LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Thursday, September 14, 2017

corporate laws -on education institutions -, We, accordingly, quash and set aside the impugned decision to the extent it bars the petitioners to admit upto 150 students in the academic session 2017-18. Instead, we direct the respondents to permit the petitioner college to take part in the current year counselling process. The cut-off date for completing the admissions in respect of the petitioner college, however, is extended till 5th September, 2017. The respondents shall forthwith make available students willing to take admission in the petitioner college through central counselling in order of their merit. This direction is being issued in exercise of plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in the peculiar facts of the present case to do complete justice and in larger public interest, so that the aspiring students who have not been admitted to the 1st year MBBS course for the academic session 2017-18, in order of their merit in NEET examination, will get opportunity to be admitted in the petitioner college. At the same time we make it clear that the MCI or the Competent Authority of the Central Government is free to inspect the petitioner college as and when deemed fit and, if any deficiency is found after giving opportunity to the petitioner college, may suitably proceed against the college in accordance with law. This arrangement will subserve the ends of justice.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.515 OF 2017
(With I.A. No.76155 of 2017)
Saraswati Educational
Charitable Trust and Anr. ….Petitioner(s)
Versus
Union of India and Anr. …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. The petitioner Saraswati Educational Charitable Trust,
Lucknow, made an application to the Ministry of Health &
Family Welfare, Government of India, for establishment of a
new medical college at Unnao, Uttar Pradesh, in the name
and style of “Saraswati Medical College, Unnao, Uttar
Pradesh”, for the academic session 2016-17. That
application was forwarded to the Medical Council of India for
2
evaluation and making recommendations to the Ministry
under Section 10A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956,
for academic session 2016-17.
2. The petitioners have filed this writ petition under Article
32 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 31st
May, 2017, passed by the Union of India, respondent No.1
herein, whereby the petitioner college has been debarred
from admitting students in MBBS course for the academic
sessions 2017-18 and 2018-19 and further permitting
respondent No.2 Medical Council of India to encash Bank
Guarantee of Rs.2 crores furnished by the petitioners. This
Court pronounced its judgment on 1st August, 2017 in group
of cases involving similar issues, in the following terms:
“24. Having regard to the fact that the Oversight
Committee has been constituted by this Court and is
also empowered to oversee all statutory functions
under the Act, and further all policy decisions of the
MCI would require its approval, its recommendations,
to state the least, on the issue of establishment of a
medical college, as in this case, can by no means be
disregarded or left out of consideration. Noticeably,
this Court did also empower the Oversight Committee
to issue appropriate remedial directions. In our view,
in the overall perspective, the materials on record
bearing on the claim of the petitioner
3
institutions/colleges for confirmation of the
conditional letters of permission granted to them
require a fresh consideration to obviate the
possibility of any injustice in the process.
25. In the above persuasive premise, the Central
Government is hereby ordered to consider afresh the
materials on record pertaining to the issue of
confirmation or otherwise of the letter of permission
granted to the petitioner colleges/institutions. We
make it clear that in undertaking this exercise, the
Central Government would re-evaluate the
recommendations/views of the MCI, Hearing
Committee, DGHS and the Oversight Committee, as
available on records. It would also afford an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner
colleges/institutions to the extent necessary. The
process of hearing and final reasoned decision
thereon, as ordered, would be completed
peremptorily within a period of 10 days from today.
The parties would unfailingly co-operate in
compliance of this direction to meet the time frame
fixed.”
3. Pursuant to the liberty granted to the petitioners by the
aforementioned order, the petitioners submitted a fresh
detailed representation to respondent No.1, pointing out that
the petitioners have complied with all the conditions
specified by the Oversight Committee (“OC” for short)
constituted by this Court, as noted in the letter granting
permission for academic session 2016-17. The petitioner
college was given an opportunity of being heard by the
4
Hearing Committee on 3rd August, 2017. During the hearing,
the petitioners pointed out the observations made by the OC
as noted in its letter dated 14.5.2017:
“The EC did not bring out any deficiency either from
assessment reports dated 18th – 19th Nov. 2016 or
21st – 22nd Dec. 2016, though they had considered
both the reports in their meeting on 13.01.2017.
Even then the College had represented against the
observations made by the assessors in their
assessment report dated 18th -19th Nov. 2016.
The deficiencies reported in the assessment report in
respect of faculty is 1.5% and residents is 6.52% and
are within acceptable limits. The other deficiencies
are subjective. No MSR.
LOP Confirmed.”
4. The petitioners had demonstrated before the Hearing
Committee that the deficiencies noticed earlier were
insignificant and within the permissible norms. With regard
to the core matters, regarding infrastructure and academics,
all facilities required as per norms were fulfilled by the
petitioner college.
5. The Hearing Committee, after considering the records
and oral and written submissions of the petitioner college,
submitted its report to the Ministry for consideration. The
Competent Authority of the Government of India accepted
5
the recommendations of the Hearing Committee, not to
permit admission of students in the MBBS course for the
academic session 2017-18 and that the petitioner college
should apply afresh for renewal of permission for academic
session 2018-19 as per MCI Regulations. The reason which
weighed with the Competent Authority of the Government of
India can be discerned from paragraphs 17 and 18 of the
impugned Communication-cum-Order dated 10th August,
2017, issued under the signature of the Under Secretary to
the Government of India. The same read thus:
“xxx xxx xxx
17. Now, in compliance with the above direction
the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 1.8.2017, the
Ministry granted hearing to the college on
03.08.2017. The Hearing Committee after
considering the records and oral and written
submission of the college submitted its reports to the
Ministry. The observation of hearing committee is as
under:
The college submitted that MCI conducted
compliance verification as per OC orders on 18-19
November 2016. However, without assigning any
reason, MCI visited the college again on 21
December, 2016 to re-inspect. In the submission of
the college, since MCI was required to conduct
compliance verification only once for confirmation of
LOP for 2016-17, it did not allow the 2nd inspection to
happen. The college representatives also informed
6
that on the day i.e. 21.12.2016 they contacted OC
over telephone. It was informed by OC that MCI was
authorized for only one inspection. The college was
asked if they obtained the same confirmation from
OC in writing to which they replied in the negative.
After the November inspection the college vide letter
dated 20.11.2016 raised its objection with the OC
that they were not allowed to put the dissent note by
the assessor and this was prejudicial to the college.
They also informed the OC about the date for major
and minor surgeries with photo and video proofs.
They also submitted other information pertaining to
OPD, investigations to the OC.
It is also seen from November SAF report that there
was faculty deficiency of 1.5% only and residents
deficiency of 6.52%.
The college did not submit any compliance since as
per its version neither MCI nor OC conveyed any
deficiency to it.
In the opinion of the Committee, MCI was not
precluded from conducting inspection subject to
sufficient reason and justification. But no adverse
comments such as the college/hospital was closed
has been made by the assessor during the 2nd visit to
the college. The November inspection had no major
deficiencies.
In the peculiar facts of the case, the Committee
recommends that LOP for 2016-17 may be confirmed.
No fresh batch for 2017-18 may be allowed. For the
session 2018-19, the college may apply for renewal
permission to MCI.
18. Accepting the recommendations of the Hearing
Committee, the Ministry confirms the conditional
permission granted to the College in 2016-17.
Further, it has been decided not to permit admission
of students in MBBS courses for the academic
session 2017-18 at the College. The College may
apply afresh for renewal of permission for the
academic session 2018-19 as per MCI Regulation.
19. Admission made in violation of above conditions
will be treated as irregular and action will be taken
7
as per provision of IMC Act, 1956 and the
Regulations made there under.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. Being aggrieved by this decision the petitioners have
filed I.A. No.76155 of 2017 in the pending writ petition
before this court praying for quashing the aforementioned
order dated 10th August, 2017, to direct the respondents to
grant renewal of permission for 2nd year and to permit the
petitioner college to admit 150 students in MBBS course for
the academic session 2017-18 and further, allow the
petitioner college to participate in the ongoing central
counselling process.
7. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the
petitioners were advised that second inspection was not
permissible after 15th December, 2016. The petitioners,
therefore, questioned the necessity for the second inspection
by the Assessing Team on 21st and 22nd December, 2016.
Inspection was already completed in November, 2016, during
which no major or serious deficiency was found. From the
available record, as has been rightly noted by the OC, the
8
deficiencies reported in the Assessment Report in respect of
faculty were 1.5% and residents 6.52% which were within
acceptable limits and the other deficiencies were subjective
sans any express stipulation therefor. It was submitted that
the petitioners are willing to comply with all the formalities
that may be necessary and further conditions, if any. The
petitioners are willing to provide inspection of the college to
MCI if the Court so directs. It is submitted that considering
the fact that the petitioner college has already started
functioning from academic session 2016-17 and fulfills all
the infrastructure and academic facilities, it ought to
continue by confirming the LOP 2016-17, and admitting
students even for the academic session 2017-18. The
petitioners have placed emphasis on the observation made
by the Competent Authority that in the Inspection carried
out in November, 2016, no major deficiency has been
noticed, which itself is a valid reason to permit the petitioner
college to admit students in MBBS course even for academic
session 2017-18.
9
8. According to the respondents, the inspection conducted
in November, 2016 will be of no avail to the petitioner
college. For granting permission to the petitioner college to
admit students for academic session 2017-18, a fresh
inspection was inevitable. There has been no inspection in
that regard as of now. Hence, the relief as claimed by the
petitioner college cannot be acceded to. It is submitted that
since the petitioners were responsible for not providing
second inspection, it is not open to them to find fault with
the decision of the Competent Authority of the Government
of India. It is submitted that no permission can be granted to
any professional college, much less medical college imparting
MBBS course, without proper scrutiny and inspection.
According to the respondents, this writ petition as well as
the application are devoid of merits and deserve to be
dismissed.
9. Having considered the rival submissions, it is noticed
that the OC in its communication dated 14.5.2017 has
clearly noted that there was no major deficiency. The
10
deficiencies reported in the assessment report in respect of
faculty were only 1.5 % and residents 6.52 %. These were
within the acceptable limits. The petitioner college has been
functioning from academic session 2016-17. Even the
Competent Authority in the impugned decision has not
opined that the deficiencies noticed earlier were significant
or critical. On the other hand, in paragraph 17, the
Competent Authority has plainly noted that the November
SAF Report mentions that there was faculty deficiency of
1.5% and residents deficiency of 6.52% only. Such
deficiencies by no standard can be said to be critical. The
same, as rightly observed by the OC, were within permissible
limits.
10. On a perusal of the record it is noticed that the
Assessors of the MCI had inspected the college on 18th and
19th November, 2016, as is evident from the Assessment
Form for 150 MBBS Admissions Report submitted to the
MCI, running into 36 pages (Annexure-P/12) to this writ
11
petition. The Summary of Assessment recorded in the
prescribed format reads thus:
“Summary of Assessment
1. Saraswati Medical College, Unnao is run by Trust
‘Saraswati Educational Charitable Trust’
2. The college has got LOP from GOI with intake of 150
seats for last academic year 2016-17 with reference
to the conditional approval accorded by Oversight
Committee
3. Type of assessment: Regular – LOP No. of seats:
150
4. PG courses : No
5. Deficiency of the infrastructure of college and
hospital if any: Pl. Mention category wise:
6. Deficiency of clinical material if any: Pl mention
category wise:
Only one major operation (C-section) was done till
12.30 pm. No minor surgeries done till 1.00 pm
Investigations both Radiological and Laboratory
inadequate. Cross verified by assessors. On an
average only 1 unit of blood being dispensed per
day. Total of 7 units were stored on the day of
assessment. Most of the OPDs had few patients.
7. Deficiency of teaching staff if any:
Shortage of teaching faculty is 1.5 %
8. Deficiency of resident doctors if any:
Shortage of resident doctors is 6.52 %
9. Any other Remarks: As mentioned in the report”
12
After this assessment report was submitted, another
surprise inspection was proposed on 21st December, 2016.
Since the said inspection was scheduled after 15th December,
2016, the Principal of the petitioner college questioned the
said action and placed the objection on record in writing vide
letter dated 21.12.2016 which reads:
“SARASWATI MEDICAL COLLEGE
LIDA, Madhu Vihar, P.O. Asha Khera, NH-25,
Lucknow Kanpur Highway, Unnao (UP), Pin-209859
Tel: (+91) 515-307000,
Email: smc@saraswaticolleges.com
___________________________________________________
Ref. No. SMC/MCI/2016-17/014 Dated:
21/12/2016
To,
The Secretary,
Medical Council of India,
New Delhi.
Sub: Surprise Assessment of Saraswati Medical
College on 21st
December, 2016.
Sir/Madam,
In reference to MCI Letter no.MCI-34(41)
(UG)/2017-18 Med./dt.21/12/2016 regarding
Surprise Assessment of Saraswati Medical College,
Unnao on 21st December, 2016. I have to submit the
following,
1. Compliance Assessment & Verification of Physical
and other facilities of Saraswati Medical College,
Unnao, as per the direction of the OC, has already
been conducted by MCI on 18th & 19th November,
13
2016 vide letter no.MCI-34(41)/2016 – Med./
dt.18/11/2016.
2. MCI vide letter no. MCI-34(41)(R-107)/2016-
Med./142566 dt. 08/11/2016 has informed the
college that assessment Inspection will be held upto
15th December 2016 only.
3. LOP has already been granted to the College by the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and per
direction of the OC an inspection verifying our
compliance has already been undertaken by the MCI
on 18th & 19th Nov., 2016.
Since the OC has given no further direction for
re-inspection of the Compliance Inspection held by
MCI on 18th & 19th Nov., 2016 and since the MCI has
categorically communicated to the college that
inspection will be carried out only upto 15th
December, 2016, the college does not see any merit
to undergo any further Compliance inspection for the
session 2016-17, hence denied the inspection on 21st
December, 2016 BY THE MCI team.
Regards,
SD/-
Prof. B.P. MATHUR
Principal”
It is noticed that the inspecting team did not insist on the
second inspection and chose to leave the college on account
of the stand taken by the Principal of the petitioner college.
That fact was reported to the MCI and the Executive
14
Committee of the MCI considered the proposal in its meeting
held on 13th January, 2017 and noted as follows:
“…The Executive Committee of the Council also
perused the letter dated 21/12/2016 from the
appointed team of Council Assessors stating therein
as under:-
With reference to email letter no.
MCI-34(41)/2016-Med./dated 21.12.2016 for the
above cited subject, we went to the college and
reached there at 10 am and met the Principal, Dr.
B.P. Mathur who informed us that they did not want
the assessment to be done and gave a letter stating
the same. The letter from the Principal is attached
along with the filled SAII form.”
The Committee further perused the letter dated
21/12/2016 from the Principal, Saraswati Medical College,
Unnao. The Committee submitted its recommendation to
MCI vide letter dated 15.01.2017 as under:-
“In view of the above, the college has failed to abide
by the undertaking it had given to the Central Govt.
that there are no deficiencies as per clause 3.2(i) of
the directions passed by the Supreme Court
mandated Oversight Committee vide communication
dated 11/08/2016. The Executive Committee, after
due deliberation and discussion, have decided that
the college has failed to comply with the stipulation
laid down by the Oversight Committee. Accordingly,
the Executive Committee recommends that as per the
directions passed by Oversight Committee in para
3.2(b) vide communication dated 11/08/2016 the
college should be debarred from admitting students
in the above course for a period of two academic
years i.e. 2017-18 & 2018-19 as even after giving an
15
undertaking that they have fulfilled the entire
infrastructure for establishment of new medical
college at Unnao, Uttar Pradesh by Saraswati
Educational Charitable Trust, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh under Chhatrapati Shahuji Maharaj
University, Kanpur, the college was found to be
grossly deficient. It has also been decided by the
Executive Committee that the Bank Guarantee
furnished by the college in pursuance of the
directives passed by the Oversight Committee as
well as GOI letter dated 20/08/2016 is liable to be
encashed.”
11. On the basis of the recommendation of the MCI, the
Ministry decided to grant a personal hearing to the college on
8
th February, 2017 by the DGHS. The Hearing Committee
after examining the oral and written submissions of the
college, submitted its report to the Ministry. The report of the
Hearing Committee was forwarded to the OC for guidance.
The OC after examining the matter, vide letter dated 14th
May, 2017 noted that the Executive Committee of MCI did
not point out any deficiency from the assessment reports. On
the other hand, the deficiency reported in the assessment
report in respect of faculty was only 1.5% and residents of
6.52% which was within the acceptable norms. The OC
further noted that the rest of the deficiencies were subjective
16
sans any express stipulation in that behalf and therefore
commended confirmation of Letter of Permission.
12. Considering the above, we find that the inspection for
issuance of Letter of Permission for academic session
2017-18 was duly carried out on 18 and 19th November,
2016. We reject the contention raised by the respondents
that no inspection in relation to academic session 2017-18
has been carried out as of now. Indeed, the petitioners
objected to the second surprise inspection intended on 21st
and 22nd December, 2016 as the same was after the cut off
date 15th December, 2016. The purpose for which the second
surprise inspection became necessary, when the earlier
report was pending consideration and that too after the cut
off date 15th December, 2016, has not been explained or
noted either by the Executive Committee in its meeting held
on 13th January, 2017 or for that matter by the Hearing
Committee and more so by the Competent Authority of the
Central Government. Significantly, it is not a case where the
college officials prevented the inspecting team from entering
17
the college. The petitioner college only placed their objection
on record as per the advice given to them that such
inspection by the MCI after the cut off date was not
permissible. The inspecting team chose to leave the college
without doing any inspection. The Competent Authority,
however, mechanically acted upon the recommendation of
the MCI to debar the petitioner college for two years and
authorised the MCI to encash the Bank Guarantee of Rs.2
crores vide order dated 31st May, 2017.
13. The said order dated 31st May, 2017, passed by the
Ministry has been assailed in the present writ petition. As
noted earlier, the writ petition was heard along with the
connected cases on 1st August, 2017 on which date this
Court directed the Central Government to reconsider the
matter afresh and record reasons. Pursuant to the said
directions, the petitioners submitted representation before
the Central Government and also participated in the hearing
before the Hearing Committee on 3rd August, 2017. The
Hearing Committee without reference to the relevant
18
matters, once again reiterated the position taken earlier, that
the petitioner college did not permit second inspection to
happen. Neither the purpose of second inspection has been
elaborated nor any justification has been given by the
Hearing Committee as to why the second inspection was
required and moreso when the first inspection was done
about a month earlier. The Central Government has
mechanically accepted the recommendation of the Hearing
Committee and has passed the impugned decision on 10th
August, 2017, as can be discerned from the observations in
paragraphs 17 and 18 of the impugned decision.
14. We have no hesitation in taking the view that the
Hearing Committee as well as the Central Government have
failed to consider all the relevant aspects of the matter and
the conclusion reached by the said authorities is, on the face
of it, without application of mind, if not perverse. We are
conscious of the fact that there is nothing in the Regulations
which expressly or for that matter by implication prohibits
the MCI from undertaking multiple inspections. However,
19
when that action is questioned, it is expected that the MCI
must offer some justification for the second surprise
inspection when its Assessors had already carried out that
exercise recently on 18th and 19th November, 2016 and
submitted an elaborate report running into 36 pages in the
prescribed format in that regard (Annexure-P/12). The
Hearing Committee as well as the Competent Authority of
the Central Government were expected to examine this
aspect of the matter before taking any final decision,
especially when the inspection report on record did not point
out any deficiency except the marginal deficiency of faculty
of 1.5% and residents of 6.52% which were obviously within
the permissible norms.
15. The question is: whether this approach of the
Competent Authority can be an impediment for
consideration of prayer to allow the petitioner college to
admit students in MBBS course for academic session
2017-18? Notably, the Competent Authority has already
confirmed the conditional permission granted to the college
20
for the academic session 2016-17 but has not permitted the
petitioner college to admit students in MBBS course for the
academic session 2017-18. Further, the impugned decision
even if read as a whole nowhere mentions the cause for the
second inspection when only one month back on 18th and
19th November, 2016 a proper inspection was done and a
comprehensive report was submitted in that regard in the
prescribed format and which was pending consideration
before the MCI. The argument now raised by the
respondents that the petitioners having objected to second
inspection are not entitled for the relief, therefore, does not
commend us. Considering the fact that the petitioner college
fulfills the infrastructure and academic requirements and
has already become functional from academic session
2016-17, by admitting the first batch of students in MBBS
course and as even the Competent Authority has noticed
that there are no major deficiencies, in the larger public
interest, we allow this petition and the application filed by
the petitioners. We are also inclined to issue further
directions to the respondents as have been issued in the
21
judgment of Dr. Jagat Narain Subharti Charitable Trust and
Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors., delivered on 30th August,
2017.
16. We, accordingly, quash and set aside the impugned
decision to the extent it bars the petitioners to admit upto
150 students in the academic session 2017-18. Instead, we
direct the respondents to permit the petitioner college to take
part in the current year counselling process. The cut-off
date for completing the admissions in respect of the
petitioner college, however, is extended till 5th September,
2017. The respondents shall forthwith make available
students willing to take admission in the petitioner college
through central counselling in order of their merit. This
direction is being issued in exercise of plenary powers of this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in the
peculiar facts of the present case to do complete justice and
in larger public interest, so that the aspiring students who
have not been admitted to the 1st year MBBS course for the
academic session 2017-18, in order of their merit in NEET
22
examination, will get opportunity to be admitted in the
petitioner college. At the same time we make it clear that the
MCI or the Competent Authority of the Central Government
is free to inspect the petitioner college as and when deemed
fit and, if any deficiency is found after giving opportunity to
the petitioner college, may suitably proceed against the
college in accordance with law. This arrangement will
subserve the ends of justice.
17. No order as to costs.
……………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
………………………………….J.
(A.M. Khanwilkar)
.………………………………...J.
(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi,
Dated: September 1, 2017.

corporate laws -on education institutions - M.B.B.S. students who have been admitted in the Institution for the academic session 2016-2017, shall continue their studies. The MCI shall send the inspecting team to the Institution within a period of two months. After the report is filed, the MCI shall apprise the Institution with regard to the deficiencies and give a date for removal of the same so that the Institution would be in a position to do the needful. We may hasten to add that the inspection that will be carried out and the further follow up action shall be done for the academic session 2018-2019. As we intend to appreciate the inspection report and the deficiencies and the action taken up thereon by the Institution, list the matter on 15th November, 2017. The renewal application that was submitted for the academic session 2017-2018 may be treated as the application for the academic session 2018-2019. The bank guarantee which has been deposited shall not be encashed and be kept alive.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.445 OF 2017
Shri Venkateshwara University ... Petitioner(s)
Through its Registrar and Another
Versus
Union of India and Another … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI.
In this writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner-University and its functionary
have prayed for issue of a direction for quashment of the order
dated 31st May, 2017, contained in letter No.U-12012/
27/2016-ME-I [3084749] debarring the petitioners from admitting
the students in MBBS course for academic sessions 2017-2018
2
and 2018-2019 and authorizing the respondent No.2, the Medical
Council of India (MCI) not to encash the bank guarantee
furnished by the petitioners to the MCI and further to issue writ of
mandamus or any other direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondents to grant renewal of permission for
academic year 2017-2018 and further to admit the students in
the said academic session.
2. The assertions made in the writ petition and the
documents annexed thereto exposit the history of litigation which,
we are inclined to think, has a different colour. Suffice it to note
that for the academic session 2016-2017, the MCI had inspected
the Institution and found certain deficiencies. The summary of
assessment, which was submitted by a team of four doctors on
12th November, 2016, has been brought on record. Paragraphs 9,
10, 11 and 12 of the said summary of assessment read as
follows:-
“9. Any other remarks: Most of the faculty as
well as resident doctors has joined this institute in
last one & half month prior to the inspection. It is
not known or could not be verified whether those
faculties where considered by MCI in the same
academic year where they were previously working
or whether these faculty is appointed on
3
permanent basis or temporarily. Most of them did
not have permanent address proof. Patients in the
ward were admitted with very vague complains
which did not require admission, like pain
abdomen, itching, cough mild fever, joint pains,
irritation in the eyes, low back pains. In some
wards both Male and female patients were
admitted in the same ward (Like Psychiatry). In
pediatrics patients above age of 14 were admitted
with vague/no complain.
10. No patients were in labor. No Lscs, No
Normal Delivery on the date of inspection.
11. Only one major surgery on the day of
inspection (Open cholecystectomy) & One minor (D
& C).
12. College website does not show names of all
the faculty members (Like only one name appears
on website out of five present in Pharmacology.)”
3. We are not referring to other aspects of the summary of
assessment, as the deficiencies pointed out are within the
permissible limit. Be it noted, the deficiencies which are noted
earlier were by the inspecting team, and the Oversight Committee
constituted by this Court accepted the explanation offered by the
University and imposed certain conditions and recommended for
grant of Letter of Permission and eventually the same was granted
by the Central Government for the year 2016-17.
4
4. After the inspection that was conducted on 11th and 12th
of November, 2016, another inspection took place on 9th
December, 2016. The team of the assessors vide letter dated 9th
December, 2016, has communicated to the MCI, which reads as
follows:-
“We reached the Dean's office. The Dean was
present in his office. However, he left his chamber
immediately and was not to be seen for next 15
minutes. Whereafter he returned to inform us his
refusal to allow us to conduct the MCI assessment
today even after presenting MCI order to conduct
the assessment. He stated that it was a holiday
declared by their own university for Eid, which falls
5 days later. It was not national or State or local
holiday. He also mentioned that there were no
doctors in wards or OPD or Emergency as it was a
holiday. When questioned again, regarding the
patients' services can also stop on a holiday, he
had no answer.
He had no answer as to why the Dean and two or
three possible officers were working on a holiday, if
all the doctors were on a holiday.
We then asked him to give his refusal in writing. It
took two hours for the Dean to hand over the letter.
In the meantime the assessors went on rounds of
campus. There were no patients. There were no
doctors in campus. Hostel rooms and wards, OPD
had no patients or nurses to be seen. In all ICUs,
there were no patients admitted. Casualty area
and reception area there were no patients, in
laboratory, no patients for giving the samples.
Only 10 to 12 cars were patient in the campus. No
sign of a running hospital was seen in the entire
5
hospital. Infrastructure looked highly inadequate.
All beds were seen to be fresh. We, the assessors'
team, wondered how an entire hospital service can
take holiday as mentioned in the Dean's reply since
a hospital should run on a 24x7 basis for an entire
year.
The way, the Dean refused for the assessment
quoting invalid excuses shows and confirms the
non-functioning of the Hospital as well as Medical
College/classes which are self declared holidays
from 08.12.2016 to 12.12.2016. The dates looked
like tailored dates confirming with the assessment
dates as and when the assessment occurred also
the leter submitted to the MCI by the College on
08.12.2016 mentions holidays of 10th & 11th
December of Saturday and Sunday respectively
and Monday 12 for Eid. No mention is found of 9th
December as claimed by the Dean in his letter.
At the fag end of the process, another letter was
submitted to us with some of the key words
changed and we were pressurized to include this
and replace the first letter. So we are submitting
both the letter for your perusal.”
5. On the basis of the assessors report, the MCI vide letter
dated 26th December, 2016, recommended to the Ministry as
follows:-
“In view of the above, the college has failed to abide
by the undertaking it had given to the Central
Govt. that there are no deficiencies as per the
directions passed by the Supreme Court mandated
Oversight Committee and communicated vide
Ministry of Health & F.W. letter dated 12/09/2016
[para 1(i)]. The Executive Committee, after due
6
deliberation and discussion, has decided that the
college has failed to comply with the stipulation
laid down by the Oversight Committee.
Accordingly, the Executive Committee recommends
that as per the directions passed by Oversight
Committee and communicated vide Ministry of
Health & F.W. letter dated 12/09/2016 [in para
2(b)], the college should be debarred from admitting
students in the above course for a period of two
academic years i.e. 2017-18 & 2018-19 as even
after giving an undertaking that they have fulfilled
the entire infrastructure for establishment of new
medical college at Gajaroula, Dist Amroha, Uttar
Pradesh by Shri Venkateshwara University, Meerut
(Trust name – Shri Bankey Bihari Educational &
Welfare Trust) under Shri Venkateshwara
University, Gajroula, Amroha, the college was
found to be grossly deficient. It has also been
decided by the Executive Committee that the Bank
Guarantee furnished by the college in pursuance of
the directives passed by the Oversight Committee
as well as GOI letter dated 12/09/2016 is liable to
be encashed.”
6. The Ministry granted a personal hearing to the
Institution on 17th January, 2017, by the Directorate General of
Health Services. The Hearing Committee, after permitting the
Institution to file written submissions, eventually, submitted its
report to the Ministry. The Ministry forwarded the report of the
Hearing Committee to the Oversight Committee for guidance. The
Oversight Committee vide letter dated 14th May, 2017, conveyed
the following views to the Ministry:-
7
“EC has not considered the assessment report of
assessment carried out on 11th-12th Nov. 2016.
As per the assessment report dated 11th – 12th Nov.
2016, there is no deficiency in infrastructure,
faculty/residents strength, clinical material and
investigation workload that would warrant
disapproval of the scheme. There are certain
remarks such as : (i) Most of the faculty and
resident doctors have joined in last one and a half
months prior to inspection. It is not known or
could not be verified whether those faculties were
considered by MCI in the same year, where they
were previously working or where these faculty
were appointed with permanent address proof.
There are no remarks given by the College.
However, it was the responsibility of the
assessment team to verify the above about the
faculty.
ii) Patients in the ward were admitted with very
vague complaints which did not require admission
like pain in abdomen, itching, cough, mild fever,
joint pains, irritation in the eyes, low back pains.
In some wards, both male and female patients were
admitted in the same ward (like Psychiatry). In
Paediatrics, patients above the age of 14 were
admitted with vague/no complaint.
The remarks about patients are not specific and
are general in nature.
iii) No patients were in labor. No LSCS. No
Normal delivery on date of assessment. This is a
subjective remark without MSR.
iv) Only 1 major & 1 minor surgery on date of
assessment. This is a subjective remark without
MSR.
8
v) It is reported in SAF that the College website
does not show name of all the faculty members
(only 1 name appears on website out of 5 present
in Pharmacology). Names of all faculty (including
Pharmacology) are shown on website
(http://vimshospital.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/
2016/12/Faculty-10-Nov-2016.pdf).”
7. Thereafter, the Union of India passed an order on
31st May, 2017. As the order was an unreasoned one, this Court
in Glocal Medical College and Super Specialty Hospital &
Research Centre vs. Union of India & Others [Writ Petition
(Civil) No.41 of 2017] had given certain directions and the present
matter was included. The direction given on 1st August, 2017, by
this Court reads as follows:-
“In the above persuasive premise, the Central
Government is hereby ordered to consider afresh
the materials on record pertaining to the issue of
confirmation or otherwise of the letter of
permission granted to the petitioner
colleges/institutions. We make it clear that in
undertaking this exercise, the Central Government
would re-evaluate the recommendations/views of
the MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the
Oversight Committee, as available on records. It
would also afford an opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner colleges/institutions to the extent
necessary. The process of hearing and final
reasoned decision thereon, as ordered, would be
completed peremptorily within a period of 10 days
9
from today. The parties would unfailingly
co-operate in compliance of this direction to meet
the time frame fixed.”
8. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the Ministry
granted hearing to the Institution on 3rd August, 2017 and on 10th
August, 2017, passed the following order:-
“The college informed that compliance verification
was carried out by MCI on 11-12 November, 2016.
As per SAF form the deficiency was 1.5% in faculty
and 8.6% in residents.
The college had declared extended holiday
due to Eid and informed MCI on 08.12.2016. But
MCI conducted surprise inspection on 09.12.2016.
The college did not allow inspection as only one
compliance inspection was warranted as per OC
orders.
It is seen from assessors note that on their
visit to the college on 09.12.2016, the campus wore
a completely deserted look. There was no sign of a
functional hospital.
In the opinion of the Committee, MCI was
not precluded from conducting inspection subject
to sufficient reason and justification. The
Committee agrees with the decision of the Ministry
conveyed by letter dated 31.05.2017 to debar the
college for 2 years and also permit MCI to encash
bank guarantee.
Accepting the recommendations of the
Hearing Committee, the Ministry reiterates its
earlier decision dated 31.05.2017 to debar the
college from admitting students for a period of two
years i.e. 2017-18 and 2018-19 and also to
10
authorize MCI to encash the Bank Guarantee of
Rs.2 Crore.”
9. Criticizing the aforesaid order, it is submitted by
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Harin P. Raval, learned senior counsel
for the petitioners that the order passed by the Union of India is
absolutely unjustified, inasmuch as the inspecting team of the
MCI could not have conducted a surprise inspection on 9th
December, 2016. However, there is a subsequent amendment to
the Medical Council of India Regulations, which clearly states that
the MCI shall ensure that such inspections are not carried out at
least 2 days before and 2 days after important religious and
festivals holidays declared by the Central/State Government.
Learned senior counsel would further submit that the controversy
is squarely covered by the decision rendered by this Court on 30th
August, 2017, in Kanachur Islamic Education Trust (R) vs.
Union of India and Another [Writ Petition (Civil) No.468 of
2017].
10. Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General
supporting the order passed by the Union of India contended that
the inspection report clearly spells out the deficiencies in the
11
Institution and if the Letter of Permission is granted, it would be
travesty of justice. It is his further submission that the
controversy in the instant case is remotely not covered by the
decision rendered in Kanachur Islamic Education Trust (R)
(supra). Additionally, learned Additional Solicitor General would
harp upon the fact that the entire exercise has been carried out
for the academic session 2016-2017 and not for 2017-2018.
11. To appreciate the controversy in issue, it is necessary to
mention that on the basis of the recommendation of the Oversight
Committee, the Central Government had granted the Letter of
Permission. The Oversight Committee had imposed certain
conditions. One such condition was to furnish the bank guarantee
amounting to Rs.2 crores and to remove certain deficiencies and
file an affidavit of affirmation of removal of deficiencies that was
meant for 2016-2017. Though, Mr. Singh, has laid immense
press that the inspection was carried out for 2016-2017, we are
not inclined to accept the same. We are disposed to think that
the inspection was done for academic session 2017-2018 because
we have been apprised in the course of hearing that the
Institution had applied for grant of renewal of permission for the
12
academic session 2017-2018.
12. The thrust of the matter is whether the inspecting team
could have inspected on 9th December, 2016. It is worthy to note
that the Medical Council of India with the previous sanction of the
Central Government had amended the “Establishment of Medical
College Regulations 1999”. The amended clause 8(3)(1)(d) reads as
follows:-
”However, the office of the Council shall ensure
that such inspections are not carried out at least 2
days before and 2 days after important religious
and festival holidays declared by the Central/State
Govt.”
13. In Kanachur Islamic Education Trust (R) (supra),
while dwelling upon the same, this Court has held:-
“The fact that the petitioner's college/institution is
a minority institution and that a major festival for
the said community was scheduled on 12.12.2016
and that the day previous thereto i.e. 11.12.2016
was a Sunday, are facts which may not be wholly
irrelevant.”
14. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to state thus:-
“The observation of the Hearing Committee that
petitioner’s college/institution has not explained
the deficiency of faculty is belied by its
representations and also the observations amongst
13
others of the Oversight Committee. The conclusion
that a few residents might have been on leave on
account of NEET (PG) examination but not all, also
seems to be inferential in the face of exhaustive
explanation provided by the petitioner's
college/institution. In this context, the observation
of the Oversight Committee in its communication
dated 14.5.2017 that eight colleges including the
petitioner’s college/institution had been assessed
twice in quick succession for the same purpose
though not authorized by it in its guidelines,
deserves attention. The Hearing Committee seems
to have ignored the explanation provided by the
Professor and Head of Department of Surgery,
explaining the treatment given to the three patients
named in clause xii (a) to (c) of the Inspection
Report in concluding that, the petitioner's
college/institution had not responded thereto. Its
deduction that there might have been more
instances of multiple entries in the OPD patient
statistics based on five such instances is also
visibly presumptive. The striking feature of the
observations of the Hearing Committee, on the
basis of which the impugned decision has been
rendered, is the patent omission on its part to
consider the relevant materials on record, as
mandated by this Court by its order dated
1.8.2017. The findings of the Hearing Committee,
in our comprehension, thus stands vitiated by the
non-consideration of the representations/
explanations of the petitioner's college/institution,
the documents supporting the same, the
recommendations/views of the MCI, the
observation of the earlier Hearing Committee,
DGHS and Oversight Committee, as available on
records. The Central Government as well readily
concurred with the observations of the Hearing
Committee in passing the impugned order, which
per se, in our estimate, is unsustainable in the
singular facts and circumstances of the case.”
14
15. On a careful reading of the aforesaid judgment, we do
not think that the clause has been interpreted as not to allow any
inspection on a Sunday, but the Court have said in the factual
matrix of the said case that the Institution was a minority
institution and a major festival for the said community was
scheduled on 12th December, 2016 and the day previous thereto
i.e. 11th December, 2016, was a Sunday and the said facts are not
wholly irrelevant. The said analysis cannot be regarded as the
construction of the clause.
16. Having said that, we shall proceed to analyze what the
clause precisely conveys. On a careful reading of the same, it is
quite clear and unambiguous that the obligation of the MCI is to
ensure that inspections are not to be carried out at least 2 days
before and 2 days after an important religious and festival
holidays declared by the Central/State Government. In the
clause, the words which gain significance are “important religious
and festival holidays”. On 12th December, 2016, it was
Milad-un-Nabi and it is the day of festival. The inspection was
done on 9th December, 2016, which was a Friday. The amended
clause of the notification state only covers 2 days before the
15
festival declared as a holiday by the Central/State Government
and 2 days thereafter. In the case at hand, the inspection team
had gone for inspection on 9th December, 2016, and they were
deprived to carry out the inspection. It was not covered by the
concept of two days of moratorium. In such a situation when the
Institution does not allow the team of the MCI or the assessors of
the MCI, it will be adding premium to deviancy. Conferment of
this kind of privilege is absolutely unwarranted. Therefore, the
directions sought for grant of renewal of Letter of Permission for
the academic session 2017-2018 is not acceptable.
17. Though we have so held, yet we think it appropriate that
the students who have been admitted in the Institution for the
academic session 2016-2017, shall continue their studies. The
MCI shall send the inspecting team to the Institution within a
period of two months. After the report is filed, the MCI shall
apprise the Institution with regard to the deficiencies and give a
date for removal of the same so that the Institution would be in a
position to do the needful. We may hasten to add that the
inspection that will be carried out and the further follow up action
shall be done for the academic session 2018-2019.
16
18. As we intend to appreciate the inspection report and the
deficiencies and the action taken up thereon by the Institution,
list the matter on 15th November, 2017. The renewal application
that was submitted for the academic session 2017-2018 may be
treated as the application for the academic session 2018-2019.
The bank guarantee which has been deposited shall not be
encashed and be kept alive.
…....................................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
….......................................J.
[Amitava Roy]
….......................................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
New Delhi,
September 01, 2017.

Corporate laws - arbitration - Objection as to appointment of arbitrator not raised earlier - after participation - objection not tenable =no bar under the new Act, for an arbitration agreement providing for an employee of a Government/statutory cor- poration/public sector undertaking (which is a party to the contract), acting as an arbitrator.The fact that the named arbitrator happens to be an employee of one of the parties to the Arbitration Agreement has not by itself, before the Amendment Act came into force, rendered such appointment invalid and unenforceable. In the circumstances, the High Court was clearly in error in exercising jurisdiction in the present case and it ought not to have interfered with the process and progress of arbitration. We therefore accept the challenge raised by the Appellant and reject that raised by the Respondent.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 12627-12628 OF 2017@
(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.25206-25207 OF 2016)
ARAVALI POWER COMPANY PVT. LTD. .…...…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S. ERA INFRA ENGINEERING LTD. ..…...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 12629-12630 OF 2017@
(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.503-504 OF 2017)
JUDGMENT
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted. These appeals challenge the common judgment and order
dated 29.07.2016 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in
O.M.P. (T) (Comm.) No.13/2016 and Arbitration Petition No.136/2016.
2
2. Construction work of permanent township for Indira Gandhi Super
Thermal Power Project at Jhajjar, Haryana was awarded to the
Respondent- M/s Era Infra Engineering Ltd. on 20.05.2009 and contract
dated 17.11.2009 signed thereafter broadly consisted of General
Conditions of Contract (GCC) and Special Conditions of Contract (SCC).
Clause 56 of the GCC stipulated arbitration between the parties in
following terms:-
“56. ARBITRATION:-
Except where otherwise provided for in the contract all
questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the
specifications, designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials
used on the work or as to any other questions, claim, rights,
matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating
to the contract, design, drawing, specifications, estimates,
instructions, orders or these conditions of otherwise concerning
the works, or the executions or failures to execute the same
whether arising during the progress of the work or after the
completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the Sole
Arbitration of the Project In-charge of the Project concerned of
the owner, and if the Project In-charge is unable or unwilling to
act, to the sole arbitration of some other persons appointed by
the Chairman and Managing Director, NTPC limited (Formerly
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd) willing to act as such
Arbitrator. There will be no objections, if the Arbitrator so
appointed is an employee of NTPC Limited (Formerly National
Thermal Power Corporation Ltd), and that he had to deal with
the matters to which the contract relates and that in the course
of his duties as such he had expressed views on all or any of the
matters in disputes or difference. The Arbitrator to whom the
matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his
office or being unable to act for any reason as aforesaid at the
time of such transfer, vacations of office or inability to act,
3
Chairman and Managing Directors, NTPC limited (Formerly
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd.), shall appoint
another person to act as Arbitrator in accordance with the terms
of the contract……”
3. According to the Appellant-Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd.,
scheduled date of completion of work was 19.05.2011 but the progress of
work was quite slow which compelled the Appellant to cancel certain
remaining works by its letters dated 18.07.2014, 24.10.2014, 30.06.2015 and
08.07.2015. By its letter dated 29.07.2015 the Respondent alleged that the
delays in the project were not attributable to the Respondent and after setting
out certain grievances, the letter thereafter sought to invoke arbitration
submitting further that arbitration be through a retired Judge of the High
Court, the relevant portion of the letter being:-
“In view of the above circumstances and inaction of APCPL
towards settlement of our claims/payments, we hereby invoke
Arbitration Clause of the Contract Agreement request your
good self to appoint Arbitrator for settlement of our claims
according to Clause 56 of GCC of the Contract Agreement.
However, we want to draw your attention to the legal point that
once the order of part cancellation has been passed at the
Highest Level of the Owner/Employer, hence, any forum for
resolution of dispute constituted by the said authority &
particularly its subordinate is of no legal consequence. It is a
well settled proposition of law that nobody can be judge in its
own cause. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid settled position
of law, we seek an independent arbitration, through a retired
Hon’ble Judge of the Hon’ble High Court so as to seek
vindication of our grievance as mentioned in foregoing paras.
Since the matter is utmost important, we hereby request that a
4
panel of independent Arbitrators may kindly be made available
to us so that we can choose from the panel. We would also be
agreeable to the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal comprising
of nominee of your company; our nominee and both the
nominee arbitrators appointing the Presiding/Umpire Arbitrator.
We request that an early action in this regard may kindly be
taken, in accordance with law.”
4. In response, while refuting the allegations in the letter under reply, the
Appellant proceeded to appoint its Chief Executive Officer as the sole
Arbitrator on 19.08.2015 and intimated the respondent on the same day in
following terms:
“Please note that in terms of the Arbitration Clause 56 of the
GCC there is no provision for selection by you of Arbitrator
from any panel of Arbitrators to be offered by us. There is also
no provision for formation of an Arbitral Tribunal as suggested
by you. Clause 56 of the GCC envisaged the appointment of
the designated officers as Arbitrator and accordingly the Chief
Executives Officer APCPL on your request, has been
designated as the Sole Arbitrator. The Learned Arbitrator shall
inform you of the Arbitral proceedings in time.”
By further communication dated 26.09.2015 the Appellant reiterated
its stand taken in letter dated 19.08.2015.
5. In the meanwhile, the Arbitrator so appointed fixed the first hearing in
arbitration on 07.10.2015. The parties appeared on 07.10.2015 and the
proceedings show that the hearing was fixed on 09.04.2016 by which time
there was to be completion of filing of statement of response to counter
claim etc. The proceedings do not show any objection having been raised by
5
the Respondent regarding continuation of the arbitration proceedings. On
04.12.2015 a letter was addressed by the Respondent to the
Arbitrator seeking extension of time to file its statement of claim. It was
stated, inter alia:
“In the last-hearing held on 07.10.2015 the Claimant was given
60 days’ time to file its Statement of Claim. In this connection
it is to state that we need to collect some more data and files
from our other offices to make the Statement of Claim. For that
purpose, we need about one month further time to submit our
Statement of Claim.
It is therefore, requested that the Ld. Sole Arbitrator may kindly
grant one month further time to the Claimant to file its
Statement of Claim.”
According to the record, the Arbitrator granted one month’s time, as
prayed for.
6. On 01.01.2016, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Act”) was gazetted and
according to Section 1(2), the Amendment Act was deemed to have come
into force on 23rd October, 2015.
7. For the first time on 12.01.2016, the Respondent sought to challenge
the Arbitrator and raised objection regarding constitution of the arbitral
tribunal as under:
“In reference to the above referred communications addressed
by us, we hereby state that the constitution of the present
arbitral tribunal is wholly invalid/void & against the settled
principles of law, and on account of which Era Infra
Engineering Ltd. is seeking appropriate legal remedies by
6
approaching the Hon’ble High Court for appointment of an
Independent Arbitral Tribunal. Accordingly, we hereby request
your good self to kindly restrain yourself from assuming
reference and seeking to proceed with the present alleged
proceedings, till the final outcome of the above referred legal
proceedings, sought to be immediately & urgently
filed/preferred by Era Infra Engineering Ltd.”
8. The objection was rejected by the Arbitrator on 22.01.2016 on the
ground that the Respondent had participated in the arbitral proceedings on
07.10.2015 without raising any protest. The Respondent was then intimated
to attend proceedings in arbitration scheduled to be held on 16.02.2016. The
Respondent however, approached the High Court of Delhi by filing petition
under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as “1996 Act”), registered as OMP(T)(Comm.) No.13/2016,
seeking termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator. Grounds I, IV, VI, VII
and VIII raised in the petition were:-
I It is submitted that it is a settled principle of law that
nobody can be a judge in his own cause. In other words, a party
to the Agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. It is
submitted that interest of justice and equity require that where a
party to the contract disputes the committing of any breach of
the condition, the adjudication should be by an independent
person or body and not by the other party to the contract.
IV That without prejudice to the above, it would also be
relevant to mention herein that the allegedly appointed
Arbitrator namely, Shri S.K. Sinha, would also be otherwise
unable to perform the functions of an independent Arbitrator, in
as much as, he has himself, in his official capacity in the
respondent-company, dealt with contracts of nature similar to
7
the contract works in question herein (including the present
contract works), on behalf of the respondent-company.
VI That it would also be worth mentioning that the Hon’ble
Courts have consistently held and observed that the policy of
the Government/Statutory Authorities/Pubic Sector
undertakings, to provide/appoint for arbitration by an Employee
Arbitrator is a vexed problem which requires reconsideration,
which is more so in deference to the specific provisions of the
new Act reiterating the need for an independent and impartial
Arbitrator.
VII That in furtherance of the aforementioned spirit as
reiterated by the Hon’ble Courts, the Act has also been suitably
amended by the Legislature, whereby, inter alia, it has been
expressly provided that an Arbitrator who is an Employee,
Manager, Director or part of the Management or has a similar
controlling influence in one of the parties to the arbitration, is a
valid ground giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the
independence or impartiality of an Arbitrator. Furthermore, it
has also been provided that an Arbitrator’s previous
involvement in the case/subject matter would also be a valid
ground giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence
or impartiality of an Arbitrator.
VIII That in the present case, as brought out above, the
alleged Arbitrator so appointed by the respondent herein is an
employee of the respondent herein itself. In fact, the allegedly
appointed individual is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
the respondent herein, who on account of such position also has
a controlling influence over the respondent-company, against
whom the petitioner herein seeks to assert its claims. In such
circumstances, the said allegedly appointed arbitrator would
both in law and fact be unable to perform his functions as an
Arbitrator in an independent or impartial manner.
9. On the same day, another petition being Arbitration Petition No.136 of
2016 was filed by the Respondent under Section 11(6) of 1996 Act for
8
appointing an independent arbitrator for adjudicating disputes between the
parties. The cause of action, as pleaded, in the said petition was:-
“That the cause of action for filing the present petition
arose on the various dates when requests were made by the
petitioner to the respondent for issuance of long outstanding
payments. The cause of action further arose on 29.07.2015
when arbitration was invoked by the petitioner. The cause of
action further arose, when the respondent erroneously and
illegally rejected the petitioner’s request for appointment of an
independent Arbitral Tribunal, which cause of action is still
subsisting and continuing since the respondent has failed to
make the outstanding payment and to so appoint an independent
Arbitral Tribunal.”
10. On 01.03.2016 the High Court issued notice and stayed further
proceedings in arbitration. The matter was contested by the Appellant
submitting, inter alia, that the petition under Section 14 of 1996 Act was not
maintainable; that the Arbitrator was appointed strictly in terms of Clause 56
of the GCC; and that though the Respondent was informed about
appointment of the Arbitrator on 19.08.2015, no steps to challenge the
appointment were undertaken within the time specified and in the manner
prescribed under 1996 Act.
11. The High Court by its judgment and order under Appeal set aside the
appointment of the Arbitrator and directed the Appellant to suggest names of
three panel Arbitrators from different departments to the Respondent who
could thereafter choose any one of them to be the Arbitrator in the matter. It
9
was directed that in the event of failure by the Appellant, the Respondent
would be at liberty to revive the petitions, in which case the Court would
appoint a sole Arbitrator from the list maintained by Delhi International
Arbitration Centre. It was also observed that the Arbitrator was CEO of the
Appellant and was previously involved in cases/contract works similar to the
one involved in the present case and it could not be disputed that the
decisions of part cancellation were taken at the highest level of the
Appellant. In the circumstances, the High Court found that the apprehension
entertained by the Respondent was reasonable and not a vague or general
objection. The observations of the High Court were:-
“13. The Arbitrator, though the CEO of the
respondent-Company and the Project In-charge of the Indira
Gandhi Super Thermal Power Project, P.O. Jharii, Distt. Jhajjar,
Haryana, was not the Engineer In-charge or the day-to-day
In-charge of the work, which was to be performed by the
petitioner under the contract in question. In fact, the Engineer
In-charge for this project is AGM (CCD-Township) who is
supported by Group of Engineers (Dy. Managers, Managers &
Sr. Managers) working under him for execution of the work.
Further, the AGM (CCD-Township) reports to AGM
(ME/CCD) who in turn reports to CEO (APCPL).
37. It is common parlance oft-quoted aphorism "Not only
must Justice be done; it must also be seen to be done." The
reason is that rules are moral constructs that are meant to serve
higher value. The amendment of 2015 emphasize that the
existence of any relationship or interest of any kind is likely to
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his neutrality is to be
avoided or any employee, manager, director, or has past or
present business or has a controlling influence, relationship
10
with a party to the dispute should not be appointed as an
Arbitrator. Similarly, it is rightly mandated in the Fifth
Schedule of the Amended Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) that if the
Arbitrator has within the past three years been appointed on
two or more occasions by one of the parties and the
Arbitrator has served within the three years in another
arbitration on a related issue involving one of the parties, his
appointment would give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
independence or impartiality of arbitrators. No doubt, the
invocation was about three months prior to amendment. But
the Court has to keep in mind about the purpose and scope
of the Act.
38. In the present case, no doubt, the invocation was on the
basis of un-amended Act but still under Section 12 of the Act
would give the similar indication. The sole Arbitrator
appointed by the respondent admittedly is CEO and Executive
of the respondent-Company who is also from the same
office/department. In order to maintain the neutrality, or to
avoid any doubt in the mind of the petitioner and the reasons
given in the petition, it would be appropriate that independent
sole Arbitrator should be appointed as ultimately neutral person
has merely to decide the dispute between the parties. Even, the
object and scope of the Act says so, that an arbitration
procedure should be fair and unbias. Thus, the appointment of
Mr. S.K. Sinha, CEO of the respondent Company is terminated
and once the Arbitrator’s appointment is terminated, the Court
can consider the prayer of the petitioner.”
12. The decision of the High Court is challenged by the Appellant and Mr.
Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate submitted, inter alia, that as the
appointment of the Arbitrator was completely in tune with Clause 56 of the
GCC there was no occasion for the High Court to exercise any power or
jurisdiction and that 1996 Act contemplated clear and definite procedure for
11
challenging the Arbitrator, and even if such challenge were to fail the
remedy under Section 13 was specific and of different nature. In either case,
according to him, the Respondent could not have approached the High Court
and both the petitions ought not to have been entertained.
13. To the extent the High Court had directed the Appellant to submit
three names from its panel of Arbitrators from which list the Respondent
was to select the sole Arbitrator, the Respondent challenged that part of the
Judgment by filing SLP (Civil) Nos.503-504 of 2017. Appearing for the
Respondent, Mr. Manoj K. Singh, learned Advocate relied upon some
decisions of this Court and submitted that an Officer who had either dealt
with the project or was directly subordinate to the Authority whose decision
was the subject matter of dispute could not be an arbitrator in the matter.
14. At the outset, it must be stated that the invocation of arbitration in the
present case was on 29.07.2015, the Arbitrator was appointed on 19.08.2015
and the parties appeared before the Arbitrator on 07.10.2015, well before
23.10.2015 i.e. the date on which the Amendment Act was deemed to have
come into force. The statutory provisions that would therefore govern the
present controversy are those that were in force before the Amendment Act
came into effect. We must mention here that both the parties have addressed
their submissions on this premise.
12
15. Before we consider the present controversy, we may quote, for
facility, Sections 12, 13 and 14 of 1996 Act as they stood before the
Amendment Act came into force:-
“12. Grounds for challenge.—
(1) When a person is approached in connection with his
possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in
writing any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence or impartiality.
(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and
throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay,
disclose to the parties in writing any circumstances referred to
in sub-section (1) unless they have already been informed of
them by him.
(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—
(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts
as to his independence or impartiality, or
(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the
parties.
(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in
whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of
which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.
13. Challenge procedure.—
(1) Subject to sub-section (4), the parties are free to agree on a
procedure for challenging an arbitrator.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), a party
who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days
after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal
or after becoming aware of any circumstances referred to in
13
sub-section (3) of section 12, send a written statement of the
reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal.
(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub-section (2)
withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the
challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge.
(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by the
parties or under the procedure under sub-section (2) is not
successful, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub-section (4), the
party challenging the arbitrator may make an application for
setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance with section
34.
(6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an application made
under sub-section (5), the Court may decide as to whether the
arbitrator who is challenged is entitled to any fees.
14. Failure or impossibility to act-
(1) The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate if—
(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his
functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue
delay; and
(b) he withdraws from his office or the parties agree to
the termination of his mandate.
(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds
referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, apply to the Court to decide on
the termination of the mandate.
(3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of section 13, an
arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the
termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, it shall not imply
acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this
section or sub-section (3) of section 12.”
14
16. In the present case Clause 56 of the GCC provides for arbitration by
the Project In-charge of the concerned Project, and in case such Project
In-charge were to be unable or unwilling to act, arbitration by any person
appointed by the Chairman and Managing Director. It further provides inter
alia that there would be no objection even if the Arbitrator had dealt with the
matters to which the contract related in the course of his duties or had
expressed views on all or any of the matters in dispute or difference.
17. The fact that the named arbitrator happens to be an employee of one
of the parties to the Arbitration Agreement has not by itself, before the
Amendment Act came into force, rendered such appointment invalid and
unenforceable. The observations of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. and Others v. Raja Transport Private Ltd.1
in paragraphs 28, 30, 31
and 32 are quite clear. Said paragraphs were as under:
“28. It is contended by the respondent that in view of the emphasis
on the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator in
the new Act and having regard to the basic principle of natural
justice that no man should be judge in his own cause, any arbitration
agreement to the extent it nominates an officer of one of
the parties as the arbitrator, would be invalid and unenforceable.
30. We find no bar under the new Act, for an arbitration agreement
providing for an employee of a Government/statutory cor-
1
(2009) 8 SCC 520
15
poration/public sector undertaking (which is a party to the contract),
acting as an arbitrator. Section 11(8) of the Act requires
the Chief Justice or his designate, in appointing an arbitrator, to
have due regard to:
“11. (8)(a) any qualifications required of the arbitrator by
the agreement of the parties; and
(b) other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment
of an independent and impartial arbitrator.”
31. Section 12(1) requires an arbitrator, when approached in
connection with his possible appointment, to disclose in writing
any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to
his independence or impartiality. Section 12(3) enables the arbitrator
being challenged if
(i) the circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to
his independence or impartiality, or
(ii) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the
parties.
32. Section 18 requires the arbitrator to treat the parties with
equality (that is to say without bias) and give each party full opportunity
to present his case. Nothing in Sections 11, 12, 18 or
other provisions of the Act suggests that any provision in an arbitration
agreement, naming the arbitrator will be invalid if
such named arbitrator is an employee of one of the parties to
the arbitration agreement.”
18. In the same decision, this Court in paragraphs 34 and 35 dealt with
“justifiable apprehension about the independence or impartiality” of an employee
arbitrator in following terms:-
“34. The fact that the named arbitrator is an employee of one of
the parties is not ipso facto a ground to raise a presumption of
16
bias or partiality or lack of independence on his part. There can
however be a justifiable apprehension about the independence
or impartiality of an employee arbitrator, if such person was the
controlling or dealing authority in regard to the subject contract
or if he is a direct subordinate (as contrasted from an officer of
an inferior rank in some other Department) to the officer whose
decision is the subject-matter of the dispute.
35. Where however the named arbitrator though a senior officer
of the Government/statutory body/government company, had
nothing to do with the execution of the subject contract, there
can be no justification for anyone doubting his independence or
impartiality, in the absence of any specific evidence. Therefore,
senior officer(s) (usually Heads of Department or equivalent) of
a Government/statutory corporation/public sector undertaking,
not associated with the contract, are considered to be independent
and impartial and are not barred from functioning as arbitrators
merely because their employer is a party to the contract.”
19. Section 12(1) as it then stood before the Amendment Act came into
force, obliged the person approached in connection with possible appointment
as an arbitrator, to disclose in writing any circumstances likely to give
rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. In the
present case, the Arbitrator undoubtedly is an employee of the Appellant but
so long as there is no justifiable apprehension about his independence or impartiality,
the appointment could not be rendered invalid and unenforceable.
As held in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (supra) mere fact that the
arbitrator is an employee is not ipso facto a ground to raise any presumption
of bias or partiality. It is not the case that there had not been any fair and
17
correct disclosure. All that the Respondent alleged in its petition seeking
termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator was, “…..he has himself in his
official capacity in the Respondent-Company dealt with contracts of nature
similar to the contract works in question….” The Respondent, while relying
on the provisions of the Amendment Act had also submitted, “…. allegedly
appointed individual is the Chief Executive Officer of the Respondent
herein, who on account of such position also has the controlling influence
over the Respondent-Company”. At the same time, the High Court observed
in Paragraph 13 of the judgment under appeal that the Arbitrator was
not the Engineer In-charge or the day-to-day In-charge of the work and as a
matter of fact, the Engineer In-charge was AGM (CCD-Township) who had
a team of other Engineers working under him a n d t h a t AG M ( C C D -
Tow n s h i p ) r e p o r t e d t o AG M ( M E - C C D ) w h o i n t u r n r e -
p o r t e d t o C E O (APCPL) i.e. the Arbitrator. The facts on record and the
hierarchy as mentioned do not show that the Arbitrator in the present matter
was either the Dealing Authority in regard to the Contract or was directly
sub-ordinate to the Officer(s) whose decision is the subject matter of dispute.
In fact, the decision, which could be subject matter of dispute, was that of
his subordinates. He may have dealt with contracts of nature similar to the
contract works in question but that by itself does not render the appointment
18
invalid. Since there is nothing on record which could raise justifiable doubts
about the independence or impartiality of the named Arbitrator, in the light
of the observations of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (supra) the
appointment of the Arbitrator could not in any way be termed to be illegal or
unenforceable.
20. However, number of decisions of this Court were relied upon by the
Respondent in support of its submission that interference in the present case
was called for. We may therefore deal with those decisions.
A. In Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway,
New Delhi v. Patel Engineering Company Ltd2
., a Bench consisting
of three learned Judges of this Court was called upon to consider the
apparent conflict between two Judgments of this Court in “ACE
Pipeline Contracts (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.3
and
Union of India v. Bharat Battery Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd.4
”. The
submission made on behalf of the appellant therein as quoted in
paragraph 5 was:-
“5.…………..It is, therefore, submitted that before the
alternative is resorted to, agreed procedure has to be
exhausted. The agreement has to be given effect and the
contract has to be adhered to as closely as possible.
Corrective measures have to be taken first and the Court
is the last resort.”
2
(2008) 10 SCC 240
3
(2007) 5 SCC 304
4
(2007) 7 SCC 684
19
The discussion in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the decision was as under:-
“12. A bare reading of the scheme of Section 11 shows
that the emphasis is on the terms of the agreement being
adhered to and/or given effect as closely as possible. In
other words, the Court may ask to do what has not been
done. The Court must first ensure that the remedies
provided for are exhausted. It is true as contended by Mr.
Desai, that it is not mandatory for the Chief Justice or
any person or institution designated by him to appoint the
named arbitrator or arbitrators. But at the same time, due
regard has to be given to the qualifications required by
the agreement and other considerations.
13. The expression “due regard” means that proper
attention to several circumstances have been focused.
The expression “necessary” as a general rule can be
broadly stated to be those things which are reasonably
required to be done or legally ancillary to the
accomplishment of the intended act. Necessary measures
can be stated to be the reasonable steps required to be
taken.
14. In all these cases at hand the High Court does not
appear to have focused on the requirement to have due
regard to the qualifications required by the agreement or
other considerations necessary to secure the appointment
of an independent and impartial arbitrator. It needs no
reiteration that appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators
named in the arbitration agreement is not a must, but
while making the appointment the twin requirements of
sub-section (8) of Section 11 have to be kept in view,
considered and taken into account. If it is not done, the
appointment becomes vulnerable. In the circumstances,
we set aside the appointment made in each case, remit the
matters to the High Court to make fresh appointments
keeping in view the parameters indicated above.”
20
B. In Union of India v. Singh Builders Syndicate5
, an arbitral
tribunal consisting of three serving Officers was constituted but no
proceedings were actually undertaken. Thereafter, on an application
preferred under Section 11, the High Court appointed a Former Judge
of that High Court as the sole arbitrator. Paragraph 11 of the decision
set out the question which arose for consideration and Paragraph 14
was as under:-
“14. It was further held in Northern Railway case that
the Chief Justice or his designate should first ensure that
the remedies provided under the arbitration agreement
are exhausted, but at the same time also ensure that the
twin requirements of sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the
Act are kept in view. This would mean that invariably the
court should first appoint the arbitrators in the manner
provided for in the arbitration agreement. But where the
independence and impartiality of the arbitrator(s)
appointed/nominated in terms of the arbitration
agreement is in doubt, or where the Arbitral Tribunal
appointed in the manner provided in the arbitration
agreement has not functioned and it becomes necessary
to make fresh appointment, the Chief Justice or his
designate is not powerless to make appropriate
alternative arrangements to give effect to the provision
for arbitration.”
C. After dealing with cases on the point including Northern
Railway Administration (supra), this Court in Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. (supra) summed up the legal position as under:-
45. If the arbitration agreement provides for arbitration
by a named arbitrator, the courts should normally give
5
(2009) 4 SCC 523
21
effect to the provisions of the arbitration agreement. But
as clarified by Northern Railway Admn., where there is
material to create a reasonable apprehension that the
person mentioned in the arbitration agreement as the
arbitrator is not likely to act independently or impartially,
or if the named person is not available, then the Chief
Justice or his designate may, after recording reasons
for not following the agreed procedure of referring the
dispute to the named arbitrator, appoint an independent
arbitrator in accordance with Section 11(8) of the Act. In
other words, referring the disputes to the named arbitrator
shall be the rule. The Chief Justice or his designate will
have to merely reiterate the arbitration agreement by
referring the parties to the named arbitrator or named
Arbitral Tribunal. Ignoring the named arbitrator/Arbitral
Tribunal and nominating an independent arbitrator shall
be the exception to the rule, to be resorted for valid
reasons.
48. In the light of the above discussion, the scope of
Section 11 of the Act containing the scheme of
appointment of arbitrators may be summarised thus:
(i) Where the agreement provides for arbitration with
three arbitrators (each party to appoint one arbitrator and
the two appointed arbitrators to appoint a third
arbitrator), in the event of a party failing to appoint an
arbitrator within 30 days from the receipt of a request
from the other party (or the two nominated arbitrators
failing to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days
from the date of the appointment), the Chief Justice or his
designate will exercise power under sub-section (4) of
Section 11 of the Act.
(ii) Where the agreement provides for arbitration by a
sole arbitrator and the parties have not agreed upon any
appointment procedure, the Chief Justice or his designate
will exercise power under sub-section (5) of Section 11,
if the parties fail to agree on the arbitration within thirty
22
days from the receipt of a request by a party from the
other party.
(iii) Where the arbitration agreement specifies the
appointment procedure, then irrespective of whether the
arbitration is by a sole arbitrator or by a three-member
Tribunal, the Chief Justice or his designate will exercise
power under sub-section (6) of Section 11, if a party fails
to act as required under the agreed procedure (or the
parties or the two appointed arbitrators fail to reach an
agreement expected of them under the agreed procedure
or any person/institution fails to perform any function
entrusted to him/it under that procedure).
(iv) While failure of the other party to act within 30
days will furnish a cause of action to the party seeking
arbitration to approach the Chief Justice or his designate
in cases falling under sub-sections (4) and (5), such a
time-bound requirement is not found in sub-section (6) of
Section 11. The failure to act as per the agreed procedure
within the time-limit prescribed by the arbitration
agreement, or in the absence of any prescribed time-limit,
within a reasonable time, will enable the aggrieved party
to file a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act.
(v) Where the appointment procedure has been agreed
between the parties, but the cause of action for invoking
the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or his designate under
clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (6) has not arisen,
then the question of the Chief Justice or his designate
exercising power under sub-section (6) does not arise.
The condition precedent for approaching the Chief
Justice or his designate for taking necessary measures
under sub-section (6) is that
(i) a party failing to act as required under the agreed
appointment procedure; or
23
(ii) the parties (or the two appointed arbitrators)
failing to reach an agreement expected of them under the
agreed appointment procedure; or
(iii) a person/institution who has been entrusted with
any function under the agreed appointment procedure,
failing to perform such function.
(vi) The Chief Justice or his designate while
exercising power under sub-section (6) of Section 11
shall endeavour to give effect to the appointment
procedure prescribed in the arbitration clause.
(vii) If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable
doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the
person nominated, or if other circumstances warrant
appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the
procedure prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate
may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated
arbitrator and appoint someone else.”
Thus, as laid down in sub-para (v) of para 48, unless the cause
of action for invoking jurisdiction under Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of
sub-section (6) of Section 11 of 1996 Act arises, there is no question
of the Chief Justice or his designate exercising power under
sub-section (6) of Section 11.
D. In Denel (Proprietary) Limited v. Bharat Electronics Limited
and Another6
, though the arbitration agreement provided that all
disputes be referred to the Managing Director or his nominee for
6
(2010) 6 SCC 394
24
arbitration, this Court appointed retired Judge of this Court as the sole
arbitrator. The reason as is clear from paras 19 to 21 of the decision
was; while invoking arbitration the appellant therein had requested the
respondent for an appointment of a mutually agreed independent
arbitrator but the respondent had plainly refused to refer the disputes
to arbitration. Para 20 of the decision is noteworthy:-
“20. In Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd.7
this
Court while considering the powers of the Court to
appoint an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940, cited the decision of this Court in Bhupinder
Singh Bindra v. Union of India8
. It was held in that case
that:
“3. It is settled law that court cannot interpose and
interdict the appointment of an arbitrator, whom
the parties have chosen under the terms of the
contract unless legal misconduct of the arbitrator,
fraud, disqualification, etc. is pleaded and proved.
It is not in the power of the party at his own will or
pleasure to revoke the authority of the arbitrator
appointed with his consent. There must be just and
sufficient cause for revocation.”
The said principle has to abide in the normal course.”
E. Similarly, in Denel (Proprietary) Limited v. Ministry of
Defence9
, the relevant clause provided for sole arbitration of the
Director General, Ordnance Factory, Government of India or a
7
(2000) 8 SCC 151
8
(1995) 5 SCC 329
9
(2012) 2 SCC 759
25
Government Servant appointed by him. It was observed that since no
arbitrator was appointed in terms of the governing clause within the
stipulated period the respondent had forfeited the right to make an
appointment of an arbitrator. Paragraphs 21 and 24 of the decision
were:-
“21. It is true that in normal circumstances while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6), the Court
would adhere to the terms of the agreement as closely as
possible. But if the circumstances warrant, the Chief
Justice or the nominee of the Chief Justice is not
debarred from appointing an independent arbitrator other
than the named arbitrator.
24. It must also be remembered that even while
exercising the jurisdiction under Section 11(6), the Court
is required to have due regard to the provisions contained
in Section 11(8) of the Act. The aforesaid section
provides that apart from ensuring that the arbitrator
possesses the necessary qualifications required of the
arbitrator by the agreement of the parties, the Court shall
have due regard to other considerations as are likely to
ensure the appointment of an independent and impartial
arbitrator. Keeping in view the aforesaid provision, this
Court in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd, whilst emphasizing that
normally the Court shall make the appointment in terms
of the agreed procedure, has observed that the Chief
Justice or his designate may deviate from the same after
recording reasons for the same……..”
F. In Union of India and Others v. Uttar Pradesh State Bridge
Corporation Limited10
, an arbitral tribunal consisting of three
10 (2015) 2 SCC 52
26
Gazetted Railway Officers was constituted in the year 2007 and
despite four years having passed, the matter was not getting
concluded. In the circumstances, while accepting the petition for
setting aside the mandate of the tribunal the High Court had appointed
a retired Chief Justice as the sole arbitrator. While considering the
grievance that such appointment was beyond the concerned arbitration
clause, this Court observed:-
“12. As is clear from the reading of Section 14, when
there is a failure on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal to act
and it is unable to perform its function either de jure or
de facto, it is open to a party to the arbitration
proceedings to approach the court to decide on the
termination of the mandate. Section 15 provides some
more contingencies when mandate of an arbitrator can
get terminated. In the present case, the High Court has
come to a categorical finding that the Arbitral Tribunal
failed to perform its function, and rightly so. It is a clear
case of inability on the part of the members of the
Tribunal to proceed in the matter as the matter lingered
on for almost four years, without any rhyme or justifiable
reasons. The members did not mend their ways even
when another life was given by granting three months to
them. Virtually a peremptory order was passed by the
High Court, but the Arbitral Tribunal remained
unaffected and took the directions of the High Court in a
cavalier manner. Therefore, the order of the High Court
terminating the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal is
flawless. This aspect of the impugned order is not even
questioned by the appellant at the time of hearing of the
present appeal. However, the contention of the appellant
is that even if it was so, as per the provisions of Section
15 of the Act, substitute arbitrators should have been
appointed “according to the rules that were applicable to
27
the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced”. On this
basis, it was the submission of Mr. Mehta, learned ASG,
that the High Court should have resorted to the provision
contained in Clause 64 of GCC.
13. No doubt, ordinarily that would be the position. The
moot question, however, is as to whether such a course of
action has to be necessarily adopted by the High Court in
all cases, while dealing with an application under Section
11 of the Act or is there room for play in the joints and
the High Court is not divested of exercising discretion
under some circumstances? If yes, what are those
circumstances? It is this very aspect which was
specifically dealt with by this Court in Tripple Engg.
Works.
11 Taking note of various judgments, the Court
pointed out that the notion that the High Court was bound
to appoint the arbitrator as per the contract between the
parties has seen a significant erosion in recent past. In
paras 6 and 7 of the said decision, those judgments
wherein departure from the aforesaid “classical notion”
has been made are taken note of……………….”
G. In Voestalpine Schienen GMBH v. Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation Limited12
, the relevant clause contemplated that the
disputes be settled by three arbitrators from and out of a list of five
engineers supplied by the respondent therein. The appellant had
invoked arbitration on 14.06.2016 i.e. after the amending Act. When
the list of five persons comprising of serving officers was supplied by
the respondents, an objection was taken that such procedure would
lead to appointment of “illegal persons” in view of Section 12(5) read
11 (2014) 9 SCC 288
12 (2017) 4 SCC 665
28
with Clause 1 of Schedule 7 of the Act. This Court considered that
Section 12 of the Act was amended pursuant to the recommendations
by the Law Commission which specifically dealt with the issue of
“neutrality of arbitrators”, and observed that if the arbitration clause
finds foul with the amended provisions, the appointment of the
Arbitrator even if apparently in conformity with the arbitration clause
in the agreement, would be illegal and thus the Court would be within
its powers to appoint such arbitrator(s) as may be permissible.
Paragraph 18 sums up this aspect of the matter:-
“18. Keeping in mind the afore-quoted recommendation
of the Law Commission, with which spirit, Section 12
has been amended by the Amendment Act, 2015, it is
manifest that the main purpose for amending the
provision was to provide for neutrality of arbitrators. In
order to achieve this, sub-section (5) of Section 12 lays
down that notwithstanding any prior agreement to the
contrary, any person whose relationship with the parties
or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute falls under
any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule,
he shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. In
such an eventuality i.e. when the arbitration clause finds
foul with the amended provisions extracted above, the
appointment of an arbitrator would be beyond pale of the
arbitration agreement, empowering the court to appoint
such arbitrator(s) as may be permissible. That would be
the effect of non obstante clause contained in sub-section
(5) of Section 12 and the other party cannot insist on
appointment of the arbitrator in terms of the arbitration
agreement.”
29
21. Except the decision of this Court in Voestalpine Schienen GMBH
(supra) referred to above, all other decisions arose out of matters where
invocation of arbitration was before the Amendment Act came into force.
Voestalpine Schienen GMBH (supra) was a case where the invocation was
on 14.6.2016 i.e. after the Amendment Act and the observations in Para 18
clearly show that since “the arbitration clause finds foul with the amended
provisions”, the Court was empowered to appoint such arbitrator(s) as may
be permissible. The ineligibility of the arbitrator was found in the context of
amended Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule (which was brought in by
Amendment Act) in a matter where invocation for arbitration was after the
Amendment Act had come into force. It is thus clear that in pre-amendment
cases, the law laid down in Northern Railway Administration (Supra), as
followed in all the aforesaid cases, must be applied, in that the terms of the
agreement ought to be adhered to and/or given effect to as closely as
possible. Further, the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 11 of 1996 Act
would arise only if the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are
satisfied. The cases referred to above show that once the conditions for
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11(6) were satisfied, in the exercise of
consequential power under Section 11(8), the Court had on certain occasions
gone beyond the scope of the concerned arbitration clauses and appointed
30
independent arbitrators. What is clear is, for exercise of such power under
Section 11(8), the case must first be made out for exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 11(6).
22. The principles which emerge from the decisions referred to above are:-
A. In cases governed by 1996 Act as it stood before the Amendment
Act came into force:-
(i) The fact that the named arbitrator is an employee of one of
the parties is not ipso facto a ground to raise a presumption of
bias or partiality or lack of independence on his part. There can
however be a justifiable apprehension about the independence
or impartiality of an employee arbitrator, if such person was the
controlling or dealing authority in regard to the subject contract
or if he is a direct subordinate to the officer whose decision is
the subject-matter of the dispute.
(ii) unless the cause of action for invoking jurisdiction under
Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (6) of Section 11 of 1996
Act arises, there is no question of the Chief Justice or his
designate exercising power under sub-section (6) of Section 11.
(iii) The Chief Justice or his designate while exercising power
under sub-section (6) of Section 11 shall endeavour to give
effect to the appointment procedure prescribed in the arbitration
clause.
(iv) While exercising such power under sub section (6) of
Section 11, If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable
doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the person
nominated, or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an
independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the
Chief Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded
ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else.
31
B. In cases governed by 1996 Act after the Amendment Act has come
into force:-
If the arbitration clause finds foul with the amended
provisions, the appointment of the Arbitrator even if apparently
in conformity with the arbitration clause in the agreement,
would be illegal and thus the Court would be within its powers
to appoint such arbitrator(s) as may be permissible.
23. The observations of the High Court in paragraphs 37-38 as quoted
above show that the exercise was undertaken by the High Court, “in order to
make neutrality or to avoid doubt in the mind of the petitioner” and ensure
that justice must not only be done and must also be seen to be done. In
effect, the High Court applied principles of neutrality and impartiality which
have been expanded by way of Amendment Act, even when no cause of
action for exercise of power under Section 11(6) had arisen. The procedure
as laid down in unamended Section 12 mandated disclosure of
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to independence and
impartiality of the arbitrator. It is not the case of the Respondent that the
provisions of Section 12 in unamended form stood violated on any count. In
any case the provision contemplated clear and precise procedure under
which the arbitrator could be challenged and the objections in that behalf
under Section 13 could be raised within prescribed time and in accordance
32
with the procedure detailed therein. The record shows that no such challenge
was raised within the time and in terms of the procedure prescribed. As a
matter of fact, the Respondent had participated in the arbitration and by its
communication dated 04.12.2015, had sought extension of time to file its
statement of claim.
24. In the circumstances, the High Court was clearly in error in
exercising jurisdiction in the present case and it ought not to have interfered
with the process and progress of arbitration. We therefore accept the
challenge raised by the Appellant and reject that raised by the Respondent.
Consequently, appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)
Nos.25206-25207 of 2016 are allowed while those arising from Special
Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.503-504 of 2017 stand dismissed. The
arbitration, in pursuance of the appointment of the Arbitrator on 19.08.2015,
shall proceed in accordance with law.
25. The appeals are disposed of in aforesaid terms, without any order as to
costs.
…….………………….J.
(Adarsh Kumar Goel)
…………….………….J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi
September 12, 2017

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

No Tenancy rights proved = there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiffs were sub-lessees of Bansi(Banshi) at any point of time. The alleged payment of Rs.5,000/- by the plaintiffs to Bansi(Banshi) is also not proved, inasmuch as, there is no documentary evidence to support such case of the plaintiffs. Neither lease deed executed 5 between the plaintiffs and Bansi(Banshi), nor any rent receipt is forthcoming on the record. Even the alleged rate of rent was not fixed between the plaintiffs and Bansi(Banshi).

1
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7444 OF 2009
RAJNARAYAN SHARMA ..APPELLANT
VERSUS
SIRNAM SHARMA AND OTHERS ..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
1. This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment
dated 12.12.2005 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Bench at Indore in Second Appeal No. 189/1999, setting aside
the judgment passed by the Additional District Judge, Gohad in
C.F.A No. 65/98, consequently confirming the judgment and
decree passed by the Civil Judge, Class-I, Gohad in Civil Suit
No. 8-A/87. In effect, the High Court, by the impugned
2
judgment, has restored the judgment of the trial Court,
decreeing the suit, filed by the plaintiffs. Order of review dated
04.12.2006 passed by the High Court has also been challenged
in this appeal.
2. The plaintiffs (respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein) filed
Civil Suit No. 8-A/87 for declaration of title and injunction, and
for cancellation of the sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit D-2),
executed by Bansi(Banshi) in favour of defendant
no.1-Raghunath, as well as, sale deed dated 21.9.1989(exhibit
D-1), executed by defendant 1-Raghunath in favour of
Rajnarayan Sharma (appellant herein) in respect of the land
bearing survey(new) numbers 123, 322, 426, 863, 1375 and
1413, admeasuring 7 Bighas 17 Biswas, situated in the village
Chandhara, Tehsil Gohad, District Bhind, Madhya Pradesh
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’).
The plaintiffs claimed that they were in possession of
the suit land as sub-lessee of Bansi(Banshi) after paying
Rs.5,000/- to Bansi(Banshi) in Samvat 2030 and since then
they continued to be in possession of the suit land; they
3
acquired rights of occupancy tenants; Bansi(Banshi)/holder of
the suit land could not have executed the sale deed in favour of
the first defendant, firstly, because Bansi(Banshi) was not in
possession of the suit property, and that the plaintiffs were in
continued possession of the property, and secondly, because
Bansi(Banshi) was mentally ill.
The case of the defendants is, that Raghunath
(original defendant no.1) purchased the suit land from
Bansi(Banshi) through a registered sale deed (exhibit D-2) dated
16.7.1984, and in turn, Raghunath sold the suit property to
Rajnarayan Sharma (appellant herein) through registered sale
deed (exhibit D-1) dated 21.09.1989.
3. The trial Court, after framing the issues, recording
the evidence and hearing the parties, decreed the suit filed by
the plaintiffs. As mentioned supra, the first appellate Court
reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and
dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs, concluding that the
plaintiffs have neither proved their ownership nor possession
over the suit land. The High Court, while allowing the appeal
4
filed by the plaintiffs in part, concluded that the plaintiffs have
got no right, title or interest whatsoever over the suit land, but
are in possession of the property and therefore they cannot be
dispossessed, except in accordance with law. The plaintiffs
have not assailed the impugned judgment of the High Court
holding that they do not have any right, title or interest
whatsoever over the suit land and therefore the said finding of
the High Court has attained finality and is binding on the
parties.
4. The only question to be decided in this appeal is with
regard to the possession over the suit property. The first
appellate Court, as well as, the High Court have categorically
recorded a finding on due consideration of the entire material
on the record in proper perspective, that there is nothing on
record to show that the plaintiffs were sub-lessees of
Bansi(Banshi) at any point of time. The alleged payment of
Rs.5,000/- by the plaintiffs to Bansi(Banshi) is also not proved,
inasmuch as, there is no documentary evidence to support
such case of the plaintiffs. Neither lease deed executed
5
between the plaintiffs and Bansi(Banshi), nor any rent receipt is
forthcoming on the record. Even the alleged rate of rent was
not fixed between the plaintiffs and Bansi(Banshi). Therefore,
though the High Court was justified in concluding that the
plaintiffs have not proved any right, title or interest over the
suit land, the High Court has erred in concluding that the
plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land since last few years
and they cannot be dispossessed, except in accordance with
law.
5. The plaintiffs solely rely upon khasra entries filed by
the defendants before the first appellate Court as an additional
evidence, which came to be accepted for the years Samvat
2036-2040 and 2041-2045, i.e., 1974-1979 and 1980-1985, to
show that they are in possession of the suit property. As
mentioned supra, the plaintiffs claimed that they were in
possession of the suit land from Samvat 2030, but there is
nothing on record to show that they entered into the
possession of the suit land in Samvat 2030. It is no doubt
true, that the names of the plaintiffs were forthcoming in the
6
certified copies of khasra entries for Samvat 2036-2040 and
2041-2045 in the column of particulars, however, the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Gohad has passed an order cancelling
the names of the plaintiffs in respect of those years, inasmuch
as, the khasra entries in the revenue record were found to be
incorrect. Except those khasra entries, no other documentary
material is forthcoming to prove the possession of the plaintiffs
over the suit property at any point of time.
6. Per contra, the sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit
D-2), executed by Bansi(Banshi) in favour of Raghunath
(original first defendant), and the sale deed dated 21.9.1989
(exhibit D-1), executed by the first defendant in favour of the
appellant herein are not questioned by anybody including the
plaintiffs till date. The sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit D-2)
depicts that the possession of the suit land was handed over by
Bansi(Banshi) to Raghunath, i.e., the predecessor-in-interest of
respondent nos. 3 to 5 herein. On receiving consideration of
Rs.15,000/-, the possession of the suit land was handed over to
Raghunath on the spot. On 13.5.1985, by the order of
7
Sub-Divisional Officer, Gohad, the revenue records were
mutated on the application of original vendor Bansi(Banshi).
Subsequently thereafter the names of defendant no.1-
Raghunath on the basis of sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit
D-2) and subsequent purchaser Rajnarayan Sharma (the
appellant herein) on the basis of sale deed dated 21.9.1989
(exhibit D-1) were mutated in the revenue records. Even after
the second sale deed dated 21.9.1989, the name of Rajnarayan
Sharma was entered into the revenue records as in possession
over the suit land and he is cultivating the land in question.
7. Having regard to the position narrated above, it is
clear that there is no documentary evidence to show that the
plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property and their case
is only based on oral evidence, which is controverted by the
defendants in their oral evidence, in our considered opinion,
the High Court was not justified in holding that the plaintiffs
are in possession of the property. The High Court has fully
relied on the revenue entries of Samvat 2036-2040 and
2041-2045 to conclude that the plaintiffs are in possession of
8
the property. While, doing so the High Court had erred in
overlooking the important factor that such entries were
cancelled by the superior revenue officer, as mentioned supra.
In view of the same the High Court fell into error in coming to
wrong conclusion. Hence, the said part of the impugned
judgment needs to be modified.
8. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed, the finding
recorded by the High Court that the plaintiffs are in possession
of the suit property and they cannot be dispossessed except in
accordance with law stands set aside, and the suit No. 8-A/87
is dismissed in toto. No order as to costs.
…...………………………………….J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
……..……………………………..……J.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12 , 2017.
9
ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.10 SECTION IV-A
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).7444/2009
RAJNARAYAN SHARMA Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SIRNAM SHARMA AND OTHERS Respondent(s)
Date : 12-09-2017 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Niraj Sharma,AOR
For Respondent(s) Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay,AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
pronounced the Non-Reportable judgment of the Bench
comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and His
Lordship.
The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs, in terms
of the signed Non-Reportable judgment.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sarita Purohit) (Tapan Kumar Chakraborty)
Court Master Branch Officer
(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

estopped from challenging - The law is well settled that once a person takes part in the process of selection and is not found fit for appointment, the said person is estopped from challenging the process of selection.= As far as the present case is concerned an advertisement was issued by Respondent No.6 inviting applications for the post of Music Teacher in Samuel LMS High School. Respondent No.1 did not raise any objection at that stage that the post could not be filled in by direct recruitment and she should be considered for promotion. Not only that, she in fact, applied for the post and took part in the selection process. After having taken part in the selection process and being found lower in merit to the appellant, she cannot at this stage be permitted to turn around and claim that the post could not be filled in by direct recruitment.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8345-8346 OF 2009
D. SAROJAKUMARI … APPELLANT(S)
Versus
R. HELEN THILAKOM & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta, J.
1. Respondent No.6, Management of Church of South India, is
running a number of schools in the State of Kerala. We are
concerned with two schools, i.e., Samuel LMS High School,
Parassala and the Light to the Blind School, Varkala. Respondent
No.1 was working as part-time Music Teacher in the Light to the
Blind School, Varkala.
2
2. The Management of the Samuel LMS High School, Parassala,
invited applications for filling up the post of Music Teacher on direct
recruitment basis. The Appellant and Respondent No.1 both
applied for the said post. The appellant was appointed as Music
Teacher on 12.07.1999 in Samuel LMS High School, Parassala.
Though Respondent No.1 had applied for being considered for
appointment as Music Teacher in the Samuel LMS High School, but
after she was not selected in the process of direct recruitment, she
raised a plea that since the Management of both the schools are
same, she was entitled to be promoted as Music Teacher on the
basis of her seniority in the Light to the Blind School, Varkala. In
this regard, she first filed a petition before the District Educational
Officer who accepted her petition and held that the case of
Respondent No.1 was covered under Rule 43 of Kerala Education
Rules (for short KER). The appellant filed an appeal which was
rejected by the Deputy Director, Education. Thereafter, a revision
petition was filed and the main ground raised by Respondent No.6
herein was that the two Schools were separate units. It was
contended that the Samuel LMS High School was run for all
children, whereas the Light to the Blind School, Varkala, was meant
3
only for differently abled children. It was pointed out that
Respondent No.6 had never maintained a common seniority list for
these two schools and this was never challenged by Respondent
No.1 or any other member of the staff. The Director, Public
Instruction held that both schools had different identities and Rule
43 was not applicable. Respondent No.1, thereafter, filed a
representation which was rejected by the State Government in
which it was held that these two schools were separate units and
Respondent No.6 had been treating the schools run by them for
specially challenged children as separate entities.
3. Respondent No.1, thereafter, filed a writ a petition in the High
Court of Kerala. An objection was raised that since Respondent
No.1 herein had taken part in the selection process, she could not,
after being not selected, be permitted to turn around and claim that
the process of direct recruitment could not have been resorted to by
the Management of Samuel LMS High School. This objection was
overruled by the High Court only on the ground that there can be
no estoppel against a statute and the appellant could not be
debarred from filing a writ petition. On merits it was held that both
4
the schools formed one unit and, therefore, Respondent No.1 was
entitled for promotion in the Samuel LMS High School. The two
writ appeals filed by the present appellant were dismissed.
4. The main ground urged on behalf of the appellant is that
Respondent No.1 having taken part in the selection process could
not be permitted to challenge the same after she was unsuccessful
in getting selected. The law is well settled that once a person takes
part in the process of selection and is not found fit for appointment,
the said person is estopped from challenging the process of
selection.
5. In Dr. G. Sarna vs. University of Lucknow & Ors.,
1 the
petitioner after appearing in the interview for the post of Professor
and having not been selected pleaded that the experts were biased.
This Court did not permit the petitioner to raise this issue and held
as follows :-
“15.We do not, however, consider it necessary in the
present case to get into the question of the
reasonableness of bias or real likelihood of bias as
despite the fact that the appellant knew all the
relevant facts, he did not before appearing for the
interview or at the time of the interview raise even his
little finger against the constitution of the Selection
1
(1976) 3 SCC 585
5
Committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared
before the committee and taken a chance of having a
favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it
is not now open to him to turn round and question the
constitution of the committee……”
6. In Madan Lal & Ors. vs. State of J&K & Ors.
2 , the
petitioner laid challenge to the manner and method of conducting
viva-voce test after they had appeared in the same and were
unsuccessful. This Court held as follows :-
“9…….Thus the petitioners took a chance to get
themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only
because they did not find themselves to have emerged
successful as a result of their combined performance
both at written test and oral interview, they have filed
this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate
takes a calculated chance and appears at the
interview, then, only because the result of the
interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn
round and subsequently contend that the process of
interview was unfair or Selection Committee was not
properly constituted……”
7. In Manish Kumar Shahi vs. State of Bihar,
3 , this Court
held as follows :-
“23…….Surely, if the petitioner’s name had appeared
in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of
challenging the selection. The petitioner invoked
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India only after he found that his name
2
(1995) 3 SCC 486
3
(2010) 12 SCC 576
6
does not figure in the merit list prepared by the
Commission. This conduct of the petitioner clearly
disentitles him from questioning the selection and the
High Court did not commit any error by refusing to
entertain the writ petition.”
8. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Shah and others vs. Anil
Joshi and others 4 the petitioners took part in the process of
selection made under the general Rules. Having appeared in the
interview and not being successful they challenged the method of
recruitment itself. They were not permitted to raise such an
objection. This Court held as follows :-
“24. In view of the propositions laid down in the above
noted judgments, it must be held that by having taken
part in the process of selection with full knowledge
that the recruitment was being made under the
General Rules, the respondents had waived their right
to question the advertisement or methodology adopted
by the Board for making selection and the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court
committed grave error by entertaining the grievance
made by the respondents.”
9. Same view has been taken in Madras Institute of
Development Studies and Another vs. Dr. K.
Sivasubramaniyan and others 5.
4
(2013) 11 SCC 309
5
(2016) 1 SCC 454
7
10. The Kerala High Court did not note the above mentioned
judgments and ignored the well settled position of law in rejecting
the specific plea raised by the appellant herein that the appellant
could not raise the issue that no direct recruitment should have
been conducted once she had applied for and taken part in the
selection process by direct recruitment.
11. As far as the present case is concerned an advertisement was
issued by Respondent No.6 inviting applications for the post of
Music Teacher in Samuel LMS High School. Respondent No.1 did
not raise any objection at that stage that the post could not be filled
in by direct recruitment and she should be considered for
promotion. Not only that, she in fact, applied for the post and took
part in the selection process. After having taken part in the
selection process and being found lower in merit to the appellant,
she cannot at this stage be permitted to turn around and claim that
the post could not be filled in by direct recruitment. The reasoning
of the learned Single Judge in rejecting the objection is not in
consonance with the law laid down by this Court. In view of this we
need not go into the other issues raised.
8
12. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside order dated
25.07.2003 of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the writ
petition O.P.No.36563 of 2002 as being not maintainable.
....................................J.
(MADAN B. LOKUR)
....................................J.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
New Delhi
September 13, 2017