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Monday, January 22, 2018

THE SECRETARY, KERALA STATE COASTAL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY ….Appellant versus DLF UNIVERSAL LIMITED (Formerly known as Adelie Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd.) & ORS. ….Respondents - Notification dated 14.9.2006 issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests in furtherance of the environment protection in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (v) of subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) read with clause (d) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986. This Notification was in supersession of the earlier Notification of 27.1.1994. The Notification states that the process was followed duly and in accordance with the objective of the National Environment Policy as approved by the Union Cabinet on 18.5.2006, such process was being modified. All new projects required prior environmental clearance from the Central Government as applicable or as the case may be the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (for short ‘SEIAA’) duly constituted by the Central Government under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act.- In conclusion we set aside the findings of the impugned order while sustaining the fine of Rs.1 crore with the direction for strict adherence to the norms in future and avoidance of such contradictions by the authorities. We also feel it appropriate that in view of the professed policy to have more single window clearance, the methodology of such processing of such applications should be endeavoured to be simplified so that there is less uncertainty and better enforcement. The same may be done within a period three months from the receipt of the copy of the order.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.117-120 of 2018
 [Arising from SLP (Civil) Nos.6929-6932/2017]
THE SECRETARY,
KERALA STATE COASTAL
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY ….Appellant
versus
DLF UNIVERSAL LIMITED
(Formerly known as Adelie Builders and
Developers Pvt. Ltd.) & ORS. ….Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL No.121 of 2018
@SLP(C) No.6861/2017
CIVIL APPEAL No.122 of 2018
 @SLP(C) No.7306/2017
CIVIL APPEAL No.123 of 2018
 @ SLP(C) No.9929/2017
J U D G M E N T
Page 1 of 39
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The battle of environment protection against development is a never
ending one and the present dispute primarily is an offshoot of such a
conflict. The dispute between the developers of a housing project and
the environment authorities is also one where different authorities
have taken variant stands. It is the say of the developer that they
obtained all requisite permissions and have proceeded with the project
in pursuance thereof while the coastal management authority and the
environment authority plead otherwise. From the perspective of the
Kerala State Coastal Management Authority, which is the main
appellant before us, it has been a saga of a sleeping authority – not
having an afternoon siesta but a Kumbhakarna sleep albeit of almost
four years. On being woken up, it suddenly seeks to see various
violations wanting to put the clock back. In this period things have
been done and dusted and a huge project has taken shape, which is at
the final stage.
3. Now coming to the facts of the case at hand, the project in question is
of respondent No.1, which purchased nearly 5.12 acres of property
Page 2 of 39
from different vendors in the year 2006 envisaging a multi-storey
residential complex of about 185 units located on the eastern bank of
Chilavannurkayal (backwaters) in Kerala. The area in question, as
apparent from the status report of the Coastal Regulation Zone
(‘CRZ’) itself shows that the area falls in the Kochi Corporation and
the said area, along with the adjoining panchayats is highly
developed. A lot of low lying areas including tidal marshes and
filtration ponds bordering the backwaters are alleged to have been
reclaimed for construction and other development activities by
various third parties and the area close to the site in question is well
developed and built up.
4. Respondent No.1 obtained a building permit for the project in
question issued by the Corporation of Cochin (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Corporation’) on 22.10.2007 under the Kerala Building Rules,
1984. It is also not really disputed that the other linked permissions
such as NOC from State Pollution Control Board, NOC from the Fire
& Rescue Department and height clearance from the Navy was also
obtained. The builders DLF Universal Limited (formerly known as
‘Adelie Builders & Developers Private Limited’) (hereinafter referred
Page 3 of 39
to as ‘DLF’) applied for environment clearance to the Ministry of
Environment and Forests on 27.11.2007. The intervening factor was a
Notification dated 14.9.2006 issued by the Ministry of Environment
and Forests in furtherance of the environment protection in exercise of
power conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (v) of subsection (2) of
Section 3 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘said Act’) read with clause (d) of sub-rule (3) of
Rule 5 of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986. This Notification
was in supersession of the earlier Notification of 27.1.1994. The
Notification states that the process was followed duly and in
accordance with the objective of the National Environment Policy as
approved by the Union Cabinet on 18.5.2006, such process was being
modified. All new projects required prior environmental clearance
from the Central Government as applicable or as the case may be the
State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (for short ‘SEIAA’)
duly constituted by the Central Government under sub-section (3) of
Section 3 of the said Act. The Notification also provided that the
SEIAA would base its decision on the recommendation of the State or
Union Territory Level Expert Appraisal Committee ( for short
Page 4 of 39
‘SEAC’) as to be constituted following the Notification and in the
absence of the setting up of these authorities, a category provided
would be treated as category ‘A’ project. Clause 8 dealt with the
Grant or Rejection of Prior Environmental Clearance (EC) and the
relevant clauses of the same are reproduced hereunder:
“8. Grant or Rejection of Prior Environmental Clearance (EC):
(i) The regulatory authority shall consider the recommendations of
the EAC or SEAC concerned and convey its decision to the
applicant within forty five days of the receipt of the
recommendations of the Expert Appraisal Committee or State
Level Expert Appraisal Committee concerned or in other words
within one hundred and five days of the receipt of the final
Environment Impact Assessment Report, and where
Environmental Impact Assessment is not required, within one
hundred and five days of the receipt of the complete application
within requisite documents, except as provided below.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(iii) In the event that the decision of the regulatory authority is not
communicated to the applicant within the period specified in
sub-paragraphs (i) or (ii) above, as applicable, the applicant may
proceed as if the environment clearance sought for has been
granted or denied by the regulatory authority in terms of the final
recommendations of the Expert Appraisal Committee or State
Level Expert Appraisal Committee concerned.”
5. As we have been informed, these authorities have been constituted
subsequently only on 19.12.2011 and, thus, logically in view of what
has been set out hereinabove, the project in question could possibly
Page 5 of 39
have been treated as a category ‘A’ project. The project of DLF was
examined by the Central Expert Appraisal Committee (for short
‘CEAC’) in its 63rd meeting and was approved as a “Silver Grading”
project. A suggestion was made by the CEAC that some of the project
area falls under the Coastal Regulation Zone (‘CRZ’) and thus, the
details of the project may be examined by the CRZ Committee of the
Ministry and a separate clearance should be acquired under the CRZ
project. In furtherance of this recommendation DLF was required to
obtain the CRZ status report from the Centre for Earth Science
Studies (for short ‘CESS’), Thiruvanathapuram, which is stated to be
one of the seven authorised/identified agencies. An application is
stated to have been made by DLF on 23.9.2008 to CESS, which in
turn made a positive recommendation in May, 2009, stating that the
project land was situated at CRZ II and there was no area in CRZ (I
and i) in the project area or close to it. It may be noted at this stage
that there have been some subsequent reports by CESS in September,
2011 and a communication dated 11.8.2014 but the project was more
or less over even by the first date or was sufficiently advanced. The
purport of the subsequent developments will be considered hereinafter
Page 6 of 39
but suffice to say that the first report sought to point out reclamation
of backwater by DLF after 2009, earlier reclamation of filtration
ponds and paddy fields and shifting of high tide lines. The
communication dated 11.8.2014 pertained to alleged replacement of
some photographs from the CESS report of May, 2009 and referred to
a stream/natural canal at site that had been mapped by the CESS.
6. It appears that DLF, however, did not wait for the environment
clearance and the construction activity went on at rapid pace at site
ostensibly on a perceived deemed clearance since there was no
communication during this period of time. This is apparent from a
visit report dated 29.10.2009 of Kerala Coastal Zone Management
Authority (for short ‘KCZMA’)/appellant. This resulted in the
KCZMA/appellant issuing a letter dated 21.1.2010, seeking
explanation for having started construction without obtaining the
necessary permissions/approval/clearance from KCZMA/appellant.
However, subsequently on 20.3.2010 in its 40th meeting the
KCZMA/appellant, post discussion of the site inspection report,
decided to recommend the project proposal to the MoEF. The
relevant portion of this is extracted hereinafter:
“KCZMA has discussed the site inspection report in detail and
Page 7 of 39
decided to recommend the project proposal to MoEF. The
contention of the Subcommittee that, the narrow canal
encountered in the imaginary line drawn parallel to the High
Tide Line from the Choice Garden building is only a drainage
canal as has been agreed by the meeting, since the narrow
drainage canal need not be considered as a canal. The
Authority also decided to collect a full set of modified
documents as per provisions of CRZ Notification, including
existing FSI & FAR as on 19th February, 1991.”
7. A sub-committee appointed by KCZMA/appellant visited the site
again and made certain recommendations dated 19.7.2010. A perusal
of the report of the sub-committee states that the construction had
already commenced and the structure of a sizeable number of floors
of a multi-storey residential project was nearing completion. This is
stated to have caused some impediment to the mandate to evaluate the
proposed site for CRZ clearance. It, however, records that the site
falls in CRZ II category and does not have any CRZ I(i) areas, such as
mangroves. In Survey No.1019 Choice Garden Apartments existed
which was, however, in existence prior to 19.2.1991. Insofar as the
narrow canal was concerned it is noted that the same functioned as a
municipal drain for waste water drainage from urban conglomeration
of the northern side of the project site. The residential apartment
construction NCR II was found to be permissible but the proposed
Page 8 of 39
construction has to be on the landward side of the existing road. The
clarifications given by the MoEF were also noted that the imaginary
line to be drawn should not cut across any river, creek, backwater,
estuary,sand beach or mangroves. The recommendations were made
and there were two significant aspects:
i. The shortest distance from the high tide line to existing authorised
building of the adjoining plot (Choice Garden Apartments), being
13.5 mtrs., the imaginary line was drawn parallel to the HTL towards
seaward side of the existing authorised building.
ii. DLF should have obtained CRZ clearance from KCZMA/appellant
before starting the construction, which was a procedural violation.
8. In a nutshell while all aspects including the narrow canal was found
not to be an impediment, there was a violation of lack of prior
approval.
9. The aforesaid report of the sub-committee was examined and minutes
drawn on 31.8.2010. The salient aspect recorded in these minutes is
that the sub-committee examined the documents submitted by DLF
and also obtained clarifications in respect of SFI from the City Town
Planners. The case was examined in the light of recent amendments
Page 9 of 39
of the MoEF with regard to CRZ-II region and a site visit was also
made on 19.7.2010. On a detailed examination, two aspects, which
once again emerge are: (i) Any portion protruding beyond the
imaginary line towards backwaters may be demolished (which has
apparently been done); (ii) In view of “procedural violations” found
by the sub-committee, a penalty for the same should be imposed.
10. The matter somehow did not end at this since the CESS is stated to
have visited the site again in June, 2011 and submitted a report in
September, 2011. This was in a sense the beginning of some further
adverse observations for DLF. It was now opined that apparently land
reclamation was carried out by DLF from 2009 onwards which had
caused the shifting of the backwater’s banks by five metres. A major
part of the area, which was reclaimed was found to be part of low
lying areas such as filtration ponds/paddy fields and lastly the lay out
building complex needed to be superimposed on the local level CRZ
map to get the exact distance from HTL.
11. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Fort Kochi on 21.11.2011 issued a
provisional stock memo to DLF to hold back construction on the
project land. There was an allegation made by the village officer that
Page 10 of 39
about 50 cents of the Chilavannur river had been illegally reclaimed,
which the RDO on 17.12.2011 reported to the Cochin Corporation.
12. The trigger for this letter was stated to be a complaint received from
one Mr. Antony A.V. of Chilavannur, Kochi pursuant whereto a team
of experts from KCZMA/appellant had visited the site. Mr. Antony is
the original petitioner in the petition from which the present
proceedings arise. The site was visited on 9.11.2012 by CESS on
intimation by KCZMA/appellant and a report was submitted seeking
to cast certain question marks over its own earlier reports. Thus
issues, such as the status of the plot prior to 2009 having not been
considered while delineating the HTL, reclamation/modification of
the backwater site, area being part of water body were all sought to be
raised. This was followed by a petition filed on 15.11.2012 by Mr.
Antony, being Writ Petition No.27248/2012, seeking to interdict DLF
from effecting any further construction and to direct Cochin
Corporation to implement the various directions of
KCZMA/appellant. The said Mr. Antony approached the Court
alleging to be living in the vicinity of the area and being affected by
the construction. Interestingly, why he chose to remain silent when
Page 11 of 39
the vast area of construction was coming up right next to his property,
is a mystery. So is it a mystery, why DLF was singled out while no
mention was made of the whole area which was highly constructed as
noticed in the reports. The learned single Judge granted interim
orders on 4.12.2012 against progress of the project.
KCZMA/appellant also became active at that stage, asking DLF to
submit a CRZ map of the project site with construction superimposed
on it and addressed to the MoEF a letter dated 29.12.2012 for
necessary action alleging that there was a land reclamation by DLF.
The CEAC in its 124th meeting held on 13/14.5.2013 decided to
consider the environment clearance and noted certain violations by
DLF. However, since the SEIAA was set up in the meantime vide
Notification dated 19.12.2011, file of the project was transferred to it.
On 31.10.2013, the project was cleared by the SEIAA qua
environment clearance but it also decided to issue a show cause notice
to DLF as to why violation proceedings should not be initiated against
it before issuance of EC. Finally on 11.12.2013, SEIAA issued an
integrated CRZ-cum-environment clearance dated 11.12.2013 to the
project subject to the outcome of the writ proceedings pending before
Page 12 of 39
the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court. We may note here
itself that one of the aspects pointed out by DLF is that this clearance
has not been challenged in any proceedings nor were the writ
proceedings amended to challenge the same.
13. It is the case of the KCZMA/appellant that there were complaints
preferred by other persons with regard to the project of DLF and thus,
in its meeting held on 17.2.2014 it was decided to constitute a three
member committee to inquire into the CRZ status of the project.
Apparently on 30.6.2014, the Chief Secretary submitted a report to
the Chief Minister reporting certain violations and a three member
committee report was available on 21.7.2014 alleging illegal
reclamation of the land and other violations. CESS also sought to
change its course on 11.8.2014 alleging that there was a natural
stream canal from the CRZ map submitted to the MoEF for CRZ
clearance and that some two photographs had been replaced. The
challenge laid to the report by DLF by way of writ petition
No.18483/2014 was disposed of on 19.8.2014 observing that the
report of the Chief Secretary dated 30.6.2014 could only be treated as
a piece of information.
Page 13 of 39
14. The learned single Judge rendered his verdict on 8.12.2014 finding
practically everything against DLF and categorised the whole
construction as illegal and in violation of law, particularly the CRZ
notification, and was thus not capable of being regularised. The
illegal structure was directed to be demolished. This order was
assailed in writ appeal No.1987/2014 by DLF. A separate writ
petition was also filed, being writ petition No.20555/2015,
challenging the report dated 21.7.2014 by the three member
committee appointed by the KCZMA/appellant. The construction
being complete and the flat buyers interest being involved, these
apartment buyers also filed writ petition Nos.2810/2015 and
3375/2015 praying for issuance of occupancy certificates.
15. The Division Bench ultimately by the impugned order while broadly
upholding the findings of the learned single Judge and setting aside
the order of demolition, directed regularisation subject to
fine/compensation amount of Rs.1 crore. This amount was to be
deposited before the District Collector, Ernakulam to be kept in a
separate account for being used exclusively for building up the
environment, maintaining ecological balance in the area situated on
Page 14 of 39
the eastern side of the Chilavannur river, with a further direction to
the District Collector to submit periodic reports before the Court as to
the utilisation of the amount for the activities undertaken, in every six
months. The writ petitions filed by the prospective buyers were
dismissed but without prejudice to get the occupancy certificates for
the building from the local authority subject to the satisfaction of the
costs. Writ petition No.20555/2015 was also dismissed.
Stand of KCZMA/Appellant
16. The KCZMA/appellant are before us by appeal with Mr. Shyam
Divan, learned Senior Advocate seeking to vehemently canvas that the
various violations required the building to be demolished or in the
alternative, the fine substantially enhanced. He took us meticulously
through the development in the case as discussed above with each of
the events to canvas the violations which have taken place. On the
Court query about the silence of this important authority for such a
long period of time, the only answer available was that it did not have
an enforcement mechanism and is dependent on the Corporation for
the same. That, in our view, could hardly be an answer for such
inaction if there were violations. Enforcement is different from
Page 15 of 39
detection of violations. There can hardly be any doubt about the
bounden duty of this authority to play a crucial role in preserving the
environment in the coastal area and it cannot wash its hands off by
giving an explanation for inaction as the alleged absence of an
enforcement force. Had this authority kept an eye open right from the
beginning and played the role which it was required to play, the
situation which has come to pass would not have so occurred and the
identification of the violations, if any, would have been made at the
threshold stage itself. This did not happen here.
17. The reliance by the learned counsel has been on the subsequent report,
after the horses had bolted from the stable, to allege violations from
the beginning. The case, which was sought to be put up and
canvassed, was that no reclamation was permissible since 1991, but
land was actually reclaimed in 2005-06 and 2009-11. The aspects
pointed out in the subsequent reports including of the natural stream,
as to how the HTL measuring norms were violated in coming to
conclusions, were pointed out.
18. One of the main bedrocks of DLF, of having obtained the integrated
environment/CRZ clearance granted by SEIAA on 11.12.2013 was
Page 16 of 39
not denied but it was sought to be contended that the clearances ought
to have been obtained prior to the commencement of construction
which would at the relevant stage have been granted by the MoEF. In
any case SEIAA ought to have based its decisions on the
recommendations of the SEAC, which was not done. The SEAC had
only considered the environment clearance and not the CRZ clearance
for the project. That file ought not to have been transferred to SEIAA
by the MoEF.
19. Learned counsel also sought to contend that insofar as CRZ status of
the project land and its implications are concerned, the project area in
question included backwater and pokkali fields (filtration ponds) by
referring to various documents, which also show that land reclamation
was undertaken at the project site from 2005 onwards, which was a
prohibited activity. It was also submitted that the imaginary line to be
drawn was cutting across a natural backwater canal and not a
manmade drainage canal as alleged by DLF.
20. An issue was also sought to be raised about the FSI and FAR status of
the project as the same had been granted of 1.99 while the Town and
Country Plan Regulation only provided for 1.5.
Page 17 of 39
21. In the written synopsis filed, it has been stated that some action has
been taken against some erring officials of Cochin Corporation and
the former Chairman of the KCZMA/appellant, and vigilance cases
are pending. It is admitted that a vigilance case is pending against the
Chief Secretary who addressed the communication dated 10.12.2014,
though not in respect of the project in question.
22. In order to establish that the action was not restricted to the project in
question, actions taken against other violators also sought to be set up.
23. KCZMA/appellant sub-committee report of 31.8.2010 giving in
principle approval/recommendation to the project and recommending
imposition of fine is stated to be based on CESS report of May, 2005,
which was based on HTL, which was subsequently found on
superimposition, to involve land reclamation and resulted in a three
member committee report dated 21.7.2014.
24. Learned senior counsel also referred to a catena of judgments to
advance the proposition that in the ‘no development zone’ there could
not be permissions granted and that this Court has frowned upon the
practice of regularisation of unauthorised construction where
environment issues are involved.
Page 18 of 39
Stand of the Cochin Municipal Corporation:
25. The Corporation has largely confined itself to the issue of FAR
sanction of 1.99. It is stated that the maximum FAR of the
Corporation of Cochin is 2.5 as clarified by MoEF. In the Kerala
Building Rules, 1999, the maximum FAR of 1.5 was extended to 2.5
FAR, which continued till 22.2.2001 when Rule 31 was amended and
maximum FAR was increased to 3.00 extendable on payment of
additional fee to 4.00.
26. The building permit in question was issued on 22.10.2007, when the
maximum FAR for central city of Kochi was reduced to 2. It was in
these circumstances that the FAR of 1.99 was made available.
Stand of the State of Kerala:
27. The State of Kerala has more or less supported the stand of KCZMA
but in the course of arguments it does appear that one aspect which
had really troubled it was the directions whereby the Collector was
sought to be made responsible for the management of Rs.1 crore fine
to be deposited as also the feasibility of utilising the same.
Stand of the Ministry of Environment and Forests:
Page 19 of 39
28. The Ministry of Environment and Forests has indulged in a complete
flip-flop-flip in its affidavit without even explaining the reasons for
the same. The original affidavit was filed before the High Court on
19.5.2016 by one Dr. S.K. Susarla, Advisor with the Ministry. The
affidavit records that the Ministry was made a party to the
proceedings by the orders of the Court in the writ proceedings. The
affidavit states that based on the recommendations of the KCZMA,
SEIAA, Kerala, it was found that the project came under category ‘B’
and the project proponents adhered to the conditions laid down and
the construction is in order. The relevant paras 19 & 20 are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“19. That the project proponents have adhered to the conditions
laid down by the SEIAA and have not violated any of the
provisions.
20. That the said constructions are technically as per the
provisions of the CRZ Notifications 1991 and EIA Notifications
2006.”
29. In the present proceedings also an affidavit dated 6.11.2017 is
available, which affirms that SEIAA, Kerala was in place in 2013 and
the project was a category ‘B’ project as per EIA notification of 2006,
the appraisal was to be done at the State level by the SEIAA. The
Page 20 of 39
averments in para 17 are as under:
“17. It is submitted that SEIAAs/SEACs comprises of members
who are well qualified and have requisite expertise in various
sectors to examine, appraise the projects and recommend them for
grant of Environmental Clearance imposing all suitable
environmental conditions to ensure sustainable environmental
management. The consideration of such projects at SEIAA/SEAC
level is to decentralise the powers confined to the Union
Government and to streamline and expedite the process of grant of
Environmental Clearance to building construction projects in view
of the growing demand of housing to all.”
30. On the conclusion of the hearing, when crystallised written synopsis
had to be filed, an affidavit is sought to be slipped in by one Mr.
Ritesh Kumar Singh, Joint Secretary of the MoEF, stating that this
affidavit is in “continuation” of the earlier affidavit dated 6.11.2017
filed on 7.11.2017. For the first time, it is sought to be now pleaded
that CRZ Notification, 1991, CRZ Notification, 2011 and EIA
Notification, 2006 have been violated and that prior clearance under
the Notifications before the commencement of construction activity
was mandatory. It is also sought to be alleged that reclaimed water
bodies and land falling under CRZ for housing projects is prohibited
under CRZ Notification. The post construction environment
clearance is stated to have been granted to the project by SEIAA
without appraisal and recommendations of SEAC and in the absence
Page 21 of 39
of approval of KCZMA. This affidavit runs into 31 paragraphs with
annexures.
31. We fail to appreciate the contradictory stands of the authority and the
endeavour to set up a different case after the conclusion of the
hearing. Such conduct is unacceptable.
DLF’s stand:
32. DLF has sought to emphasise that while an entrepreneur is obliged to
obtain all the requisite permissions, there is also a corresponding
obligation on the Regulatory Authorities to facilitate informed
decisions and compliances by the entrepreneur. DLF is stated to have
obtained all the requisite permissions for construction of the site from
various authorities including the Municipal Authorities. The issue
pertains only to the environment clearance and the CRZ on which
aspects there have been varying stands by different authorities and
also changing stands of the same authority.
33. The allegation of reclamation of land in 2005-2006 and 2009-2011 is
strongly rebutted. It is pointed out that since there are registered sale
deed documents of land, assuming without admitting, that there is any
Page 22 of 39
reclamation, DLF had no role to play in the same as the transactions
took place in 2006. The Revenue Authority would certainly know
what is the nature of the area, i.e., whether it is land or not. Linked to
this issue, it is pointed out, that the Coastal Regulation Zone Land
Use Map No.34A prepared in 1996, which had been received by DLF
under RTI directly from CESS clearly mentions the nature of the
property. The filtrations ponds are marked as ‘FP’. There is no such
FP marked in the area where DLF has constructed. The finding by the
Court below is, thus, assailed as contrary to record.
34. The aforesaid fact is sought to be buttressed by a reference to a recital
in the sale deeds where the district, sub-districts, taluk, village, kara,
firka, tenure and survey numbers are all mentioned. Thus, the land
certainly existed at the time of purchase. Not only that the sale deed
dated 20.10.2006 mentions the boundary of the land with building
Nos.CC 29/288 in Item No.7 and 29/201 in item No.9, thereby
suggesting that a part of the land had housed two buildings.
35. Insofar as the Google maps images of February, 2005 and December,
2005 are concerned, it is sought to be denied that the dark area in the
images is a water body as is sought to be made out by the KCZMA.
Page 23 of 39
In this behalf a reference has been made to the Google map of
September, 2002 not suggesting any water body. The report of the
Institute of Remote Sensing, where a closer study of Google map of
February, 2005, through the process of separate enlargement would
show that the embankment is well protected without any change that
there was a large massof stagnant water in the property, which has
shallow depth as vegetation below the water, could easily be noticed.
This is not stated to have any permanent link with the back water of
the Chillavannur canal. The Google map of 26.12.2005 was also
enlarged by the Institute of Remote Sensing and the entire
Chillavannur lake is seen to have green patches of Colocasia trees
surviving in low salinity. The property is stated to have lush and thick
vegetation and coconut trees in the middle, western, and southern side
of the property and the Google map clearly distinguishes the geo
morphology of the land which is totally different from the
Chillavannur canal and confirms the well marked boundary line with
the water body in the Chillavannur canal.
36. The December, 2012 map is stated to show thick vegetation with no
mark of water body and the coastal line abutting Chillavannur canal is
Page 24 of 39
well defined and marked. It is also pointed out that the CESS in its
report of May, 2009 published the coastal regulation zone status
report for an apartment complex as Vytilla, Cochi and the photograph
of the front page itself shows that the land in question before the
construction in May, 2009 next to Choice Garden is full of coconut
trees thereby suggesting that in May, 2009, it was clearly not a water
body. Such coconut trees could not have come up overnight as they
have a gestation period of 10-15 years.
37. The development arising from the successive CESS report is sought to
be analysed and it is alleged that Mr. K.V. Thomas was a party to
these reports. The reports were with KCZMA and, thus, there could
not be any issue of replacement of photographs. The photograph on
the front cover of the report also shows the coconut trees on the
property. The CESS report prepared by the same Mr. Thomas and
others in 2009 marks the drain in red colour and describes it as
inter-tidal zone falling under CRZ-I(ii). In the 2010 report to which
Mr. Joseph is a party while referring to the HTL, the canal is referred
to as a drainage canal and, thus, the requirement of imaginary line not
to cut across the water body would not be invoked. In another report
Page 25 of 39
in January, 2011, Mr. Thomas gave recommendations by naming
various projects, which had committed CRZ violations on the banks
of Chillavannur lake, which had committed violations by either
constructing on a reclaimed filtration pond or backwater side of
authorised buildings and respondent No.1 project was not named in
the same. Thus, right till February, 2011 at least, it is submitted, that
in the opinion of the KCZMA/appellant, DLF was stated to be in
compliance of all statutory provisions.
38. DLF draws strength from the fact that only part of the area was found
to be in CRZ-II, municipal authorities granted approvals and that no
statutory provisions in 1991 Notification or of September, 2006, made
prior CRZ approval before commencement of construction
mandatory. Once KCZMA itself recommended the proposal to MoEF,
it was submitted by respondent No.1 that there was no impediment in
the way of proceeding further with the project and there was really no
occasion for the CESS to revisit the issue.
39. It has been sought to be emphasised by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior
counsel on behalf of DLF that no explanation was sought from DLF
Page 26 of 39
in respect of the observations of September, 2011. The 2012 report
was also never put to the DLF. Why these aspects were not so put is
unexplained.
40. Learned senior counsel sought to emphasise that the churning and the
rigmarole ultimately did produce a clearance of the project at least on
11.12.2013 and it was only after construction was complete, the
different aspects were triggered off at the behest of Mr. Antony, who
had seen the whole project develop near his property as alleged
without raising a finger on the issue over a number years. The FSI
position stands explained by the Corporation. Lastly, however, it was
conceded that though the fine was uncalled for, DLF has not sought
overturning of the fine as it did not file an appeal against the
impugned order.
Conclusion:
41. We commenced this order pointing out the sleeping role of the
authorities which developed into contradictory claims by different
authorities over factual issues and finally even by the same authority,
like MoEF taking contradictory stands, even trying to slip in a further
additional stand after conclusion of hearing. It is a matter of concern
Page 27 of 39
to us that authorities have not performed their task with promptitude,
not realising the importance of the role they play including
KCZMA/appellant.
42. We would like to deal with this matter on two planes – one is the
general plane; and the other is in the given facts of the case.
43. It is trite to say that the importance of environment and ecological
balance requires the enforcement of various Regulations, Rules and
enactments to be strictly followed. Specialised bodies like the
KCZMA/appellant have been created to deal with the CRZ
Regulations for greater sensitivity. It is, thus, no answer to say that it
does not have an enforcement mechanism and thus, cannot act.
44. The case law, which Mr. Shyam Divan took us through itself brings
forth the importance of compliances.
45. In Anil Hoble v. Kashinath Jairam Shetye1
, it was held that any
illegal structure falling within the ‘No Development Zone’ (200 mtrs.
from the HTL) in a CRZ III area was directed to be demolished and
even the permission granted by the Coastal Zone Management
Authority was of no avail. Similarly, the practice of regularising
1 (2016) 10 SCC 701
Page 28 of 39
unauthorised constructions effected by erring buildings in violation of
law has not found approval from this Court and humanitarian and
equitable grounds found no place in the same. In Union Territory of
Lakshadweep v. Seashells Beach Resort2
, it has been observed as
under:
“30. The High Court’s order proceeds entirely onhumanitarian and
equitable considerations, in the process neglecting equally, if
notmore,important questions that have an impact on the future
development and management of theLakshadweep Islands. We are
not, therefore, satisfied with the manner in which the High
Courthas proceeded in the matter.
31. The High Court obviously failed to appreciate that
equitableconsiderations were wholly misplaced in a situation
where the very erection of the building to beused as a resort
violated the CRZ requirements or the conditions of land use
diversion. No onecould in the teeth of those requirements claim
equity or present the administration with a faitaccompli. The
resort could not be commissioned under a judicial order in
disregard of seriousobjections that were raised by the
Administration, which objections had to be answered beforeany
direction could issue from a writ Court.”
46. To the aforesaid extent are also the observations in Esha Ekta
Apartments Cooperative Housing Society v. Municipal Corporation
of Mumbai3
.
47. In Piedade Filomena Gonsalves v. State of Goa4
, it has been
2 (2012) 6 SCC 136
3 (2013) 5 SCC 257
4 (2004) 3 SCC 445
Page 29 of 39
observed as under:
“5. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the writ
petition, the appellant had moved two applications, one of which
is dated 11.7.1995, for the purpose of regularisation of the
construction in question. The Goa State Coastal Committee for
Environment, the then competent body constituted a
sub-committee which inspected the site and found that the entire
construction raised by the appellant fell within 200 metres of HTL
and the construction had been carried out on existing sand dunes.
The Goa State Coastal Committee for Environment, in its meeting
dated 20.10.1995, took a decision inter alia holding that the entire
construction put up by the appellant was in violation of the
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification.
6. The Coastal Regulation Zone Notifications have been issued in
the interest of protecting environment and ecology in the coastal
area. Construction raised in violation of such regulations cannot
be lightly condoned. We do not think that the appellant is entitled
to any relief. No fault can be found with the view taken by the
High Court in its impugned judgment.”
48. We are of the view that if the allegation of large scale violations by
DLF were to be correct there would be no alternative but to bring
down the structure. The moot point, however, remains is as to what is
the correct analysis of the factual position in the case.
49. We would also like to emphasise that there has to be undoubtedly
greater clarity on the processes and a better understanding between
various authorities so that developers are not left in the lurch –
violators have to be punished but it cannot be that the authorities
continue to do a flip-flop-flip putting the large investments at stake in
Page 30 of 39
a jeopardy. This is what appears to have happened in the present case.
50. We also make it clear that in the future, wherever permissions are
required to come and are to be obtained before commencement of
construction, it would be no answer that activity can be carried on
without obtaining the permissions. Simultaneously, the permissions
itself are envisaged in a time bound schedule and not through
improvement of cases by authorities running into years. Thus, from
the inception itself, there should be clarity on what is permissible and
what is not.
51. In the aforesaid conspectus, if the present project is seen, there is
really no question mark over the various permissions to carry on
construction having been obtained by DLF. The land was purchased
through sale deeds and the sale deeds specified the nature of the area.
It would, thus, be no answer to state that even the Revenue authorities
are oblivious to what is the nature of the land. DLF, thus, purchased
the land legally and obtained requisite permissions including qua the
FAR, which aspect stands explained by the Corporation as to why it is
not 1.50 as alleged by KCZMA/appellant nor 2.5 as is alleged by DLF
but in the given case was taken as 2 and that is why 1.99 FAR was
Page 31 of 39
permitted so that there is no doubt about the legality of the FAR
granted. We may not delve further on this aspect as the crucial
question is relating to the environment clearance and the clearance
required for the CRZ area.
52. The possibility of some area being CRZ-I area had given rise to the
observations by the CEAC in its 63rd meeting on 16-18.8.2008 for the
project to take CRZ clearance as well while granting environmental
clearance. Thus, the environmental clearance was also granted and
the aspect which remained was relating to the CRZ area.
53. There are stated to be notified authorities numbering seven at that
stage, who would prepare reports for analysis by the
KCZMA/appellant and one such notified agency was CESS. The
CESS did give a report in May, 2009 categorically stating that there
was no CRZ-I (i) land in project area or close to it but it was situated
in CRZ-II. The well developed, constructed area in the large expanse
around the property in question, also stood enumerated in that report.
54. The fault of DLF was that it should have stayed its hand till CRZ
permission had also been obtained but the fact remains that on
account of delay in the same it was perceived as a deemed permission
Page 32 of 39
case – rightly or wrongly. The construction in between was also
stopped but the appellant itself decided to recommend the project
proposal to MoEF on 20.3.2010 on the basis that the narrow canal was
a drainage canal. If there was any doubt about the same, it should
have been settled at that stage itself. The sub-committee appointed by
the appellant also categorically observed that the narrow canal was a
drainage canal but recommended a fine being imposed for not
obtaining prior approval/clearance. Really speaking the matter should
have ended with that, with a quantification of the fine to be imposed.
55. As to why after the initial report of CESS of May, 2009, should
CESS,after two years be again asked to visit at the request of the
appellant is not really understood. In the meantime most of the
construction was apparently done. The complaints made by Mr.
Antony started playing a role from 2012, a person who, also for
reasons best known to him, decided to knock at the doors of the
authority and the Court when most of the project was over.
Interestingly CESS, once again, visited based on recommendation of
the appellant in November, 2012 at the same time when Mr. Antony
filed the petition.
56. In our view it is undoubtedly the specialised authorities who have to
Page 33 of 39
carry out the task, but with promptitude. Their lackadaisical attitude
has permitted DLF to raise the issue of a deemed environment
clearance by virtue of Clause 8(3) of the EIA Notification of 2006,
which has already been extracted hereinabove. While the
environment clearance was applied on 27.11.2007, the integrated
clearance was granted on 11.12.2013 after six years, while by 2012,
the project stood completed.
57. Insofar as the nature of the area is concerned, we have given due
weightage to the revenue records, which are reflected in the sale deeds
executed. Some of the aspects which have weighed with the Courts
below do not find favour with us. The reason is that the alleged
violations have not emerged with clarity.
58. The Coastal Regulation Zone land use map 34A produced before us
by DLF and as explained by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel
shows that wherever filtration ponds existed they were so recorded.
In 1995-96 much prior to the year 2000 no such filtration ponds are
recorded in the area constructed upon. Therefore, the findings to the
contrary cannot be sustained. There could not have been a
reclamation of the filtration pond by DLF.
59. In the course of arguments, Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel
Page 34 of 39
has sought to rely upon the Google images of February, 2005 and
December, 2005 to suggest that there has been obviously large scale
reclamation. On behalf of DLF, Mr. Sibal has been able to throw
grave doubts over reliance of such Google images for the purposes of
coming to the conclusion that the dark area in the image is a water
body apart from the fact that in the sale deed dated 20.10.2006 it is
not so mentioned as per the revenue record. The Google images
produced on behalf of DLF show that in September, 2003 there was
no suggestion of a water body. DLF has also taken the assistance of a
report of the Institute of Remote Sensing in respect of two Google
images relied upon by the appellant to substantiate its case and
explain that there was a large mass of stagnant water in the property
of shallow depth with vegetation below the water visible. This water
appears not to have any permanent link with the backwater of the
Chillannavur canal. The existence of the coconut trees is another
aspect which throws doubt on the submissions made on behalf of the
appellant.
60. As noticed above, if the appellant had acted with promptitude at the
relevant time, we are sure that the correct picture would have been
Page 35 of 39
available whether for or against.
61. On behalf of CESS also there have been meanderings and
contradictions in the approach, even though Mr. K.V. Thomas was
party to all of them. In the context of the drain, in the 2009 report it is
clearly stated to be an inter tidal zone falling under CRZ 1(ii). The
report has been prepared after inspection. The HTL from the Choice
Garden building was found cutting the canal, which was labelled as a
drainage canal and thus, was not cutting a water body. It is not
understood how the contradictions arose subsequently in the 2011 and
2012 reports.
62. The approach of MoEF also appears to be strange and a complete
contradiction between what was stated before the High Court, before
us three weeks before the conclusion of hearing and then the
endeavour to slip in an additional affidavit post conclusion of hearing.
63. The CEAC in 2008 itself had suggested that the CRZ Committee may
examine the proposal which was so done. This was discussed with
the appellant and further requisite information was also sought. The
report from the CESS was obtained in May, 2009 and only a part of
the project area was found in CRZ II category. After going through
all the procedural requirements, the appellant made a recommendation
Page 36 of 39
on 31.8.2010 that the construction falls in CRZ II areas and the
narrow canal was not an impediment to the construction. The
appellant itself decided to recommend the proposal to the MoEF.
64. It is the own wisdom of the MoEF that with the establishment of
SEIAA the whole file should be forwarded to it and this was sought to
be justified on the basis of the experts available with SEIAA. What
weighs with us most is that post transfer of the file on 11.12.2013, the
proposal was cleared by SEIAA, being the final authority, and that has
never been withdrawn or cancelled or challenged. This clearance was
post a show cause notice seeking explanation from DLF and on
explanation being offered, was issued. Now for the authorities to say
otherwise or contradict themselves would not be fair to DLF and
would cause grave uncertainty if such an approach was to be
permitted.
65. We are, thus, not in agreement with the findings of the Courts below
on the violations alleged against DLF except to the extent that there is
a question mark on the issue of not having obtained prior clearance
and proceeding on the basis of a deemed clearance, which aspect, at
least for the future we have clarified that whatever be the manner in
which Clause 8(3) of Notification of 2006 is worded, it should imply
Page 37 of 39
henceforth a prior clearance and necessary clarifications should be
issued by the concerned authorities in a time bound manner to obviate
such situations to arise in the future. We feel that the direction
contained in the impugned order to deposit Rs.1 crore (stated to be
already deposited) can be treated as a fine for the said purpose.
66. We are also of the view that the operative directions against the
Collector of the State Government to monitor and do this task would
be non-workable and it is appropriate that this amount is transferred to
the KCZMA/appellant for purposes of better enforcement and
development of CRZ area.
67. In conclusion we set aside the findings of the impugned order while
sustaining the fine of Rs.1 crore with the direction for strict adherence
to the norms in future and avoidance of such contradictions by the
authorities. We also feel it appropriate that in view of the professed
policy to have more single window clearance, the methodology of
such processing of such applications should be endeavoured to be
simplified so that there is less uncertainty and better enforcement.
The same may be done within a period three months from the receipt
of the copy of the order.
68. The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. The parties are
Page 38 of 39
left to bear their own costs.
..........….….…………………….J.
 (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
 ...….....…………………………J.
 (SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)
New Delhi.
January 10, 2018.
Page 39 of 39

This Court in Kanshi Ram vs. Om Prakash Jawal and others, 1996 (4) SCC 593, has again in context of suit for specific performance of the contract held that granting decree for specific performance of contract is one of the discretion to be exercised on sound principles. When the court gets into equity jurisdiction, it would be guided by justice, equity, good conscience and fairness to both the parties. - we are of the view that ends of justice be served in awarding compensation of Rs.10 lakh in favour of the plaintiff­appellants out of the compensation received consequent to the acquisition of the suit land. The rest of the compensation, if any, received towards land and shops in question has to be paid to the land owner that is defendant Nos.1 to 5 (respondent Nos.2 to 6 to this appeal) after deducting an amount of Rs.10 lakh out of the said compensation. We further direct in event compensation has not yet been disbursed, the compensation be disbursed to the appellants (legal heirs of the plaintiff) and respondent Nos.2 to 6 in the above manner and in the event the compensation has been received by defendant No.6 (respondent No.1), respondent No.1 shall return the compensation to the extent of Rs.10 lakh to the appellants and the rest of the amount to defendant Nos.1 to 5 (respondent Nos.2 to 6). - URMILA DEVI AND OTHERS    ... APPELLANTS VERSUS THE DEITY, MANDIR SHREE CHAMUNDA DEVI, THROUGH TEMPLE COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS    ... RESPONDENTS

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 462 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No.25771 of 2013)
URMILA DEVI AND OTHERS    ... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE DEITY, MANDIR SHREE CHAMUNDA DEVI,
THROUGH TEMPLE COMMISSIONER AND
OTHERS    ... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   has   been   filed   by   the   plaintiff
through   legal   heirs   questioning   the   judgment   of   the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Regular Second Appeal
No.117   of   2002   which   appeal   was   filed   by   respondent
No.1 (defendant No.6 in the suit). The High Court by
the   impugned   judgment   has   modified   the   decree   of
specific performance of contract granted by two courts
2
below into a decree ordering respondent Nos.2 to 6 to
pay a sum of Rs.90,000/­ with interest @ 9% per annum
from the date of filing of the suit.
3. The brief facts of the case which are necessary to
notice for deciding the appeal are:
Respondent   Nos.2   to   6   executed   an   agreement   to
sell dated 19.04.1989 in favour of of Krishan Lal, the
predecessor­in­interest of the appellants for sale of
their 5/16th  share in Khasra Nos.430 and 431 equal to
0­22­57   hectares   for   consideration   of   Rs.90,000/­.
Respondent   Nos.2   to   6   received   full   consideration   of
Rs.90,000/­   and   handed   over   possession   to   the
plaintiff.   The   plaintiff   after   getting   possession
constructed   three   shops   in   the   suit   land.   Respondent
Nos.2 to 6 executed a gift deed in favour of respondent
No.1 of the suit land on 08.07.1991. When in spite of
respondents   having   received   the   entire   sale
consideration the sale deed was not executed and  with
mala   fide  intention   the   gift   deed   was   executed   in
favour  of respondent No.1. Civil Suit No.148 of 1991
was filed by Krishan Lal. Written statements were filed
3
by  defendant  Nos.1  to 5 jointly and separate  written
statement was filed by defendant No.6 who is respondent
No.1   in   the   present   appeal.   It   was   admitted   to   all
defendants that the suit land has been gifted in favour
of  defendant  No.6 by  gift deed dated 08.07.1991.  The
execution of agreement to sell was not disputed and the
receipt   of   total   sale   consideration   was   also   not
denied.   The   trial   court   decreed   the   suit   vide   its
judgment   and   order   dated   31.03.1999.   The   trial   court
declared that gift deed executed by defendant Nos.1 to
5 in favour of  defendant No.6 is null and void to the
extent they relate to the doner's 5/16th  share in the
suit land that was agreed to be sold by them to the
plaintiff, decree of specific performance was granted
in favour of the plaintiff against defendant Nos.1 to
5. The appeal was filed by defendant No.6 only against
the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   which   was   also
dismissed   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   vide   its
judgment   dated   17.12.2001.   Defendant   No.6   filed
Regular   Second   Appeal   in   the   High   Court   being   RSA
No.117 of 2002. During pendency of the second appeal in
4
the High Court notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition   Act   dated   22.12.2005   was   issued   for
acquisition of suit land. An award dated 10.06.2008 was
also given for the land as well as three shops which
were   constructed   in   the   suit   land.   The   name   of
defendant   No.6   being   recorded   in   the   Revenue   records
compensation was awarded in favour of defendant No.6.
4. Before the High Court a submission was raised on
behalf   of   defendant   No.6   that   the   land   has   been
acquired during the pendency of Regular Second Appeal,
the   decree   of   the   specific   performance   cannot   be
maintained.     The   High   Court   agreeing   with   the
submission   of   defendant   No.6   modified   the   decree   by
ordering   respondent   Nos.2   to   6   to   pay   a   sum   of
Rs.90,000/­   to   the   plaintiff   with   interest   @   9%   per
annum   from   the   date   of   filing   of   the   suit.   The
plaintiff   through   legal   heirs   aggrieved   by   the   said
judgment has come up in this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of
the appeal contends that the High Court erred in law in
5
ordering   the   refund   of   Rs.90,000/­   in   favour   of
plaintiff   whereas   the   plaintiff(appellants)   was
entitled to receive the amount of compensation of land
which was received by defendant No.6 consequent to the
acquisition of land. Defendant No.6 had no right in the
land   in   dispute   as   the   gift   deed   had   been   declared
null and  void.  It was the plaintiff (appellants)  who
was   entitled   to   receive   the   compensation.   The   High
Court   having   not   interfered   with   the   finding   of   the
courts   below   that   gift   deed   was   void   as   well   as
plaintiff   was   entitled   for   decree   of   specific
performance   of   the   contract,   it   was   plaintiff
(appellants)  who was entitled to receive compensation
consequent to the acquisition of the suit land.
6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 to
6 supports the judgment and decree of the High Court
and   he,   however,   does   not   dispute   that   judgment   and
decree   of   the   Courts   below   declaring   the   gift   deed
dated   08.07.1991   as   void   having   not   been   interfered
with, the defendant No.6 has no right in the suit land.
Learned   counsel   for   respondent   Nos.2   to   6,   however,
6
submits that compensation determined consequent to the
land   acquisition   be   appropriated   equally   between   the
plaintiff as well as defendant Nos.1 to 5.
7. No one has appeared on behalf of respondent No.1
(defendant No.6).
8.  We have considered the submissions of the parties
and perused the records.
9. From   the   facts   and   material   on   record,   it   is
undisputed   that   agreement   to   sell   was   executed   by
defendant   Nos.1   t   5   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   and
entire sale consideration of Rs.90,000/­ was received
and possession was delivered in the year 1989 itself.
Plaintiff   constructed   three   shops   on   the   suit   land.
Plaintiff's   case   that   to   defeat   the   rights   of   the
plaintiff a gift deed dated 08.07.1991 was executed by
defendant Nos.1 to 5 in favour of defendant No.6 has
been accepted by courts below which have declared the
gift   deed   as   null   and   void.   The   decree   for   specific
performance   was   granted   by   the   trial   court,
it   was   confirmed     by     the     First     Appellate
Court.   The   suit   land   was   acquired   and
7
compensation was determined in favour of defendant No.6
whose   name   was   recorded   in   the   Revenue   records.   No
objection can be taken to the view of the High Court
that consequent of the acquisition of suit land under
the   land   acquisition   proceedings   decree   of   specific
performance   granted   in   favour   of   plaintiff   could   not
have been maintained.
10. The limited question which needs to be answered in
the   present   appeal   is   as   to   what   relief   the
(plaintiff)appellants   were   entitled   in   the   event   the
decree   of   specific   performance   was   required   to   be
modified by an alternate decree.
11. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act empowers the
Court to award compensation in certain cases. Section
21 of the Specific Relief Act is as follows:
“21.   Power   to   award   compensation   in   certain
cases.—
(1) In a suit for specific performance of a
contract,   the   plaintiff   may   also   claim
compensation   for   its   breach,   either   in
addition   to,   or   in   substitution   of,   such
performance.
(2) If, in any such suit, the court decides
that   specific   performance   ought   not   to   be
granted, but that there is a contract between
8
the   parties   which   has   been   broken   by   the
defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled
to   compensation   for   that   breach,   it   shall
award him such compensation accordingly.
(3) If, in any such suit, the court decides
that   specific   performance   ought   to   be
granted,   but   that   it   is   not   sufficient   to
satisfy   the   justice   of   the   case,   and   that
some compensation for breach of the contract
should   also   be   made   to   the   plaintiff,   it
shall   award   him   such   compensation
accordingly.
(4)   In   determining   the   amount   of   any
compensation awarded under this section, the
court   shall   be   guided   by   the   principles
specified   in   section   73   of   the   Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(5)   No   compensation   shall   be   awarded   under
this section unless the plaintiff has claimed
such compensation in his plaint:
Provided that where the plaintiff has not
claimed any such compensation in the plaint,
the   court   shall,   at   any   stage   of   the
proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on
such   terms   as   may   be   just,   for   including   a
claim for such compensation.
Explanation.—The   circumstances   that   the
contract   has   become   incapable   of   specific
performance does not preclude the court from
exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this
section.”
12. This Court had occasion to consider Section 21 of
the   Specific   Relief   Act   in   context   of   a   case   which
9
arose   almost   on   similar   facts   in  Jagdish   Singh   vs.
Nathu Singh, 1992 (1) SCC 647.  In the above case also
suit was filed for specific performance on the basis of
a   contract   to   sell   dated   July   3,   1973,   the   suit  was
dismissed by the trial court as well as First Appellate
Court.   However,   the   High   Court   in   second   appeal
reversed the finding of the courts below and held that
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the contract
and was entitled for   decree. In the above case also
during   the   pendency   of   the   second   appeal   before   the
High Court, proceedings for compulsory acquisition of
the   land   was   initiated   and   the   land   was   acquired.
Question arose as to whether plaintiff was entitled for
the   amount   of   compensation   received   in   the   land
acquisition   proceedings   or   was   entitled   only   to   the
refund   of   the   earnest   money.   The   High   Court   in   the
above   case   has   modified   the   decree   of   the   specific
performance   of   the   contract   with   decree   for   a
realisation   of   compensation   payable   in   lieu   of
acquisition.   In   paragraph   13   of   the   judgment   the
directions of the High Court were extracted   which is
10
to the following effect:
“13.  The   High   Court   issued   these
consequential directions:
“If   the   decree   for   specific
performance of contract in question is
found incapable of being executed due
to   acquisition   of   subject   land,   the
decree   shall   stand   suitably
substituted   by   a   decree   for
realisation of compensation payable in
lieu   thereof   as   may   be   or   have   been
determined under the relevant Act and
the   plaintiff   shall   have   a   right   to
recover   such   compensation   together
with   solatium   and   interest   due
thereon.   The   plaintiff   shall   have   a
right to recover it from the defendant
if the defendant has already realised
these   amounts   and   in   that   event   the
defendant   shall   be   further   liable   to
pay   interest   at   the   rate   of   12   per
cent   from   the   date   of   realisation   by
him   to   the   date   of   payment   on   the
entire   amount   realised   in   respect   of
the disputed land.”
13. In   the   above   context,   this   Court   proceeded   to
examine   the   ambit   and   scope   of   Section   21   of   the
Specific   Relief   Act.   This   Court   came   to   the   opinion
that when the contract has  become impossible with no
fault of the plaintiff, Section 21 enables the Court to
award compensation in lieu of the specific performance.
11
Paragraphs 24, 29 and 30 are extracted below:
“24. When the plaintiff by his option has
made   specific   performance   impossible,
Section   21   does   not   entitle   him   to   seek
damages. That position is common to both
Section   2   of   Lord   Cairn’s   Act,   1858   and
Section   21   of   the   Specific   Relief   Act,
1963.   But   in   Indian   law   where   the
contract, for no fault of the plaintiff,
becomes impossible of performance Section
21 enables award of compensation in lieu
and substitution of specific performance.
29.  In   the   present   case   there   is   no
difficulty in assessing the quantum of the
compensation.   That   is   ascertainable   with
reference   to   the   determination   of   the
market   value   in   the   land   acquisition
proceedings. The compensation awarded may
safely   be   taken   to   be   the   measure   of
damages   subject,   of   course,   to   the
deduction therefrom of money value of the
services, time and energy expended by the
appellant   in   pursuing   the   claims   of
compensation and the expenditure incurred
by   him   in   the   litigation   culminating   in
the award.
30.  We accordingly confirm the finding of
the High Court that respondent was willing
and ready to perform the contract and that
it   was   the   appellant   who   was   in   breach.
However, in substitution of the decree for
specific performance, we make a decree for
compensation, equivalent to the amount of
the land acquisition compensation awarded
for the suit lands together with solatium
and   accrued   interest,   less   a   sum   of   Rs
1,50,000   (one   lakh   fifty   thousand   only)
12
which, by a rough and ready estimate, we
quantify as the amount to be paid to the
appellant in respect of his services, time
and money expended in pursuing the legal
claims for compensation.”
14. This Court in Kanshi Ram vs. Om Prakash Jawal and
others, 1996 (4) SCC 593, has again in context of suit
for   specific   performance   of   the   contract   held   that
granting decree for specific performance of contract is
one   of   the   discretion   to   be   exercised   on   sound
principles.   When   the   court   gets   into   equity
jurisdiction,   it   would   be   guided   by   justice,   equity,
good conscience and fairness to both the parties.
15. From materials brought on record, it does appear
compensation   was   determined     in   favour   of   defendant
No.6 to the extent of amount of Rs.10,03,743/­. It also
appears   that   compensation   towards   shops   was   also
determined. The name of defendant No.6 being recorded
in the Revenue records, compensation was determined in
its   favour.   In   view   of   the   judgment   and   decree   of
courts below whereby the gift deed dated 08.07.1991 has
13
been   declared   void,   defendant   No.6   is   left   with   no
right in the suit land and is clearly not entitled to
receive any amount consequent to the acquisition of the
suit land. It has not come on the record as to whether
compensation consequent to the acquisition of the suit
land   has   been   received   by   defendant   No.6(respondent
No.1 to the appeal) or not.
16. Taking   into   consideration   overall   facts   of   the
present case, we are of the view that ends of justice
be   served   in   awarding   compensation   of   Rs.10   lakh   in
favour   of   the   plaintiff­appellants   out   of   the
compensation received consequent to the acquisition of
the suit land. The rest of the compensation, if any,
received towards land and shops in question has to be
paid   to  the  land   owner   that  is   defendant   Nos.1   to   5
(respondent Nos.2 to 6 to this appeal) after deducting
an amount of Rs.10 lakh out of the said compensation.
We   further   direct   in   event   compensation   has   not   yet
been   disbursed,   the   compensation   be   disbursed   to   the
appellants   (legal   heirs   of   the   plaintiff)   and
14
respondent Nos.2 to 6 in the above manner and in the
event the compensation has been received by defendant
No.6   (respondent   No.1),   respondent   No.1   shall   return
the   compensation   to   the   extent   of   Rs.10   lakh   to   the
appellants   and   the   rest   of   the   amount   to   defendant
Nos.1 to 5 (respondent Nos.2 to 6). The judgment and
decree of the High Court dated 02.11.2012is modified to
the above extent.
17. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
...............................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
...............................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
JANUARY 10, 2018.

the National Anthem=(i) The Committee appointed by the Union government shall submit its recommendations to the competent authority in terms of the Notification dated 5th December, 2017, for follow up action. (ii) The order passed on 30th November, 2016, is modified to the extent that playing of the National Anthem prior to the screening of feature films in cinema halls is not mandatory, but optional or directory. (iii) Since the Committee constituted by the Union government is looking into all aspects of the matter, it shall make its recommendations uninfluenced by the interim directions of this Court, as clarified in our order dated 23rd October, 2017. Similarly, the competent authority shall in taking its decision(s) not be constrained or influenced by any of the interim directions. 24 (iv) Citizens or persons are bound to show respect as required under executive orders relating to the National Anthem of India and the prevailing law, whenever it is played or sung on specified occasions. (v) The exemption granted to disabled persons shall remain in force till the final decision of the competent authority with regard to each occasion whenever the National Anthem is played or sung.-SHYAM NARAYAN CHOUKSEY … Petitioner(s) Versus UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS … Respondent(s)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.855 OF 2016
SHYAM NARAYAN CHOUKSEY … Petitioner(s)
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI.
The petitioner, a public spirited person, has approached this
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for issue of a
writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
commanding the respondents to take appropriate steps for
inculcating in the public a proper sense for paying due respect to
the National Anthem; to issue a writ, order or direction as to what
is required to be done and not to be done when the National
Anthem is being played or sung; to specify what will constitute
disrespect and abuse of the National Anthem; and to restrain the
2
use of the National Anthem for any commercial exploitation or to
gain financial advantage in any manner.
2. Apart from the aforesaid prayers, there are many other prayers
and one such prayer includes that no one should print the National
Anthem on any undesirable object or display it in a manner and at
such places which may be disgraceful and may tantamount to
showing disrespect to the National Anthem.
3. After issue of notice, learned Attorney General for India
entered appearance. On 30th November, 2016, taking note of the
assertions made in the petition, this Court had passed an interim
order, which reads thus:-
―Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and awaiting the reply from the Union of India, as
an interim measure, it is directed that the following
directions shall be scrupulously followed:-
(a) There shall be no commercial exploitation to give
financial advantage or any kind of benefit. To
elaborate, the National Anthem should not be
utilized by which the person involved with it either
directly or indirectly shall have any commercial
benefit or any other benefit.
(b) There shall not be dramatization of the National
Anthem and it should not be included as a part of
any variety show. It is because when the National
Anthem is sung or played it is imperative on the part
3
of every one present to show due respect and
honour. To think of a dramatized exhibition of the
National Anthem is absolutely inconceivable.
(c) National Anthem or a part of it shall not be
printed on any object and also never be displayed in
such a manner at such places which 3 may be
disgraceful to its status and tantamount to
disrespect. It is because when the National Anthem
is sung, the concept of protocol associated with it
has its inherent roots in National identity, National
integrity and Constitutional Patriotism.
(d) All the cinema halls in India shall play the
National Anthem before the feature film starts and
all present in the hall are obliged to stand up to
show respect to the National Anthem.
(e) Prior to the National Anthem is played or sung in
the cinema hall on the screen, the entry and exit
doors shall remain closed so that no one can create
any kind of disturbance which will amount to
disrespect to the National Anthem. After the
National Anthem is played or sung, the doors can be
opened.
(f) When the National Anthem shall be played in the
Cinema Halls, it shall be with the National Flag on
the screen.
(g) The abridge version of the National Anthem made
by any one for whatever reason shall not be played
or displayed.‖
4. After issuing the directions, this Court noted the submissions
of the learned Attorney General which were to the following effect:-
4
―We have so directed as Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned
Attorney General for India submits with all humility
at his command and recommend that National
Anthem has to be respected. The directions are
issued, for love and respect for the motherland is
reflected when one shows respect to the National 4
Anthem as well as to the National Flag. That apart,
it would instill the feeling within one, a sense
committed patriotism and nationalism.‖
5. Thereafter, as the factual matrix would unfurl, two
applications were filed seeking impleadment and recall of the
interim order. They were taken up on 9th December, 2016, and on
that day, the prayer for impleadment was allowed, but as far as the
application for recall was concerned, the Court passed the following
order:-
―As far as the recall of the order is concerned, the
same has to be heard on merits when the matter is
finally debated upon. Be it noted, Mr. Dinesh,
learned counsel for the applicant at the time of
mentioning had submitted that there has to be some
kind of exemption for the physically challenged
persons or physically handicapped persons. Mr.
Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel who was
present in Court has referred to the Persons with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.
Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for
India submitted that how the physically challenged
or physically handicapped persons shall show
respect to the National Anthem, the Central
Government will issue guidelines within ten days
5
hence. As the guidelines are going to be issued, we
clarify, if a physically challenged person or physically
handicapped person goes to the Cinema hall to
watch a film, he need not stand up, if he is incapable
to stand, but must show such conduct which is
commensurate with respect for the National Anthem.
When we say physically challenged or physically 3
handicapped persons, it means persons with
disability as defined under Sections 2(i) and 2(t) of
the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act,
1995. Another aspect needs to be cleared. When we
said that the doors shall be closed, we did not mean
that the doors shall be bolted as mentioned in the
case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi vs.
Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association and Ors. [(2011)
14 SCC 481] but only to regulate the ingress and
egress during the period while the National Anthem
is played.‖
6. On the next date of hearing i.e. 14th February, 2017, certain
interlocutory applications were filed, which related to the difficulties
faced by the disabled persons. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior
counsel, who was appointed as the friend of the Court, had
highlighted certain aspects and taking note of the same, the
following order was passed:-
―Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned amicus curiae,
submitted that it may be clarified that the people are
not expected to stand when the National Anthem is
sung or played as a part of the storyline in the
feature film or as a part of the newsreel or the
documentary. Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General
6
accepted the said suggestion.
In view of the aforesaid, it is clarified that when
the National Anthem is sung or played in the
storyline of a feature film or par of the newsreel or
documentary, apart from what has been stated in
the order dated 30.11.2016, the audience need not
stand.
At this juncture, we may state that the
Parliament has brought a new legislation called 'The
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.
Section 102 repeals 'The Persons with Disabilities
(Equal Opportunity Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 1995. This Court on 9.12.2016
has modified the earlier order regard being had to
the handicapped persons keeping in view the 1995
Act. On a query being made, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,
learned Attorney General for India submitted that
the Union of India shall issue an appropriate
notification/guidelines in view of the language
employed in the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Act, 2016. The said notification/guidelines may be
issued within a week hence.
Mr. Subhash Chandran, learned counsel
submits that he may be permitted to file an
application for intervention on behalf of the National
Platform for the Rights of the Disabled. He is at
liberty to file the application.‖
7. On 18th April, 2017, dealing with I.A. No.15 of 2017, which
also related to disabled persons, certain modifications were made.
The said order is as follows:-
―This is an application filed by the NPRD to direct
7
the respondent No.1 to exempt certain categories of
disabled persons from the purview of the order of
this Court dated 30th November, 2016 and 9th
December, 2016. The categories of persons
mentioned are:-
(i) Wheel chair users – can be cerebral palsy,
Parkinsons, Multiple sclerosis, Muscular dystrophy
or other conditions
(ii) Those with autism
(iii) Those with cerebral palsy
(iv) Intellectual disabilities
(v) Mental illness
(vi) Deaf blind
(vii) Multiple disabilities
(viii) Parkinsons, Multiple sclerosis
(ix) Leprosy cured
(x) Muscular dystrophy
Having heard learned counsel for the
parties, we are inclined to modify the orders and
direct that the persons who are wheel chair users,
those with autism, persons suffering from cerebral
palsy, multiple disabilities, parkinsons, multiple
sclerosis, leprosy cured, muscular dystrophy and
deaf and blind be treated not to be within the ambit
of the orders passed by this Court.
As far as the other categories, which we
have not referred to mentioned in the application,
are concerned, the same may be considered by the
8
Union of India.‖
8. On the previous occasion i.e. 23rd October, 2017, having heard
learned counsel for the parties and the learned Attorney General for
India, the following order came to be passed:-
―The submission of the learned Attorney General is
that because of the vast diversity in the country
based on religion, race, caste and even region, it
becomes necessary to have uniformity which should
be cultivated by playing the National Anthem so that
when people come out from the cinema halls,
instilling the belief that they are all Indians. Be that
as it may. In this context, he has referred to Article
51A(a) of the Constitution of India.
Having heard learned counsel for the
parties for some time, we think it appropriate that
the Central WP(C) 855/16 4 Government should
take a call in this regard and, if necessary, as
advised, may bring out the requisite notification or
circular or rules. When we say 'take a call', needless
to say, the discretion rests with the Central
Government. The discretion has to be exercised
without being influenced by our interim order. We
may further emphasize that the discretion may be
utilized to regulate in an inclusive manner or as the
Central Government feels fit.‖
9. In pursuance of our earlier order, an affidavit has been filed by
the Union of India. It is submitted by Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned
Attorney General that the Central Government has constituted a
9
Committee by a Notification/Order dated 5th December, 2017. We
shall refer to the same at a later stage.
10. Mr. Abhinav Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner has raised the following contentions:-
(a) The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 (for
short, ‗the 1971 Act‘) vide Section 3 only deals with prevention
of singing/playing of National Anthem, etc., but it does not
deal fully as to how the respect is to be shown and, therefore,
appropriate measures should be prescribed by law in that
regard.
(b) Article 51A(a) of the Constitution which provides that every
citizen of India is to abide by the Constitution and respect its
ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National
Anthem, warrants that every citizen or person in this country
has to show respect to the National Anthem wherever it is
played.
(c) The Preamble of the Constitution uses the word ―unity and
integrity of the Nation‖ and the said words are required to be
interpreted on a broad canvass so that honour and respect
10
due to the National Anthem are maintained.
(d) The order passed by this Court sub-serves the cause of
integrity of the Nation and, therefore, need not be recalled and
should be made absolute.
(e) The instructions issued under the heading ―Orders Relating to
the National Anthem of India‖ are executive in nature as they
relate to various aspects and are not binding and, therefore,
there has to be an appropriate law in the field and in the
absence of law, this Court may issue directions till the law is
brought covering the said aspects.
11. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General, referring to the
affidavit and the Notification/Order would contend that the
Committee constituted by the Notification shall look into every
aspect including the amendment to the 1971 Act and formulation of
further executive instructions and till then the mandatory order
passed by this Court for playing/singing of the National Anthem
before starting of feature films in cinema halls may be modified by
making it directory. The suggestion given by him is that the word
―shall‖ used in the order be substituted by ―may‖.
11
12. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted
that Article 51A of the Constitution has been brought when the
1971 Act was in force and, therefore, it has to be understood in the
said perspective. He has also submitted that Section 2 of the 1971
Act was amended vide Act 31 of 2003 with effect from 8th May,
2003, as a consequence of which, respect to the National Anthem is
a part of the statutory provision. To buttress the said submission,
he has emphasized on the language employed in Section 2 which
uses the words ―or the Constitution of India or any part thereof‖.
To have a sense of completeness, we think it appropriate to
reproduce Section 2 of the 1971 Act, which is as under:-
―2. Insult to Indian National Flag and Constitution of
India.- Whoever in any public place or in any other
place within public view burns, mutilates, defaces,
defiles, disfigures, destroys, tramples upon or
*otherwise shows disrespect to or brings into
contempt (whether by words, either spoken or
written, or by acts) the Indian National Flag or the
Constitution of India or any part thereof, shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation 1.– Comments expressing
disapprobation or criticism of the Constitution or of
the Indian National Flag or of any measures of the
Government with a view to obtain an amendment of
the Constitution of India or an alteration of the
Indian National Flag by lawful means do not
12
constitute an offence under this section.
Explanation 2.– The expression, ―Indian National
Flag‖ includes any picture, painting, drawing or
photograph, or other visible representation of the
Indian National Flag, or of any part or parts thereof,
made of any substance or represented on any
substance.
Explanation 3.– The expression ―public place‖
means any place intended for use by, or accessible
to, the public and includes any public conveyance.
Explanation 4.- The disrespect to the Indian
National flag means and includes—
(a) a gross affront or indignity offered to the Indian
National Flag; or
(b) dipping the Indian National Flag in salute to any
person or thing; or
(c) flying the Indian National Flag at half-mast
except on occasions on which the Flag is flown at
half-mast on public buildings in accordance with
the instructions issued by the Government; or
(d) using the Indian National Flag as a drapery in
any form whatsoever except in state funerals or
armed forces or other para-military forces funerals;
or
(e) using the Indian National Flag:-
(i) as a portion of costume, uniform or accessory of
any description which is worn below the waist of any
person; or
(ii) by embroidering or printing it on cushions,
handkerchiefs, napkins, undergarments or any
13
dress material; or
(f) putting any kind of inscription upon the Indian
National Flag; or
(g) using the Indian National Flag as a receptacle for
receiving, delivering or carrying anything except
flower petals before the Indian National Flag is
unfurled as part of celebrations on special occasions
including the Republic Day or the Independence
Day; or
(h) using the Indian National Flag as covering for a
statue or a monument or a speaker‘s desk or a
speaker‘s platform; or
(i) allowing the Indian National Flag to touch the
ground or the floor or trail in water intentionally; or
(j) draping the Indian National Flag over the hood,
top, and sides or back or on a vehicle, train, boat or
an aircraft or any other similar object; or
(k) using the Indian National Flag as a covering for a
building; or
(l) intentionally displaying the Indian National Flag
with the ―saffron‖ down.‖
13. It is his further submission that once the words ―or any part
thereof‖ have been used in the 1971 Act, the same is bound to be
read in consonance with Article 51A(a) of the Constitution and
hence, it presently gets ingrained as a statutory command.
14. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel, who was
14
permitted to intervene in-person, has supported the stand of the
Union of India so far as the modification of the interim order is
concerned.
15. Though Mr. Sajan Poovayya, learned senior counsel, has filed
a separate writ petition relating to some other aspect, he submitted
that the word ―secular‖ that finds place in the Preamble is meant
for integration of the diverse communities existing in India and the
said principle has been recognized in the context of the Flag Code
in the Union of India vs. Naveen Jindal and Another1. He has
drawn our attention to paragraph 27 of the judgment which we
think it seemly to reproduce:
―Then the question arises, which view is to be
accepted. National Anthem, National Flag and
National Song are secular symbols of the
nationhood. They represent the supreme collective
expression of commitment and loyalty to the nation
as well as patriotism for the Country. They are
necessary adjuncts of sovereignty being symbols
and actions associated therewith.‖
16. Emphasizing on the aforesaid passage, he would contend that
both the National Anthem and the National Flag and the National
Song being secular symbols representing the nationhood command
1
(2004) 2 SCC 510
15
desired respect. He has also drawn our attention to the statement
made by the President of the Constituent Assembly. It is as under:-
―Statement
Mr. President: There is one matter which has been
pending for discussion, namely, the question of the
National Anthem. At one time, it was thought that
the mater might be brought up before the House
and a decision taken by the House by way of a
resolution. But it has been felt that, instead of
taking a formal decision by means of resolution, it is
better if I make a statement with regard to the
National Anthem. Accordingly I make this
statement.
The composition consisting of the words
and music known as Jana Gana Mana is the
National Anthem of India, subject to such
alterations in the words as the Government may
authorise as occasion arises; and the song Vande
Mataram, which has played a historic part in the
struggle for Indian freedom, shall be honoured
equally with Jana Gana Mana and shall have equal
status with it. I hope this will satisfy the Members.‖
17. We may hasten to add that we have reproduced the same to
show the sanctity of the National Anthem and the respect it has to
be given.
18. Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
intervenor, which has filed an application for recalling the interim
order contends that in the absence of any law, this Court should
16
not have made the playing of National Anthem in cinema halls
mandatory.
19. At this juncture, Mr. P.V. Dinesh, learned counsel assisting
Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel would submit that if this
Court thinks of continuing the interim order, it may at least modify
the direction that whenever there is a film festival and more than
five to six films are exhibited in a day, the audience should be
permitted to stand only at the commencement of the first feature
film.
20. Mr. V.K. Biju, learned counsel who has intervened in the writ
petition has submitted that though the Committee has been
constituted to look into the matter from various spectrums, the
interim order should be allowed to continue.
21. Ms. Nanita Sharma, learned counsel, who is appearing for the
respondent No.4 because of the application for intervention having
been allowed, submitted that the said organization has submitted
representations to the Government and they need to be considered
as they are pending since 2014.
17
22. Mr. Sanjeev Bhatnagar, who has filed an application for
intervention, appearing in-person has submitted that there can be
no doubt that the National Anthem and the National Flag are to be
respected and every citizen is obliged to show respect, but the
cinema halls may not be the appropriate place.
23. To appreciate the submissions advanced at the Bar, it is
necessary to refer to Section 3 of the 1971 Act. It reads as under:-
―3. Prevention of singing of National Anthem, etc..-
Whoever intentionally prevents the singing of the
Indian National Anthem or causes disturbances to
any assembly engaged in such singing shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term, which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.‖
24. On a perusal of the said provision, it is clear as day that no
one can intentionally prevent the singing of the National Anthem or
cause any disturbance to an assembly engaged in such singing. It
is a penal provision. The Orders relating to the National Anthem
deal with playing of the anthem, mass singing of the anthem,
playing of foreign anthems and general provisions. Clause III(4) of
the orders reads as follows:-
―III(4). It is not possible to give an exhaustive list
of occasions on which the singing (as distinct from
18
playing) of the Anthem can be permitted. But there
is no objection to the singing of the Anthem
accompanied by mass singing so long as it is done
with due respect as a salutation to the motherland
and proper decorum is maintained.‖
25. On a careful reading of the above provision, it is clear that the
said Order states that it is not possible to give an exhaustive list of
the occasions. It further lays down that there is no objection to the
singing of the National Anthem accompanied by mass singing so
long as it is done with due respect as a salutation to the
motherland and maintenance of the proper decorum. Thus, three
aspects are obvious: First the National Anthem is not only to be
respected, but it is a respect as a salutation to the motherland;
second, the list of occasions cannot be exhaustively stated; and,
third, proper decorum has to be maintained when the National
Anthem is played or sung.
26. At this stage, we may refer to the Order/Notification dated 5th
December, 2017. It is as follows:-
―ORDER
Subject: Constitution of an Inter-Ministerial
Committee on playing/singing of the National
Anthem.
19
It has been decided to constitute an
Inter-Ministerial Committee under the
Chairmanship of Additional Secretary (Border
Management), Ministry of Home Affairs, with
representatives (not below the rank of Joint
Secretary) from the following
Ministries/Departments to give recommendations
regarding regulation of playing/singing of National
Anthem and to suggest changes in the Prevention
to Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 or in the
Orders Relating to the National Anthem of India.
Sl. No. Ministry/Department
1 Additional Secretary (BM),
MHA
Chairman
2 Ministry of Defence Member
3 Ministry of External Affairs Member
4 Ministry of Culture Member
5 Ministry of Women and Child
Development
Member
6 Ministry of Parliamentary
Affairs
Member
7 Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting
Member
8 Ministry of Minority Affairs Member
9 Department of Legal Affairs Member
10 Department of School
Education and Literacy
Member
11 Department of Empowerment
of Persons with Disability
Member
12 Joint Secretary (Admn.), MHA Convenor
2. The Committee will submit its
20
recommendations in six months.
3. This issues with the approval of the Competent
Authority.‖
27. It is perceptible from the said order, that the inter-Ministerial
Committee has been given the responsibility to make
recommendations for regulating the playing/singing of the National
Anthem and to suggest changes in the 1971 Act or in the Orders
relating to the National Anthem of India.
28. We may presently travel to the past. This Court in Bijoe
Emmanuel and Others vs. State of Kerala and Others2 (in
paragraphs 9 and 10) has also emphasized on respect to the
National Anthem. We may hasten to add that it sustained the right
of the petitioner therein, but yet observed that a person who stands
up respectfully when the National Anthem is sung, is showing
proper respect. Thus, the stress is on respect when the National
Anthem is sung or played.
29. We may at this stage reproduce the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the 1971 Act, as the same has been stressed by Mr.
2 AIR 1987 SC 748
21
Abhinav Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner. It reads as
under:-
―STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
Cases involving deliberate disrespect to
National Flag, the National Anthem and the
Constitution have come to the notice in the recent
past. Some of these incidents were discussed in
both the Houses of Parliament and members
expressed great anxiety about the disrespect shown
to the national symbols. Government were urged to
prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
Disrespect to the National Flag and the Constitution
or the National Anthem is not punishable under the
existing law. Public acts of insults to these symbols
of sovereignty and the integrity of the nation must
be prevented. Hence the Bill. The scope of the law
is restricted to overt acts of insult to and attack on,
the national symbols by burning, trampling defiling
or mutilating in public. It is not intended to prohibit
honest and bona fide criticism of the symbols, and
express provisions to this effect have been made in
the Bill.‖
30. When we consider the perspectives put forth before us
pronounced in their own way, we have no shadow of doubt that one
is compelled to show respect whenever and wherever the National
Anthem is played. It is the elan vital of the Nation and fundamental
grammar of belonging to a nation state. However, the prescription
of the place or occasion has to be made by the executive keeping in
view the concept of fundamental duties provided under the
22
Constitution and the law.
31. In view of the aforesaid, we think it appropriate that the
Committee should comprehensively look into all the aspects. Mr.
K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India has submitted
in the course of argument that the petitioner can give suggestions
by way of representation to the Committee. Mr. V.K. Biju and Ms.
Nanita Sharma, learned counsel and Mr. Sanjeev Bhatnagar, the
applicant in-person can also give suggestion in this regard. When
we say suggestions, we mean that suggestions shall only relate to
the National Anthem and nothing else.
32. Having said that, the issue remains for continuance of the
interim order or modification of the same. As submitted by Mr.
Venugopal, learned Attorney General, the playing of the National
Anthem in the cinema halls on the screen may not be made
mandatory and the word ―shall‖ may be substituted with ―may‖
until a final decision is taken by the Committee and, thereafter, by
the Central Government. Needless to emphasize, the discretion
vests with the Central Government and they shall take a decision
uninfluenced by the interim order as clarified in our order dated
23rd October, 2017.
23
33. In view of the aforesaid, we do not intend to keep the writ
petition pending and dispose of the same with the following
directions:-
(i) The Committee appointed by the Union government shall
submit its recommendations to the competent authority in
terms of the Notification dated 5th December, 2017, for follow
up action.
(ii) The order passed on 30th November, 2016, is modified to the
extent that playing of the National Anthem prior to the
screening of feature films in cinema halls is not mandatory,
but optional or directory.
(iii) Since the Committee constituted by the Union government is
looking into all aspects of the matter, it shall make its
recommendations uninfluenced by the interim directions of
this Court, as clarified in our order dated 23rd October,
2017. Similarly, the competent authority shall in taking its
decision(s) not be constrained or influenced by any of the
interim directions.
24
(iv) Citizens or persons are bound to show respect as required
under executive orders relating to the National Anthem of
India and the prevailing law, whenever it is played or sung on
specified occasions.
(v) The exemption granted to disabled persons shall remain in
force till the final decision of the competent authority with
regard to each occasion whenever the National Anthem is
played or sung.
34. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be
no order as to costs.
..............................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
...................................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
...................................J.
[Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud]
New Delhi
January 09, 2018.

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH …Appellant Versus RAJ KUMAR ...Respondent - High Court entertained fanciful doubts and rejected the credible evidence of Jeewan Lal (PW-1) on slender grounds. Due to mis-appreciation of evidence, the High Court set aside the conviction and caused a miscarriage of justice. Reasonings of the High Court for acquitting the accused are unsustainable and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.= The conviction of the respondent under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him by the trial court are affirmed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 31 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1204 of 2015)
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH …Appellant
Versus
RAJ KUMAR ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal preferred by the State challenges the
judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Criminal
Appeal No.559 of 2008 acquitting the respondent under
Section 302 IPC by setting aside his conviction and the
sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him by the trial
court.
3. Husband of deceased Meena Devi passed away about
eleven years ago prior to the incident. Meena Devi was
residing with her son Jeewan Lal (PW-1), daughter Rekha
Page No. 1 of 13
Devi (PW-2) and accused Raj Kumar (brother-in-law) in the
joint family house. On 23.08.2007 at 08.30 p.m., while
Meena Devi was taking meal along with her family,
respondent-accused came there in drunken condition and
started abusing Meena Devi and her children PW-1 and PW-2
without any reason and threatened to kill them. Barf
Devi-grandmother of PW-1 who was present in the house
took Jeewan Lal (PW-1) to adjoining sleeping room and
bolted the room from outside. She asked Rekha Devi (PW-2)
daughter of deceased to go to the house of her maternal
uncle Anant Ram (PW-3). While being inside the room, PW-1
heard the cries of his mother Meena Devi and from the
window saw the respondent-accused taking her mother
towards the house of another accused Om Prakash. After
few hours, accused opened the door and told him that his
mother had run away from the house and that he should tell
the same to his maternal uncle Anant Ram (PW-3). Under
such threat from respondent-accused and another accused
Ramesh Kumar, PW-1 told his maternal uncle (PW-3) that his
mother had run away from the house. On 24.08.2007 at
Page No. 2 of 13
about 02.00 a.m., Anant Ram (PW-3) came to the house of
accused. Thereafter, PW-1 and PW-3 went to Dharampur
Police Station and informed the police about missing of
Meena Devi. On 25.08.2007, they again went to the police
station Dharampur and at about 11.00-11.30 a.m; at the
time Anant Ram (PW-3) received a phone call from Nek Ram
informing that the dead body of deceased Meena Devi was
found hanging from a tree at Ghat Bahu forest. Thereafter,
PW-1 and PW-3 along with police party went to the spot and
found that the dead body of Meena Devi was hanging from
the branch of a pine tree with a plastic rope, tied around her
neck. Statement of PW-1 was recorded, based on which, case
in FIR No.250 of 2007 was registered under Section 302 IPC
and Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC.
4. Initial investigation was conducted by Sub-Inspector of
Police Sat Prakash (PW-20) and further investigation was
conducted by Inspector of Police LR Thakur (PW-22). PW-22
prepared spot map, inquest and conducted further
investigation. Dr. Vivek Banyal (PW-24) conducted autopsy
and opined that "....death was because of haemorrhagic
Page No. 3 of 13
shock due to rupture of spleen and anti-mortem injuries
suggesting gagging. Hanging was post-mortem". Accused
Raj Kumar was taken to custody on 25.08.2007 and he was
interrogated. Confession statement of accused was recorded
on 27.08.2007 which led to the recovery of a lady shirt from
the room of the house of accused Ramesh Kumar which was
under construction. Upon completion of investigation,
chargesheet was fled against accused Raj Kumar, Ramesh
Kumar, Om Prakash and Barf Devi under Section 302 IPC
and Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC.
5. To bring home the guilt of the accused, in the Sessions
Court, prosecution has examined as many as twenty four
witnesses and marked number of exhibits and material
objects. In the questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the
accused denied all the incriminating circumstances and
evidence and pleaded that he is innocent. The accused has
not offered any explanation on the death of deceased Meena
Devi.
Page No. 4 of 13
6. Based upon the evidence of Anant Ram (PW-3) and
Bhindra Devi (PW-15), the trial court held that Meena Devi
suffered harassment at the hands of her brother-in-law
(respondent-accused). The trial court held that Jeewan Lal
(PW-1) son of the deceased had spoken about the overt act
of the accused in beating the deceased and that the accused
taking away Meena Devi from the house. The trial court held
that no reasonable explanation was forth coming from the
accused for the death of the deceased Meena Devi who was
living jointly with the respondent-accused. On those
fndings, the trial court convicted the respondent-accused
under Section 302 IPC and Section 201 IPC read with Section
34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.
Other accused Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash were
acquitted. Accused Barf Devi remained absconding.
7. In the appeal preferred by the accused, the High Court
observed that Jeewan Lal (PW-1) son of the deceased, while
deposing as witness before the court in narrating the whole
incident, had made improvements and hence, PW-1 is not a
reliable witness. The High Court further held that there were
Page No. 5 of 13
bald assertions regarding dispute, but no specifc motive was
attributed to the accused for committing murder of the
deceased Meena Devi. Observing that the case of
prosecution suffers from serious infrmities, the High Court
allowed the criminal appeal fled by the respondent-accused
thereby setting aside the conviction and the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed upon him. Being aggrieved, the
State is before us.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the impugned judgment and materials on record.
9. Prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence.
It is well settled that in a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt
is sought to be drawn must be cogently and frmly
established and that those circumstances must be
conclusive in nature unerringly pointing towards the guilt of
the accused. Moreover all the circumstances taken
cumulatively should form a complete chain and there should
be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved
Page No. 6 of 13
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his
innocence.
10. In a case, based on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be drawn only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused. In Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681, it
was held as under:-
"12. ...........The normal principle in a case based on
circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from
which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be
cogently and frmly established; that those circumstances
should be of a defnite tendency unerringly pointing
towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances
taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that
there is no escape from the conclusion that within all
human probability the crime was committed by the
accused and they should be incapable of explanation on
any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused
and inconsistent with their innocence."
The same principle was reiterated in State of Rajasthan v.
Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254, Ganesh Lal v. State of
Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731, State of Maharashtra v.
Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 and State of Tamil Nadu v.
Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679.
Page No. 7 of 13
11. After death of her husband, Meena Devi was living with
her children viz. Jeewan Lal (PW-1) and Rekha Devi (PW-2)
along with the accused Raj Kumar in the joint family. In their
evidence, PW-1 and PW-2 clearly stated that on 23.08.2007,
respondent came in drunkard condition and threatened to
kill them. Jeewan Lal (PW-1) who is the son of deceased
Meena Devi clearly stated that he had heard the cries of his
mother and also seen accused taking his mother towards the
house of accused Om Parkash. On 25.08.2007, body of
Meena Devi was found hanging from a pine tree in the
nearby forest. PW-24-Dr. Vivek Banyal who conducted the
autopsy has clearly said that "anti-mortem injuries were
caused due to gagging and hanging process of dead body
was post-mortem".
12. In his evidence, Jeewan Lal (PW-1) stated that he was
threatened by the accused Om Parkash to make telephonic
call to his maternal uncle Anant Ram (PW-3) that Meena Devi
had run away from the house and under such threat Jeewan
Lal (PW-1) informed Anant Ram (PW-3) accordingly. After
Anant Ram (PW-3) came to the village at 02.00 a.m. on
Page No. 8 of 13
24.08.2007, PW-1 and PW-3 went to P.P. Dharampur and
informed them about missing of Meena Devi. Meena Devi
was living with her brother-in-law/accused along with her
children. If Meena Devi was so missing, the natural conduct
of the accused was to inform the police and also Anant Ram
(PW-3). But that was not done. In view of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, burden is cast upon the accused, being the
inmate of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how
Meena Devi died. No reasonable explanation is forthcoming
from the accused as to why he had neither lodged the
complaint nor informed the police about the missing of
Meena Devi. The respondent-accused being inmate of the
house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering
no explanation. This is a strong militating circumstance
against the respondent indicating that he might be
responsible for the commission of the offence.
13. The motive attributed to the accused is that he had
frequently quarrelled with the deceased and also assaulted
her. A dispute is also suggested pertaining to the land of one
Swami who wanted to give his property solely to the
Page No. 9 of 13
deceased Meena Devi which was not acceptable to the
accused. Yet another motive attributed to the accused was
his greed for the fxed deposit of Rs.1,20,000/- which had
become due payable to the deceased on 13.08.2007. PW-15
Bhindra Devi, sister-in-law of the deceased in her evidence
had clearly stated that as and when Meena Devi visited her
house, Meena Devi used to tell her about the suffering
meted out to her by the accused Raj Kumar. Further, Bhindra
Devi (PW-15) had clearly spoken about the motive
attributed to the accused. From the evidence of PW-15, it is
brought out that the accused Raj Kumar is a chronic
drunkard. On previous occasion, respondent-accused had
beaten Meena Devi and he had entered into compromise
with Meena Devi by assuring her that he would not beat her
in future. Evidence of PW-15 as to the motive attributed to
the accused was not properly appreciated by the High Court.
14. Jeewan Lal (PW-1) has clearly spoken as to the attack
on Meena Devi by the accused on the night of 23.08.2007
and the subsequent threat to PW-1 by the accused and one
Om Prakash. The trial court which had the opportunity of
Page No. 10 of 13
seeing and observing demeanour of the witnesses held that
Jeewan Lal (PW-1) is a trustworthy witness. While so, the
High Court was not right in doubting the version of Jeewan
Lal (PW-1) on the ground that PW-1 made improvements in
his version. In his statement (Ex.P/A) dated 25.08.2007,
Jeewan Lal (PW-1) did not disclose the participation qua
accused Nos. 2 and 3 namely Ramesh Kumar and Om
Parkash in the commission of the offence. Evidence of
Jeewan Lal (PW-1) cannot be doubted simply because names
of Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash were not mentioned in his
statement recorded on 25.08.2007 immediately after
bringing down the hanging body of Meena Devi from the
tree. The circumstances in which PW-1 was placed at that
time, is to be kept in view. PW-1 was only aged nineteen
years. On the night of 23.08.2007, he had heard the cries of
his mother at the time when she was beaten. PW-1 and
PW-3 had been searching for Meena Devi for more than
twenty four hours that is from 24.08.2007 to 25.08.2007,
only to fnd her dead. PW-1 was already threatened by
accused Om Parkash to inform Anant Ram (PW-3) that Meena
Page No. 11 of 13
Devi had run away. On 25.08.2007, when PW-1's
statement was recorded, he must have been in trauma and
fear psychosis. In such circumstances, omission to mention
the names of Om Parkash and Ramesh Kumar in his
statement (Ex.P/A) does not render PW-1's evidence
untrustworthy. Upon proper appreciation of the evidence,
the trial court observed that evidence of PW-1 inspires
confdence of the court. While so, in our view, the High
Court ought not to have doubted the version of PW-1 and his
credibility.
15. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read
as a whole appears to be truthful in the given circumstances
of the case. Once that impression is formed, it is necessary
for the court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly
keeping in view the drawbacks and infrmities pointed out in
the evidence and evaluate them to fnd out whether it is
against the general tenor of the prosecution case. Jeewan
Lal (PW-1) is the son of the deceased Meena Devi residing
with her and the accused in the same house, and a natural
Page No. 12 of 13
witness to speak about the occurrence. Evidence of PW-1 is
cogent and natural and is consistent with the prosecution
case. The High Court was not right in doubting the evidence
of PW-1 on the ground of alleged improvements made by
Jeewan Lal (PW-1) and rejecting his evidence on the premise
that there were certain improvements.
16. As pointed out by the Sessions Judge, deceased Meena
Devi was last seen alive in the company of accused Raj
Kumar and the accused did not satisfactorily explain the
missing of deceased Meena Devi and the same is a strong
militating circumstance against the accused. Meena Devi
who was residing in the same house with the accused and
was last seen alive with the accused, it is for him to explain
how the deceased died. The accused has no reasonable
explanation as to how the body of Meena Devi was found
hanging from the tree. As held in Kashi Ram case, it is for
the accused to explain as to what happened to the
deceased. If the accused does not throw light on the fact
which is within his knowledge, his failure to offer any
Page No. 13 of 13
explanation would be a strong militating circumstance
against him.
17. As pointed out earlier, in his questioning under Section
313 Cr.P.C., the accused simply denied the evidence of
incriminating circumstance put to him and pleaded that he is
innocent. A feeble attempt was made by the defence to
suggest that the deceased consumed poison and committed
suicide. Viscera of deceased Meena Devi was sent to FSL
Tungand. As per FSL report, no poison was detected in the
viscera of the deceased. In our considered view, the trial
court rightly rejected the plea suggested by the defence.
18. As pointed out earlier, in a catena of judgments, this
Court held that when conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence, there should not be any gap in the chain of
circumstances; the accused is entitled to the beneft of
doubt. In the present case, by cogent and convincing
evidence, prosecution has established the circumstances:- (i)
Motive (evidence of PW-15); (ii) accused beating the
deceased and taking her away (Evidence of PW-1); (iii) Death
Page No. 14 of 13
of Meena Devi is homicidal (evidence of PW-24); (iv) Conduct
of accused in not reporting to the police about missing of the
deceased Meena Devi; and (v) Absence of explanation from
the accused as to the death of the deceased. The
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are proved by
cogent and reliable evidence. The circumstances
cumulatively taken form a complete chain pointing out that
the murder was committed by the accused and none-else.
19. In the appeal, the High Court has not properly
appreciated the evidence and intrinsic worth of testimony of
prosecution witnesses and the formidable circumstances
established by the prosecution against the accused. The
High Court entertained fanciful doubts and rejected the
credible evidence of Jeewan Lal (PW-1) on slender grounds.
Due to mis-appreciation of evidence, the High Court set
aside the conviction and caused a miscarriage of justice.
Reasonings of the High Court for acquitting the accused are
unsustainable and the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained.
Page No. 15 of 13
20. In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and
the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the respondent
under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment
imposed on him by the trial court are affirmed. The
respondent shall be taken into custody to serve the
remaining sentence.
…....………………………..J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
…....………………………..J.
 (UDAY UMESH LALIT)
New Delhi;
January 8, 2018
Page No. 16 of 13