under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code in terms of local amendment made by the State of Kerala in the first proviso to Order 9 Rule 13, wherein the words "after notice to them” were inserted. This local amendment made in the first proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 was applicable to defendant nos. 1 and 2 - no notice was served on defendant Nos. 1 and 2 before setting aside the ex parte decree and in their absence, the suit was restored. This was, in our view, one irregularity committed by the Trial Court while restoring the entire suit, though it was for the benefit of defendant Nos. 1 and 2.= In our view, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to a notice of the proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code in terms of local amendment made by the State of Kerala in the first proviso to Order 9 Rule 13, wherein the words "after notice to them” were inserted. This local amendment made in the first proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 was applicable to defendant nos. 1 and 2. When enquired, it was stated that no notice was served on defendant Nos. 1 and 2 before setting aside the ex parte decree and in their absence, the suit was restored. This was, in our view, one irregularity committed by the Trial Court while restoring the entire suit, though it was for the benefit of defendant Nos. 1 and 2.- The Trial Court will now issue fresh notice to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit by usual mode of service and then by substituted service, if need arises. It is only after the service of the suit is held complete on defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the Trial Court will proceed with the trial in the suit on merits. So far as defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned, they are already served and hence they are not entitled to any noticeJayaprakash & Anr. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS T.S. David & Ors. ….Respondent(s).

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 14306 of 2015)
Jayaprakash & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
T.S. David & Ors. ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the plaintiffs against the
final judgment and order dated 05.11.2014 passed
by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in R.F.A.
No.541 of 2007 whereby the High Court allowed the
2
appeal filed by defendant Nos. 3 & 4 (respondent
Nos.1 & 2 herein) and set aside the judgment and
decree dated 20.02.2007 passed by the sub-Court,
Kottayam in O.S. No.337 of 2001.
3. In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved in the appeal, few relevant facts need
mention hereinbelow.
4. The appellants are the plaintiffs whereas the
respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out
of which this appeal arises.
5. The appellants filed a civil suit being O.S. No.
337/2001 against the respondents (defendants) in
the Court of Principal Sub-Judge, Kottayam for
specific performance of the agreement (Ex-A-1) for
sale of suit properties to the appellants by the
respondents (defendant Nos.1-4) for a total
consideration of Rs.5,70,000/-.
3
6. According to the appellants, since defendant
Nos. 1 and 2 (original owners of the suit properties)
failed to sell the suit properties to the appellants as
per the terms of the agreement despite taking
advance money from the appellants and instead
sold the suit properties to defendant Nos. 3 and 4,
the appellants filed the suit against defendant Nos.
1 to 4 seeking specific performance of the agreement
(Ex-A-1) against defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
7. The defendants (respondents) were served by
substituted service. They, however, remained ex
parte since inception. The Trial Court, therefore, on
27.02.2004 passed an ex parte decree against the
defendants (respondents) jointly and severally.
8. Thereafter, defendant Nos. 3 and 4 applied for
setting aside of the ex parte decree dated 27.2.2004
under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The Trial Court, by order
4
20.12.2006, allowed the application and set aside
the ex parte decree and restored the original suit to
its file to decide the suit afresh on merits.
9. On remand, defendant Nos. 3 and 4 filed the
written statement. So far as defendant Nos. 1 and 2
are concerned, they remained ex parte. The Trial
Court, by judgment/decree dated 20.02.2007, again
decreed the suit against all the four defendants
jointly and severally.
10. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 felt aggrieved and filed
first appeal before the High Court. By impugned
judgment, the High Court allowed the appeal and
while setting aside the judgment/decree of the Trial
Court again remanded the case to the Trial Court
for fresh trial on merits. In the opinion of the High
Court, the Trial Court did not decide the issues
arising in the case properly and, therefore, the
entire case needs a fresh consideration with a
5
liberty to parties to adduce further evidence. The
case was accordingly remanded to the Trial Court.
11. The plaintiffs felt aggrieved by the impugned
judgment and have filed this appeal by way of
special leave in this Court.
12. Therefore, the short question, which arises
for consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court was justified in remanding the case to the
Trial Court for its de novo trial.
13. Heard Mr. C.S. Rajan, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants and Mr. Thomas P.
Joseph, learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.
3 & 4 and Mr. C.K. Sasi, learned counsel for
respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
14. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in this appeal.
6
15. In our opinion, the remand order of the High
Court to try the suit afresh on merits appears to be
correct, though we uphold the remand order on
additional grounds, which were not taken note of by
the High Court and nor urged here. In our opinion,
therefore, the remand of the case to Trial Court is
otherwise called for.
16. It is not in dispute that all the four defendants
(1 to 4) suffered ex parte decree on 27.02.2004
jointly and severally. It is also not in dispute that
only defendant Nos. 3 and 4 applied to the Court for
setting aside the decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of
the Code. This application was allowed by the Trial
Court by order dated 20.12.2005 which resulted in
setting aside of the entire ex parte decree against all
the defendants, including defendant Nos. 1 and 2
though they did not apply for its setting aside. The
7
suit was accordingly restored to its file for fresh trial
on merits.
17. In our view, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were
entitled to a notice of the proceedings under Order 9
Rule 13 of the Code in terms of local amendment
made by the State of Kerala in the first proviso to
Order 9 Rule 13, wherein the words "after notice to
them” were inserted. This local amendment made in
the first proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 was applicable
to defendant nos. 1 and 2. When enquired, it was
stated that no notice was served on defendant Nos.
1 and 2 before setting aside the ex parte decree and
in their absence, the suit was restored. This was, in
our view, one irregularity committed by the Trial
Court while restoring the entire suit, though it was
for the benefit of defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
18. Be that as it may, in our considered opinion,
after the suit was restored at the instance of
8
defendant Nos. 3 and 4, the Trial Court committed
another error inasmuch as it again did not issue
fresh notice of the suit to defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In
other words, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled
for a fresh notice of the suit once restored despite
their non-appearance in the first round of trial in
the suit and in Order 9 Rule 13 proceedings.
19. The Trial Court, however, again decreed the
suit by judgment/decree dated 20.02.2007 ex parte
against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 but after hearing
only defendant Nos. 3 and 4. It is against this
judgment and decree which was impugned in
appeal by defendant Nos. 3 and 4, which was again
set aside by the High Court by impugned judgment
resulting in remand of the case to the Trial Court for
fresh trial on merits giving rise to filing of this
appeal by the plaintiffs.
9
20. As mentioned above, though we are inclined to
uphold the remand order, but that we do so on the
basis of aforementioned two grounds noticed by us
in the proceedings in the suit and in Order 9 Rule
13 proceedings. The two legal infirmities noticed by
us in the proceedings call for remand of the case to
the Trial Court for fresh adjudication of the civil suit
on merits in accordance with law.
21. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the
appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
22. The Trial Court will now issue fresh notice to
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit by usual mode of
service and then by substituted service, if need
arises. It is only after the service of the suit is held
complete on defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the Trial Court
will proceed with the trial in the suit on merits.
10
23. So far as defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are
concerned, they are already served and hence they
are not entitled to any notice.
24. Parties to appear before the Trial Court in the
Suit on 05.02.2018 to enable the Trial Court to
proceed in the trial as directed above. The Trial
Court will decide the suit on merits strictly in
accordance with law expeditiously.



………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
January 25, 2018 

land acquisition Act - one-third deduction - small extent of land for development - In Subh Ram and Others v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2010) 1 SCC 444, the deduction of 67% was held to be not improper. In the case in hand, the High Court applied deduction at 67.5% which in our considered view is on the higher side. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and considering that the exemplar dated 26.05.1983 was for a small extent of land and that the acquired land has to be developed for construction of warehouse, we deem it appropriate to apply one-third deduction and deducting one-third that is Rs.2,21,629/- from Rs.6,64,887/-, the compensation to be awarded is arrived at Rs.4,43,258/- per acre.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 873-874 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.30923-30924 of 2016)
MAYA DEVI (D) THROUGH LRs & ORS. …Appellants
Versus
STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Leave granted
2. These appeals arise out of the judgment of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in and by which the High Court
enhanced the compensation to Rs.2,19,413/- per acre and also
dismissed the review holding that the subsequent evidence sought to
be brought is not relevant as it is based upon post notification.
3. Respondent No.2-Haryana State Ware Housing Corporation
had acquired 40 kanal and 8 marlas land at Rania for construction of
warehouse/godown vide Notification dated 12.02.1988 issued under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act'); out
Page No. 1 of 10
of which 40 kanal 8 marlas land, 21 kanal 6 marlas land was of the
present appellants; Notification dated 21.02.1989 was issued under
Section 6 of the Act. Vide award No.9 dated 19.05.1990, the Land
Acquisition Officer awarded compensation of Rs.75,000/- per acre.
Being aggrieved by the award dated 19.05.1990, the
appellants/claimants filed a reference petition under Section 18 of the
Act before Additional District Judge, Sirsa for enhancement of
compensation, which came to be dismissed by judgment dated
15.02.1993. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the claim for
enhancement, the appellants/claimants filed appeal before the High
Court in R.F.A.No.1519 of 1993. The High Court relied upon the sale
deed dated 26.05.1983 wherein small extent of land of 9 marlas was
sold for Rs.25,500/- as an exemplar. The High Court gave escalation
at 10% for the time gap of 56 months and calculated the value at
Rs.6,64,887/- per acre and made the deduction at the rate of 67.5%
for development charges and calculated the compensation to be
awarded at Rs.2,19,413/- per acre.
4. Being aggrieved, the land owners filed Special Leave
Petition(C) No.27989 of 2013 before this Court which was withdrawn
by order dated 01.08.2014 with liberty to file review before the High
Page No. 2 of 10
Court. In the review petition, the appellants/claimants relied upon:- (i)
sale deed dated 27.12.1988; and (ii) subsequent acquisition of
nearby land vide notification dated 27.03.1989 in which the High
Court by its judgment dated 15.09.2006 in R.F.A. No.866 of 1996
awarded compensation of Rs.7,26,000/- per acre. The High Court
dismissed the review, inter alia, holding that the sale deed dated
27.12.1988 is a post notification sale and also the acquisition vide
notification dated 27.03.1989 was subsequent one and the same is
not relevant for determining the market value of the lands acquired
vide notification dated 12.02.1988. Moreover, the High Court found
no valid ground for review under Order XLVII C.P.C. Being
aggrieved, the appellants/land owners have filed these appeals.
5. Contention of the appellants/claimants are mainly three-fold:- (i)
there was only ten months difference between the notification dated
12.02.1988 and the sale deed dated 27.12.1988 while so, the High
Court was not justified in not considering the said sale deed dated
27.12.1988 as an exemplar on the ground that the same is a post
notification; (ii) considering that the land acquired falls within
municipal limits and had immense potential for use for commercial
and residential purpose, applying the maximum cut at the rate of
Page No. 3 of 10
67.5% was not justified; and (iii) for acquisition of the land of the
adjoining khasra by notification dated 27.03.1989, compensation was
awarded at the rate of Rs.7,26,000/- per acre by the High Court which
is more than three times higher than the compensation awarded in
the present case.
6. So far as the first contention is concerned, the sale deed relied
upon by the appellants/claimants dated 27.12.1988 is post
notification. Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act provides that the
compensation to be awarded shall be determined by the reference
court, based upon the market value of the acquired land at the date
of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). In Kolkata
Metropolitan Development Authority v. Gobinda Chandra Makal
and Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 207, it was held that the relevant date for
determining the compensation is the date of publication of the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the Gazette. In para (34),
it was held as under:-
"34. One of the principles in regard to determination of the market
value under Section 23(1) is that the rise in market value after the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act should
not be taken into account for the purpose of determination of
market value. If the deeming definition of “publication of the
notification” in the amended Section 4(1) is imported as the
meaning of the said words in the first clause of Section 23(1), it will
lead to anomalous results. The owners of the lands which are the
Page No. 4 of 10
subject-matter of the notification and neighbouring lands will come
to know about the proposed acquisition, on the date of publication
in the Gazette or in the newspapers. If the giving of public notice of
the substance of the notification is delayed by two or three months,
there may be several sale transactions in regard to nearby lands in
that period, showing a spurt or hike in value in view of the
development contemplated on account of the acquisition itself."
Applying the ratio of the above decision, we are of the view that the
post notification instances cannot be taken into consideration for
determining the compensation of the acquired land.
7. So far as the contention regarding deduction at the rate of
67.5% for development charges is concerned, the exemplar relied
upon by the High Court dated 26.05.1983 was for a small extent of
land of 9 marlas which was sold for Rs.25,500/-. The transaction
relates to the period which is about 56 months prior to the notification
under Section 4 of the Act and the High Court adopted the rate of
escalation at 10% and calculated the value at Rs.6,64,887/-.
Considering the fact that the acquired land required for development
and that the property covered under the exemplar was for a small
extent of 9 marlas of land, the High Court applied maximum
deduction at 67.5% and calculated the compensation to be paid at
Rs.2,19,413/- per acre.
Page No. 5 of 10
8. In Haryana State Agricultural Market Board and Anr. v.
Krishan Kumar and Ors. (2011) 15 SCC 297, this Court has held
that "if the value of small developed plots should be the basis,
appropriate deductions will have to be made therefrom towards the
area to be used for roads, drains, and common facilities like park,
open space, etc. Thereafter, further deduction will have to be made
towards the cost of development, that is, the cost of leveling the land,
cost of laying roads and drains, and the cost of drawing electrical,
water and sewer lines."
9. Observing that the development charges for development of
particular plot of land could range from 20% to 75%, in Lal Chand v.
Union of India and Another (2009) 15 SCC 769, in paras (13), (14)
and (20), this Court held as under:
“13. The percentage of ‘deduction for development’ to be made to
arrive at the market value of large tracts of undeveloped agricultural
land (with potential for development), with reference to the sale
price of small developed plots, varies between 20% to 75% of the
price of such developed plots, the percentage depending upon the
nature of development of the layout in which the exemplar plots are
situated.
14. The ‘deduction for development’ consists of two components.
The first is with reference to the area required to be utilised for
developmental works and the second is the cost of the
development works.
.….....
20. Therefore the deduction for the ‘development factor’ to be made
with reference to the price of a small plot in a developed layout, to
arrive at the cost of undeveloped land, will be for more than the
Page No. 6 of 10
deduction with reference to the price of a small plot in an
unauthorised private layout or an industrial layout. It is also well
known that the development cost incurred by statutory agencies is
much higher than the cost incurred by private developers, having
regard to higher overheads and expenditure."
The same principle was reiterated in Andhra Pradesh Housing
Board v. K. Manohar Reddy and Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 707.
10. In a catena of judgments, this Court has taken the view to apply
one-third deduction towards the development charges. After referring
to various case laws on the question of deduction for development, in
Major General Kapil Mehra and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr.
(2015) 2 SCC 262, this Court held as under:
"35. Reiterating the rule of one-third deduction towards
development, in Sabhia Mohammed Yusuf Abdul Hamid Mulla v.
Land Acquisition Officer (2012) 7 SCC 595, this Court in para 19
held as under: (SCC pp. 606-07)
“19. In fixing the market value of the acquired land, which
is undeveloped or underdeveloped, the courts have
generally approved deduction of 1/3rd of the market
value towards development cost except when no
development is required to be made for implementation
of the public purpose for which land is acquired. In
Kasturi v. State of Haryana (2003) 1 SCC 354 the Court
held: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 7)
‘7. … It is well settled that in respect of
agricultural land or undeveloped land which
has potential value for housing or commercial
purposes, normally 1/3rd amount of
compensation has to be deducted out of the
amount of compensation payable on the
acquired land subject to certain variations
depending on its nature, location, extent of
expenditure involved for development and the
area required for road and other civic amenities
to develop the land so as to make the plots for
residential or commercial purposes. A land may
be plain or uneven, the soil of the land may be
Page No. 7 of 10
soft or hard bearing on the foundation for the
purpose of making construction; maybe the
land is situated in the midst of a developed
area all around but that land may have a hillock
or may be low-lying or may be having deep
ditches. So the amount of expenses that may
be incurredin developing the area also
varies.....................There may be various
factual factors which may have to be taken into
consideration while applying the cut in
payment of compensation towards
developmental charges, maybe in some cases
it is more than 1/3rd and in some cases less
than 1/3rd. It must be remembered that there is
difference between a developed area and an
area having potential value, which is yet to be
developed. The fact that an area is developed
or adjacent to a developed area will not ipso
facto make every land situated in the area also
developed to be valued as a building site or
plot, particularly when vast tracts are acquired,
as in this case, for development purpose.’
The rule of 1/3rd deduction was reiterated in Tejumal Bhojwani v.
State of U.P. (2003) 10 SCC 525, V. Hanumantha Reddy v. Land
Acquisition Officer (2003) 12 SCC 642, H.P. Housing Board v.
Bharat S. Negi (2004) 2 SCC 184 and Kiran Tandon v. Allahabad
Development Authority (2004) 10 SCC 745.”(emphasis in original)
36. While determining the market value of the acquired land,
normally one-third deduction i.e. 33 1/3% towards development
charges is allowed. One-third deduction towards development was
allowed in Tehsildar (LA) v. A. Mangala Gowri (1991) 4 SCC 218,
Gulzara Singh v. State of Punjab (1993) 4 SCC 245, Santosh
Kumari v. State of Haryana (1996) 10 SCC 631, Revenue Divl.
Officer and LAO v. Sk. Azam Saheb (2009) 4 SCC 395, A.P.
Housing Board v. K. Manohar Reddy (2010) 12 SCC 707, Ashrafi v.
State of Haryana (2013) 5 SCC 527 and Kashmir Singh v. State of
Haryana (2014) 2 SCC 165.
37. Depending on the nature and location of the acquired land,
extent of land required to be set apart and expenses involved for
development, 30% to 50% deduction towards development was
allowed in Haryana State Agricultural Market Board v. Krishan
Kumar (2011) 15 SCC 297, Director, Land Acquisition v. Malla
Atchinaidu (2006) 12 SCC 87, Mummidi Apparao v. Nagarjuna
Page No. 8 of 10
Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. (2009) 4 SCC 402 and Lal Chand v.
Union of India (2009) 15 SCC 769.
38. In few other cases, deduction of more than 50% was upheld. In
the facts and circumstances of the case in Basavva v. Land
Acquisition Officer (1996) 9 SCC 640, this Court upheld the
deduction of 65%. In Kanta Devi v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC
201, deduction of 60% towards development charges was held to
be legal. This Court in Subh Ram v. State of Haryana (2010) 1 SCC
444, held that deduction of 67% amount was not improper.
Similarly, in Chandrashekar v. Land Acquisition Officer (2012) 1
SCC 390, deduction of 70% was upheld."
11. In Subh Ram and Others v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2010)
1 SCC 444, the deduction of 67% was held to be not improper. In the
case in hand, the High Court applied deduction at 67.5% which in our
considered view is on the higher side. In the facts and circumstances
of the present case and considering that the exemplar dated
26.05.1983 was for a small extent of land and that the acquired land
has to be developed for construction of warehouse, we deem it
appropriate to apply one-third deduction and deducting one-third that
is Rs.2,21,629/- from Rs.6,64,887/-, the compensation to be awarded
is arrived at Rs.4,43,258/- per acre.
12. The impugned judgment is modified and the
appellants/claimants are entitled to get enhanced compensation of
Rs.4,43,258/- payable with all statutory benefits. The appeals are
partly allowed. It is made clear that the appellants/claimants shall not
Page No. 9 of 10
be entitled to claim interest for the period of delay in preferring the
appeals from the review.
…….…………...………J.
 [RANJAN GOGOI]
…………….……………J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
January 25, 2018
Page No. 10 of 10

application filed under Order 7 Rule 14 and the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code. = firstly, the suit is still at the initial stage, i.e., the trial has not yet begun; Second, the proposed amendment sought in the plaint does not change the nature of suit; Third, the applications could not be said to have been filed by the plaintiff belatedly because the suit had been dismissed by the Trial Court as not maintainable in its initial stages and for all these years it was sub judice in appeal. It is only after the Appellate court remanded the case to the Trial Court for its trial, the appellant (plaintiff) filed the applications in the suit and sought permission to amend the plaint and file certain documents in support thereof; Fourth, the Courts, in these circumstances, should have been liberal in allowing the proposed amendment.- So far as the filing of documents is concerned, this application too should have been allowed on the same grounds on which we have allowed the amendment application. In other words, when the suit is still at its initial stage and the trial is yet to begin and when the documents filed are alleged to be that of the respondents themselves having obtained through RTI, there is no reason why the appellant(plaintiff) be not allowed to file them.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.882 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 9651 of 2017)
N.C. Bansal ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Uttar Pradesh Financial
Corporation & Anr. ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is filed by the plaintiff against the
final judgment and order dated 19.12.2016 passed
by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM(M)
No. 1223 of 2016 whereby the High Court dismissed
2
the petition and upheld the order of the Trial Court
dated 21.09.2016 in Civil Suit No.7930 of 2016.
3) In order to decide the short question, it is not
necessary to set out the facts in detail and
mentioning of the few facts alone would suffice.
4) The controversy involved in the appeal is
whether the two Courts below were justified in
dismissing the three applications filed by the
plaintiff in a pending suit, namely, (i) application
under Order 7 Rule 14 of the Code for filing of
documents, (ii) application under Order 6 Rule17 of
the Code seeking amendment in the plaint, and (iii)
application seeking directions against the
respondents for production of some original
documents.
5) The appellant is the plaintiff and the
respondents are the defendants in the suit out of
which this appeal arises.
3
6) The appellant (plaintiff) has filed a civil suit
being Civil Suit No. 252/2005 now renumbered as
(C.S. No 7930/2016) against the respondents
(defendants) in the Court of JSCC-Cum ASCJ-cumGuardian
Judge (West) Delhi.
7) The appellant's suit is for a declaration and
permanent injunction in relation to certain
properties (hereinafter referred to as "the suit
property”). The appellant has claimed the following
reliefs:
“It is, therefore, most respectfully
prayed that the Hon’ble Court be pleased - to
pass the decree of declaration as the said
property (at the second floor) bearing No.21
NWA Club Road, Punjabi Bagh Extn., New
Delhi-110026 is not a collateral security or
not a mortgage property under the
defendants and also to pass a decree of
permanent injunction in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendants thereby
restraining the defendants its agents,
servant, attorneys, nominees etc. etc. from
taking forcible possession or selling of the
said premises bearing No.21, NWA Club Road,
Punjabi Bagh Extn., New Delhi-110026
(situated at second floor on plot no.21 in
NVVA in the layout plan of the Adarsh
Shawan Co-op. House Building Society Ltd.
4
Colony known as Punjabi Bagh Extn. In the
area of Viii Madipur, Delhi-110026 as shown
in red colour in the site plan and from
creating any interference in the use and
enjoyment of the said property, in the
interest of justice.
Any other relief, which this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper be also passed
in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendants along with the cost of the suit.”
8) The respondents have filed their written
statement and denied the appellant's claim set up
in the plaint. The respondents, however, also raised
certain legal objections regarding the
maintainability of the appellant's suit. The Trial
Court upheld the objections raised by the
respondent and accordingly dismissed the
appellant's suit vide judgment/decree dated
20.09.2011 in the initial stage itself as not
maintainable.
9) The appellant felt aggrieved and filed appeal
being R.C.A. 121/14/11 before the Additional
District Judge, Tis Hazari Court, New Delhi. By
5
order dated 20.11.2014, the first Appellate Court
allowed the appellant's appeal and while setting
aside the judgment/decree of the Trial Court
remanded the case to the Trial Court for deciding
the suit on merits.
10) It appears that the respondents (defendants)
did not take up the matter to the High Court against
the order of the first Appellate Court and, therefore,
the case has now gone back to the Trial Court to
proceed with the trial in the suit.
11) After remand, the appellant (plaintiff), as
mentioned above, filed three applications in his
pending suit. One was under Order 7 Rule 14 of
Code seeking permission to file some additional
documents, second was an application under Order
6 Rule 17 seeking amendment in the plaint and the
third application was for a direction to the
6
respondents for production of some original
documents.
12) The respondents (defendants) opposed the
applications filed by the appellant. The Trial Court
by order dated 21.09.2016 dismissed the
applications filed by the appellant (plaintiff).
13) The appellant felt aggrieved and filed writ
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India in the High Court of Delhi. By impugned
order, the Single Judge dismissed the appellant's
(plaintiff’s) writ petition and upheld the order of the
Trial Court.
14) Against the said order, the appellant(plaintiff)
has felt aggrieved and filed this appeal by special
leave in this Court questioning its legality and
correctness.
7
15) Heard Mr. Shantanu Bansal, learned counsel
for the appellant and Mr. S.K. Misra, learned
counsel for the respondents.
16) Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to allow the appeal and while setting
aside the order of the Trial Court dated 21.09.2016
and also the impugned order of the High Court
allow the two applications filed by the plaintiff
(appellant herein), namely, application filed under
Order 7 Rule 14 and the application filed under
Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code.
17) We have perused the pleadings and also the
two applications under consideration filed by the
appellant. In our considered opinion, both the
applications filed by the appellant(plaintiff) should
have been allowed and he should have been
8
permitted to amend the plaint and file the additional
documents.
18) It is for the reason that firstly, the suit is still
at the initial stage, i.e., the trial has not yet begun;
Second, the proposed amendment sought in the
plaint does not change the nature of suit; Third, the
applications could not be said to have been filed by
the plaintiff belatedly because the suit had been
dismissed by the Trial Court as not maintainable in
its initial stages and for all these years it was sub
judice in appeal. It is only after the Appellate court
remanded the case to the Trial Court for its trial,
the appellant (plaintiff) filed the applications in the
suit and sought permission to amend the plaint and
file certain documents in support thereof; Fourth,
the Courts, in these circumstances, should have
been liberal in allowing the proposed amendment.
9
19) So far as the filing of documents is concerned,
this application too should have been allowed on
the same grounds on which we have allowed the
amendment application. In other words, when the
suit is still at its initial stage and the trial is yet to
begin and when the documents filed are alleged to
be that of the respondents themselves having
obtained through RTI, there is no reason why the
appellant(plaintiff) be not allowed to file them.
20) So far as the third application for production of
documents by the respondents is concerned, no
argument was advanced by the learned counsel for
the appellant. We, therefore, uphold the order of its
rejection by the two Courts below. In other words,
our order is confined to consideration of only two
applications mentioned above.
21) We, however, make it clear that we have not
expressed any opinion either on the merits of the
10
proposed amendment or on the alleged documents
sought to be filed by the appellant. It is for the
appellant to prove the case set up in the plaint
including the amended pleadings so also to prove
the documents and its relevance in accordance with
law by adducing adequate evidence.
22) In view of forgoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set
aside so also the order dated 21.09.2016 is set aside
to the extent indicated above. As a consequence, the
two applications filed by the appellant(plaintiff), i.e.,
one filed under Order 7 Rule 14 and the other
under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code are allowed,
however, subject to the appellant paying a cost of
Rs.10,000/- to the respondents. Let the cost be paid
by the appellant to the respondents within one
month.
11
23) Let the amendment be incorporated in the
plaint as proposed by the plaintiff in his application
for amendment within one month. The respondent
is granted an opportunity to amend their written
statement and make consequential amendment in
reply to the amended plea of the plaintiff (appellant).
24) The appellant(plaintiff) is also allowed to file
the additional documents, as prayed by him. The
respondent(defendant) is also granted an
opportunity to file additional documents in rebuttal,
if they so desire.
25) The Trial Court will then reframe the issues
arising in the case in the light of the original
pleadings and the amended pleadings and make an
endeavor to decide the suit in accordance with law
preferably within one year as an outer limit
uninfluenced by any observations made by the High
12
Court in the impugned order and our observations
in this order.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
January 25, 2018 

The writ petitioners had passed M.Phil. from different universities under distance education (between the year 2007 to 2009) before 11.07.2009. Writ petitioners were engaged as guest lecturers in different Government/Semi Government Colleges since before the year 2009.- applied for postings - The Government order provided for criteria for selection under which various marks were 3 allocated for Ph.D and NET/SET, M.Phil. and NET/SET. - On inquiry, they came to know that those candidates who had obtained M.Phil. degree through distance education programme are not qualified. =We are thus of the view that judgment of the High Court needs no interference in this appeal, however, the appeals are to be disposed off with the direction to consider the eligibility of the writ petitioner taking also into consideration the Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment). THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MANOJ SHARMA & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.871 OF 2018
arising out of SLP (C)No. 26528 of 2013
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.   ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MANOJ SHARMA & ORS.                 ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.872 OF 2018
arising out of SLP (C)No. 26529 of 2013
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.  ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
ALOK TRIPATHI & ORS.              ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. These two appeals have been filed against
the identically worded judgments of High Court
of   Madhya   Pradesh   dated   05.12.2012   and
17.01.2013   respectively   dismissing   the   writ
2
appeal   filed   by   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh.
The facts and issue in both the appeals being
common, it is sufficient to refer to the facts
and   pleadings   in   civil   appeal   arising   out   of
SLP (C) No. 26528 of 2017 for deciding both the
appeals.   The   parties   shall   be   referred   to   as
described in the writ petition.
3. The   writ   petitioners   had   passed   M.Phil.
from   different   universities   under   distance
education   (between   the   year   2007   to   2009)
before   11.07.2009.   Writ   petitioners   were
engaged   as   guest   lecturers   in   different
Government/Semi   Government   Colleges   since
before   the   year   2009.   Higher   Education
Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh
issued an order dated 22.02.2012 on the subject
“Arrangement   of   Guest   Lecturers   in   Government
Colleges   for   the   remaining   period  of   Academic
Session 2011­12 and upcoming sessions”.
4. The Government order provided for criteria
for   selection   under   which   various   marks   were
3
allocated   for   Ph.D   and   NET/SET,   M.Phil.   and
NET/SET.   Regional   Additional   Director,   Higher
Education,   Gwalior   Madhya   Pradesh   issued   an
advertisement   dated   21.04.2012   inviting
application for the post of Guest Lecturer in
different   subjects.   Writ   Petitioners   had
applied for different posts of Guest Lecturers
through   online   mode.   Their   applications   were
not   accepted.     On   inquiry,   they   came   to   know
that those candidates who had obtained M.Phil.
degree through distance education programme are
not qualified.
5. Writ   Petition   No.   3290   of   2012,  Manoj
Sharma   and   others   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh
was filed wherein High Court passed an interim
order   on   14.05.2012   and   directing   the
respondents   to   accept  the  application  form   of
the candidates and the result of the candidates
was to be kept in the seal­cover.
6. Writ   Petitioners   on   the   strength   of   the
interim   order   submitted   their   applications.
4
Writ   Petition   No.   3290   of   2012,   Manoj   Sharma
and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh was
finally disposed off by learned Single Judge on
29.08.2012,   holding   that   those   candidates   who
have   cleared   M.Phil.   qualification   before   the
Regulations   2009,   namely,   University   Grants
Commission     (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure
for   the   award   of   M.Phil./Ph.D   Degree)
Regulations,   2009   (hereinafter   shall   be
referred   to   as   “Regulations   2009   of   UGC
(Minimum Standards and Procedure”) are eligible
and   their   result   be   declared.   Learned   Single
Judge issued following directions:
“It is further reported that although
petitioner's case was considered, but
by   way   of   interim   order,   it   was
directed that his result will not be
declared.   Now   final   order   is   passed.
Petitioner   is   found   eligible,
therefore,   respondents   shall   consider
the case of the petitioner as eligible
on the basis of the aforesaid Master
of Philosophy certificate and declare
the   result   alongwith   other
candidates.”
7. The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   filed   a   writ
5
appeal against the judgments of learned Single
Judge and Division Bench of the High Court vide
its   judgment   dated   05.12.2012   dismissed   the
appeal.   The   State   is   in   appeal   against   the
judgment of the Division Bench.
8. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits
that in view of the regulations framed by the
University Grants Commission, Regulations 2009
of   UGC   (Minimum   Standards  and  Procedure),  the
M.Phil./Ph.D.   Programmes   conducted   through
distance   education   are   not   acceptable.   He
submits that since M.Phil. degree of the writ
petitioners   was   by   distance   education   mode,
they   do   not   fulfil   the   qualification   for
appointment as Guest Lecturer and the judgment
of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench
taking a contrary view is unsustainable.
9. No   one   has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the
respondent at the time of hearing. Although a
counter   affidavit  on   behalf   of   the   Respondent
No. 1, Manoj Sharma has been filed, supporting
6
the view taken by the learned Single Judge and
the   Division   Bench.   We   have   considered   the
submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant and perused the record.
10. The     Regulations   2009   of   UGC   on   Minimum
Standards   and   Procedure   were   published   in
Gazette   of   India   on   11.7.2009.   Regulation   5
which is relevant, is to the following effect:
“Regulation   5.   Notwithstanding
anything   contained   in   these
Regulations   or   any   other   Rule   or
regulation,   for   the   time   being   in
force,   no   University,   Institution,
Deemed   to   be   University   and
College/Institution   of   National
Importance   shall   conduct   M.Phil   and
Ph.D   Programmes   through   distance
education mode.”
11. Learned   Single   Judge   and   Division   Bench
took   the   view   that   according   to   Regulations
2009 of UGC on Minimum Standards and Procedure,
it was only with effect from 11.7.2009 that any
university,   institution   or   deemed   university
were   prohibited   from   conducting   M.Phil./Ph.D.
7
through   distance   education   mode   hence,   degree
obtained   prior   to   enforcement   of   said
regulation are not washed out. The High Court
has held that Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum
Standards   and   Procedure)   are   prospective   in
nature   and   shall   not   operate   retrospectively.
Learned   Single   Judge   took   the   view   that
Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards and
Procedure)   being   not   retrospective   shall   not
wipe   out   the   M.Phil.   qualification   already
acquired   by   the   writ   petitioners   prior   to
above­said regulation.
12. Regulation 3 under Regulations 2009 of UGC
(Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure),   clearly
provides   for   enforcement   for   the   regulation
from   the   date   of   their   publication   in   the
Gazette of India. Regulation 3 is as follows:
“They   shall   come   into   force   with
effect   from   the   date   of   their
publication in the Gazette of India.”
13. Thus,   it   is   clear   that   regulations   are
prospective   in   nature   and   may   not   affect   the
8
qualifications   granted   by   an   university   or
institution   prior   to   the   enforcement   of   the
regulation.   We   thus   do   not   find   any   error   in
the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Madhya
Pradesh. Learned Single Judge had thus rightly
directed the respondent to consider the case of
the   writ   petitioners   on   the   basis   of   M.Phil.
degree   and   declare   the   result  alongwith   other
candidates.
14. There   is   another   issue   which   needs   to   be
noticed at this juncture. On the same day when
regulations pertaining to Minimum Standards and
Procedure for the award of M.Phil./Ph.D Degree
were   published,   another   regulations   were
published in the Gazette on the same day i.e.
on   11.7.2009,   namely,   UGC(Minimum
Qualifications   for   Appointment   and   Career
Advancement   of   Teachers   in   Affiliated
Universities   and   Institutions)   (3rd  amendment)
Regulations,   2009   (hereinafter   shall   be
referred to as “Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum
9
Qualifications for Appointment”).
15. University   Grants   Commission   had   issued
regulations   relating   to   minimum   qualification
for the post of lecturer in the year 2000 which
regulations   were   amended   in   2002   and   2006.
According to Regulations 2000, Regulation 1.3.3
provides   for   qualification   for   Lecturer   as
follows:
“1.3.3 Lecturer
Good academic record with at least 55%
of the marks or, an equivalent grade
of B  in the 7 point scale with latter
grades O, A, B, C, D, E and F at the
Master's degree level, in the relevant
subject from an Indian University, or,
an   equivalent   degree   from   a   foreign
university.
Besides   fulfilling   the   above
qualifications, candidates should have
cleared the eligibility test (NET) for
lecturers   conducted   by   the   UGC,   CSIR
or similar test accredited by the UGC.
Note:   NET   shall   remain   the
compulsory   requirement   for
appointment   as   Lecturer   even   for
candidates   having   Ph.D.   degree.
However,   the   candidates   who   have
completed M. Phil. Degree or have
10
submitted   Ph.D.   thesis   in   the
concerned   subject   up   to   31st
December, 1993, are exempted from
appearing in the NET examination.”
16. As   noted   above,   the   above­mentioned
regulations   were   amended   and   amendments   dated
11.7.2009   were   relevant   whereas   the   note   as
contained in Regulation 1.3.3 was substituted by
following:
“NET/SLET   shall   remain   the   minimum
eligibility   condition   for   recruitment
and   appointment   of   Lecturers   in
Universities /Colleges/Institutions.
Provided,   however,   that
candidates,   who   are   or   have   been
awarded Ph.D. Degree in compliance of
the   “University   Grants
Commission(minimum   standards   and
procedure   for   award   of   Ph.D   Degree),
Regulation   2009,   shall   be   exempted
from   the   requirement   of   the   minimum
eligibility condition of NET/SLET for
recruitment   and appointment   of
Assistant   Professor   or   equivalent
positions   in   Universities/Colleges
/Institutions.”
17. It has to be noticed that the amendment as
made in the minimum qualification, now provides
11
that the exemption from NET shall be given to
the   Ph.D.   degree   holders,   only   when   Ph.D.
degree has been awarded to them in compliance
with   the   Regulations   2009   of   UGC   (Minimum
Standards   and   Procedure).   The   above   provision
thus, made it mandatory that for lecturers NET
qualification is necessary and exemption shall
be   granted   to   those   Ph.D.   degree   holders   who
have   obtained  Ph.D.   degree   in  accordance   with
the Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards
and Procedure). The purpose and object of the
above   amendments   in   both   Regulations   2009   of
UGC   (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure)  as   well
as  Regulations   2009   of   UGC   (Minimum
Qualifications   for   Appointment)   is   not   far   to
seek.   There   has   been   challenge   to   amendments
made   in   Regulations   2009   of   UGC   (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment)in so far as it
denied the benefit to Ph.D degree holders who
had   obtained   Ph.D   prior   to   11.7.2009.     Writ
Petitions  were   filed   in   different  High   Courts
12
challenging   the   regulations   on   different
grounds   including   that   regulations   are
arbitrary   and   violative   of   Article   14   which
discriminate the Ph.D. degree holders who have
obtained   Ph.D.   degree   prior   to   11.7.2009   and
those  who  obtained   the   degree  after   11.7.2009
in accordance with  Regulations 2009 of UGC on
Minimum Standards and Procedure.
18. The challenge to regulations were repelled
by different High Courts whereas Allahabad High
Court  vide  its judgment dated 6.4.2012 in  Dr.
Ramesh   Kumar   Yadav   and   Another   versus
University   of  Allahabad and  Others  has   upheld
the   challenge.   Appeals   were   filed  against  the
judgment   of   the   Rajasthan   High   Court,   Delhi
High   Court   and   Madras   High   Court   by   the
candidates whose writ petitions were dismissed
as   well   as   against   the   judgment   of   the
Allahabad   High   Court   dated   06.04.2012,
upholding   the   contention   of   the   candidates.
This   Court   decided   all   the   appeals   by   its
13
judgment   reported   in  P.   Susheela   and   Others
versus University Grants Commission and Others,
(2015)   8   SCC   129.  This   Court   upheld   the
judgment   of   the   High   Courts   of   Rajasthan,
Madras and Delhi and set aside the judgment of
the   Allahabad   High   Court   dated   6.4.2012,
upholding   that   the   amendments   made   in
Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum Qualifications
for   Appointment)   were   valid   and   there   is   a
valid classification between the candidates who
have obtained degree prior to Regulations 2009
of   UGC   (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure)   and
those   who   obtained   the   degree   in   accordance
with the above­said regulation.
19. Thus,   rejecting   the   contention   of   the
private respondent, following was laid down in
paragraph Nos. 16, 17 and 18:
“16.   Similar   is   the   case   on   facts
here. A vested right would arise only
if any of the appellants before us had
actually been appointed to the post of
Lecturer/Assistant   Professors.   Till
that date, there is no vested right in
any of the appellants. At the highest,
14
the appellants could only contend that
they have a right to be considered for
the   post   of   Lecturer/Assistant
Professor.   This   right   is   always
subject   to   minimum   eligibility
conditions, and till such time as the
appellants   are   appointed,   different
conditions   may   be   laid   down   at
different   times.   Merely   because   an
additional   eligibility   condition   in
the form of a NET test is laid down,
it does not mean that any vested right
of   the   appellants   is   affected,   nor
does   it   mean   that   the   regulation
laying   down   such   minimum   eligibility
condition   would   be   retrospective   in
operation.   Such   condition   would   only
be prospective as it would apply only
at   the   stage   of   appointment.   It   is
clear, therefore, that the contentions
of   the   private   appellants   before   us
must fail.
17. One of the learned counsel for the
petitioners   argued,   based   on   the
language   of   the   direction   of   the
Central   Government   dated   12­11­2008
that   all   that   the   Government   wanted
UGC to do was to "generally" prescribe
NET as a qualification. But this did
not   mean   that   UGC   had   to   prescribe
this   qualification   without   providing
for   any   exemption.   We   are   unable   to
accede to this argument for the simple
reason   that   the   word   "generally"
precedes the word "compulsory" and it
is   clear   that   the   language   of   the
direction   has   been   followed   both   in
letter   and   in   spirit   by   the   UGC
regulations of 2009 and 2010.
15
18.   The   arguments   based   on Article
14 equally have to be rejected. It is
clear   that   the   object   of   the
directions   of   the   Central   Government
read   with   the   UGC   Regulations   of
2009/2010   are   to   maintain   excellence
in   standards   of   higher   education.
Keeping this object in mind, a minimum
eligibility   condition   of   passing   the
national   eligibility   test   is   laid
down.   True,   there   may   have   been
exemptions   laid   down   by   UGC   in   the
past,   but   the   Central   Government   now
as a matter of policy feels that any
exemption   would   compromise   the
excellence   of   teaching   standards   in
universities/   colleges/institutions
governed by the UGC. Obviously, there
is nothing arbitrary or discriminatory
in   this   ­   in   fact   it   is   a   core
function   of   UGC   to   see   that   such
standards do not get diluted.”
20. Thus, from the above judgment, it is clear
that   NET   qualification   is   now   minimum
qualification   for   appointment   of   Lecturer   and
exemption   granted   to   M.Phil.   degree   holders
have   been   withdrawn   and   exemption   is   allowed
only   to   those   Ph.D.   degree   holders   who   have
obtained   the   Ph.D.   degree   in   accordance   with
11.7.2009 regulations, namely, Regulations 2009
of   UGC   (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure).
16
Although, this aspect has not been noticed by
the   High   Court   but   since   the   learned   Single
Judge   has   directed   the   consideration   of   the
case   of   the   writ   petitioner   on   the   basis   of
M.Phil.   degree   which   was   obtained   by   them   by
distance   education   mode   prior   to   2009,   it   is
necessary  that   their   eligibility   for   the   post
be   examined   taking   into   consideration   the
Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Qualifications
for   Appointment).   The   advertisement   and
selection   for   Guest   Lecturers   having   been
conducted   in   the   year   2012   when   both   the
Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards and
Procedure) and  Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum
Qualifications   for   Appointment)   were
applicable.
21. There   is   nothing   on   the   record   as   to
whether   after   the   judgment   of   the   learned
Single   Judge,   writ   petitioners'   result   was
declared   and   they  were   selected   or   appointed.
This Court has also passed an interim order of
17
16.08.2013   staying   the   operation   of   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court   for   the   period   of
three   months.   No   further   orders   have   been
passed extending the interim order.
22. We   are  thus  of  the   view  that  judgment  of
the   High   Court   needs   no   interference   in   this
appeal, however, the appeals are to be disposed
off   with   the   direction   to   consider   the
eligibility of the writ petitioner taking also
into consideration the Regulations 2009 of UGC
(Minimum Qualifications for Appointment).
23. Both   the   appeals   are   disposed   off
accordingly.
.........................J.
      ( A.K. SIKRI )
.........................J.
      ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
January 25, 2018.

those candidates who had obtained M.Phil. degree through distance education programme are not qualified.= on the basis of M.Phil. degree which was obtained by them by distance education mode prior to 2009, it is necessary that their eligibility for the post be examined taking into consideration the Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment). The advertisement and selection for Guest Lecturers having been conducted in the year 2012 when both the Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards and Procedure) and Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum Qualifications for Appointment) were applicable. it is clear that regulations are prospective in nature and may not affect the qualifications granted by an university or institution prior to the enforcement of the regulation. We thus do not find any error in the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Learned Single Judge had thus rightly directed the respondent to consider the case of the writ petitioners on the basis of M.Phil. degree and declare the result alongwith other candidates.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.871 OF 2018
arising out of SLP (C)No. 26528 of 2013
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.   ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MANOJ SHARMA & ORS.                 ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.872 OF 2018
arising out of SLP (C)No. 26529 of 2013
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.  ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
ALOK TRIPATHI & ORS.              ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. These two appeals have been filed against
the identically worded judgments of High Court
of   Madhya   Pradesh   dated   05.12.2012   and
17.01.2013   respectively   dismissing   the   writ
2
appeal   filed   by   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh.
The facts and issue in both the appeals being
common, it is sufficient to refer to the facts
and   pleadings   in   civil   appeal   arising   out   of
SLP (C) No. 26528 of 2017 for deciding both the
appeals.   The   parties   shall   be   referred   to   as
described in the writ petition.
3. The   writ   petitioners   had   passed   M.Phil.
from   different   universities   under   distance
education   (between   the   year   2007   to   2009)
before   11.07.2009.   Writ   petitioners   were
engaged   as   guest   lecturers   in   different
Government/Semi   Government   Colleges   since
before   the   year   2009.   Higher   Education
Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh
issued an order dated 22.02.2012 on the subject
“Arrangement   of   Guest   Lecturers   in   Government
Colleges   for   the   remaining   period  of   Academic
Session 2011­12 and upcoming sessions”.
4. The Government order provided for criteria
for   selection   under   which   various   marks   were
3
allocated   for   Ph.D   and   NET/SET,   M.Phil.   and
NET/SET.   Regional   Additional   Director,   Higher
Education,   Gwalior   Madhya   Pradesh   issued   an
advertisement   dated   21.04.2012   inviting
application for the post of Guest Lecturer in
different   subjects.   Writ   Petitioners   had
applied for different posts of Guest Lecturers
through   online   mode.   Their   applications   were
not   accepted.     On   inquiry,   they   came   to   know
that those candidates who had obtained M.Phil.
degree through distance education programme are
not qualified.
5. Writ   Petition   No.   3290   of   2012,  Manoj
Sharma   and   others   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh
was filed wherein High Court passed an interim
order   on   14.05.2012   and   directing   the
respondents   to   accept  the  application  form   of
the candidates and the result of the candidates
was to be kept in the seal­cover.
6. Writ   Petitioners   on   the   strength   of   the
interim   order   submitted   their   applications.
4
Writ   Petition   No.   3290   of   2012,   Manoj   Sharma
and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh was
finally disposed off by learned Single Judge on
29.08.2012,   holding   that   those   candidates   who
have   cleared   M.Phil.   qualification   before   the
Regulations   2009,   namely,   University   Grants
Commission     (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure
for   the   award   of   M.Phil./Ph.D   Degree)
Regulations,   2009   (hereinafter   shall   be
referred   to   as   “Regulations   2009   of   UGC
(Minimum Standards and Procedure”) are eligible
and   their   result   be   declared.   Learned   Single
Judge issued following directions:
“It is further reported that although
petitioner's case was considered, but
by   way   of   interim   order,   it   was
directed that his result will not be
declared.   Now   final   order   is   passed.
Petitioner   is   found   eligible,
therefore,   respondents   shall   consider
the case of the petitioner as eligible
on the basis of the aforesaid Master
of Philosophy certificate and declare
the   result   alongwith   other
candidates.”
7. The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   filed   a   writ
5
appeal against the judgments of learned Single
Judge and Division Bench of the High Court vide
its   judgment   dated   05.12.2012   dismissed   the
appeal.   The   State   is   in   appeal   against   the
judgment of the Division Bench.
8. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits
that in view of the regulations framed by the
University Grants Commission, Regulations 2009
of   UGC   (Minimum   Standards  and  Procedure),  the
M.Phil./Ph.D.   Programmes   conducted   through
distance   education   are   not   acceptable.   He
submits that since M.Phil. degree of the writ
petitioners   was   by   distance   education   mode,
they   do   not   fulfil   the   qualification   for
appointment as Guest Lecturer and the judgment
of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench
taking a contrary view is unsustainable.
9. No   one   has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the
respondent at the time of hearing. Although a
counter   affidavit  on   behalf   of   the   Respondent
No. 1, Manoj Sharma has been filed, supporting
6
the view taken by the learned Single Judge and
the   Division   Bench.   We   have   considered   the
submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant and perused the record.
10. The     Regulations   2009   of   UGC   on   Minimum
Standards   and   Procedure   were   published   in
Gazette   of   India   on   11.7.2009.   Regulation   5
which is relevant, is to the following effect:
“Regulation   5.   Notwithstanding
anything   contained   in   these
Regulations   or   any   other   Rule   or
regulation,   for   the   time   being   in
force,   no   University,   Institution,
Deemed   to   be   University   and
College/Institution   of   National
Importance   shall   conduct   M.Phil   and
Ph.D   Programmes   through   distance
education mode.”
11. Learned   Single   Judge   and   Division   Bench
took   the   view   that   according   to   Regulations
2009 of UGC on Minimum Standards and Procedure,
it was only with effect from 11.7.2009 that any
university,   institution   or   deemed   university
were   prohibited   from   conducting   M.Phil./Ph.D.
7
through   distance   education   mode   hence,   degree
obtained   prior   to   enforcement   of   said
regulation are not washed out. The High Court
has held that Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum
Standards   and   Procedure)   are   prospective   in
nature   and   shall   not   operate   retrospectively.
Learned   Single   Judge   took   the   view   that
Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards and
Procedure)   being   not   retrospective   shall   not
wipe   out   the   M.Phil.   qualification   already
acquired   by   the   writ   petitioners   prior   to
above­said regulation.
12. Regulation 3 under Regulations 2009 of UGC
(Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure),   clearly
provides   for   enforcement   for   the   regulation
from   the   date   of   their   publication   in   the
Gazette of India. Regulation 3 is as follows:
“They   shall   come   into   force   with
effect   from   the   date   of   their
publication in the Gazette of India.”
13. Thus,   it   is   clear   that   regulations   are
prospective   in   nature   and   may   not   affect   the
8
qualifications   granted   by   an   university   or
institution   prior   to   the   enforcement   of   the
regulation.   We   thus   do   not   find   any   error   in
the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Madhya
Pradesh. Learned Single Judge had thus rightly
directed the respondent to consider the case of
the   writ   petitioners   on   the   basis   of   M.Phil.
degree   and   declare   the   result  alongwith   other
candidates.
14. There   is   another   issue   which   needs   to   be
noticed at this juncture. On the same day when
regulations pertaining to Minimum Standards and
Procedure for the award of M.Phil./Ph.D Degree
were   published,   another   regulations   were
published in the Gazette on the same day i.e.
on   11.7.2009,   namely,   UGC(Minimum
Qualifications   for   Appointment   and   Career
Advancement   of   Teachers   in   Affiliated
Universities   and   Institutions)   (3rd  amendment)
Regulations,   2009   (hereinafter   shall   be
referred to as “Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum
9
Qualifications for Appointment”).
15. University   Grants   Commission   had   issued
regulations   relating   to   minimum   qualification
for the post of lecturer in the year 2000 which
regulations   were   amended   in   2002   and   2006.
According to Regulations 2000, Regulation 1.3.3
provides   for   qualification   for   Lecturer   as
follows:
“1.3.3 Lecturer
Good academic record with at least 55%
of the marks or, an equivalent grade
of B  in the 7 point scale with latter
grades O, A, B, C, D, E and F at the
Master's degree level, in the relevant
subject from an Indian University, or,
an   equivalent   degree   from   a   foreign
university.
Besides   fulfilling   the   above
qualifications, candidates should have
cleared the eligibility test (NET) for
lecturers   conducted   by   the   UGC,   CSIR
or similar test accredited by the UGC.
Note:   NET   shall   remain   the
compulsory   requirement   for
appointment   as   Lecturer   even   for
candidates   having   Ph.D.   degree.
However,   the   candidates   who   have
completed M. Phil. Degree or have
10
submitted   Ph.D.   thesis   in   the
concerned   subject   up   to   31st
December, 1993, are exempted from
appearing in the NET examination.”
16. As   noted   above,   the   above­mentioned
regulations   were   amended   and   amendments   dated
11.7.2009   were   relevant   whereas   the   note   as
contained in Regulation 1.3.3 was substituted by
following:
“NET/SLET   shall   remain   the   minimum
eligibility   condition   for   recruitment
and   appointment   of   Lecturers   in
Universities /Colleges/Institutions.
Provided,   however,   that
candidates,   who   are   or   have   been
awarded Ph.D. Degree in compliance of
the   “University   Grants
Commission(minimum   standards   and
procedure   for   award   of   Ph.D   Degree),
Regulation   2009,   shall   be   exempted
from   the   requirement   of   the   minimum
eligibility condition of NET/SLET for
recruitment   and appointment   of
Assistant   Professor   or   equivalent
positions   in   Universities/Colleges
/Institutions.”
17. It has to be noticed that the amendment as
made in the minimum qualification, now provides
11
that the exemption from NET shall be given to
the   Ph.D.   degree   holders,   only   when   Ph.D.
degree has been awarded to them in compliance
with   the   Regulations   2009   of   UGC   (Minimum
Standards   and   Procedure).   The   above   provision
thus, made it mandatory that for lecturers NET
qualification is necessary and exemption shall
be   granted   to   those   Ph.D.   degree   holders   who
have   obtained  Ph.D.   degree   in  accordance   with
the Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards
and Procedure). The purpose and object of the
above   amendments   in   both   Regulations   2009   of
UGC   (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure)  as   well
as  Regulations   2009   of   UGC   (Minimum
Qualifications   for   Appointment)   is   not   far   to
seek.   There   has   been   challenge   to   amendments
made   in   Regulations   2009   of   UGC   (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment)in so far as it
denied the benefit to Ph.D degree holders who
had   obtained   Ph.D   prior   to   11.7.2009.     Writ
Petitions  were   filed   in   different  High   Courts
12
challenging   the   regulations   on   different
grounds   including   that   regulations   are
arbitrary   and   violative   of   Article   14   which
discriminate the Ph.D. degree holders who have
obtained   Ph.D.   degree   prior   to   11.7.2009   and
those  who  obtained   the   degree  after   11.7.2009
in accordance with  Regulations 2009 of UGC on
Minimum Standards and Procedure.
18. The challenge to regulations were repelled
by different High Courts whereas Allahabad High
Court  vide  its judgment dated 6.4.2012 in  Dr.
Ramesh   Kumar   Yadav   and   Another   versus
University   of  Allahabad and  Others  has   upheld
the   challenge.   Appeals   were   filed  against  the
judgment   of   the   Rajasthan   High   Court,   Delhi
High   Court   and   Madras   High   Court   by   the
candidates whose writ petitions were dismissed
as   well   as   against   the   judgment   of   the
Allahabad   High   Court   dated   06.04.2012,
upholding   the   contention   of   the   candidates.
This   Court   decided   all   the   appeals   by   its
13
judgment   reported   in  P.   Susheela   and   Others
versus University Grants Commission and Others,
(2015)   8   SCC   129.  This   Court   upheld   the
judgment   of   the   High   Courts   of   Rajasthan,
Madras and Delhi and set aside the judgment of
the   Allahabad   High   Court   dated   6.4.2012,
upholding   that   the   amendments   made   in
Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum Qualifications
for   Appointment)   were   valid   and   there   is   a
valid classification between the candidates who
have obtained degree prior to Regulations 2009
of   UGC   (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure)   and
those   who   obtained   the   degree   in   accordance
with the above­said regulation.
19. Thus,   rejecting   the   contention   of   the
private respondent, following was laid down in
paragraph Nos. 16, 17 and 18:
“16.   Similar   is   the   case   on   facts
here. A vested right would arise only
if any of the appellants before us had
actually been appointed to the post of
Lecturer/Assistant   Professors.   Till
that date, there is no vested right in
any of the appellants. At the highest,
14
the appellants could only contend that
they have a right to be considered for
the   post   of   Lecturer/Assistant
Professor.   This   right   is   always
subject   to   minimum   eligibility
conditions, and till such time as the
appellants   are   appointed,   different
conditions   may   be   laid   down   at
different   times.   Merely   because   an
additional   eligibility   condition   in
the form of a NET test is laid down,
it does not mean that any vested right
of   the   appellants   is   affected,   nor
does   it   mean   that   the   regulation
laying   down   such   minimum   eligibility
condition   would   be   retrospective   in
operation.   Such   condition   would   only
be prospective as it would apply only
at   the   stage   of   appointment.   It   is
clear, therefore, that the contentions
of   the   private   appellants   before   us
must fail.
17. One of the learned counsel for the
petitioners   argued,   based   on   the
language   of   the   direction   of   the
Central   Government   dated   12­11­2008
that   all   that   the   Government   wanted
UGC to do was to "generally" prescribe
NET as a qualification. But this did
not   mean   that   UGC   had   to   prescribe
this   qualification   without   providing
for   any   exemption.   We   are   unable   to
accede to this argument for the simple
reason   that   the   word   "generally"
precedes the word "compulsory" and it
is   clear   that   the   language   of   the
direction   has   been   followed   both   in
letter   and   in   spirit   by   the   UGC
regulations of 2009 and 2010.
15
18.   The   arguments   based   on Article
14 equally have to be rejected. It is
clear   that   the   object   of   the
directions   of   the   Central   Government
read   with   the   UGC   Regulations   of
2009/2010   are   to   maintain   excellence
in   standards   of   higher   education.
Keeping this object in mind, a minimum
eligibility   condition   of   passing   the
national   eligibility   test   is   laid
down.   True,   there   may   have   been
exemptions   laid   down   by   UGC   in   the
past,   but   the   Central   Government   now
as a matter of policy feels that any
exemption   would   compromise   the
excellence   of   teaching   standards   in
universities/   colleges/institutions
governed by the UGC. Obviously, there
is nothing arbitrary or discriminatory
in   this   ­   in   fact   it   is   a   core
function   of   UGC   to   see   that   such
standards do not get diluted.”
20. Thus, from the above judgment, it is clear
that   NET   qualification   is   now   minimum
qualification   for   appointment   of   Lecturer   and
exemption   granted   to   M.Phil.   degree   holders
have   been   withdrawn   and   exemption   is   allowed
only   to   those   Ph.D.   degree   holders   who   have
obtained   the   Ph.D.   degree   in   accordance   with
11.7.2009 regulations, namely, Regulations 2009
of   UGC   (Minimum   Standards   and   Procedure).
16
Although, this aspect has not been noticed by
the   High   Court   but   since   the   learned   Single
Judge   has   directed   the   consideration   of   the
case   of   the   writ   petitioner   on   the   basis   of
M.Phil.   degree   which   was   obtained   by   them   by
distance   education   mode   prior   to   2009,   it   is
necessary  that   their   eligibility   for   the   post
be   examined   taking   into   consideration   the
Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Qualifications
for   Appointment).   The   advertisement   and
selection   for   Guest   Lecturers   having   been
conducted   in   the   year   2012   when   both   the
Regulations 2009 of UGC (Minimum Standards and
Procedure) and  Regulations 2009 of UGC(Minimum
Qualifications   for   Appointment)   were
applicable.
21. There   is   nothing   on   the   record   as   to
whether   after   the   judgment   of   the   learned
Single   Judge,   writ   petitioners'   result   was
declared   and   they  were   selected   or   appointed.
This Court has also passed an interim order of
17
16.08.2013   staying   the   operation   of   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court   for   the   period   of
three   months.   No   further   orders   have   been
passed extending the interim order.
22. We   are  thus  of  the   view  that  judgment  of
the   High   Court   needs   no   interference   in   this
appeal, however, the appeals are to be disposed
off   with   the   direction   to   consider   the
eligibility of the writ petitioner taking also
into consideration the Regulations 2009 of UGC
(Minimum Qualifications for Appointment).
23. Both   the   appeals   are   disposed   off
accordingly.
.........................J.
      ( A.K. SIKRI )
.........................J.
      ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
January 25, 2018.