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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Thursday, December 29, 2016

Road Accidents = No shop for the sale of liquor shall be (i) visible from a national or state highway; (ii) directly accessible from a national or state highway and (iii) situated within a distance of 500 metres of the outer edge of the national or state highway or of a service lane along the highway.

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL Nos .12164-12166   OF 2016
              [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14911-14913 of 2013]


THE STATE OF TAMILNADU            .....APPELLANTS
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY HOME,
PROHIBITION & EXCISE DEPT & ORS

                                   Versus

K BALU & ANR           .....RESPONDENTS


                                    WITH

                      CIVIL APPEAL No. 12167   OF 2016
                   [Arising out of SLP (C)No.8267 OF 2014]

                      CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 12168   OF 2016
                   [Arising out of SLP(C) No.8971 OF 2014]

                      CIVIL APPEAL No. 12169   OF 2016
                  [Arising out of SLP (C) No.35454 OF 2014]

                       CIVIL APPEAL No.12170   OF 2016
             [S.L.P.(C) No.36787 of 2016 @ of CC No.231 OF 2015]

                   CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 12171-12172  OF 2016
    [S.L.P.(C) Nos.36788-36789  of 2016 @ of CC Nos.18587-18588 OF 2015]

                       CIVIL APPEAL No.12173   OF 2016
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No.34525 OF 2015]



                                     AND

                          T.P.(C) No.739-741OF 2016




                               J U D G M E N T



Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.



The issue which we address in this case is  about  the  presence  of  liquor
vends on national and state highways across the  country.  The  backdrop  to
the case is provided by  alarming  statistics  on  the  occurrence  of  road
accidents. They have claimed human lives and  caused  debility  and  injury.
Both on a personal scale (in terms of the injuries  and  loss  of  life)  as
well as in a social context, restitution in the form of mandatory awards  of
compensation can never undo the trauma of loss and the  pain  of  suffering.
The law can only imperfectly alleviate the consequences of  road  accidents.
In terms of personal suffering caused to individuals and  families  as  well
as in terms of deprivation  caused  to  society  of  its  productive  social
capital, road accidents impose  unacceptable  costs.  We  will  analyse  the
issues which have been raised in this case on the basis of facts  which  are
not in dispute and on the foundation  of  policy  statements  of  the  Union
government which have been formulated after careful consideration. In  doing
that, the court must ensure that the parameters  for  the  exercise  of  its
jurisdiction  are  confined  to  the  familiar  terrain  of  enforcing   the
constitutional right to lead a life of dignity and self-worth.

2     The Union  and  the  State  Lists  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the
Constitution  distribute  (in  conjunction  with  Articles  245   and   246)
legislative jurisdiction over the highways which  traverse  the  length  and
breadth of  India,  between  Parliament  and  the  State  Legislatures.  The
constitutional pattern in relation to the distribution of legislative  heads
is replicated in this area : what is  national  is  reserved  to  Parliament
while that which has a state-centric orientation is reserved  to  the  state
legislatures. Entry 23 of the Union List is thus :

“23. Highways declared by or under law made by  Parliament  to  be  national
highways”.





Entry 13 of the State List is thus :

“13. Communications, that is to say,  roads,  bridges,  ferries,  and  other
means  of  communication  not  specified  in  List  I;  municipal  tramways;
ropeways; inland waterways and traffic thereon subject to the provisions  of
List I and List III with regard  to  such  waterways;  vehicles  other  than
mechanically propelled vehicles.”



3     The Union Ministry of Road Transport and  Highways  in  its  Transport
Research Wing has brought out a publication titled “Road Accidents in  India
- 2015”. The cover depicts in rather graphic terms vehicles involved in  car
crashes. There is a large group of persons assembled in the  foreground,  an
ambulance bearing the ‘108’ logo  and  a  police  car.  Familiar  sights  on
Indian roads. The publication tells us that :

“11.1 During 2015, within the category of drivers’ fault,  accidents  caused
and  persons killed due to ‘Exceeding lawful speed’, accounted  for  a  high
share of 62.2 per cent (2,40,463 out of 3,86,481  accidents)  and  61.0  per
cent (64,633 out of 1,06,021 deaths), respectively.

However taking  into  account  the  total  road  accidents  and  total  road
accident killings, the share  of  over  speeding  comes  to  47.9  per  cent
(2,40,463 out of 5,01,423 accidents)  and  44.2  per  cent  (64,633  out  of
1,46,133 deaths) respectively.

11.2 Intake of alcohol/drugs by drivers resulted in  16,298  road  accidents
and 6,755 fatalities in 2015 within the category of drivers’  fault,  intake
of alcohol/drugs accounted for 4.2 per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively.

However taking  into  account  the  total  road  accidents  and  total  road
accident killing, the share of intake of  alcohol/drugs  comes  to  3.3  per
cent (16,298 out of 5,01,423 accidents) and  4.6  per  cent  (6,755  out  of
1,46,133 deaths) respectively.”



4     The total number of persons  killed  in  road  accidents  on  national
highways was 48,768 in 2012 and 51,204 in 2015. In  2014,  on  the  national
highways there were 1.24 lakh accident cases resulting in 1.35 lakh  persons
injured and 46,110 deaths. During the same year, on  state  highways,  there
were 1.13 lakh accident cases resulting in  1.24  lakh  injured  and  39,352
deaths. The expressways witnessed 4,208 accident cases,  4,229  injured  and
1,802 deaths.[1]. Figures are also available of  the  distribution  of  road
accidents by causes during 2014. 1.38 lakh  persons  were  injured  in  road
accidents  involving  dangerous  or  careless  driving  and  42,127   deaths
occurred. Injuries caused in accidents due to over-speeding  stood  at  1.81
lakh while there were 48,654 deaths. 7,307 accident cases involving  driving
under the influence of drugs/alcohol  were  registered  resulting  in  7,398
injuries and 2,591 deaths. In regard to the figures of death or  injury  due
to drunken driving there is a tendency to under estimate or under—report  in
order not to impede the right of  victims  and/  or  their  legal  heirs  to
receive compensation.

5     Now in this background, it would be necessary to elucidate the  policy
 adopted by the Union government. The National Road  Safety  Council  (NRSC)
is an apex body for road safety established under Section 215 of  the  Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. NRSC unanimously agreed in  a  meeting  which  was  held
nearly thirteen years ago on 15 January 2004 that licences for liquor  shops
should not to be given along the national highways.  The  Ministry  of  Road
Transport  and  Highways  (MoRTH)  issued  a  circular  to  all  the   state
governments advising them to remove liquor  shops  situated  along  national
highways and not to issue fresh licenses. Since 26  October  2007,  when  an
advisory  was  issued,  MoRTH  has  consistently  advised  all   the   state
governments to remove liquor shops  and  not  to  issue  fresh  licences  to
liquor vends along national highways.

6     On 1 December 2011, MoRTH in an advisory to the Chief  Secretaries  of
all the States and Union Territories  noted  that  India  had  reported  the
highest number of road accident fatalities in the world  and  data  of  2009
indicated  that  a  road  accident  occurred  every  four  minutes.  Drunken
driving, it was stated, was a leading cause of road accidents with  as  many
as 27,152 road accidents being caused under  the  influence  of  alcohol  in
that year. The advisory drew attention to the provisions of Section  185  of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and solicited the following enforcement  action
:

“(i)  Strict enforcement of section 185 of MV Act 1988  preferably  pursuing
cases in various courts for award of penalty  of  imprisonment  followed  by
adequate publicity which will  together  act  as  a  deterrent  for  drunken
driving.

(ii)  Removal of Liquor shops along National highways.

(iii)  No fresh license may be issued to Liquor vendors to open shops  along
National highways.

(iv) Wherever licenses have been given in the  past  to  open  liquor  shops
along National highways, such cases may be reviewed  and  corrective  action
taken under intimation to this Ministry.”



Section 185 to which a  reference  has  been  made  in  the  above  circular
provides as follows :


“185. Driving   by  a   drunken  person   or   by   a   person   under   the
influence of  drugs.

Whoever, while driving, or attempting to drive, a motor vehicle,--

has,  in his  blood, alcohol  in any quantity, howsoever small the  quantity
may be, or

is under the influence of a drug to such an extent as  to  be  incapable  of
exercising proper control over the vehicle,  shall  be  punishable  for  the
first offence with imprisonment  for  a  term  which  may   extend  to   six
months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with  both;
and for a second or subsequent offence, if committed   within  three   years
of  the commission  of the  previous similar offence, with imprisonment  for
a term which may extend to  two years,  or with fine  which  may  extend  to
three thousand rupees, or with both.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, the drug or drugs  specified
by the Central Government in this behalf, by notification  in  the  Official
Gazette, shall be deemed to render a person incapable of  exercising  proper
control over a motor vehicle.”
.

Section 185 is indicative of  a  Parliamentary  intent  to  follow  a  zero-
tolerance policy towards driving under the influence of alcohol.

The position was illustrated in another advisory  dated  18  March  2013  of
MoRTH to the Chief Secretaries of States and Union Territories where it  was
stated that in 2011,  1.42  lakh  people  were  killed  in  4.9  lakhs  road
accidents.  24,655  road  accidents  were  caused  due  to  drunken  driving
resulting in 10,553 deaths and injuries  to  21,148  persons.  The  advisory
requested the removal of all liquor vends on national highways and a ban  on
the issuance of fresh licences on the  ground  that  “prevention  is  better
than cure”.

7     In an advisory dated 21 May 2014, MoRTH  stated  that  in  2012,  1.38
lakh people were killed in 4.9 lakh road accidents.  23,979  road  accidents
were caused due to drunken driving resulting in 7835 deaths and injuries  to
23,403 persons.

8     The Union government has constantly issued advisories setting out,  as
a matter of policy, its position.

9     The material which has been placed on record indicates that :

(i) India has a high rate of road accidents and fatal road accidents  –  one
of the advisories states that it  is  the  highest  in  the  world  with  an
accident occurring every four minutes;

(ii)  There is a high incidence of road accidents due to driving  under  the
influence of alcohol;

(iii)  The existence  of  liquor  vends  on  national  highways  is  in  the
considered view of the National Road  Safety  Council  and  MoRTH  –  expert
authorities with domain knowledge – a cause for road accidents  on  national
highways;

(iv) Advisories  have  been  issued  to  the  State  Governments  and  Union
Territories to close down liquor vends on national highways  and  to  ensure
that no fresh licences are issued  in  the  future.  The  reason  why  these
advisories  are  confined  to  the  national  highways  is  because  of  the
distribution of legislative competence between  the  Union  and  the  States
under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. State  highways  fall  under
the domain of the states.

10    The figures which are  available  on  the  record  indicate  that  the
occurrence of a large number of road accidents is not a phenomenon  confined
to national highways nor is the  prevalence  of  road  accidents,  including
fatalities, confined only  to  the  national  highways.  Both  the  national
highways and state highways share a common  experience  of  an  unacceptably
high number of road  accidents,  the  prevalence  injuries  and  fatalities;
drunken driving being one of the major causes. Hence,  the  content  of  the
advisories which have been issued by the Union government as well  as  their
basis, rationale and foundation  would  equally  apply  to  state  highways.
Human life  is  precious.  As  the  road  network  expands  in  India,  road
infrastructure being an integral part  of  economic  development,  accidents
profoundly impact on the life of the common citizen.  For a  nation  on  the
cusp of economic development, India can well avoid  the  tag  of  being  the
accident capital of the world.  Our  highways  are  expanding,  as  are  the
expressways.   They   provide   seamless   connectivity    and    unheralded
opportunities for the growth of trade and industry and for the  movement  of
goods, persons and capital. They are the backbone of the  freedom  of  trade
and commerce guaranteed by Article 301 of  the  Constitution.  Our  highways
are dotted with sign boards warning of the dangers of  combining  speed  and
alcohol. Together, they constitute a heady  cocktail.  The  availability  of
liquor along the highways is an  opportunity  to  consume.  Easy  access  to
liquor shops allows for drivers of vehicles    to  partake  in  alcohol,  in
callous disregard to  their  own  safety  and  the  safety  of  others.  The
advisories of the Union government to the states are founded  on  a  logical
and sound rationale.

11    We are conscious of the fact that the policy of the  Union  government
to discontinue liquor vends on national highways may not  eliminate  drunken
driving completely. A driver of a motor  vehicle  can  acquire  liquor  even
before the commencement of a journey or, during a journey at a  place  other
than a national or state highway. The  law  on  preventing  drunken  driving
also requires proper enforcement. Having said this, the  court  must  accept
the policy of the Union government for  more  than  one  reason.  First  and
foremost, it is trite law that in matters of policy, in this case  a  policy
on safety, the court will defer to and accept a considered  view  formed  by
an expert body. Second as we have seen, this view of  the  Union  government
is based on statistics and data which make out  a  consistent  pattern  year
after year. Third the existence of  liquor  vends  on  highways  presents  a
potent source for easy availability of  alcohol.  The  existence  of  liquor
vends; advertisements and sign boards drawing attention to the  availability
of liquor coupled with the arduous drives  particularly  in  heavy  vehicles
makes it abundantly necessary to enforce the policy of the Union  government
to safeguard human life. In doing so, the court does  not  fashion  its  own
policy but enforces the right to life under Article 21 of  the  Constitution
based on the considered view of expert bodies.

12    There is no fundamental right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  to  trade  in
liquor. Liquor has been regarded as res extra commercium :  State  of  Bihar
v.  Nirmal  Kumar  Gupta,  (2013)  2  SCC  565;  Amar  Chandra  Chakraborty,
Appellant v. Collector of Excise, Govt of Tripura, Agartala,  (1972)  2  SCC
442; Nashirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 1 SCC 29; Har  Shankar  v.
Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, (1975)  1  SCC  737;  Secretary  to
Government, Tamil Nadu v. K. Vinayagamurthy, (2002)  7  SCC  104;  State  of
Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 26. State of Kerala  v.
Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573.

13    Liquor licences in respect of potable alcoholic liquor are granted  by
the state governments. Entry 51 of the state list  provides  for  duties  of
excise on alcoholic liquors for home consumption manufactured  and  produced
in the state and countervailing  duties  at  the  same  or  lower  rates  on
similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India.    The  power  of
the states to grant liquor licences is undoubted. The issue is whether  such
liquor licences should be granted on national  and  state  highways  at  the
cost of endangering  human lives and safety. In our view, which is based  on
the expert determination of the Union government, we hold  that  the  answer
should be in the negative. Though, excise duty is  an  important  source  of
revenue to the states, a prohibition on the  grant  of  liquor  licences  to
liquor shops on the national and state  highways  would  only  regulate  the
grant of such licences in a manner that would ensure  that  the  consumption
of alcoholic liquor does not pose dangers to the lives  and  safety  of  the
users of national and state highways. May  we  also  remind  ourselves  that
among the Directive Principles contained in  the  Constitution  is  that  in
Article 47 :


“47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the  standard  of
living and to improve public health:
The State shall regard the  raising  of  the  level  of  nutrition  and  the
standard of living of its people and the improvement  of  public  health  as
among its primary duties and, in particular, the State  shall  endeavour  to
bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes  of
intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.”




14    Well over a decade  ago,  the  Union  government  had  formulated  for
consideration  and  adoption  by  the  states  a  document   titled   “Model
Policy/taxation/act/rules for alcoholic beverages and  alcohol”.  The  Model
Policy inter alia made general provisions relating  to  liquor  vends.  Para
92(2) of the Model Policy inter alia provides as follows :

“(2) No licence for sale of  liquor  shall  be  granted  to  a  retail  vend
selected within a distance of 100 metres from any religious  or  educational
institution or hospital or outside the inhabited site of village  /town/city
or any Office of  the  State/Central  Government  or  Local  Authorities  or
within a distance of 220  metres  from  the  middle  of  the  State/National
Highways.

Explanation – For the purpose of this rule :

“National Highway” or “State Highway” shall not include such  parts  of  the
National Highway or State Highway as  are  situated  within  the  limits  of
Municipal  Corporation,  City  or  Town  Municipal  Council  or  such  other
authority having a population of twenty thousand or more.”



This Model Policy provided for a minimum distance  from  the  state/national
highways for locating liquor shops. However, an exception was carved out  to
the effect that the national or state highways would not include such  parts
of them as are situated within the limits of the local  authorities  with  a
population of 20,000 or more. By an order of this Court  dated  8  September
2015, the attention of the authorities was drawn to the fact that the  model
policy had been prepared nearly a decade earlier and  several  decisions  of
the High Courts have been delivered since. Hence, the court opined  that  it
was necessary  that  the  policy  is  revisited  by  the  states  and  union
territories and by the Union government together in regard to  the  sale  of
liquor and alcoholic beverages  in  the  proximity  of  national  and  state
highways. MoRTH however has informed the court on  affidavit  that  a  model
policy on alcoholic beverages and alcohol does not fall within its  purview,
and hence it may not be in a position to  review  the  model  policy.  MoRTH
while stating this has emphasised its considered view and position based  on
the statistics of road accidents that liquor shops should  not  be  situated
along national highways. We see no rational basis to  exclude  stretches  of
national highways and state highways which  fall  within  the  limits  of  a
municipal or local authority  (with  a  population  exceeding  a  stipulated
figure) from the ambit of the suggested prohibition.  Where  a  national  or
state  highway  passes  through  a  city,  town  or  through  the  area   of
jurisdiction of a local authority, it would completely deny sense and  logic
to allow the sale of liquor along that  stretch  of  the  highway.  Such  an
exclusion would defeat the policy since the presence of liquor  shops  along
such stretches of a  national  or  state  highway  would  allow  drivers  to
replenish their stock of alcohol, resulting in a situation which the  policy
seeks to avoid in the first place. Once it is an accepted position that  the
presence of liquor vends along the highways poses a  grave  danger  to  road
safety an exception cannot be carved out to permit the sale of liquor  along
a stretch of the highway which passes through the limits of a city, town  or
local authority. Such an exception would be wholly arbitrary  and  violative
of Article 14.

15    During the course of the hearing, learned counsel appearing on  behalf
of the State of Punjab stated before the  court  that  based  on  the  model
policy the Punjab Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016 was brought into force on  28
March 2016. Section 26A of the Punjab Excise Act, 1941 provides  as  follows
:

"26-A. (1) The location of the  liquor  vends  shall  be  regulated  by  the
Government: Provided that this section shall be applicable  only  to  liquor
vends situated in areas adjoining the National Highways and  State  Highways
for consumption, off the premises. (2) No licence for sale of  liquor  shall
be granted to  a  liquor  vend  situated  within  the  road  reservation  of
National Highways and State Highways and  beyond  road  reservation  neither
the liquor vends nor  their  entry  points  shall  be  visible  or  directly
accessible from the National Highways and State Highways. Explanation.–  (i)
“Visibility” means existence of any signboard, direction  mark,  display  of
stock of liquor, display of rates or any direct/indirect invitation  to  the
commuter travelling on such Highway; and (ii)  “Directly  Accessible”  means
such liquor vend shall  not  be  directly  approachable  from  the  National
Highway and State Highway. (3) The restrictions referred to  in  sub-section
(2) shall not apply to the liquor vends situated in the areas  adjoining  to
National Highway and State Highway, passing through the limits of  Municipal
Corporation/Municipal   Council/   Municipal   Committee/   Notified    Area
Committee/ Nagar Council/ Cantonment Board or any other Authority  having  a
population of twenty thousand or more."



16    Explanation 3 by its operation merely confers an enabling  power  upon
the state government to grant liquor  licences  in  the  area  as  described
therein. We are of the view that the exercise of this enabling power by  the
State government  must  not  obstruct  or  impede  the  overwhelming  public
interest in ensuring that  the  sale  of  liquor  along  national  or  state
highways should be   discontinued  having  regard  to  the  danger  to  road
safety.

17    These proceedings have arisen under Article 136  of  the  Constitution
from the judgments of the High Courts  at  Madras  and  Punjab  and  Haryana
respectively. The Madras High  Court  was  seized  with  a  public  interest
litigation seeking the removal of retail outlets for liquor on national  and
state highways, contrary to the advisory of the  Union  government  dated  1
December 2011. The High Court noted that in the state of Tamil  Nadu  liquor
shops along the highways  are  being  run  by  Tamil  Nadu  State  Marketing
Transport  Corporation  (TASMAC).  Before  the  High  Court,  the   Managing
Director of TASMAC stated that :

“It was also submitted that TASMAC Ltd has been taking all prudent steps  to
remove the shops located in Highways  and  has  instructed  all  the  Senior
Regional Managers to refrain from giving new  licenses  to  shops  that  are
proposed to be located on the Highways and also shift the existing shops  to
some other place without violating the Rule  8  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Liquor
Retail Vending (in Shops and Bars) Rules, 2003 and other relevant laws.”

The affidavit stated that nearly  504  shops  are  situated  along  national
highways and sometime would be required to  relocate  them.  It  was  stated
that 75 shops have been shifted and a new location for 335  shops  had  been
identified. Six  months’  time  was  sought  for  shifting  the  shops;  the
affidavit having being filed in March 2013. The High  Court  by  a  judgment
and order of its Division Bench dated 25 February 2013  granted  time  until
31 March 2013 for the relocation of  existing  liquor  shops  being  run  on
national/state highways. This order of the High Court  has  been  questioned
by the State of Tamil Nadu and TASMAC.

18    During the pendency of these proceedings,  this  Court  by  its  order
dated 7 May 2013 directed that  liquor  vends  along  national  highways  be
removed by 14 August 2013. Notice was issued, confined  to  the  closure  of
liquor vends along state highways. An affidavit was filed before this  Court
on 22 August 2013 by the state government stating  that  504  TASMAC  retail
liquor shops along the national highways have been shifted.  The  additional
affidavit filed by the state on 29 April  2013  sets  out  the  position  in
regard to state highways.

The total length of state highways is  divided  into  five  regions  namely,
            (i) Chennai; (ii) Coimbatore (iii) Madurai; (iv) Salem; and  (v)
Trichy and traverses 9520.4 kilometres. The total number of  shops  situated
thereon is stated to be 1731. 839 liquor shops out of them are  situated  in
market areas abutting  the  state  highways  in  towns,  municipalities  and
corporations while 892 are liquor shops in rural areas  abutting  the  state
highways. These figures which have been disclosed by  the  state  government
indicate the serious nature of the  problem.  The  proliferation  of  liquor
shops on state highways (1731 shops  over  9520  kilometres)  indicates  the
easy availability of liquor  on  the  state  highways.  Evidently  within  a
distance of a few kilometres a liquor shop is  available  to  cater  to  the
demand of the users of the highways.  There  can  be  no  valid  distinction
between a national highway and state highway  insofar  as  the  location  of
liquor shops abutting the highway is concerned. Accidents  take  place  both
on national and state highways and the easy availability of  liquor  possess
a grave danger to the safety and lives of those who use these highways.

19    Insofar as the State of Punjab is concerned, the petition for  special
leave has been filed by the state government against a  judgment  and  order
of a Division Bench of the High Court dated 18 March  2014.  Like  the  case
before the Madras  High  Court,  the  proceedings  before  the   Punjab  and
Haryana High Court were instituted in public interest (in this case  by  the
Arrive Safe Society of Chandigarh) seeking directions  for  the  removal  of
liquor vends from   highways. The High Court directed the State  of  Haryana
to ensure in its liquor policy that no liquor vend shall  be  located  along
the  national  highways/state  highways  and  that  liquor  shops  are   not
accessible or visible from those highways or from the service lanes  running
along such highways. The High Court rejected the case of the state that  the
prohibition should be confined only  to  the  national  highways.  The  High
Court has, in our view, justifiably held that it  can  hardly  be  contended
that drunken driving is not permissible on national  highways  but  does  no
harm on state highways. In relation to the  States  of  Punjab  as  well  as
Haryana the High Court has held that the prohibition would  apply  to  state
and national highways.

20    For the reasons that we have already indicted, we  have  come  to  the
conclusion that the views of the High Court of Madras and the High Court  of
Punjab and Haryana are unexceptionable. No distinction can be  made  between
national and state highways in regard to the location of  liquor  shops.  In
regulating the use of national and state highways, the safety of  the  users
of the road is of paramount concern. It would defy common sense to  prohibit
liquor  shops  along  national  highways  while  permitting  them  on  state
highways. Drunken driving as a menace and as a cause of road accidents is  a
phenomenon common to  both  national  and  state  highways.  Nor,  is  it  a
plausible defence to urge that while it is impermissible to drink and  drive
on a  national highway, it is permissible to do so on a state highway.

21    Moreover, we find merit in the restrictions suggested  by  the  Punjab
and Haryana High Court that the prohibition should extend not merely to  the
national and state highways but must be so appropriately tailored so  as  to
ensure that the policy is not defeated by locating  liquor  shops  in  close
proximity of the  highway.  A  restriction  that  the  shop  should  not  be
accessible or visible from the national or state highways or from a  service
lane along such highways is necessary to  ensure  that  the  policy  is  not
surreptitiously violated. Our attention has been drawn during the course  of
the hearing to a report filed by the OSD Vigilance before  the   High  Court
indicating that the prohibition was sought to  be  defeated  by  setting  up
liquor vends which, though not visible from the highway,  were  situated  in
close proximity with signboards indicating their presence. The entry to  the
shop is camouflaged or placed at the rear  portion  to  evade  the  judicial
direction. A detailed survey has been made by the OSD in which  observations
in regard to liquor shops located along the highway have been  recorded.  We
may also advert at this stage to  a  letter  dated  4  August  2012  of  the
Project Director of National Highways  Authority  of  India  (NHAI)  to  the
Deputy Commissioners of various regions in  Punjab.  The  letter  highlights
that on a stretch of 291 kilometres on the Panipat-Jalandhar section of  NH-
1, there are as many as 185 liquor shops (though in  comparison  the  trauma
centres and hospitals where immediate medical service  can  be  provided  to
road accident victims is almost negligible). Many of the liquor  shops  have
encroached on national highway land. Though, NHAI has sought the removal  of
these shops, “concrete action” is yet  to  be  taken  due  to  the  lack  of
support from various quarters. Liquor shops,  the  Project  Director  notes,
are  owned  by  influential  people  making  the  removal  of   unauthorised
encroachment impossible without the support of the district  administration.


22    For all these  reasons,  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  no
licences for liquor shops should be allowed both on the national  and  state
highways. Moreover, in order to ensure that this provision is  not  defeated
by the adoption of subterfuge, it would  be  necessary  to  direct  that  no
exception can be carved out for the grant of liquor licences in  respect  of
those stretches of the national or state highways  which  pass  through  the
limits of any municipality  corporation,  city,  town  or  local  authority.
Necessary safeguards must be  introduced to ensure  that  liquor  vends  are
not visible or directly accessible from  the  highway  within  a  stipulated
distance of 500 metres form the  outer  edge  of  the  highway,  or  from  a
service lane along the highway.

23    However, we have also duly borne  in  mind  the  practical  difficulty
which has been expressed on behalf of the licence holders  (including  those
in the town of Mahe) and the states that there are licences which have  been
duly renewed and whose term is still to expire. The  states  apprehend  that
premature termination may lead to claims for refund of licence fee  for  the
unexpired term, with large financial implications.  Hence  we  would  direct
that current licences may continue for the existing term but not later  than
1 April 2017.

24    We accordingly hereby direct and order as follows :

All states and union territories  shall  forthwith  cease  and  desist  from
granting licences for the sale of liquor along national and state highways;



The  prohibition  contained  in  (i)  above  shall  extend  to  and  include
stretches of such highways which fall  within  the  limits  of  a  municipal
corporation, city, town or local authority;



The existing licences which have already been renewed prior to the  date  of
this order shall continue until the term  of  the  licence  expires  but  no
later than 1 April 2017;



All signages and advertisements of  the  availability  of  liquor  shall  be
prohibited and existing ones removed forthwith both on  national  and  state
highways;



No shop for the sale of liquor shall be  (i)  visible  from  a  national  or
state highway; (ii) directly accessible from a  national  or  state  highway
and (iii) situated within a distance of 500 metres of the outer edge of  the
national or state highway or of a service lane along the highway.



All States and Union territories are mandated to strictly enforce the  above
directions. The Chief Secretaries and  Directors  General  of  Police  shall
within one month chalk out a plan for enforcement in consultation  with  the
state revenue and home departments. Responsibility shall be  assigned  inter
alia  to  District  Collectors  and  Superintendents  of  Police  and  other
competent authorities. Compliance shall be  strictly  monitored  by  calling
for fortnightly reports on action taken.



These directions issue under Article 142 of the Constitution.

25    We dispose of the appeals and transfer petitions in the  above  terms.
There shall be no order as to costs.


….......................................CJI
                                                     [T S  THAKUR]



    ….............................................J
                                                   [Dr D Y  CHANDRACHUD]




...........................................J
                                                    [L NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi
December 15, 2016.
-----------------------
[1]

      [2] See death A.7 page 160


crossed the threshold of four red entries= there was no application of mind by the authorities to the circumstances which have to be taken into consideration while exercising the power under Rule 13. The mere fact that the appellant had crossed the threshold of four red entries could not be a ground to discharge him without considering other relevant circumstances including (i) the nature of the violation which led to the award of the red ink entries; (ii) whether the appellant had been exposed to duty in hard stations and to difficult living conditions; (iii) long years of service, just short of completing the qualifying period for pension. Even after the Madhya Pradesh High Court specifically directed consideration of his case bearing in mind the provisions of the circular, the relevant factors were not borne in mind. The order that was passed on 26 February 2007 failed to consider relevant and germane circumstances and does not indicate a due application of mind to the requirements of the letter of Army Headquarters dated 28 December 1988 and the circular dated 10 January 1989. For these reasons, we are of the view that the Armed Forces Tribunal was in error in rejecting the application. The orders of the Tribunal dated 23 September 2010 and 15 September 2011 are set aside. Since the appellant would have attained the age of superannuation, the ends of justice would be met if he is treated to have been in service till the time he would have completed the qualifying service for grant of pension. No back-wages shall however be admissible. The benefit of continuity of service for all other purposes shall be granted to the appellant including pension. The monetary benefits payable to the appellant shall be released within a period of four months from the date of this order.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL Nos.12179-12180 of 2016
             (Arising out of CIVIL APPEAL (D)No. 34132 OF 2013)


VIJAY SHANKAR MISHRA                   .....APPELLANT


                                   Versus



UNION OF INDIA & ORS          .....RESPONDENTS







                               J U D G M E N T

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

Leave granted

Delay condoned.

These appeals arise from judgment of the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal  dated  23
September 2010 and 15 September, 2016.



The appellant was enrolled in the Army Medical Corps on 23 June 1984.  On  3
October 1997, a notice to show cause was issued to him  to  explain  why  he
should not be discharged from service under Rule  13(3)III(v)  of  the  Army
Rules on the ground that his conduct which in service  had  not  been  found
satisfactory. On 15 October 1997 the appellant was placed in a  low  medical
category BEE (Permanent).  On  4  December  1998,  he  was  discharged  from
service under Rule 13(3) Table (III)(v).      By that time he  had  rendered
service of 13 years 8 months and 19 days (excluding 188 days non  qualifying
service). The minimum qualifying service for earning pension under Rule  132
of the Pension Regulations for the Army 1961 (Part-I) is fifteen years.   By
an order of 22 May 1999 the appellant was also denied disability pension.



The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court
which was dismissed on 21 November 2006.  In appeal a Division Bench by  its
judgment dated 3 January 2007 directed reconsideration of the  case  of  the
appellant in terms of  a  circular  bearing  No.0201/A/164/Admn-1  dated  10
January 1989. Pursuant to the order of the High Court an  order  was  issued
on 26 February 2007 rejecting his claim for pension on the  ground  that  he
did not have fifteen years’ service and had been discharged for  the  reason
that he was unlikely to  become  an  efficient  soldier.  Moreover,  it  was
stated that disability pension was denied to the  appellant  (despite  being
placed in a low medical category on account of primary hypertension) on  the
ground that he had earned six red ink entries which were a part of an  award
of punishment on nine occasions.



The appellant filed a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court  in
2007  which  was  eventually  transferred  to  the  Armed  Forces   Tribunal
registered as TA 320 of 2010.  The Tribunal  dismissed  the  application  by
its order dated 23 September  2010.   The  appellant  then  filed  a  review
application in 2011 which was rejected  by  the  Tribunal  on  15  September
2011. A writ petition was filed before the Madhya Pradesh High  Court  which
was dismissed on 4 July 2012 since the remedy of  the  appellant  would  lie
before this Court.  The  application  filed  by  the  appellant  before  the
Tribunal for leave to appeal to this Court was rejected  on  the  ground  of
delay on 4 April 2013.

5     The contention of the appellant is that his discharge  shortly  before
he would complete qualifying service for the grant of  pension  was  grossly
disproportionate. Moreover, reliance was placed on behalf of  the  appellant
on circular No.0201/A/164/Admn-1 dated 10 January  1989  which  provides  as
follows:

“Discharge from service consequent to four red entries is  not  a  mandatory
or legal requirement.  In such cases, Commanding Officer must  consider  the
nature of offences for which each red ink entry has been awarded and not  be
harsh with the individuals, especially when they are about to  complete  the
pensionable  service.   Due  consideration  should  be  given  to  the  long
service, hard stations and difficult living conditions that the OR has  been
exposed to during his service and the discharge should be ordered only  when
it is absolutely necessary in the interest of service”.



6     In the submission of the appellant the mere  fact  that  he  had  been
punished while in service on nine occasions inclusive  of  six  red  entries
was no ground to exercise the power under Rule 13(3) Table III(v).   It  was
urged that the mere award of four red entries does not  render  a  discharge
mandatory and that the individual facts including the nature of the  offence
for which the entries were awarded and long service in hard  stations  where
a member of the force was posted have to be duly borne in mind.

7     The issue which arises in the present  case  is  not  res  integra.  A
Bench of three learned Judges  of  this  Court  including  one  of  us  (the
learned Chief Justice) in Veerendra Kumar Dubey v. Chief  of  Army  Staff[1]
held as follows :

“10. The Government has, as rightly mentioned by  the  learned  counsel  for
the  appellant,  stipulated  not  only  a  show-cause  notice  which  is  an
indispensable part of the requirement of the  Rule  but  also  an  impartial
enquiry into the allegations against him in  which  he  is  entitled  to  an
adequate opportunity of putting up his  defence  and  adducing  evidence  in
support  thereof.  More  importantly,  certain  inbuilt  safeguards  against
discharge from service  based  on  four  red  ink  entries  have  also  been
prescribed. The first and foremost is an unequivocal declaration  that  mere
award of four red ink entries to an individual does not make  his  discharge
mandatory. This  implies  that  four  red  ink  entries  is  not  some  kind
of Laxman rekha, which if crossed would  by  itself  render  the  individual
concerned undesirable or unworthy of retention in the force. Award  of  four
red ink entries simply pushes the individual  concerned  into  a  grey  area
where he can be considered for discharge. But just because he qualifies  for
such discharge, does not mean that he must necessarily suffer that fate.  It
is one thing to qualify for consideration and an  entirely  different  thing
to be found fit for discharge. Four red ink entries in that sense  take  the
individual closer to discharge but does not push him over. It  is  axiomatic
that the Commanding Officer is,  even  after  the  award  of  such  entries,
required to consider the nature of the offence for which such  entries  have
been awarded and other aspects  made  relevant  by  the  Government  in  the
procedure it has prescribed.”



This Court has in the above judgment construed the provisions of Rule 13  of
the Army Rules, 1954 together with a letter of the Army  Headquarters  dated
28  December  1988  (bearing  No.  A/15010/150/AG/PS-2(c).  Emphasising  the
factors which have to be borne in mind, this Court held thus :

“16. The procedure prescribed by the  Circular  dated  28-12-1988  far  from
violating Rule 13 provides safeguards against an unfair and improper use  of
the power vested in the authority, especially when even independent  of  the
procedure  stipulated  by  the   competent   authority   in   the   Circular
aforementioned, the authority exercising the power of discharge is  expected
to take into consideration all relevant factors. That an individual has  put
in long years of service giving more often than not the  best  part  of  his
life to armed forces,  that  he  has  been  exposed  to  hard  stations  and
difficult living conditions during his tenure and that he may be  completing
pensionable service, are factors which the authority competent to  discharge
would have even independent of the procedure  been  required  to  take  into
consideration while exercising the  power  of  discharge.  Inasmuch  as  the
procedure stipulated specifically made them relevant  for  the  exercise  of
the power by the competent authority there was neither any  breach  nor  any
encroachment by executive instructions into the  territory  covered  by  the
statute.”



8     In the present case, it is evident that there was  no  application  of
mind by the authorities to the circumstances which have  to  be  taken  into
consideration while exercising the power under Rule 13.  The mere fact  that
the appellant had crossed the threshold of four red entries could not  be  a
ground to discharge him without  considering  other  relevant  circumstances
including (i) the nature of the violation which led to the award of the  red
ink entries; (ii) whether the appellant had been exposed  to  duty  in  hard
stations and to difficult living conditions; (iii) long  years  of  service,
just short of completing the qualifying period for pension.  Even after  the
Madhya Pradesh High Court specifically directed consideration  of  his  case
bearing in mind the provisions of the circular, the  relevant  factors  were
not borne in mind.  The order that was passed on 26 February 2007 failed  to
consider relevant and germane circumstances and  does  not  indicate  a  due
application of mind to the requirements of the letter of  Army  Headquarters
dated 28 December 1988 and the circular dated 10 January 1989.

9     For these reasons, we are of the view that the Armed  Forces  Tribunal
was in error in rejecting the  application.   The  orders  of  the  Tribunal
dated 23 September 2010 and 15 September  2011  are  set  aside.  Since  the
appellant would have  attained  the  age  of  superannuation,  the  ends  of
justice would be met if he is treated to have been in service till the  time
he would have completed the qualifying service  for  grant  of  pension.  No
back-wages shall  however  be  admissible.  The  benefit  of  continuity  of
service for all other purposes shall be granted to the  appellant  including
pension. The monetary benefits payable to the appellant  shall  be  released
within a period of four months from the date of this order.

10    The appeals are allowed in these terms. There shall be no order as  to
costs.


.......................................CJI
                                                        [T S  THAKUR]



                                ...........................................J
                                                           [Dr      D      Y
CHANDRACHUD]


New Delhi
December 15, 2016.




















-----------------------
[1]

      [2] (2016) 2 SCC 627


Thursday, December 22, 2016

We thus hold that the respondent guilty of having violated the Order dated 24.10.2013 passed by this Court and for having obstructed administration of justice. We also hold Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. K.S. Sachdev guilty for having helped the respondent in his attempts and thereby obstructing administration of justice. Having held so, we could straightaway have imposed appropriate punishment under the Act. However, we deem it appropriate to grant one more opportunity to these contemnors. The respondent has not filed any affidavit nor tendered an apology. At the same time for Dr. K.S. Sachdev, Managing Director of the company that owns the hospital is said to be 76 years of age. Considering the fact that these are medical professionals with sufficient standing, in our view ends of justice would be met if one more opportunity is granted to them to present their view on the issue of punishment. In the circumstances, we direct presence of these three contemnors on January 2, 2017. The respondent is in custody and therefore appropriate production warrant shall be issued under the signature of Registrar of this Court ensuring presence of the respondent before this Court. The concerned police is directed to facilitate such production of the respondent. The contemnors can also present their views and make appropriate submission in writing on or before December 23, 2016.

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                            ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.374 OF 2014

                                     IN

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1834 OF 2013



Sita Ram                                         ……Petitioner

                                   Versus

Balbir @ Bali                                             …. Respondent



                                  JUDGMENT



Uday Umesh Lalit J.



This petition  under  Section  12  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’)  highlights  willful  and  deliberate
violation of the Judgment and Order dated 24.10.2013 passed  by  this  Court
in Criminal Appeal No.1834 of  2013  and  seeks  initiation  of  appropriate
proceedings under the Act.
2.    The petitioner, original informant  in  FIR  No.141  dated  06.05.2011
with  Police  Station  Kalanaur,  District  Rohtak,  Haryana  for   offences
punishable under Sections 148, 302 and 307 of the  Indian  Penal  Code  read
with Section 149 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, was  the  appellant  in
Criminal Appeal No.1834 of 2013 assailing the Order dated 11.02.2013  passed
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana granting  bail  to  the  respondent.
While setting aside the Order granting bail, this Court in its Judgment  and
 dated 24.10.2013 observed as under:
“4.   …………… In the FIR, the Appellant/Informant has stated  that  Respondent
No.1 fired upon his brother-in-law Vishnu from his revolver  and  thereafter
Sombir also fired upon Vishnu.  The  other  persons  mentioned  also  opened
fire indiscriminately leading to firearm injuries  on  several  persons  who
were  at  the  shop  of  the  Appellant/Informant  at  that  fateful   time.
……………………………….

5.    ………………………. Respondent No.1 is indubitably a  very  influential  person
in the area, at the time of the incident he was an ex-MLA.  Section 109  and
Section 149, as envisaged under the IPC have been cited.   By  Orders  dated
23.1.2013, the Addl. Sessions Judge has, on a perusal of the  police  report
and material  documents,  found  existence  of  a  prima  facie  case  under
Sections 148, 302 read with Section 149, 307 read  with  Sections  149,  323
read with Section 149 IPC against all the accused and in addition to this  a
prima facie case under Section 302 IPC, 109 IPC and 25 of Arms  Act  against
Balbir @ Bali, a prima facie case under Section 307 IPC against  Naresh  and
Rishi, a prima facie case under Section 25 of  Arms  Act  against  Dinesh  @
Kala and Sunil and a prima facie case under Section 27 of Arms Act.

6.    Keeping all these factors in perspective,  especially  the  wide-scale
injuries suffered by several persons, there is a strong prima facie case  of
the involvement of the Respondent No.1 in  the  alleged  crimes.   Moreover,
the antecedents of  Respondent  No.1  are  such  that  a  reasonably  strong
apprehension of his tampering with  witnesses  or  leveling  of  threats  is
imminent and  omnipresent.   The  severity  of  the  attack  should  not  be
overlooked.  For these manifold reasons, we set  aside  the  impugned  Order
dated 11.2.2013, allow the Appeal and cancel the bail granted to  Respondent
No.1 who shall surrender to custody forthwith.”


3.    Thus, while setting aside the Order granting  bail,  this  Court  took
into account the role played by the respondent in firing upon  the  deceased
and the fact that he was an influential person in  the  area  with  criminal
antecedents.  In keeping with direction to surrender to  custody  forthwith,
it was expected of the respondent to do the needful.   However,  the  record
indicates otherwise and shows attempts to evade execution  of  consequential
non-bailable warrants issued from time to time leading to delays  in  trial.
The Orders passed by the Trial Court on 20.11.2013, 05.02.2014,  15.03.2014,
16.04.2014 and 14.05.2014 bear testimony  in  that  behalf,   which   Orders
were as under:
                                 20.11.2013

“Present: Shri A.S. Kadian, Public Prosecutor  for  the  State  assisted  by
Shri R.K. Sehgal, counsel for the complainant.

Accused Sunil and Ajay in custody, whereas all the remaining accused  except
accused Balwan alias Balli on bail, with  Shri  O.P.  Chugh,  Shri  Surinder
Verma, Advocates.

Accused Balwan absent.

Three PWs namely Sita Ram, Ram Chander and Ram Mehar are present, but  their
statements could not  be  recorded  as  warrant  of  arrest  issued  against
accused Balwan not received  back  either  executed  or  unexecuted  and  an
application seeking exemption of accused Balwan alias  Balli  from  personal
appearance for today along with affidavit of his son and  photocopy  of  the
Special Criminal Review Petition, has been moved.  Heard.   Perused.   Since
there is no stay granted by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in this case  and
further more bail of accused-applicant Balwan had already been cancelled  by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, thus there is no merit in  this  application
and the same is hereby dismissed and fresh  warrant  of  arrest  of  accused
Balwan be issued, 7.12.2013.  PWs present today stand discharged  and  would
be summoned after procuring the presence of accused Balwan.

      Since there is non-compliance of the issuance  of  warrant  of  arrest
against accused Balwan in view of the Order dated 24.10.2013  as  passed  by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, therefore, notice be given  to  SHO,  Police
Station Kalanaur as to why warrant of arrest of accused Balwan  alias  Balli
have not been sent back to this court either  executed  or  unexecuted,  for
7.12.2013.”

                                 05.02.2014

“Present: Shri A.S. Kadian, Public Prosecutor for the State.   Accused  Ajay
in custody, whereas  all  the  remaining  accused  on  bail  except  accused
Balwan, with counsel Shri O.P. Chugh, Advocate…………………………

Warrant of arrest of accused Balwan received  back  unexecuted.   Now  fresh
warrant of arrest  of  accused  Balwan  be  issued  through  SP  Rohtak  for
15.03.2014.  Notice to surety and identifier of accused  Balwan  alias  Bali
be also issued for the date fixed.”


                                 15.03.2014

“Present : Shri Surender Pahwa, Public Prosecutor for  the  State.   Accused
Ajay in custody, whereas all the remaining accused on  bail  except  accused
Balbir alias Bali.

Warrant of arrest of accused Balbir alias  Bali  received  back  unexecuted.
Now fresh non-bailable-warrant against accused Balbir alias Bali  be  issued
through SP Rohtak for 16.4.2014.  Notice to his  surety  and  identifier  be
issued through SHO concerned for the date fixed.

   16.04.2014

            “Present: Shri Surender Pahwa, Public Prosecutor for the State.
Shri O.P. Chugh, counsel for accused Rohtas  and  Balbir  @  Bali.   Accused
Ajay in custody while all the  remaining  accused  on  bail  except  accused
Balbir @ Bali…………………….

An application has been moved on behalf of accused Balbir @  Bali  in  which
it is stated  that  accused  Balbir  @  Bali  has  filed  Curative  Petition
No.12576/2014 in the Hon’ble Apex  Court  and  hence,  intimation  is  being
submitted before the Court.  Since  warrant  of  arrest  have  already  been
issued against accused Balbir @ Bali, hence, the filing of  the  application
on behalf of accused is of no consequence.  The non-bailable  warrant  which
was issued against Balbir @ Bali received back unexecuted and the report  is
perused.  Fresh non-bailable warrant be again issued against Balbir  @  Bali
and be sent through Superintendent of  Police,  Rohtak  with  the  direction
that the same be  executed  through  some  responsible  police  officer  for
14.5.2014.”

                                 14.05.2014

“ Present Shri Surender Pahwa, Public Prosecutor for the State.
Shri O.P. Chugh, counsel for the accused Balbir @ Bali.
Accused Ajay in custody while all  the  remaining  accused  on  bail  except
accused Balbir @ Bali.

Non-bailable warrant issued against accused  Balbir  @  Bali  received  back
unexecuted.  Even the bailable warrant issued against surety  has  not  been
executed.  Report perused.  It appears that  State  is  not  making  serious
efforts for execution of the warrant of arrest.  Hence,  fresh  non-bailable
warrant be issued against accused Balbir @ Bali and the same be  sent  to  a
Superintendent of Police,  Rohtak  Range,  Rohtak  for  execution  with  the
direction to get the same executed through some responsible officer  of  the
police for 07.07.2014.  Fresh bailable warrant against surety in the sum  of
Rs.10,000/- be also issued for the next date of hearing.”

4.    These Orders passed by the Trial Court show  that  although  witnesses
for prosecution were present to record their statements  on  20.11.2013,  no
statements could be recorded in the absence of  the  accused.   Further,  on
subsequent dates the accused in custody  was  produced  but  the  respondent
consistently remained absent.  Though he was represented  by  his  Advocate,
the record does not indicate whether the whereabouts of the respondent  were
disclosed. In these circumstances, the present  petition was filed in  which
notice was issued by this Court on 29.08.2014.  Since the  respondent  could
not be served, fresh notice was ordered to be issued  on  27.10.2014  to  be
served through the District Judge,  Rohtak.   The  compliance  report  dated
15.01.2015 was forwarded by  the  District  Judge,  Rohtak  whereafter  this
Court passed the following Order on 19.01.2015:
“In the present contempt petition also the respondent has  failed  to  enter
appearance despite service of a notice issued by this Court.  Our  attention
is drawn by learned counsel for the petitioner to an Order dated  14.05.2014
passed by the Trial Court  who  also  appear  to  have  issued  non-bailable
warrants against respondent No.1 which warrants also remain to  be  unserved
despite several efforts.  Be that as it may from the  service  report  dated
14.01.2015 submitted to this  Court  it  appears  that  respondent  No.1  is
admitted to the hospital for the past 15 months.  No medical certificate  to
that effect is however available on record.  In the circumstance we deem  it
fit to direct the Senior Superintendent of Police, Rohtak  Range  to  verify
whether the statement made by Amit Kumar son  of  the  respondent  regarding
admission of respondent No.1 in the hospital is  factually  correct  and  to
file a report before this Court regarding his medical  condition  if  he  is
indeed admitted to the hospital anywhere in the State of Haryana”.


5.    Accordingly Mr.  Shashank  Anand,  Superintendent  of  Police,  Rohtak
submitted an affidavit on 16.02.2015,  stating that son  of  the  respondent
in his statement recorded on  8.02.2015  had  stated  that  his  father  was
admitted in Privat  Hospital,  Gurgaon  and  that  said  son  also  produced
Medical Certificate dated 7.02.2015 to  that  effect.  After  verifying  the
fact, instructions were issued to keep close watch and take  the  respondent
in custody upon his discharge.  The  Medical  Certificate  dated  07.02.2015
was annexed to the affidavit and the Certificate reads as under:-
      “PRIVAT HOSPITAL DR. SACHDEV PVT. LTD.
DLF PHASE-II, M.G. ROAD,
GURGAON-122002, INDIA.

                                             Date:07.02.2015
            MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

Certified that Mr.  Balbir  Singh  is  admitted  in  Privat  Hospital  since
11.04.2014 with diagnosis of
      An o/c of Ischaemic Heart Disease
      With Angioplasty done twice in past
      With hypertension
      With COPD and Acute Examination
      With Anxiety with Acid Peptic Disorder
      And GIRD.

      He has improved significantly,  symptomatically  and  no  intervention
was done during the hospitalization. He is likely to be discharged  in  next
5-7 days…….”


6.     The matter was taken up on 24.04.2015 when the Counsel for the  State
produced copies of Medical Certificates  dated  11.04.2014  and  26.03.2015.
The Certificate dated 26.03.2015 stated that the respondent was  fit  to  be
produced in a  Court  of  Law  but  it  did  not  indicate  whether  he  was
discharged, and if not discharged, the reason for his  continued  admission.
This Court, being prima facie of the view that the  Hospital  was  providing
medical asylum to the respondent to avoid arrest, ordered as under:-
“……………….. We are in  the  circumstances  inclined  to  direct  the  personal
presence of the Superintendent of Police, Rohtak, and Dr. Munish  Prabhakar,
Medical Director, Privat Hospital, Gurgaon, who shall file an affidavit  and
explain why:

Respondent No.1 has not been taken into custody despite an order  of  arrest
and medical certificate dated 26th March, 2015 issued by the hospital  which
declares him asymptomatic.
The hospital has not formally discharged respondent No.1 if he is  otherwise
fit and does not require any further hospitalization.
The Medical Director shall also place on record details  about  the  medical
bills raised against respondent No.1 from the date  of  his  admission  till
date and the amount paid towards the same by the patient or  anyone  on  his
behalf.


7.    Pursuant to the Order dated 24.04.2015 an affidavit was filed  by  Dr.
Munish Prabhakar, Medical Director, Privat Hospital, Gurgaon on  02.07.2015.
Relevant portions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and  8  of  the  affidavit  were  as
under:-

“5.   The patient had improved significantly  symptomatically  but  required
Angiography/Thallium scan for further management but never gave consent  for
that.   He  always  refused  consent  and  wanted  conservative   treatment.
During the stay he was told many times  that  he   can  be  discharged   but
kept  on delaying the decision for being discharged.  He was not
making payments for  his  medical  bills.   He  had  kept  on  assuring  the
hospital that he will clear all the medical bills but kept on  paying  small
amounts and promising balance of payment soon.

6.    It is submitted  that  on  13.02.2015,  the  police  officials  at  PS
Kalanaur, Dist. Rohtak, Haryana had informed the Hospital that the  hospital
may inform the SHO, Kalanaur Police Station, Rohtak, whenever  the  Hospital
discharges this patient………

7.    Subsequently,  the  Police  official  from  Kalanaur  Police  Station,
Rohtak vide his communication dated 15.03.2015 inter  alia,  requesting  the
Hospital to opine whether this patient can be produced in the Court  of  Ld.
ADJ, Rohtak.

8.    In response to  his  communication  dated  15.03.2015  of  the  Rohtak
Police, the Hospital  had  clearly  informed  them  on  16.3.2015  that  the
patient Mr. Balbir Singh is fit to be produced in the  Court.   The  further
details of his treatment in  the  Hospital  with  a  Certificate  were  also
issued on  26.03.2015.   ……..  The  police  officials  from  Rohtak  by  his
communication dated 1.5.15 had requested the Hospital to issue  a  discharge
slip.  While respectfully reiterating that from 15.3.15  itself  the  police
officials of Rohtak Police had been clearly told by the Hospital  that  this
patient is fit to be taken to the Court where he is required,  the  Hospital
once again acceded to the request of the Rohtak Police  and  also  issued  a
Discharge Slip on the same day, i.e., 01.05.2015.  ………..”


      The affidavit went on to state that the Hospital was not aware of  any
direction to the respondent  to  surrender  to  custody  which  he  had  not
complied with and that the respondent had cleverly continued to stay in  the
Hospital.

8.    Shashank Anand, Superintendent of Police, Rohtak filed  his  affidavit
dated 02.07.2015 in which developments  subsequent  to  the  filing  of  the
earlier affidavit were detailed in paragraphs 6 to 13:-
“6.   It is further submitted that on 21.02.2015, the S.H.O. Police  Station
Kalanaur, District Rohtak, Haryana along with other police officials of  the
Police Station went to the above said hospital to arrest  accused  Balbir  @
Bali but doctors of  the  above  said  hospital  refused  to  discharge  the
accused Balbir @ Bali.  In this regard DDRs No.9 and No.38 dated  21.02.2015
were recorded by the SHO Police Station Kalanaur, Rohtak, Haryana.

7.    That it is pertinent to mention here that  on  21.02.2015,  27.02.2015
and 25.03.2015 Sh.  Pawan  Kumar,  HPS,  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,
Rohtak had also telephonically contacted Mr. R.  N.  Sharma,  Administrative
Officer and Dr.  Prabhakar,  Medical  Director  of  the  said  hospital  and
requested them to discharge the  accused  Balbir  @  Bali  but  no  positive
response was provided by the hospital authorities.

8.    That accused Balbir @ Bali through his counsel served a  legal  notice
dated 20.03.2015 upon SHO Police Station Kalanaur, District Rohtak,  Haryana
and Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rohtak,  Haryana  (Supervisory  Officer
of Police Station Kalanaur) calling upon them not to harass him,  who  is  a
patient and further, if any harassment is caused they  shall  be  personally
responsible for the same.  In the said notice it was mentioned that  accused
Balbir @ Bali, who was under regular treatment and was unable to  appear  in
the court, was being unnecessarily harassed by the police.

9.    That on 25.03.2015, the S.H.O, of Police  Station  Kalanaur,  District
Rohtak, Haryana along with other police officials of the Police Station  had
gone to Privat Hospital Dr. Sachdev Pvt. Ltd., Phase-II, M.G. Road,  Gurgaon
to arrest accused Balbir @ Bali who  was  declared  Proclaimed  Offender  in
case     FIR      No.141      dated      06.05.2011      under      Sections
148/149/323/325/307/302/109/114  IPC  &  25  of  Arms  Act,  Police  Station
Kalanaur, District Rohtak, Haryana but the  doctors  of  the  said  hospital
again refused to discharge accused Balbir @ Bali under the pretext that  his
treatment was going on and intimation shall be given within two  days  after
completing his treatment.  The S.H.O.,  Police  Station  Kalanaur,  District
Rohtak before going  and  after  returning  recorded  the  DDR  No.12  dated
25.03.2015 at 8.20 AM and  DDR  No.42  at  10.20  PM  mentioning  all  these
details therein at Police Station Kalanaur, District Rohtak, Haryana.

10.    That  notwithstanding  the  issuance  of  medical  certificate  dated
26.3.2015 by Privat Hospital Dr. Sachdev Pvt.  Ltd.  Gurgaon,  Haryana,  the
concerned hospital authorities intentionally did not discharge  the  accused
Balbir @ Bali from the hospital for reasons known to them.   It  is  further
mentioned that the doctors of the said hospital orally  advised  the  police
not to arrest the accused as it may put his life in jeopardy/or danger.

11.   That owing to the prevarication  on  part  of  authorities  of  Privat
Hospital, a request was made to the Chief Medical  Officer  (CMO),  Gurgaon,
Haryana by the S.H.O. Police  Station  Kalanaur,  District  Rohtak,  Haryana
through ASI  Mahabir  Singh  No.222/RTK  of  the  said  Police  Station  for
constituting a Medical Board to give opinion whether the  accused  Balbir  @
Bali who is getting treatment in the said hospital can be arrested from  the
hospital in the said situation by getting  his  physical  condition  and  if
not, then to provide the medical team of Doctors  to  accompany  the  police
for bringing him to Rohtak so that he may be  produced  before  the  learned
Court in the supervision of Doctors.

12.   That the authorities of Privat Hospital Dr. Sachdev Pvt. Ltd.  Gurgaon
failed to formally discharge the accused Balbir @  Bali  from  the  hospital
despite several visits of the  local  police.   Due  to  non-cooperation  of
Privat Hospital authorities, accused Balbir @ Bali could not be  taken  into
custody despite an Order of arrest.  It is further submitted that the  Chief
Medical Officer, Gurgaon also refused to provide an Ambulance  and  team  of
Doctors in whose supervision accused Balbir  @  Bali  i.e.  respondent  No.1
could be brought  to  Rohtak  and  produced  before  the  learned  Court  of
concerned Magistrate, Rohtak.  The local police  tried  its  level  best  to
arrest the accused by making sincere efforts  but  due  to  the  above  said
circumstances, it could not succeed in arresting accused Balbir @ Bali  i.e.
respondent No.1.

13.   That on 01.05.2015, accused Balbir @ Bali was formally  discharged  by
the hospital authorities and thereafter, he  was  immediately  arrested  and
produced before the learned Court of concerned Magistrate, Rohtak,  Haryana,
on very same day by a team of police officials headed by  Sh.  Pawan  Kumar,
HPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police,  Rohtak.   The  learned  Court  issued
direction to the police that “before taking him  to  central  jail,  accused
shall be medicolegally examined and  if  the  Medical  officer  examing  the
accused feels any necessity of retaining him in the  hospital,  then  it  is
for him to decide.  In compliance of Order dated 01.05.2015  passed  by  the
learned Court of ACJM,  Rohtak,  the  accused  was  brought  before  Medical
Officer of PGIMS, Rohtak, who after examining the accused  admitted  him  in
ICCU vide CR  No.342761  dated  01.05.2015  for  evaluation,  investigation,
treatment and monitoring.  The accused Balbir @ Bali  remained  admitted  in
PGIMS, Rohtak from 01.05.2015 to 12.05.2015.  That  on  12.05.2015,  accused
Balbir @ Bali was discharged from PGIMS, Rohtak and  is  since  in  District
Jail, Rohtak, Haryana.”

9.    The matter was thereafter  taken up on 08.07.2015   when  this  Court,
with a  view to find out whether the Hospital had become party  to  attempts
of the respondent  to  prevent  the  law  from  taking  its  course,  passed
following Order:-
       “………From the versions presented to  us  about  the  circumstances  in
which respondent-Balbir continued to evade arrest by the police  on  account
of his prolonged admission to the hospital, we are prima facie of  the  view
that an appropriate enquiry is called for in order to  bring  the  truth  to
light especially with a view to finding out whether the hospital had  become
a privy to the attempt of the respondent to somehow  prevent  the  law  from
taking its course. The fact that the respondent  remained  admitted  to  the
hospital concerned for a long period without so much as  paying  the  amount
claimed by the hospital shows that the admission of the  respondent  to  the
hospital may not have been an innocent act. We do not for the  present  wish
to say anything further at this  stage  lest  it  causes  prejudice  to  any
party. All that we need mention is that, in  our  opinion,  the  appropriate
course would be to direct a proper inquiry into the circumstances  in  which
the respondent-Balbir continued to avoid arrest and  escape  from  the  long
arms of law with or without the help of the hospital concerned.

We accordingly direct the Director of Central Bureau of Investigation  (CBI)
to suitably nominate a  senior  officer  to  conduct  an  inquiry  into  the
circumstances in which the respondent was admitted to  the  Privat  Hospital
Dr. Sachdev Pvt. Ltd. and also to report whether there was  any  criminality
attached to the action of the management of the hospital or on the  part  of
the doctors concerned in granting a prolonged admission  to  the  respondent
with the object  of  protecting  the  respondent  from  being  arrested  and
committed to jail. We hope and trust the  officer  concerned  completes  the
inquiry expeditiously and submits a report to this Court within a period  of
two months from today…….. ”

10.    An  enquiry  was  accordingly  conducted  by   Shri   S.S.   Kishore,
Superintendent of Police, CBI, New Delhi. In his report dated 18.09.2015  he
summarized the matter as under:-
“(4). Summary of the Enquiry Report is as follows:

  Accused Balbir Singh is a heart patient and had undergone a  treatment  at
Medanta Hospital, Gurgaon as an indoor patient from  4.9.2013  to  10.9.2013
and as an  outdoor  patient  on  17.9.2013  and  18.10.2013  i.e.  prior  to
cancellation of his bail by this Hon’ble Court.

After this Hon’ble Court cancelled the  bail  of  accused  Balbir  Singh  on
24.10.2013, the accused  got  himself  admitted  in  the  said  Hospital  on
15.11.2013.

Accused Balbir singh remained admitted in the said Hospital for a total  527
days on three occasions viz. from 15.11.2013  to  25.12.2013  for  41  days,
from 31.12.2013 to 9.04.2014 for 100 days and from 11.04.2014  to  1.05.2015
for 386 days, respectively.

Accused Balbir Singh did not give his consent for Angiography  as  suggested
by the doctors during his admission in the said Hospital, and requested  for
Conservative  Treatment  through  medicines  which  was  agreed  to  by  the
doctors.

Accused Balbir Singh was  not  required  to  remain  admitted  in  the  said
Hospital for such a long period for the Conservative Treatment which he  was
given in said Hospital as confirmed by Dr. Munish Prabhakar, the  Consultant
Physician of the said Hospital.

There  was  no  change  in  the  condition  of  accused  Balbir  Singh  from
12.06.2014 to 1.12.2014 necessitating him to be kept as  indoor  patient  as
is evident from the table given at Para 3 (ii) (c ) at  Page  No.5  of  this
Enquiry Report, still he was kept in the said Hospital for no reason.

No laboratory tests were conducted during  the  period  from  25.02.2014  to
12.04.2014 and from 12.04.2014 to  01.5.2015  which  indicate  that  neither
illness of accused Balbir Singh was serious nor treatment given to  him  was
intensive.

There was no cogent ground for which accused Balbir  Singh  was  allowed  to
move out of the said Hospital for 47 times during the admission in the  said
Hospital. Rather it establishes that he was fit to move freely and  was  not
required to be kept as indoor patient.

There was no justification for the continued  admission  of  accused  Balbir
Singh in the said Hospital from 11.04.2014 to 1.05.2015 i.e. for 386 days.

Accused Balbir Singh remained admitted in  the  said  Hospital  without  any
payment for the first  274  days  during  his  third  admission  as  he  was
admitted in the said Hospital on 11.04.2014 and he made  the  first  payment
of Rs. 50,000/- only on 10.01.2015.

The administration of said Hospital kept the accused admitted for  financial
gains as they were getting approximately Rs. 9,500/- per day.

Accused Balbir Singh made full payment of his  first  and  second  admission
bills in said Hospital, but paid only a part  of  his  dues  for  his  third
admission bills.

Filing of complaint case against accused  Balbir  Singh  in  the   Court  of
Judicial  Magistrate,  1st  Class,  Gurgaon  u/s  138  of   the   Negotiable
Instruments Act on 20.07.2015 for dishonour of cheque of Rs. 5,00,000/-  and
filing of a suit against accused Balbir Singh on 13.08.2015 in the Court  of
Civil Judge, Gurgaon  for  recovery  of  remaining  bill  amounting  to  Rs.
29,58,459/- (Twenty Nine Lakh Fifty Eight Thousand Four  Hundred  and  Fifty
Nine) appear to be afterthoughts of the administration of the said  Hospital
as these have been filed after the Order dated  8.07.2015  of  this  Hon’ble
Court.

The said Hospital on more  than  one  occasion  informed  Rohtak  Police  in
writing that accused Balbir Singh was fit to be taken to Court but  did  not
discharge him.

It appears that Rohtak Police came to know about accused Balbir Singh  being
admitted in the said Hospital on 8.02.2015, but arrested  the  accused  only
on 1.05.2015.

The stand of Rohtak Police that accused could not be arrested as he was  not
discharged by the said Hospital does not hold substance.

Certain inconsistencies have been found in the  affidavit  filed  by  Rohtak
Police. The details are mentioned in Para 3 (x) at Page Nos. 12  and  13  of
this Enquiry Report.”


      11.   The Enquiry Report also dealt with the  efforts  made  by  local
police to locate and arrest the respondent and reported as under:-

      “(viii). NBWs and Efforts made by local police to  locate  and  arrest
accused Balbir Singh

            This Hon’ble Court had  rejected  the  bail  of  accused  Balbir
Singh on 24.10.2013 and directed him to surrender forthwith. Accused  Balbir
Singh did not comply with the Order of this Hon’ble Court.  Thereafter,  the
Trial Court of Additional Sessions Judge,  Rohtak,  Haryana  issued  various
non-bailable warrants of arrest against accused Balbir Singh on  08.11.2013,
21.11.2013, 02.01.2014, 12.2.2014,  19.03.2014,  18.04.2014  and  15.05.2014
which were returned unexecuted by PS Kalanaur. None of the execution  report
mentioned about any enquiry from  family  members  of  the  accused  or  his
whereabouts. It was also revealed that some  of  the  entries  made  in  the
General Diaries of PS Kalanaur in connection with the efforts for  arresting
the accused Balbir Singh do not correspond with the respective log books  of
vehicles.”


12.   After considering the Enquiry Report, this Court was  prima  facie  of
the opinion, that notice was required to be issued to Dr. K.S. Sachdev,  why
he should not be punished for committing contempt of court. The Order  dated
19.11.2015 passed by this Court dealt with the matter as under:-
      “………………We have heard learned counsel for the parties and  are  of  the
view that a notice of show cause ought to issue even  to  Dr.  K.S.  Sachdev
who happens to be the Managing Director  of  Privat  Hospital   Dr.  Sachdev
Pvt. Ltd., Gurgaon.  A  notice  shall  accordingly  issue  asking  Dr.  K.S.
Sachdev to show cause why he should not be punished for committing  contempt
of this Court in as much as from the material placed on record,  it  appears
that Balbir Singh accused in Sessions Case No. 62 of 2011 was  harboured  by
the Hospital run by the Company of which he is the Managing Director  for  a
considerable period and prima facie without any justification and only  with
a view to preventing his arrest  and  committal  to  jail  pursuant  to  the
Orders passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1834 of 2013  the  Orders
passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1834 of 2013  dated  24.10.2013.
Notice shall be directed to the Station House Officer to the  Jurisdictional
Police Station for service upon Dr. K.S. Sachdev.

      ………………. Mr. Shashank Anand, S.P. shall also file his  reply  affidavit
to the contempt petition as also the preliminary report within  three  weeks
from today with an advance copy to learned counsel for  the  petitioner  who
will have one week thereafter to respond to the same.”


13.   Accordingly, Shashank Anand, Superintendent of  Police,  Rohtak  filed
his  affidavit  dated  07.12.2015  submitting  that  he   took   charge   as
Superintendent of Police, Rohtak on 24.11.2014.  He  stated  that  the  fact
that the respondent had not surrendered despite cancellation of his bail  by
this Court was brought to his knowledge for the first  time  on  12.01.2015,
whereafter the matter was entrusted  to  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,
Meham, Rohtak.  He further stated that he became aware of the  admission  of
the respondent in Privat Hospital,  Gurgaon  on  16.02.2015.  He  thereafter
undertook steps to ensure that the respondent did not escape and deployed  a
guard at the hospital  since  16.02.2015  right  till  01.05.2015  when  the
respondent was finally discharged from the hospital. The  affidavit  further
stated that soon after the enquiry report of CBI a  fact  finding  probe  to
fix the responsibility/negligence/ connivance on part  of  police  officials
who dealt with process  of  service  of  non-bailable  warrant  against  the
respondent  was  undertaken.   Pursuant  to   the   enquiry   report   dated
07.12.2015, vide Memo Nos.2145, 2146, 2147 and 2148  all  dated  07.12.2015,
necessary action was recommended against certain police officials.

14.   A reply affidavit was also filed by Dr. K.S.  Sachdev  on  07.01.2016.
It was submitted that the hospital came to  know  that  the  respondent  was
required in a criminal case only on 13.02.2015.  However, the affidavit  did
not disclose why even after  13.02.2015  the  respondent-contemnor  was  not
discharged.  The affidavit stated that after  it  received  a  communication
from Rohtak Police dated 15.03.2015 to get  the  respondent  examined  by  a
Medical Board, that the hospital on 16.03.2015 furnished  a  fitness  report
to Rohtak Police declaring the respondent to be fit to be produced in  court
of law.  The affidavit further stated that for reasons best  known  to  them
the police did not take  the  respondent  from  the  hospital  despite  such
fitness report and the respondent was finally discharged after letter  dated
01.05.2015  seeking  his  discharge  was  received  from  the  police.   The
affidavit stated that no  police  official  came  to  the  hospital  seeking
custody of the respondent and that the hospital had not  refused  to  comply
with the request of the police at any stage.  It further stated:
“The prolonged admission happened as the accused  trapped  the  Hospital  by
not paying.  There was no criminality on part of hospital as it was  totally
unaware of his criminal status before 13.02.2015.   The   hospital  did  not
keep him as he was paying Rs.9,500/- to the hospital, it  was  non-  payment
of this amount that gave him prolonged stay and he very cleverly  used  this
position that for the fear of losing money, the hospital will not  discharge
him and he trapped the hospital very cleverly being a wily politician.”


15.   We heard Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned Advocate for the petitioner,  Mr.
Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General  appearing  for  Shashank
Anand, Superintendent of  Police,  Mr.  Dushyant  A.  Dave,  learned  Senior
Advocate for Dr. K.S. Sachdev  and  Mr.  Siddharth  Luthra,  learned  Senior
Advocate for Dr. Munish Prabhakar.

16.   From the record and the Enquiry Report as stated above,  it  is  clear
that soon after the Order  dated   24.10.2013  passed  by  this  Court,  the
respondent remained admitted in the  Hospital  for  a  total  of  527  days.
Nothing has been placed on record, nor  any  medical  condition  or  reasons
have been  adverted to why such admission was required in the  first  place.
As found in the Enquiry, no laboratory test was conducted during the  period
of  admission  from  25.02.2014  to  12.04.2014  and  from   12.04.2014   to
01.05.2015.  This shows that the illness as projected  was  not  serious  at
all and no intensive treatment as indoor  patient  was  required  or  called
for.  This prolonged admission without any justifiable  medical  reason  was
essentially to defeat the direction issued by this Court in its Order  dated
24.10.2013 and repeated non-bailable warrants issued by the Trial Court.

17.   The Order passed by the  Trial  Court  on  20.11.2013  shows  that  an
affidavit of son of the respondent was filed along with  a  copy  of  review
petition.  The application seeking  exemption  was  rejected  by  the  Trial
Court and SHO concerned was issued notice why the warrant of arrest was  not
executed.  Subsequent Orders dated 05.02.2014,  15.03.2014,  16.04.2014  and
15.04.2014 indicate that  fresh  warrants  of  arrest  were  issued  through
Superintendent of Police.  Neither the respondent surrendered to custody  as
directed by this Court nor the concerned police took  any  steps  to  arrest
him or try to find his whereabouts.  No report was made to the Trial  Court.
What is evident is total inaction on the part of  the  police  which  helped
the respondent in evading the arrest and  defeating  the  Orders  passed  by
this Court as well as  by  the  Trial  Court.   This  callous  attitude  and
conduct  of  the  police  calls  for  strict  administrative   actions   and
corrective penal measures.

18.   The conduct exhibited by the respondent in  getting  himself  admitted
in the hospital when there was no medical reason to justify  such  admission
and in continuing  to remain admitted till action was taken  by  this  Court
in contempt jurisdiction, exhibits scant respect and regard for  the  orders
and  processes  issued  by  the  Court.  Despite  issuance  of  notice,  the
respondent has neither filed any response nor tendered any apology.   Having
gone through the record and considered the Enquiry Report, we have no  doubt
that the respondent is guilty of having committed contempt of the  direction
issued by this Court in its Order dated 24.10.2013 and also  in  obstructing
the administration of justice.

19.   We now turn to the role of the  hospital  and  medical  professionals.
The explanation offered by Dr. Munish Prabhakar and  Dr.  K.S.  Sachdev  was
that they were not aware of any direction by this Court  to  the  respondent
to surrender to custody or that the respondent was  required  in  connection
with any crime.  At the outset, it must be stated that the respondent  stood
admitted in the hospital for 527 days.  Not a  single  laboratory  test  was
conducted during the period  from  15.02.2014  to  01.05.2015.   The  papers
produced on record do not in any way suggest  any  medical  emergency  which
could justify continued admission of the respondent as  an  indoor  patient.
Further, during the third admission of the respondent  from  12.04.2014  the
first payment to the hospital was made only on 10.01.2015 i.e. nearly  after
247 days.  It is inconceivable that in normal circumstances a man,  who  has
no ailment or a medical condition requiring  emergency  treatment  would  be
kept as indoor patient without any laboratory test and   without  recovering
a single paisa for more than 247 days.  Moreover, the record indicates  that
on as many as 47 occasions during his admission the respondent  was  allowed
to move out of the hospital without  even  an  endorsement  by  any  medical
professional justifying such movement.  The  Enquiry  Report  further  shows
that there used to  be  regular  stream  of  visitors  during  the  stay  of
respondent  in  the  hospital.    These  features  clearly  show  that   the
respondent was in perfect condition of  health  and  never  really  required
admission in the hospital as an indoor patient.  The role  of  the  hospital
was certainly not as innocent as is sought to be projected and the  features
detailed above clearly show that the hospital was  party to the attempts  on
part of the respondent to defeat the Order passed by this Court.

20.   When the compliance report forwarded by the District Judge, Rohtak  on
15.01.2015 indicated admission of the respondent in a hospital,  this  Court
by Order dated 19.01.2015 called for a report  from  the  Superintendent  of
Police, Rohtak.  The enquiry initiated thereafter resulted in  recording  of
the statement of son of the  respondent  on  08.02.2015  who  also  produced
medical certificate dated 07.02.2015.  This  certificate  issued  by  Privat
Hospital shows that the respondent was likely to be discharged in next 5  to
7 days.  Significantly, said certificate was not even referred to in any  of
the subsequent  affidavits  filed  by  Dr.  Munish  Prabhakar  or  Dr.  K.S.
Sachdev.  If the respondent was likely to  be  discharged  in  few  days  as
certified on 07.02.2015 what went wrong in not discharging him or was  there
any medical emergency justifying his continued admission?  Nothing is  spelt
out in any  of  the  affidavits.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  subsequent
certificate dated 26.03.2015 did not even speak of likelihood  of  discharge
and used the expression “………he is fit to be produced in the Court of law  as
per present health condition.”  The assertions made  by  Shashank  Anand  in
his affidavit dated 02.07.2015 are that  notwithstanding  issuance  of  such
certificate  dated  26.03.2015,  the  hospital  refused  to  discharge   the
respondent and orally advised the police not to arrest the  respondent  lest
it may put his life in jeopardy  or  danger.   The  Enquiry  Report  rightly
observed “……the said hospital on more  than  one  occasion  informed  Rohtak
Police in writing that accused Balbir Singh was fit to  be  taken  to  court
but did not discharge him.”  It was only after this Court passed  the  Order
dated 24.04.2015 directing personal presence of Dr. Munish Prabhakar with  a
direction to file an affidavit and explain the situation, that the  hospital
discharged the respondent on 01.05.2015 which then resulted  in  arrest  and
production of the respondent.

21.   The explanation offered by Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr.  Sachdev  that
the respondent trapped the hospital and by non-payment  of  the  bills  kept
prolonging his stay in the hospital does not inspire confidence at all.   If
the hospital was really a victim of the machinations of the  respondent,  at
the first opportunity i.e. when  requisition  was  made  by  the  police  on
13.02.2015, the hospital would have responded immediately.  The  requisition
dated 13.02.2015 had informed the hospital that respondent was a  proclaimed
offender and that his custody was required.  This requisition was  close  on
the  heels  of  the  medical  certificate  dated  07.02.2015  and  if   that
certificate was a correct one, the  time  was  ripe  for  discharge  of  the
respondent.  However, as stated by Shashank Anand  in  his  affidavit  dated
02.07.2015, the hospital refused to discharge the  respondent.   The  theory
that the hospital was trapped by the designs of the  respondent  is  a  mere
eye-wash and we reject the same. Thus, the inescapable  conclusion  is  that
the hospital extended protection and asylum to the respondent to defeat  the
Order passed by this Court as well as those passed by the  Trial  Court  and
thereby obstructed administration of justice.

22.   Dr. Munish Prabhakar has been Medical Director of the hospital and  as
submitted by learned Senior Counsel on his behalf, he  receives  salary  and
some percentage of consultation charges recovered from  the  patients.   Dr.
K.S. Sachdev, on the other hand, has  been  the  Managing  Director  of  the
Company which owns and runs said hospital. We have found that the  continued
admission for such a long period as indoor patient was not  justifiable  for
any reason or medical  condition  of  the  respondent.  Both  these  medical
professionals  are  responsible  for  such  prolonged  admission  which  was
actuated by only one reason which  was  to  extend  medical  asylum  to  the
respondent as a cover to defeat the orders passed  by  this  Court  and  the
Trial Court. In this process, these medical professionals  not  only  helped
the  respondent  in  violating  the  Order  of  this  court  but  they  also
obstructed administration of justice.

23.  The aforementioned conclusions then raise issues regarding  the  extent
of liability of the contemnors. Sections 2 (b) and 2 (c) of the Contempt  of
Courts Act, 1971 which define ‘civil contempt’ and ‘criminal  contempt’  are
as under:-
“(b) “civil contempt” means willful disobedience to  any  judgment,  decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach  of  an
undertaking given to a court;
(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words,  spoken  or
written, or by signs, or by visible representation,  or  otherwise)  of  any
matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers  or  tends  to  lower  the
authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,  the  due  course
of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to  interfere  with,  or  obstructs  or  tends  to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;”

       Willful  disobedience  to  a  direction  issued  by  this  Court   on
24.10.2013 on part of the respondent is quite evident. He was party  to  the
proceedings and bound by the order and as such his liability on  that  court
stands established. Further, by his defiance of the direction so issued,  he
also obstructed administration of justice. He is thus liable for  committing
civil contempt as well as criminal contempt. But the  Medical  Professionals
namely Dr. Munish Prabhakar and Dr. K.S. Sachdev were  not  parties  to  the
matter where the direction in question was passed.

24.   As regards the  liability  of  the  aforesaid  Medical  Professionals,
questions that arise are: 1) whether  a  person,  who  is  not  bound  by  a
direction issued by the Court could be held guilty for  committing  contempt
of court for his conduct in either directly aiding  and  abetting  violation
on part of the person who is bound by such direction; and  2)  what  is  the
extent of liability of such person.
A.]   In Seaward v. Paterson[1]  the landlord of the concerned premises  had
obtained an injunction against Paterson  i.e.  his  tenant  restraining  him
from doing or allowing to be done anything on the premises which would be  a
nuisance to the landlord and from using the premises otherwise than for  the
purposes of  a  private  club.   Alleging  that  the  tenant  had  committed
contempt of the court by  allowing  the  premises  to  be  used  for  boxing
matches, the landlord applied for committal of two  other  persons,  namely,
Sheppard and Murray on the ground that  they  had  aided  and  assisted  the
tenant in his disobedience to the injunction.  The following  passages  from
the Judgment of Lindley LJ are quite instructive:
“Now, Let us consider what jurisdiction the  court  has  to  make  an  order
against Murray. There is no injunction against him--  He is  no  more  bound
by the injunction granted against Paterson than  any  other  member  of  the
public. He is bound, like other members of  the  public,  not  to  interfere
with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice;  and  the  case,  if  any,
made against him must be this--not that he  has  technically  infringed  the
injunction, which was not granted against him in any sense of the word,  but
that he has been  aiding  and  abetting  others  in  setting  the  Court  at
defiance, and deliberately treating the order of the Court  as  unworthy  of
notice. If he has so conducted himself, it is perfectly  idle  to  say  that
there is no jurisdiction to commit him for contempt as distinguished from  a
breach of the injunction, which has a technical meaning.”

“A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is  technically
wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one thing; and  a  motion  to
commit a man for  contempt  of  court,  not  because  he  is  bound  by  the
injunction by being party  to  the  cause,  but  because  he  is  conducting
himself so as to obstruct the course of justice, is another  and  a  totally
different thing. The difference is very marked. In the one  case  the  party
who is bound by the injunction is  proceeded  against  for  the  purpose  of
enforcing the Order of the Court for the benefit of the person who  got  it.
In the other case, the Court will not allow its process to be set at  naught
and treated with contempt.”

B]    In Z Ltd. v.  A[2]  the  plaintiff  had  obtained  injunction  against
certain defendants and the assets of one such  defendant  against  whom  the
injunction was granted, were held by a bank.  The bank  was  served  with  a
copy of the injunction but the concerned defendant had not yet been  served.
 While considering the question whether any disposal of assets belonging  to
the defendant by the bank would make it liable for  committing  contempt  of
Court, it was stated as under:
“I  think  that  the  following  propositions  may  be  stated  as  to   the
consequences which  ensue  when  there  are  acts  or  omissions  which  are
contrary to the terms of injunction. (1) The person against whom  the  Order
is made will be liable for contempt of Court if he acts  in  breach  of  the
Order after having notice of it. (2) A third party will also  be  liable  if
he knowingly assists in the breach, that is to say if knowing the  terms  of
the injunction he willfully assists the person to whom it  was  directed  to
disobey it. This will be so whether or  not  the  person  enjoined  has  had
notice of the injunction… I will give my reasons for the second  proposition
and take first the question of prior notice to the defendant. It was  argued
that the liability of the third person  arose  because  he  was  treated  as
aiding and abetting the  defendant  (i.e.  was  an  accessory)  and  as  the
defendant could himself not be in breach unless he had  notice  it  followed
that there was no offence to which the third party could  be  an  accessory.
In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the  liability
of the third party.  He  is  liable  for  contempt  of  court  committed  by
himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing  a
dual character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and  abetting  the
contempt by another, but the conduct  will  always  amount  to  contempt  by
himself.  It  will  be  conduct  which   knowingly   interferes   with   the
administration  of  justice  by  causing  the  Order  of  the  court  to  be
thwarted.”

C]    The extent of liability of third party in such actions was  considered
by the House of Lords in Attorney  General  v.  Times  Newspapers  Ltd.  and
another[3].  In that case the Attorney General had  brought  action  against
two  newspapers  seeking  permanent   injunction   restraining   them   from
publishing material from a book written by  a  person  who  was  formerly  a
member of the security service and by terms of his employment was  bound  by
confidentiality which would stand breached if his  memoirs  were  published.
While the interlocutory injunctions restraining publication of the  material
pending trial of such action  was  granted  against  those  two  newspapers,
three other newspapers published extensive extracts  and  summaries  of  the
book following which proceedings for criminal  contempt  against  them  were
brought by the Attorney General.  At the trial of  those  proceedings  those
three other newspapers were held to be guilty  of  criminal  contempt.  Lord
Brandon of Oakbrook concluded as under:
“………………The claims of the Attorney General  in  the  confidentiality  actions
were for permanent injunctions restraining the  defendants  from  publishing
what may conveniently be called Spycatcher  material.  The  purpose  of  the
Millet injunctions was to prevent  the  publication  of  any  such  material
pending the trial of the confidentiality actions.  The  consequence  of  the
publication of Spycatcher material by  the  publishers  and  editor  of  the
Sunday Times  before  the  trial  of  the  confidentiality  actions  was  to
nullify, in part at least, the purpose of such trial  because  it  put  into
the public domain part of the material which it was claimed by the  Attorney
General in the confidentiality actions ought  to  remain  confidential.   It
follows that the conduct of the publishers and editor of  the  Sunday  Times
constituted  the  actus  reus   of  impeding   or   interfering   with   the
administation of justice by the court in the confidentiality actions.”

D]    In a separate concurring opinion Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle stated
as under:
“I turn to consider whether there is any reason  why  established  principle
should not be applied to the situation in this case.  I do  not  accept  the
propostion  that  to  apply  established   principles   in   the   foregoing
circumstances would effectively be to convert every injuction from an  order
in personam to  an  order  contra  mundum.   That  proposition  ignores  the
distinction between the breach of an order by the person named  therein  and
interference with the course of justice resulting from a frustration of  the
order by the third party.”

25. In our view, the Medical Professionals namely Dr. Munish  Prabhakar  and
Dr. K.S. Sachdev extended medical asylum to  the  respondent  without  there
being any reason or medical condition justifying prolonged admission of  the
respondent as an indoor patient as a cover to defeat the  Orders  passed  by
this Court and the Trial Court,  as  stated  above  and  thereby  aided  and
assisted the respondent in violating  the  Order  of  this  Court.  By  such
conduct  these  Medical  Professionals  have  obstructed  administration  of
justice.

26.    We thus hold that the respondent guilty of having violated the  Order
dated  24.10.2013  passed  by  this  Court   and   for   having   obstructed
administration of justice. We also hold Dr. Munish Prabhakar  and  Dr.  K.S.
Sachdev guilty for having helped the respondent in his attempts and  thereby
obstructing  administration  of  justice.   Having   held   so,   we   could
straightaway have imposed appropriate punishment under the Act. However,  we
deem it appropriate to grant one more opportunity to these  contemnors.  The
respondent has not filed any affidavit nor tendered an apology. At the  same
time for Dr. K.S. Sachdev, Managing Director of the company  that  owns  the
hospital is said to be 76 years of age. Considering the fact that these  are
medical professionals with sufficient standing, in our view ends of  justice
would be met if one more opportunity is granted to  them  to  present  their
view on the issue of punishment. In the circumstances,  we  direct  presence
of these three contemnors on January 2, 2017. The respondent is  in  custody
and therefore appropriate production  warrant  shall  be  issued  under  the
signature of Registrar of this Court ensuring  presence  of  the  respondent
before this Court. The concerned  police  is  directed  to  facilitate  such
production of the respondent.  The contemnors can also present  their  views
and make appropriate submission in writing on or before December 23, 2016.

27.   Coming to the role of the police officials in the present  matter,  we
have already observed that the conduct exhibited  by  the  concerned  police
officials in not ensuring compliance of  the  Orders  passed  by  the  Trial
Court calls for strict administrative action.  The actions  in  that  behalf
have already  been  initiated  and  for  the  present  we  rest  content  by
observing that the disciplinary proceedings shall be taken  to  logical  end
and the guilty shall be brought to book. We request the Director General  of
Police of Haryana and the Home Secretary to look into the matter and  ensure
that the departmental proceedings are taken to logical end at the  earliest.
The status report/action taken report in that behalf shall be filed in  this
court within three months from the date of this judgment.

28.  As regards the role of Mr. Shanshank Anand, Superintendent  of  Police,
Rohtak, we find that he took charge as Superintendent of Police,  Rohtak  on
24.11.2014 i.e. well after the Order dated  24.10.2013  of  this  Court  and
after the Orders directing issuance of  non-bailable  warrants  against  the
respondent were passed by the Trial Court.  However, even according  to  his
own affidavit, if he  became  aware  that  respondent  had  not  surrendered
despite cancellation of  his  bail  and  that  he  was  admitted  in  Privat
Hospital, Gurgaon only in February  2015,  the  steps  that  he  took  after
16.2.2015  cannot  strictly  be  called  actions   taken   with   reasonable
promptitude. Even  according  to  Paras  6,  7  and  8  of  affidavit  dated
2.07.2015 nothing was done during the period 27.02.2015 to 23.03.2015.   The
action apparently was initiated only after the  Order  dated  24.4.2015  was
passed by this Court.  Though we express dissatisfaction, we do not deem  it
appropriate to carry the matter further as against him.  The  notice  issued
to him is discharged and the petition as against him stands closed.










29.   Ordered accordingly.


…………………CJI.
(T.S. Thakur)



…………………….J.
(R. Banumathi)



…………………….J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi,
December 15, 2016
-----------------------
[1]     (1895-99) All ER 1127
[2]    (1982) 1 All ER 556
[3]    (1991) 2 All ER 398