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Tuesday, January 10, 2017

All the office bearers of BCCI and of its affiliated State Associations who fail to meet the norms recommended by the Committee and accepted by this Court, shall forthwith demit and cease to hold office namely: “A person shall be disqualified from being an Office Bearer if he or she : Is not a citizen of India; Has attained the age of 70 years; Is declared to be insolvent, or of unsound mind; Is a Minister or government servant; Holds any office or post in a sports or athletic association or federation apart from cricket; Has been an Office Bearer of the BCCI for a cumulative period of 9 years; Has been charged by a Court of Law for having committed any criminal offence.” Shri Anurag Thakur, President of BCCI and Shri Ajay Shirke, Secretary, BCCI shall forthwith cease and desist from being associated with the working of BCCI; A notice to show cause shall issue to Mr Anurag Thakur to explain why he should not be proceeded against under the provisions of Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; A notice to show cause shall issue to Mr Anurag Thakur to explain why he should not be proceeded with under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; A Committee of administrators shall supervise the administration of BCCI through its Chief Executive Officer; This Court shall by a separate order nominate the persons who shall form part of the Committee of administrators. In order to enable the Court to have the benefit of objective assistance in making the nominations, we request Mr Fali S Nariman, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Gopal Subramaniam, the learned Amicus Curiae to assist the Court by suggesting names of persons with integrity and experience in managing a similar enterprise. We request the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties to also place their suggestions before the Court so as to facilitate a considered decision; In addition to the function assigned in (v) above, the Committee of administrators shall also ensure that the directions contained in the judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016 (which accepted the report of the Committee with modifications) are fulfilled and to adopt all necessary and consequential steps for that purpose; In view of the directions contained in (ii) above, the senior most Vice- President of BCCI shall perform the duties of the President, BCCI and the Joint Secretary shall perform the duties of Secretary. Those of the office bearers of BCCI who are not disqualified in terms of clause (i) above (other than the President and Secretary) may continue subject to their filing an unconditional undertaking before this Court within four weeks of the date of this order to abide by and implement the directions contained in the judgment dated 18 July 2016. Upon the Committee of administrators as nominated by this Court assuming charge, the existing office bearers shall function subject to the supervision and control of the Committee of administrators. The Committee of administrators would have the power to issue all appropriate directions to facilitate due supervision and control; and The remuneration payable to the members of the Committee of Administrators shall be fixed in consultation with the Committee consisting of Mr Justice R M Lodha, Mr Justice Ashok Bhan and Mr Justice R V Raveendran.The role of the Justice R M Lodha Committee shall hereafter be confined to overall policy and direction on such matters as may be referred by this Court. We would request the leaned Senior Counsel and the learned Amicus Curiae to endeavour to submit their suggestions to this Court within two weeks. The proceedings shall be listed before this Court on 19 January 2017 for pronouncement of directions in regard to the names of the administrators. 26 There shall accordingly be an order in these terms.

                                                                  REPORTABLE


  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4235 OF 2014


Board of Control for Cricket in India
.....APPELLANT



                                   Versus



Cricket Association of Bihar & Ors
.....RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 4236 OF 2014


                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 1155 OF 2015





                                  O R D E R



This  proceeding  is  a  sequel  to  the  order  and  directions  issued  on
    21 October 2016. In the previous order of this Court, the status  report
submitted by the three member Committee (consisting of Justice  R  M  Lodha,
Justice  Ashok  Bhan  and  Justice  R  V  Raveendran)  was  taken   up   for
consideration.

2     The Committee was tasked with overseeing  the  implementation  of  the
judgment and order of this Court dated 18 July 2016. The  judgment  of  this
Court has attained finality. Review and Curative petitions  have  also  been
dismissed. By its judgment, this  Court  has  accepted  the  recommendations
made by the Committee in a report  dated  18  December  2015  providing  for
reforms in  the  structure,  organization  and  working  of  BCCI.  Such  an
exercise is necessary in order to make the functioning of BCCI  transparent,
objective and accountable to the trust with which  it  is  impressed,  as  a
body which presides over the affairs  of  a  sport  which  has  millions  of
followers. This Court had by  its  judgment  expressed  the  hope  that  the
process of implementing its directions would be completed  within  a  period
of four months or, at best, six months. The status report submitted  by  the
Committee recorded that the directions of this Court were  ignored,  actions
were taken by BCCI to present a fait  accompli  to  the  Committee  and  the
directives issued by the Committee were  breached.  The  Committee  observed
that BCCI has repeatedly taken steps to undermine  its  authority  and  this
Court with several statements and actions which “are grossly  out  of  order
and would even constitute contempt”.

3     On 7 October 2016, while taking note of the  status  report  submitted
by the Committee, this Court recorded the following prima facie findings :

“… The sequence of events.. since 18th July, 2016 and  referred  to  in  the
status report prima facie give an impression that BCCI has far from  lending
its fullest cooperation to the Committee adopted an  obstructionist  and  at
times a  defiant  attitude  which  the  Committee  has  taken  note  of  and
described as an impediment undermining not only the Committee but  even  the
dignity of this Court with several statements and  actions  which  according
to  the  Committee  are  grossly  out  of  order  and  may  even  constitute
contempt”.



4     On 7 October 2016, this Court took note of the fact that  despite  the
directions which the Committee issued on 21 August  2016  that  the  AGM  of
BCCI may transact only routine business for 2015-2016 and that any  business
or matter for 2016-2017 may be dealt with only after  the  adoption  of  the
Memorandum of Association and rules in pursuance of the  recommendations  of
the Committee, substantial  amounts  running  into  crores  of  rupees  were
disbursed in favour of State Associations. BCCI had informed the court  that
one of the reasons for its  failure  to  adopt  the  proposed  MoA  was  the
reluctance  of  its  State  Associations  to  subscribe  to  it.   In   this
background, the court was constrained to issue directions inter alia to  the
effect that no further amounts shall be disbursed to the State  Associations
except to those associations which undertake the reforms  suggested  by  the
Committee and accepted by the court.

5     Another issue which was of concern was the conduct  of  the  President
of BCCI (Mr Anurag Thakur) who, the Committee recorded as having  asked  the
CEO of ICC to state that the Committee appointed by this Court  amounted  to
‘governmental interference’. It may be noted here that in  an  interview  to
the electronic media, the CEO of ICC  stated  that  the  President  of  BCCI
sought a letter from ICC that the  appointment  of  a  nominee  of  CAG  (as
directed by this Court on 18 July 2016 in terms of  the  recommendations  of
the Committee) would amount  to  ‘governmental  interference’  inviting  the
suspension of BCCI from the membership of ICC. By its order dated 7  October
2016, the President of BCCI  was  directed  to  file  a  personal  affidavit
clarifying the position.

6     There were two versions before  this  Court  in  regard  to  what  had
transpired between the President of BCCI and Mr Shashank Manohar,  President
of ICC at a meeting that was held at Dubai on 6 and 7 August 2016 during  an
ICC Governance Review  Committee  meeting.  Mr.  Ratnakar  Shivaram  Shetty,
General Manager of Admin and Game Development,  BCCI  had  in  his  response
stated as follows :

“It appears that an interview was given by Mr. David Richardson the ICC  CEO
falsely stating that the BCCI President had requested the  ICC  to  issue  a
letter stating that the intervention  by  this  Hon’ble  Court  amounted  to
Governmental interference.  It is submitted that  no  such  letter  or  oral
request was ever made to the said gentleman either by the BCCI President  or
any office bearer of the BCCI.  It  is  apparent  that  Mr.  Richardson  has
confused himself in relation to the issue.  This issue  is  required  to  be
considered in the light  of  the  fact  that  Mr.  Shashank  Manohar  Senior
Advocate had clearly opined as the BCCI President that  appointment  of  the
CAG in the BCCI  shall  result  in  suspension  of  the  BCCI  as  it  would
constitute governmental interference.  In fact the same had  been  submitted
on affidavit before this Hon’ble Court.  However, as Chairman  of  the  ICC,
Mr. Manohar had taken a contrary stand and stated that it would  not  amount
to governmental interference.  It was in  this  context  that  a  discussion
took place between Mr. Shashank Manohar  and  Mr.  Anurag  Thakur  during  a
meeting in Dubai wherein a clarification as  sought  by  Mr.  Anurag  Thakur
during an informal discussion on what the exact status would be if  the  CAG
was inducted by the BCCI as part of its  management  and  whether  it  would
amount to governmental interference as had been advised and affirmed by  Mr.
Manohar during his stint as BCCI President.” (emphasis supplied)



Paragraph 7(d) of the response contains a statement that :

      “It is being incorrectly  alleged  that  the  President  BCCI  made  a
request to the ICC to issue a letter stating that this Committee amounts  to
Governmental interference.  This suggestion is denied”. (emphasis supplied)



On the other hand, the President of BCCI in his response (filed pursuant  to
the directions of this Court) stated as follows :

“In this context  it  is  respectfully  submitted  that  there  was  an  ICC
governance review committee meeting scheduled to be held in  Dubai  on  6th&
7th August 2016. There were certain issues relating to financial  model  for
which my inputs were required and as such I was invited by ICC for the  said
meeting.   During  the  meeting  with  regard   to   the   review   of   the
constitutional provisions of ICC, I pointed out to the Chairman of the  ICC,
Mr. Shashank Manohar that when he was the President of BCCI he had  taken  a
view that the recommendations of the Justice Lodha committee appointing  the
nominee of the  CAG  on  the  Apex  Council  would  amount  to  governmental
interference  and  might  invoke  an  action  of  suspension  from  ICC.   I
therefore requested him that he being the  ICC  Chairman  can  a  letter  be
issued clarifying the position which he had taken as  BCCI  President.   Mr.
Manohar explained to me at the meeting that when  the  stand  was  taken  by
him, the matter was pending before this  Hon’ble  Court  and  had  not  been
decided.  However, on 18.07.2016 this Hon’ble Court delivered  its  judgment
in the matter.  In the said judgment, this Hon’ble Court  has  rejected  the
submission that the appointment of the nominee of CAG on Apex council  would
amount to Governmental interference and had also held  that  the  ICC  would
appreciate the appointment as it would bring transparency  in  the  finances
of the Board.” (emphasis supplied)



7     In the response filed by Mr Shetty on  behalf  of  BCCI  there  was  a
specific denial that its President had  requested  ICC  to  issue  a  letter
stating that the Committee amounted to  governmental  interference.  On  the
other hand, in the affidavit which the President of BCCI filed in  pursuance
of the directions of this Court dated 7  October  2016  he  accepted  having
made a request to the Chairman of ICC for issuing a letter  “clarifying  the
position which he had taken as BCCI President” (that the  recommendation  of
the Committee for appointment of a CAG nominee would amount to  governmental
interference and may lead to a suspension of BCCI from ICC  membership).  Mr
Shetty had not disclosed that there was any such request for a  letter  made
by the President of BCCI whereas according to the latter he had made such  a
request. Mr Shetty in fact denied that any request for a letter was made  to
the ICC President by Mr Anurag Thakur.

8     This Court by its order dated 21 October 2016 observed as follows :

“10.  Be that as it may,  it  is  a  matter  of  serious  concern  that  the
President of BCCI, even after the declaration  of  the  final  judgment  and
order of this Court dated 18 July 2016, requested  the  Chairperson  of  ICC
for a letter “clarifying” (as he states) the position which he had taken  as
BCCI President to the effect that the  induction  of  a  CAG  nominee  would
amount to governmental interference and may result in BCCI  being  suspended
from ICC.  There was no occasion for the President of BCCI  to  do  so  once
the recommendation of the Committee for the induction of a CAG  nominee  was
accepted in the final judgment of this  Court.   In  the  judgment  of  this
Court dated 18 May 2016, this Court observed as follows :

“77. There is, in our view, no basis  for  the  argument  that  any  measure
taken by the BCCI on its own or under the direction  of  a  competent  court
specially when aimed at streamlining  its  working  and  ensuring  financial
discipline, transparency and  accountability  expected  of  an  organization
discharging public functions such  as  BCCI  may  be  seen  as  governmental
interference calling for suspension/derecognition  of  the  BCCI.  Far  from
finding fault with presence of a nominee of the Accountant  General  of  the
State and C&AG, the ICC would in our opinion appreciate any  such  step  for
the same would prevent misgivings about the working of the  BCCI  especially
in  relation  to  management  of  its  funds  and  bring  transparency   and
objectivity necessary to inspire public confidence in the fairness  and  the
effective management of the affairs of the BCCI and the State  Associations.
The nominees recommended by the Committee would act  as  conscience  keepers
of the State Association and BCCI in financial matters and  matters  related
or incidental thereto which will in no way adversely impact the  performance
or working of the BCCI for the promotion and  development  of  the  game  of
cricket. The criticism leveled against the recommendations of the  Committee
is, therefore, unfounded and accordingly rejected”.
11    This finding which is contained in the final  judgment  and  order  of
this Court binds BCCI.   Prima  facie,  an  effort  has  been  made  by  the
President of BCCI to create a record in order to question the legitimacy  of
the recommendation of the Committee for the appointment  of  a  CAG  nominee
after the recommendation was accepted by this Court on  18  July  2016.   We
presently defer further  consideration  of  the  action  to  be  taken  with
reference to his conduct. Mr. Shetty in his response to  the  status  report
claims that the CEO of ICC had “falsely” stated in his  interview  that  the
President of BCCI had requested ICC to  issue  a  letter  stating  that  the
intervention of this  Court  amounted  to  governmental  interference.   The
version of Mr. Shetty is at variance to what is alleged to have been  stated
by the CEO of ICC.  It may also become necessary for this  Court  to  assess
the veracity of the version of Mr. Shetty and that of Mr.  Richardson.   Mr.
Shashank Manohar, the then President of BCCI is presently  the  Chairman  of
ICC.  A copy of this order shall be forwarded to him  by  the  Secretary  to
the Committee in order to enable him to consider filing a  response  setting
out his version, to set the record  straight  and  assist  this  Court.  Mr.
Manohar is at liberty to obtain a report from Mr. Richardson  before  filing
his response.”



In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court on 21  October  2016,  a
response received by Mr Shashank Manohar, President of ICC has  been  placed
before this Court by the Amicus Curiae.

9     After reviewing whether due and adequate steps were taken by  BCCI  to
implement the final judgment of this Court, this Court in  its  order  dated
            21 October 2016 recorded the following findings :

“15.  For the reasons which have weighed with us in  the  earlier  order  of
this Court dated 7 October 2016 and for those which we have  adduced  above,
we are inclined to take a serious  view  of  the  conduct  of  BCCI  in  the
present case.  Despite the prima facie findings which  were  arrived  at  in
the previous order, the further hearing was deferred.   There  has  been  no
change in the position of BCCI.  The intransigence continues.  If  BCCI  had
any  difficulties  about  adhering  to  the  timelines  laid  down  by   the
Committee, the appropriate course would have been  to  move  the  Committee.
Even the grievance which was urged during  this  proceeding  by  BCCI,  that
some  of  the  directions  of  the  Committee  have  travelled  beyond   the
parameters set by this Court can and ought to be urged before the  Committee
in the first instance.” (emphasis supplied)



10    A statement was made on behalf of the BCCI by learned  Senior  Counsel
that  BCCI  would  establish  its  bonafides   before   the   Committee   by
establishing the compliance made of those of its recommendations  which  are
stated to have been fulfilled. Accordingly, in order to  furnish  BCCI  with
an opportunity to demonstrate its compliance with  the  directions  of  this
Court,  we  desisted  from  issuing  a  direction  at  that  stage  for  the
appointment of administrators (as sought by the Committee) in the hope  that
BCCI would comply  with  the  judgment  and  order  of  this  Court  in  the
meantime. While doing so, this Court observed that :

“19….We have presently come to the conclusion that, prima  facie,  there  is
substance in the status report submitted by the  Committee.   Implementation
of the final judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016 has prima facie  been
impeded by the intransigence of  BCCI  and  its  office  bearers.   However,
having due regard to the submission made on behalf of  BCCI  that  it  would
make every genuine effort to  persuade  the  state  associations  to  secure
compliance with the judgment of this Court, and having regard to the  larger
interests of the game of cricket, we are desisting from issuing a  direction
at this stage in terms of the request made by the Committee for  appointment
of administrators so as to enable BCCI to demonstrate  its  good  faith  and
the steps taken for compliance  both  before  the  Committee  in  the  first
instance and before this Court by  the  next  date  of  hearing.”  (emphasis
supplied)



11    In pursuance of the previous directions issued by this  Court,  on  21
October 2016, the Committee filed another status report on 7  November  2016
on which orders were passed by this Court on 8 November 2016. The  Committee
has filed another status report on 14 November 2016  seeking  the  following
directions :

That  all  office  bearers  of  BCCI  and  State  Associations   who   stand
disqualified by virtue of the norms contained in its report dated 4  October
2016 and accepted by this Court must cease to hold office forthwith;



All administrative and management matters be carried out by the CEO of  BCCI
without  advertence to the office bearers; and

Appointment of anamed observer to supervise the administration  of  BCCI  by
the CEO.

The Committee has suggested that its own role may  be  confined  to  overall
policy and direction and not the actual administration of BCCI.

12    The President of BCCI has filed an affidavit in these  proceedings  on
3 December 2016. The affidavit states that neither  the  President  nor  the
Secretary of BCCI command voting rights  in  the  meetings  of  the  Working
Committee. The affidavit states  in  the  following  terms  that  the  State
Associations have  declined  to  accept  the  recommendations  made  by  the
Committee and accepted by this     Court :

“Accordingly the Hon Secretary convened the said meeting referred  to  above
of the General Body of the BCCI for the 30.9.2016….

The meeting resumed the next day i.e. on 1.10.2016….

I further state that I as Hon. President do not have a vote when  I  sit  in
the general body meeting neither does the Hon. Secretary….

I further state that I as a Hon.  President  am  in  no  position  to  force
members to adopt the full memorandum as recommended, even though armed  with
an order of this Hon’ble Court, as the members are of the  opinion  that  as
per the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975  under
which the BCCI is registered, they can  amend  their  memorandum  only  when
three fourths of the members  present  and  entitled  to  vote,  accept  the
changes to the memorandum.

I further state that another informal meeting of the members was once  again
held in New Delhi on 15.10.2016, wherein I along  with  the  Hon.  Secretary
again conveyed to all the members present that should  they  not  adopt  the
memorandum as proposed by the Lodha Committee, all the payments due  to  the
member state associations would be stopped….

The members  stuck  to  their  stand  that  they  would  abide  by  the  new
memorandum only as approved by them with the changes as approved by them  in
the adjourned meeting of the 30.9.2016, irrespective of  the  fact  that  no
further payments would be made to them. The members were of the view that  a
few of the Lodha Committee recommendations  were  not  in  the  interest  of
Indian Cricket and would be a huge setback to the game in India and  destroy
it completely…..

As  Hon.  President,  I  am  rendered  totally  incapable  and  without  any
authority to force the members, who are 30 in number and have voting  rights
under the statute, to adopt the entire memorandum as proposed  for  adoption
by the Hon. Lodha Committee.”              (emphasis supplied)



13    The position as it has emerged before the court is  that  despite  the
fact that there is a judgment and final order dated 18 July  2016  accepting
the report submitted by the Committee, the implementation of the  directions
issued by this Court has been obstructed and impeded. By the order  of  this
Court of 7 October 2016 and the subsequent directions that  were  issued  on
21 October 2016, sufficient time  was  granted  to  BCCI  to  abide  by  the
judgment and order of this Court.

14    Initially, as the Committee informed  this  Court,  BCCI  appeared  to
have taken the position that it was only if its Review Petition as  well  as
Curative Petition were dismissed, that the recommendations of the  Committee
would be accepted. This statement of  BCCI  at  a  meeting  of  its  Working
Committee held on 21 October 2016 was  manifestly  misconceived.  Once  this
Court  had   affirmed   the   recommendations   of   the   Committee   (with
modifications) in a final  judgment  and  order  dated  18  July  2016,  the
judgment had to be implemented as it stands. By  the  Order  of  this  Court
dated 21  October  2016,  this  Court  made  it  clear,  if  indeed  such  a
clarification was at all warranted, that :

“A party to a litigation cannot be heard  to  say  that  it  would  treat  a
judgment of this Court as not having binding effect  unless  the  Review  or
Curative Petitions that it has filed are dismissed.”



15    As a matter of record, both the Review as well as  Curative  petitions
have also been dismissed. Yet, the intransigence of BCCI has continued.  The
course of events indicates that though sufficient  opportunities  have  been
granted to BCCI to comply with the judgment and order of this Court, it  has
failed to do so. The President and Secretary  and  office  bearers  of  BCCI
have obstructed the implementation of the final directions of this Court  on
the basis of a specious plea that its State Associations are not willing  to
abide  by  the  directions.   This   Court   having   furnished   sufficient
opportunities to BCCI to comply, it is constrained now to take  recourse  to
coercive steps  to  ensure  that  the  directions  contained  in  its  final
judgment and order are not left to be a writ in sand.

16    The Committee consists of a former Chief  Justice  of  India  and  two
former Judges of the Supreme Court. They  have  together  been  tasked  with
overseeing implementation of the judgment of this Court. Yet, the  Committee
has repeatedly been confronted with a barrage  of  unfortunate  comments  by
BCCI – in Press conferences and in correspondence with  an  intent  that  it
should be led to a situation where it throws up  its  arms  in  despair  and
frustration.

17    Among the recommendations of the Committee that have been accepted  by
this Court are the following disqualifications for being  an  office  bearer
of BCCI and of the State Associations :

“A person shall be disqualified from being an Office Bearer if he or she :

Is not a citizen of India;

Has attained the age of 70 years;

Is declared to be insolvent, or of unsound mind;

Is a Minister or Government Servant;

Holds any office or post in a sports or athletic association  or  federation
apart from cricket;

Has been an Office Bearer of the BCCI for a cumulative period of 9 years;

Has been charged by a  Court  of  Law  for  having  committed  any  criminal
offence.”



18    The Committee has in its status report dated 14  November  2016  drawn
the attention of the court to the fact that several office bearers  both  of
BCCI and the State Associations continue to hold posts although  they  stand
disqualified in terms of the above norms which have been  accepted  by  this
Court. Persons who have a vested interest in continuing in  their  positions
inspite of the norms noted above have ensured that the writ of the court  is
obstructed and impeded. We need to emphasise that the turf  of  the  cricket
field is not a personal turf or fiefdom. We  must  hence  order  and  direct
that  no  person  shall  hereafter  continue  to  be  or  be  entitled   for
appointment as office bearer of BCCI or a State  Association  in  breach  of
the above norms. All existing office  bearers  of  BCCI  and  of  the  State
Associations who do not fulfill the above norms shall with effect  from  the
date of this Order stand disqualified.

19    That leads the court to the  issue  of  the  conduct  of  Shri  Anurag
Thakur, President of BCCI. By the final judgment and  order  of  this  Court
dated 18 July 2016, the plea that the appointment of a nominee of CAG  would
amount  to  governmental  interference  with  the  affairs   of   BCCI   was
specifically negatived. By its judgment, this Court had observed as  follows
:

“77. There is, in our view, no basis  for  the  argument  that  any  measure
taken by the BCCI on its own or under the direction  of  a  competent  court
specially when aimed at streamlining  its  working  and  ensuring  financial
discipline, transparency and  accountability  expected  of  an  organization
discharging public functions such  as  BCCI  may  be  seen  as  governmental
interference calling for suspension/derecognition  of  the  BCCI.  Far  from
finding fault with presence of a nominee of the Accountant  General  of  the
State and C&AG, the ICC would in our opinion appreciate any  such  step  for
the same would prevent misgivings about the working of the  BCCI  especially
in  relation  to  management  of  its  funds  and  bring  transparency   and
objectivity necessary to inspire public confidence in the fairness  and  the
effective management of the affairs of the BCCI and the State  Associations.
The nominees recommended by the Committee would act  as  conscience  keepers
of the State Association and BCCI in financial matters and  matters  related
or incidental thereto which will in no way adversely impact the  performance
or working of the BCCI for the promotion and  development  of  the  game  of
cricket. The criticism leveled against the recommendations of the  Committee
is, therefore, unfounded and accordingly rejected.”



20    Once this position had been laid down  by  the  court,  there  was  no
occasion for the President of BCCI at the ICC  Governance  Review  Committee
Meeting held at Dubai on 6 and 7 August 2016 to solicit a  letter  from  the
Chairperson of ICC. Such a solicitation was but  an  effort  to  thwart  the
implementation of the orders of the court. An attempt was made to  build  up
a record to indicate that implementing the orders of the  Supreme  Court  of
India would run the risk of endangering the status of BCCI as  a  member  of
ICC. In  pursuance  of  the  Order  of  this  Court,  Mr.  Shashank  Manohar
(President – ICC) has in an email dated       2 November 2016  addressed  to
the Committee made the following disclosure :

“I would like to state that there was a meting of the Working Group  of  the
ICC held at Dubai on the 6th August, 2016 to consider  the  ICCs  Governance
and Financial Structure. At the meeting, apart from  myself  and  Mr  Anurag
Thakur, Mr Giles Clarke,    Mr David Peever and Mr  Imran  Khwaja,  who  are
all Directors of ICC were present. The ICC  CEO,       Mr  David  Richardson
and ICC COO Mr. Lain Higgins were also present..

During the meeting Mr  Thakur  pointed  out  to  me  that  when  I  was  the
President of BCCI a submission was advanced before the Supreme Court  at  my
behest that the appointment of a nominee of the  CAG  on  the  Apex  Council
might amount to Governmental interference and  would  invoke  an  action  of
suspension from the ICC. He therefore requested me  to  issue  a  letter  to
that effect in my capacity as ICC Chairman..

I declined to issue such a  letter  and  explained  to  him  that  the  said
submission was advanced before the Hon Supreme  Court  when  the  court  was
hearing the matter. However, on 18-7-2016 the Hon SC delivered its  judgment
in the matter and rejected the submission that the appointment of a  nominee
of the CAG would amount to governmental interference.  The  Hon  SC  further
held that the appointment of the CAG nominee  on  the  Apex  Council  either
made by the BCCI on its own or under the orders of a competent  court  aimed
at  bringing  financial  discipline  and  transparency  cannot  be  seen  as
governmental interference calling for suspension of the BCCI by the ICC..

The Hon SC further held that the ICC would  appreciate  the  appointment  of
such a nominee as the same would bring transparency in the finances  of  the
Board..

I therefore explained to Mr Thakur that the issue  having  been  decided  by
the Hon Supreme Court of India, which is the highest court  of  the  country
and whose judgment binds everybody, I cannot  give  him  any  such  letter.”
(emphasis supplied)



21    The response by Mr Shashank Manohar indicates that  the  President  of
BCCI requested him on 6 August 2016 to issue a letter  in  his  capacity  as
ICC Chairman in terms of the position that he had adopted as  the  President
of BCCI

(“that the appointment  of  a  CAG  nominee  would  amount  to  governmental
interference and would invoke  an  action  of  suspension  from  ICC”).  The
conduct of the President of BCCI in seeking a letter from the  President  of
ICC in August 2016, after the final judgment and Order  of  this  Court,  is
nothing but an attempt on the part of the head of BCCI to  evade  complying,
with the Order of this Court. That he sought a letter  is  clear  even  from
the affidavit of Mr Thakur dated 15 October 2016 (though he states  that  he
had requested the ICC Chairman to clarify the position which  he  had  taken
as BCCI President). Even going by that version, we are constrained  to  note
that there was absolutely no occasion for the President of BCCI  to  solicit
any such clarification from the Chairperson of  ICC  in  the  teeth  of  the
judgment that was delivered  by  this  Court.  Moreover,  we  find  adequate
reasons to doubt the veracity of the explanation which has been tendered  by
Mr Thakur about the sequence of  events.  It  must  be  noted  that  in  the
response which was filed by  Mr  Ratnakar  Shivaram  Shetty  to  the  status
report of the Committee there was a reference to  a  discussion  which  took
place between Mr Manohar and Mr Thakur  in  Dubai  and  to  a  clarification
sought by the latter on what “the exact status would be” if  a  CAG  nominee
was inducted by BCCI.       Mr Shetty specifically  denied  that  Mr  Thakur
had requested the ICC Chairperson to issue a letter.  Mr  Shetty’s  response
was based on records. This reference to some “clarification”  was  evidently
not on the basis of the minutes of the purported  meeting  of  BCCI  Working
Committee held on 22 August 2016 which were  placed  on  record  by  learned
Senior Counsel for BCCI during the course of the hearing prior to the  Order
of this Court dated 21  October  2016.  If  those  minutes  were  before  Mr
Shetty, he would have made  a  disclosure  in  their  terms.  The  purported
minutes read as follows :

“Mr. Anurag Thakur was in the Chair and called  the  meeting  to  order  and
welcomed the members. He briefed the members about his meeting with the  ICC
Chairman at Dubai during the ICC governance review committee meeting on  6th
& 7th August 2016. Certain financial mode inputs were  required  during  the
said meeting which he gave. During the meeting with regard to the review  of
the constitutional provisions of ICC it was informed by Mr. Thakur  that  he
asked Chairman ICC Mr. Shashank Manohar that when he was  the  President  of
BCCI he  had  taken  a  view  that  the  recommendations  of  Justice  Lodha
committee appointing the nominee of  the  CAG  on  the  Apex  Council  would
amount  to  governmental  interference  and  might  invoke  an   action   of
suspension from ICC. It was therefore requested from him that he  being  the
ICC Chairman could a letter be issued clarifying the position which  he  had
taken as BCCI President. Mr. Manohar  thereafter  explained  that  when  the
stand was taken by him the matter was pending before the Supreme  Court  and
was not decided. However on 18th of July 2016  the  Hon.  Supreme  Court  of
India delivered its judgment and the Court has rejected the submission  that
the appointment of the nominee  of  CAG  on  Apex  council  will  amount  to
Governmental interference and had also held that the  ICC  would  appreciate
the appointment as it would  bring  transparency  in  the  finances  of  the
Board. The discussion stopped in view of his  explanation  on  this  issue”.
(emphasis supplied)



22    Prima facie it would appear that these minutes had not seen the  light
of the day when the response by Mr  Shetty  to  the  status  report  of  the
Committee was filed, and have been fabricated subsequently to lend  credence
to the version of Mr Thakur. The statement that Mr Manohar was requested  to
clarify the position which he had taken as BCCI President  is  falsified  by
Mr Manohar’s disclosure that he was asked to give a letter in  his  capacity
as ICC Chairman.The version of Mr Thakur that he had  requested  Mr  Manohar
that “he being ICC Chairman can a letter be issued clarifying the  position”
which he had taken as BCCI President is belied by the disclosure  which  has
been made by Mr Shashank Manohar.          Mr Manohar’ s  response  dated  2
November 2016 clearly indicates that during the course  of  the  meeting  at
Dubai on 6 August 2016, Mr Thakur requested him to issue  a  letter  in  his
capacity as ICC Chairperson that the appointment of  a  nominee  of  CAG  in
BCCI might  amount  to  governmental  interference,  leading  to  action  of
suspension  from  ICC.  Prima  facie,  it  emerges  from  the  record   that
         Mr Thakur did seek such  a  letter  from  the  ICC  Chairperson  as
stated by                  Mr Manohar. The disclosure which  Mr  Thakur  has
made in his affidavit dated 15 October 2016 is  prima  facie  false  to  his
knowledge. Prima facie, we also find that the minutes of the meeting of  the
Working Committee of BCCI which were produced before this  Court  have  been
made up to lend support to the version of Mr Thakur.

23    We accordingly have arrived at the conclusion that Mr  Thakur  has  by
his actions and conduct rendered himself unfit for continuance as  President
of BCCI, for the following reasons :

Firstly, he has obstructed and impeded the implementation of the  directions
contained in the judgment and order of this Court dated 18  July  2016.  His
own version is that he has been “rendered totally incapable and without  any
authority” to compel the members to comply with the orders  of  this  Court.
This is indicative of his having washed his hands off a duty and  obligation
to ensure compliance.

Secondly, we are prima facie of the view that Mr  Thakur  is  liable  to  be
proceeded with for contempt of court for having obstructed and  impeded  the
orders of this Court.

Thirdly, prima facie we are of the view that Mr Thakur has  made  statements
on affidavit before this Court which are false to his  knowledge.  A  notice
to show cause should be issued to Mr Thakur why he should not  be  proceeded
with under Section 195 read  with  Section  340  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure, 1973 for having made false statements before this Court.

24     In  determining  the  modalities  to  be  followed,  we  have   drawn
sustenance from an order dated 28 March  2014  passed  by  a  Bench  of  two
learned Judges of this Court consisting of Hon’ble Mr Justice  A  K  Patnaik
and Hon’ble Mr Justice F M I Kalifulla. In view of the  circumstances  which
had then arisen resulting in the President of BCCI being unable  to  perform
his duties, this Court appointed a distinguished  cricket  sportsperson,  as
an interim measure, to exercise the powers of the President in  relation  to
IPL 2014. With regard to all other matters, the senior  most  Vice-President
of BCCI was under the  orders  of  the  Court  permitted  to  discharge  the
functions of the President, BCCI.

25    For the above reasons, we order and direct as follows :

All the office bearers of BCCI and  of  its  affiliated  State  Associations
who fail to meet the norms recommended by  the  Committee  and  accepted  by
this Court, shall forthwith demit and cease to hold office namely:

“A person shall be disqualified from being an Office Bearer if he or she :

Is not a citizen of India;



Has attained the age of 70 years;



Is declared to be insolvent, or of unsound mind;



Is a Minister or government servant;



Holds any office or post in a sports or athletic association  or  federation
apart from cricket;



Has been an Office Bearer of the BCCI for a cumulative period of 9 years;



Has been charged by a  Court  of  Law  for  having  committed  any  criminal
offence.”



Shri Anurag Thakur, President of BCCI and Shri Ajay Shirke, Secretary,  BCCI
shall forthwith cease and desist from being associated with the  working  of
BCCI;

A notice to show cause shall issue to Mr Anurag Thakur  to  explain  why  he
should not be proceeded against  under the provisions of  Section  195  read
with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;



A notice to show cause shall issue to Mr Anurag Thakur  to  explain  why  he
should not be proceeded with under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971;



A Committee of administrators shall supervise  the  administration  of  BCCI
through its Chief Executive Officer;



This Court shall by a separate order nominate the  persons  who  shall  form
part of the Committee of administrators. In order to  enable  the  Court  to
have the benefit of objective  assistance  in  making  the  nominations,  we
request Mr Fali S Nariman, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Gopal  Subramaniam,
the learned Amicus Curiae  to  assist  the  Court  by  suggesting  names  of
persons with integrity and experience in managing a similar  enterprise.  We
request the learned Counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the  parties  to  also
place their suggestions before the Court so as to  facilitate  a  considered
decision;



In addition to  the  function  assigned  in  (v)  above,  the  Committee  of
administrators shall also  ensure  that  the  directions  contained  in  the
judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016 (which accepted the report of  the
Committee with modifications) are fulfilled and to adopt all  necessary  and
consequential steps for that purpose;

In view of the directions contained in (ii) above,  the  senior  most  Vice-
President of BCCI shall perform the duties of the President,  BCCI  and  the
Joint Secretary shall perform the duties of Secretary. Those of  the  office
bearers of BCCI who are not  disqualified  in  terms  of  clause  (i)  above
(other than the President and  Secretary)  may  continue  subject  to  their
filing an unconditional undertaking before this Court within four  weeks  of
the date of this order to abide by and implement  the  directions  contained
in the judgment dated 18 July 2016. Upon the Committee of administrators  as
nominated by this Court assuming charge, the existing office  bearers  shall
function subject  to  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  Committee  of
administrators. The Committee of administrators  would  have  the  power  to
issue all appropriate directions to facilitate due supervision and  control;
and



The remuneration payable to the members of the Committee  of  Administrators
shall be fixed in consultation with the Committee consisting of  Mr  Justice
R M Lodha, Mr Justice Ashok Bhan and Mr Justice R V Raveendran.The  role  of
the Justice R M Lodha Committee  shall  hereafter  be  confined  to  overall
policy and direction on such matters as may be referred by this Court.



We would request the leaned Senior Counsel and the learned Amicus Curiae  to
endeavour to submit their suggestions to this Court within  two  weeks.  The
proceedings shall be listed  before  this  Court  on  19  January  2017  for
pronouncement of directions in regard to the names of the administrators.

26    There shall accordingly be an order in these terms.



                           ..............................................CJI
                                                             [T.S. THAKUR]


                           …...............................................J
                                                                         [A.
                               M. KHANWILKAR]


                         ..................................................J

                               [Dr D Y  CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi
January  02, 2017

National Lawyers’ Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms & Anr. Vs. The Bar Council of India & Anr.” filed in the High Court of Delhi to challenge the constitutional validity of Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961. The argument is that hearing of this writ petition should await the disposal of the said petition which is possible only if our order dated 21st October, 2016 is recalled and the matter listed for hearing afresh. 3. In Writ Petition(C) No.6331 of 2016, the constitutional validity of Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961 which provide the statutory basis for designation of lawyers as senior advocates appears to have been challenged. Now, if the source of power for such designation is itself under challenge it would be more appropriate to hear the matters together by transferring the petition pending in the High Court to this Court. This is particularly so because issues touching designation of lawyers as per the prevalent procedure appears to be causing considerable dissatisfaction among a section of the bar which fact is evident from the large number of interventions made in these proceedings and an equally large number of solutions proposed at the bar for improvement of the system. A feeling among those opposing the process of designation that they were not heard fully before the matter was reserved for orders only adds to their frustration and avoidable misgivings. 4. In the circumstances, it would be more appropriate if the matter is set down for fuller arguments afresh along with Writ Petition (C) No.6331 of 2016, which is hereby transferred to this Court for hearing and disposal. 5. In light of what we have said above, our order dated 21st October, 2016 shall stand recalled and the matter set down for final hearing along with transferred Writ Petition (C) No.6331 of 2016 in the month of February, 2017. The parties may complete pleadings in the transferred case during the intervening period.

                                        R E P O R T A B L E

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                      WRIT PETITION (C) NO.454 of 2015


INDIRA JAISING                               ...Petitioner

                                   Versus

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
THROUGH SECRETARY GENERAL AND ORS.           ...Respondents


                                  O R D E R

T.S. THAKUR, CJI.

1.    We had on 21st October, 2016 heard learned  counsel  for  the  parties
and  the  interveners  at  some  length  and   reserved   the   matter   for
pronouncement of orders.  An  application  was  in  the  meantime  filed  on
behalf of Shri R.R. Nair seeking recall of our  order  dated  21st  October,
2016 for a two-fold reason.  Firstly, the application points out  that  when
the matter was taken-up for hearing on 21st October, 2016 the Court did  not
fully hear submissions on behalf of what the application  describes  as  95%
of the non-designated lawyers.  Mr. Nedumpara,  advocate,  alone  was  heard
for  a  short  while,  but  even  Mr.  Nedumpara  was,  according   to   the
application, not in a position to formulate the points on  which  he  wanted
to address this Court during the short  time  available  to  him.   He  was,
therefore, asked to give written submissions in support of  his  case  which
may not be conducive to justice keeping in view the grave importance of  the
questions that fall for determination of this Court.



2.    Secondly, the application refers to Writ Petition (C) No.6331 of  2016
titled “National Lawyers’ Campaign for Judicial Transparency and  Reforms  &
Anr. Vs. The Bar Council of India & Anr.” filed in the High Court  of  Delhi
to challenge the constitutional validity of Sections 16  and  23(5)  of  the
Advocates Act, 1961.  The argument is that hearing  of  this  writ  petition
should await the disposal of the said petition which  is  possible  only  if
our order dated 21st October, 2016 is recalled and  the  matter  listed  for
hearing afresh.

3.    In Writ Petition(C) No.6331 of 2016, the  constitutional  validity  of
Sections 16  and  23(5)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  which  provide  the
statutory basis for designation of lawyers as senior  advocates  appears  to
have been challenged.  Now, if the source of power for such  designation  is
itself under challenge it would be more  appropriate  to  hear  the  matters
together by transferring the petition pending in  the  High  Court  to  this
Court.  This is particularly  so  because  issues  touching  designation  of
lawyers as per the prevalent procedure appears to  be  causing  considerable
dissatisfaction among a section of the bar which fact is  evident  from  the
large number of interventions made  in  these  proceedings  and  an  equally
large number of solutions  proposed  at  the  bar  for  improvement  of  the
system.  A feeling among those opposing  the  process  of  designation  that
they were not heard fully before the matter was  reserved  for  orders  only
adds to their frustration and avoidable misgivings.



4.    In the circumstances, it would be more appropriate if  the  matter  is
set down for fuller arguments afresh along with Writ  Petition  (C)  No.6331
of 2016,  which  is  hereby  transferred  to  this  Court  for  hearing  and
disposal.



5.    In light of what we have said above, our  order  dated  21st  October,
2016 shall stand recalled and the matter set down for  final  hearing  along
with transferred  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.6331  of  2016  in  the  month  of
February, 2017. The parties may complete pleadings in the  transferred  case
during the intervening period.



                                                      ..................CJI.
                                                                (T.S.THAKUR)





                                                      ....................J.
                                                      (DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD)





                                                      ....................J.
                                                          (L. NAGESWARA RAO)
New Delhi;
January 2, 2017

where the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases.

                                                         R E P O R T A B L E
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7600 OF 2014

ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS.             ...Appellant(S)

                                   Versus
KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARI            …Respondent(S)


                               J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, CJI.

1.    In this appeal by special leave the appellant calls  in  question  the
correctness of a judgment and order dated 28th October, 2013 passed  by  the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ  Petition
No.2867 of 2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order  dated
29th July, 2005 passed by the Disciplinary  Authority  and  that  dated  5th
January, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority  directing  removal  of  the
respondent from the service of the appellant-bank quashed.  The  High  Court
has as a result directed the appellant bank to provide  all  service/retiral
benefits to the petitioner within ninety days of the order.   The  challenge
mounted by the appellant arises in the following circumstances:

2.    The respondent was employed with the  appellant-bank  and  was  during
the relevant period posted as  Officer  in-charge  at  the  appellant-bank’s
Sultanpur branch in District Sultanpur in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh.   He
was, by an order dated 10th  December,  2004,  placed  under  suspension  in
contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry  which  was  initiated  against  him
with  the  service  of  a  charge-sheet  dated  10th  February,  2005.   The
respondent pleaded  not  guilty  but  the  Enquiry  Officer   concluded  the
enquiry proceedings rather quickly within a span of  just  about  forty-five
days  and  submitted  a  report  dated  27th  May,  2005  holding  that  the
respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were  held  proved  but
only partially. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings and  passed
an order imposing upon the respondent the  major  penalty  of  removal  from
service.

3.    Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental  appeal  which  was
dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated 5th  January,  2006.
The respondent then questioned the said two orders before the High Court  in
a writ petition which as noticed earlier has been allowed by the High  Court
in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.

4.    The High Court came to the conclusion that  neither  the  Disciplinary
Authority nor the Appellate Authority had applied  their  mind  or  recorded
reasons in support of their conclusions.   Relying  upon  the  decisions  of
this court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.  (2009)  2  SCC
570, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. (1999) 2  SCC  10,  Nand
Kishore  v. State of Bihar (1978) 3 SCC 366,  Kailash Nath Gupta v.  Enquiry
Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 480, State  Bank  of  Bikaner  &
Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd. Yunus Khan v.  State
of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539, the High Court held that the order  passed
by  the  disciplinary   authority   and   the   appellate   authority   were
unsustainable in law.  The High Court found that the  findings  recorded  by
the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed  by  the  Appellate  Authority  were
perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever.  The High Court  observed
that the Appellate Authority had not  applied  its  mind  independently  and
simply cut and pasted the  findings  of  the  Disciplinary  Authority  while
dismissing the appeal.
5.    On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended before  us  that  the
High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction  in  re-appreciating  the  evidence
and holding the respondent not guilty.  It was argued that so long as  there
was some evidence  on  which  the  Disciplinary  Authority  could  rest  its
findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could  not  be  gone
into by a Writ Court.  Alternatively, it was submitted that  even  if  there
was any infirmity in the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority or  the
Appellate Authority, on account of absence or insufficiency of  the  reasons
in support of the findings recorded by them, the proper course for the  High
Court was to remand the matter  back  to  the  Appellate  Authority  or  the
Disciplinary Authority as the case may be  for  doing  the  needful  afresh.
The  High  Court  could  not,  on  account  of   absence   of   reasons   or
unsatisfactory appraisal of  the  evidence  by  them,  quash  the  order  of
punishment  and  direct  release  of  the  service  benefits  due   to   the
respondent.

6.    On behalf of the respondent it was on the other  hand  contended  that
the enquiry conducted against the respondent and the conclusion  arrived  at
by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the  Appellate  Authority
suffered from fatal defects.  Firstly, because the enquiry conducted by  the
Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulted in gross miscarriage of  justice
on account of the failure of the Enquiry Officer  to  provide  a  reasonable
opportunity to the respondent to lead  evidence  in  his  defense.   In  the
second place the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and  so  also  the
Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and  were
perverse  to  say  the  least.   In  the  third  place,  the   orders   were
unsustainable also for the reason that the same did  not  disclose  due  and
proper application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and  the  Appellate
Authority.  The order passed by the Appellate Authority was, in  particular,
bad in law as the same did not examine the material on record  independently
and had simply relied  upon  the  findings  of  the  Disciplinary  Authority
without adverting to the points which the respondent had raised  in  support
of his challenge. It was lastly submitted  that  the  respondent  has  since
superannuated and was a physical wreck having suffered a heart attack and  a
debilitating stroke which had confined  him  to  bed.   Any  remand  of  the
proceedings to the  Appellate  Authority  to  pass  a  fresh  order  or  the
Disciplinary Authority for re-examination and  fresh  determination  of  the
respondent’s guilt would not only be harsh but would  tantamount  to  denial
of justice to him.  The High Court was in that view justified  in  taking  a
pragmatic view of the matter and in directing continuity of service  to  the
respondent and release of all service and retiral benefits to him  upto  the
date of his superannuation.

7.    We have given our anxious consideration  to  the  submissions  at  the
bar.  It is true that a writ court is very  slow  in  interfering  with  the
findings of facts recorded by a  Departmental  Authority  on  the  basis  of
evidence available on record.  But it is equally true that in a  case  where
the Disciplinary Authority records a finding  that  is  unsupported  by  any
evidence whatsoever or a finding  which  no  reasonable  person  could  have
arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound  to  examine
the matter and grant relief in  appropriate  cases.   The  writ  court  will
certainly interfere  with  disciplinary  enquiry  or  the  resultant  orders
passed by the competent authority on that basis if the  enquiry  itself  was
vitiated on account of violation of principles of  natural  justice,  as  is
alleged to be the position in the present case.    Non-application  of  mind
by the Enquiry Officer  or  the  Disciplinary  Authority,  non-recording  of
reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds  on
which the writ courts are  justified  in  interfering  with  the  orders  of
punishment.  The High Court has, in  the  case  at  hand,  found  all  these
infirmities in the order  passed  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the
Appellate Authority.  The respondent’s case that the enquiry  was  conducted
without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity  for  leading  evidence  in
defense  has  not  been  effectively  rebutted  by  the   appellant.    More
importantly the Disciplinary Authority does  not  appear  to  have  properly
appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his  conclusion.
 To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead  of  recording  its
own reasons and independently appreciating the material  on  record,  simply
reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the  Enquiry
Officer,  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the  Appellate  Authority  have
faltered in the discharge  of  their  duties  resulting  in  miscarriage  of
justice. The High Court was in that  view  right  in  interfering  with  the
orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

8.    There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the  High
Court finds the enquiry to be deficient  either  procedurally  or  otherwise
the proper course always is to remand  the  matter  back  to  the  concerned
authority to redo the same afresh.  That course  could  have  been  followed
even in the present  case.   The  matter  could  be  remanded  back  to  the
Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and  a
fresh report and order. But that course may not have been  the  only  course
open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of  a  long
time lag or such other supervening circumstances the  writ  court  considers
it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary  to  direct  a  fresh  enquiry  or
fresh order by the competent authority.  That is  precisely  what  the  High
Court has done in the case at hand.  The High Court has taken  note  of  the
fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the  year  2004
and dismissed in the year 2005.  The dismissal order was challenged  in  the
High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained  pending  in  the
High Court for nearly seven years till 2013.  During the intervening  period
the respondent superannuated on 30th November, 2011.  Not only that  he  had
suffered a heart attack and  a  stroke  that  has  rendered  him  physically
disabled and confined to bed. The respondent  may  by  now  have  turned  65
years of age.  Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh  enquiry
or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the  Appellate
Authority would thus be  very  harsh  and  would  practically  deny  to  the
respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is  the  fact  that
the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any  evidence  to
show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the  bank  on  account  of  the
alleged misconduct of the respondent. The  discretion  vested  in  the  High
Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised.

9.    The next question is whether  the  respondent  would  be  entitled  to
claim arrears of salary as part  of  service/retiral  benefits  in  full  or
part.  The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We  say  so
because while  the  High  Court  has  directed  release  of  service/retiral
benefits, it is not clear whether the same  would  include  salary  for  the
period between the date of removal and the date of  superannuation.   Taking
a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court’s direction  for
release of service benefits would include the release of his  salaries  also
for the period mentioned above.  We are, however, of the opinion that  while
proceedings need not be remanded for  a  fresh  start  from  the  beginning,
grant of full salary for the period between the date of  dismissal  and  the
date of superannuation would not also be justified.   We,  therefore,  allow
this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while orders  passed  by
the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand  quashed,
and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the  date  of  his
superannuation with  all  service  benefits  on  that  basis,  he  shall  be
entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the  date  of  his
removal from service till  the  date  of  superannuation.  Retiral  benefits
shall also be released in his favour.  The order passed by  the  High  Court
shall, to the extent indicated above,  stand  modified.  The  parties  shall
bear their own costs.

                                                           …………………….…..…CJI.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)

                                                            ……………………….…..…J.
                                                           (A.M. KHANWILKAR)

New Delhi
January 2,  2017

question the correctness of an order dated 11th September, 2007 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi whereby the appellants have been found guilty of contempt and directed to remain present in person before the High Court for being heard on the quantum of sentence to be awarded to them

                                                         R E P O R T A B L E

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1234 OF 2007


Vitusah Oberoi and Ors.                 ...Appellant(s)

                                   Versus
court of its own motion                 ...Respondent(S)

                                    WITH

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1299 OF 2007



                               J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, CJI.

1.    In these appeals, the appellants call in question the  correctness  of
an order dated 11th September, 2007 passed by a Division Bench of  the  High
Court of Delhi whereby the appellants have been  found  guilty  of  contempt
and directed to remain present in person before the  High  Court  for  being
heard on the quantum of sentence to be awarded  to  them.   Facts  necessary
for appreciating the challenge mounted by the appellants may  be  summarized
as under:
2.    Appellants No.1 and 2 are the Editor and City Editor  respectively  of
Mid Day, an English  Daily  Newspaper,  with  a  large  circulation  in  the
National Capital Region. Appellant  No.3  happens  to  be  the  Printer  and
Publisher of the papers while appellant No.4 is  a  Cartoonist  working  for
the said paper. The genesis of the suo motu contempt  proceedings  initiated
by the High Court of Delhi lies in a story that appeared  in  ‘Mid  Day’  in
its issue dated 2nd May, 2007 under the title  “Injustice”.   The  substance
of the publication brought to light  the  alleged  misuse  of  the  official
residence of Justice Sabharwal who  demitted  office  as  Chief  Justice  of
India on 13th January, 2007, by the  same  being  shown  as  the  registered
office of three companies promoted by Justice Sabharwal’s  sons.   A  second
story published on 18th May, 2007  in  Mid  Day  pointed  out  that  Justice
Sabharwal’s son had entered into  a  partnership  with  shopping  malls  and
commercial complex developers just before Justice  Sabharwal  passed  orders
for sealing of commercial establishments running  in  residential  areas  in
different parts of Delhi. This,  according  to  the  story,  benefitted  the
partnership business of Justice Sabharwal’s sons.  On 19th May, 2007 came  a
third story that quoted some senior lawyer’s saying that if the facts  about
Justice Sabharwal’s sons’ partnership business benefitting from  the  orders
of Justice Sabharwal’s Bench were true, then Justice  Sabharwal  should  not
have heard the case. The paper also carried in the same issue a  cartoon  by
Mohd. Irfan Khan, appellant No.4 showing as if  Justice  Sabharwal’s  family
had benefitted from the orders passed by Justice Sabharwal’s Bench.
3.    It was in the  above  backdrop  that  Shri  R.K.  Anand,  an  advocate
practicing in Delhi High  Court  appears  to  have  placed  a  copy  of  the
newspaper dated 18th May, 2007 before a Division Bench of the High Court  of
Delhi on 21st May, 2007 to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Court  about  the
article published in the said paper maligning the former  Chief  Justice  of
India and tending to lower the image of the judiciary in  the  eyes  of  the
common man.  Prima facie satisfied that the news item was objectionable  and
tended to lower the image of judiciary in the eyes of the  common  man,  the
High Court initiated suo-motu contempt proceedings  and  issued  show  cause
notices to appellants No.1 to 3. On 25th May, 2007  Shri  Anand  appears  to
have filed another copy of Mid Day newspaper dated  19th  May,  2007  before
the High Court which carried the cartoon drawn by the  appellant  No.4,  the
paper’s cartoonist.  The High Court found the same also to be  objectionable
and issued notice  even  to  appellant  No.4  to  show  cause  why  contempt
proceedings may not be initiated against him.
4.    In response to the notices served  upon  them,  the  appellants  filed
their objections  supported  by  affidavits.   In  the  affidavit  filed  by
appellant No.1-Editor of Mid-day it was, inter alia,  stated  that  all  the
facts published in the paper were supported by unimpeachable  documents  and
were true. A supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the  appellant  No.1
gave some more details about a company promoted by Justice Sabharwal’s  sons
and the documents relevant thereto.  An affidavit sworn by  appellant  No.4,
the cartoonist was also filed explaining his position.   This  was  followed
by additional affidavits filed by the appellants on  21st  August,  2007  in
which the appellants tried to justify their publications on the ground  that
the said publications  were  intended  to  bring  to  light  an  impropriety
committed only by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and that the same was not  intended
either to malign or undermine the judiciary in this  country  or  any  other
Judge in the Supreme Court of India or any other Court for that matter.  The
affidavits in particular stated:
“The Article which was  published  was  intended  to  bring  to  light  such
impropriety by Mr. Y.K. Sabharwal and was not intended at all  to  undermine
or malign the Judiciary of India or any other Judge of the  Hon’ble  Supreme
Court of India or of may other court in India.  If our articles created  any
impression on anyone that we were or were intending to malign the  judiciary
or any other Judge, we sincerely apologise for the same.”

I most respectfully submit that I have the utmost  regard  and  respect  for
the majesty of law and the Court of law.  The Article in question  published
by Mid Day was not intended to undermine the authority of law or  lower  the
image  of  judiciary  or  with  any  intention  of  interfering   with   the
administration of Justice.”


5.    The explanation offered by the  appellants  notwithstanding  the  High
Court has by the order  impugned  in  these  appeals  found  the  appellants
guilty of contempt and directed them to remain present in person  for  being
heard on the question of quantum of sentence that may be  awarded  to  them.
The present appeal assails the correctness of the said order.
6.    Appearing for the appellants M/s. Shanti Bhushan and Prashant  Bhushan
raised a short point in support of the appeal. They contended that the  High
Court could under  Article  215  of  the  Constitution  of  India  no  doubt
initiate proceedings and punish for its own  contempt,  but  it  could  not,
according to the learned counsel, initiate proceedings  or  punish  for  the
contempt of the Supreme Court.  It was urged that even under Section  10  of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the High Court could punish only  for  its
own contempt or the contempt of a Court subordinate to  it.   There  was  no
provision, argued the learned counsel, either in the Constitution  of  India
or in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that  empowered  the  High  Court  to
take cognizance of the contempt of a superior Court like the  Supreme  Court
of India. Inasmuch as the High Court had failed to appreciate the  scope  of
the powers of contempt exercisable by it, it had fallen  in  palpable  error
that required to be corrected. It was contended that  while  the  appellants
had pleaded truth as a defense to the  charge  of  contempt  yet  regardless
whether the publication could be justified on  the  ground  of  truth  under
Section 30(b) of the Act, the impugned order passed by the  High  Court  was
liable to be set aside.
7.    The genesis of the suo motu proceedings initiated by  the High  Court,
as noticed earlier, lay in the publication  of  the  articles,  stories  and
write ups questioning the propriety of certain orders passed by a  two-Judge
bench of this Court of  which  Justice  Y.K.  Sabharwal  was  the  Presiding
Judge.   The  substance  of  the  offending  publication  was  that  Justice
Sabharwal had by reason of the orders passed by  the  bench  benefitted  the
partnership business of his sons in real estate development  in  and  around
Delhi.  The text and the  context  of  the  said  publications  was  focused
entirely on the question whether Justice Sabharwal  should  have  heard  the
matters and passed sealing orders of commercial  properties  in  residential
areas of Delhi which orders were perceived to  be  beneficial  to  the  real
estate business of his sons.  What is, therefore,  undeniable  is  that  the
publications were  actually  seen  as  contemptuous  vis-a-vis  the  Supreme
Court.  No part of the publications referred to the High Court of  Delhi  or
any other High Court for that matter. The publications did not refer to  any
Judge or any order of any Court subordinate to  the  High  Court  of  Delhi.
Initiation of proceedings by the High Court in such  circumstances  was,  it
is evident, meant to vindicate the Supreme Court more than  the  High  Court
who initiated those proceedings. The question  is  whether  the  High  Court
could do so. The appellants argued and, in our opinion, rightly so that  the
Supreme Court was and is competent to punish for contempt  of  itself.  This
is evident from Article 129 of the Constitution which reads as under :
“Article 129

129. Supreme Court to be a court of record: The Supreme  Court  shall  be  a
court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including  the
power to punish for contempt of itself.”


8.    So also Article 215 of the Constitution empowers  the  High  Court  to
punish for its contempt.  That provision reads:

“Article 215
High Courts to be courts of record: Every High Court shall  be  a  court  of
record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power  to
punish for contempt of itself.”

9.    The provisions of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971  also
empower the High Court to punish for its own contempt  or  the  contempt  of
Courts subordinate to it. Section 10 reads:

“ 10.    Power  of  High  Court   to   punish   contempts   of   subordinate
courts.—Every High Court shall have  and  exercise  the  same  jurisdiction,
powers and authority, in accordance with the same  procedure  and  practice,
in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has  and  exercises
in respect of contempts of itself:

      Provided that no High  Court  shall  take  cognizance  of  a  contempt
alleged to have been committed in respect  of  a  court  subordinate  to  it
where such contempt is an offence punishable under  the  Indian  Penal  Code
(45 of 1860).”

10.   There is, from a plain reading of the above, nothing in  the  Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 or in Article 215 of the Constitution which can be  said
to empower the High Court to initiate proceedings suo-motu or otherwise  for
the contempt of a superior Court like the  Supreme  Court  of  India.  As  a
matter of fact, the Supreme Court under Article 129  and  High  Court  under
Article 215 of the Constitution are both declared to be  Courts  of  Record.
One of the recognised attributes of a  court  of  record  is  the  power  to
punish for its contempt and the contempt of courts subordinate to it.   That
is precisely why Articles 129 and 215, while  declaring  the  Supreme  Court
and the High Courts as Courts of Record, recognise the power vested in  them
to punish for their own contempt. The use of the expression  “including”  in
the said provisions is explanatory in  character.   It  signifies  that  the
Supreme Court and the High Courts shall, as Courts of Records, exercise  all
such powers as are otherwise  available  to  them  including  the  power  to
punish for their own contempt.  Whether or  not  the  power  to  punish  for
contempt of a subordinate court was an attribute of a court of  record  fell
for consideration of this Court in Delhi Judicial  Service  Association  vs.
State of Gujarat  (1991) 4  SCC  406.   The  argument  there  was  that  the
Supreme Court could not initiate contempt proceedings based on  an  incident
that involved a subordinate court like a Chief Judicial  Magistrate  working
in the State of Gujarat.  That contention was examined and rejected by  this
Court. It was held that the language employed in Article 129 indicated  that
the Supreme Court is a Court of Record and was entitled not only  to  punish
for its own contempt but to do all that which is  within  the  powers  of  a
Court of Record.  This Court held that since the Constitution  has  designed
the Supreme Court as a Court of Record, Article 129 thereof  recognises  the
existing inherent  power  of  a  Court  of  Record  in  its  full  plenitude
including the power to punish for its own contempt and the contempt  of  its
subordinate.  The Court said:
“29. Article 129 declares the  Supreme  Court  a  court  of  record  and  it
further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such  a
court including the  power  to  punish  for  contempt  of  itself  (emphasis
supplied).  The expression used in Article 129 is  not  restrictive  instead
it is extensive in nature.  If the  Framers  of  the  Constitution  intended
that the Supreme Court shall have power to punish  for  contempt  of  itself
only, there was no necessity for inserting  the  expression  “including  the
power to punish for contempt of itself.”  The Article confers power  on  the
Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself and in addition,  it  confers
some additional  power  relating  to  contempt  as  would  appear  from  the
expression “including.” The expression “including” has been  interpreted  by
courts, to extend and widen the scope of power.  The plain language  of  the
Article 129 clearly indicates that this Court  as  a  court  of  record  has
power to punish for contempt of itself and also something else  which  could
fall  within  the  inherent  jurisdiction  of  a  court   of   record.    In
interpreting  the  Constitution,  it  is  not   permissible   to   adopt   a
construction which would render any  expression  superfluous  or  redundant.
The courts  ought  not  accept  any  such  construction.   While  construing
Article 129, it is not permissible to ignore the significance and impact  of
the inclusive power conferred on the  Supreme  Court.   Since,  the  Supreme
Court is designed by the Constitution as  a  court  of  record  and  as  the
Founding Fathers were aware that a superior court  of  record  had  inherent
power to indict a person for the contempt of itself as  well  as  of  courts
inferior to it, the expression “including” was deliberately inserted in  the
Article.  Article 129 recognised the existing inherent power of a  court  of
record in its full plenitude including the power to punish for the  contempt
of inferior courts. If Article 129 is susceptible  to  two  interpretations,
we would prefer to  accept  the  interpretation  which  would  preserve  the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court being the superior court of  record,  to
safeguard and protect the subordinate judiciary, which forms the  very  back
bone of  administration  of  justice.   The  subordinate  courts  administer
justice at the grass root level, their protection is necessary  to  preserve
the confidence of people in the efficacy of Courts and to  ensure  unsullied
flow of justice at its base level.”

11.   The power to punish for contempt vested in a  Court  of  Record  under
Article 215 does not, however, extend to punishing for  the  contempt  of  a
superior court.  Such a power has never been recognised as an  attribute  of
a court of record nor has the same  been  specifically  conferred  upon  the
High Courts under Article 215.  A  priori  if  the  power  to  punish  under
Article 215 is  limited  to  the  contempt  of  the  High  Court  or  courts
subordinate to the High Court as appears to us to  be  the  position,  there
was no way the High Court could justify invoking that power  to  punish  for
the contempt of  a  superior  court.   That  is  particularly  so  when  the
superior court’s power to punish for its contempt has been in  no  uncertain
terms recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution.   The  availability  of
the power under Article 129 and its plenitude  is  yet  another  reason  why
Article 215 could never have been intended to empower  the  High  Courts  to
punish for the contempt of the Supreme Court.   The  logic  is  simple.   If
Supreme Court does not, despite the availability of the power vested in  it,
invoke the same to punish for its contempt, there is no question of a  Court
subordinate to the Supreme Court doing  so.   Viewed  from  any  angle,  the
order passed by the High Court appears to us  to  be  without  jurisdiction,
hence, liable to be set aside.
12.   We, accordingly, allow these appeals, set aside the  judgment  of  the
High Court and discharge the rule issued by the High Court.  The parties  to
bear their own cost.


                                                            ..……………………..CJI.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)



                                                .…….......................J.
                                                           (A.M. KHANWILKAR)

New Delhi;
January 2, 2017.

Saturday, December 31, 2016

Happy New Year

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Wish You and Your family a Happy and Prosperous New Year
all best wishes
with regards
Yours
Advocatemmmohan