favour   of   defendant no.2/respondent   no.1¬Chowdamma   was   not   binding   on   their   2/3 rd share in the suit schedule property.  A relief for permanent injunction was also sought.   A certain set of other facts was also pleaded which may not be material for the disposal of this appeal.   It is relevant to note   that   at   the   time   of   filing   of   the   suit,   i.e.   on   24.01.1985,   the appellant no.2 herein, namely, Krishna was aged about 17 years.  The appellant   no.1/Plaintiff   No.1   herein   being   the   elder   brother   of appellant no.2 filed the suit not only on his personal behalf but also on behalf of the second appellant-second plaintiff (who was a minor). 
3. The  trial Court dismissed the suit   on   merits.     The   first Appellate Court allowed the Regular Appeal No. 90 of 2003 filed by the unsuccessful   plaintiffs   and   decreed   the   suit.     Aggrieved   by   the judgment   of   the   first   appellate   Court,   the   unsuccessful   defendant no.2¬   Chowdamma/purchaser   of   the   property   filed   Regular   Second Appeal before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. 
By   the   impugned   judgment,   the   High   Court   has   allowed   the appeal and dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the plaintiff no.1 being the elder brother could not act as the guardian of plaintiff no.2   during   the   life¬time   of   Kempaiah, the father   of   the   plaintiffs (defendant no.1), inasmuch as plaintiff no.1/appellant no.1 was not appointed as a guardian of the minor plaintiff no. 2 by any competent Court.  Since the first defendant is the father of plaintiff no.2, he was the natural guardian and hence he could only represent plaintiff no.2 and none else.
  It is to be noted that no issue was raised in the trial Court with regard to competency of plaintiff No.1 to represent plaintiff no.2 in the suit.   Even in the first appellate Court, such question was not raised, hence not considered.  However, the High Court seems to have permitted such question to be raised for the first time in the second appeal, since it is purely a question of law.
4. Hence,   the   only   question   to   be   decided   in   this   appeal   is, whether   the   first   plaintiff   being   the   elder   brother   of   minor   second plaintiff (at the time of filing of the suit) could have filed the suit on behalf of the minor as his next friend/guardian.
5. The   High   Court,   while   coming   to   the   conclusion   that   the first plaintiff could not have acted as a guardian of the minor¬ second plaintiff,   has   relied   upon   Section   4(b)   of   the   Hindu   Minority   and Guardianship   Act   (hereinafter   called   as   ‘Hindu   Guardianship   Act’). Sub-Section (b) of Section 4 of the Hindu Guardianship Act reads as under:
“(b) "guardian” means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his person and property, and includes—
(i) a natural guardian,
(ii)   a   guardian   appointed   by   the   will   of   the   minor's father or mother,
(iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and
(iv)  a   person   empowered to act  as such  by   or  under any enactment relating to any court of wards;” As mentioned supra, the High Court has ruled that defendant no.1, being   the   father   of   minor   plaintiff   no.2,   is   the   natural   guardian   of plaintiff no.2 and consequently plaintiff no.1 could not have acted as the guardian in the suit on behalf of minor plaintiff, particularly when he was not appointed as a guardian by any competent court of law.  In our considered opinion, the High Court has totally misdirected itself while concluding so.
6. There cannot be any dispute that the plaintiff no.1 did not and does not come within the meaning of a “Guardian” as specified in sub-section (b) of Section 4 of the Hindu Guardianship Act. But the present   facts   are   not   governed   by   the   provisions   of   Hindu Guardianship   Act;   rather   they   are   governed   by   Order   XXXII   of   the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to “Code”).  To decide the present   controversy   it   would   be   relevant   to   note   the   following provisions as contained in Order XXXII,   Rules 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14 of the Code (as amended in Karnataka State, since the matter is from Karnataka State) :
1. Minor   to   sue   by   next   friend.–Every   suit   by   a minor shall be instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the next friend of the minor.
[Explanation:  In this Order, “minor” means a person who has not attained his majority within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875), where the suit relates to any of the matters mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 2 of that Act or to any other matter.]
2. Where   suit   is   instituted   without   next   friend, plaint   to   be   taken   off   the   file.–  (1)   Where   a   suit   is instituted   by   or   on   behalf   of   a   minor   without   a   next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with costs to be paid by the pleader or other person by whom it was presented.
(2)   Notice   of   such   application   shall   be   given   to   such person,   and   the   Court, after  hearing  his  objections  (if any) may make such order in the matter as it thinks fit.
3. Qualifications to be a next friend or guardian.— (1) Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority   may   act   as   next   friend   of   a   minor   or   as   his guardian for the suit:
Provided that the interest of that person is not adverse to that of the minor and that he is not, in the case of next friend, a defendant, or, in the case of a guardian for the suit, a plaintiff  (2) Appointed or declared guardians to be preferred and to be superseded only for reasons recorded.— Where a minor   has   a   guardian   appointed   or   declared   by competent authority, no person other than the guardian shall act as the next friend of the minor or be appointed his guardian for the suit unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded, that it is for the minor’s welfare that another person he permitted to act or oe appointed as the case may be.
(3) Where the defendant is a minor, the Court on being satisfied   of   the   fact   of   his   minority   shall   appoint   a proper person to be guardian for the suit for the minor. A   person   appointed   as   guardian   under   this   sub¬rule, shall,   unless   his   appointment   is   terminated   by retirement or removal by order of Court on application made   for   the   purpose   or   by   his   death,   continue throughout all proceedings in the suit or arising out of the   suit   including   proceedings   in   any   appeal   or   in revision and  any  proceedings in execution of a decree and the service of any process in any such proceeding on the said guardian if duly made shall be deemed to be good service for the purposes of such proceedings.
(4) An order for the appointment of a guardian for the suit may be obtained upon an application in the name and   on   behalf   of   the   minor   or   by   the   plaintiff.   The application   where   it   is   by   the   plaintiff   shall   whenever necessary set forth in the order of their suitability a list of   persons   who   are competent  and qualified  to  act as guardian for the suit for the minor defendant. (5) The application referred to in the last preceding sub¬ rule whether made by the plaintiff or on behalf of the minor   defendant   shall   be   supported   by   an   affidavit verifying the fact that the proposed guardian has not or that no one of the proposed guardians has any interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of   the   minor   and   that   the   proposed   guardian   or guardians   are   fit   persons   to   be   so   appointed.   The affidavit   shall   further   state   according   to   the circumstances of each case particulars of any existing guardian appointed or declared by competent authority, the name and address of the person, if any, who is the de   facto   guardian   of   the   minor,   the   names   and addresses of persons, if any, who, in the event of either the   natural   or   the   de   facto   guardian   or   the   guardian appointed or declared by competent authority, not being permitted   to   act,   are   by   reason   of   relationship   or interest,   or   otherwise   suitable   persons   to   act   as guardians for the minor for the suit.
(6) An application for the appointment of a guardian for the   suit   of   a   minor   shall   not   be   combined   with   an application   for   bringing   on   record   the   legal representative of a deceased party.
(7)   No   order   shall   be   made   on   any   application   under sub-rule (4) above except upon notice to the minor and also to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in that behalf, or where there is no such guardian upon notice to the father or natural guardian   of   the   minor   or   where   there   is   no   father   or natural   guardian   upon   notice   to   the   person   in   whose actual care the minor is and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person so served with notice. The notice required by this sub-rule shall be   served   at   least   seven   clear   days   before   the   day named in the notice for hearing of the application. (8)   Where   none   of   the   persons   mentioned   in   the   last preceding   sub¬rule   is   willing   to   act   as   guardian,   the Court   shall   direct   notice   to   other   person   or   persons proposed   for   appointment   as   guardian   either simultaneously to some or all of them or successively as it   may   consider   convenient   or   desirable   in   the circumstances of the case. The Court shall appoint such person as it thinks proper from among those who have signified   their   consent   and   intimate   the   fact   of   such appointment to the person appointed by registered post unless he is present at the time of appointment either in person or by pleader.
(9) No person shall be appointed guardian for the suit without   his   consent   and   except   in   cases   where   an applicant himself prays for his appointment as guardian notices issued shall clearly require the party served to signify his consent or refusal to act as guardian. (10) Where the Court finds no person fit and willing to act as guardian for the suit the Court may appoint any of its officers or a pleader of the Court to be a guardian and may direct that costs to be incurred by that officer or pleader in the performance of his duties as guardian shall   be   borne   either   by  the  parties or  by  any  one or more   of   the   parties   to   the   suit   or   out   of   any   fund   in Court   in   which   the   minor   is   interested   and   may   give direction for the repayment or allowance of the costs as justice and the circumstances of the case may require. (11) When a guardian for the suit as a minor defendant is appointed and it is made to appear to the Court that the   guardian   is   not   in   possession   of   any   or   sufficient funds   for   the   conduct   of   the   suit   on   behalf   of   the defendant and that the defendant will be prejudiced in his  defence  thereby, the Court may from time to time order  the   plaintiff to advance moneys to the guardian for   the   purpose   of   his   defence   and   all   moneys   so advanced   shall   form   costs   of   the   plaintiff   in   the   suit. The  order shall direct that the guardian as and when required by the Court shall file into Court the account of the moneys so received by him."¬¬
6. Receipt by next friend or guardian for the suit of property under decree for minor. – (1) A next friend or guardian for the suit shall not, without the leave of the Court, receive any money or other movable property on behalf of a minor either—
(a) by way of compromise before decree or order, or
(b)   under   a   decree   or   order   in   favour   of   the   minor. (2) Where the next friend or guardian for the suit has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be guardian of the property of the minor, or, having been so appointed or declared, is under any disability known   to   the   Court   to   receive   the   money   or   other movable property, the Court shall, if it grants him leave to receive the property, require such security and give such   directions   as   will,   in   its   opinion,   sufficiently protect the property from waste and ensure its proper application:
[Provided   that   the   Court   may,   for   reasons   to   be recorded,   dispense   with   such   security   while   granting leave   to   the   next   friend   or   guardian   for   the   suit   to receive money or other movable property under a decree or order, where such next friend or guardian—
(a) is the manager of a Hindu undivided family and the decree or order relates to the property or business of the family; or
(b) is the parent of the minor.] Provided that the Court may in its discretion dispense with   the   security   in   cases   where   the   next   friend   or guardian   for   the   suit   is   a   manager   of   a   joint   Hindu family or the Karnavan of a Tharwad or the Ejaman of an   Aliyasanthana   family   and   the   decree   is   passed   in favour   of   such   joint   family   or   Tharwad   or   the Aliyasanthanafamily as the case may be.
7.  Agreement   or   compromise   by   next   friend   or guardian  for the suit.–(1) No next friend or guardian for   the   suit   shall,   without   the   leave   of   the   Court, expressly   recorded   in   the   proceeding,   enter   into   any agreement   or   compromise   on   behalf   of   a   minor   with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.
(2) Where an application is made to the Court for leave to   enter   into   an   agreement   or   compromise   or   for withdrawal of a suit in pursuance of a compromise or for taking any other similar action on behalf of a minor or other person under disability, the affidavit in support of the application shall set out the manner in which the proposed   compromise,   agreement   or   other   action   is likely to effect the interests of the minor or other person under   the   disability   and   the   reason   why   such compromise, agreement or other action is expected to be for   the   benefit   of   the   minor   or   other   person   under disability, where in such a case the minor or the other person   under   disability   is   represented   by   counsel   or pleader, the said counsel or pleader shall also file into Court   along   with   the   application   a   certificated   to   the effect   that   the   agreement   or   compromise   or   action proposed is in his opinion for the benefit of the minor or other person under disability. If the Court grants leave under sub rule (1) of this Rule, the decree or order of the   Court  shall  expressly recite the grant of the leave sought   from   the   Court   in   respect   of   the   compromise, agreement   or   other   action   as   aforesaid   after consideration   of   the   affidavit   and   the   certificate mentioned   above   and   shall   also   set   out   either   in   the body   of   the   decree   itself   or   in   a   schedule   annexed thereto   the   terms   of   the   compromise   or   agreement   or the particulars of other action.
(3)   Any   such   agreement   or   compromise   entered   into without   the   leave   of   the   court   so   recorded   shall   be voidable against all parties other than the minor.
9.  Removal   of   next   friend.–(1)   Where   the   interest   of the next friend of a minor is adverse to that of the minor or   where   he   is   so   connected   with   a   defendant   whose interest  is   adverse to  that  of the minor  as to make it unlikely   that   the   minor’s   interest   will   be   properly protected by him, or where he does not do his duty, or during the pendency of the suit, ceases to reside within India, or for any other sufficient cause, application may be made on behalf of the minor or by a defendant for his removal; and the Court, if satisfied of the sufficiency of the   cause   assigned,   may   order   the   next   friend   to   be removed accordingly, and make such other order as to costs as it thinks fit.
(2) Where the next friend is not a guardian appointed or declared by an authority competent in this behalf, and an application is made by a guardian so appointed or declared,   who   desires   to   be   himself   appointed   in   the place of the next friend, the Court shall remove the next friend unless it considers, for reasons to be recorded by it, that the guardian ought not to be appointed the next friend   of   the   minor,   and   shall   thereupon   appoint   the applicant to be next friend in his place upon such terms as to the costs already incurred in the suit as it thinks fit
12.   Course   to   be   followed   by   minor   plaintiff   or applicant on attaining majority.– (1) A minor plaintiff or   a   minor   not   a   party   to   a   suit   on   whose   behalf   an application is pending shall, on attaining majority, elect whether he will proceed with the suit or application.  (2)   Where   he   elects   to   proceed   with   the   suit   or application, he shall apply for an order discharging the next friend and for leave to proceed in his own name.  (3) The title of the suit or application shall in such case be corrected so as to read henceforth thus:— “A,B.,  late  a  minor, by C.D., his next friend, but now having attained majority”.
(4) Where he elects to abandon the suit or application, he shall, if a sole plaintiff or sole applicant, apply for an order to dismiss the suit or application on repayment of the costs incurred by the defendant or opposite party or which may have been paid by his next friend.
(5)   Any   application   under   this   rule   may   be   made   ex parte;   but   no   order   discharging   a   next   friend   and permitting a minor plaintiff to proceed in his own name shall be made without notice to the next friend.
13.   Where   minor   co ¬plaintiff   attaining   majority desires   to   repudiate   suit.–(1)   Where   a   minor   co¬ plaintiff   on  attaining  majority desires to repudiate the suit, he shall apply to have his name struck out as co¬ plaintiff;   and   the   Court,   if   it   finds   that   he   is   not   a necessary   party,   shall   dismiss   him   from   the   suit   on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.  (2) Notice of the application shall be served on the next friend, on any co¬ plaintiff and on the defendant. (3) The costs of all parties of such application, and of all or any proceedings theretofore had in the suit, shall be paid by such persons as the Court directs.
(4) Where the applicant is a necessary party to the Suit, the Court may direct him to be made a defendant.
14.  Unreasonable   or   improper   suit.–(1)   A   minor   on attaining majority may, if a sole plaintiff, apply that a suit   instituted   in   his   name   by   his   next   friend   be dismissed   on   the   ground   that   it   was   unreasonable   or improper.
(2) Notice of the application shall be served on all the parties concerned; and the Court, upon being satisfied of such unreasonableness or impropriety, may grant the application and order the next friend to pay the costs of all parties in respect of the application and of anything done in the suit, or make such other order as it thinks fit.
14¬A.  When a minor defendant attains majority either he or the guardian appointed for him in the suit or the plaintiff   may   apply   to   the   Court   to   declare   the   said defendant a major and to discharge the guardian and notice thereof shall be given to such among them as are not  applicants.   When the Court by  order  declares the said   defendant   as   major   it   shall   by   the   same   order discharge the guardian and thereafter the suit shall be proceeded with against the said defendant as a major. A  bare   reading   of   Order   XXXII, Rule 1 of the  Code makes it amply clear that every suit by a minor shall be instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the “next friend” of the minor. The next friend need not necessarily be a duly appointed guardian as specified under Sub-Section (b) of Section 4 of Hindu Guardianship Act.   “Next friend” acts for the benefit of the “minor” or other person who is unable to look after  his or her own interests or manage his or her   own   law   suit   (person   not  sui   juris)   without   being   a   regularly appointed guardian as per Hindu Guardianship Act.   He acts as an officer of the Court, especially appearing to look after the interests of a minor or a disabled person whom he represents in a particular matter. The afore-said provision authorises filing of the suit on behalf of the minor by a next friend.   If a suit by minor is instituted without the next   friend,   the   plaint   would   be   taken   off   the   file   as   per   Rule   2   of Order   XXXII   of   the   Code.     Order   XXXII   Rules   1  and   3  of   the   Code together make a distinction between a next friend and a guardian ad litem; i.e., (a) where the suit is filed on behalf of a minor and (b) where the suit is filed against a minor.   In case, where the suit is filed on behalf of the minor, no permission or leave of the Court is necessary for   the   next   friend   to   institute   the   suit,   whereas   if   the   suit   is   filed against a minor, it is obligatory for the plaintiff to get the appropriate guardian ad litem appointed by the Court for such minor. A “guardian ad   litem”  is   a   special   guardian   appointed   by   a   court   in   which   a particular litigation is pending to represent a minor/infant, etc. in that particular litigation and the status of guardian ad litem exists in that specific litigation in which appointment occurs. Various High Courts have also adopted this view. The Madras High Court in  Kaliammal, minor by Guardian, Patta Goundan v. Ramaswamy Goundan, AIR 1949   Mad.   859  observed   that   there   is   no   need   of   sanction   of   the Court for a next friend to sue, if he is not incapacitated.  This was also the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad in K. Kumar v. Onkar Nath, AIR 1972 All. 81.
7. The   Kerala   High   Court   upheld   the   same   in   no   uncertain terms in Gopalaswamy Gounder v. Ramaswamy Kounder, AIR 2006 Ker 138. In that case, the High Court observed that any person who does not have any interest adverse to that of the minor can figure as his next friend. It held as follows:
“Law   does   not   contemplate   the   appointment   of   a next   friend   for   a   minor   who   institutes   a   legal proceeding   either   as   a   Plaintiff   or   as   a   Petitioner. The object of a minor being represented through a next friend is only for the purpose of enabling the opposite party to look upon the next friend for costs, if any, ordered against the minor…” ….      ….         ….
Where   the   minor   institutes   a   proceeding   as   a Plaintiff or applicant any person who does not have any interest adverse to that of the minor can figure as  his  next friend. The mere fact that the minor's mother Selvi was appointed as the guardian of the minor   in   execution   proceedings   where   the   minor was   impleaded   as   an   additional   Respondent,   will not   disable   Gopalaswamy   Kounder   from   styling himself   as   the   next   friend   of   the   minor   for   the purpose of filing the petitions under Order 21, Rule 90 Code of Civil Procedure There was absolutely no necessity   for   the   next   friend   to   seek   his appointment  as   the next  friend nor  was the  court below   justified   in   dismissing   the   said   application. Even in a case where the proceedings are instituted by   the   minor   through   his   next   friend,   the   real Plaintiff  or applicant is the minor himself and not the next friend.”
8. Not   only,   is   there   no   provision   for   appointment   of   next friend   by   the   Court,   but   the   permission   of   the   Court   is   also   not necessary.
However, even in respect of minor defendants, various High Courts are consistent in taking the view that the decree cannot be set aside even where certain formalities for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the defendant have not been observed.  The High Courts   have   observed   in   the   case   of   minor   defendants,   where   the permission of the Court concerned under Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code is not taken, but the decree has been passed, in the absence of prejudice   to   the   minor   defendant,   such   decree  cannot  be  set  aside. The   main   test   is   that   there   has   to   be   a   prejudice   to   the   minor defendant for setting aside the decree. For reference, see the cases of Brij   Kishore   Lal   v.   Satnarain   Lal   &   Ors.,   AIR   1954   All.   599, Anandram   &   Anr.   v.   Madholal   &   Ors.   AIR   1960   Raj.   189 Rangammal   v.   Minor   Appasami   &   Ors.   AIR   1973   Mad.12,Chater Bhuj Goel v. Gurpreet Singh AIR 1983 Punjab 406 & Shri Mohd.  Yusuf  and  Ors.  v.  Shri Rafiquddin Siddiqui.  ILR  1974 (1) Delhi 825.
In the matter on hand, the suit was filed on behalf of the minor and therefore   the   next   friend   was   competent   to   represent   the   minor. Further, admittedly no prejudice was caused to plaintiff no. 2.

9.      “Guardian” as defined under the Hindu Guardianship Act is a different concept from the concept of “next friend” or the “Guardian ad litem”.     Representation   by   “next   friend”   of   minor   plaintiff   or   by “guardian  ad litem” of minor defendant is purely temporary, that too for the purposes of that particular law suit.
10. There   is   no   hurdle   for   a   natural   guardian   or   duly constituted   guardian   as   defined   under   Hindu   Guardianship   Act   to represent   minor   plaintiff   or   defendant   in   a   law   suit.       But   such guardian   should   not   have   adverse   interest   against   minor.     If   the natural guardian or the duly constituted guardian has adverse interest against the minor in the law suit, then a next friend or guardian  ad litem,   as   the   case   may   be,   would   represent   the   minor   in   the   civil litigation.
11.   It is by now well settled and as per the provisions of Order XXXII   of   Code   that   any   person   who   is   of   sound   mind,   who   has attained majority, who can represent and protect the interest of the minor, who is a resident of India and whose interest is not adverse to that of the minor, may represent the minor as his next friend. Such person who is representing the minor plaintiff as a next friend shall not be party to the same suit as defendant. Rules 6 and 7 of Order XXXII of the Code specifically provide that the next friend or guardian
in the suit shall not without the leave of the Court receive any money or immovable property and shall not without the leave of the Court enter into any agreement or compromise.  The rights and restrictions of the natural guardian provided under the Hindu Guardianship Act do not conflict with the procedure for filing a suit by a next friend on behalf of the minor.   Not only is there no express prohibition, but a reading of Order XXXII of the Code would go to show that wherever the legislature thought it proper to restrict the right of the next friend, it has expressly provided for it in Rules 6 and 7 of Order XXXII of the Code.  Rule 9 of Order XXXII – apart from other factors, clarifies that where a next friend  is not a guardian appointed or declared by the authority competent in this behalf and an application is made by the guardian so appointed or declared who desires to be himself appointed in the place of the next friend, the Court shall remove the next friend unless   it   considers,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded,   that   the   guardian ought   not   to   be   appointed   as   the   next   friend   of   the   minor.     Order XXXII, Rules 12, 13 and 14 of the Code empower the minor plaintiff to take a decision either to proceed with the suit or to abandon the suit, after attaining majority.  Thus, after attaining majority,  if the plaintiff elects   to   proceed   with   the   suit,   he   may   do   so   by   making   an application,   consequent   upon   which   the   next   friend   ceases   to
represent the minor plaintiff from the date of attaining majority by the minor.  Order XXXII Rule 12 of the Code requires the minor plaintiff to have the option either to proceed with the suit or to abandon the suit and  does not  at all  provide that if no such election is made by the minor  plaintiff  on attaining majority, the suit is to be dismissed on that ground. In case, if the Court discovers during the pendency of the suit that the minor plaintiff has attained majority, such plaintiff needs to be called upon by the Court to elect whether he intends to proceed with the suit or not. In other words the minor who attained majority during the pendency of the matter must be informed of the pendency of the suit and in the absence of such a notice the minor cannot be imputed with the  knowledge of the pendency of the suit. So, before any adverse orders are to be made against the minor who has attained majority, the Court has to give notice to such person. Of course, in the present matter, under the facts and circumstances, such occasion did not arise, since plaintiff no. 2 on attaining majority has continued with the suit, which means he has elected to proceed with the suit.
12. The principles arising out of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the Hindu Guardianship Act may not be apposite to the next friend appointed under Order XXXII of the Code. The appointment of a guardian  ad   litem  to   represent   the   defendant   or   a   next   friend   to
represent the plaintiff in a suit is limited only for the suit and after the discharge   of   that   guardian  ad   litem/next   friend,   the   right/   duty   of guardian as defined under sub-section (b) of Section 4 of the Hindu Guardianship   Act   (if   he   has   no   adverse   interest)   automatically continues as guardian. In other words, a next friend representing the minor in the suit under Order XXXII, Rule 1 of the Code, will not take away   the   right   of   the   duly   appointed   guardian   under   the   Hindu Guardianship Act as long as such guardian does not have an adverse interest or such duly appointed guardian is not removed as per that Act.
13. In the case on hand, respondent No.2/defendant 1, though was the father of the plaintiff no.2 could not have represented plaintiff no.2   in   the   present   suit   as   his   guardian,   because   his   interest   was adverse to that of plaintiff no.2.   A number of allegations are made against the vendor of the property i.e. against the natural guardian by plaintiff no.2 in the suit while questioning the validity of the sale deed. The action of respondent no.2 herein (defendant no.1) in selling the property without any valid reason and family necessity is the subject matter in the suit. On the other hand, plaintiff no.1 (elder brother of plaintiff no.2) who did not have any adverse interest to that of plaintiff no.2, has properly represented plaintiff no.2 as his next friend.   The 
plaintiff   no.2   has   not   made   a   single   allegation   against   the   plaintiff no.1/his next friend, after he attained majority.
14. The   minor¬plaintiff   no.2   had   attained   majority   within   one   year from the date of filing of the suit. The suit, as afore¬mentioned, was filed on 21.04.1985 when the plaintiff No.2 was 17 years of age. Thus plaintiff   no.2   attained   the   age   of   majority   on   or   about   20.04.1986. Evidence of PW1 (the first witness of the plaintiffs) was recorded on 15.10.1992, which means, much prior to the recording of evidence of any of the witnesses, plaintiff no.2 had attained majority and he had by then elected to continue with the suit.   It is also relevant to note that plaintiff no.2 is pursuing the matter from the date of attaining majority till this date on his own. Therefore, it was not open for the High   Court   to   non¬suit   the   plaintiff   no.2   for   the   afore¬mentioned reasons.
15. Though   records   are   not   produced   before   us   to   show   that plaintiff no.2 had filed a formal application for discharging the next friend   after   he   attained   majority,   the   fact   remains   that   he   has continued with the proceedings on his own, from the trial Court to this Court.   The   same   clearly   shows  his  intention  of  continuing  with  the litigation. He has not abandoned his claim but has elected to continue with civil action.

16. To sum up, instituting a suit on behalf of minor by a next friend or to represent a minor defendant in the suit by a guardian ad litem  is   a   time¬tested   procedure   which   is   in   place   to   protect   the interests of the minor in civil litigation. The only practical difference between   a   “next   friend”   and   a   “guardian  ad   litem”   is   that   the   next friend is a person who represents a minor who commences a lawsuit; guardian  ad litem  is a person appointed by the Court to represent a minor   who   has   been   a   defendant   in   the   suit.   Before   a   minor commences   suit,   a   conscious   decision   is   made   concerning   the deserving adult (next friend) through whom the suit will be instituted. The   guardian  ad   litem  is   appointed  by  Court  and whereas  the next friend   is   not.   The   next   friend   and   the   guardian  ad   litem  possess similar powers and responsibilities. Both are subject to control by the Court  and   may   be   removed by  the  Court  if the  best  interest of  the minor so requires.
17. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the   impugned   order   relying   upon   the   provisions   of   Hindu Guardianship Act to non¬suit the plaintiff no.2 is not justified.  Having regard   to   the   totality   of   the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  it would be just and proper if the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with law.   Accordingly,
this appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh   decision   on   merits,   in   accordance   with   law.     Needless   to mention, that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.  There shall be no order as to costs. 
…………………………………J.
         [Arun Mishra]               …………….……………………J.
[Mohan M. Shantanagoudar] New Delhi;
January  08, 2018






ITEM NO.1501                     COURT NO.10                         SECTION IV-A
(For Judgment)

                  S U P R E M E C O U R T O F                I N D I A
                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s).22969/2017

NAGAIAH    & ANR.                                                  Appellant(s)

                                      VERSUS

SMT. CHOWDAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS.        & ANR.                        Respondent(s)


Date : 08-01-2018 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of Judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Nikhil Majithia,Adv.
Mr. Yadav Narender Singh,AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Nishanth Patil,Adv.
Mr. Prasanna Mohan,Adv.
Mr. Anup Jain,AOR Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar pronounced the Reportable Judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and His Lordship.
The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
      (Sarita Purohit)                             (Jagdish Chander)
         Court master                                Branch Officer

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

Friday, January 26, 2018

Court has to examine or compare with that of admitted signatures of deceased - instead of discarding as not sent for expert opinion, when the husband clearly says that he can identified the writing of his wife When the appellant, who is the husband of the deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the aforesaid chit (Ext. D19) has been written by the deceased herself and has been signed by her and it also appears from his evidence quoted above that he was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, the Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a finding one way or the other by comparing her handwriting and signature with some of her other handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. In the alternative, the Trial Court and the High Court could have sought for an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on whether the handwriting and signature were that of the deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the deceased.

Page 1
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1431 OF 2007
VIPIN JAISWAL(A-I) Appellant (s)
 VERSUS
STATE OF A.P. REP.BY PUB.PROSECUTOR Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
A.K. PATNAIK, J.
This is an appeal against the judgment dated 11th
December, 2006 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2003.
2. The facts briefly are that an FIR was lodged
by Gynaneshwar Jaiswal on 4.4.1999 at 2.15 p.m. in
Mangalhat Police Station, Hyderabad. In the FIR it was
stated by the informant that his daughter Meenakshi
Jaiswal was married to the appellant on 22.2.1996 and
at the time of marriage he gave sufficient gold
Page 2
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jewellery, silver items, furniture, electrophinic
gadgets etc., worth above Rs.2,50,000/- but ever since
her marriage, she was subjected to physical and mental
torture by her husband Vipin Jaiswal, her husband's
parents Prem Kumar Jaiswal and Yashoda Bai and her
husband's sister Supriya and her husband and they all
brutally assaulted her on innumerable occasions for not
getting sufficient dowry. It was further stated in the
FIR that on 2.4.1999 the informant received a call from
the appellant and he went to the house of the appellant
along with his relatives to find out what had happened
as well as to give invitation for a function at his
place but they all abused him and the appellant
physically assaulted and pushed him out from the house
but fearing the safety of his daughter and her welfare,
he did not report the matter to the police. It is
further stated in the FIR that on 4.4.1999 at about
1.00 p.m. when he came back home, he was informed on
telephone by his son that Meenakshi had received severe
burn injuries and as a result died in the house of the
appellant. The police registered a Criminal Case under
Section 304B, IPC and took up investigation and
submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant and his
other relatives under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC.
Page 3
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3. At the trial, besides other witnesses, the
prosecution examined the father of the deceased
(informant) as PW 1, the cousin of PW 1 as PW 2 and the
mother of the deceased as PW 4. The appellant
volunteered to be a witness and got examined himself as
DW 1 and took the defence that the deceased had left
behind a suicide note written by her one day before her
death in which she has stated that she had committed
suicide not on account of any harassment by the
appellant and her family members but due to the
harassment by her own parents. The Trial Court,
however, disbelieved the defence and convicted the
appellant and his other relatives under Sections 304B
and 498A, IPC. The Trial Court in particular held that
there was material that two days prior to the death of
the deceased, her father (PW1) and his relative (PW2)
were called by her and told that she has been harassed
by the appellant and her in laws for not being paid the
amount demanded by the appellant and when PWs 1 and 2
went to the house of the appellant, they were abused by
the appellant and on 4.4.1999, PW 1 and others were
informed by one Suresh Kumar, a neighbour of the
appellant, about the incident. From the aforesaid and
other evidence, the Trial Court came to the conclusion
that the deceased was subjected to torture and
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harassment by the accused, mainly for the reason that
an amount of Rs.50,000/- was not given to the appellant
by PW 1. The appellant and other relatives of the
appellant carried Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2003
before the High Court and by the impugned judgment, the
High Court acquitted the two other relatives of the
appellant (A2 and A3) but maintained the conviction of
the appellant under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC.
4. At the hearing before us, learned senior
counsel for the appellant submitted that the findings
of the Trial Court and of the High Court with regard to
the demand of dowry are in relation to the demand of
Rs.50,000/-. He submitted that this demand of
Rs.50,000/- is not mentioned in the FIR (Ext. P1). He
further submitted that in any case, the evidence of PW1
and PW4 is clear that this demand of Rs.50,000/- by the
appellant was not a dowry demand but an amount which
the appellant wanted from the family of the deceased to
purchase a computer and set up his own business. He
further submitted that the Trial Court and the High
Court ought not to have disbelieved the suicide note
(Ext. D19) which was in the handwriting of the deceased
as proved by DW1. In this context, he explained that
the signature on the suicide note (Ext. D19) purporting
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to be that of the deceased, tallied with the signature
of the deceased in Ext. D1 which was a hall ticket
issued by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University for an
examination which the deceased took in March, 1998.
5. Learned counsel for the State, on the other
hand, submitted that both the Trial Court and the High
Court have discussed the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, and in particular, the evidence of PWs 1, 2
and 4 to establish that there was demand of dowry of
not only Rs.50,000/- but other items as well. He
further submitted that Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 defines 'dowry' as any property
or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly at or before or any time after
the marriage in connection with the marriage of the
parties to the marriage. He submitted that the
expression “in connection with the marriage of the
parties to the marriage” is wide enough to cover the
demand of Rs.50,000/- made by the appellant for
purchase of a computer. He further submitted that so
far as the suicide note (Ext. D19) is concerned, the
same cannot be believed to have been written by the
deceased who was only a matriculate and the High Court
has given good reasons in the impugned judgment why the
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suicide note cannot be believed to have been written
by the deceased. He argued that in any case only on the
basis of the evidence given by DW1, the Court cannot
hold that the suicide note had been written by
the deceased and not by someone else. He submitted that
since the prosecution has been able to prove that the
deceased had been subjected to not only a demand
of dowry but also cruelty soon before her death,
the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly
held the appellant guilty both under Sections 304B and
498A, IPC.
6. We have perused the evidence of PW 1 and
PW 4, the father and mother of the deceased
respectively. We find that PW 1 has stated that at the
time of marriage, gold, silver articles, ornaments,
T.V., fridge and several other household articles worth
more than Rs.2,50,000/- were given to the appellant and
after the marriage, the deceased joined the appellant
in his house at Kagaziguda. He has, thereafter, stated
that the appellant used to work in a xerox cum type
institute in Nampally and in the sixth month after
marriage, the deceased came to their house and told
them that the appellant asked her to bring Rs.50,000/-
from them as he was intending to purchase a computer
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and set up his own business. Similarly, PW4 has stated
in her evidence that five months after the marriage,
the appellant sent her away to their house and when she
questioned her, she told that the appellant was
demanding Rs.50,000/- and that the demand for money is
to purchase a computer to start his own business. Thus,
the evidence of PW1 and PW4 is that the demand of
Rs.50,000/- by the appellant was made six months after
the marriage and that too for purchasing a computer to
start his own business. It is only with regard to this
demand of Rs.50,000/- that the Trial Court has recorded
a finding of guilt against the appellant for the
offence under Section 304B, IPC and it is only in
relation to this demand of Rs.50,000/- for purchase of
a computer to start a business made by the appellant
six months after the marriage that the High Court has
also confirmed the findings of the Trial Court with
regard to guilt of the appellant under Section 304B,
IPC. In our view, both the Trial Court and the High
Court failed to appreciate that the demand, if at all
made by the appellant on the deceased for purchasing a
computer to start a business six months after the
marriage, was not in connection with the marriage and
was not really a 'dowry demand' within the meaning of
Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. This
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Court has held in Appasaheb & Anr. Vs. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721:
“In view of the aforesaid definition of
the word "dowry" any property or valuable
security should be given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly at or
before or any time after the marriage and in
connection with the marriage of the said
parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of
property or valuable security must have some
connection with the marriage of the parties
and a correlation between the giving or
taking of property or valuable security with
the marriage of the parties is essential.
Being a penal provision it has to be strictly
construed. Dowry is a fairly well known
social custom or practice in India. It is
well settled principle of interpretation of
Statute that if the Act is passed with
reference to a particular trade, business or
transaction and words are used which
everybody conversant with that trade,
business or transaction knows or understands
to have a particular meaning in it, then the
words are to be construed as having that
particular meaning. (See Union of India v.
Garware Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and
Chemicals and Fibres of India v. Union of
India, AIR (1997) SC 558).”
7. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of
both the offences under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC,
the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW1 and PW4,
we find that they have made general allegations of
harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and
have not brought in evidence any specific acts of
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9
cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased.
On the other hand, DW1 in his evidence has stated that
on 4.4.1999, the day when the incident occurred, he
went to the nearby temple along with his mother (A2)
and his father (A3) went to the bazar to bring ration
and his wife (deceased) alone was present at the house
and at about 1.00 p.m., they were informed by somebody
that some smoke was coming out from their house and
their house was burning. Immediately he and his mother
rushed to their house and by that time there was a huge
gathering at the house and the police was also present.
He and his family members were arrested by the police
and after one month they were released on bail. What
DW1 has further stated is relevant for the purpose of
his defence and is quoted hereinbelow:
“While cleaning our house we found a
chit on our dressing table. The said chit was
written by my wife and it is in her
handwriting and it also contains her
signature. Ex. D 19 is the said chit. I
identified the handwriting of my wife in Ex.
D19 because my wife used to write chits for
purchasing of monthly provisions as such on
tallying the said chit and Ex. D19 I came to
know that it was written by my wife only.
Immediately I took the Ex. D19 to the P.S.
Mangalhat and asked them to receive but they
refused to take the same.”
From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that while
cleaning the house the appellant came across a chit
written in the handwriting of his wife and containing
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10
her signature. This chit has been marked as Ext. D19
and the appellant has identified the handwriting and
signature of the deceased in Ext. D19 which is written
in Hindi. The English translation of Ext.D19
reproduced in the impugned judgment of the High Court
is extracted hereinbelow:
“I, Meenakshi W/o Vipin Kumar, do hereby
execute and commit to writing this in my
sound mind, consciousness and senses and with
my free will and violation to the effect that
nobody is responsible for my death. My
parents family members have harassed much to
my husband. I am taking this step as I have
fed up with his life. Due to me the quarrels
are taking place here, as such I want to end
my life and I beg to pardon by all.”
It appears from Ext. D19 that the deceased has written
the chit according to her free will saying that nobody
was responsible for her death and that her parents and
family members have harassed her husband and she was
taking the step as she was fed up with her life and
because of her quarrels were taking place.
8. When the appellant, who is the husband of the
deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the
aforesaid chit (Ext. D19) has been written by the
deceased herself and has been signed by her and it
also appears from his evidence quoted above that he
was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, the
Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a
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finding one way or the other by comparing her
handwriting and signature with some of her other
handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the
Evidence Act. In the alternative, the Trial Court and
the High Court could have sought for an expert's
opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on
whether the handwriting and signature were that of the
deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court
nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions
of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary
reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant
that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the
deceased.
9. In our considered opinion, the evidence of
DW1 (the appellant) and Ext.D19 cast a reasonable
doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was
subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with
demand of dowry. In our view, onus was on the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
ingredient of Section 498A, IPC and the essential
ingredient of offence under Section 498A is that the
accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected
her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to
Section 498A, IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw
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the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act
that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined
in Section 304B, IPC, the prosecution has to prove
besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty
caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her
death. Since the prosecution has not been able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of
harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under
Sections 498A and 304B, IPC has been made out by the
prosecution.
10. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside
the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of
the Trial Court and direct that the bail bond
furnished by the appellant shall stand discharged.
............................J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
............................J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 13, 2013

law never demands direct evidence on sub lease = “4. Sub-tenancy or sub-letting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property. It is the actual, physical and exclusive possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sub-let.” - In our considered opinion, the aforesaid principle of law fully applies to the case at hand against the respondent due to his contradicting stand and by admitting Joynal Mullick’s presence in the suit shop but not being able to properly prove the nature and the capacity in which he was sitting in the suit shop.- the appellants were able to prove the case of sub-letting against the respondent.

1

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4189 OF 2007
Flora Elias Nahoum & Ors. .... Appellants
Versus
Idrish Ali Laskar …. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal arises from the final judgment and
final order/decree dated 07.07.2005 passed by the
High Court of Calcutta in F.A. No.416 of 1984
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the eviction suit filed by the appellants
against the respondent and set aside the decree for
2
eviction passed by the Trial Court in their favour
and against the respondent.
2. In order to appreciate the issues involved in
this appeal, it is necessary to set out the facts in
detail herein-below.
3. The appellants are the plaintiffs (landlords)
whereas the respondent is the defendant (tenant) in
the eviction suit out of which this appeal arises.
4. The appellants (plaintiffs) are the
owners/landlords of one shop (room) bearing
premises No.1, Hartford Lane, Calcutta (hereinafter
referred to as “the suit shop”), which was originally
owned by Late Nahoum Elias and Miss Resmah
Nahoum. The present appellants are the
successors-in-interest of the suit shop. They had let
out the suit shop to one - Alfajuddin Laskar on a
monthly rent of Rs.40/-. In the suit shop,
3
Alfajuddin Laskar used to do the business of sale of
eggs under the name “24, Parganas Egg Stores”.
5. Alfajuddin Laskar expired in 1976. The
respondent being his son became the tenant of the
appellants on same terms and conditions. The
respondent, however, closed his father's business of
selling of eggs and started his tailoring business
under the name “New India Tailors” in the suit
shop.
6. In 1978, the appellants filed an Eviction Suit
against the respondent under the provisions of the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The eviction
was claimed on four grounds, viz., default in
payment of monthly rent, bona fide need,
sub-letting and lastly, making of unauthorized
construction in the suit shop by the respondent.
4
7. The respondent filed the written statement and
denied all the four grounds. Parties adduced their
evidence. The Trial Court, by order dated
30.01.1984, partly decreed the suit. It was held that
so far as the grounds relating to default of rent and
bona fide need are concerned, both are not made
out whereas the other two grounds, namely,
sub-letting and making of unauthorized
construction in the suit shop, both stood made out
against the respondent.
8. In this view of matter, the appellants’ suit was
decreed in part against the respondent and the
decree for eviction on the ground of sub-letting and
unauthorized construction made by the respondent
in the suit shop was passed. The respondent was
granted six months’ time to vacate the suit shop
and handover its vacant possession to the
appellants.
5
9. Being aggrieved by the said order, the
respondent filed appeal before the High Court at
Calcutta. The appellants, however, did not file any
cross appeal or cross-objection against that part of
the order by which two grounds, viz., default in
payment of rent and bona fide need were held not
made out. The judgment of the Trial Court thus
became final to that extent.
10. Therefore, the only question before the High
Court was whether the Trial Court was justified in
decreeing appellants’ suit on the grounds of
sub-letting and making of unauthorized
construction in the suit shop.
11. In other words, the question was whether the
Trial Court was right in holding that the ground of
sub-letting and making of unauthorized
construction in the suit shop was made out.
6
12. The High Court, by impugned judgment,
allowed the respondent’s appeal and dismissed the
appellants’ eviction suit. The High Court held that
no ground of either sub-letting or an unauthorized
construction was made out, hence, the suit was
liable to be dismissed in its entirety. It was
accordingly, dismissed.
13. Against this judgment, the landlords felt
aggrieved and filed this appeal by way of special
leave in this Court.
14. Heard Ms. Daisy Hannah, learned counsel for
the appellants and Mr. Zakiullah Khan, learned
senior counsel for the respondent.
15. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to allow the appeal and while setting
aside of the impugned judgment, we restore that of
7
the Trial Court and, in consequence, decree the
appellants’ suit in part, as indicated below.
16. There can be no dispute to the legal
proposition that even if the landlord is able to make
out only one ground out of several grounds of the
eviction, he is entitled to seek the eviction of his
tenant from the suit premises on the basis of that
sole ground which he has made out under the Rent
Act.
17. In other words, it is not necessary for the
landlord to make out all the grounds which he has
taken in the plaint for claiming eviction of the
tenant under the Rent Act. If one ground of eviction
is held made out against the tenant, that ground is
sufficient to evict the tenant from the suit premises.
18. As mentioned above, the Trial Court held that
the appellants were able to make out two grounds
for respondent's eviction, namely, sub-letting and
8
unauthorized construction made by him in the suit
shop. The High Court, accordingly, reversed the
findings on these two grounds and dismissed the
suit.
19. We consider it proper to examine first, the
ground of sub-letting with a view to find out as to
whether the plaintiffs (appellants) were able to make
out this ground against the respondent. In other
words, let us first examine as to whether the Trial
Court was right or the High Court was right on this
issue.
20. In order to examine, whether the ground of
sub-letting is made out or not, it is necessary to see
as to how this ground was pleaded and sought to be
proved by the parties.
21. The appellants, in Para 4 of the plaint, pleaded
the case of sub-letting as under:
“4. The defendant after acquiring
right of tenancy in respect of the said shop
9
room after his father’s death, wrongfully
transferred possession of the said shop room
to one Joynal Mallick evidently for creating a
sub-tenant in his favour in respect of the suit
shop room without obtaining the permission
and consent of the plaintiffs.”
22. The respondent, in reply to Para 4 of the
plaint, gave the following reply in Para 9 of his
written statement as under:
“9. The defendant denies the
allegations made in paragraph 4 of the plaint
and in particular denies the allegations that
he has transferred possession of the shop
under his tenancy to one Joynal Mullick or
anybody as falsely alleged.”
23. It is clear from the perusal of the pleadings
that the case of the appellants was that the
respondent has sub-let and parted with possession
of the suit shop to one Joynal Mullick without
appellants’ consent.
24. So far as the respondent is concerned, he
simply denied the appellants’ case in para 9 saying
that he has not sub-let the suit shop to anyone,
10
much less to Joynal Mullick, as claimed by the
appellants.
25. The respondent examined himself as witness
No.1 and examined Joynal Mullick as witness No.2.
26. In examination-in-chief, the respondent
changed his stand and said that he has not sub-let
the suit shop to Joynal Mullick but he is in his
employment. This is what he said:
“It is not a fact that I sublet the shop room
in suit to one Jainal Mullick. Jainal Mullick
is in my employment.”
27. The respondent further in his
cross-examination again changed his stand and in
answer to a specific question put to him as to
whether he has employed any person in his tailoring
business said "no". This was his reply:-
“No. In the tailoring business I have no
employee but the work is done on contract
basis.”
11
28. The respondent then in answer to another
question put to him as to how many persons work
for you on contract basis in his tailoring business,
his reply was- four persons and out of four, Joynal
Mullick and Jahangir Mullick were his employees.
This is what he said:-
“Najrul Islam and Sayed, Volunteers – Besides
these persons there are two other persons
who look after the business in my absence.
They are Jainal Mullick and Zahangir Mullick
volunteers. These two persons are my
employee.”
29. The respondent then was asked another
question, viz., Did he disclose the name of any of his
employee while submitting the declaration form
under the Shops and Establishment Act, his reply
was “no”. This is what he said:-
“I am the owner of the tailoring shop.
Volunteers – fresh declaration has been
submitted about 10/12 days back. In that
declaration I have not declared that these
two persons Jainal and Zahangir are my
employees.”
12
30. The respondent was then asked last pointed
question - whether Joynal Mullick is doing business
in the suit shop. To this, his reply was that Joynal
Mullick is his business partner. This is what he
said:-
“I obtained the trade license from the
Corporation of Calcutta for the business
carried in the shop showing Jainal Mullick
and Zahangir Mullick as my partners in the
business. It is not a fact that Jainal and
Zahangir are not my employees.”
31. Joynal Mullick then in his evidence said that
he is an employee of the respondent for the last 7/8
years and whatever the respondent (his owner) tells
him to do, he does it while sitting in the suit shop.
He stated that, in his presence, the respondent had
constructed "Macha" in the suit shop. He said that
he joined the business under the name "New India
Tailor".
32. Keeping in view the statements of the
respondent and Joynal Mullick, the question arises
13
as to whether a case of sub-letting and parting of
possession of the suit shop in favour of Joynal
Mullick, whether whole or in part, is made out.
33. Section 13(1)(a) of the Act deals with the
ground of sub-letting and provides that where the
tenant or any person residing in the premises let to
the tenant without the previous consent in writing
of the landlord transfers, assigns or sublets in
whole or in part the premises held by him, then it is
a ground for the tenant’s eviction from the tenanted
premises.
34. In our considered opinion, keeping in view the
pleadings and the nature of the evidence adduced
by the parties, the ground of sub-letting, as
contemplated under Section 13(a) ibid, is made out.
This we say for the following reasons.
14
35. In the first place, we find that the respondent
(tenant), since inception, was taking inconsistent
stand on the question of sub-letting.
36. To begin with, he denied having sub-let the
suit shop to anyone in his written statement. Then,
contrary to what he alleged in the written
statement, he said in his examination-in-chief that
Joynal Mullick was his employee. Then, again
contrary to this statement, he said, in next breath,
that Joynal Mullick is his partner in tailoring
business.
37. So far as Joynal Mullick is concerned, he
admitted that he has been sitting in the suit shop
for the last 7/8 years but he has been sitting in a
capacity as an “employee” of the respondent.
38. In our opinion, the contradictory stand of the
respondent and that too without any evidence
clearly leads to an inference that the respondent
15
was unable to prove, in categorical terms, as to
which capacity, Joynal Mullick was sitting in the
suit shop - whether as an "employee" or a "business
partner" or in any “other capacity”.
39. It seems that the respondent was not sure as
to what stand he should take to meet the plea of
sub-letting. He, therefore, went on changing his
stand one after the other and could not prove either.
40. In our view, since the respondent had admitted
the presence of Joynal Mullick in the suit shop, the
burden was on him to prove its nature and the
capacity in which he used to sit in the suit shop.
41. In other words, if Joynal Mullick was the
respondent’s employee then, in our view, he should
have proved it by filling a declaration form, which
he had submitted under the Shops and
Establishment Act to the authorities. But it was not
done. Rather he admitted that he did not disclose
16
the name of Joynal Mullick in the declaration form.
That apart, the respondent could have proved this
fact by filing payment voucher, or any other relevant
evidence to show that Joynal Mullick was his
employee and that he used to sit in the suit shop in
that capacity only. It was, however, not done.
42. Second, if Joynal Mullick was a partner of the
respondent in the tailoring business then the
respondent could have proved this fact by filing a
copy of the partnership deed. However, he again
failed to produce the copy of partnership deed. In
this way, he failed to prove even this fact.
43. Now so far as the appellants are concerned,
they appear to have discharged their initial burden
by pleading the necessary facts in Para 4 and then
by proving it by evidence that firstly, they let out the
suit shop to the respondent and secondly, the
respondent has sub-let the suit shop to Joynal
17
Mullick, who was in its exclusive possession
without their consent.
44. In a case of sub-letting, if the tenant is able to
prove that he continues to retain the exclusive
possession over the tenanted premises
notwithstanding any third party’s induction in the
tenanted premises, no case of sub-letting is made
out against such tenant.
45. In other words, the sin qua non for proving the
case of the sub-letting is that the tenant has either
whole or in part transferred or/and parted with the
possession of the tenanted premises in favour of
any third person without landlord's consent.
46. This Court in Bharat Sales Ltd. vs. Life
Insurance Corporation of India (1998) 3 SCC 1,
while dealing with the case of sub-letting succinctly
explained the concept of sub-letting and what are
its attributes.
18
47. Justice Sagir Ahmad, speaking for the Two
Judge Bench, held as under:
“4. Sub-tenancy or sub-letting comes
into existence when the tenant gives up
possession of the tenanted accommodation,
wholly or in part, and puts another person in
exclusive possession thereof. This
arrangement comes about obviously under a
mutual agreement or understanding between
the tenant and the person to whom the
possession is so delivered. In this process,
the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather,
the scene is enacted behind the back of the
landlord, concealing the overt acts and
transferring possession clandestinely to a
person who is an utter stranger to the
landlord, in the sense that the landlord had
not let out the premises to that person nor
had he allowed or consented to his entering
into possession over the demised property. It
is the actual, physical and exclusive
possession of that person, instead of the
tenant, which ultimately reveals to the
landlord that the tenant to whom the
property was let out has put some other
person into possession of that property. In
such a situation, it would be difficult for the
landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the
contract or agreement or understanding
between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It
would also be difficult for the landlord to
prove, by direct evidence, that the person to
whom the property had been sub-let had paid
monetary consideration to the tenant.
Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential
element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid
in cash or in kind or may have been paid or
promised to be paid. It may have been paid in
19
lump sum in advance covering the period for
which the premises is let out or sub-let or it
may have been paid or promised to be paid
periodically. Since payment of rent or
monetary consideration may have been made
secretly, the law does not require such
payment to be proved by affirmative evidence
and the court is permitted to draw its own
inference upon the facts of the case proved at
the trial, including the delivery of exclusive
possession to infer that the premises were
sub-let.”
48. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid
principle of law fully applies to the case at hand
against the respondent due to his contradicting
stand and by admitting Joynal Mullick’s presence in
the suit shop but not being able to properly prove
the nature and the capacity in which he was sitting
in the suit shop.
49. In view of the foregoing discussion, we have
formed an opinion that the appellants were able to
prove the case of sub-letting against the
respondent. 
20
50. We cannot thus concur with the reasoning and
the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and
instead prefer to agree with the conclusion of the
Trial Court insofar as it relates to the ground of
sub-letting. In view of this, it is not necessary to
examine the other ground relating to making of
unauthorized construction by the respondent in the
suit shop.
51. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is
allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and
that of the Trial Court is restored.
52. The respondent is, however, granted three
months’ time to vacate the suit shop, subject to the
respondent filing in this Court a usual undertaking
that he will deposit the entire arrears of rent up to
the date as per the agreed rate within one month
and will also deposit the mesne profits for a period
of three months up to the date of vacation in
21
advance at the agreed rate and would vacate the
suit shop on or before 30.04.2018.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
January 25, 2018