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Thursday, May 18, 2017

The other glaring aspect is non-conduction of the test identification parade. This aspect gains relevance as PW4 and PW5, who are cited as eye witnesses to the incident, deposed that they have not mentioned the names of the accused and that they did not know the accused. Therefore we find that the prosecution case is filled with infirmities and lacunas, therefore the only possible and probable course left open is to grant benefit of reasonable doubt to the appellant herein. Resultantly, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The bail bonds of the appellant stands discharged.

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 841 OF 2007



KANAKARAJAN @ KANAKAN                        …     APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA                                            …RESPONDENT


                                  JUDGMENT

N.V. RAMANA, J.

This appeal is directed  against  the  Judgment  dated  8th  November,  2006
passed by the High Court of Kerala in Criminal  Appeal  No.  1906  of  2004,
wherein  the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  appeal  preferred   by   the
accused/appellant herein and upheld the order  of  conviction  and  sentence
passed by  the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Fast  Track  Court-I,
Palakkad, in Sessions Case No. 104 of 2002.

The material available on record reveals  that  initially  there  were  nine
accused in this case against whom an FIR was registered at 9 am on  6.3.2000
at Kongad Police Station for causing the death of one  Rajesh  and  injuring
the complainant/Vinod (PW2), who happens to be the cousin of  the  deceased.
Since the accused No. 2 (Ayyappankutty) was found hanging  from  a  tree  on
the next day and was declared dead, charges were framed   only  against  the
remaining accused under Sections 143, 147, 148, 302, 342 and 324 r/w 149  of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter  ‘IPC’  for  brevity].  The  Trial  Court
acquitted A3, A4, A6, A7,  A8  and  A9  of  the  charges  and  convicted  A1
(Kanakarajan) and A5 (Sukumaran) for the offences punishable under  Sections
143, 147, 148, 342 and 302 r/w 149 of IPC.  On an  appeal,  the  High  Court
acquitted A5 of all the charges but  upheld  the  order  of  conviction  and
sentence as against A1  (Kanakarajan)  who  is  before  us  in  the  present
appeal.

The brief facts of the case as unfolded from  the  case  of  prosecution  is
that, on the intervening night of 5th and 6th March, 2000, an ox  procession
was going on at Kunnappully temple at Tharakassery and  several  people  had
gathered around the temple premises. At about 2 A.M,  accused  attacked  the
deceased Rajesh, with deadly weapons such as swords and sticks, as a  result
of which he sustained grievous injuries. When  the  complainant—Vinod  (PW2)
tried to intervene and stop the  accused,  he  too  was  beaten  up  by  the
accused. While  the  general  public  started  gathering  at  the  place  of
incident, the accused party took to their heels. With the help  of  some  of
the people assembled there, PW2 took the injured Rajesh in his jeep  to  the
Fort Hospital where the doctor advised to shift the injured  Rajesh  to  the
Medical College Hospital, Thrissur. On  the  way  to  the  Medical  College,
Rajesh succumbed to the injuries at about 5.30 A.M.

Based on the information furnished by the complainant-Vinod/PW2  (cousin  of
the deceased), Sub-Inspector (PW 21) at  Kongad  Police  Station  registered
the case as  Crime  No.  56/2000.   PW22  (Circle  Inspector)  took  up  the
investigation and carried it through to a larger extent and  his  successor,
Circle Inspector (PW23) concluded the investigation  and  filed  the  charge
sheet against all the nine accused persons,   who  pleaded  not  guilty  and
claimed trial.

The prosecution in order  to  bring  home  the  guilt  of  the  accused  has
produced 23 witnesses and the defense has produced one witness. Out  of  the
aforesaid 23 prosecution  witnesses,  PW3  who  was  an  eyewitness  to  the
incident, turned hostile. PWs 11 and 12, who were witnesses to the  recovery
mahazar (Ext. P10), also turned hostile.  PW11 being the panch  witness  for
the recovery of ‘vadival’, allegedly the  weapon  used  for  committing  the
crime,  did  not   support   the   case   of   the   prosecution.   In   the
accused/appellant’s statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C, he had stated  that
on the eve of Kummati festival he went to the temple to pay respects to  the
deity and while having a soda drink from a roadside shop, he saw a group  of
people running  into  the  temple  compound  and  heard  from  someone  that
Haridas, Vinod (PW2) and Rajesh (deceased)  were  attacking  Ayyappan  Kutty
(A2). While he was trying to see from a closer point, as to  what  is  going
on, someone among the crowd said  some  persons  have  taken  away  Ayyappan
Kutty (A2).  On the next day i.e.  7.3.2000  at  about  9.30  A.M,  Ayyappan
Kutty was found hanging from a tree while his legs were touching the  ground
and there were injury marks on  A2’s  body.  When  he  went  to  the  police
station to report the same, the police arrested  him  and  foisted  a  false
case upon him, though he had nothing to do with the incident.

The Trial Court, after a full-fledged trial has come to the conclusion  that
the prosecution could not prove the guilt of accused A3, A4, A6, A7, A8  and
A9 beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted them by extending the   benefit  of
doubt. However, the Trial Court found A1 and A5 guilty of the  offences  and
sentenced them under Section 302, IPC to imprisonment for life and to pay  a
fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default, to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment
for six months. Further under Section 342, IPC, the accused  were  sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six  months  under  Section
143 and for a period of one year under Section 148, IPC. The sentences  were
however directed to run concurrently.

Aggrieved by the conviction both appellant/A1  and  A5  carried  the  matter
over to the High Court in appeal, where  the  High  Court  gave  benefit  of
doubt to A5 and allowed  his  appeal  by  acquitting  him  of  the  offences
charged. The appeal of appellant/A1 was however dismissed by the High  Court
as being devoid of any merit, thereby confirming  the  order  of  conviction
and sentence passed by the Trial Court.

We heard the  learned  senior  counsel  Mr.  R.  Basant  appearing  for  the
accused/appellant. He contended that  the  entire  case  is  fabricated  and
foisted one suppressing the real incident that had taken place in  order  to
falsely implicate the accused/appellant. He has vehemently argued  that  the
prosecution has  concocted  the  story  to  harass  the  accused  by  taking
advantage of his long standing rivalry with the deceased concerning  cutting
of some rubber trees. At the alleged place of incident, which  is  a  temple
compound, there were more than 10,000 people  present  in  addition  to  the
police force stationed around the temple compound. He points out that,  when
an incident of  such  grave  nature  had  taken  place  amidst  huge  public
gathering  and  police  force,  it  is  impossible  to  not  have  a  single
independent witness.

Another vital aspect pointed out by  the  learned  senior  counsel  is  that
making PW2  a  witness  to  the  alleged  incident  is  an  afterthought  of
prosecution. PW2—the  author  of  FIR  and  being  cousin  of  deceased,  in
connivance with his brother-in-law who was a Sub-Inspector of Police in  the
same district, is the mastermind in implicating the accused.   As  a  matter
of fact, on the night of the said incident, it  was  PW2  and  the  deceased
Rajesh who attacked A2 (the brother of A1) and kidnapped him, due  to  their
past enmity over cutting rubber trees belonging to  another  brother  of  A1
and A2. On the next day, the dead body of A2 was found hanging from  a  tree
under mysterious circumstances with his feet touching  the  ground.  Sixteen
(16) ante  mortem  injuries  were  found  in  his  body  and  some  greenish
poisonous substance was found oozing from his mouth.  When  A1  visited  the
police station to report the mysterious death  of  A2,  instead  the  police
arrested him in the present case. In order to save PW2,  his  brother-in-law
being Sub-Inspector of Police, concocted the prosecution story  and  falsely
implicated A1 in the case.  On A2’s mysterious death, the police had  merely
registered a case  of  unnatural  death  and  no  proper  investigation  was
conducted and no person was prosecuted or arrested.

Learned senior counsel further submitted that there was an inordinate  delay
of 24 hours on the part of police in presenting the  FIR  before  the  court
and no reason has been given by the prosecution for such delay.  He  further
contends that the motive behind the crime, as alleged  by  the  prosecution,
is so trivial and unbelievable, would not be a  sufficient  reason  for  the
accused to settle with such a heinous crime. Further he submits that it  was
well known fact among the people living in the vicinity  that  the  deceased
Rajesh was known to be a person of bad character in the locality as  he  has
previously indulged in various illegal  activities  and  had  disputes  with
several people.  According  to  learned  senior  counsel  this  fact  stands
corroborated with the evidence of PW’s 2 and 4. Doubting the reliability  of
prosecution witnesses, it is  submitted  that  out  of  the  23  prosecution
witnesses, PW3 (eyewitness) turned hostile. PW 11 (panch  witness)  did  not
support the prosecution case on recovery of  alleged  weapon.  The  presence
and conduct of PWs 4 and 5 (eyewitnesses) at  the  place  of  occurrence  is
highly doubtful because despite being close friends of  the  deceased,  even
after witnessing the incident, neither did they  accompany  the  injured  to
the hospital nor did they take effort to register a case  with  the  police.
Their statement was recorded by the police five  days  after  the  incident.
Even PW4 in his evidence did not mention the name and  presence  of  PW5  at
the alleged scene of offence. Learned senior counsel has  finally  submitted
that though the High Court discarded the statement of PW2  as  his  presence
at the place of offence was doubtful but the High Court still  believed  the
story of prosecution and convicted the  appellant  while  discharging  other
accused by giving them benefit of doubt. Hence, he prayed that the  judgment
of the High Court is perverse and that it is based on wrong  reasoning,  and
therefore needs to be set aside by this Court.

On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for  the  State  supported  the
prosecution case on all aspects and submitted that the  reasoning  given  by
the High  Court  in  convicting  the  accused  is  based  on  settled  legal
principles. The High Court clearly  recorded  the  finding  that  though  no
reliance is placed on the testimony made by the prime witness (PW2), it  may
not make any difference in fastening the liability of the  accused.   Hence,
the impugned judgment does not call for interference by this Court.

Having heard learned counsel for both side  and  after  carefully  analyzing
the material  available  on  record,  the  following  point  falls  for  our
consideration is (1.) “Whether the High Court  is  justified  in  convicting
the accused (A1) and (2.) Whether the prosecution could prove the  guilt  of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt”?

Looking at the evidence on record we find that  there  are  certain  pivotal
issues  where  the  prosecution  has  failed  to  provide   a   satisfactory
explanation. The facts on hand reveal that the incident took place at  2  AM
on the night of 5th and 6th March 2000. The place of occurrence  is  in  the
compound of the temple. On that day an ox procession  was  going  on,  there
was a huge gathering of  people  and  also  several  police  personnel  were
present to maintain  law  and  order.  Moreover  PW2-the  eye  witness,  who
happens to be the cousin of the deceased, basing on  whose  information  the
criminal law was set into  motion.  According  to  his  statement  a  police
constable was present when the incident was taking  place.  Further  he  had
tried to stop the accused and was injured in the  process.  He  carried  the
injured to the hospital at Pallakkad in his  own  jeep.  Later  he  did  not
accompany the deceased to the Medical College Hospital  Thrissur,  where  on
the way deceased succumbed to the injuries. He came to know about the  death
at 7:30 AM, he neither chose to go to the  police  nor  to  the  doctor  for
treatment and kept quiet till the police  came  to  him.  According  to  PW2
there are several houses and shops in the vicinity of the  place  where  the
incident took place, PW3  who  is  cited  as  eye  witness  turned  hostile.


The prosecution then relied upon the evidences of PW4 and PW5; both of  them
have stated to have witnessed the incident and are cited as the  independent
witnesses. It is to be noted that the witness statements of PW 4  and  PW  5
were recorded five days after the incident. PW4 deposed that he is a  friend
of deceased and got acquainted with PW2  after  the  incident.  He  did  not
mention about the presence of PW5 at the time  of  incident.  Admittedly  no
test identification parade was conducted and he did not know  the  names  of
accused persons as on the date of occurrence.  PW11,  the  panchwitness  for
recovery of the weapon, has turned hostile. He deposed that  he  signed  the
document without even knowing the contents of it.

As per PW21 the Sub Inspector of Police, several policemen were on  duty  at
temple premises. As per PW22 the C.I of police PW4 told him that there  were
3 constables present at the scene of crime. Neither PW4  nor  PW5  disclosed
to him that they knew the accused before the incident.  They  also  did  not
mention the names of any of the accused. In clear terms,  he  admitted  that
though he had interrogated the people near the place of occurrence,  he  did
not include them as witness. PW6 is the doctor who conducted post mortem  on
the deceased. PW18 is the doctor who examined  the  dead  body  of  deceased
Ayyappan Kutty (A2). According  to  him  the  cause  of  death  was  due  to
hanging. In the report he mentioned that in the stomach portion  there  were
few unidentified food particles in  a  brownish  fluid  medium  emitting  an
insecticide smell. He also expressed the view that there  can  be  death  of
the person or unconsciousness after consuming insecticide.  Evidently  there
were 16 ante mortem injuries on his body and was found hanging from  a  tree
with his feet touching the ground. There is no investigation or  explanation
put forth by the prosecution for these injuries.

The crucial evidence of DW1 is that on  the  evening  of  5.3.2000,  he  saw
Rajesh (deceased) scuffling with an Auto Rickshaw driver when A2  interfered
and separated them taking the side of Auto Rickshaw  driver.  Later  in  the
midnight, Rajesh (deceased) holding a liquor bottle in one  hand  and  knife
in the other hand, attacked A2. At that point of time, when  people  started
gathering, 2-3 people had taken away Ayyappan Kutty  (A2)  from  there.  The
next day at 9.30 am the body of A2 was found hanging from a  tree  with  his
legs touching the ground.

In the backdrop of these  facts  and  circumstance  a  closer  look  at  the
evidence of prosecution witnesses, in particular PW2, PW4 PW5,  PW11,  PW12,
PW21 and PW22,  would  reveal  that  these  witnesses  are  not  cogent  and
trustworthy to form basis to convict the appellant. Admittedly the  incident
had taken place in the midst of several hundred people and  the  prosecution
witnesses in equivocal terms stated that the police personnel were  present.
There is nothing on record to show that the police constables  available  at
the scene of offence were examined or that they  have  played  any  role  in
preventing the accused. The conduct of PW2 in not accompanying  the  accused
to the second hospital, not giving the  complaint  to  the  police  and  not
getting his injuries treated raises serious doubts and supports the case  of
the defense that PW2 is the king pin who has  implicated  the  accused  with
the help of his brother-in-law who is in the police  department.  Above  all
when the High Court disbelieves  the  presence  of  PW2,  at  the  scene  of
offence, it ought not to have  taken  into  consideration  his  evidence  to
convict the appellant.  The  prosecution  has  not  taken  minimum  care  to
examine the independent witnesses in support of their case and  particularly
when it is nobody’s case that independent witnesses were not available.

We feel that non examination of credible independent witnesses in this  case
is very much fatal to the prosecution’s case. Particularly when it is  their
own case that there were several  shops  and  houses  in  the  vicinity  and
several people were present. It is not necessary  that  in  each  and  every
case on the ground of non examination of independent witnesses the  case  of
the prosecution has to be brushed aside,  if  the  evidence  of  prosecution
witnesses is consistent, cogent and corroborated by other  evidence  it  can
be safely relied upon, but it is not so in the case at hand. The High  Court
disbelieved the presence of PW2, PW3 turned hostile, statements of PW4,  PW5
and PW 22 do  not  inspire  confidence.  No  other  independent  witness  is
examined. PW11 the panchwitness for  recovery  of  weapon  has  also  turned
hostile and deposed that he signed without reading the same. Moreover  there
is no evidence to show any results of forensic examination of the weapon  so
recovered. In our considered opinion the High Court,  while  convicting  the
appellant, should have been more cautious while  weighing  the  evidence  of
these prosecution witnesses.

It is  to  be  noted  that  the  High  Court  has  undertaken  a  scientific
hypothesis to conclude that the difference of time  of  death,  between  the
deceased A2 and  Rajesh,  were  not  connected.  High  Court’s  reliance  on
conjectural premise  built  upon  the  timing  of  rigor  mortis,  when  the
surrounding  circumstances  were  suspicious,  would  not  be  safe  to   be
followed. The next important aspect which requires our consideration is non-
explanation of the injuries on  the  body  of  deceased  A2.  The  death  of
deceased A2  as  per  ocular  and  medical  evidence  appears  to  be  under
suspicious circumstances. It is a clear case  of  latches  on  the  part  of
prosecuting agency in conducting investigation  goes  to  the  root  of  the
matter. Non-explanation of the serious injuries on the body of  the  accused
A2 by the prosecution is fatal in this case.

In this case the High Court while  convicting  the  accused  has  overlooked
settled principles of criminal  law  and  in  a  mechanical  way  based  its
conclusion on the premise that  the  injuries  were  not  sustained  in  the
process of  the  same  incident.  In  a  case  of  this  nature,  where  the
investigating agency utterly failed in its duty  to  thoroughly  investigate
and find out the reasons for the death of A2 who is alleged to be the  prime
accused in causing the death of the deceased, convicting  an  accused  would
not be safe.

The other ground put forth by the learned senior counsel is  in  respect  of
motive. According to him the motive attributed to the  accused  is  that  he
had cut the rubber trees belonging to the brother of the  accused  four  (4)
years prior to the incident and it is not  a  sufficient  motive  to  commit
such a heinous crime. Needless to say that in this  case  the  motive  is  a
double edged sword, as it can be a reason for crime and at the same  time  a
reason for false prosecution specially when the motive alleged  is  of  ill-
will and bad blood. In the present case evidence on record does not  inspire
confidence. Therefore, reliance on the motive would not be safe and as  such
serves no purpose.

The other glaring  aspect  is  non-conduction  of  the  test  identification
parade. This aspect gains relevance as PW4 and PW5, who  are  cited  as  eye
witnesses to the incident, deposed that they have not  mentioned  the  names
of the accused and that they did not know the accused.


Therefore we find that the prosecution case is filled with  infirmities  and
lacunas, therefore the only possible and probable course  left  open  is  to
grant benefit of reasonable doubt to the appellant herein. Resultantly,  the
impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The bail bonds  of
the appellant stands discharged.

                                         ..................................J
                                                              (N. V. Ramana)


                                          .................................J
                                                          (Prafulla C. Pant)

New Delhi
Dated:  April 21, 2017




the writ petition is now rendered infructuous in the light of certain subsequent events.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No.6022 OF 2012



Hill View Colony & Ors.                  ….Appellant(s)

                                   VERSUS

State of Nagaland & Ors.            …Respondent(s)




                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1)    This appeal is filed  against  the  final  judgment  and  order  dated
05.08.2011 passed by the High Court of Gauhati, Kohima Bench in Writ  Appeal
(c) No. 23(K)  of  2010  whereby  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court
dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellants herein  and  affirmed  the
order dated 01.09.2010 of the Single Judge  in W.P.(c) No.117(K) of 2010.
2)    We need not burden the order  by  setting  out  the  facts  in  detail
except to the extent necessary to appreciate the short controversy  involved
in the appeal.

3)    Respondent No.2 herein (Industrial Village Razhuphe, Dimapur) filed  a
writ petition against respondent Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 in  the  High  Court  of
Gauhati (Kohima Bench) and sought the following reliefs therein:
“(a) directing the Dimapur Municipal  Council,  Dimapur,  to  cancel  and/or
reject the census record collected by its staff from the Industrial  Village
Razhuphe, Dimapur and

(b)  direct the respondents, in  particular  the  respondent  No.3,  not  to
accept the census record submitted by the Dimapur Municipal Council,  in  so
far as it relates  to  the  census  record  collected  from  the  industrial
village Razhuphe.”

4)    The respondents to the writ petition  (State  of  Nagaland  and  other
agencies of the State) filed their  counter  affidavits  and  contested  the
writ petition on various grounds.
5)     The  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court,   by  order  dated
01.09.2010,  in substance allowed the writ petition and  issued  a  writ  of
certiorari and mandamus against the  State  and  its  agencies  (respondents
therein) in relation to  the  subject  matter  of  the  writ  petition.  The
eventual direction issued by the writ Court reads as under:
“In the facts situation, the  Extra  Assistant  Commissioner  (Gen.)  Charge
Officer of the Census, respondent No.3 herein  is  directed  to  cancel  the
Census records collected by the staff of the DMC,  Dimapur  with  a  further
direction to conduct Census  in  the  Petitioner  village  through  official
enumerators appointed by him.

      With the above directions, Writ Petition stands disposed of.”

6)    Appellant Nos. 1 to 4  herein,  who  were  not  parties  to  the  writ
petition and they having come to know of the aforesaid  order  of  the  writ
Court, felt aggrieved of the eventual writs issued by the writ Court  sought
leave to file appeal before the Division Bench and challenged  the  legality
and the correctness of the order of the writ Court. The  leave  was  granted
and accordingly the appellants filed writ appeal.

7)    The Division Bench,  by  impugned  order,  dismissed  the  appeal  and
affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge  giving  rise  to  filing  of
this appeal by way of special leave by the appellants before this Court.

8)    Heard Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior  counsel  for  the  appellants
and Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija  and  Mr.  Vikramjit  Banerjee,  learned  senior
counsel for the respondents.

9)    Having heard learned senior counsel for  the  parties  at  length  and
having perused the record of the case as also the written submissions  filed
by the learned counsel as directed, we are inclined to allow the  appeal  in
part and while setting aside of the impugned order  as  also  of  the  order
passed by the learned Single Judge restore the writ petition, out  of  which
this appeal arises, to its file and request the writ  Court  to  decide  the
writ petition afresh on merits in accordance with law.

10)   In substance, the issue involved in the writ petition and  carried  to
this Court in the appeal arises out of Census  Act  as  also  certain  State
laws applicable to the State of Nagaland.  The challenge inter alia  therein
is to orders issued by the State Authorities in relation to census.

11)   In our considered opinion, the need to remand the  case  to  the  writ
Court has occasioned due to the following reasons as detailed herein:

12)    First, since the appellants herein were not parties to  the  original
writ petition but became parties in appeal for  the  first  time,  the  writ
Court decided the writ petition without taking into consideration the  stand
of the appellants.

13)    Second, once the Appellate Court granted leave to the  appellants  to
file appeal thereby recognizing their locus in the  subject  matter  of  the
writ petition then, in our view, instead  of  deciding  the  issues  in  its
appellate jurisdiction, the Appellate Court should have  remanded  the  case
to the writ Court for deciding the writ petition afresh  after  granting  an
opportunity to the appellants to file their counter affidavits in answer  to
the writ petition. It was, however, not done.

14)   Third, having regard to the nature  of  the  controversy  and  various
issues raised therein by all the parties concerned and also keeping in  view
the subsequent events which have come into existence during the pendency  of
this appeal, we are of the opinion that it would be in the interest  of  all
the parties concerned that the writ Court (Single Judge) should  decide  the
writ petition afresh.
15)   We, accordingly,  grant  liberty  to  the  appellants  to  file  their
counter affidavits in response to the writ petition as respondent  Nos.5  to
9 to the writ petition. The writ petitioner and  other  original  respondent
Nos.1-4 (State and its agencies) are also granted  liberty  to  amend  their
pleadings and  raise  all  objections  both  on  facts  and  law  by  filing
additional counter affidavit/rejoinders etc.

16)   We, however, make it clear that we have refrained from  recording  any
finding on all the issues  argued  by  the  parties  before  this  Court  in
support of their respective stand which, inter alia, included that the  writ
petition is now rendered infructuous in  the  light  of  certain  subsequent
events.  It is now for the writ Court to decide all such issues.   The  writ
Court would, therefore, decide the writ petition uninfluenced by any of  our
observations.  We request the learned Single Judge (writ  Court)  to  decide
the writ petition expeditiously.
17)   In view of foregoing discussion and  the  directions,  the  appeal  is
allowed in part.  Impugned judgment is set aside.


                                      ……..................................J.
                                  [R.K. AGRAWAL]

                                      ……..................................J.
                                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
      New Delhi;
April  21, 2017
-----------------------
8



In our considered view, in order to appreciate the factual and legal controversy involved in the lis, the least which is expected of is that the order which decides the lis between the parties should contain the brief facts involved in the case, the grounds on which the action is impugned, the stand of the parties defending the action, the submissions of the parties in support of their stand, legal provisions, if any, applicable to the controversy involved in the lis, and lastly, the brief reasons as to why the case of one party deserves acceptance or rejection, as the case may be.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CIVIL APPEAL No.460 OF 2008


Municipal Board, Sumerpur      ….Appellant(s)

                                   VERSUS

Kundanmal & Ors.              …Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1)    This appeal is filed  against  the  final  judgment  and  order  dated
09.03.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur
in D.B. Civil  Special  Appeal  No.  92  of  2006  whereby  the  High  Court
dismissed the special appeal filed by the appellant herein and affirmed  the
judgment/order dated 02.08.2005 of the Single Judge  in  S.B.C.W.P.  No.1403
of 2004.





2)    Facts of the case need not  be  mentioned  in  detail  except  to  the
extent necessary for the disposal of this appeal.
3)    The appellant - a Municipal Board, Sumerpur (writ petitioner) filed  a
writ petition being Civil Writ No. 1403 of  2004   against  the  respondents
challenging therein the order dated  30.09.2003  passed  by  the  Collector,
Pali in Municipal Appeal No.03/2001. The Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court
dismissed the writ petition in limine by order dated 02.08.2005 which  reads
as under:
“Heard learned counsel for the parties.

The order impugned, Annex.8 has been  passed  in  compliance  of  the  order
passed by Division Bench of this Court dated 15.1.2001 passed  inter-parties
being Annex.7.  It is not shown, as to how the  order,  Annex.8  is  not  in
accordance with the directions contained in Annex.7.  In that  view  of  the
matter, I do not find any  ground  to  interfere.   The  writ  petition  is,
therefore, dismissed summarily.”



4)    The appellant, felt aggrieved, filed writ appeal before  the  Division
Bench. By impugned  order,  the  Division  Bench  dismissed  the  appeal  in
limine. The impugned order reads as under:
“Having heard learned counsel for the appellant we are of the  opinion  that
no interference is called for in this appeal  in  the  judgment  of  learned
Single Judge who has rightly exercised his  discretion  in  not  interfering
with the order passed by the Collector as the learned counsel has  not  been
able to show how the impugned order is contrary  to  direction  of  Division
Bench.

      In essence learned counsel for the appellant tried to  urge  that  the
decision rendered in Hotechad’s case in the  light  of  which  the  Division
Bench in his earlier decision has directed  to  decide  his  representation,
was erroneous.  That is not permissible.”

5)    Felt aggrieved, the appellant (writ petitioner) has  filed  appeal  by
way of special leave before this Court.
6)    Heard Mr. Puneet Jain, learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  and  Mr.
Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents.

7)    Having heard the learned counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal in  part  and
while setting aside the impugned order also of the writ Court,  restore  the
appellant's writ petition  to  its  file  for  its  decision  on  merits  in
accordance with law.
8)    In our considered opinion, the need to remand the  case  to  the  writ
Court has occasioned due to the reason that both, i.e., the writ  Court  and
the Appellate Court did not set out even the factual controversy  nor  dealt
with the submissions urged by the appellant and nor examined the  issues  in
the  context  of  relevant  provisions  of  the  Act  which   governed   the
controversy.
9)    In our considered view, in order to appreciate the factual  and  legal
controversy involved in the lis, the least which is expected of is that  the
order which decides the lis between the parties  should  contain  the  brief
facts involved in the case,  the grounds on which the  action  is  impugned,
the stand of the parties  defending  the  action,  the  submissions  of  the
parties in support of their stand, legal provisions, if any,  applicable  to
the controversy involved in the lis,  and lastly, the brief  reasons  as  to
why the case of one party deserves acceptance or rejection, as the case  may
be.
10)    This enables the superior  Court  to  examine  the  legality  of  the
decision in its proper perspective in its appellate jurisdiction.
11)   Having regard to the nature of controversy involved  in  the  case  in
hand, in our view, the writ Court should have  issued  notice  of  the  writ
petition to the respondents and then decided the writ petition on merits  by
reasoned order rather than to dismiss it in limine.
12)   The Appellate Court too while dismissing the appeal in limine did  not
deal with any of the submissions raised by the appellant  and  nor  assigned
any reason much less in detail thereby  depriving  the  Appellate  Court  to
examine the issues arising in the case in its proper perspective.
13)   It is for these reasons, we cannot concur with the conclusion  arrived
at by the two Courts below and consider it proper in the facts of this  case
to remand it to the writ Court for deciding the writ petition on  merits  in
accordance with law.
14)   Since we have formed an opinion to remand the case, we have  refrained
from recording any finding on merits on any of the  issues  arising  in  the
case.
15)    In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal  succeeds  and   is
accordingly allowed in part. The impugned order and the order  of  the  writ
Court are set aside. The writ petition out of which this  appeal  arises  is
restored to its file. The writ Court (Single Judge) is requested  to  decide
the writ petition on merits in accordance with law uninfluenced  by  any  of
our observations.
16)   Since the matter is quite old, we request the Single Judge  to  decide
the writ petition expeditiously.



                                       …….................................J.
                                     [R.K. AGRAWAL]

        …......................................J.
                                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
      New Delhi;
April 21, 2017
-----------------------
7



Wednesday, May 3, 2017

whether the disputes could be otherwise settled out of the Court and the Court did succeeded, to some extent, when the parties were not able to reach an agreement on certain issues.

                                     NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7131-7132 OF 2010


FARHAT SHEIKH                                 APPELLANT(S)

                                VERSUS
JAVED ZAKI & ORS.                            RESPONDENT(S)


WITH
C.A NOS.7134-7135 OF 2010


                        J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.

      Applications for impleadment are allowed.
      These appeals have  been  pending  before  this  Court  for  almost  a
decade. Several attempts have been made by this Court  to  see  whether  the
disputes could be otherwise settled out of  the  Court  and  the  Court  did
succeeded, to some extent, when the  parties  were  not  able  to  reach  an
agreement on certain issues.
      In that background on 01.02.2017, this Court requested Mr. R.  Basant,
learned Senior Counsel, whether he could assist the parties to arrive  at  a
settlement on the remaining issues.
      Thanks to the efforts taken by the learned Senior Counsel  on  several
days and also in view of the subsequent orders passed by this Court, we  are
informed that the parties have been able to arrive at a settlement.
      The terms of settlement have been reduced to  writing  and  have  been
duly signed by all the parties in  the  form  of  Family  Settlement  Terms.
Settlement Terms have been filed along with I.A. Nos.21-22 of 2017  &  15-16
of 2017 in both sets of appeals. Settlement  Terms  filed  today  are
                           1.
taken on  record.  The  parties  have  also  filed  joint  applications  for
recording  the compromise  among  the  parties  and  for  disposing  of  the
appeals in terms of the settlement in both sets of appeals.
      The two family companies involved in the  two  appeals  are  Detinners
Pvt. Ltd. and Esemen Metalo Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., who were under the  control
of one SK. Md. Naqi, since  deceased,  the  predecessor  of  the  individual
parties herein. After his death, the shares of the two  companies  were  and
still are in the control of the parties herein, the descendants of the  said
deceased and members of the same family. Disputes arose with regard  to  the
control and management of the said two companies and  their  properties.  In
settling the said disputes, the family members being the individual  parties
herein, through the able and effective mediation of Mr.  Basant  R.,  Senior
Advocate, Supreme Court, have settled all issues. Keeping in mind the  well-
being of the family and equitable distribution of the realisable  assets  by
and between family members, the Appellant, the  Respondents  and  the  added
Respondents have agreed to the settlement terms which is duly signed by  all
the parties and their Advocates and filed in court.
      The I.A. Nos.21 and 22 of  2017  are  allowed  by  adding  Ruby  Zaki,
Kausar Zaki, Anisa Zaki and Detinners P. Ltd. in Civil Appeal  Nos.7134-7135
of 2010. The newly added parties are appearing through their  advocates  and
they waive service of notice.
      We direct all the parties to act accordingly. We make  it  clear  that
in case of violation of any of the terms referred to in  paragraphs  16,  18
and 19 of Family Settlement, the parties shall approach only this Court.
      We record our  appreciation  for  the  services  rendered  by  Mr.  R.
Basant, Senior Advocate who was ably assisted by Mr. A. Karthik, Advocate.
      Mr. R. Basant submits that this settlement  has  been

                               2.
arrived at between the parties by the  assistance  rendered  by  Mr.  D.  N.
Mitra, Advocate, and he also needs to  be  appreciated  since  he  had  been
working not only as a counsel for one side, but  has  made  sincere  efforts
for settlement. We thus record our appreciation for the assistance  rendered
by Mr. D. N. Mitra, Advocate.
      Despite the persuasive request of the Court, Mr.  R.  Basant  and  his
associate Mr. A. Karthik have declined to accept any  remuneration  for  the
wonderful assistance, though we are convinced  that  they  are  entitled  to
receive the same.
      However, parties on both the sides submit that  they  will  make  some
substantial  contribution  to  the  Tata  Memorial   Cancer   Hospital.   We
appreciate the gesture shown by the parties.
      Appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.
      Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.


                                               ...........................J.
                                    (KURIAN JOSEPH)




                                                ..........................J.
                                     (R. BANUMATHI)
NEW DELHI,
APRIL 20, 2017














                                                  3.

Tuesday, May 2, 2017

when acquitted under sec.498 A - no conviction under sec.306 due to missing link third ingredient for application of Section 113A = having absolved the appellants of the charge of cruelty, which is the most basic ingredient for the offence made out under Section 498A, the third ingredient for application of Section 113A is missing, namely, that the relatives i.e., the mother-in-law and father-in-law who are charged under Section 306 had subjected the victim to cruelty. No doubt, in the facts of this case, it has been concurrently found that the in-laws did harass her, but harassment is something of a lesser degree than cruelty. Also, we find on the facts, taken as a whole, that assuming the presumption under Section 113A would apply, it has been fully rebutted, for the reason that there is no link or intention on the part of the in- laws to assist the victim to commit suicide. In the absence of this vital link, the mere fact that there is a finding of harassment would not lead to the conclusion that there is “abetment of suicide”. On the facts, therefore, we find, especially in view of the fact that the appellants have been acquitted for the crime under Section 498 A of the Code, that abetment of suicide under Section 306 is not made out.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.790/2017
(@Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).1165/2017)

HEERA LAL AND ANR                                  Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                 Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T

ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN J

1.    Leave granted.

2.    In the present case, an F.I.R. dated 28th March, 2002  was  lodged  in
which it was stated that the father-in-law and  mother-in-law  of  the  lady
who committed suicide  harassed  her  for  at  least  five  years  and  this
harassment, therefore, led to offences being committed under  Sections  498A
and Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court  relied  upon  the
evidence of PWs 4 and 5, who were neighbours, who attested to the fact  that
there was harassment  meted  by  the  in-laws  to  the  dead  lady.  Medical
evidence also shows that there  were  90%  burns  as  the  lady  had  poured
kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. Most importantly, according  to
both the Trial Court and the  High  Court,  a  dying  declaration  was  made
before PW 9 who was a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, which reads as follows:-
“The PW-9, Himmat Singh has stated that as on 28.03.02, he  was  working  as
SDM and on that day he had gone to the hospital to record the  statement  of
the deceased. At that time Dr. Verma was the duty doctor and he  has  stated
that Lalita was in a state of fitness  to  record  her  statement.  When   I
asked  Lalita she had told that she was sleeping and
                                     -2-
her in-laws were quarrelling with her every day. Today also they  quarrelled
with me. They asked me to leave the house. My  husband  is  not  responsible
for anything. He resides in Kuwait. He has come  here  now.  I  am  residing
separately from my in-laws. Today they had come with their luggage and  said
that they have come to stay with her. I told them that  I  am  not  in  good
relations with them and therefore I cannot reside with them. They  told,  we
will stay here and you get lost. Then  I  got  angry  and  went  inside  the
kitchen and poured kerosene from the  stove  and  set  myself  on  fire.  My
father-in-law was looking at me but did not  try  to  stop  me.  My  husband
tried to save me. My in-laws were demanding dowry from me. I  did  not  have
any quarrels with my husband. My  signatures  are  there  on  the  statement
recorded by me. Lalita's thumb impression is there at point  X.  During  the
cross examination by the Ld. Counsel the witness stated that  the  statement
recorded by him is at Ex. P-5 and at point X the thumb impression of  Lalita
is there. At the time of recording the statement no one  from  her  parent's
side was present and the in-laws of the deceased  were  turned  out  of  the
room at the time of recording the statement. Lalita's husband Omprakash  was
present at the time of Lalita setting herself on fire and  at  the  time  of
putting off the flames.”

3.    On this evidence, the Trial Court held that the offence under  Section
498A was not made out but convicted  the  two  appellants  before  us  under
Section 306 and sentenced them  to  imprisonment  for  three  years.  In  an
appeal filed by them before the High Court, the  High  Court,  relying  upon
the aforesaid dying declaration, dismissed the appeal.
4.    Learned counsel for the appellants  has  argued  before  us  that  the
State did not appeal against their acquittal under Section  498A  and,  that
therefore, the fact that the offence under Section 498A

                                     -3-

has not been made out is final. This has a  vital  bearing  on  the  offence
under Section 306 as one of the ingredients of this offence is that  cruelty
should have been meted out by the offenders. He also argued  that  based  on
the dying declaration which has been given prime importance, this is  not  a
case of abetment as there is no  evidence  of  any  intention  to  help  the
deceased to commit suicide.
5.    On the other hand, the learned counsel  appearing  for  the  State  of
Rajasthan  supported  the  impugned  Judgment.  According  to  him,  it   is
concurrently held, based on the evidence of the case as well  as  the  dying
declaration, that abetment of suicide is made out on the facts of the  case.
Learned counsel also  heavily  relied  upon  the  presumption  contained  in
Section 113A of the Evidence Act inasmuch as death has  been  caused  within
seven  years  of  the  marriage;  and  this  presumption,  not  having  been
rebutted, did not require any interference at our end.
6.    Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and  having
gone through the evidence, we are of the opinion that Section  113A  of  the
Indian Evidence Act requires three ingredients to  be  satisfied  before  it
can be applied i.e., (i) that a  woman  has  committed  suicide,  (ii)  such
suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the  date  of
her marriage and (iii) the husband or his  relatives  who  are  charged  had
subjected her to cruelty.
                                     -4-
7.    This Court in an illuminating Judgment in Ramesh Kumar  vs.  State  of
Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 has stated the law as follows:-
“This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second)  Amendment  Act,
1983 with effect  from  26-12-1983  to  meet  a  social  demand  to  resolve
difficulty of proof where helpless married women were  eliminated  by  being
forced to commit  suicide  by  the  husband  or  in-laws  and  incriminating
evidence was usually available within the four corners  of  the  matrimonial
home and hence was not available to anyone  outside  the  occupants  of  the
house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of  that  the  presumption  is
intended to operate against the  accused  in  the  field  of  criminal  law.
Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must  exist.  A
bare reading of  Section  113-A  shows  that  to  attract  applicability  of
Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman  has  committed  suicide,
(ii) such suicide has been committed within a period  of  seven  years  from
the date of her marriage, (iii)  the  husband  or  his  relatives,  who  are
charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability  of  the
abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such  suicide  had  been
abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband.  Parliament  has
chosen to  sound  a  note  of  caution.  Firstly,  the  presumption  is  not
mandatory; it is only  permissive  as  the  employment  of  expression  “may
presume”  suggests.  Secondly,  the  existence  and  availability   of   the
abovesaid  three  circumstances  shall  not,  like a  formula,
enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn  the
court shall have to have regard to  “all  the  other  circumstances  of  the
case”. A consideration of all  the  other  circumstances  of  the  case  may
strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience  of  the  court  to
abstain  from  drawing  the  presumption.  The  expression  -   “the   other
circumstances  of the case” used in Section 113-A suggests the
                                     -5-

need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the  cruelty  and  the
suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but  not  the  least,
the presumption is not an  irrebuttable  one.  In  spite  of  a  presumption
having been raised  the  evidence  adduced  in  defence  or  the  facts  and
circumstances otherwise available on record  may  destroy  the  presumption.
The phrase “may presume” used in Section 113-A is defined in  Section  4  of
the Evidence Act, which says - “Whenever it is provided  by  this  Act  that
the court may presume a fact, it may either  regard  such  fact  as  proved,
unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.”

8.    We find that having absolved the appellants of the charge of  cruelty,
which is the most basic ingredient for the offence made  out  under  Section
498A, the third ingredient for  application  of  Section  113A  is  missing,
namely, that the relatives i.e., the  mother-in-law  and  father-in-law  who
are charged under Section 306  had  subjected  the  victim  to  cruelty.  No
doubt, in the facts of this case, it has been concurrently  found  that  the
in-laws did harass her, but harassment is something of a lesser degree  than
cruelty. Also,  we  find  on the facts, taken as a whole, that assuming  the
presumption under Section 113A would apply, it has been fully rebutted,  for
the reason that there is no link or  intention  on  the  part   of  the  in-
laws to assist the victim to commit suicide.
9.    In the absence of this vital link, the  mere  fact  that  there  is  a
finding of harassment would  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is
“abetment of suicide”.
10    On the facts, therefore, we find,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact
that  the  appellants have been acquitted for the crime under
                                     -6-
Section 498 A of the Code, that abetment of suicide  under  Section  306  is
not made out.
11.   In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned Judgment of  the  High
Court. If incarcerated, the appellants shall be released forthwith.
12.   The appeal is allowed in the afore-stated terms.





                                       .......................J
                                       (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)





                                       .........................J
                                       (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
NEW DELHI;
24TH APRIL, 2017.