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Friday, May 26, 2017

the word 'payable' in Section 40(a)(ia) would mean only when the amount is payable and not when it is actually paid. Grammatically, it may be accepted that the two words, i.e. 'payable' and 'paid', denote different meanings. = The liability to deduct tax at source under the provisions of Chapter XVII is mandatory. A person responsible for paying any sum is also liable to deposit the amount in the Government account. All the sections in Chapter XVII-B require a person to deduct the tax at source at the rates specified therein. The requirement in each of the sections is preceded by the word “shall”. The provisions are, therefore, mandatory. There is nothing in any of the sections that would warrant our reading the word “shall” as “may”. The point of time at which the deduction is to be made also establishes that the provisions are mandatory. For instance, under Section 194C, a person responsible for paying the sum is required to deduct the tax “at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the contractor or at the time of the payment thereof. ……”= In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the view taken by the High Courts of Punjab & Haryana, Madras and Calcutta is the correct view and the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd., (2013) 357 ITR 642 did not decide the question of law correctly. Thus, insofar as the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is concerned, we overrule the same. Consequences of the aforesaid discussion will be to answer the question against the appellant/assessee thereby approving the view taken by the High Court.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5512 OF 2017


|M/S. PALAM GAS SERVICE                         |.....APPELLANT(S)         |
|VERSUS                                         |                          |
|COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX                     |.....RESPONDENT(S)        |


                               J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.

            The neat question which arises for consideration in this  appeal
relates to the interpretation of Section 40(a)(ia) of the  Income  Tax  Act,
1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Section 197C  of  the  Act  has
also some bearing on the issue involved.

Section 40 of the Act  enumerates  certain  situations  wherein  expenditure
incurred by the assessee, in  the  course  of  his  business,  will  not  be
allowed to be deducted in computing the income  chargeable  under  the  head
'Profits and Gains from Business or Profession'.  One  such  contingency  is
provided in clause (ia) of sub-section (a) of  Section  40.  This  provision
reads as under:
“S. 40 - Amounts not deductible:

Notwithstanding anything to  the  contrary  in  Sections  30  to  [38],  the
following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the  income  chargeable
under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”,—

                         xxx         xxx        xxx

(ia)  any interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional  services
or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable  to
a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident for  carrying  out  any  work
(including supply of labour for carrying out any  work),  on  which  tax  is
deductible at source  under  Chapter  XVII-B  and  such  tax  has  not  been
deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid during  the  previous  year,
or in the subsequent year before the expiry of  the  time  prescribed  under
sub-section (1) of Section 200;

Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax  has  been  deducted  in
any subsequent year or has been deducted in the previous year  but  paid  in
any subsequent year after the expiry  of  the  time  prescribed  under  sub-
section (1) of section 200, such sum shall be  allowed  as  a  deduction  in
computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.

                            xxx   xxx        xxx”


As per clause (ia), certain payments made, which  includes  amounts  payable
to a contractor or sub-contractor, would not be allowed  as  expenditure  in
case the tax is deductible at source  on  the  said  payment  under  Chapter
XVIIB of the Act and such tax has not been  deducted  or,  after  deduction,
has not been paid during the previous year or in the subsequent year  before
the expiry of the time prescribed under sub-section (1) of  Section  200  of
the Act.  In the instant case, certain payments were made by  the  appellant
assessee, in the Assessment Year 2006-2007 but the tax  at  source  was  not
deducted and deposited. We may point out here itself  that  as  per  Section
194C of the Act, payments to contractors and sub-contractors are subject  to
tax deduction at source.  The Income Tax Department/Revenue has,  therefore,
not allowed the amounts paid  to  the  sub-contractors  as  deduction  while
computing the income chargeable to tax at the hands of the assessee  in  the
said Assessment Year.

It can be seen that Section 40(a)(ia) uses the expression 'payable'  and  on
that basis the question which is raised for consideration is:
“Whether the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) shall  be  attracted  when  the
amount is not 'payable' to a  contractor  or  sub-contractor  but  has  been
actually paid?"


Some facts which will have  bearing  on  the  aforesaid  issue  need  to  be
mentioned at this stage:
      The appellant-assessee is engaged in  the  business  of  purchase  and
sale of LPG cylinders under the name and style of M/s. Palam Gas Service  at
Palampur.  During the course of assessment proceedings, it  was  noticed  by
the Assessing Officer that the main contract of the  assessee  for  carriage
of LPG was with  the  Indian  Oil  Corporation,  Baddi.   The  assessee  had
received the total freight payments from  the  IOC  Baddi  to  the  tune  of
Rs.32,04,140/-.  The assessee had, in turn, got the  transportation  of  LPG
done through three persons, namely, Bimla Devi, Sanjay  Kumar  and  Ajay  to
whom he  made  the  freight  payment  amounting  to  Rs.  20,97,689/-.   The
Assessing Officer observed that the assessee had made  a  sub-contract  with
the said three persons within the meaning of Section 194C of  the  Act  and,
therefore, he was liable to deduct tax at source from  the  payment  of  Rs.
20,97,689/-.  On account of his failure to do so the said  freight  expenses
were disallowed by the Assessing Officer as per the  provisions  of  Section
40(a)(ia) of the Act.  Against the  order  of  the  Assessing  Officer,  the
assessee  preferred  an  appeal  before  the  Commissioner  of  Income   Tax
(Appeals), Shimla who vide its order dated August 17, 2012 upheld the  order
dated November 30, 2011.  The matter thereafter came  up  in  appeal  before
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘ITAT’) which too met with  the
same fate.
      In further appeal to the High Court under Section  260A  of  the  Act,
the outcome remained unchanged as the High Court of  Himachal  Pradesh  also
dismissed the appeal affirming the order of the ITAT.

It may be pertinent to observe that the question raised now  and  formulated
above was specifically raised before the authorities  below,  including  the
High Court.

The question is, as noted above, when the word used in Section 40(a)(ia)  is
'payable', whether this Section would cover only those  contingencies  where
the amount is due and still payable or it would also  cover  the  situations
where the amount is already paid but no advance tax was deducted  thereupon.
 This issue has come up for hearing before various  High  Courts  and  there
are divergent views of the High Courts there upon.  In  fact,  most  of  the
High Courts have taken the view that the  aforesaid  provision  would  cover
even those cases where the amount stands paid.  This  is  the  view  of  the
Madras, Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts.  Contrary view  is  taken  by  the
Allahabad High Court.  In a recent  judgment,  the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High
Court took note of the judgments of the aforesaid High Courts and  concurred
with the view taken by the Madras, Calcutta  and  Gujarat  High  Courts  and
showed its reluctance to follow the view taken by the Allahabad High  Court.


In this scenario, we would like to first discuss the reasons  given  by  the
High Courts in two sets of judgments, arriving  at  a  contrary  conclusion.
Before that, we would also like to reproduce relevant  portions  of  Section
194C and 200 of the Act as well as Rule  30(2)  of  the  Income  Tax  Rules,
since they are also relevant to decide the  controversy.   These  provisions
make the following reading:
194-C. Payments to contractors.—(1) Any person responsible for  paying  any
sum  to  any  resident  (hereafter  in  this  section  referred  to  as  the
contractor) for carrying out  any  work  (including  supply  of  labour  for
carrying out any work) in pursuance of a  contract  between  the  contractor
and a specified person shall, at the time of  credit  of  such  sum  to  the
account of the contractor or at the time of payment thereof in  cash  or  by
issue of a cheque or draft or by  any  other  mode,  whichever  is  earlier,
deduct an amount equal to—
.……… ……. …… ………

200. Duty of person deducting tax.—(1)  Any  person  deducting  any  sum  in
accordance with the foregoing provisions of this chapter] shall  pay  within
the prescribed time, the sum so  deducted  to  the  credit  of  the  Central
Government or as the Board directs.

(2)  Any person being an  employer,  referred  to  in  subsection  (1-A)  of
Section 192 shall pay, within the prescribed time, the tax to the credit  of
the Central Government or as the Board directs.

(3)  Any person deducting any sum on or after the 1st day of April, 2005  in
accordance with the foregoing provisions of this chapter  or,  as  the  case
may be, any person being an employer referred to  in  sub-section  (1-A)  of
Section 192 shall, after paying the  tax  deducted  to  the  credit  of  the
Central Government within the prescribed time, prepare such  statements  for
such period as may be prescribed] and deliver or cause to  be  delivered  to
the prescribed income  tax  authority  or  the  person  authorised  by  such
authority such statement in such  form  and  verified  in  such  manner  and
setting forth such particulars and within such time as may be prescribed.”


Rule 30(2) of the Income Tax Rules which stipulates the time prescribed  for
payment of the tax deducted to the  credit  of  the  Central  Government  as
required by Section 200(1) and relevant portion thereof reads as under:
“Time and mode of payment to Government account of tax  deducted  at  source
or tax paid under sub-section (1A) of section 192.

30(1) All sums deducted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter  XVII-B
by an office of the Government shall be paid to the credit  of  the  Central
Government-
.….. ………. …….. ……..

(2) All sums deducted in accordance with the provisions  of  Chapter  XVII-B
by deductors other than an office of the Government shall  be  paid  to  the
credit of the Central Government-

 on or before 30th day of April where the income or amount  is  credited  or
paid in the month of March; and
in any other case, on or before seven days from the  end  of  the  month  in
which-
the deduction is made; or
income-tax is due under sub-section(1A) of section 192.”

As per Section 194C, it is the statutory obligation  of  a  person,  who  is
making payment to the sub-contractor, to deduct tax at source at  the  rates
specified therein.  Plain language of the Section suggests that such  a  tax
at source is to be deducted at the  time  of  credit  of  such  sum  to  the
account of the contract or at the time  of  payment  thereof,  whichever  is
earlier. Thus, tax has to be deducted in both the  contingencies,  namely  ,
when the amount is credited to the account of the  contractor  or  when  the
payment is actually made. Section 200 of the Act imposes further  obligation
on the person deducting tax at source, to deposit the same with the  Central
Government or as the Board directs, within the prescribed time.
      A conjoint reading of these two Sections would suggest that  not  only
a person, who is paying to the contractor, is  supposed  to  deduct  tax  at
source on the said  payment  whether  credited  in  the  account  or  actual
payment made, but also deposit that amount to  the  credit  of  the  Central
Government within the stipulated time.  The time within  which  the  payment
is to be deposited with the Central Government is mentioned  in  Rule  30(2)
of the Rules.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in P.M.S. Diesels & Ors. v. Commissioner  of
Income Tax – 2, Jalandhar &  Ors.,  (2015)  374  ITR  562,  has  held  these
provisions to be mandatory in nature with the following observations:
“13.  The liability to deduct tax at source under the provisions of  Chapter
XVII is mandatory. A person responsible for paying any sum  is  also  liable
to deposit the amount  in  the  Government  account.  All  the  sections  in
Chapter XVII-B require a person to deduct the tax at  source  at  the  rates
specified therein. The requirement in each of the sections  is  preceded  by
the word  “shall”.  The  provisions  are,  therefore,  mandatory.  There  is
nothing in any of the sections that  would  warrant  our  reading  the  word
“shall” as “may”. The point of time at which the deduction  is  to  be  made
also establishes that the provisions  are  mandatory.  For  instance,  under
Section 194C, a person responsible for paying the sum is required to  deduct
the tax “at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the  contractor
or at the time of the payment thereof. ……”


While holding the aforesaid view, the Punjab & Haryana High Court  discussed
the judgments of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, which  had  taken  the
same view, and concurred with the same, which is clear  from  the  following
discussion contained in the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court:
“14. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner  of  Income
Tax v. Crescent Export Syndicate, (2013) 216 Taxman 258 (Calcutta) held:-

“13.…………… ……………… ……………

The term ‘shall’ used in all these sections make it  clear  that  these  are
mandatory provisions and applicable to the  entire  sum  contemplated  under
the respective sections. These sections do not  give  any  leverage  to  the
assessee to make the payment  without  making  TDS.  On  the  contrary,  the
intention of the legislature  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  timing  of
deduction of tax is earliest possible opportunity to recover tax, either  at
the time of credit in the account of payee or at  the  time  of  payment  to
payee, whichever is earlier.”

15.  Ms. Dhugga invited our attention to a judgment of  the  Division  Bench
of  Madras  High  Court  in Tube  Investments  of  India   Ltd. v. Assistant
Commissioner of Income-Tax (TDS), [2010] 325 ITR  610  (Mad).  The  Division
Bench referred to the statistics placed before it by  the  Department  which
disclosed  that  TDS  collection  had  augmented  the  revenue.  The   gross
collection of advance tax, surcharge, etc. was  Rs.  2,75,857.70  crores  in
the financial year 2008-09 of which the TDS component alone constituted  Rs.
1,30,470.80  crores.  The  Division  Bench  observed  that  introduction  of
Section 40(a)(ia) had achieved the objective of  augmenting  the  TDS  to  a
substantial  extent.  The  Division  Bench  also  observed  that  when   the
provisions and procedures relating to TDS are scrupulously applied, it  also
ensured the identification of the payees thereby confirming the  network  of
assessees and that once the assessees are identified  it  would  enable  the
tax collection machinery to bring within its fold all such persons  who  are
liable to come  within  the  network  of  tax  payers.  These  objects  also
indicate the legislative intent that the requirement  of  deducting  tax  at
source is mandatory.

16.  The liability to deduct tax at source is, therefore, mandatory.”


The aforesaid interpretation of Sections 194C conjointly  with  Section  200
and Rule 30(2) is unblemished and without any  iota  of  doubt.   We,  thus,
give our imprimatur to the view taken.  As would be  noticed  and  discussed
in little detail hereinafter, the Allahabad High Court,  while  interpreting
Section 40(a)(ia), did not deal with this aspect at all, even when it has  a
clear bearing while considering the amplitude of the said provision.

In the aforesaid backdrop, let us now deal with the issue, namely, the  word
'payable' in Section 40(a)(ia) would mean only when the  amount  is  payable
and not when it is actually paid. Grammatically, it  may  be  accepted  that
the two words, i.e. 'payable' and 'paid',  denote  different  meanings.  The
Punjab & Haryana High Court, in P.M.S. Diesels & Ors.,  referred  to  above,
rightly remarked that the word 'payable'  is, in fact,  an  antonym  of  the
word 'paid'.   At  the  same  time,  it  took  the  view  that  it  was  not
significant to the interpretation of  Section  40(a)(ia).   Discussing  this
aspect further, the Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  first  dealt  with  the
contention of the assessee that Section  40(a)(ia)  relates  only  to  those
assessees who follow the mercantile system and  does  not  cover  the  cases
where the assessees follow the cash system. Those  contention  was  rejected
in the following manner:
“19. There is nothing that persuades  us  to  accept  this  submission.  The
purpose of the section  is  to  ensure  the  recovery  of  tax.  We  see  no
indication in the section that this object was confined to the  recovery  of
tax from a particular type of assessee or assessees following  a  particular
accounting practice. As far as this provision is concerned,  it  appears  to
make no difference to the Government as to the  accounting  system  followed
by the assessees. The Government is interested in the recovery of taxes.  If
for some reason, the Government was interested in ensuring the  recovery  of
taxes only from assessees following the mercantile  system,  we  would  have
expected the provision to so stipulate clearly, if not expressly. It is  not
suggested that assessees following the cash system are not liable to  deduct
tax at source. It is not suggested that the provisions of Chapter XVII-B  do
not apply to assessees following  the  cash  system.  There  is  nothing  in
Chapter XVII-B either that suggests otherwise.

20.  Our view is fortified by the Explanatory Note to Finance Bill  (No.  2)
of 2004. Sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of Section 40 was introduced  by  the
Finance Bill (No. 2) of 2004 with effect from  01.04.2005.  The  Explanatory
Note to Finance Bill-2004 stated:-

“….. ….. ….. ….. ..
With a view to augment compliance of  TDS  provisions,  it  is  proposed  to
extend  the  provisions  of  section  40(a)(i)  to  payments  of   interest,
commission  or  brokerage,  fees  for  professional  services  or  fees  for
technical services to residents, and payments to a  resident  contractor  or
sub-contractor for carrying out any work (including  supply  of  labour  for
carrying out any work),  on  which  tax  has  not  been  deducted  or  after
deduction, has not been paid before the expiry of the time prescribed  under
sub-section(1) of section 200 and in accordance with  the  other  provisions
of Chapter XVII-B. ……”

21.  The adherence to the provisions ensures not merely  the  collection  of
tax but also enables the authorities to bring within  their  fold  all  such
persons who are liable to  come  within  the  network  of  tax  payers.  The
intention was to ensure the collection of tax irrespective of the system  of
accounting followed by the assessees. We do not see how  this  dual  purpose
of augmenting the  compliance  of  Chapter  XVII  and  bringing  within  the
Department's fold tax payers  is  served  by  confining  the  provisions  of
Section 40(a)(ia) to assessees who follow the mercantile system. Nor  do  we
find anything that indicates that for some reason the  legislature  intended
achieving these objectives  only  by  confining  the  operation  of  Section
40(a)(ia) to assessees who follow the mercantile system.

22.  The same view was taken by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High  Court
in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Crescent Export Syndicate, (supra). It  was
held:-

“12.3. It is noticeable that Section 40(a)  is  applicable  irrespective  of
the method of accounting followed by an assessee. Therefore,  by  using  the
term  ‘payable’  legislature  included  the  entire  accrued  liability.  If
assessee was following mercantile system  of  accounting,  then  the  moment
amount was credited to the account of payee on  accrual  of  liability,  TDS
was required to be made  but  if  assessee  was  following  cash  system  of
accounting, then on making payment TDS was to be made as the  liability  was
discharged by making payment. The TDS provisions are applicable both in  the
situation of actual payment as well of the credit of the amount. It  becomes
very clear from the fact that the phrase, ‘on which  tax  is  deductible  at
source under Chapter XVII-B’, was not there in the Bill but incorporated  in
the Act. This was not without any purpose.”


We approve the aforesaid view as well.  As a  fortiorari,  it  follows  that
Section 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the  amount  is  payable
but also when it is paid. In this behalf,  one  has  to  keep  in  mind  the
purpose with which Section 40 was enacted and that has  already  been  noted
above. We have also to keep in mind the  provisions  of  Sections  194C  and
200.  Once it is found that the  aforesaid  Sections  mandate  a  person  to
deduct tax at source not only on the amounts payable but also when the  sums
are actually paid to the contractor, any person who does not adhere to  this
statutory obligation has to suffer the consequences which are stipulated  in
the Act itself.  Certain consequences of failure to  deduct  tax  at  source
from the payments made, where tax was to be deducted at  source  or  failure
to pay the same to the credit of the Central Government, are  stipulated  in
Section 201 of the Act.  This Section provides  that  in  that  contingency,
such a person would be deemed to be an assessee in  default  in  respect  of
such tax.  While stipulating this  consequence,  Section  201  categorically
states that the aforesaid Sections would be without prejudice to  any  other
consequences  which  that  defaulter  may  incur.   Other  consequences  are
provided under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, namely, payments made  by  such
a person to a contractor shall not be  treated  as  deductible  expenditure.
When read in this context, it is clear that  Section  40(a)(ia)  deals  with
the nature of default and the consequences thereof.   Default  is  relatable
to Chapter  XVIIB  (in  the  instant  case  Sections  194C  and  200,  which
provisions are  in  the  aforesaid  Chapter).  When  the  entire  scheme  of
obligation to deduct the tax at source and paying it  over  to  the  Central
Government is read holistically, it cannot be held that the  word  'payable'
occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) refers to only those cases where  the  amount
is yet to be paid and does not cover the cases where the amount is  actually
paid. If the provision  is  interpreted  in  the  manner  suggested  by  the
appellant herein, then even when  it  is  found  that  a  person,  like  the
appellant, has violated the provisions of  Chapter  XVIIB  (or  specifically
Sections 194C and 200 in the instant case), he would  still  go  scot  free,
without suffering the consequences of such  monetary  default  in  spite  of
specific provisions laying down these consequences.  The  Punjab  &  Haryana
High Court has exhaustively interpreted Section  40(a(ia)  keeping  in  mind
different aspects. We would again quote the following  paragraphs  from  the
said judgment, with our complete approval thereto:
“26.  Further, the mere  incurring  of  a  liability  does  not  require  an
assessee to deduct the tax at source even if such payments, if  made,  would
require an assessee to deduct the tax at source.  The  liability  to  deduct
tax at source under Chapter XVII-B arises only upon payments being  made  or
where so specified under  the  sections  in  Chapter  XVII,  the  amount  is
credited to the account of the payee.  In  other  words,  the  liability  to
deduct tax at source arises not on account of the assessee being  liable  to
the payee but only upon the liability being discharged in  the  case  of  an
assessee following the cash  system  and  upon  credit  being  given  by  an
assessee following the mercantile system. This is clear from  every  section
in Chapter XVII.

27.  Take for instance, the case  of  an  assessee,  who  follows  the  cash
system of accounting and where the assessee who though  liable  to  pay  the
contractor, fails to do so for any reason. The assessee is not  then  liable
to deduct tax at source. Take also the case of an assessee, who follows  the
mercantile system. Such an assessee may have incurred the liability  to  pay
amounts to a party. Such an assessee is also not  bound  to  deduct  tax  at
source unless he credits such sums to the account of the  party/payee,  such
as, a contractor. This is clear from  Section  194C  set  out  earlier.  The
liability to deduct tax at source, in the case of an assessee following  the
cash system, arises only when the payment is made and  in  the  case  of  an
assessee following the mercantile system, when he credits such  sum  to  the
account of the party entitled to receive the payment.

28.  The government has nothing to do with the dispute between the  assessee
and the payee such as a contractor. The  provisions  of  the  Act  including
Section 40 and the provisions  of  Chapter  XVII  do  not  entitle  the  tax
authorities to adjudicate the liability of an assessee to  make  payment  to
the payee/other contracting party. The appellant's submission, if  accepted,
would require an adjudication by the tax authorities as to the liability  of
the assessee to make payment. They would then  be  required  to  investigate
all the records of an assessee to ascertain its liability to third  parties.
This could in many cases be an extremely complicated task especially in  the
absence of the third party. The third party may not  press  the  claim.  The
parties may settle the dispute,  if  any.  This  is  an  exercise  not  even
remotely required or even contemplated by the section.”


As mentioned above, the Punjab & Haryana High Court found support  from  the
judgments of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts taking identical  view  and
by extensively quoting from the said judgments.

Insofar as judgment of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  is  concerned,  reading
thereof would reflect that the High Court,  after  noticing  the  fact  that
since the amounts had already been paid, it straightaway concluded,  without
any discussion, that Section 40(a)(ia) would apply only when the  amount  is
'payable' and dismissed the  appeal  of  the  Department  stating  that  the
question of law framed did not  arise  for  consideration.   No  doubt,  the
Special Leave Petition thereagainst was dismissed by this Court  in  limine.
However, that would not amount to confirming the view of the Allahabad  High
Court (See V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,
(2000) 243 ITR 383 and Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v.  Union
of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that  the  view  taken  by  the
High Courts of Punjab & Haryana, Madras and Calcutta  is  the  correct  view
and the judgment of the Allahabad High  Court  in  CIT  v.  Vector  Shipping
Services (P) Ltd., (2013) 357 ITR 642 did not decide  the  question  of  law
correctly.  Thus, insofar as the judgment of the  Allahabad  High  Court  is
concerned, we overrule the same. Consequences of  the  aforesaid  discussion
will be to  answer  the  question  against  the  appellant/assessee  thereby
approving the view taken by the High Court.

The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.


                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                             (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 03, 2017.

conviction of the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 201 IPC and various sentences imposed upon the petitioner including death sentence under Section 302 IPC and life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) IPC. In view of the decision of this Court in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and others.[1], these review petitions were listed in Court for oral hearing.= Principles (1) The court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the “rarest of rare” case for imposition of a death sentence. (2) In the opinion of the court, imposition of any other punishment i.e. life imprisonment would be completely inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice. (3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. (4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant considerations. (5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to commission of such heinous crime = after the Judgment under review, the petitioner has completed Bachelors Preparatory Programme offered by the Indira Gandhi National Open University enabling him to prepare for Bachelor level study and that he has also completed the Gandhi Vichar Pariksha and had participated in drawing competition organized sometime in January 2016. It is asserted that the jail record of the petitioner is without any blemish. The matter is not contested as regards Conditions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 as stated in paragraph 206 of the decision in Bachan Singh (supra) but what is now being projected is that there is a possibility of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated. Though these attempts on part of the petitioner are after the Judgment under review, we have considered the material in that behalf to see if those circumstances warrant a different view. We have given anxious consideration to the material on record but find that the aggravating circumstances namely the extreme depravity and the barbaric manner in which the crime was committed and the fact that the victim was a helpless girl of four years clearly outweigh the mitigating circumstances now brought on record. Having taken an overall view of the matter, in our considered view, no case is made out to take a different view in the matter. We, therefore, affirm the view taken in the Judgment under review and dismiss the present Review Petitions..

                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.637-638 of 2015

                                     IN

                    Criminal Appeal Nos.2486-2487 of 2014


Vasanta Sampat Dupare                                     ….. Petitioner

                                   Versus

State of Maharashtra                                   …. Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


Uday Umesh Lalit, J.



1.    These Review Petitions are directed against  the  Judgment  and  Order
dated 26.11.2014 passed by this Court  in  Criminal  Appeal  Nos.2486-87  of
2014 affirming conviction of the  petitioner  for  the  offences  punishable
under Sections 302, 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 201 IPC and   various  sentences
imposed upon the petitioner including death sentence under Section  302  IPC
and life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) IPC.  In view of the  decision
of this Court in Mohd. Arif  @ Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court  of  India
and others.[1], these  review  petitions  were  listed  in  Court  for  oral
hearing.



2.    The facts leading to the filing of  criminal  appeals  in  this  Court
including the nature and quality of evidence on record have been dealt  with
and considered in the Judgment  of  this  Court  dated  26.11.2014[2].   The
charge against the petitioner was that the victim,  a  minor  girl  of  four
years was raped and battered to death by  the  petitioner.   The  petitioner
allegedly lured the victim by  giving  her  chocolates,  kidnapped  her  and
after satisfying his lust caused crushing injuries to her with the  help  of
stones weighing about 8.5 kg and 7.5 kg.  The prosecution  relied  upon  the
evidence of PW2 Manisha, PW3 Minal, PW5 Vandana and PW6 Baby Sharma who  had
seen the petitioner taking away the victim on a bicycle on the fateful  day.
  In his disclosure statement under Section  27  of  the  Evidence  Act  the
petitioner had shown the place where dead body of the victim was  lying  and
the tap where  he  had  washed  his  blood  stained  clothes.   The  medical
evidence on record was dealt with in paragraph  14  of  the  Judgment  under
review as under :-

14.   According to the doctor, he  had  found  during  internal  examination
that under scalp haematoma was present over left frontal and  right  frontal
region of size 4cm × 4cm, dark red,  the  frontal  bone  was  fractured  and
depressed, fracture  line  extended  up  to  occipital  bone  through  right
temporal and parietal bone fracture on interior  and  middle  cranial  side.
The subarachnoid haemorrhage was present all  over  the  brain  surface  and
meninges were congested. In  his  opinion,  the  cause  of  death  was  head
injury, associated with the injury on the genital region. He  has  testified
that the two stones that were sent to him in sealed  cover  along  with  the
requisition, Ext.62,  for  opinion,  could  have  been  used  to  cause  the
injuries on the victim. He has weighed the  stones,  which  are,  8.5kg  and
7.5kg, and has opined that there had been forceful sexual intercourse.”


3.    After taking into  account  the  evidence  and  the  circumstances  on
record, this Court in the Judgment under review concluded as under:-

      “On a critical analysis of the evidence on record,  we  are  convinced
that the circumstances that have  been  clearly  established  are  that  the
appellant was seen in the courtyard where the minor girl and other  children
were playing; that the  appellant  was  seen  taking  the  deceased  on  his
bicycle; that he had gone to the grocery shop owned  by  PW-6  to  buy  Mint
chocolate along with her; that the accused had told PW2 that the  child  was
the daughter of his friend and he was going to ‘Tekdi-Wadi’ along  with  the
girl; that the appellant had led to  discovery  of  the  dead  body  of  the
deceased, the place where he had washed his clothes and at his instance  the
stones smeared  with blood were recovered; that the medical  report  clearly
indicates about the injuries sustained by the deceased  on  her  body;  that
the injuries sustained on the private parts have been stated by  the  doctor
to have been caused by forcible sexual intercourse;  that  the  stones  that
were seized were smeared with blood and the medical  evidence   corroborates
the fact that injuries could have been  caused  by  battering  with  stones;
that the chemical analysis report shows that the blood group  found  on  the
clothes  of  the  appellant;  that  the  appellant  has  not   offered   any
explanation with regard to the recovery  made  at  his  instance;  and  that
nothing has been stated in his  examination  under  Section  313  CrPC  that
there was any justifiable reason to implicate him in the crime in  question.
 Thus, we find  that  each  of  the  incriminating  circumstances  has  been
clearly established and the chain of circumstances are conclusive in  nature
to exclude any kind of hypothesis, but the one proposed to  be  proved,  and
lead to a definite conclusion that the crime was committed by  the  accused.
Therefore, we have no hesitation in affirming  the  judgment  of  conviction
rendered by the learned trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court.”





4.    On the issue of death sentence awarded to the petitioner,  this  Court
first considered the principles governing the matter in issue as under:-

“39. Now we shall proceed to deal with the  facet  of  sentence.  In  Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab[3], the Court held thus:

“(a) The normal rule is that the offence of murder shall  be  punished  with
the sentence of life imprisonment. The Court can depart from that  rule  and
impose the sentence of death only if there are  special  reasons  for  doing
so. Such reasons must be recorded  in  writing  before  imposing  the  death
sentence.

(b) While considering the  question  of  sentence  to  be  imposed  for  the
offence of murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the Court  must  have
regard to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well  as  the
criminal. If the Court finds, but not otherwise, that the offence is  of  an
exceptionally depraved and heinous character and constitutes, on account  of
its design and the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to  the
society at large, the Court may impose the death sentence.”

40. In Bachan Singh case3, the Court referred to the decision in  Furman  v.
Georgia[4] and noted the suggestion given by the learned counsel  about  the
aggravating and the mitigating circumstances.  While  discussing  about  the
aggravating circumstances, the Court  noted  the  aggravating  circumstances
suggested by the counsel which read as follows: (Bachan Singh case3, SCC  p.
749, para 202)
“Aggravating circumstances.—A court may, however,  in  the  following  cases
impose the penalty of death in its discretion:
(a) if the murder has been committed after previous  planning  and  involves
extreme brutality; or
(b) if the murder involves exceptional depravity; or
(c) if the murder is of a member of any of the armed forces of the Union  or
of a member of any police force or of any public servant and was committed—
(i) while such member or public servant was on duty; or
(ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such  member
or public servant in the lawful discharge of his  duty  as  such  member  or
public servant whether at the time of murder he was such  member  or  public
servant, as the case may be, or had ceased  to  be  such  member  or  public
servant; or
(d) if the murder is of a person who had acted in the  lawful  discharge  of
his duty under Section 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973,  or  who
had rendered assistance to a Magistrate or a police  officer  demanding  his
aid or requiring his assistance under Section 37  and  Section  129  of  the
said Code.”
After reproducing the same, the Court opined: (SCC p. 749, para 203)
“203. Stated broadly, there can be no objection to the acceptance  of  these
indicators but as we have indicated already, we would prefer not  to  fetter
judicial discretion by attempting to make an exhaustive enumeration one  way
or the other.”

41.  Thereafter,  the  Court  referred  to  the  suggestions  pertaining  to
mitigating circumstances: (Bachan Singh case3, - SCC p.750 para 206)
“Mitigating circumstances.—In the exercise of its discretion  in  the  above
cases, the court shall take into account the following circumstances.—
(1) That the offence was committed under the influence of extreme mental  or
emotional disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he shall not  be
sentenced to death.
(3) The probability that the accused  would  not  commit  criminal  acts  of
violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society.
(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated.
The State shall  by  evidence  prove  that  the  accused  does  not  satisfy
Conditions (3) and (4) above.
(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the  case  the  accused  believed
that he was morally justified in committing the offence.
(6) That the accused  acted  under  the  duress  or  domination  of  another
person.
(7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was mentally  defective
and  that  the  said  defect  impaired  his  capacity  to   appreciate   the
criminality of his conduct.”
After reproducing the above, the Court observed: (SCC p. 750, para 207)
“207. We will do no more than to say that  these  are  undoubtedly  relevant
circumstances and must  be  given  great  weight  in  the  determination  of
sentence.

42. In the said case, the Court has also held  thus:  (Bachan  Singh  case3,
SCC p. 751, para 209)
“209. … It is, therefore, imperative  to  voice  the  concern  that  courts,
aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated by us,  will  discharge
the onerous function with  evermore  scrupulous  care  and  humane  concern,
directed along the  highroad  of  legislative  policy  outlined  in  Section
354(3) viz. that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment  is  the
rule and death sentence an exception. A real and  abiding  concern  for  the
dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life  through  law’s
instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare  cases
when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”

43. In Machhi Singh and others v. State of  Punjab[5]  a  three-Judge  Bench
has explained the concept of rarest of the rare cases by stating that:  (SCC
p. 487, para 32)
“32. The reasons  why  the  community  as  a  whole  does  not  endorse  the
humanistic approach reflected in ‘death  sentence-in-no-case’  doctrine  are
not far to seek.  In  the  first  place,  the  very  humanistic  edifice  is
constructed on the foundation of ‘reverence  for  life’  principle.  When  a
member of the community violates this  very  principle  by  killing  another
member, the society may not feel  itself  bound  by  the  shackles  of  this
doctrine. Secondly,  it  has  to  be  realised  that  every  member  of  the
community is able to live with safety without his  or  her  own  life  being
endangered because of the protective arm of the community and on account  of
the rule of law enforced by it. The very existence of the rule  of  law  and
the fear of being brought to book operates as a deterrent of those who  have
no scruples in killing others if it suits their ends. Every  member  of  the
community owes a debt to the community for this protection.”

44. Thereafter, after adverting  to  the  aspects  of  the  feeling  of  the
community and its desire for self-preservation, the Court  opined  that  the
community  may  well  withdraw  the  protection  by  sanctioning  the  death
penalty. The Court in that regard ruled thus: (Machhi Singh  case5,  SCC  p.
487, para 32)
“32. … But the community will not do so in every case. It may do so ‘in  the
rarest of rare cases’ when its collective conscience is so shocked  that  it
will expect the holders of  the  judicial  power  centre  to  inflict  death
penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as  regards  desirability  or
otherwise of retaining death penalty.”
It is apt to state here that in the said case, emphasis was laid on  certain
aspects, namely, manner of commission of murder, motive  for  commission  of
murder, anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude  of
crime and personality of the victim of murder.

45. After so enumerating, the propositions  that  emerged  out  from  Bachan
Singh3 were culled out which are as follows: (Machhi  Singh  case5,  SCC  p.
489, para 38)
“38. … The following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh case3:
‘(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted  except  in  gravest
cases of extreme culpability.
(ii)  Before  opting  for  the  death  penalty  the  circumstances  of   the
“offender” also require to  be  taken  into  consideration  along  with  the
circumstances of the “crime”.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an  exception.  In
other words death sentence must  be  imposed  only  when  life  imprisonment
appears to be an altogether  inadequate  punishment  having  regard  to  the
relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and  only  provided,  the
option  to  impose   sentence   of   imprisonment   for   life   cannot   be
conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and  circumstances  of
the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
 (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to  be
drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have  to  be  accorded
full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between  the  aggravating
and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.”

46. Thereafter,  the  three-Judge  Bench  opined  that  to  apply  the  said
guidelines, the following questions are required  to  be  answered:  (Machhi
Singh case5, SCC p. 489, para 39)
“(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders  sentence  of
imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence?
(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that  there  is  no  alternative
but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage  to  the
mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?”
In the said case, the Court upheld the extreme penalty of death  in  respect
of three accused persons.”

5.    In the light of the principles as  stated  above,  the  facts  of  the
present matter were considered by this Court in the  Judgment  under  review
as under:-
“57. Keeping  in  view  the  aforesaid  authorities,  we  shall  proceed  to
adumbrate what is the duty of the Court when the  collective  conscience  is
shocked because of the crime committed. When  the  crime  is  diabolical  in
nature and invites abhorrence of the  collective,  it  shocks  the  judicial
conscience  and  impels  it  to  react  keeping  in  view   the   collective
conscience, cry of the community for justice and the intense indignation  at
the manner in which  the  brutal  crime  is  committed.  We  are  absolutely
conscious that Judges while imposing sentence, should never be  swayed  away
by any kind of individual philosophy  and  predilections.  It  should  never
have the flavour of Judge-centric attitude or perception. It has to  satisfy
the test laid down in various precedents relating to the rarest of the  rare
case. We are also required to pose two questions that have  been  stated  in
Machhi Singh case5.

58. Presently, we shall proceed to dwell upon the manner in which the  crime
was committed. Materials on record clearly reveal  that  the  appellant  was
well acquainted with the inhabitants of the locality and as is  demonstrable
he had access to the house of the father of the deceased  and  the  children
used to call him “uncle”. He had lured the deceased to go with him  to  have
chocolates. It is an act of taking advantage of absolute innocence.  He  had
taken the deceased from place to place by his bicycle and  eventually  raped
her in a brutal manner, as if he had an insatiable  and  ravenous  appetite.
The injuries caused on the minor girl are likely to  send  a  chill  in  the
spine of the society and shiver in the marrows of human conscience.  He  had
battered her to death by assaulting her with two heavy stones.  The  injured
minor girl could not have shown any kind of resistance. It  is  not  a  case
where the accused had a momentary lapse. It is also not  a  case  where  the
minor child had died because of profuse bleeding due to rape but because  of
the deliberate cruel assault by the appellant.  After  the  savage  act  was
over, the coolness of the appellant is evident, for he  washed  the  clothes
on the tap and took proper care to hide things. As is manifest, he even  did
not think for a moment the  trauma  and  torture  that  was  caused  to  the
deceased. The gullibility and vulnerability  of  the  four  year  girl,  who
could not have nurtured any idea about the maladroitly  designed  biological
desires of this nature, went with  the  uncle  who  extinguished  her  life-
spark. The barbaric act of the appellant does not remotely show any  concern
for the precious life of a young minor child who had really not  seen  life.
The criminality of the conduct of the appellant is  not  only  depraved  and
debased, but can have a menacing effect on the society. It is calamitous.

60. In the case at hand, as we find, not only was the rape  committed  in  a
brutal manner but murder was also committed in a barbaric manner.  The  rape
of a minor girl child is nothing but a monstrous burial of  her  dignity  in
the darkness. It is a crime against the holy body of a girl  child  and  the
soul of society and such a crime is aggravated by the  manner  in  which  it
has been committed. The nature of the crime and the manner in which  it  has
been  committed  speaks  about  its  uncommonness.  The  crime   speaks   of
depravity, degradation and uncommonality. It  is  diabolical  and  barbaric.
The crime was committed in an inhuman manner. Indubitably, these go  a  long
way to establish the aggravating circumstances.

61. We are absolutely conscious that  mitigating  circumstances  are  to  be
taken into consideration. The learned counsel  for  the  appellant  pointing
out the mitigating circumstances would submit that the appellant is  in  his
mid-fifties and there is possibility of his reformation. Be  it  noted,  the
appellant was aged about forty-seven years at the time of commission of  the
crime. As is noticeable, there has been  no  remorse  on  the  part  of  the
appellant. There are cases when this Court has commuted the  death  sentence
to life finding that the accused has expressed remorse or the crime was  not
premeditated. But the obtaining factual matrix when unfolded stage by  stage
would show the premeditation, the proclivity and the rapacious  desire.  The
learned counsel would submit that the appellant had no criminal  antecedents
but we find that he was a history-sheeter and had a number of cases  pending
against him. That alone may not be sufficient. The appalling  cruelty  shown
by  him  to  the  minor  girl  child  is  extremely  shocking  and  it  gets
accentuated, when his age is taken into consideration. It was not  committed
under any mental stress or emotional disturbance  and  it  is  difficult  to
comprehend that he would not commit such  acts  and  would  be  reformed  or
rehabilitated. As the  circumstances  would  graphically  depict,  he  would
remain a menace to society, for a defenceless child has become his prey.  In
our considered opinion, there are no mitigating circumstances.”


6.    The above quoted observations of this Court in Judgment  under  review
show that the aggravating facts were considered in paragraphs 58 and 60  and
the entirety of the  matter  including  the  mitigating  circumstances  were
dealt with more particularly in paragraph 61.   The  aggravating  facts  not
only showed the extreme depravity but in the  opinion  of  this  Court  they
brought to the fore the diabolical and barbaric manner in  which  the  crime
was committed.  The Court did  not  find  any  mitigating  circumstances  in
favour of the accused to tilt the balance in his favour for awarding  lesser
punishment.

7.    At this juncture, it may be noted that the decision of this  Court  in
Machhi  Singh  (supra)  shows  that  after  having  laid   down   oft-quoted
principles, this Court considered individual cases of accused Machhi  Singh,
Jagir Singh and Kashmir Singh.  As regards Machhi Singh, it was observed  in
paragraph 42:-
“…….The offence committed was  of  an  exceptionally  depraved  and  heinous
character. The manner of its execution and its design would put  it  at  the
level of extreme atrocity and cruelty.

……..   The  crime  committed  carries  features  which  could   be   utterly
horrendous especially when we know the weapons and the manner of their  use.
The victims could offer no resistance to the  accused  appellants.  The  law
clamours for a sterner sentence; the  crime  being  heinous,  atrocious  and
cruel.

……..The crime was gruesome and cold-blooded revealing the propensity of  the
accused appellants to commit murder.”

      Similarly as regards Jagir Singh it was observed,

“…….The crime committed carries features which could be  utterly  horrendous
especially when we know the weapons and their manner  of  use.  The  victims
could offer no resistance to the accused appellants. The law clamours for  a
sterner sentence; the crime being heinous, atrocious and cruel.

………The helpless state of the victims and the circumstances of the case  lead
us to confirm the death sentence.”


8.    Further, paragraphs 44 and 45 show that  one  of  the  accused  namely
Kashmir Singh had caused the death of a defenceless child of six  years  and
the matter as regards said accused Kashmir  Singh  in  particular  and  with
regard to all the accused in general, was dealt with as under:-
 “44. Insofar as appellant Kashmir Singh s/o Arjan Singh is concerned  death
sentence has been imposed on him by the Sessions Court and confirmed by  the
High Court for the following reasons:
Similarly, Kashmir Singh appellant caused the death of a child Balbir  Singh
aged six years while asleep, a poor defenceless life put off by  a  depraved
mind reflecting grave propensity to commit murder.

45. We are of the  opinion  that  insofar  as  these  three  appellants  are
concerned the rarest of rare cases rule prescribed in Bachan Singh  case  is
clearly attracted and sentence of death is called  for.  We  are  unable  to
persuade ourselves  that  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  will  be
adequate in the circumstances of the crime. We therefore  fully  uphold  the
view concurrently taken by the  Sessions  Court  and  the  High  Court  that
extreme penalty of death requires to be imposed  on  appellants  (1)  Machhi
Singh (2) Kashmir Singh s/o Arjan Singh  (3)  Jagir  Singh.  We  accordingly
confirm the death sentence imposed on them and dismiss their appeals.”


9.    The assessment and the consideration bestowed by this Court in  Machhi
Singh (supra) shows that the aggravating circumstances namely the manner  in
which the  crime  was  committed,  the  brutality  and  barbaric  manner  of
execution, the status and helplessness of victims  and  the  fact  that  the
crime was gruesome and cold blooded were given due weightage.   These  facts
themselves were found to  be  tilting  the  balance  against  the  concerned
accused.  In the present case a minor girl  of  four  years  was  raped  and
battered to death by the petitioner.  The brutality  and  diabolical  nature
of the crime and the fact that the victim had reposed trust  and  confidence
in  the  petitioner  was  taken  into  account  and  this  Court  found  the
aggravating circumstances completely outweighing  the  other  factors.   The
evidence and circumstances were dealt with in the Judgment under  review  in
great detail and this  Court  had  no  hesitation  in  affirming  the  death
sentence.

10.   In the present Review Petition, Mr.  Anup  Bhambhani,  learned  Senior
Advocate appearing for the petitioner, at the  outset,  raised  a  grievance
that in the light of principles laid down in Bachan Singh and  Machhi  Singh
(supra) mitigating factors ought to have been taken into  account  and  that
proper and effective  hearing  in  that  behalf  was  not  extended  to  the
petitioner.  This Court therefore by Order dated  31.08.2016  permitted  the
petitioner to file material to indicate mitigating  factors  for  conversion
of the death sentence to life imprisonment.  This was in  keeping  with  the
principles laid down  by  this  Court  in  Dagdu  and  Others  v.  State  of
Maharashtra[6] wherein three Judge Bench of this Court had observed:-

“79 …..The Court, on convicting an accused, must unquestionably hear him  on
the question of sentence. But if, for any reason, it omits to do so and  the
accused makes a grievance of it in the higher court, it  would  be  open  to
that Court to remedy the breach by giving a hearing to the  accused  on  the
question of sentence.”

80. …….For a proper and effective implementation of the provision  contained
in Section 235(2), it is not always necessary to remand the  matter  to  the
court which has recorded the conviction……Remand is  an  exception,  not  the
rule, and ought therefore to be avoided as far as possible in the  interests
of expeditious, though fair, disposal of cases.”


11.   The petitioner thereafter filed Crl.M.P. Nos.16369-70 of 2016  placing
on record certain facts and material.  It was submitted :-
“Education and Activities undertaken by the Petitioner    in Jail

The Petitioner submits that he had to discontinue  school  after  class  6th
during  childhood.   Thereafter  he  worked  in   various   jobs   such   as
electrician, construction labourer, nursery worker, security  guard.   Death
row prisoners in Maharashtra are not permitted to work, but  the  Petitioner
as an undertial has worked in the jail nursery.  During  incarceration,  the
Petitioner has undertaken studies,  art  competitions  as  well  as  several
programmes  aimed  at  reforming  himself.   The  Petitioner’s  counsel   is
informed that his drawings are exhibited in jail as well.

The Petitioner has in 2015 successfully completed the Bachelors  Preparatory
Programme offered by the  Indira  Gandhi  National  Open  University.   This
course enables people who have discontinued schooling  before  matriculation
to prepare for bachelors-level studies.

The Petitioner  in  2015  also  successfully  completed  the  Gandhi  Vichar
Pariksha (Examinaiton on Gandhian  Thoughts).   This  examination  seeks  to
rehabilitate prisoners who have committed violent crimes, by  learning  from
the life and teaching of M.K. Gandhi.  The course includes  classes  on  the
teachings of M.K. Gandhi,  reading  his  autobiography,  and  a  descriptive
exam.

The Petitioner is quite proficient in drawing and has also  participated  in
a drawing competition organized by  the  Nagpur  Municipal  Corporation  and
Kalajarn Foundation on 10.01.2016.

It is therefore submitted that the Petitioner is on the path to  reformation
and rehabilitation and therefore the death sentence imposed on him  deserves
to be commuted to imprisonment for life.”

      The application then set out  that  the  Disciplinary  Record  of  the
Petitioner in Jail was without any blemish and that there were  no  criminal
antecedents.

 12.  The matter was thereafter posted for  hearing.   Mr.  Anup  Bhambhani,
learned Senior Advocate principally submitted:-
a.    The judgment of conviction and order of sentence were  passed  by  the
trial court on the same  day  namely  on  23.02.2012  which  was  completely
opposed to the law laid down by this Court  in Allauddin Mian and Others  v.
State of Bihar[7] and against the spirit of Section 235(2) of the CrPC.

b.    As laid down in para 206 of  Bachan  Singh  (supra)  “the  probability
that the accused can be reformed” was an important facet and the burden  was
on the State to prove by evidence that the accused  could  not  possibly  be
reformed.  However, such burden was not  discharged  by  the  State  and  no
evidence was led.  In the absence of such evidence by the  State,  no  death
sentence could be awarded or confirmed.


13.   Para 10 of the decision of this Court in Allauddin Mian  v.  State  of
Bihar (supra)  on which reliance was placed,  is to the following effect:-
10. Even a casual glance at the provisions of the Penal Code will show  that
the punishments have been carefully graded corresponding  with  the  gravity
of offences; in grave wrongs the punishments prescribed are  strict  whereas
for minor offences leniency is shown. Here again there is considerable  room
for  manoeuvre  because  the  choice  of  the  punishment  is  left  to  the
discretion of the judge with only the outer limits stated. There are only  a
few cases where a minimum punishment is prescribed.  The  question  then  is
what procedure does the judge follow for determining the  punishment  to  be
imposed in each case to fit the crime? The  choice  has  to  be  made  after
following the procedure set out in sub-section (2) of  Section  235  of  the
Code. That sub-section reads as under:

If the accused  is  convicted,  the  judge  shall,  unless  he  proceeds  in
accordance with the provisions of Section  360,  hear  the  accused  on  the
question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.

The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satisfy  the  rule  of
natural justice. It is a fundamental  requirement  of  fair  play  that  the
accused who was hitherto concentrating on the prosecution  evidence  on  the
question of guilt should,  on  being  found  guilty,  be  asked  if  he  has
anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence.  This
is all the more necessary since the courts are generally  required  to  make
the choice from a wide range of discretion in the matter of  sentencing.  To
assist the court in determining the  correct  sentence  to  be  imposed  the
legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235.  The  said  provision
therefore satisfies a  dual  purpose;  it  satisfies  the  rule  of  natural
justice by according to the accused an opportunity of  being  heard  on  the
question of sentence and at the same time helps  the  court  to  choose  the
sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the  accused
an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having  a
bearing on the  question  of  sentence  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the
provision  is  salutary  and  must  be  strictly  followed.  It  is  clearly
mandatory and should not be treated  as  a  mere  formality.  Mr  Garg  was,
therefore, justified in making a grievance that  the  trial  court  actually
treated it as a mere formality as is evident from the fact that it  recorded
the finding of guilt on 31-3-1987, on the same day before the accused  could
absorb and overcome the shock of conviction they  were  asked  if  they  had
anything to say on the question of sentence and immediately  thereafter  the
decision imposing the death penalty on the two accused was pronounced. In  a
case of life or death as stated earlier, the presiding officer must  show  a
high decree of concern for the statutory right of  the  accused  and  should
not treat it as a mere formality to be crossed before making the  choice  of
sentence. If the choice is  made,  as  in  this  case,  without  giving  the
accused an effective and real opportunity to place his  antecedents,  social
and economic background, mitigating  and  extenuating  circumstances,  etc.,
before the court, the court’s decision on the sentence would be  vulnerable.
We need hardly mention that in many cases  a  sentencing  decision  has  far
more serious consequences on the offender and his  family  members  than  in
the case of a purely administrative decision;  a  fortiori,  therefore,  the
principle of fair play must apply with greater vigour in  the  case  of  the
former  than  the  latter.   An   administrative   decision   having   civil
consequences, if taken without giving a hearing is generally struck down  as
violative of the rule of natural justice.  Likewise  a  sentencing  decision
taken without following the requirements of sub-section (2) of  Section  235
of the Code in letter and spirit would also meet  a  similar  fate  and  may
have to be replaced by an  appropriate  order.  The  sentencing  court  must
approach the question seriously and must  endeavour  to  see  that  all  the
relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the  question  of  sentence  are
brought on record. Only after giving due weight to the  mitigating  as  well
as the aggravating circumstances placed before it,  it  must  pronounce  the
sentence. We  think  as  a  general  rule  the  trial  courts  should  after
recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a future date and  call  upon
both the prosecution as well as the defence to place the  relevant  material
bearing on the question of sentence before it and thereafter  pronounce  the
sentence to be imposed on the offender. In the present case, as pointed  out
earlier, we  are  afraid  that  the  learned  trial  Judge  did  not  attach
sufficient importance to the mandatory requirement  of  sub-section  (2)  of
Section 235 of the Code.”


14.   Sub-section (2) of Section 235 of Cr.P.C. obliges the  Court  to  hear
the accused on the question of sentence and normally  it  is  expected  that
after recording the conviction, the matter be adjourned  to  a  future  date
calling upon both the prosecution as well as the defence to  place  relevant
material  having  bearing  on  the  question  of  sentence.  The  effect  of
recording of the conviction and imposition of death  sentence  on  the  same
day, was also considered by a bench of three learned Judges  of  this  Court
in Malkiat Singh and others v. State  of  Punjab[8].   In  that  case,  this
Court did not deem it expedient to remand the matter  after  six  years  and
converted the sentence of death to imprisonment for life. It was observed:-

“18. On finding that the accused committed  the  charged  offences,  Section
235(2) of the Code empowers the Judge that he shall  pass  sentence  on  him
according to law on  hearing  him.  Hearing  contemplated  is  not  confined
merely to oral hearing but also intended to afford  an  opportunity  to  the
prosecution as well as the accused to  place  before  the  court  facts  and
material relating to various factors on the question  of  sentence,  and  if
interested by either side, to  have  evidence  adduced  to  show  mitigating
circumstances to impose a lesser sentence or aggravating grounds  to  impose
death penalty. Therefore, sufficient time must be given to  the  accused  or
the prosecution on the question of sentence, to show the  grounds  on  which
the prosecution may plead or the accused may show that the maximum  sentence
of death may be the appropriate sentence or the  minimum  sentence  of  life
imprisonment may be awarded, as the  case  may  be.  No  doubt  the  accused
declined to adduce oral evidence. But  it  does  not  prevent  to  show  the
grounds to impose lesser sentence on A-1.  This  Court  in  the  aforestated
Allauddin and Anguswamy[9] cases held that the sentence awarded on the  same
day of finding guilt is not in accordance with the law. That would  normally
have  the  effect  of  remanding  the  case  to  the   Special   Court   for
reconsideration. But in the view of the fact that A-1 was  in  incarceration
for long term of six years from the date of conviction,  in  our  considered
view it needs no remand for further evidence.  It  is  sufficient  that  the
sentence of death awarded to A-1 is  converted  into  rigorous  imprisonment
for life. The  sentences  of  death  is  accordingly  modified  and  A-1  is
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for causing  the  deaths
of all four deceased.”


15.    In a recent Judgment rendered by three learned Judges of  this  Court
in B.A. Umesh v. High Court of Karnataka[10], the facts were  more  or  less
similar, in that no separate date for hearing on sentence  was  given  after
recording conviction.  Para 8 of that decision of this Court is  quoted  for
ready reference:-
“8.  In addition to above, it is  contended  on  behalf  of  the  petitioner
(Review Applicant) that since no separate date for hearing on  sentence  was
given in the present case by the trial  court,  as  such  for  violation  of
Section 235(2) Cr.P.C., the sentence of death cannot be  affirmed.  We  have
considered the argument of Ms. Suri. It is  true  that  the  convict  has  a
right to be heard before sentence. There is no  mandate  in  Section  235(2)
Cr.P.C. to fix separate date for hearing on  sentence.  It  depends  on  the
facts and circumstances as to  whether  a  separate  date  is  required  for
hearing on sentence or parties feel convenient to argue on sentence  on  the
same day. Had any party  pressed  for  separate  date  for  hearing  on  the
sentence, or both of them wanted to be heard on some other  date,  situation
could have been different. In the present case, the parties  were  heard  on
sentence by both the  courts  below,  and  finally  by  this  Court,  as  is
apparent from the Judgment under review. As  such,  merely  for  the  reason
that no separate date is given for  hearing  on  the  sentence,  the  Review
Petition cannot be allowed.”

This Court then relied on the principle laid  down  in  Dagdu  v.  State  of
Maharashtra (supra) which was followed  subsequently  by  another  Bench  of
three learned Judges in  Tarlok  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab[11].   In  the
circumstances, merely because no separate date  was  given  for  hearing  on
sentence, we cannot find the entire  exercise  to  be  flawed  or  vitiated.
Since we had allowed the  petitioner  to  place  the  relevant  material  on
record in the light of the  principles  laid  down  in  Dagdu  v.  State  of
Maharashtra (supra), we will proceed to consider the material so  placed  on
record and weigh these factors and the aggravating  circumstances  as  found
by the Court in the Judgment under review.

16.   However, before such  consideration  we  must  deal  with  the  second
submission advanced by Mr.  Bhambhani,  learned  Senior  Advocate.   In  his
submission, in terms of paragraph 206 of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
Bachan Singh (supra) the burden was upon the State in respect of  conditions
(3) and  (4),  which  burden  was  not  discharged  at  all.   Consequently,
according to him, the sentence of death would be required  to  be  converted
to life imprisonment.  Paragraph 206  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
Bachan Singh (supra) detailed certain  mitigating  circumstances  and  while
dealing with conditions (3) and (4), this Court observed that  it  would  be
for the State to  prove  by  evidence  that  the  accused  did  not  satisfy
conditions (3) and (4).  However,  subsequent  paragraphs  show  that  those
circumstances would certainly be relevant and great weight  be  attached  to
them but it was the cumulative effect of  the  mitigating  circumstances  on
one hand and the aggravating facts on the other, which would be  weighed  to
come to the final conclusion whether the case satisfied the  requirement  of
being “rarest of rare”.  It is not as if mere failure on part of  the  State
to lead such evidence would clinch the issue in favour of the accused.

17.   Mr. Bhambhani, learned Senior Advocate then relied on the decision  of
this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. State through Government of NCT of  Delhi[12],
particularly paragraphs 73 and 74 thereof which paragraphs are as under:
“73. In the instant case the State has failed to show that the appellant  is
a continuing threat  to  the  society  or  that  he  is  beyond  reform  and
rehabilitation. On the other hand, in para 77 of the impugned  judgment  the
High Court observed as follows:
“We have no evidence that the appellant is incapable of being  rehabilitated
in  society.  We  also  have  no  evidence  that  he  is  capable  of  being
rehabilitated   in   society.   This   circumstance   remains   a    neutral
circumstance.”

74. It is clear from the aforesaid finding of the High Court that  there  is
no evidence to show that the accused  is  incapable  of  being  reformed  or
rehabilitated in the society and the High Court has considered the  same  as
a neutral circumstance. In our view the High Court  was  clearly  in  error.
The very fact that the accused can be rehabilitated in the  society  and  is
capable of being reformed, since the State has not  given  any  evidence  to
the contrary, is certainly a mitigating  circumstance  and  which  the  High
Court has failed to take into consideration. The High Court has also  failed
to take into consideration that the appellant is not a continuing threat  to
the society in the absence of any evidence to the  contrary.  Therefore,  in
para 78 of the impugned judgment, the High Court, with respect, has taken  a
very narrow and a myopic view of  the  mitigating  circumstances  about  the
appellant. The High Court has only considered that the appellant is a  first
time offender and he  has  a  family  to  look  after.  We  are,  therefore,
constrained  to  observe  that  the  High   Court’s   view   of   mitigating
circumstances has been very truncated and narrow insofar  as  the  appellant
is concerned.”

The discussion shows that this Court found that mitigating circumstances  in
favour of the appellant were not properly considered  and  in  the  ultimate
analysis the case did not satisfy being  “rarest  of  rare”  and  therefore,
this Court substituted the sentence of imprisonment  for  life  to  that  of
death sentence.  The discussion in paragraphs 73 and 74  does  not  indicate
that in the absence of any evidence led by  the  State  in  connection  with
conditions (3) and (4) as stated in paragraph 206 of Bachan  Singh  (supra),
the entire exercise gets vitiated and the matter must always be answered  in
favour of the accused.  It is undoubtedly  a  relevant  consideration  which
will be weighed by the Court together with other  circumstances  on  record.
We, therefore, do not find any merit in the second submission.

18.   In Ramnaresh and  Others  v.  State  of  Chhattisgarh[13]  this  Court
considered the import of  governing principles regarding death sentence  and
summed up that it is the cumulative  effect  of  both  the  aggravating  and
mitigating circumstances that need to be taken into account.  Paragraphs  76
to 81 of the decision are as under:-
“76. The law enunciated by this Court in its recent  Judgments,  as  already
noticed, adds and elaborates the  principles  that  were  stated  in  Bachan
Singh and thereafter, in Machhi Singh. The

 aforesaid Judgments, primarily dissect these principles into two  different
compartments—one being  the  “aggravating  circumstances”  while  the  other
being  the  “mitigating  circumstances”.  The  court  would   consider   the
cumulative effect of both these aspects and normally, it  may  not  be  very
appropriate  for  the  court  to  decide  the  most  significant  aspect  of
sentencing policy with reference to one of the  classes  under  any  of  the
following heads while completely ignoring other classes under  other  heads.
To balance the two is the primary duty of the court. It will be  appropriate
for the court to come to a final  conclusion  upon  balancing  the  exercise
that would help  to  administer  the  criminal  justice  system  better  and
provide an effective and meaningful reasoning by the court  as  contemplated
under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C.

Aggravating circumstances

(1) The offences relating to the commission of heinous crimes  like  murder,
rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping, etc. by the accused with a prior record  of
conviction for capital felony or offences committed by the person  having  a
substantial history of serious assaults and criminal convictions.
(2) The offence  was  committed  while  the  offender  was  engaged  in  the
commission of another serious offence.
(3) The offence was committed with the intention to create a fear  psychosis
in the public at large and was committed in a public place by  a  weapon  or
device which clearly could be  hazardous  to  the  life  of  more  than  one
person.
(4) The offence of murder was committed  for  ransom  or  like  offences  to
receive money or monetary benefits.
(5) Hired killings.
(6) The offence was committed outrageously for  want  only  while  involving
inhumane treatment and torture to the victim.
(7) The offence was committed by a person while in lawful custody.
(8) The murder or the offence was committed to  prevent  a  person  lawfully
carrying out  his  duty  like  arrest  or  custody  in  a  place  of  lawful
confinement of himself or another. For instance, murder is of a  person  who
had acted in lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 CrPC.
(9) When the crime is enormous in  proportion  like  making  an  attempt  of
murder of the entire family or members of a particular community.
(10) When the victim is innocent, helpless  or  a  person  relies  upon  the
trust of relationship and social norms, like  a  child,  helpless  woman,  a
daughter or a niece staying with a father/uncle and is  inflicted  with  the
crime by such a trusted person.
(11) When murder is committed for a motive which evidences  total  depravity
and meanness.
(12) When there is a cold-blooded murder without provocation.
(13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or  shocks  not  only
the judicial conscience but even the conscience of the society.

Mitigating circumstances

(1) The manner  and  circumstances  in  and  under  which  the  offence  was
committed, for example, extreme mental or emotional disturbance  or  extreme
provocation in contradistinction to all these situations in normal course.
(2)  The  age  of  the  accused  is  a  relevant  consideration  but  not  a
determinative factor by itself.
(3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in commission of  the  crime
again and the probability of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
(4) The condition of the accused shows that he was  mentally  defective  and
the defect impaired his capacity to  appreciate  the  circumstances  of  his
criminal conduct.
(5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life, would render  such  a
behaviour possible and could have  the  effect  of  giving  rise  to  mental
imbalance in that given situation like persistent harassment  or,  in  fact,
leading  to  such  a  peak  of  human  behaviour  that,  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of  the  case,  the  accused  believed  that  he  was  morally
justified in committing the offence.
(6) Where the court upon proper appreciation of  evidence  is  of  the  view
that the crime was not committed in a preordained manner and that the  death
resulted in the course of commission of another crime and that there  was  a
possibility of it being construed as consequences to the commission  of  the
primary crime.
(7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely  upon  the  testimony  of  a  sole
eyewitness though  the  prosecution  has  brought  home  the  guilt  of  the
accused.
77. While determining the questions  relatable  to  sentencing  policy,  the
court has  to  follow  certain  principles  and  those  principles  are  the
loadstar besides the above considerations in imposition or otherwise of  the
death sentence.

Principles

(1) The court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the  “rarest  of
rare” case for imposition of a death sentence.
(2) In the opinion of the court, imposition of  any  other  punishment  i.e.
life imprisonment would be completely inadequate  and  would  not  meet  the
ends of justice.
(3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception.
(4) The option to  impose  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  cannot  be
cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and  circumstances  of  the
crime and all relevant considerations.
(5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner  (extent  of  brutality
and  inhumanity,  etc.)  in  which  the  crime   was   committed   and   the
circumstances leading to commission of such heinous crime.

78. Stated broadly, these are the accepted indicators for  the  exercise  of
judicial discretion but it is always preferred not to  fetter  the  judicial
discretion by attempting to make the excessive enumeration, in  one  way  or
another.  In  other  words,  these  are   the   considerations   which   may
collectively or otherwise weigh in the mind of the court,  while  exercising
its jurisdiction. It is difficult to state it as  an  absolute  rule.  Every
case has to be decided on its own merits. The judicial  pronouncements,  can
only state the precepts that may govern the exercise of judicial  discretion
to a limited extent. Justice may be done on the facts of  each  case.  These
are the factors which  the  court  may  consider  in  its  endeavour  to  do
complete justice between the parties.

79. The court then would draw a balance sheet of aggravating and  mitigating
circumstances. Both aspects have to be  given  their  respective  weightage.
The court has to strike a balance between the  two  and  see  towards  which
side the  scale/balance  of  justice  tilts.  The  principle  of  proportion
between the crime and the punishment is  the  principle  of  “just  deserts”
that  serves  as  the  foundation  of  every  criminal  sentence   that   is
justifiable. In  other  words,  the  “doctrine  of  proportionality”  has  a
valuable application to the sentencing  policy  under  the  Indian  criminal
jurisprudence. Thus, the court will not only have to examine  what  is  just
but also as to what the accused deserves keeping in view the impact  on  the
society at large.

80. Every punishment imposed is bound to have its effect  not  only  on  the
accused alone, but also on the society as a whole. Thus, the  courts  should
consider retributive and deterrent aspect of punishment while  imposing  the
extreme punishment of death.

81. Wherever, the  offence  which  is  committed,  manner  in  which  it  is
committed, its attendant circumstances and the  motive  and  status  of  the
victim, undoubtedly bring the case within the  ambit  of  “rarest  of  rare”
cases and the court finds that the imposition of life imprisonment would  be
inflicting of inadequate punishment, the  court  may  award  death  penalty.
Wherever, the case falls in any of the exceptions to the  “rarest  of  rare”
cases, the court may exercise its judicial discretion  while  imposing  life
imprisonment in place of death sentence.”


19.   It is thus well settled, “the  Court  would  consider  the  cumulative
effect  of  both  the  aspects  (namely  aggravating  factors  as  well   as
mitigating circumstances) and it may not be very appropriate for  the  Court
to decide the most significant aspect of sentencing  policy  with  reference
to one of the classes completely ignoring other classes  under  other  heads
and it is the primary duty of the Court to balance the two.”   Further,  “it
is always preferred not to fetter the judicial discretion by  attempting  to
make excessive enumeration, in one way or another;  and  that  both  aspects
namely aggravating and mitigating  circumstances  have  to  be  given  their
respective weightage and that the Court has to strike  the  balance  between
the two and see towards which side  the  scale/balance  of  justice  tilts.”
With these principles in mind we now consider the present  review  petition.


20.   The material placed on record shows  that  after  the  Judgment  under
review,  the  petitioner  has  completed  Bachelors  Preparatory   Programme
offered by the Indira  Gandhi  National  Open  University  enabling  him  to
prepare for Bachelor level study and that he has also completed  the  Gandhi
Vichar Pariksha  and  had  participated  in  drawing  competition  organized
sometime in January 2016.  It is  asserted  that  the  jail  record  of  the
petitioner is without any blemish.   The matter is not contested as  regards
Conditions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 as stated in paragraph 206 of  the  decision  in
Bachan Singh (supra) but what is now being projected  is  that  there  is  a
possibility of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.   Though  these
attempts on part of the petitioner are after the Judgment under  review,  we
have considered the material in that behalf to see  if  those  circumstances
warrant a different view.   We  have  given  anxious  consideration  to  the
material on record but find that the aggravating  circumstances  namely  the
extreme depravity and the barbaric manner in which the crime  was  committed
and the fact that the victim was a  helpless  girl  of  four  years  clearly
outweigh the mitigating circumstances now brought on record.   Having  taken
an overall view of the matter, in our considered view, no case is  made  out
to take a different view in the  matter.  We,  therefore,  affirm  the  view
taken  in  the  Judgment  under  review  and  dismiss  the  present   Review
Petitions.


                                                               ..………………………J.
                                                   (Dipak Misra)



                                                   ...………..…..………...J.
                                                    (Rohinton Fali Nariman)



                                                   …………..……..……..J.
                                                    (Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi,
May 03, 2017


-----------------------
[1]

      [2] (2014) 9 SCC 737
[3]

      [4] (2015) 1 SCC 253
[5]

      [6] (1980) 2 SCC 684
[7]

      [8] 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 = 408 US 238 (1972)
[9]

      [10](1983) 3 SCC 470
[11]

      [12] (1977) 3 SCC 68
[13]

      [14](1989) 3 SCC 5
[15]

      [16] (1991) 4 SCC 341
[17]

      [18] (1989) 3 SCC 33
[19]

      [20] (2016) 9 SCALE 600
[21]

      [22] (1977) 3 SCC 218
[23]

      [24] (2011) 13 SCC 706
[25]

      [26] (2012) 4 SCC 257


whether the offences for which the employee is convicted constitute moral turpitude. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would be open to the competent authority to pass the order of termination without holding inquiry. However, if the offences for which an employee is convicted have no shades of moral turpitude, the disciplinary authority has to look into the attendant circumstances leading to the conduct of such an employee to see whether he is suitable for rejection in government service or not.”- convicted under sec.323 I.P.C. - In the present case by the time the benefit of acquittal of the co- accused was pressed in service and claim was raised by the respondent, Dharam Singh had already expired. In the circumstances, we direct that the respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits in terms of the judgment under appeal except the payment of back wages. All the other consequential benefits be computed and released to the respondent within two months from the date of this Judgment. With the aforesaid modification, the appeal stands disposed of.

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6066   of 2017
                (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.21622 of 2015)



State of  Haryana and Another                                 …. Appellants

                                   Versus

Ved Kaur                                           …. Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T



Uday Umesh Lalit, J.



1.    Leave granted.


2.    The  appellants  seek  to  challenge  the  judgment  and  order  dated
25.08.2014 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh  passed  in
LPA No.1353 of 2014 (OM), affirming the view taken by the  Single  Judge  of
the High Court on 22.01.2014 in CWP No.14998 of 2007.


3.    One Dharam Singh (since deceased and represented  by  his  widow,  the
respondent herein) was working as JBT teacher  in  Education  Department  in
State of Haryana since 07.10.1967.  He and two others were  convicted  under
Section 304 Part-II IPC vide judgment and order passed by  the  trial  court
on 29.10.1994 and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  four
years.  On the basis of said  conviction  and  sentence,  Dharam  Singh  was
dismissed from service,  without  holding  any  enquiry,  vide  order  dated
28.03.1995 on the ground that he was convicted and sentenced for an  offence
involving moral turpitude.


4.    While the appeal preferred against  the  judgment  of  conviction  and
sentence was pending, Dharam Singh expired  on  11.12.2002  and  his  appeal
abated.  Subsequently the appeal of the co-accused was  partly  allowed  and
they were acquitted of the offence under Section 304 Part II  IPC  but  were
convicted under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC.  The role of  the  co-
accused was admittedly similar to that of Dharam Singh.


5.    After the acquittal of the co-accused, the respondent called upon  the
State to set aside the order of dismissal of her husband  in  the  light  of
the finding recorded by the appellate court and to release all  the  service
benefits to which her deceased husband  was  entitled.   This  claim  having
been rejected,  the  respondent  filed  CWP  No.10134  of  2005   which  was
disposed of by the High Court directing the State to  reconsider  the  claim
of the respondent.  The matter was, therefore,  reconsidered  by  the  State
but the claim was again rejected.


6.    The rejection of claim was challenged  afresh  by  the  respondent  by
filing CWP No.14998 of 2007 which was allowed by the  Single  Judge  of  the
High Court, relying on the instructions dated 26.03.1975 issued by State  of
Haryana wherein offences involving “moral  turpitude”  stand  enlisted.   It
was observed that the offence under Section 323 IPC did not fall under  said
category of offences.  It was further observed that the role  attributed  to
the deceased husband of the respondent  was  similar  to  that  of  his  co-
accused and that the appellate court had held that the  death  in  the  case
was not because of the  injuries  attributed  to  the  accused  but  it  was
because of renal failure.


7.    The decision of the Single  Judge  was  questioned  by  the  State  by
filing Letters Patent Appeal No.1353 of  2014  (OM).    Affirming  the  view
taken by the Single Judge, the Division Bench dismissed  the  aforesaid  LPA
and held the respondent to be entitled to all consequential benefits.


8.    The instructions dated  26.03.1975  which  were  relied  upon  in  the
present case, had been considered by this Court in Pawan Kumar v.  State  of
Haryana and another[1] and paragraph 12 of  the  decision  is  relevant  for
present purposes.  The said paragraph was as under:

“12.   Moral turpitude” is an expression which is  used  in  legal  as  also
societal parlance to  describe  conduct  which  is  inherently  base,  vile,
depraved or having any  connection  showing  depravity.  The  Government  of
Haryana while considering the  question  of  rehabilitation  of  ex-convicts
took  a  policy  decision  on  2-2-1973  (Annexure  E  in  the  Paper-book),
accepting the recommendations of the Government of India,  that  ex-convicts
who were  convicted  for  offences  involving  moral  turpitude  should  not
however be taken in government  service.  A  list  of  offences  which  were
considered involving  moral  turpitude  was  prepared  for  information  and
guidance in that connection. Significantly Section  294  IPC  is  not  found
enlisted in the list of offences constituting  moral  turpitude.  Later,  on
further consideration, the Government of Haryana on  17/26-3-1975  explained
the policy decision of 2-2-1973 and decided to modify the  earlier  decision
by streamlining determination of moral turpitude as follows:

“… The following terms should ordinarily be applied  in  judging  whether  a
certain offence involves moral turpitude or not;

whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could  shock  the  moral
conscience of society in general.

whether the motive which led to the act was a base one.

whether on account of the act having been committed  the  perpetrator  could
be considered to be of a depraved character  or  a  person  who  was  to  be
looked down upon by the society.

Decision in each case will, however, depend  on  the  circumstances  of  the
case and the competent  authority  has  to  exercise  its  discretion  while
taking a decision in accordance with the above-mentioned principles. A  list
of offences which involve moral turpitude is enclosed for  your  information
and guidance. This list, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and  there
might be offences which  are  not  included  in  it  but  which  in  certain
situations and circumstances may involve moral turpitude.”

Section 294 IPC still remains out of the list. Thus the  conviction  of  the
appellant under  Section  294  IPC  on  its  own  would  not  involve  moral
turpitude depriving him of the opportunity to serve  the  State  unless  the
facts and circumstances, which led to the conviction, met  the  requirements
of the policy decision above-quoted.”



9.    The aforesaid decision shows that Section 294 IPC was not part of  the
list of offences appended to the instructions dated 26.03.1975 and  as  such
it was held by this Court that  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  therein
under Section 294 IPC would not involve moral  turpitude  depriving  him  of
the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances  which
led to his conviction, met the requirement of the policy decision.


10.   In the aforesaid context, decision of the Division Bench of  the  High
Court of Punjab  and  Haryana  in  State  of  Haryana  and  another  v.  Ram
Chander[2]  on  which  reliance  was  placed  by  the  respondent,  is  also
significant wherein same instructions dated 26.03.1975  were  considered  by
the Division Bench and paragraphs 11 and 12 of the  said  decision  were  as
under:

“11.  Following principles can be culled out, as contained in the  aforesaid
instructions:-


(a) Those who are involved  in  moral  turpitude  should  not  be  taken  in
government service.


(b) Those who  are  convicted  of  offences,  which  do  not  involve  moral
turpitude or those who are released under the Probation  of  Offenders  Act,
should  not  suffer  any  disability  in  respect  of  obtaining  government
service.


(c)  With  regard  to  those  convicted  of  offence  not  involving   moral
turpitude, laying down uniform policy, is not possible and  it  is  left  to
the appointing authority in each case to make detailed inquiry  and  satisfy
himself fully that ex-convict has reformed himself after release  from  jail
and nothing  adverse  about  his  conduct  has  come  to  notice  after  his
conviction. Such  an  inquiry  is  to  be  made  invariably  through  Police
Department.


(d) What amounts to moral turpitude is also stated  in  para  (iii)  of  the
instructions.


(e) Discretion is given to the competent authority while taking decision  in
accordance with principle mentioned in these instructions.


12.   On the basis of these instructions, when  competent  authority  is  to
invoke its power under Rule 7(2)(b)  of  the  P&A  Rules,  1978,  the  first
question would be as to whether the  offences  for  which  the  employee  is
convicted constitute moral turpitude. If the answer is in  the  affirmative,
it  would  be  open  to  the  competent  authority  to  pass  the  order  of
termination without holding inquiry. However, if the offences for  which  an
employee is convicted have no shades of moral  turpitude,  the  disciplinary
authority has to look  into  the  attendant  circumstances  leading  to  the
conduct of such an employee to see whether he is suitable for  rejection  in
government service or not.”


11.   In the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, the conviction  under
Section 323 was not held to constitute  one  involving  moral  turpitude  in
terms of the test laid down  in  instructions  dated  26.03.1975.    In  the
premises, the decision of the Division Bench affirming that  of  the  Single
Judge in the present case does not call for any interference.   However,  it
must be noted at this stage  and  it  was  fairly  accepted  by  Mr.  Tushar
Bakshi, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent that in  view  of  the
decision of this Court in State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed  Abdul
Rahim[3] the order regarding payment of backwages as directed by the  courts
below needed modification.  Paragraph 12 of said decision was as under:
“The respondent was acquitted on 22-2-2002,  the  demand  for  reinstatement
was made by him on 22-4-2002  and  he  was  reinstated  in  service  by  the
appellant bank on 7-11-2002.  On  the  view  that  we  have  taken,  at  the
highest, what can be said  in  favour  of  the  respondent  is  that  he  is
entitled to wages from the date he  had  lodged  the  demand  for  the  same
following his acquittal, namely, from  22-4-2002,  until  the  date  of  his
reinstatement, if the same has not already been  granted  by  the  appellant
Bank.”


 12.  In the present case by the time the benefit of acquittal  of  the  co-
accused was pressed in service and  claim  was  raised  by  the  respondent,
Dharam Singh had already expired.  In the circumstances, we direct that  the
respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits in terms  of  the  judgment
under appeal except the payment of back wages.  All the other  consequential
benefits be computed and released to the respondent within two  months  from
the date of this Judgment.  With  the  aforesaid  modification,  the  appeal
stands disposed of.



………………………J.
(Adarsh Kumar Goel)




…………………..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi,
May 03,  2017
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[1]   (1996) 4 SCC 17
[2]    LPA No.95 of 2013 (O&M) decided on 18.02.2013
[3]   (2013) 11 SCC 67