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Tuesday, January 10, 2017

Until NCMSC formulates a scientific method for determining the basis for computing the required judge strength of the district judiciary, the judge strength shall be computed for each state, in accordance with the interim approach indicated in the note submitted by the Chairperson, NCMSC; NCMSC is requested to endeavour the submission of its final report by 31 December 2017; A copy of the interim report submitted by the Chairperson, NCMSC shall be forwarded by the Union Ministry of Law and Justice to the Chief Justices of all the High Courts and Chief Secretaries of all states within one month so as to enable them to take follow-up action to determine the required judge strength of the district judiciary based on the NCMSC interim report, subject to what has been stated in this judgment; The state governments shall take up with the High Courts concerned the task of implementing the interim report of the Chairperson, NCMSC (subject to what has been observed above) and take necessary decisions within a period of three months from today for enhancing the required judge strength of each state judiciary accordingly; The state governments shall cooperate in all respects with the High Courts in terms of the resolutions passed in the joint conference of Chief Justices and Chief Ministers in April 2016 with a view to ensuring expeditious disbursal of funds to the state judiciaries in terms of the devolution made under the auspices of the Fourteenth Finance Commission; The High Courts shall take up the issue of creating additional infrastructure required for meeting the existing sanctioned strength of their state judiciaries and the enhanced strength in terms of the interim recommendation of NCMSC; The final report submitted by NCMSC may be placed for consideration before the Conference of Chief Justices. The directions in (i) above shall then be subject to the ultimate decision that is taken on receipt of the final report; and A copy of this order shall be made available to the Registrars General of each High Court and to all Chief Secretaries of the States for appropriate action. 23 List the proceedings for disposal of the criminal appeals before the appropriate bench in the third week of July 2017.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 254-262 OF 2012


IMTIYAZ AHMAD                         .....APPELLANT
                                   VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                                      .....RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

These Appeals arise from a batch of interlocutory orders  of  the  Allahabad
High Court in a criminal writ petition (1786 of 2003). On  9  April  2003  a
learned Single Judge of the High Court admitted a  writ  petition  filed  by
the second and third respondents and stayed an order dated 7  December  2002
of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gautam  Budh  Nagar,  directing
the registration of a case against them. The case was adjourned  before  the
High Court on several dates on which it was listed.   As  a  result  of  the
adjournments,  on  the  date  of  the  institution  of  the  Special   Leave
Petitions, the writ petition was pending in the High Court for six years.

2     This Court was concerned with the pendency of similar cases before
the High Courts, where proceedings were stayed at the stage of the
registration of an FIR, investigation, framing of charges or during trial,
in exercise of the power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution or
Sections 397/482 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. Hence this Court, by
an order dated 8 January 2010 called for reports from the Registrars
General of the High Courts, in regard to serious cases involving: (i)
murder; (ii) rape; (iii) kidnapping; and (iv) dacoity.  On the basis of the
data received, reports were presented to the Court by the amicus curiae.
These reports were considered in an order dated 1 February 2012 by a Bench
of two learned Judges, including one of us (the learned Chief Justice of
India). In the order of this Court dated 1 February 2012 the findings in
the second report submitted by the amicus curiae were summarized thus :
“(a) As high as 9% of the cases have completed more than twenty years  since
the date of stay order;

(b) Roughly 21% of the cases have completed more than ten years;

(c) Average pendency per case (counted from the  date  of  stay  order  till
July 26, 2010) works out to be around 7.4 years;

(d) Charge-sheet was found to be the most prominent stage  where  the  cases
were stayed with almost 32% of the cases falling under  this  category.  The
next two prominent stages are found to be “appearance” and  “summons”,  with
each comprising 19% of the total number of cases”.



3     During the course of the  hearing  of  these  proceedings,  the  Union
Government has been impleaded as a party to the  proceedings  having  regard
to the fact that seminal issues are involved  directly  impacting  upon  the
administration of justice. This Court has  assumed  jurisdiction  since  the
long delays in the disposal of cases, particularly  criminal  cases,  has  a
serious impact both on the rule of law and on access to justice which  is  a
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

4     In 1958, the fourteenth Report of the Law Commission of India  on  the
Reform of Judicial Administration dealt with the issue of delay and  arrears
and identified  inadequate  judge  strength  as  the  “root  cause”  of  the
problem.  This  perspective  has  been  reiterated  in  several   successive
reports, including of the Law Commission.  These include the 77th Report  of
the Law Commission  of  India  on  “Delay  and  arrears  in  trial  courts”,
November, 1978 (Ministry of Law and  Justice,  Government  of  India);  78th
Report of the  Law  Commission  of  India  on  “Congestion  of  under  trial
prisoners  in  jails”,  February,  1979  (Ministry  of  Law   and   Justice,
Government of India); 79th Report of the Law Commission of India  on  “Delay
and Arrears in High Courts and other Appellate Courts”, May, 1979  (Ministry
of  Law  and  Justice,  Government  of  India);  121st  Report  of  the  Law
Commission  of  India  (method  of  review  of  judge  strength  at  regular
intervals), 1987; 124th Report of the Law Commission of  India  –  The  High
Court Arrears – A fresh look, 1988; Report of The Arrears  Committee  (Three
Chief Justices Committee : Kerala, Calcutta & Madras), 1989-90.
5     The 120th Report of the Law Commission on  Manpower  Planning  in  the
Judiciary (1987) suggested a formula for the  fixation  of  judge  strength,
adopting a demographic approach.  The  Report  suggested  that  demographics
should be the basis for fixation of judge strength.  Its rationale  was  set
out thus :
“ As to the possible accusation that the working out of the ratio of  Judges
strength  per  million  of  Indian  population  is  a  gross  measure,   the
Commission wishes to say that  this  is  one  clear  criterion  of  manpower
planning.  If legislative representation can be worked out, as  pointed  out
earlier, on the basis of population and if other services  of  the  State  –
bureaucracy, police etc. – can  also  be  similarly  planned,  there  is  no
reason at all for the  non-extension  of  this  principle  to  the  judicial
services.  It must also be frankly stated that while  population  may  be  a
demographic unit, it is also a democratic unit.   In  other  words,  we  are
talking of citizens with democratic rights  including  right  to  access  to
justice which it is the duty of the State to provide.”

The Report indicated that though the US in 1981  had  one-third  of  India’s
population, it had a judge to population ratio of one hundred  seven  judges
per million, while in India it was only ten judges  per  million.   The  Law
Commission suggested that the  judge  to  population  ratio  be  immediately
increased  from  ten  judges  to  fifty  judges  per  million.   The  Report
suggested that by 2000 India should achieve a  target  of  one  hundred  and
seven judges per million (which the US had in 1981).
6     If these recommendations had been acted upon India  would  have  judge
strength of 1,10,071 in 2000 (with  the  population  of  1028  million)  and
1,36,794 as on 31 December 2015. However, the  sanctioned  strength  of  the
judiciary at all levels on 31 December 2015 was only 21,607.
7     This Court in a judgment delivered on  21  March  2002  in  All  India
Judges Association v. Union of  India[1]  endorsed  the  views  of  the  Law
Commission in its 120th Report and  directed  that  a  judge  to  population
ratio of fifty judges per million be achieved within a period of five  years
and not later than ten years in any case.  This Court observed :
“The increase in the Judge strength to 50 Judges per 10 lakh  people  should
be effected and implemented with the filling  up  of  the  posts  in  phased
manner to be determined and directed by the Union Ministry of Law, but  this
process should be completed and the increased  vacancies  and  posts  filled
within a period of five years  from  today.  Perhaps  increasing  the  Judge
strength by 10 per 10 lakh people every year could be  one  of  the  methods
which may be adopted thereby completing the first stage  within  five  years
before embarking on further increase if necessary”.

The Report of the Parliamentary Standing  Committee  on  Arrears  in  Courts
(2002) supported the application of the demographic  norm  as  the  starting
point for determination of judge strength. In a letter dated 2  April  2013,
the then Prime Minister of India also accepted  the  recommendation  of  the
Chief Justice of India to double the existing number of courts.   When  this
issue was taken up at the Joint Conference  of  Chief  Ministers  and  Chief
Justices in 2013 it was resolved to create new posts  of  judicial  officers
with requisite staff and infrastructure.
8     In order to address the issue of arrears, a policy decision was  taken
by the Union government to constitute  fast  track  courts  and  funds  were
allocated under the Eleventh Finance Commission for a period of  five  years
(2000-05).  When the issue of the discontinuation of fast-track courts  came
up, this Court in Brij  Mohan  Lal  v.  Union  of  India[2]  held  that  the
policies  of  the  State  should  not  derogate  from  undermining  judicial
independence and if a policy was counter-productive or  liable  to  increase
the case load, the court intervene judicially.  Though this  Court  desisted
from interfering with the policy decision in regard  to  discontinuing  fast
track courts, keeping in mind the huge pendency of cases,  a  direction  was
issued for the creation of additional posts in  the  district  judiciary  to
the extent of ten per cent of the total regular cadre  within  a  stipulated
period.
9     In a recent Report prepared by the Centre for  Research  and  Planning
of the Supreme Court of India  titled  “Subordinate  Courts  of  India  :  A
Report on Access to Justice 2016” a detailed analysis has been made  of  the
pendency of cases in the district judiciary.  The following table which  has
been compiled in the Report shows the figures of institution,  disposal  and
pendency in the district judiciary for 2013-15 :
|Year                                         |

Where,
BEJ= Additional No. of Judges required to Break Even.
AI= Average Institution
ARD= Average Rate of Disposal
D2010, D2011, D2012 = Annual Disposal for that year
J2010, J2011, J2012 = Annual Working Strength of Judges for that year
J= Current Working Strength of Judges
The formula for determining the Number of Judges for  disposing  of  Backlog
required to dispose of pending cases within a given time period is:

|AJBk =  (B/ARD)/t                  |


Where,
AJBk= No. of Judges for disposing of Backlog
B= Backlog, defined as the number of cases pending for more than a year.
t= The time frame, in number of years, within which the backlog needs to  be
cleared”.

12    The Law Commission has noted that in the past, it was  suggested  that
judges required to dispose of the backlog are needed only until the  backlog
is cleared. Hence, it was  proposed  that  short-term,  ad-hoc  appointments
should be made  from  amongst  retired  judges  for  clearing  the  backlog.
However, the previous experience of the functioning of ad  hoc  appointments
in the district judiciary reflected serious concern especially of  the  lack
of  accountability  in  their   functioning   and   performance.   Moreover,
additional infrastructure would be required to be created  even  for  ad-hoc
judges appointed in the system. The proposal to  have  a  shift  system  has
been resisted by the Bar since it results in  an  increase  in  the  working
hours.
13    The note submitted by  Professor  Dr  G  Mohan  Gopal  raises  certain
concerns about the rate of disposal method suggested by the Law  Commission.
These concerns as set out in the  note  submitted  by  him,  are  summarized
below :

The definition of backlog  (difference  between  institution  and  disposal)
does not take into account the fact that every case  requires  a  reasonable
period for its disposal based on the nature of the dispute involved in  that
case. Under the above definition, even cases which have been  filed  towards
the end of a year must be disposed  of  by  31  December  to  eliminate  the
backlog.  In the absence of  established  time  frames  in  our  system  for
disposal of cases the elimination of a backlog is virtually  unimplementable
since it is impossible for courts to dispose of cases filed  days  or  weeks
before the end of a specified reference period;

The rate of disposal method  unintentionally  incentivizes  lower  disposals
because lower the rate of disposal, the greater  the  number  of  additional
judicial positions which that court will get under  this  methodology.   The
method proposed by the Law Commission is (according  to  the  critique)  not
designed to improve productivity nor does it concern itself  with  judge  to
case ratio;

The rate of disposal method does not give  weightage  to  cases  based  upon
their nature and complexity and all types  of  cases  are  treated  at  par.
Complex cases require greater amounts  of  judicial  time  and  effort  than
simple cases;

The rate of disposal method does not take into  account  the  reasonableness
of the work load of judges.  Any assessment of judge strength must take  due
account of the “maximum  permissible  reasonable  work  load”  for  a  judge
before mental and physical fatigue start impairing the quality of working;

Merely focusing upon the reduction of backlog is not adequate since what  is
required is a scientific method to assess the judge strength needed to  deal
with the backlog as well as the flow of new cases.



14    NCMSC has suggested that the clearance of backlog is not the  sole  or
central  basis  for  determining  judge  strength.  Several  other  critical
parameters include (i) rate of case clearance: the number of cases  disposed
of as a percentage  of  institution;  (ii)  on  time  disposal  rate  –  the
percentage of cases resolved within an established time  frame;  (iii)  pre-
trial  custody periods wherein an under-trial is in  custody  pending  trial
of a criminal case; and (iv)  trial  date  certainty  –  the  proportion  of
important  case  processing  provisions  that  are  held  according  to  the
schedule finalized.   Professor Dr G Mohan Gopal suggests that the  rate  of
disposal method does not make a substantial departure from  past  approaches
that have not yielded desired results.

15    The Chairperson of  NCMSC  has  proposed  an  interim  approach  which
augments the disposal rate method of the Law Commission with the  prevailing
unit system of the High Courts to attribute a weightage to  cases  based  on
their nature and complexity.  Under the unit system  the  High  Courts  have
established disposal  norms  for  the  district  judiciary  based  on  units
allocated for disposal of different  cases.   On  the  basis  of  the  units
prescribed, performance  is  rated  from  “excellent”  and  ‘very  good’  to
‘unsatisfactory’. The approach which has been suggested, based on  the  unit
system, is as follows :

      “Applying The Unit System to Assess Required Judge Strength

(i)Number of judges required to dispose of the annual “flow”  of  new  cases
(“break even”)

25. Every court should calculate in units its  average  annual  filing  over
the previous five years for all types of cases.

26. Divide the annual filing units above  by  the  number  of  annual  units
required to be disposed of by a judge for VERY GOOD performance.

27. This will give for each court, the number of judges required  to  ensure
“break even”, i.e., disposal equals the number  of  new  cases  filed  every
year in that court.



(ii)Number of judges required for disposal of backlog of cases

28. First, every court should calculate in units  its  “backlog”,  i.e.  the
number of cases of all categories pending for more  than  the  maximum  time
standard set by it for disposal (e.g., three years)

29. Second, a suitable time period may  be  established  within  which  this
“backlog” should be cleared (e.g. 5 years).

30. Third, divide the total backlog in units by the number of  years  within
which it has to be cleared (e.g., 5 years).  This  will  give  the  required
annual disposal of “backlog”.

31. Fourth, divide the required annual disposal of backlog by the number  of
annual units required to be disposed of by each judge  (units  required  for
VERY GOOD performance).

32. This gives the number of judges required to  dispose  of  “the  backlog”
within the prescribed time frame.

33. The judge strength so assessed should be monitored annually.

34.  Needless  to  say,  it  will  be  desirable  that  unit   systems   are
rationalized and strengthened with as much  uniformity  of  approach  across
the country as feasible, addressing variations and  limitations  of  systems
currently in place.



iii.  Total number of  judges  required  for  achieving  “break  even”  plus
“disposal of backlog”

35. Add the number of Judges required for “break  even”  to  the  number  of
Judges required for disposal of backlog, as determined above.

      iv. Trigger for creation of new courts

36. When for any court, the total number of units required  to  be  disposed
annually (“breakeven” plus backlog, if any) is greater than  1.5  times  the
disposal norm for a “very good performance” judge, a new  court  would  need
to be created.”



16    While evaluating the  limitations  of  the  rate  of  disposal  method
suggested by the  Law  Commission  which  have  been  noted  in  the  report
submitted by the Chairperson, NCMSC, certain aspects would have to be  borne
in mind. The criticism that the rate of disposal method places an  incentive
on lower disposals in certain courts has its own limitations. A  lower  rate
of disposal may not necessarily reflect upon the  efficiency  with  which  a
judge has conducted the court. Trials are held up because of  a  paucity  of
public prosecutors.  Witnesses  cited  by  the  state,  particularly  police
personnel, remain absent on dates fixed  for  trial,  resulting  in  delays.
Service of summons is delayed because of the laxity of  police.  In  several
northern states, particularly, the State of  Uttar  Pradesh  soaring  summer
temperatures  have  in  the  absence  of  basic  infrastructural  facilities
including continuous power supply resulted in  the  institutionalization  of
morning courts in several districts. The convenience of  ordinary  litigants
and witnesses with limited resources, who travel from  afar  without  proper
means of transportation cannot be  disregarded  by  the  presiding  judicial
officer.The   functioning   of   courts   which   lack   even    rudimentary
infrastructure is affected, as a result. In a number of states, it has  been
the experience that there are  impediments  faced  by  the  district  courts
including strikes of lawyers and abstention from work for  causes  unrelated
to the functioning of the judge or court concerned. The loss of  mandays  on
account of such causes results in a wastage  of  productive  judicial  time.
Hence, it would not be correct to assert that the rate  of  disposal  method
places an incentive upon the unproductive or inefficient.  Ground  realities
cannot be ignored merely on the basis of statistics.
17    Another aspect which merits emphasis is that while  prescribing  units
for disposal, a robust attempt must be made by the  High  Courts  to  ensure
that due importance is given  to  the  disposal  of  old  cases.  The  units
prescribed for disposal  must  provide  adequate  incentives  to  attend  to
complex and time consuming cases. Failing this, the out-turn proscribed  for
the district judiciary is attempted to be  achieved  without  due  attention
being given to the disposal of those cases which remain pending for long  as
a result of their complexity, the number  of  witnesses  involved  and  such
other  factors. This is an aspect which needs to be looked into by the  High
Courts in consultation with the district  judiciary.  District  judges  with
long years of experience in the service are  in  a  position  to  appreciate
practical realities and to indicate the manner in which the unit system  can
be revised in each state to encourage judges  at  both  the  trial  and  the
appellate level to take up those  cases  which  consume  judicial  time  and
which should not be placed on the back-burner for fear that the  judge  will
not be able to  fulfill  the  units  expected.  The  Chief  Justices  should
initiate the process of revising unit  based  norms  in  relation  to  their
states. Each state has its own requirements specific to it which have to  be
borne in mind. The unit system must be framed so as to recognize the  output
of judicial officers in disposing of those cases which clog the system.
18    In prescribing the judge strength it is necessary  to  ensure  that  a
backlog does not result in the future as a result of an increase  in  annual
filings. The rate of increase in  future  filings  has  to  be  anticipated.
Anticipation of what  the  future  holds  is  an  estimate.  One  method  of
estimating the extent of the increase in future filings is  to  have  regard
to the increase reflected over a comparable period in  the  past  for  which
data is available. Those  figures  can  be  extrapolated  to  determine  the
increase in annual filings. The enhancement in the strength of the  district
judiciary should be such that  a  ‘five  plus  zero’  pendency  is  achieved
(wiping out the backlog within a target period of five years).
19    In response to  the  recommendations  submitted  by  the  Chairperson,
NCMSC, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Union of  India  in  the
Ministry of Law and Justice.  The Union government has stated that while  it
is broadly in agreement with this approach,  the  methodology  suggested  by
NCMSC can be adopted subject to certain stipulations. The relevant  part  of
the response is extracted below :

“6. The Ministry of Law and Justice,  Government  of  India  is  broadly  in
agreement with the recommendations  made  by  NCMS  Committee  as  indicated
above.  The methodology suggested by  NCMS  Committee  can  be  adopted  for
determining the adequacy of judge strength with following stipulations.

(i) All High Courts must evolve uniform data collection and data  management
methods under the ongoing E-Courts Mission Mode Project and  make  available
online Real time Data on pendency of various  categories  of  cases  to  the
respective State Governments and Central Government.

(ii) The trigger for creation of new posts must be activated only after  90%
of the sanctioned strength has been filled up, failing  which  the  creation
of additional posts will have no  impact  or  consequence  on  reduction  of
pendency”.



20    The report which has been submitted to this Court by the  Chairperson,
NCMSC observes that in the long term, the judge strength of  the  courts  in
the district judiciary will have to be assessed by a  scientific  method  to
determine the total number of judicial hours required for disposing  of  the
case load of each court.  In the interim, a weighted disposal  approach,  as
explained above has been suggested. Since the Union  government  is  broadly
in agreement with this approach,  we  deem  it  appropriate  and  proper  to
permit it to be utilized at this stage for the purpose  of  determining  the
required judge strength of the  district  judiciary.  The  Union  government
has, however, suggested two broad stipulations.  The first is that  all  the
High Courts must make available real time data on the  pendency  of  various
categories of cases. In this regard, both the NCMSC as well  as  E-Committee
are actively engaging with the High Courts.  An endeavour should be made  to
ensure that real time data is duly compiled and  made  available  online  by
the High Courts as part of the National Judicial Arrears Grid.  We  are  not
inclined to accept the second stipulation that new posts should  be  created
only after 90 per cent of the sanctioned strength has been filled  up.   For
one thing, filling up of vacancies in the district judiciary is an  on-going
process.  In many states, the process of filling  up  posts  is  pursued  in
conjunction with the State Public Service Commissions.  Many of  the  delays
are not in the control of the High Courts.  Moreover,  it  is  necessary  to
provide for the required judge strength in every  state  district  judiciary
so as to facilitate the creation of infrastructure.  In several states,  the
available infrastructure is inadequate and insufficient  to  meet  even  the
existing judge strength. Hence, a  scientific  assessment  of  the  required
judge strength will form the basis of ensuring that  the  state  governments
put into place the infrastructure required for tackling judicial delays.

21    By an order of this Court dated  29  November  2016,  this  Court  had
permitted the  Union  government  to  place  on  the  record  the  following
information in regard to funds made  available  by  the  Fourteenth  Finance
Commission for meeting the needs of the state judiciary and  the  modalities
for disbursement and utilisation :

“i) Whether any break-up of the said allocation has  been  provided  for  by
the Finance Commission and/or Government of India or any  guidelines  as  to
the areas in which the said amount will be expended.

ii)  In  case   such   a   break-up   is   prescribed,   a   copy   of   the
communication/order under which the same has  been  provided  be  placed  on
record.

iii) What is the manner  by  which  the  Government  of  India  proposes  to
monitor the utilization of  the  amount  set  apart  for  judiciary  by  the
States.  State wise allocation be also indicated.”



In pursuance of these directions, an affidavit has been filed on  behalf  of
the Union Ministry of Law and Justice.  The  affidavit  indicates  that  the
Department  of  Justice  had  submitted  the  following  proposals  to   the
Fourteenth Finance Commission involving a total requirement of  Rupees  9749
crores :

Pendency Reduction                          :  Rs.858.83 crore



Establishment of Fast Track Courts   :  Rs.4144.11 crore

Establishment of Family

Courts in districts without

such courts                                   :  Rs.541.06 crore

Re-designing existing

court complexes to become

more litigant friendly                :  Rs.1400 crore

Augmenting technical

support for ICT enabled courts           :  Rs.479.68 crore

Scanning and Digitalisation

of Case Records of High Courts

and District Courts                             :  Rs.752.50 crore

Enhancing Access to Justice

Support for Law School

based Legal Aid Clinics with

focus on undertrials            :  Rs.50.50 crore

Organizing Lok Adalats            :  Rs.93.61 crore

Support for Mediation

/conciliation in ADR centres      :  Rs.300 crore

Incentives to Mediators

/Concilators                            :  Rs.503.44 crore

(a) Training and capacity

building of judges, public

prosecutors, mediators,

lawyers: Refresher, ongoing             :  Rs.550 crore

(b)   Establishment of

State Judicial Academies

in Manipur, Meghalaya and

Tripura                                  :  Rs.75 crore

     Total Cost                 :  Rs.9749 crore”

State-wise and sector-wise details have been annexed to the  affidavit.  The
Fourteenth Finance Commission endorsed the proposals of  the  Department  of
Justice and has urged the state governments to  use  the  additional  fiscal
allocation provided in the form of tax devolution to meet  the  requirements
of the state judiciaries. The  Prime  Minister  of  India  has  addressed  a
letter dated 23 April 2015 to the  Chief  Ministers  calling  upon  them  to
allocate funds required for the activities  recommended  by  the  Fourteenth
Finance Commission in the  state  budgets  from  2015-2016  to  improve  the
working of the judicial system and provide speedy  justice.   Following  the
joint conference of Chief Justices of High Courts  and  Chief  Ministers  of
States held in April 2015, the Union Minister of Law and  Justice  addressed
letters to the Chief Justices and Chief Ministers in  June  2015  requesting
them  to  institute  a  mechanism  for  regular   interaction   to   resolve
outstanding issues particularly those relating to  infrastructure  and  man-
power needs of the judiciary.  It may be noted here that at  the  Conference
of Chief  Justices  of  High  Courts  held  in  April  2016,  the  following
resolution was adopted :

“Resolved that the following strategy be adopted by the High Courts:

Constitution of  a  dedicated  cell  for  the  utilization  of  funds.   The
composition of  the  Cell  should  consist  of  policy  makers,  experts  in
planning  and  budgeting,  senior  judicial  officers  and  persons  to   be
nominated by the Chief Justice.  The Cell shall be assigned the task of:

                    (a)     Preparing  perspectives/annual  plans  and  time
            lines;

(b)    Drawing up budget estimates;

(c)   Monitoring and review of the implementation of

            each scheme;

(d)   Taking up the matter with the State Government to  ensure  release  of
funds.

Submitting a request for funds from the State  Government  within  time  for
financial years 2016-17 to 2019-2020;

Ensuring that funds are spent in accordance with  the  budgetary  allocation
and  speedy  and  effective  utilization.   For  this  purpose,   periodical
meetings and reviews be conducted; and

Monitoring of schemes and outcomes through special on-line portals  and  ICT
tools.  Progress made be reviewed in State Court Management System  meetings
and quarterly progress reports be forwarded to the Supreme Court for  review
by National Court Management System”.



Thereafter, in the Conference of Chief Justices  and  Chief  Ministers,  the
following resolution was adopted :

“With a view to facilitate proper  and  timely  utilization  of  funds  made
available by the 14th Finance Commission to the State  judiciaries,  it  was
resolved that:

Finance Secretaries of each State be associated with the work  of  the  High
Court committees in-charge of monitoring 14th Finance Commission funds;

Proper coordination be ensured between the Central and State Governments  in
regard  to  the  submission  of  utilization  certificates  in  relation  to
infrastructure projects of the state judiciaries;

In respect of the e-Court Scheme and  Infrastructure scheme which are  being
monitored by the Department of Justice, intimations  of  funds  remitted  to
the State Governments under these two Schemes shall  also  be  forwarded  by
the Department of Justice to the High Courts.

State Governments shall (i) lend such assistance to the High  Courts  as  is
required for proper utilization of 14th Finance Commission funds;  and  (ii)
grant a one time exemption for 2016-17 to facilitate proper utilization”.



The Union Minister of Law and Justice has since addressed communications  to
the Chief Ministers of States requesting that the state Finance  Secretaries
should assist the registries of  the  High  Courts  to  prepare  perspective
plans/individual plans for  activities  to  be  undertaken  in  the  justice
sector. A letter has been addressed to the Chief Justices  on  26  September
2016. The affidavit explains that necessary  mechanisms  have  been  set  up
under the  resolutions  of  the  Conference  of  Chief  Justices  and  Chief
Ministers and of the Chief Justices respectively.

22    Having regard to the above background, we  now  proceed  to  formulate
our directions in the following terms :

Until NCMSC formulates a scientific method for  determining  the  basis  for
computing  the required judge strength of the district judiciary, the  judge
strength shall be computed for each state, in accordance  with  the  interim
approach indicated in the note submitted by the Chairperson, NCMSC;

NCMSC is requested to endeavour the submission of its  final  report  by  31
December 2017;

A copy of the interim report submitted by the Chairperson,  NCMSC  shall  be
forwarded by the Union Ministry of Law and Justice to the Chief Justices  of
all the High Courts and Chief Secretaries of all states within one month  so
as to enable them to take follow-up action to determine the  required  judge
strength of the district  judiciary  based  on  the  NCMSC  interim  report,
subject to what has been stated in this judgment;

The state governments shall take up with the High Courts concerned the  task
of implementing the interim report of the  Chairperson,  NCMSC  (subject  to
what has been observed above) and take necessary decisions within  a  period
of three months from today for enhancing  the  required  judge  strength  of
each state judiciary accordingly;

The state governments shall cooperate in all respects with the  High  Courts
in terms of  the  resolutions  passed  in  the  joint  conference  of  Chief
Justices and  Chief  Ministers  in  April  2016  with  a  view  to  ensuring
expeditious disbursal of funds to the state  judiciaries  in  terms  of  the
devolution made under the auspices of the Fourteenth Finance Commission;

The  High  Courts  shall  take  up  the   issue   of   creating   additional
infrastructure required for meeting  the  existing  sanctioned  strength  of
their state judiciaries and the enhanced strength in terms  of  the  interim
recommendation of NCMSC;

 The final report submitted by NCMSC may be placed for consideration  before
the Conference of Chief Justices. The directions in (i) above shall then  be
subject to the ultimate decision that is  taken  on  receipt  of  the  final
report; and

A copy of this order shall be made available to the  Registrars  General  of
each High Court and to all Chief Secretaries of the States  for  appropriate
action.

23    List the proceedings for disposal of the criminal appeals  before  the
appropriate bench in the third week of July 2017.

                                …........................................CJI
                                               [T S  THAKUR]


                             ............. …...............................J
                                                    [Dr D Y  CHANDRACHUD]



                           ................................................J
                                                    [L NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi
January 02, 2017.
-----------------------
[1]

      [2]    (2002) 4 SCC 247
[3]
      [4]    (2012) 6 SCC 502


when there is an allegation of fraud by non-disclosure of necessary and relevant facts or concealment of material facts, it must be inquired into. It is only after evidence is led coupled with intent to deceive that a conclusion of fraud could be arrived at. A mere concealment or non-disclosure without intent to deceive or a bald allegation of fraud without proof and intent to deceive would not render a decree obtained by a party as fraudulent. To conclude in a blanket manner that in every case where relevant facts are not disclosed, the decree obtained would be fraudulent, is stretching the principle to a vanishing point.- fraud has a definite meaning in law and it must be proved and not merely alleged and inferred. In so far as the present appeal is concerned, there is no doubt that Makhija had an opportunity to prove the allegation of fraud when he filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC. However, he missed that opportunity right up to this court. Makhija took a second shot at alleging fraud and filing another suit against Pushparani. However, the evidence that he relied upon was very thin and could not even be considered as secondary evidence. Accordingly both the Trial Court as well as the High Court rejected the allegation of fraud by not accepting the evidence put forward by Makhija to allege that fraud had been committed by Pushparani when she obtained the decree dated 4th October, 1999.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.11491 OF 2016


HARJAS RAI MAKHIJA (D) THR. LRS.
...APPELLANTS

                                     VS.

PUSHPARANI JAIN & ANR.                              …RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T

MADAN B. LOKUR,  J.

1.     The  appellant  (Harjas  Rai  Makhija  represented   by   his   legal
representatives) is aggrieved by the judgment and  order  dated  3rd  April,
2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in FA No.961  of
2010 whereby his appeal has been dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/-.

2.    Respondent  No.1,  Pushparani  Jain  (Pushparani)  was  allotted  Plot
No.251 in Major Shopping Centre Zone - II, Habibganj,  Bhopal  under  Scheme
No.13 of the Bhopal Development Authority (for short BDA).  Since she was  a
resident of the  United  States  of  America  and  had  some  difficulty  in
completing the formalities with regard to the allotment, she  appointed  her
brother Jinendra Jain as her attorney on or about 28th August,  1981.   This
was communicated by her to the Chairman of the BDA by a letter of  the  same
date.
3.    On the basis of the communication sent by Pushparani to the  BDA,  and
on the basis of the Power of Attorney given by her  to  Jinendra  Jain,  she
was able to obtain possession of the plot allotted to her and  complete  the
necessary formalities.

4.    According to the  appellant  Harjas  Rai  Makhija  (Makhija),  another
Power of Attorney had been executed by Pushparani on  30th  April,  1983  in
favour of Jinendra Jain.   The  original  of  this  document  has  not  been
produced by anybody.  Be that as it may, on the basis of the  alleged  Power
of Attorney dated 30th April, 1983, an agreement was  entered  into  between
Jinendra Jain and Makhija on 16th October, 1988 to sell  the  plot  allotted
to Pushparani in favour of Makhija. In terms  of  the  agreement,  the  sale
deed was to be executed on or before 30th April, 1989.

5.    When Pushparani came to know about the agreement for sale  in  respect
of the plot allotted to her, she filed a  civil  suit  before  the  District
Judge, Bhopal and that suit subsequently came to be numbered as Suit No. 51-
A of 1999.   The  prayer  made  by  Pushparani  in  the  plaint  was  for  a
declaration that the  agreement  for  sale  dated  16th  October,  1988  was
without any authority given to Jinendra Jain.  She also made  a  prayer  for
recovery of possession and grant of mesne profits since  possession  of  the
plot had been given by Jinendra Jain to Makhija.
6.    Makhija also filed a  civil  suit  before  the  District  Judge  which
subsequently came to be numbered as Suit No.52-A of 1999.  The  prayer  made
by Makhija  was  for  specific  performance  of  the  agreement  dated  16th
October, 1988 entered into by  him  with  Pushparani  through  her  attorney
Jinendra Jain.

7.    Both the suits one filed by Pushparani and the other by  Makhija  were
taken up and heard together.  By a judgment and decree  dated  4th  October,
1999 the suit filed by Pushparani was  decreed  with  the  result  that  the
agreement for sale dated 16th October, 1988 was declared to be illegal.   It
was also  decreed  that  Makhija  shall  handover  possession  of  the  suit
property to Pushparani  and  pay  monthly  compensation  of  Rs.5,000/-  per
month.  The suit filed by Makhija was dismissed.

8.    Feeling aggrieved by the result of  the  two  suits  mentioned  above,
Makhija preferred two appeals before the High Court being F.A.  No.  607  of
1999 and F.A. No.638 of 1999 challenging the decree  granted  in  favour  of
Pushparani and the dismissal of his suit.
9.    During the  pendency  of  the  aforesaid  appeals,  Makhija  filed  an
application before the High Court under Order XLI Rule 27  of  the  Code  of
Civil Procedure[1] (for short the CPC) for adducing additional evidence.  By
virtue  of  this  application,  Makhija  sought  to  bring  on   record   an
application said to have been filed by Jinendra Jain with the BDA on  behalf
of Pushparani as her attorney for the grant of a  No  Objection  Certificate
in respect of the suit property.  According to  the  averment  made  in  the
application, Jinendra Jain had moved the application before the BDA  on  1st
June, 1983.
10.   By a judgment and order dated 13th  September,  2002  the  High  Court
dismissed both the appeals filed by  Makhija  as  well  as  the  application
under Order XLI  Rule 27 of the CPC.  While dismissing the appeals  and  the
application, the High Court held that no document was  produced  before  the
Trial Court to establish that Pushparani had executed a  Power  of  Attorney
in favour of Jinendra Jain on 30th April, 1983.  The High Court  also  noted
that according to Makhija what was produced before the BDA as the  Power  of
Attorney dated 30th April, 1983 was in  fact  a  photocopy  of  the  alleged
Power of  Attorney.   Therefore,  the  High  Court  took  the  view  that  a
photocopy produced before it was a photocopy  of  another  photocopy  (filed
before the BDA) and as such it could not even  be  considered  as  secondary
evidence.  Even otherwise, the  High  Court  concluded  that  there  was  no
material to indicate that Jinendra Jain was  authorized  to  enter  into  an
agreement for sale the suit property on behalf of Pushparani.

11.   Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of  the  appeals  as  well  as  the
application, Makhija preferred S.L.P.(C) Nos.524-525 of 2003 which  came  to
be  dismissed by this Court on 25th July, 2003.  The review petitions  filed
by Makhija also came to be dismissed by this Court on 9th September, 2003.

12.   Notwithstanding the dismissal of Makhija’s case,  he  was  unrelenting
and filed yet another suit before  the  Additional  District  Judge,  Bhopal
which came to be numbered as Suit  No.471-A  of  2008.   In  this  suit,  he
produced a certified copy of the Power of Attorney dated  30th  April,  1983
allegedly filed by Jinendra Jain before the BDA.  The  prayer  made  in  the
plaint filed by Makhija was for a declaration  that  the  decree  dated  4th
October, 1999 passed in favour of Pushparani was obtained  in  a  fraudulent
manner and is void and not worthy of being executed.  This suit came  to  be
dismissed by the Additional District Judge by the judgment and decree  dated
28th September, 2010.

13.   Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit filed by  him,  Makhija
preferred FA No. 961 of 2010 in the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh.   The
appeal was taken up for consideration by the High Court and by judgment  and
order dated 3rd April, 2012 (impugned) the appeal was  dismissed.  The  High
Court took the view that the alleged Power of  Attorney  dated  30th  April,
1983 could not be accepted as a valid piece of documentary evidence being  a
certified copy of a photocopied document. It was also held that Makhija  had
an opportunity to raise the same issue  when  the  application  for  leading
additional evidence was filed but did not do so and  cannot  have  a  second
shot for the same purpose.  The allegation of fraud leveled by  Makhija  was
not accepted by the High Court.
14.   Learned counsel for Makhija raised quite a few submissions  before  us
but in our opinion, the present appeal  deserves  to  be  dismissed  on  the
ground that no fraud has been alleged in the  plaint  filed  by  Makhija  or
found in respect of the decree dated 4th October, 1999.

15.   There is no doubt that a decree was passed in favour of Pushparani  by
the District Judge on 4th October, 1999 after a full-fledged trial and  that
decree was upheld not only by  the  High  Court  but  also  by  this  Court.
Makhija made an application before the  High  Court  to  produce  additional
evidence to suggest that the agreement for sale entered  into  by  him  with
Pushparani through her attorney Jinendra Jain  on  16th  October,  1988  was
genuine and based on the Power of Attorney given by her to Jinendra Jain  on
30th April, 1983.  Not only was  the  application  for  bringing  on  record
additional evidence dismissed by the High Court but  the  decree  dismissing
the suit for specific performance  of  the  agreement  for  sale   filed  by
Makhija was dismissed by the High Court.  That dismissal  attained  finality
when the petitions for  special  leave  to  appeal  filed  by  Makhija  were
dismissed by this Court.

16.   It is significant to note that Makhija  has  not  sought  (and  indeed
could not seek) to reopen the proceedings pertaining  to  the  dismissal  of
his suit for specific performance. As such, as mentioned above,  the  decree
dismissing his suit for specific performance of  the  agreement  dated  16th
October, 1988 has become  final.   Therefore,  under  no  circumstances  can
Makhija now collaterally pray  for  a  decree  of  specific  performance  in
respect of that agreement.

17.   Through a  collateral  attack,  Makhija  has  now  sought  to  deprive
Pushparani of her allotment of the suit property by alleging  that  she  had
concealed the Power of Attorney executed by her in favour of  Jinendra  Jain
on 30th April, 1983 and had thereby committed a fraud on the courts.

18.   We have been taken through the plaint filed by  Makhija  in  Suit  No.
471-A of 2008 and find that he has nowhere made any specific  allegation  of
a fraud having been played by Pushparani on the Trial Court while  obtaining
the decree dated 4th October, 1999.

19.   During the course of  submissions,  it  was  contended  on  behalf  of
Makhija that it is a settled proposition of law that a  decree  obtained  by
playing fraud on the court is a nullity and that  such  a  decree  could  be
challenged at any time in any proceedings.   Reliance  was  placed  on  A.V.
Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P.[2]  This proposition is  certainly  not
in dispute.
20.   Learned counsel also placed reliance  on  Union  of  India  v.  Ramesh
Gandhi[3] which reads as under:-


“27.  If a judgment obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity  and
is to be treated as non est by every court, superior or inferior,  it  would
be strange logic to hear  that  an  enquiry  into  the  question  whether  a
judgment was secured by playing fraud on the court  by  not  disclosing  the
necessary facts relevant for the adjudication of the controversy before  the
court is impermissible. From the above judgments, it is clear that  such  an
examination is permissible. Such a principle is required to be applied  with
greater emphasis in the realm of public law  jurisdiction  as  the  mischief
resulting from such fraud has larger dimension affecting the  larger  public
interest.” (Emphasis supplied by us).



21.   We agree that when there is an allegation of fraud  by  non-disclosure
of necessary and relevant facts or concealment of material  facts,  it  must
be inquired into. It is only after evidence is led coupled  with  intent  to
deceive that a conclusion of fraud could be arrived at. A  mere  concealment
or non-disclosure without intent to deceive or a bald  allegation  of  fraud
without proof and intent to deceive would not render a decree obtained by  a
party as fraudulent.  To conclude in a blanket manner  that  in  every  case
where relevant facts  are  not  disclosed,  the  decree  obtained  would  be
fraudulent, is stretching the principle to a vanishing point.
22.   What is fraud has been adequately discussed in Meghmala & Ors.  v.  G.
Narasimha Reddy & Ors.[4]  Unfortunately, this decision does  not  refer  to
earlier decisions where also there is an  equally  elaborate  discussion  on
fraud.   These  two  decisions  are  Bhaurao  Dagdu  Paralkar  v.  State  of
Maharashtra & Ors.[5] and State of Orissa  &  Ors.  v.  Harapriya  Bisoi.[6]
In view of the elaborate discussion in these and several other  cases  which
have been referred to in these decisions, it  is  clear  that  fraud  has  a
definite meaning in law and it must be proved and  not  merely  alleged  and
inferred.
23.   In so far as the present appeal is concerned, there is no  doubt  that
Makhija had an opportunity to prove the allegation of fraud  when  he  filed
an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC.  However, he missed  that
opportunity right up to this court.  Makhija took a second shot at  alleging
fraud and filing another suit against  Pushparani.   However,  the  evidence
that he relied upon was very thin  and  could  not  even  be  considered  as
secondary evidence.   Accordingly both the Trial Court as well as  the  High
Court rejected the allegation of fraud by not  accepting  the  evidence  put
forward by Makhija to allege that fraud had  been  committed  by  Pushparani
when she obtained the decree dated 4th October, 1999.

24.   Fraud not having been proved but merely alleged, we do  not  find  any
reason to differ with the judgment and order passed by the  High  Court  and
the Trial Court.

25.   The appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.50,000/-.



                                                            ..……………………………..J
                                                    (Madan B. Lokur )



                                                               ………………………………J
                                                   (Adarsh Kumar Goel )
New Delhi;
January 2, 2017


-----------------------

[1]   [2]  Order XLI  Rule  27.  -  Production  of  additional  evidence  in
Appellate Court. - (1) The parties to an appeal shall  not  be  entitled  to
produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in  the  Appellate
Court. But if –  (a) the Court from whose decree  the  appeal  is  preferred
has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or


      (aa) the party seeking to  produce  additional  evidence,  establishes
that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such  evidence  was  not
within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due  diligence,  be
produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or


      (b)  the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced  or  any
witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any  other
substantial cause,  the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or  document
to be produced, or witness to be examined.


      (2)  Wherever additional evidence is allowed  to  be  produced  by  an
Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.


[3]   [4] (2007) 4 SCC 221
[5]   [6] (2012) 1 SCC 476
[7]   [8] (2010) 8 SCC 383 (paragraphs 28 to 36)
[9]   [10] (2005) 7 SCC 605
[11]  [12] (2009) 12 SCC 378


minor discrepancies, even if noticed, would not affect the prosecution case, if there is a sufficient independent evidence to sustain the conviction

Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 658-659 OF 2010



Ram Chander & Ors.                           Appellant(s)



                             VERSUS



State of Haryana                        Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T



Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1)    These appeals are filed against the common final  judgment  and  order
dated 12.08.2008  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at
Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 448-DB and 395-DB  of  1998  whereby  the
Division Bench of  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  appeals  filed  by  the
appellants  herein  and  upheld  the  judgments/orders  of  conviction   and
sentence rendered by the Trial Court.

2)    The case of the prosecution is as under:

 One Hari Singh (since dead) was married to Messo (deceased).  Out  of  this
wedlock, the couple was blessed with three daughters,  namely,  Dholi  alias
Krishna, Sumitra and Raj Bala. Raj Bala was aged around  15  years  and  the
youngest amongst the three daughters. Both Dholi and  Sumitra  were  married
at a place (village) called Kagdana whereas Rajbala was unmarried.

3)    Hari Singh has two brothers, namely, Sohan Lal (accused - since  dead)
and Bhoop Singh.  Sohan Lal has  four  sons,  namely,  Ram  Chander,  Ranbir
alias Randhir, Ram  Kumar  and  Om  Parkash  (accused-  appellants  herein).
Messo has one sister Guddi (PW- 9) who is married to Bhoop Singh.

4)    Messo and Raj Bala (mother and daughter) were living in one  house  at
village Arnianwali. Guddi  was  their  next-door  neighbour.  Messo  was  in
search of a boy for Raj Bala and had selected one boy from  a  place  called
Manak Dewan for which talks had been going on for the last one month  or  so
from the date of incident. The engagement  ceremony  was  accordingly  fixed
for 22.09.1996 at Arnianwali.  Dholi  alias  Krishna  (married  daughter  of
Messo)  had,  therefore,  come  to  her  mother’s  place  at  Arnianwali  on
19.09.1996 to help her mother and sister–Raj Bala for the ceremony.

5)    On 20.09.1996, around 3 p.m. Sohan  Lal  along  with  his  four  sons,
namely, Ranbir, Ram Chander, Ram Kumar and Om Parkash, came to the house  of
Messo and told her to desist from settling the marriage of Raj Bala  with  a
boy from Manak Dewan. Sohan Lal said that they could settle it according  to
their own choice. Sohan Lal, who was not happy with the  marriage  proposal,
expressed his total unhappiness and did not want the  marriage  proposal  to
fructify.  He then threatened Messo that in case she did not  agree  to  his
proposal then both (Messo and Raj Bala) would not see the sun the next  day.
After giving this threat, Sohan Lal along with his sons (appellants  herein)
left the place. Dholi and Guddi were present along with Messo and  Raj  Bala
when Sohan Lal and his four sons had come.

6)    Messo fearing with the threat of Sohan Lal asked  her  daughter  Dholi
to go immediately to her brother, Ram Sarup at village Dhigtania  which  was
around 20 KM away from her house and inform  him  about  happening  of  such
incident with her. Dholi, accordingly, went there and narrated the  incident
to Ram Sarup-her maternal uncle.  She then stayed overnight with Ram Sarup.

7)    On  21.09.1996,  in  the  early  hours,  when  Dholi  and   Ram  Sarup
accompanied by one Om Prakash-Sarpanch of Village Dhigtania reached  to  the
house of Messo, they found both,  Messo  and  Raj  Bala,  missing  from  the
house.  They, therefore, went to the house of Guddi (PW-9), who  was  living
next to the house of Messo. They noted that Guddi was  weeping  and  was  in
the state of shock.

8)    When they inquired from her about the whereabouts  of  Messo  and  Raj
Bala, Guddi told them that Sohan Lal and his  four  sons  had  come  in  the
night and murdered Messo and Raj Bala,  burnt  their  bodies  in  house  and
carried the remains of the dead bodies and ashes in a  cart  driven  by  the
tractor from her house to an unknown place.

9)    This led to the registration of FIR  bearing  No.197  (Ex-PA-1)  dated
21.09.1996 by Dholi at Police Station Nathusari  Chopta  naming   Sohan  Lal
and his four sons (appellants herein) as accused persons for committing  the
murder of her mother-Messo and sister–Raj Bala. The police authorities  then
started investigation, visited the spot,  recorded  the  statements  of  the
witnesses, prepared the spot map, recovered several articles from  the  spot
and arrested the accused persons. On being interrogated,  the  accused  made
disclosure statements about the manner in  which  ashes/bones  of  both  the
deceased were disposed of in a nearby Canal known  as-Sheranwali  Canal  and
also disclosed the place  where  the  weapons  used  in  commission  of  the
offence and tractor with cart were kept. On such disclosure being made,  the
police made recoveries of the articles at the instance of the accused.

10)   After completion of the investigation, the case was committed  to  the
Court of Sessions and the accused persons were  charged  for  commission  of
the offences punishable under Sections 148, 302 read with  Section  149  and
201 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (for short ‘IPC’).

11)   On 07.08.1997, Om Parkash-one  of  the  accused  escaped  from  police
custody from Civil Hospital Sirsa. Proceedings under Sections 82 and  83  of
the Criminal Procedure Code,1973  (for  short  ‘the  Code’)  were  initiated
against him. He was declared ‘Proclaimed  Offender’  and  proceedings  under
Section 299 of the Code were ordered to be taken up against him.  The  trial
of other accused, however, proceeded on merits.

12)   The prosecution, in support of  his  case,  examined  as  many  as  11
witnesses  whereas  the  defence  did  not  choose  to  lead  any  evidence.
Proceedings  under  Section  313  of  the  Code  were  carried  out.   After
completion of  the  trial,  the  Trial  Court  (Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Sirsa), vide judgment  dated  27.07.1998,  convicted  Sohan  Lal,  Ranbir  @
Randhir, Ram Chander  and  Ram  Kumar  for  the  offences  punishable  under
Sections 148,  302/149  and  201/149  IPC  and  sentenced  them  to  undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each under Section  148  IPC.
Ram Chander and Ranbir @ Randhir to  undergo  imprisonment  for  life  under
Section 302 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- each, in default of  payment,
further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a  period  of  one  year  each.
Sohan Lal and Ram Kumar  were  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  life  under
Section 302/149 IPC and to pay a fine  of  Rs.5000/-  each,  in  default  of
payment of fine, further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  a  period  of
one year each. All the four  accused  were  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years  each  for  the  offences  punishable
under  Section  201/149  IPC.  All  the  sentences  were  ordered   to   run
concurrently.

13)   After arrest of  Om  Parkash  on  22.02.1999,  a  separate  trial  was
conducted against him and after  its  completion,  the  Trial  Court,  by  a
separate  judgment  dated  7/8.08.2000,  convicted  him  for  the   offences
punishable under Sections 148, 302/149 and 201/149 IPC and sentenced him  to
undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  under   Section   148   IPC
imprisonment for life and  fine  of  Rs.5000/-  with  default  clause  under
Section 302/149 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two  years  under  Section
201/149  IPC.  All  the  substantive   sentences   were   ordered   to   run
concurrently.

14)   Against the  judgment  of  conviction  and  order  of  sentence  dated
27.07.1998, Sohan Lal, Ram Chander, Ram Kumar and  Ranbir  @  Randhir  filed
Criminal Appeal No. 448-DB of 1998 before the High Court.

15)   Against the  judgment  of  conviction  and  order  of  sentence  dated
7/8.9.2000, Om Parkash filed separate Criminal Appeal  No.  395-DB  of  2000
before the High Court.

16)    The  appeals  were  heard  together.  By  impugned   judgment   dated
12.08.2008, the High Court dismissed both the appeals. During  the  pendency
of the appeals before the High Court,  Sohan  Lal  died,  therefore,  appeal
against him stood abated.

17)   Aggrieved by the said judgment,  all  the  accused  have  filed  these
appeals by special leave before this  Court  questioning  the  legality  and
correctness of their conviction and sentence.

18)    Heard  Mr.  Naresh  Kaushik,  learned  counsel  for  the   appellants
(accused) and Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-
State.  We also perused the written submissions  submitted  by  the  learned
counsel for the parties.

19)   Learned counsel for  the  appellants  (accused)  while  assailing  the
legality  and  correctness  of  the  impugned  order,  reiterated  the  same
submissions which were pressed  in  service  though  unsuccessfully  by  the
appellants before the two courts below resulting in their conviction.

20)   In substance, the submissions were that firstly, the  appellants  were
falsely implicated in the incident inasmuch as none of the  appellants  were
connected with the commission of the offence in question in any way so  also
their complicity in the commission of the offence could not  be  established
by the prosecution for want of evidence against any of them.

21)   The second submission was that neither the motive  for  commission  of
the offence and nor the presence of any of  the  appellants  either  jointly
and individually was proved at the time of the commission of the offence  by
the  prosecution  and  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution  is  not
sufficient to implicate the appellants for commission of the offence.

22)   The third submission was that the two Courts below  erred  in  placing
reliance on the  evidence  of  the  so-called  eye-witness-Guddi  (PW-9)  as
according to the learned counsel, her testimony, if scanned  properly  would
neither inspire confidence and nor will command  creditability  due  to  her
close relationship with the deceased family.

23)   The fourth submission was that apart from the evidence of  Guddi  (PW-
9),  no  independent  eye-witness  to  the  incident  was  examined  by  the
prosecution, therefore, it  is  not  safe  to  rely  on  the  uncorroborated
testimony of Guddi (PW-9) for sustaining the appellants’ conviction.

24)   The fifth submission was that when the  prosecution  claimed  that  on
the strength of disclosure statement of one accused, they recovered   “Ashes
and Bones" from the canal, this itself renders the case of  the  prosecution
wholly unacceptable because ashes could never be recovered from canal.

25)   The sixth submission was that it  looked  highly  improbable  that  no
villager could witness the incident except Guddi(PW-9). This,  according  to
learned counsel, is sufficient  to  hold  that  the  prosecution  failed  to
establish the complicity of the appellants in commission of the crime.

26)   The seventh submission was that no  expert  opinion  was  obtained  to
find out as to whether bones recovered were human bones or animal bones?

27)   It is basically  these  submissions,  which  were  elaborated  by  the
learned counsel for  the  appellants  with  reference  to  the  evidence  on
record.

28)   In reply, learned counsel for the respondent  supported  the  impugned
order  and  contended  that  since  both  the  Courts   below,   on   proper
appreciation of evidence, have held that the  appellants  were  involved  in
the commission of the offence in question and  committed  brutal  murder  of
two innocent ladies, mother and daughter, and further both the  Courts  have
given cogent reasons while  rejecting  their  submissions  and  hence  there
arises no reason to interfere in the impugned order.

29)   Having heard the learned counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we find no merit in the appeals.

30)   At the outset, we may take note of one  legal  principle  consistently
reiterated by this Court since inception that it  is  not  the  function  of
this Court to re-assess evidence and an argument on a point  of  fact  which
did not prevail with the Courts below cannot avail the  appellants  in  this
Court (see observation  of  learned  Judge  –  Saiyid  Fazl  Ali,  J.  while
speaking for the Bench in the case of Lachhman Singh  and  others  vs  State
(AIR 1952 SC 167).

31)   Here is  a  case  where  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court,  on
appreciating the  entire  oral  evidence,  recorded  categorical  concurrent
findings of fact against the appellants (accused) about their complicity  in
commission of crime in question which resulted in killing of mother and  her
unmarried daughter.

32)   Both the Courts below held that firstly, it were  the  appellants  who
had come to the house of Messo (mother) and threatened her that she  (Messo)
should not pursue her daughter, Raj Bala's marriage with the boy from  Manak
Diwan, otherwise both  will  not  see  the  sun  the  next  day.   Secondly,
noticing that both did not pay any heed to the threat, the  appellants  came
to Messo’s house in the midnight with a  pre-determined  mind  to  eliminate
Messo and Raj Bala. Thirdly,  the  appellants  accomplished  their  plan  by
mercilessly killing Messo and Raj Bala with the use  of  gandasa  when  both
were in fast asleep.  Fourthly,  the appellants first caught hold  of  Messo
and chopped her head with Gandasa and then did the  same  to  Raj  Bala  and
then put them on a cot and put mattresses and wood sticks over their  bodies
and poured kerosene/diesel and set  their  bodies  to  fire.   Fifthly,  the
appellants then removed the ashes and bones from the place of occurrence  in
a tractor and all this was witnessed by Guddi (PW-9) who was living as  next
door neighbour of the deceased.  Sixthly, Guddi (PW-9) was a  reliable  eye-
witness  whose  evidence  did  not  suffer  from  any   infirmities   or/and
inconsistencies.  Seventhly, the ashes, human bones, plastic  bags,  Gandasa
used in execution of the offence were recovered from the canal and house  at
the instance of the respective appellants  on  the  strength  of  individual
disclosure  statements  made  during  their  interrogation.  Eighthly,   the
defence did not adduce any evidence to demolish the case of the  prosecution
and nor statements of the accused made under Section 313  of  the  Code,  in
any manner, could  demolish the case of  the  prosecution  on  any  material
points.  Ninthly, the case set up by the prosecution  was  proved  with  the
aid of evidence adduced by witnesses, namely, PW-1 to PW-11.

33)   As observed supra,  the  aforementioned  nine  main  findings  of  the
Sessions Court were affirmed by the High Court after appreciating  the  oral
evidence. These findings of fact being  concurrent  in  nature  are  usually
binding on this Court.  This Court, being the last  Court  of  appeal,  does
not re-visit and re-appreciate the entire  oral  evidence  de  novo  in  its
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution unless there  are  strong
and prima facie reasons to do so pointing out  therein  any  apparent  legal
and jurisdictional error prejudicing any rights of the accused.

34)   However, since  this  Court  granted  leave  to  file  appeal  to  the
appellants against the impugned  order  of  the  High  Court  and  hence  we
considered it just and proper to have a re-look to the evidence of  material
witnesses with a view to find out whether the  concurrent  findings  of  the
two Courts below are based on proper appreciation  of  evidence  or  any  of
these findings call for any interference.

35)   As mentioned above, the only eye-witness to the incident  in  question
is Guddi (PW-9). Both the Courts below found her testimony  to  be  natural,
credible and consistent.

36)   Guddi (PW-9) is the real sister of the  deceased  Messo  and  she  was
living next to the house of Messo. She, in her evidence, narrated in  detail
her family tree and their inter se relations  including  her  relation  with
the accused family.

37)   She stated that Sohan Lal-one of the  accused  (since  dead)  was  her
husband's (Bhoop Singh’s) real elder brother and the accused are  Sohan  Lal
and his sons. She stated that Sohan Lal and his sons (appellants)  had  come
to Messo's house in the afternoon on the  date  of  incident  (incident  had
occurred in midnight the same day) and held out a  threat  to  her  and  Raj
Bala that marriage proposal of her daughter with the boy  from  Manak  Diwan
should not be materialized and if it is  not  cancelled  then  she  and  her
daughter will not see the sun the next day. She stated that Sohan  Lal  gave
this threat to Messo in her presence and in presence  of  Dholi  (PW-8)  who
had come to Messo to extend help for engagement ceremony of Raj Bala.

38)   She stated that Messo on hearing the threat asked  Dholi-her  daughter
to go to her maternal uncle (Ram Sarup) - who was  the  resident  of  nearby
village and bring him with her, if possible.

39)   She stated that Dholi immediately left to the house of Ram  Sarup  and
on reaching there she  told  him  about  the  incident.  Dholi  stayed  back
overnight with Ram Sarup.

40)   She then stated that during mid-night hours, she heard some  noise  in
the house of Messo. She, therefore, woke up and came out  to  find  out  the
cause of noice. She stated that between her house and the  house  of  Messo,
there is one common wall with sufficient  space,  which  enables  anyone  to
peep through easily in both the houses.

41)   She stated that she came near to the joint wall and through  space  in
the wall saw that Ram Chander (accused) and Randhir (accused)  were  holding
Gandasas  in  their  hands  whereas  Sohan  Lal  (accused)  and  Om  Prakash
(accused) had  caught  hold  of  Masso's  hand  and  legs  and  Ram  Chander
(accused) with his gandasa gave  blow  on  Messo's  neck,  which  completely
severed Messo's neck from her body.

42)   She stated that Ram Kumar (accused) then caught hold of Raj  Bala  who
was on a separate cot and Ranbir (accused) with his  gandasa  gave  blow  on
Raj Bala's throat due to which her neck  was  completely  severed  from  her
body. The accused persons then put both the bodies on  one  cot  along  with
their severed heads and put mattresses on the dead bodies.  Sohan  Lal  then
put some wood sticks by  the  side  of  the  cot  and  poured  two  tins  of
diesel/kerosene on the cot and set the cot ablaze with matchstick.

43)   She stated that Ranbir (accused) then came to her (Guddi‘s) house  and
took their tractor and camel cart to Messo's house. He dumped  ashes,  bones
and other burnt material in the tractor and proceeded with  the  tractor  to
an unknown place. She stated that before leaving, Ram Chander plastered  the
place of occurrence with mud and cow-dung and cleaned the place. She  stated
that she told about this incident to Bhoop Singh but on hearing it,  he  ran
away out of fear.

44)   She stated that next morning when Ram Sarup,  Dholi  and  Om  Prakash-
Sarpanch came, she narrated the entire incident to  them,  which  eventually
led to filing of FIR by Dholi immediately in  the  concerned  nearby  Police
Station naming therein the appellants as the culprits of commission  of  the
offence.

45)   Dholi (PW-8) corroborated the evidence of  Guddi  (PW-9)  on  material
points such as (1) all the accused visiting Messo's house and giving  threat
in her presence to Messo and Raj Bala,  (2)  Raj  Bala's  marriage  proposal
with a boy from Manik Dewan (3)  She having left to  her  uncle's  place  at
the request of her mother Messo to inform him about the  incident  (4)   her
family relations with the accused and with other family members and  lastly,
what Guddi (PW-9) told her about the  entire  incident  and  the  manner  in
which it was accomplished by the accused  on her  reaching  the  house  next
day morning with Ram Sarup and Om Prakash.

46)   Ram Sarup (PW-10) also corroborated the version of  Guddi  (PW-9)  and
Dholi (PW-8) on all material points. He  stated  that  when  he  along  with
Dholi and Om Prakash went to Guddi,  she  was  weeping  and  frightened.  On
being consoled, she narrated the entire incident (mentioned above) to them.

47)   The evidence of the Investigating Officer Hardawari  Lal  (PW-11)  and
Kiran Kumar (PW-7)  who  was  the  Scientific  Assistant  (Forensic  Science
Laboratory) proved that the blood stains were found on the walls  and  earth
and also fresh mud and cow-dung was found on  the  walls  and  when  it  was
removed, blood stains were noticed on the bricks of the  wall.  Kiran  Kumar
(PW-7) also corroborated the existence of joint wall with  sufficient  space
available in the common wall as stated by Guddi (PW- 9).

48)    The  evidence  of  Investigating  Officer  (PW-11)  also  proved  the
recoveries of articles  on  the  basis  of  disclosure  statements  made  by
respective  appellants  (accused).  The  seized  articles  were  proved  and
exhibited.

49)   It is with this evidence, the question arises as to  whether  the  two
Courts below were justified in placing reliance on  the  evidence  of  Guddi
(PW-9) for resting the appellant's conviction?

50)   On scanning the aforementioned evidence,  we  are  of  the  considered
opinion that both the Courts below were justified in accepting the  evidence
of Guddi (PW-9) for resting the appellants’ conviction upon  it.  We,  while
concurring with the reasoning and the conclusion of both the  Courts  below,
give our reasons infra.  In our view, the following facts  are  proved  with
the aid of evidence.

51)   First, Guddi (PW-9) was next-door neighbour to the house of  both  the
deceased where the incident took place. Second, she was closely  related  to
the deceased family and the family of  the  accused.  Third,  she  knew  the
accused persons and the family members of the deceased very well much  prior
to the date of incident being a part of the same families. Fourth,  she  was
fully aware of the marriage issue of Raj Bala. Fifth,  she  was  present  at
the time of threat given by Sohan Lal  and  his  sons  (accused)  to  Messo.
Sixth, she was able to see the incident graphically due to sufficient  space
available in the common wall.  Seventh, Scientific  Assistant,  Kiran  Kumar
(PW-7) on inspection of the place of occurrence proved that the common  wall
has space. He said "there was open space between this wall  and  the  room".
Eighth, it also corroborates with the evidence of Hardawari  Lal(PW-11)  and
the spot map (EX-PU) of the place of incidence that the wall  and  the  open
space therein did exist; Ninth, Guddi's narration of entire incident  is  so
graphic that it looks natural. It also shows how confidently  she  was  able
to narrate the role of every accused in commission of the  offence.   Tenth,
the existence of blood stains on wall and earth coupled with fresh  mud  and
cow dung put on the walls/earth duly proved by Hardawari Lal,  Investigating
Officer(PW-11) and Kiran Kumar (PW-7) corroborates  Guddi's  statement  that
"Ram Chander - one of the accused before leaving  the  place  of  occurrence
cleaned the place with mud and cow-dung". Eleventh, it is  not  possible  to
give description of an incident in such graphic manner and  that  too  by  a
middle aged illiterate housewife unless she had actually seen such  incident
and why should  Guddi  (PW-9)  give  evidence  against  the  appellants  and
falsely implicate them when there is no evidence  to  prove  their  previous
animosity; Twelfth, motive to eliminate the  two  deceased  was   proved  by
Guddi against the appellants and lastly, nothing could  be  brought  out  to
shake her testimony in cross-examination.

52)   The submission of learned counsel for the appellants that since  Guddi
(PW-9) was in close relation with the deceased persons, she  should  not  be
believed for want of evidence of any independent  witness,  deserves  to  be
rejected in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Dalbir Kaur  and
Ors. vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158, and Harbans Kaur  and  Anr.  vs.
State  of  Haryana,  (2005)  9  SCC  195,  which  lays  down  the  following
proposition:

“There is no proposition  in  law  that  relatives  are  to  be  treated  as
untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown  when  a  plea
of partiality is raised to show that the  witnesses  had  reason  to  shield
actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.”

53)   In Namdeo?Vs.?State of  Maharashtra,  (2007)  14  SCC150,  this  Court
further held:

“38. ………. it is clear that a close relative cannot be  characterised  as  an
“interested” witness. He is a  “natural”  witness.  His  evidence,  however,
must be scrutinised carefully. If on such scrutiny, his  evidence  is  found
to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable  and  wholly  trustworthy,
conviction can be based on the  “sole”  testimony  of  such  witness.  Close
relationship of witness with the deceased or victim is no ground  to  reject
his evidence.  On  the  contrary,  close  relative  of  the  deceased  would
normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and  falsely  implicate
an innocent one.”



54)   We follow and apply this well settled principle of law  for  rejecting
the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants.

55)   In the light of aforementioned twelve reasons,  we  are  of  the  view
that Guddi (PW-9) was rightly held to be an eye-witness and the  two  Courts
rightly relied upon her  sworn  testimony  for  sustaining  the  appellants’
conviction.

56)   This takes us  to  the  next  argument  of  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants. It was urged that  the  alleged  recovery  of  articles  on  the
strength of disclosure statement  of  the  accused  and  in  particular  the
"ashes and the bones" from the canal is not possible. We do not agree.

57)   In our view, there is no evidence to prove the fact as to whether  the
canal from where the recovery of ashes and bones  was  made  had  any  water
therein or not at the relevant time. We do not find that  any  question  was
put to any witness on this issue and secondly, no independent  evidence  was
brought on record to prove as to whether the canal was full of water or  had
no water therein. In any event,  one  could  not  dispute  that  bones  were
recovered from the canal. In  the  absence  of  any  evidence,  which  could
otherwise be led in any form, this submission at this stage  is,  therefore,
not acceptable.

58)   This takes us  to  the  next  argument  of  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants. Learned Counsel urged that why the prosecution did  not  examine
any independent witness from the village other then Guddi (PW-9).

59)   We find no merit in this submission for more than one  reason.  First,
no such argument was advanced before  the  two  courts  below.  Second,  the
incident had taken place during midnight when all the  villagers  were  fast
asleep. Third, no evidence was adduced to  prove  that  near  the  place  of
incident, there were many houses and lastly, had the injury been  caused  by
the Gun Shot, it would have created some noise in the  nearby  locality  and
attract the attention of the villagers. Such  was,  however,  not  the  case
because the weapon used in commission of the offence was ‘Gandasa’.

60)   In our considered opinion,  the  disclosure  statements  made  by  the
accused during their interrogation on the basis of which the  recoveries  of
articles were made such as - gandasa, bones,  ashes,  blood  stained  bricks
and earth, tractor with cart, two plastic cans smelling  diesel  oil,  which
were duly proved by the Investigating Officer are sufficient to sustain  the
conviction when it is examined in  the  context  of  oral  evidence.  Merely
because no expert  opinion  was  obtained  to  prove  as  to  whether  bones
recovered were human or animal bones, in our  view,  would  not  weaken  the
case of prosecution in the  light  of  overwhelming  evidence  available  on
record to prove the complicity of the appellants.

61)   It is the consistent view of  this  Court  that  minor  discrepancies,
even if noticed, would not affect  the  prosecution  case,  if  there  is  a
sufficient independent evidence to sustain the conviction. (See  –  Vijay  @
Chinee vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191, Paras 23  &  23).   In
this case,  the  evidence  adduced  was  found  sufficient  to  sustain  the
conviction and we find no good ground to take a different view from the  one
taken by the two Courts below and concur with their findings  and  views  by
giving our own reasons mentioned supra.

62)   In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals are found  to  be  devoid
of any merit. The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.  In  case
if any of the appellants is on bail, his bail bond stands cancelled  and  he
is directed to be taken into custody forthwith to undergo  remaining  period
of sentence awarded to him by the Sessions Court.

                                     ………..................................J.
  [A.K. SIKRI]


                                    .……...................................J.
                [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
      New Delhi,
      January 02, 2017
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