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Monday, December 19, 2016

BHUSHAN POWER AND STEEL LTD. Vs. S. L. SEAL & ORS.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 275 OF 2016
                                     IN
                  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 374 OF 2012
                                     IN
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2790 OF 2012

|BHUSHAN POWER & STEEL LIMITED              |.....PETITIONER(S)           |
|VERSUS                                     |                             |
|MR. S.L. SEAL                              |                             |
|ADDL. SECRETARY (STEEL & MINES)            |                             |
|GOVERNMENT OF ODISHA & ORS.                |.....RESPONDENT(S)           |


                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.
                 The erstwhile Bhushan Ltd. (predecessor-in-interest of  the
petitioner) had proposed setting up of plant in some identified villages  in
the district of Sambalpur, Odisha. For this purpose, it had made  a  request
for acquisition of land,  measuring  1250  acres,  which  was  acquired  for
Bhushan Ltd.  It had also applied for grant of lease of mining of  iron  ore
for  use  in  the  proposed  plant.  These  applications   were   favourably
considered by the State of Odisha (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  'State
Government') which agreed to accord due priority to Bhushan Ltd.  for  grant
of suitable iron ore areas and also agreed to recommend the proposal to  the
Government of India for grant of a coal block. Even a MoU was  entered  into
between the State Government and Bhushan Ltd. containing the  commitment  of
the State Government to recommend to the Central Government, grant  of  iron
ore mines for its use  in  the  proposed  plant.   For  this  purpose,  area
earmarked for recommendation were Thakurani  area  with  96  million  tonnes
iron ore reserves and Keora area, District  Sundargarh  for  additional  128
million tonnes of iron ore; both for 50 years'  requirement  of  the  plant.
Though various statutory and other permissions required for  setting  up  of
the plant were granted and the plant was also set up, but due  to  some  in-
fight  between  the  family  members  who  owned  Bhushan  Ltd.,  it   faced
difficulties in getting the grant of iron ore lease.

Insofar as granting of mining lease of iron ore reserves  in  the  aforesaid
areas is concerned, it fell into rough  weather.   It  resulted  into  show-
cause notice dated January 18, 2006 by the State  Government  which  led  to
the decision that mining lease over the Thakurani area could not be  allowed
on various grounds and the application made by Bhushan Ltd.  was  premature.
Thereafter, the Government of Orissa made a recommendation  to  the  Central
Government on February 09, 2006 to grant mining lease in favour of  one  M/s
Neepaz Metallics (P) Ltd. in relaxation of Rule 59(1) of the  Mining  Rules,
for a period of 30 years. Challenging these orders, Bhushan Ltd. filed  Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 6646 of 2006 in the High Court on May  08,  2006.  This
writ petition was dismissed by the High  Court  on  December  14,  2007  and
challenging this decision a special leave petition was filed in which  leave
was granted, thereby  converting  the  special  leave  petition  into  Civil
Appeal No. 2790 of 2012.   This  appeal  was  allowed  by  this  Court  vide
judgment dated March 14, 2012, which was reported as Bhushan Power  &  Steel
Ltd. v. State of Orissa[1], with the  following  directions:  (SCC  p.  256,
paras 41-42)
“41...Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and  order
of the High Court of Orissa and also the decision of  the  State  Government
dated 9-2-2006, rejecting the appellant's claim for grant of mining lease.

42. During the course of hearing,  we  have  been  informed  that  Thakurani
Block A has large reserves of iron ore, in which the appellants can also  be
accommodated.  We,  accordingly,  direct  the  State  of  Orissa   to   take
appropriate steps to act in terms of the MoU dated 15-5-2002,  as  also  its
earlier commitments to recommend the case of the appellants to  the  Central
Government for grant of adequate iron ore reserves to meet the  requirements
of the appellants in their steel plant at Lapanga.”

It would be pertinent to mention that  the  State  of  Odisha  had  filed  a
review petition seeking review of this judgment but the  same  was  rejected
vide order dated September 11, 2012.  Pursuant to the aforesaid  directions,
though Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. has been  given  Thakurani  Block  A,  the
order was not implemented qua Keora, District  Sundargarh.   The  petitioner
treated the aforesaid inaction on  the  part  of  the  State  Government  as
contemptuous and filed Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 374 of  2012[2].   This
petition  was  contested  by  the  respondents  on  various  grounds.   Main
contention raised was  that  the  direction  given  by  this  Court  in  its
judgment dated March 14,  2012  was  incapable  of  enforcement.   For  this
purpose, the State  Government  had  placed  reliance  upon  the  subsequent
judgment of this Court in Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores  Limited  v.  State
of Karnataka & Ors.[3] and submitted that in view of the law  laid  down  in
the said  judgment,  it  was  not  possible  to  carry  out  the  directions
contained in the judgment rendered on March 14, 2012 passed in the  case  of
the petitioner herein.

Without going into the niceties by stating the basis of the said plea  taken
by the State Government, suffice is to state that the  aforesaid  stand  did
not   find   favour   with   this   Court.    It   was   found   that    the
contemnors/officials of the State Government were in contempt of the  orders
dated March 14, 2012.  In these  circumstances,  one  more  opportunity  was
given to the State  Government  to  send  requisite  recommendation  to  the
Central Government.  However, for a better understanding of  the  nature  of
directions which were  given,  we  reproduce  following  extracts  from  the
judgment dated April 22, 2014 in the said Contempt Petition:
“21.  We cannot lose sight of the fact  that  there  is  a  judgment,  inter
parties, which has become final.  Even  when  the  civil  appeal  was  being
heard, certain other parties claiming their interest  in  these  very  lands
had moved intervention applications which were dismissed. At that time  also
it was mentioned that there are  195  applicants.  However,  notwithstanding
the same, this Court issued firm  directions  to  the  State  Government  to
recommend the case of the petitioners for mining lease in  both  the  areas.
In view  of  such  categorical  and  unambiguous  directions  given  in  the
judgment which has attained finality, merely because  another  judgment  has
been delivered by this Court in Sandur Manganese case, cannot  be  a  ground
to undo the directions contained in the judgment  dated  14-3-2012.  Insofar
as law laid down in Sandur Manganese is concerned, that may be  applied  and
followed by the State Government in respect of other applications which  are
still pending.  However,  that  cannot  be  pressed  into  service  qua  the
petitioner whose rights have been crystallised by the judgment  rendered  in
its favour. It cannot be reopened, that too at the stage  of  implementation
of the said judgment.

22.  We would like to place on record the arguments of  the  learned  Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that the total area under notification is  731.67
sq km and out of this 406 sq km is yet to be allotted. The area which  comes
to the share of the petitioner under MoU is 13.91 sq km which is  barely  3%
of 406 sq km and,  therefore  recommendation  by  the  State  Government  in
favour of the petitioner cannot be stalled or put  to  naught  only  on  the
basis of inchoate applications, fate whereof is yet to  be  decided.  It  is
also pointed out that insofar as the petitioners  in  other  writ  petitions
are concerned area claimed by them is not overlapping with the  petitioner's
area. However, it may not even be necessary to go into these contentions  in
detail. Once we hold  that  the  respondents  are  bound  to  implement  the
direction contained in the judgment dated 14-3-2012, insofar  as  the  State
Government is  concerned,  it  is  obliged  to  comply  therewith  and  such
matters, along with other  relevant  considerations,  can  be  left  to  the
wisdom  of  the  Central  Government  while  taking  a   decision   on   the
recommendation of the State Government.

                          xx          xx         xx

24.  As a consequence,  we  hold  that  the  respondents/contemnors  are  in
contempt of orders dated 14-3-2012 passed by this  Court  in  not  complying
with the directions in respect of Keora area. However,  we  are  giving  one
final opportunity to them to purge the contempt  by  transmitting  requisite
recommendations to the Central Government.  It  would  be  for  the  Central
Government to consider the said recommendations on its  own  merits  and  in
accordance with law. In case the recommendation is  sent  within  one  month
from the date of copy of receipt of this order, we propose not to  take  any
further action and the respondents/contemnors shall  stand  discharged  from
this contempt petition. However, in case the respondents  do  not  purge  in
the manner mentioned above, it would be open to  the  petitioners  to  point
out the same to this Court by moving appropriate  application  and  in  that
event the contemnors shall be proceeded against.”

According to the petitioner, the respondent State Government has not  purged
the contempt and, therefore, in view  of  the  opportunity  granted  in  the
judgment dated April 22,  2014,  as  contained  in  paragraph  24  extracted
above, the petitioner has moved the instant Contempt Petition  in  which  we
have heard M/s. Kapil Sibal and P. Chidambaram, learned senior  counsel  for
the  petitioner,  and  Mr.  Maninder  Singh,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General for the Union of India, and Mr. Ashish  Kumar  Sinha,  Advocate  for
the State Government.

We may mention at the outset that it is not disputed by the petitioner  that
after the directions dated April 22, 2014  given  in  the  earlier  Contempt
Petition, the State Government had  sent  requisite  recommendation  to  the
Central Government for grant of mining lease in the area in  question.   The
Central Government has, however, taken the view that having  regard  to  the
amendments in the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,  1957
(for short, the 'Act'), vide Mine and Minerals (Development and  Regulation)
Amendment Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as  the  Amendment  Act,  2015)
dated March 26, 2015, the grant of mining lease has  to  be  dealt  with  in
accordance with the new provisions introduced by  the  Amendment  Act,  2015
and  under  the  new  scheme,  the  petitioner's  earlier   request   stands
invalidated. This view  of  the  Central  Government  is  contained  in  its
letters dated May  13,  2015  and  May  29,  2015  addressed  to  the  State
Government, with copies to the petitioner.   The  State  Government  has  in
turn written to the petitioner vide letter dated July 09, 2016 on  the  same
lines. The petitioner has, however, taken  the  position  that  the  amended
sections have a  saving  provision,  in  which  category  the  case  of  the
petitioner  falls,  and  in  view  thereof  the  approval  of  the   Central
Government is not even required and, therefore,  the  State  Government  was
competent to grant the mining lease itself.   It  is  for  this  reason  the
petitioner has impleaded Union of  India  as  well,  as  respondent  in  the
present proceedings and one of the prayers is to  quash  the  letters  dated
May 13, 2015 and May 29, 2015 issued by the Central Government, as  well  as
the communication dated July 09, 2015 issued by the State Government.

At this stage, we may reproduce the exact prayers made by the petitioner  in
this Contempt Petition:
“(a)    Initiate    contempt    of    court    proceedings    against    the
Respondents/Contemnors and after hearing them,  punish  them  for  willfully
flouting  and  deliberately  disobeying  the  judgments  and  orders   dated
14.3.2012 and 22.4.2014 passed by this Hon'ble Court  in  Civil  Appeal  No.
2790 of 2012 and Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 374/2012 respectively.

(b)  Hold that the letters dated 13/05/2015 and  29/05/2015  issued  by  the
Central Government (Annexure 9 & 10) and letter dated  09/07/2015  (Annexure
12) issued by the State Government are in breach and contempt  of  Judgments
and Orders of this Hon'ble Court and are thus of no  legal  consequence  and
effect.

(c)  Pass appropriate directions, directing the Respondents to  comply  with
and implement the judgments  of  this  Hon'ble  Court  dated  14.3.2012  and
22.4.2014 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Civil Appeal No. 2790 of 2012  and
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 374/2012 respectively and within two weeks  of
receipt of notice, to execute mining leases as recommended in Annexure  Nos.
P-5 and P-6.

(d)  Pass such other or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may  deem  fit,
just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

As pointed out above,  the  petitioner  accepts  the  fact  that  the  State
Government had in fact made the recommendation dated May  24,  2014  to  the
Central Government for grant of  mining  lease  over  an  area  of  1063.633
hectares in village Rakma, Marsuan,  Tibira  and  in  Khajurdihi  RF  (Keora
Sector) in the districts of Keonjhar and Sundergarh.  It is  further  stated
that despite this recommendation, the Central Government did  not  take  any
action to grant the approval.  In the meantime, on  January  12,  2015,  the
Central Government promulgated an Ordinance amending the Mines and  Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.  This Ordinance  was  made  into  an
Act of Parliament on March 26, 2015 with effect from January 12,  2015.   On
May 13, 2015, the Central Government  has  issued  a  letter  to  the  State
Government, a copy whereof was also marked to the petitioner, stating that:
“3.  As per details available with the Ministry, this  proposal  for  accord
of prior approval for grant of mineral concession becomes ineligible as  per
the provisions of Section 10A(1) of the  Amendment  Act.   Accordingly,  the
proposal should be treated as closed and necessary order may be isued.   The
State Government may also ascertain  whether  the  proposal  is  saved  from
ineligibility under the provisions of Section  10A  of  the  Amendment  Act,
2015 before communicating the same  to  the  applicant  and  take  following
action in this matter:

(i)  if the proposal  is  ineligible,  it  may  be  treated  as  closed  and
necessary order may be issued; and

(ii)  if the proposal remain eligible, the State Government (sic)  bring  it
to the notice of the Ministry so that necessary action as per provisions  of
the Amended Act may be taken.”

A few days later, the Central Government wrote another letter dated May  29,
2015 regarding proposal for grant of  ML  for  iron  ore  over  an  area  of
1390.663 hectares in village Rakma, Marsuan and Triba of  Keonjhar  district
and Khajuridihi of Sundargah district stating as follows:
“As per details available with the Ministry, this  proposal  for  accord  of
prior approval for grant of mineral concession  becomes  ineligible  as  per
the provisions of Section 10A(1) of the Amendment Act.  The  matter  may  be
treated as closed.  However, the State Government is advised to examine  the
proposal and in case there is strong case for the  concession  to  be  saved
from ineligibility under the provision of Section  10(a)  of  the  Amendment
Act then this Ministry may be informed  accordingly  for  further  necessary
action.”

Letter dated July 09, 2015 sent by the State Government  to  the  petitioner
rejecting the application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease  reads
as under:
“And whereas, as  per  section-10A(1)  of  MMDR  Amendment  Act,  2015,  all
applications received prior to the date of commencement  of  the  Mines  and
Minerals (Development and Regulation)  Amendment  Act,  2015,  shall  become
ineligible.

And whereas, both the  ML  application  No.  775  dated  04.12.2001  and  ML
application No. 780 dated 01.03.2002 of the applicant company are the  fresh
applications seeking grant of mining leases, which have been recommended  to
Government of India prior to the date  of  commencement  of  the  Mines  and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.

Therefore, after careful consideration of  the  facts  &  circumstances  and
materials on record, the State  Government  is  pleased  to  reject  the  ML
application No. 775 dated 04.12.2001  and  ML  application  No.  780,  dated
01.03.2002 of the applicant company being ineligible as per  the  provisions
of section-10A(1) of the Amendment Act, 2015.”

It is in the aforesaid background, learned senior counsel appearing for  the
petitioner argued that the aforesaid approach of the Central  Government  as
well as the State Government contained in  their  respective  communications
is totally misconceived inasmuch as direction of this Court, which is  inter
parties, still remain binding, notwithstanding the introduction  of  Section
10A by the Amendment Act, 2015.  It is also argued that  even  if  the  said
Amendment Act applies, case of the petitioner  is  preserved  and  protected
under Section  10A(2)(c)  of  the  Act.  Section  10A  makes  the  following
reading:
“10A.  Rights of existing concession-holders  and  applicants.  –  (1)   All
applications received prior to the date of commencement  of  the  Mines  and
Minerals (Development and Regulation)  Amendment  Act,  2015,  shall  become
ineligible.

(2)  Without  prejudice  to  sub-secion  (1),  the  following  shall  remain
eligible on and from the date of commencement  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 –

(a)  applications received under section 11A of this Act;

(b)  where before the commencement of the Mines  and  Minerals  (Development
and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 a reconnaissance permit  or  prospecting
licence has been granted in respect of any land for any mineral, the  permit
holder or the licensee shall  have  a  right  for  obtaining  a  prospecting
licence followed by a mining lease, or a mining lease, as the case  may  be,
in respect of that  mineral  in  that  land,  if  the  State  Government  is
satisfied that the permit-holder or the licensee, as the case may be, –

(i)  has undertaken reconnaissance operations or prospecting operations,  as
the case may be, to establish the existence  of  mineral  contents  in  such
land in accordance with such parameters as may be prescribed by the  Central
Government;

(ii)  has not committed any breach  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the
reconnaissance permit or the prospecting licence;

(iii)  has not become ineligible under the provisions of this Act; and

(iv)  has not failed to apply for grant of  prospecting  licence  or  mining
lease, as the case may be, within a period of three months after the  expiry
of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence, as  the  case  may  be,  or
within such further period not exceeding six months as may  be  extended  by
the State Government.

(c)  where the Central Government  has  communicated  previous  approval  as
required under sub-section (1) of section 5 for grant of a mining lease,  or
if a letter of intent (by whatever name  called)  has  been  issued  by  the
State Government to grant a mining lease, before  the  commencement  of  the
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)  Amendment  Act,  2015,  the
mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment  of  the  conditions  of
the previous approval or of the letter of intent  within  a  period  of  two
years from the date of commencement of the said Act:

Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule,  no
prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted  under  clause  (b)  of
this  sub-section  except  with  the  previous  approval  of   the   Central
Government.”

It was argued with  vehemence  that  even  when  under  sub-section  (1)  of
Section 10A, all applications received prior to the date of commencement  of
the Amendment Act, 2015  have  been  rendered  ineligible,  sub-section  (2)
saves certain kinds of applications.  Clause (c) thereof is invoked  by  the
petitioner to submit that in the instant case since 'Letter of  Intent'  had
been  issued  by  the  State  Government  to  grant  a  mining  lease,   the
petitioner's   application   stands   protected.     For    this    purpose,
recommendation dated May 24, 2014 is treated as  Letter  of  Intent  by  the
petitioner, laying emphasis on the words  'letter  of  intent  (by  whatever
name called)'.  It was, thus, argued that form of Letter of  Intent  is  not
necessary and the substance of the letter had to be  seen.   It  was  argued
that since the letter dated May 24, 2014 of the State Government is  in  the
nature of recommendation for grant  of  lease,  it  signifies  intention  to
grant the mining lease insofar as the State  Government  is  concerned  and,
therefore, in substance, it is the Letter of Intent.  It was,  thus,  argued
that under the new regime contained in Section 10A, approval of the  Central
Government was not  even  required  and  the  State  Government  could  have
proceeded further and granted the lease.

Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, submitted, on  the
other  hand,  that  the  view  taken  by  the  Central  Government  in   its
communications dated May 24, 2014 and May 29, 2015  is  in  accordance  with
the provisions of Section 10A of the Act.  It was argued that  letter  dated
May 24, 2014 cannot be treated as  Letter  of  Intent  as  on  the  date  of
writing this letter, the State Government had no such power to  give  Letter
of Intent without the prior approval of the Central Government.   Therefore,
it was only a request to the Central Government for considering the case  of
the petitioner favourably.  It is further submitted that  Letter  of  Intent
mentioned in clause (c) deals with the situations where  sanction  from  the
Central Government is received and Letter of Intent is issued but no  formal
lease executed.  Only those  cases  are  protected  with.   It  was  further
submitted that after coming into effect  the  amended  provision,  the  very
methodology of grant of mining lease  has  undergone  a  significant  change
inasmuch as now the leases are to be granted through auction,  which  is  so
specifically provided in the amended Section 11 of the Amendment Act,  2015.
 It is for this  reason,  requirement  of  prior  approval  of  the  Central
Government is dispensed with.  Learned Additional Solicitor General  further
submitted that there is no contempt of the orders of this Court inasmuch  as
the only direction given in the impugned judgment dated March 14,  2012  was
to the State Government to send  the  recommendation,  which  direction  was
reiterated in the judgment dated April  22,  2014  passed  in  the  Contempt
Petition as well.  The State Government  complied  with  this  direction  by
sending such a recommendation to the  Central  Government.   Therefore,  the
present contempt petition was not even maintainable.  Counsel for the  State
Government supported the aforesaid stand taken  by  the  learned  Additional
Solicitor General.

We have to bear in mind that the matter is being dealt with  in  a  Contempt
Petition.  Therefore, what is  to  be  seen  is  as  to  whether  directions
contained in the judgment are complied with or  not.   In  the  main  appeal
which was filed by the petitioner against the judgment of  the  Orissa  High
Court, it was allowed vide judgment dated March  14,  2012.   Direction  was
given to the State Government  to  send  the  recommendation  for  grant  of
mining lease to the petitioner.  As per the law  prevailing  at  that  time,
the role of the State Government was only to send the recommendation to  the
Central Government for allotting  mining  areas.   Ultimate  authority/power
was vested with the Central Government  to  take  a  decision  on  the  said
request of the State  Government.   Since  the  State  Government  had  even
refused to send such a request, this Court was of the view that the  act  of
the State Government in refusing to send recommendation was contrary to  the
MoU dated May 15, 2002 and direction was issued to do the needful.   In  the
order dated April 22, 2014, passed in Contempt Petition (Civil) No.  374  of
2012, this was made clear by observing that insofar as the State  Government
is concerned, it is obliged to comply  therewith  and  such  matters,  along
with other relevant considerations, can be left to  the  Central  Government
while taking a decision on the recommendation of the State  Government.   We
state at the cost of repetition that since the Union  of  India  was  not  a
party, no direction was given to it.  On the contrary, it was  left  to  the
Central Government to take an appropriate decision on the recommendation  of
the State Government.  This was made clear in para 24 of the judgment  dated
April 22, 2014 by observing that it would be for the Central  Government  to
consider the said recommendations on its own merits and in  accordance  with
law.

Since the State Government had sent the necessary letter of request  to  the
Central Government, direction contained in  the  judgment  dated  March  14,
2012  stands  complied  with.   The  issue  now  raised,  as  reflected  and
discussed  in  the  earlier  portion  of  this  judgment,  is  whether   the
application of the petitioner is rendered ineligible in view of Section  10A
of the Act or whether it still survives.   We are examining  this  issue  as
the petitioner's counsel have argued that the petitioner is eligible  to  be
considered as its application falls in the category  carved  out  by  clause
(c) of Section 10A(2) and further that since  no  approval  of  the  Central
Government is required now, the State  Government  could  itself  grant  the
lease.  It is argued  that  failure  of  the  State  Government  amounts  to
contempt of the orders of this Court.

Undoubtedly, as  per  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  10A,  all  applications
received prior to coming into force  of  the  Amendment  Act,  2015,  become
ineligible.  Reason for interpreting such a provision is not  far  to  seek.
Before  the  passing  of  the  Amendment  Act,  2015,  it  was  the  Central
Government which had  the  ultimate  control  over  the  grant  of  licenses
insofar as mining of major minerals is  concerned.   As  per  the  procedure
then existing, State Government could recommend  the  application  submitted
by any applicant for grant of mining lease to  the  Central  Government  and
the Central Government was given the power to grant or refuse to  grant  the
approval.   Thus,  'previous  approval'  from  the  Central  Government  was
essential for grant of lease, without which the State Government  could  not
enter into any such lease agreement with  the  applicant.   Shortcomings  of
this procedure were noticed by  this  Court  in  its  judgment  rendered  in
Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs.  Union  of  India[4]  (for  short,
'CPIL case') and also in  Re.:  Spl.  Ref.  No.  1  of  2012[5].   In  these
judgments, this Court expressed that allocation of natural resources  should
normally be by auction.  Judgment in CPIL case had  a  direct  relevance  to
the grant of mineral  concessions  as  the  Government  found  that  it  was
resulting in multipurpose litigation which was becoming counter  productive.
Mining Ordinance, 2015 was passed on January 12, 2015 which  was  ultimately
replaced when the Parliament enacted the Amendment Act, 2015.

The exhaustive Statement of Objects and Reasons reveals that  the  extensive
amendment in  the  Act  were  effected  after  extensive  consultations  and
intensive scrutiny by the Standing Committee on Coal  and  Steel,  who  gave
their  Report  in  May,  2013.  As  is  evident  from  the  Statement   that
difficulties were experienced because the existing Act does not  permit  the
auctioning of mineral concessions. It was observed that with  auctioning  of
mineral concessions, transparency in  allocation  will  improve;  Government
will get an increased share of the value of mineral resources; and  that  it
will alleviate the procedural delay, which  in  turn  would  check  slowdown
which adversely affected the growth of mining sector.

The Amendment Act, 2015, as is  evident  from  the  objects,  aims  at:  (i)
eliminating discretion; (ii) improving transparency  in  the  allocation  of
mineral resources; (iii) simplifying procedures; (iv) eliminating  delay  on
administration, so as to enable expeditious and optimum development  of  the
mineral resources of the  country;  (v)  obtaining  for  the  Government  an
enhanced share of the value of the mineral resources;  and  (vi)  attracting
private investment and the latest technology.

The Amendment Act, 2015 ushered in the amendment of Sections 3,  4,  4A,  5,
6, 13, 15, 21 and First Schedule; substitution of new sections for  Sections
8, 11 and 13; and, insertion of new sections 8A,  9B,  9C,  10A,  10C,  11B,
11C, 12A, 15A, 17A, 20A, 30B, 30C and Fourth Schedule.

These amendments brought in vogue: (i) auction to  be  the  sole  method  of
allotment; (ii) extension of tenure of  existing  lease  from  the  date  of
their last renewal to March 31, 2030 (in the  case  of  captive  mines)  and
till March 31, 2020 (for the merchant miners)  or  till  the  completion  of
renewal already granted, if any, or a period of 50 years from  the  date  of
grant of such lease; (iii) establishment of District Mineral Foundation  for
safeguarding interest of persons  affected  by  mining  related  activities;
(iv) setting up of a National  Mineral  Exploration  Trust  created  out  of
contributions from the mining lease holders, in order to  have  a  dedicated
fund  for  encouraging  exploration  and  investment;  (v)  removal  of  the
provisions requiring 'previous approval' from  the  Central  Government  for
grant of mineral concessions in case of important minerals  like  iron  ore,
bauxite, manganese etc. thereby making  the  process  simpler  and  quicker;
(vi) introduction of stringent penal  provisions  to  check  illegal  mining
prescribing higher penalties up to ?5 lakhs per hectare and imprisonment  up
to 5 years; and (vii) further empowering the  State  Government  to  set  up
Special Courts for trial of offences under the Act.

Newly inserted provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015 are to be examined  and
interpreted keeping in view the aforesaid method of  allocation  of  mineral
resources through auctioning, that has  been  introduced  by  the  Amendment
Act, 2015.  Amended Section 11 now makes it clear  that  the  mining  leases
are to be granted by auction.  It is for this reason  that  sub-section  (1)
of Section 10A mandates that all applications received prior to January  12,
2015 shall become  ineligible.   Notwithstanding,  sub-section  (2)  thereof
carves out exceptions by saving  certain  categories  of  applications  even
filed before the Amendment Act, 2015 came into  operation.  Three  kinds  of
applications are saved.
            First, applications received  under  Section  11A  of  the  Act.
Section 11A, under new avatar is an exception to Section 11  which  mandates
grant of prospecting license combining lease through auction in  respect  of
minerals, other than notified minerals.  Section 11A  empowers  the  Central
Government to select certain  kinds  of  companies  mentioned  in  the  said
Section,  through  auction  by  competitive  bidding  on  such   terms   and
conditions,  as  may  be   prescribed,   for   the   purpose   of   granting
reconnaissance permit, prospecting license or mining  lease  in  respect  of
any area containing coal  or  lignite.   Unamended  provision  was  also  of
similar nature except that the companies which can be selected now for  this
purpose under the new provision are different from the companies which  were
mentioned in the old provision.  It is  for  this  reason,  if  applications
were  received  even  under  unamended  Section  11A,  they  are  saved  and
protected, which means  that  these  applications  can  be  processed  under
Section 11A of the Act.
            Second category of applications, which are kept  eligible  under
the  new  provision,  are  those  where  the   reconnaissance,   permit   or
prospecting license had been granted and the permit holder or the  licensee,
as the case may be, had undertaken reconnaissance operations or  prospecting
operations.   The  reason  for  protecting  this  class  of  applicants,  it
appears, is that such applicants, with hope to get the license, had  altered
their position by spending lot of  money  on  reconnaissance  operations  or
prospecting operations.  This category, therefore,  respects  the  principle
of legitimate expectation.

Third category is that category of applicants where the  Central  Government
had already communicated previous approval under Section  5(1)  of  the  Act
for grant of mining lease or the  State  Government  had  issued  Letter  of
Intent to grant a mining lease before coming into  force  of  the  Amendment
Act, 2015.  Here again, the raison d'etre is that certain right had  accrued
to  these  applicants  inasmuch  as  all  the   necessary   procedures   and
formalities were complied with  under  the  unamended  provisions  and  only
formal lease deed remained to be executed.
      It would, thus, be seen that in all the  three  cases,  some  kind  of
right, in law, came to be vested in these categories of cases which led  the
Parliament to make such a provision saving those rights, and  understandably
so.

Here, the petitioner seeks to cover its case under the third  category  with
the plea that insofar as the State Government is concerned,  it  had  issued
'Letter of Intent'.  The petitioner is treating letter dated May  24,  2014,
which was sent by the State Government to  the  Central  Government  with  a
request to the Central Government to give its approval for grant of  mineral
concessions, as the 'Letter of Intent'.    It is in this hue, submission  is
that the intention behind the said letter is to be seen even if  it  is  not
termed as 'Letter of Intent' and this argument is predicated on   the  words
'by whatever name called'.

No doubt, having  regard  to  the  words  'by  whatever  name  called',  the
expression 'Letter of Intent' is to be given wider  connotation.   It  means
that nomenclature of the letter would not be the determinative  factor.   It
is the substantive nature of the letter in question that would determine  as
to whether it can be treated as the Letter of Intent.  For this purpose,  it
is first necessary to find the meaning that has  to  be  attributed  to  the
term 'Letter of Intent'.  As per the legal dictionary, Letter of  Intent  is
a document that described the preliminary understanding between the  parties
who intend to make a contract or join  together  in  another  action.   This
term has come up for interpretation on few occasions before this Court.   In
Rishi Kiran Logistics Private Limited v. Board of Trustees  of  Kandla  Port
Trust and Others[6], relying upon an earlier decision, this Court held  that
a Letter of Intent merely indicates a party's  intention  to  enter  into  a
contract with other party in future, as can be seen from the following  para
43 thereof, which reads as under:
“43. At this juncture, while keeping the  aforesaid  pertinent  features  of
the case in mind, we would  take  note  of  “the  Rules  and  Procedure  for
Allotment of Plots” in question issued by Kandla Port Trust. As  per  Clause
12 thereof the Port Trust had reserved with itself right  of  acceptance  or
rejection of any bid with specific stipulation that mere payment of EMD  and
offering of premium will not confer any right or interest in favour  of  the
bidder for allotment of land. Such a  right  to  reject  the  bid  could  be
exercised “at any time without assigning any  reasons  thereto”.  Clause  13
relates  to  “approvals  from  statutory  authorities”,   with   unequivocal
assertion therein that the allottees will have to obtain all approvals  from
different authorities and these included approvals from CRZ as well. As  per
Clause 16, the allotment was to be made subject to the  approval  of  Kandla
Port Trust Board/competent authority. In view of  this  material  on  record
and factual position noted in earlier paragraphs we are of the opinion  that
observations in Dresser Rand  S.A.  v.  Bindal  Agro  Chem  Ltd.   would  be
squarely available in the present case, wherein the Court  held  that:  (SCC
p. 773, paras 39-40)

“39...a letter of intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter  into
a contract with the other party  in  future.  A  letter  of  intent  is  not
intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract. …

40. It is no doubt true that a letter  of  intent  may  be  construed  as  a
letter of acceptance if such intention is evident from its terms. It is  not
uncommon in contracts involving detailed procedure, in order to  save  time,
to issue a letter of intent communicating the acceptance of  the  offer  and
asking the contractor  to  start  the  work  with  a  stipulation  that  the
detailed contract would be drawn up later. If such a  letter  is  issued  to
the contractor, though it may be termed  as  a  letter  of  intent,  it  may
amount to acceptance of the offer resulting in a concluded contract  between
the parties. But the question whether the letter  of  intent  is  merely  an
expression of an intention to place an order in future or whether  it  is  a
final acceptance of the offer thereby leading to a  contract,  is  a  matter
that has to be decided with reference to the terms of the letter.”

When the LoI is itself hedged with the condition that  the  final  allotment
would be made later after obtaining CRZ and other clearances, it may  depict
an intention to enter into contract at a later stage. Thus, we find that  on
the facts of this case it appears that a  letter  with  intention  to  enter
into a contract which could take  place  after  all  other  formalities  are
completed. However, when the  completion  of  these  formalities  had  taken
undue long time and  the  prices  of  land,  in  the  interregnum,  shot  up
sharply, the respondent had a right to cancel  the  process  which  had  not
resulted in a concluded contract.”

      {See also Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd.  v.  Maha  Laxmi
Mingrate Marketing Service Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.[7]}.

Applying the aforesaid meaning, can it be said that  letter  dated  May  24,
2014 of the State Government would constitute a Letter of  Intent?   We  are
afraid, answer has to be in the negative. Reason is  simple.   As  mentioned
above, in order to enable the State  Government  to  enter  into  any  lease
agreement/contract with the prospecting  licensee,  'previous  approval'  of
the Central Government was essential.  Unless such approval came, the  State
Government could not communicate  to  the  prospecting  licensee/lessee  its
intention to enter into any contract as  the  pre-requisite  prior  approval
would be lacking.   Therefore,  no  promise  could  be  held  by  the  State
Government to any applicant showing its intention to enter into  a  contract
in the future.  Position would have been different had letter dated May  24,
2014  been  issued  after  receiving  previous  approval  of   the   Central
Government.   However,  that  is  not  so.   This  letter  to  the   Central
Government was only recommendatory in nature and  ultimate  decision  rested
with the Central Government.   It  is  a  different  thing  if  the  Central
Government refuses to give its approval on any extraneous  reasons  or  mala
fides or does not take into consideration  relevant  factors/material  while
rejecting the application, which may form a different cause  of  action  and
may become a reason to  challenge  the  action  of  the  Central  Government
rejecting the application on the grounds that are available in law  to  seek
judicial review of such an action.  However, we are not  dealing  with  that
situation in the instant case.  Our  discussion  is  confined  to  the  plea
raised before us, viz., whether letter dated May 24, 2014 can be  termed  as
'Letter of Intent'.  For the reasons stated above, we are of the  view  that
it  was  not  a  Letter  of  Intent.  The  application  of  the  petitioner,
therefore, would not be covered by clause (c) of Section 10A of the Act.

We are conscious of the fact  that  the  petitioner  herein  had  originally
succeeded in the appeal inasmuch  as  judgment  dated  March  14,  2012  was
rendered giving direction to the State Government to recommend the  case  of
the petitioner, in terms of the MoU entered into  between  the  parties,  to
the Central Government.  This was not done and the decision  was  reiterated
in orders dated April 22, 2014 passed in Contempt Petition (Civil)  No.  374
of 2012.  It is possible that had the State Government  acted  promptly  and
sent  the  recommendations  earlier,  the  Central  Government  might   have
accorded its approval.  However, whether it could have done so or not  would
be in the realm of  conjectures.   Insofar  as  the  Central  Government  is
concerned, no direction was ever given by this Court.  On the  contrary,  it
was categorically observed in the order dated April  22,  2014  in  Contempt
Petition (Civil)  No.  374  of  2012  that  it  would  be  for  the  Central
Government to consider the recommendations of the State  Government  on  its
own merits and in accordance with law.  If that has not  been  done  by  the
Central Government, it cannot be the  subject  matter  of  present  Contempt
Petition.

This  Contempt  Petition,   thus,   stands   closed   with   the   aforesaid
observations.

                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                       (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 15, 2016.
-----------------------
[1]   (2012) 4 SCC 246
[2]   Bhushan Power and Steel Limited & Ors. v. Rajesh Verma & Ors., (2014)
5 SCC 551
[3]   (2010) 13 SCC 1
[4]   (2012) 3 SCC 1
[5]       (2012) 10 SCC 1
[6]   (2015) 13 SCC 233
[7]   (1996) 10 SCC 405

Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases are not even brought to light because of the social stigma attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has been a steep rise in child rape cases. Children need special care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country's future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted. The overturning of a well-considered and well- analysed judgment of the trial court on grounds like non-examination of other witnesses, when the case against the respondent otherwise stood established beyond any reasonable doubt was not called for. The minor contradiction of recovery of one or two underwears was wholly insignificant.”


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    1231   OF 2016
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 5575 OF 2015)


|STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                  |.....APPELLANT(S)            |
|VERSUS                                     |                             |
|SANJAY KUMAR @ SUNNY                       |.....RESPONDENT(S)           |



                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.
                 Leave granted.

Since the matter was fixed for final disposal, counsel for both the  parties
were heard in detail.

It is a case where the respondent herein was charged  for  having  committed
an offence punishable under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian  Penal  Code,
1860 (for short, 'IPC').  After trial, the Additional Sessions  Judge,  Fast
Track Court,  Chamba,  Himachal  Pradesh,  convicted  the  respondent  under
Section 376(2)(f) as well as under Section 506 of the IPC.

The respondent challenged the order by  preferring  the  appeal  before  the
High Court in which he succeeded as the High  Court,  after  revisiting  the
issue, has come to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed  to  prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt.    According to it there  existed  certain
circumstances  which  created  reasonable  doubt  in  the  version  of   the
prosecution.  It has resulted in setting aside the  conviction  recorded  by
the trial court thereby acquitting the respondent.   This  judgment  of  the
High Court is assailed in these proceedings.

In the impugned judgment, the High Court has taken note of  the  prosecution
case.  As there is no dispute that the said version  is  correctly  recorded
by the High Court, we reproduce the same from the said judgment.

As per the prosecution, the prosecutrix, who,  at  the  relevant  time,  was
nine years old, used to reside  at  Dalhousie  with  her  parents.  She  was
studying in VII Standard in Moti Ka Tibba school in Dalhousie.   Her  native
place is Aruwan.  Her grandparents  had  been  living  in  joint  family  at
Aruwan.  Somewhere in the month of December 2009,  during  winter  vacation,
prosecutrix visited the place of  her  grandparents.   She  had  been  taken
there by her mother Babli (PW-1).  While at the place of  her  grandparents,
the prosecutrix was  playing  with  her  younger  brother.   The  respondent
called her to the room on the first floor.  She responded  to  the  call  of
the accused.  On reaching the room, the  respondent  bolted  the  door  from
inside and made the prosecutrix lie on the bed.  Her mouth was gagged.   The
respondent stripped off salwar of the prosecutrix of her one  leg.   He  put
off his trousers.  Thereafter, he laid on the  prosecutrix  and  thrust  his
penis  inside  her  vagina.   She  fell  unconscious.   When  she   regained
consciousness, the prosecutrix found no one in  the  room.   The  respondent
also criminally intimidated the prosecutrix not  to  disclose  this  act  to
anyone, otherwise  she  would  be  killed.   After  10-15  days  again,  the
respondent took the prosecutrix  to  the  same  room  and  committed  sexual
intercourse with her.  Thereafter, the prosecutrix  returned  to  Dalhousie.
Again, after two months, the prosecutrix visited her grandparents  on  seven
days vacation.  During this period also, the respondent  took  her  forcibly
to his own room where he had sexual intercourse  with  her  and  once  again
criminally intimidated her not to disclose  the  act  to  anyone.   After  a
lapse of 2-3 months again, the prosecutrix visited her grandparents and  the
respondent yet again called her to which she did  not  respond  and  slipped
away.  Prior to September  2012,  the  prosecutrix  started  complaining  of
stomach ache and was given medicine by the local doctor.  PW-1 took her  for
treatment at Kakira Hospital on  September  03,  2012.   She  was  medically
checked up  by  Dr.  Jasbir  Kaur  (PW-8).   She  told  the  mother  of  the
prosecutrix that her daughter might have been sexually assaulted  2-3  years
back.  PW-1 enquired from the prosecutrix as to what happened with  her  2-3
years back.  The prosecutrix then  told  her  mother  about  the  respondent
committing sexual intercourse with her three  times  when  she  was  at  her
grandparents place at village Aruwan.  PW-1 shared this  incident  with  her
husband.  They went to the Police Station and lodged complaint (Exhibit  PW-
1/A) on September 06, 2012  before  the  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,
Dalhousie, who forwarded the same  to  the  Station  House  Officer,  Police
Station, Kihar with  endorsement  (Exhibit  PW-12/A)  along  with  OPD  Slip
(Exhibit PW-8/A).  The prosecutrix  was  sent  for  medical  examination  to
Regional Hospital, Chamba.  Dr. Arti  Sharma  (PW-9)  and  Dr.  Richa  Gupta
medically  examined  the  prosecutrix  and  issued  MLC  (Exhibit   PW-9/B).
Thereafter, date of birth of the prosecutrix was  obtained;  the  respondent
was arrested; and he was  also  medically  examined.   After  completion  of
investigation, challan was put up in the  Court  after  completing  all  the
codal formalities.

Prosecution examined as many as twelve witnesses in all to  prove  its  case
against the respondent.  Statement of the respondent under  Section  313  of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) was also recorded wherein  he
pleaded innocence. According to the respondent, a false case has  been  made
out against him due to  personal  enmity  in  the  family.   The  Additional
Sessions Judge,  Fast  Track  Court,  Chamba  convicted  and  sentenced  the
respondent, which has been set aside by the High Court, as noted above.

Though the prosecution examined twelve witnesses, it may  not  be  necessary
to state the deposition of all those witnesses.  The material witnesses  are
PW-1 (mother of the prosecutrix),  PW-2  (prosecutrix  herself),  PW-8  (Dr.
Jasbir Kaur, who had examined the prosecutrix on September  03,  2012),  and
PW-9 (Dr. Arti Sharma, who had examined the prosecutrix after  the  FIR  was
lodged).

PW-1, who is the mother of the prosecutrix, got married thirteen years  back
with Mohinder Singh.  Her daughter was twelve years old  and  son  was  nine
years old.  Her daughter was studying in VII Standard  in  Moti  Tibba  High
School, Dalhousie.  Her daughter used to complain  of  having  stomach  ache
for the past 2-3 months and was taken to the  local  doctor,  who  gave  her
medicine.  The prosecutrix was then taken for treatment to  Kakira  Hospital
on September 03, 2012 where  PW-8  examined  her  and  told  PW-1  that  the
prosecutrix  might  have  been  sexually  assaulted  2-3  years  back.   The
prosecutrix was given medicine for  10-15  days.   On  returning  home,  she
enquired from her daughter as to what had happened with her 2-3 years  back.
 Her daughter told that the  respondent  had  sexual  intercourse  with  her
three years  back  when  she  was  away  at  her  grandparents  place.   The
respondent was real brother of her husband and uncle of her  daughter.   Her
daughter narrated that three years back when she was with  her  grandparents
at Aruwan, the respondent came and called her to the  room.   Her  daughter,
being niece of accused,  responded  to  his  call  and  went  to  the  room.
Thereafter, the respondent bolted the door from inside and committed  sexual
intercourse with her daughter after putting off her clothes.   Her  daughter
told that the respondent had gagged her mouth  when  started  weeping.   The
respondent had criminally intimidated her daughter not to disclose  this  to
anyone.  Her daughter also told that the  respondent  had  committed  sexual
intercourse with her three times.  PW-1 then shared this incident  with  her
husband.  They went to the Police Station to lodge  complaint  (Exhibit  PW-
1/A).  In her cross-examination, PW-1 has deposed that her husband  had  not
accompanied her to the Hospital at Kakira.  He stayed at home since  he  was
employed as Chowkidar in the local building.  On the next day,  PW-1  shared
this incident with her husband.  Her father-in-law was having  joint  family
with his two brothers.  All of them resided  together  in  the  same  house.
There were ten rooms in the house of her in-laws  consisting  six  rooms  on
the ground floor and another four rooms on the  first  floor.   Property  of
her father-in-law was joint with his brother.  She  was  not  aware  whether
there was a brawl on May 28, 2012 between her father-in-law and  the  father
of the respondent.  She was not aware whether the matter went to the  Police
and  the  proceedings  were  still   pending   before   the   Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Churah.  She has admitted in her  cross-examination  that  there
were 20-25 persons in the joint family of her in-laws, who resided  together
in the same house at Aruwan.  Her mother-in-law also resided on  the  ground
floor.  All the rooms on the ground floor  were  occupied  by  other  family
members.  She had brought her children after two months when they  had  gone
to avail winter vacation in the month of December 2009.

Statement of the  prosecutrix  (PW-2)  was  recorded  in-camera.  The  trial
court, after putting five questions to her, was satisfied  that  she  was  a
competent witness.  According to her,  her  native  place  is  Aruwan.   Her
grandparents were residing there  in  a  joint  family.  Three  years  back,
during winter vacation, she was at  the  place  of  her  grandparents.   Her
mother had taken her.  She was playing with her younger brother and  younger
cousin when the respondent, who is her uncle, called her to the room on  the
first floor.  She responded to his call.  On reaching the  room,  he  bolted
the door from inside and made her lie on the bed.  He gagged her mouth.   He
stripped off her salwar from her one leg and had put off his  trousers.   He
laid on her and thrust his penis inside her vagina and thereafter  she  fell
unconscious.  When she regained consciousness, she found that there  was  no
one in the room.  The respondent  had  criminally  intimidated  her  not  to
disclose this incident to anyone, otherwise she would be killed.  After  10-
15 days again, the respondent took her to  the  same  room  and  had  sexual
intercourse with her.  Thereafter, she returned  to  Dalhousie.   After  two
months again, she visited her grandparents' home  on  seven  days  vacation.
During her visit, the respondent again took her forcibly to his  room  where
he had sexual intercourse with her.  The respondent  had  again  intimidated
her not to disclose this act to anyone.  After a lapse of 2-3 months  again,
when she visited her grandparents, the respondent called  her  but  she  did
not respond and slipped away.  Thereafter,  she  went  to  the  hospital  at
Kakira with her mother when she developed  severe  stomach  ache  and  while
returning from there, she disclosed to her mother that  the  respondent  had
sexual intercourse with her on her visit to  grandparents  place.   She  was
checked up by a lady doctor.  Her  statement  was  recorded  at  the  Police
Station, Kihar.  She was medically examined.  In her cross-examination,  she
has deposed that white discharge had  commenced  10-15  days  prior  to  her
visit to the hospital at Kakira.  Stomach  ache  started  after  1-2  months
when the respondent had sexual intercourse with her.  She  used  to  have  a
lot of pain in the stomach and often she shared with her mother.   She  went
to Kakira Hospital  on  September  03,  2012.   Lady  doctor  had  medically
examined her.  She did  not  disclose  the  incident  to  her  mother  after
returning home from her grandparents place  and  only  shared  the  incident
with her while returning from the hospital at Kakira.  She did not  disclose
to her mother about the pain  since  she  was  not  aware  that  it  was  an
offshoot of sexual intercourse.  She further stated  that  her  grandparents
are having bedroom on the ground floor.  There were total six rooms  on  the
ground floor.  One room was in possession  of  her  parents  on  the  ground
floor.  The other room was given to her youngest  uncle,  Khem  Raj.   There
were two rooms on the first floor  and  in  one  room,  her  uncle  Res  Raj
resided.  Second room on the first floor was in  possession  of  her  Papa's
uncle.  She has admitted that her grandparents have joint family  consisting
of 20-25 members.  She remained confined with the  respondent  in  the  room
during the act of sexual intercourse for about 9-10 minutes.  During  sexual
intercourse, she had  bleeding.   Bed  sheet  had  blood  stains  where  the
respondent had committed sexual intercourse.  Her salwar  was  also  smeared
with blood stains.  She had a lot of pain and had also raised cries but  her
mouth was gagged by the  respondent.   She  had  not  disclosed  before  the
Police while giving statement that she had fallen unconscious.  She did  not
recall as to how long she remained  unconscious.   The  incident  had  taken
place in the  morning  hours  around  8:00  to  9:00  a.m.   Female  members
returned back to the house after one hour of  the  incident.   She  had  not
disclosed about the incident to anyone since accused had threatened to  kill
her.  She had also not disclosed to her mother out of fear  on  phone  since
she was not  conversant  how  to  make  a  call  on  the  phone.   When  the
respondent took her forcibly to the room, there was  no  one  in  the  close
vicinity.  She screamed but her mouth was gagged.  She had two real  uncles.
 The respondent was the son of her grandfather's brother.

PW-8, Dr.  Jasbir  Kaur,  has  deposed  that  on  September  03,  2012,  the
prosecutrix appeared before her as an OPD  patient  along  with  her  mother
complaining of flatus incontinence (involuntary passage  of  gas).   On  her
vaginal examination, it was found that hymen was ruptured and  her  external
anal sphincter was also torn.  In the opinion of PW-8, the prosecutrix  must
have been sexually assauled forcibly and  since  her  anal  sphincters  were
also not functioning properly, she might have been  sodomised.   She  issued
OPD Slip (Exhibit PW-8/A).  In her cross-examination, PW-8 admitted that  in
the said OPD Slip, parentage and residence proof  of  the  patient  was  not
mentioned.  She has also admitted that there was  over-writing  with  regard
to date on the OPD Slip.  According to her, this over-writing could be  done
by the person who issued the said slip.  She has admitted that she  had  not
given history with regard to internal examination of the patient in the  OPD
Slip.

PW-9, Dr. Arti Sharma, has also  examined  the  prosecutrix.   She  has  not
noticed any injury marks  on  the  whole  body  and  private  parts  of  the
prosecutrix.  She noticed that hymen was torn, vagina admitted  two  fingers
and the prosecutrix had been subjected to sexual intercourse.   It  was  not
possible to say when the said  incident  was  committed.   She  issued  MLC,
which is marked as Exhibit PW-9/B.

We may also mention at this stage that PW-3 proved the date of birth of  the
prosecutrix as April 21, 2000, as per the Birth and  Death  Register.   This
fact is not disputed.   Likewise,  PW-7  Dr.  Ajay  Nath  had  examined  the
respondent and in his opinion  the  respondent  was  capable  of  performing
sexual intercourse.  This fact is  also  not  disputed  by  the  respondent.
Relationship of parties is also not in dispute, i.e., the respondent is  the
son of prosecutrix's grandfather's brother.  In this manner, prosecutrix  is
the niece of the respondent.  It is also not in dispute that the  respondent
was living in the same  house  where  the  grandfather  of  prosecutrix  was
staying.   Insofar  as  the  respondent  is  concerned,  his  statement  was
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein he  deposed  that  he  was
falsely implicated because of some family dispute over the property.

The trial court, after analysing the evidence, found  that  there  were  few
contradictions in the statement of PW-1 and her daughter  PW-2  with  regard
to the period of stomach  ache  and  the  duration  for  which  she  was  on
medication by the local doctor/private chemist.  However, in the opinion  of
the Sessions Court, these  were  very  minor  discrepancies.   The  Sessions
Court noted that the prosecutrix was only nine  years  old  child  when  the
incident happened and she was only twelve years of age when she  deposed  in
the Court and, therefore, it could not be expected of  her  to  report  each
and every fact by giving minute details.  The trial court  further  observed
that both the witnesses withstood the test  of  credibility  as  even  after
undergoing detailed cross-examination their  depositions  on  vital  aspects
remained firm and could not be shaken.

The main argument advanced by the defence before the trial  court  was  that
it was a case of inordinate delay where reporting to the  Police  was  three
years after the incident.  The trial court, however, was  not  convinced  by
this argument.  In the judgment given by the trial court,  detailed  reasons
are given, which will be discussed at the appropriate stage  by  us,  as  to
how, in the given circumstances, the prosecution was  able  to  explain  the
delay.  Taking aid of various pronouncements of this Court on  this  aspect,
the trial court concluded that the said delay had not  dented  the  case  of
the prosecution.  Other argument of the defence that  PW-1,  mother  of  the
prosecutrix, had filed  false  complaint  to  implicate  the  respondent  on
account of family feud was also not found to be convincing.

In the ultimate analysis, the trial court  believed  the  statement  of  the
prosecutrix as true since it was supported by medical  evidence  on  record.
It was found to be trustworthy and not shrouded with any doubt.   The  trial
court pointed out that the statement of  PW-8  clearly  suggested  that  the
prosecutrix was forcefully raped by the respondent and as a result  of  that
her hymen was ruptured and her external anal sphincter was also torn.   Even
internal sphincter was not continence.  She found  that  anal  sphincter  of
the prosecutrix was not functioning properly.  In the opinion  of  PW-8,  on
account of injury to the  prosecutrix's  anal  sphincter,  she  might  be  a
sufferer throughout her life.

Another argument of the defence before the  trial  court  was  that  it  was
impossible that such an incident would have occurred in the house  where  so
many family members lived.  In such circumstances, it could not be  believed
that the respondent would have taken the prosecutrix  to  the  room  on  the
first floor and  committed  sexual  intercourse.   This  argument  was  also
brushed  aside  by  the  trial  court  pointing  out  that,  in  her  cross-
examination, the prosecutrix has stated that the incident  had  taken  place
in the morning hours, around 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.  Female members  of  the
family returned back to the house  after  one  hour  of  the  incident.  The
prosecutrix had stated that she had not  disclosed  about  the  incident  to
anyone since the respondent had threatened to kill  her  and  also  did  not
disclose to her mother on phone, out of fear.   She was not  conversant  how
to make a call on phone.  The Sessions Court found  that  the  testimony  of
the prosecutrix appeared to be true.  It could not have been expected  of  a
child of tender age to narrate the incident or share the happening with  her
to anyone when she had been put under fear by the accused.  Even  she  could
not disclose this incident to her mother.  Her testimony that  she  did  not
disclose to her mother out  of  fear  on  phone  appeared  probable  to  the
Session Court, keeping in view her tender age.

Concluding that the deposition of the prosecutrix was found to  be  credible
and trustworthy, which was sufficient to convict the accused person even  in
the absence of any corroboration, insofar as the present case is  concerned,
the medical evidence supported her version.  On this  basis,  conviction  of
the respondent was recorded under Sections 376(2)(f) and 506 of the IPC.

Before the High Court, the respondent made same arguments in order to  shake
the case of the  prosecution  and  argued  that  the  trial  court  did  not
consider these arguments in the right perspective.   The  High  Court  found
the arguments of the defence as convincing, inasmuch as,  according  to  the
High Court:
(a)   FIR was lodged much belatedly, which  was  fatal  to  the  prosecution
when the delay was not satisfactorily explained;
(b)   there were 20-25 persons in the joint family who resided  together  in
the same house in Aruwan.   As  per  the  prosecution,  since  the  incident
happened at 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., it was not believable that  where  there
is a joint family consisting of 20-25 members, such an incident  could  take
place;
(c)   even if some of the members of the family were not found to be in  the
house at the time of incident, the  prosecutrix  was  supposed  to  disclose
this incident to the other members of  the  family,  including  her  mother,
when she met her;
(d)   according to the  prosecutrix,  her  salwar  was  smeared  with  blood
stains and it could not have gone unnoticed;
(e)   in a house of ten rooms occupied by 20-25 persons, if the  prosecutrix
had screamed, it would not have gone unnoticed;
(f)   there was a dispute between the parties, which was apparent  from  the
contents of Exhibit DW-1/A, which could have been  the  reason  for  lodging
the complaint belatedly on September 06, 2012;
(g)   even when the incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to  her  mother
on September 03, 2012, the complaint was lodged three days thereafter,  i.e.
on September 06, 2012, which was also fatal.

Learned counsel for  the  State  made  an  endeavour  to  tear  through  the
reasoning given by the High  Court  with  the  submission  that  these  were
hardly any reasons to give benefit of doubt to the respondent having  regard
to the impeccable testimony of the prosecutrix  herself,  more  particularly
when that is to be read along with the deposition of PW-1  (her  mother)  as
well as medical evidence.  He submitted that the High Court did  not  go  in
the right direction while analysing the evidence on record, inasmuch as,  it
totally ignored the principles on which such depositions are to be  analysed
and adjudged.  It was also argued that the delay  in  reporting  the  matter
was satisfactorily explained, which was  accepted  by  the  trial  court  on
sound reasoning.  He also submitted that presence  of  other  persons  in  a
joint family in such a big  house  was  totally  inconsequential  which  was
given undue importance by the High Court.  It  was  also  submitted  by  him
that the alleged dispute between the parties could not have  been  a  reason
for the mother of the prosecutrix to make a false FIR thereby  exposing  her
minor daughter of tender age in a  charge  of  this  kind  and  putting  her
future in jeopardy.  He read out from the reasons given by the  trial  court
discussing all these aspects in detail and submitted that  the  High  Court,
in the impugned judgment, has not at all stated as to how  the  trial  court
went wrong in its analysis of the evidence.

Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand,  submitted  that  the
reasons given by the High Court were strong  and  formidable  reasons  which
are sufficient to put considerable dent on the veracity of  the  prosecution
case and, therefore, the High Court rightly held  that  the  charge  against
the respondent could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt  thereby  rightly
giving the benefit of doubt to the respondent.   He  also  relied  upon  the
discussion contained in the judgment of  the  High  Court  and  the  reasons
given by the High Court in quashing the verdict of  conviction  against  the
respondent.

We have already narrated  the  case  of  the  prosecution  as  well  as  the
testimonies of the prosecutrix, her mother PW-1 and  the  medical  evidence.
After going through the evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother, we  find
that apart from some minor and trivial  discrepancies  with  regard  to  the
period  of  stomach  ache  or  about  the  medicine  taken  from  the  local
doctor/chemist,  insofar  as  material  particulars  of  the  incident   are
concerned, version of both these witnesses  is  in  sync  with  each  other.
Here is a case where charge of sexual assault on a girl aged nine  years  is
leveled.  More pertinently, this is to be  seen  in  the  context  that  the
respondent, who is accused of the crime, is the uncle in  relation.   Entire
matter has to be examined in this perspective taking into consideration  the
realities of life that prevail in Indian social milieu.

As per the prosecutrix, she was called by the respondent to his room,  which
is on the first floor of the house.  Unmindful of what could be  the  motive
of an uncle  to  call  her,  she  obliged  as  a  dutiful  child.   However,
according to the prosecution, unfortunate incident  happened.   It  happened
with a nine year old child who was totally unaware of the catastrophe  which
had befallen her.  Her mental faculties had not developed fully; she was  in
the age of innocence; unaware of the dreadful consequences. Further, at  the
time when she was being sexually assaulted, her mouth  was  gagged  so  that
she was not able to scream and after the incident she was threatened not  to
disclose this incident to anybody.  In fact, she kept mum out of this  fear.
 It is quite understandable that a nine year  old  child,  after  undergoing
traumatic experience and inflicted with threats, would be frozen  with  fear
and she could not find voice to  speak  against  her  uncle.   In  cases  of
incestuous abuse, more often, silence is  built  into  the  abuse.  Incident
came to light and tragedy struck on the prosecutrix  only  when  her  mother
noticed that she was continuously  suffering  from  stomach  ache  and  was,
therefore, taken to a Gynecologist for her treatment.  But  for  the  above,
matter may not have come to light.  It is only after  she  was  examined  by
Dr. Jasbir Kaur (PW-8), who had medically examined and  formed  the  opinion
that the prosecutrix had been sexually assaulted forcibly  about  2-3  years
ago, since her hymen was ruptured and her external and  internal  sphincters
were also torn, that PW-1 queried  the  prosecutrix  and  she  revealed  the
incident, hitherto hidden by her from the entire  world  out  of  fear,  not
only as a result of the threats extended by the respondent  but  for  varied
other reasons.

When the matter is examined in  the  aforesaid  perspective,  which  in  the
opinion of this Court is the right perspective, reluctance on  the  part  of
the prosecutrix in not narrating the incident to anybody  for  a  period  of
three years and not sharing the same  event  with  her  mother,  is  clearly
understandable.  We would like to extract the  following  passage  from  the
judgment of this Court in Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa[1]:
“5.   We  shall  first  deal  with  the  question  of  delay.  The   unusual
circumstances satisfactorily explained the delay in  lodging  of  the  first
information report.  In  any  event,  delay  per  se  is  not  a  mitigating
circumstance for the accused when accusations of rape  are  involved.  Delay
in lodging the first information report cannot  be  used  as  a  ritualistic
formula for discarding the prosecution case and doubting  its  authenticity.
It only puts  the  court  on  guard  to  search  for  and  consider  if  any
explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is  offered,  the  court
is to  only  see  whether  it  is  satisfactory  or  not.  In  case  if  the
prosecution  fails  to  satisfactorily  explain  the  delay  and  there   is
possibility of embellishment or exaggeration in the prosecution  version  on
account of such  delay,  it  is  a  relevant  factor.  On  the  other  hand,
satisfactory explanation of the delay is weighty enough to reject  the  plea
of false implication or  vulnerability  of  the  prosecution  case.  As  the
factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware  of  the  catastrophe
which had befallen her. That being so, the mere  delay  in  lodging  of  the
first information report does not in any way render the prosecution  version
brittle.”

In Karnel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh[2], this Court observed that:
“7...The submission overlooks the fact that in  India  women  are  slow  and
hesitant to complain of such assaults and if the prosecutrix happens  to  be
a married person she will not do anything  without  informing  her  husband.
Merely because the complaint was lodged less than promptly  does  not  raise
the inference that the complaint was false. The  reluctance  to  go  to  the
police is because of society's attitude towards such women; it  casts  doubt
and shame upon her rather than comfort and sympathise with  her.  Therefore,
delay in lodging complaints in such  cases  does  not  necessarily  indicate
that her version is false...”

Likewise, in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.[3], it was observed:
“8...The courts cannot overlook the fact that in sexual  offences  delay  in
the lodging of the FIR can be due to variety  of  reasons  particularly  the
reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police  and
complain  about  the  incident  which  concerns  the   reputation   of   the
prosecutrix and the honour of her family. It is only after giving it a  cool
thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged...”

Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court accepted the  explanation  for
delay as satisfactory by giving detailed reasons, we are  dismayed  to  find
that the High Court has been swayed by this delay in  reporting  the  matter
with omnibus statement that it is not satisfactorily explained without  even
an  iota  of  discussion  on  the  explanation  that  was  offered  by   the
prosecution in the form of testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2.

It seems that the main reason which has influenced  the  mind  of  the  High
Court is that there were 20-25 persons in the joint family and some of  them
were bound to be in the house at the time of the  incident  and,  therefore,
it was not possible that such an incident  would  go  unnoticed  if  it  had
actually happened.  This is coupled with the fact that  the  salwar  of  the
prosecutrix was smeared  with  blood  stains,  which  could  not  have  gone
unnoticed. Here again, the High Court has gone by the  aforesaid  two  facts
without going into the details and the discussion  is  totally  perfunctory.
The aforesaid two facts are simply noted and on that basis  the  prosecution
version is discarded as unbelievable. These may have been  relevant  factors
only if there was absence of any explanation by  the  prosecution  on  these
aspects.  In the first instance, it may be noticed  that  the  room  of  the
respondent was  on  the  first  floor  where  the  prosecutrix  was  called.
Defence has nowhere  stated  that  on  the  first  floor  there  were  rooms
adjacent to the room of the respondent and there were other members  of  the
family.  What is smoke-screened  in  the  process  is  that  in  the  cross-
examination the prosecutrix  categorically  stated  that  the  incident  had
taken place in the morning hours around 8:00  a.m.  to  9:00  a.m.  and  the
female members returned back to the house after one hour  of  the  incident.
It also came  in  her  cross-examination  that  during  the  act  of  sexual
intercourse, she remained confined in the room for about 9-10 minutes.   She
raised screams but her mouth was gagged.  Her confinement by the  respondent
on the first floor for about 9-10 minutes was insignificant  and  would  not
have been taken note of by the other family  members  who  might  have  been
present there.  Further, nobody could notice as her screams were  doused  by
gagging her  mouth.   Her  statement  also  suggests  that  she  had  fallen
unconscious and on regaining consciousness she did not find  anyone  in  the
room.  After she  came  out  of  the  room,  she  obviously  refrained  from
disclosing the incident to anyone because of the threat extended to  her  by
the respondent.  In such a situation, obviously the prosecutrix had  ensured
that her salwar which was smeared with blood  stains  is  not  seen  by  any
person.

Likewise, delay of three days in lodging the FIR by  PW-1,  after  eliciting
the information from her daughter PW-2, is inconsequential in the  facts  of
this case.  It is not to  be  forgotten  that  the  person  accused  by  the
prosecutrix was none else than her  Uncle.   It  is  not  easy  to  lodge  a
complaint of this nature exposing prosecutrix to the risk of  social  stigma
which unfortunately still prevails in our society.  A decision to lodge  FIR
becomes more difficult and hard when accused happens to be a family  member.
 In fact, incestuous abuse is still regarded as a taboo to be  discussed  in
pubic.  This reticence  hurts  the  victims  or  other  family  members  who
struggle to report.  After all, in such a situation, not only the honour  of
the family is at stake, it may antagonize other relations  as  well,  as  in
the first blush, such other members of family would not take charge of  this
nature very kindly.  We also find that the  so-called  dispute  between  the
parties was so trivial in nature that it would not  have  prompted  PW-1  to
lodge a false complaint, putting her minor daughter  of  impressionable  age
to risks of serious kinds, as pointed out above.

By no means, it is suggested that whenever such  charge  of  rape  is  made,
where the victim is a child, it has to be treated as a gospel truth and  the
accused person has to be convicted.  We have  already  discussed  above  the
manner in which testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and  analysed
in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of  the
victim is trustworthy.  At the same time, after taking all  due  precautions
which are necessary, when it is found that the prosecution version is  worth
believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that  is  needed  in
such cases.  In such a situation one has to take stock of the  realities  of
life as well.  Various studies show that in more  than  80%  cases  of  such
abuses,  perpetrators  have  acquaintance  with  the  victims  who  are  not
strangers.  The danger is more  within  than  outside.  Most  of  the  time,
acquaintance rapes, when the culprit  is  a  family  member,  are  not  even
reported for various reasons, not difficult to fathom. The  strongest  among
those is the fear of attracting social  stigma.   Another  deterring  factor
which many  times  prevent  such  victims  or  their  families  to  lodge  a
complaint is that  they  find  whole  process  of  criminal  justice  system
extremely intimidating coupled with absence of victim protection  mechanism.
 Therefore, time is ripe to bring about significant reforms in the  criminal
justice system as well.  Equally, there is  also  a  dire  need  to  have  a
survivor centric approach towards victims of sexual violence,  particularly,
the children, keeping in view the traumatic long  lasting  effects  on  such
victims.

After thorough analysis of all relevant and attendant  factors,  we  are  of
the opinion that none of the grounds, on which the High  Court  has  cleared
the respondent, has any merit. By now it is well settled that the  testimony
of a victim in cases of sexual  offences  is  vital  and  unless  there  are
compelling  reasons  which  necessitate  looking  for  corroboration  of   a
statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the  testimony  of
the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused.  No doubt,  her
testimony has to inspire confidence.  Seeking corroboration to  a  statement
before relying upon the same as a  rule,  in  such  cases,  would  literally
amount to adding insult to injury.  The deposition of the  prosecutrix  has,
thus, to be taken as a whole.  Needless to  reiterate  that  the  victim  of
rape is not an accomplice  and  her  evidence  can  be  acted  upon  without
corroboration.  She stands at a higher  pedestal  than  an  injured  witness
does.  If the court finds it difficult to accept her version,  it  may  seek
corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her  version.   To
insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases,  is  to  equate
one who is a victim of the lust of another with an  accomplice  to  a  crime
and thereby insult womanhood.  It would be adding insult to  injury to  tell
a woman  that  her  claim  of  rape  will  not  be  believed  unless  it  is
corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice  to  a
crime.  Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman  who  complains  of
rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted  with
lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion?  The plea  about  lack  of
corroboration has no substance {See Bhupinder Sharma v.  State  of  Himachal
Pradesh[4]}.  Notwithstanding this legal position, in the instant  case,  we
even  find  enough  corroborative  material  as  well,  which  is  discussed
hereinabove.

From the evaluation of the  prosecution  material  discussed  above,  it  is
abundantly clear that the  evidence  brought  on  record  contains  positive
proof, credible sequence of events and factual truth linking the  respondent
with rape of the prosecutrix and had  criminally  intimidated  her.   Hence,
respondent is found to be guilty for offence under  Sections  376(2)(f)  and
506 of IPC since he committed rape with a minor girl aged  nine  years.   It
is pertinent to point out at this stage that at the time  of  deposition  of
the prosecutrix in the Court, the trial court had an opportunity to see  her
demeanor.  On that basis, the trial court in the judgment had  commented  as
under:
“66.  The statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence even though  a  child
witness since while deposing in the Court her demeanor  appeared  like  that
of competent witness and no likelihood  of  tutor.   I  find  her  testimony
reliable since she was found competent to depose after  preliminary  inquiry
as she understood questions and to  give  rational  answers.   I  have  gone
through her  statement  with  extra  caution  and  full  of  circumspection.
Therefore, I have no hesitation to believe her statement.”

At this juncture, we would also like  to  reproduce  the  following  passage
from the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash[5]:
“19. Child rape cases  are  cases  of  perverse  lust  for  sex  where  even
innocent children are not  spared  in  pursuit  of  sexual  pleasure.  There
cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime  against  humanity.
Many such cases are not even brought to light because of the  social  stigma
attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has been a steep rise  in
child rape cases. Children need special care and protection. In such  cases,
responsibility on the shoulders of the courts  is  more  onerous  so  as  to
provide proper legal  protection  to  these  children.  Their  physical  and
mental immobility  call  for  such  protection.  Children  are  the  natural
resource of our country. They are the country's  future.  Hope  of  tomorrow
rests on them. In our  country,  a  girl  child  is  in  a  very  vulnerable
position and one of the modes of her  exploitation  is  rape  besides  other
modes of sexual abuse. These factors  point  towards  a  different  approach
required to be adopted. The  overturning  of  a  well-considered  and  well-
analysed judgment of the trial court  on  grounds  like  non-examination  of
other witnesses, when  the  case  against  the  respondent  otherwise  stood
established beyond any reasonable  doubt  was  not  called  for.  The  minor
contradiction  of  recovery  of   one   or   two   underwears   was   wholly
insignificant.”

In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside  the  judgment  of  the  High
Court  and  restore  the  conviction  recorded  by  the  trial  court.   The
respondent shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of twelve  years
for the offence under Section  376(2)(f)  and  shall  also  pay  a  fine  of
?50,000, failing which he shall undergo further sentence of  one  year.   He
is also convicted for committing offence under Section 506 IPC for which  he
is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two  years.   Both  the  sentences
shall run concurrently.  The respondent be taken into custody  forthwith  to
serve out his remaining sentence.


                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                       (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 15, 2016.
-----------------------
[1]   (2003) 8 SCC 590
[2]   (1995) 5 SCC 518
[3]   (1996) 2 SCC 384
[4]   (2003) 8 SCC 551
[5]   (2002) 5 SCC 745

MOHAMMED ZUBAIR CORPORAL NO.781467-G Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 8643 OF 2009

MOHAMMED ZUBAIR CORPORAL NO.                       .....APPELLANT
781467-G



                                   Versus



UNION              OF               INDIA               &               ORS.
.....RESPONDENTS


                                    With

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 8644 OF 2009



                               J U D G M E N T





Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

CIVIL APPEAL No. 8644 OF 2009


      The Appellant was enrolled as an Airman in the Indian Air Force on  19
December 2001.  After enrolment he was sent for training  and  was  assigned
the trade of Workshop Fitter (B).  On 1 September 2004 he was  posted  to  3
Base Repair  Depot  at  Chandigarh.   On  10  January  2005,  the  Appellant
submitted an application seeking permission to keep  a  beard  on  religious
grounds, since he is a Muslim.  The  Air  Officer  Commanding  rejected  the
application on 1 February 2005 and the Appellant was informed on 9  February
2005 of the rejection, which was on the  ground  of  the  Air  Headquarters’
Policy dated 24 February 2003.  On 22 March  2005  the  Appellant  submitted
another application to the Air Officer  Commanding  seeking  reconsideration
of the earlier decision.  He was granted an interview with him  on  10  June
2005, when he was informed of the necessity to maintain  uniformity  amongst
Air Force personnel because of which his request had been rejected. The  Air
Officer Commanding, however, addressed a communication dated  23  June  2005
to the Headquarters Maintenance  Command  seeking  a  clarification  on  the
legal issues raised by the Appellant.  In the meantime on 20 June  2005  the
Appellant proceeded on annual leave.  When he returned on 1 August 2005,  he
was found to sport a beard.  On 1  August  2005  he  was  informed  by  Wing
Commander that contrary to Air Force Regulations, he was  found  to  have  a
beard while in service uniform.   The Appellant was instructed to shave  off
his beard and to report at 0700 hrs on 2 August 2005, failing which  it  was
stated that "severe disciplinary action" would  be  initiated  against  him.
The Appellant declined to shave off his beard.   Since  in  the  meantime  a
clarification had been sought from HQ -MC, he was permitted to grow a  beard
on a provisional basis until his earlier application was  finalised.   By  a
communication dated 26 August 2005 HQ-MC Nagpur, informed  3  BRD,  AF  that
under the current policy of the Air Force (Area HQ/C 23406/24/PS)  dated  24
February 2003 and 9 July 2003 an Airman was not permitted to  have  a  beard
on religious  grounds.   On  receipt  of  this  letter,  the  Appellant  was
directed  to  shave  off  his  beard  and  informed  that  the   provisional
permission granted to him on 3 August 2005 was withdrawn.

2     On 17 September 2005 the Appellant filed a writ  petition  before  the
Punjab & Haryana High Court in which by an interim order dated 20  September
2005 a Single Judge stayed the operation of the  Air  Force  order  dated  5
September 2005.   The  Air  force  authorities  moved  the  High  Court  for
vacating the interim stay but the application was dismissed  on  9  February
2006.  A Special Leave Petition  was  filed  before  this  Court  which  was
disposed of on 28 September 2007  with  a  request  to  the  High  Court  to
dispose of the petition expeditiously.  By an order of the High Court  dated
14 July 2008 the writ petition was dismissed.  A Letters Patent  Appeal  was
dismissed by the High Court on 31 July 2008.  In the meantime, a  notice  to
show cause was issued to the Appellant calling upon him  to  explain  as  to
why he should not be discharged from service.  In reply to the  notice,  the
Appellant  asserted  his  right  to  retain  a  beard.   The  Appellant  was
eventually discharged from service under Rule 15(2)(g)(ii) of the Air  Force
Rules 1969 on 1 September 1997.

3     In the writ proceedings before the High Court, which  were  instituted
on 17 September 2005 the Appellant sought the following reliefs :

“a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction  for
quashing of Annexure P-5 vide  which  the  petitioner,  a  Muslim  has  been
directed to shave his beard by 20.092005,  the  same  (Annexure  P-5)  being
illegal, without any sanction of law  and  in  contravention  of  Regulation
425(b) of the Regulations of the Indian Air Force and policy  letters  dated
08.05.1980 and 10.08.1982 (Annexures P-1 and P-2);

            With a further prayer that the operation of the  impugned  order
(Annexure P-5) may kindly be stayed till the disposal of this writ  petition
since Air Force Regulations and policies explicitly confer  upon  Muslims  a
right to sport beard and provide for no discretion  to  the  respondents  to
take away this right under any circumstance”.



The challenge was to the direction issued to the Appellant to shave off  his
beard on 20 September 2005 on the ground that it was contrary to  Regulation
425(b) of the Regulations governing the Indian Air Force and to  the  policy
letters of 8 May 1980 and 10 August 1982.  Even prior to the institution  of
the  writ  petition,  the  Appellant  had  been  discharged  from   service.
Strictly speaking a mere challenge to the direction by which he  was  called
upon to shave off his beard would not subserve the cause  of  the  Appellant
once he stood discharged from service.  Be that  as  it  may,  the  Division
Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated 31  July  2008  came
to the conclusion that the purpose of Regulation 425(b) is  to  ensure  that
the identity of a person is not altered during the course of service  so  as
to render recognition possible.  The Division Bench  affirmed  the  judgment
of the learned Single Judge to the effect that maintaining a beard  was  not
an integral part of the religion professed by the Appellant.   In  the  view
of the High Court, the matter pertained to the Armed Forces where a  certain
degree of discipline had to be maintained  and  the  rules  and  regulations
broadly accommodate "the basic interest of various religions  in  a  secular
manner".

4     The policy governing the growth of hair,  including  facial  hair,  in
the Air Force has been enunciated  in  paragraph  425  of  the  Armed  Force
Regulations, 1964.  Regulation 425 provides as follows :

“425. Growth of Hair etc. by Air Force Personnel.

Except as in sub para (b), the hair of the head will be kept neatly cut  and
trimmed.  The hair  of  airman  under  detention/sentence  will  be  cut  no
shorter than is customary/ throughout the service except on  medical  advice
and except where on an application made by the airman he has been  permitted
to keep long hair.  Face will be clean shaven.  Whiskers and moustaches,  if
worn will be moderate length.

Personnel whose religion prohibits the cutting of the  hair  or  shaving  of
the face of its members will be permitted to  grow  hair  or  retain  beard.
However, such hair and/ or beards will be kept clean, properly  dressed  and
will not be removed  except  on  medical  grounds  or  on  application  duly
approved”.



Clause (a) of Regulation 425 mandates  firstly,  that  Air  Force  personnel
must keep their hair neatly cut and trimmed.  Secondly, facial hair  has  to
be shaved and  every  airman  must  have  a  clean  shaven  face.   Thirdly,
whiskers and moustaches though permitted have to be of  a  moderate  length.
The rest of the clause deals with Airmen under detention  or  sentence  with
which the present case is not concerned.   Clause  (b)  of  Regulation  425,
however, stipulates that an airman will be permitted  to  grow  hair  or  to
retain a beard where the religion professed by him prohibits the cutting  of
hair or shaving of facial hair.  In that case, the hair  and/or  beard  must
be kept clean and properly dressed and cannot be removed except  on  medical
grounds or on an application which is duly  approved.   The  touchstone  for
being allowed to grow one’s hair or to retain a beard is where  there  is  a
religious command which prohibits either the  hair  being  cut  or  a  beard
being shaved.

5     The Air Force is a combat force, raised and maintained to  secure  the
nation against hostile forces.   The  primary  aim  of  maintaining  an  Air
Force is to defend the nation from air  operations  of  nations  hostile  to
India and to advance air  operations,  should  the  security  needs  of  the
country so require.  The Indian Air Force has over eleven thousand  officers
and one lakh and twenty thousand personnel below  officers  rank.   For  the
effective and thorough functioning of a large combat force, the  members  of
the Force must  bond  together  by  a  sense  of  Espirit-de-corps,  without
distinctions  of  caste,  creed,  colour  or  religion.   There  can  be  no
gainsaying the fact that maintaining the unity of the Force is an  important
facet of instilling a  sense  of  commitment,  and  dedication  amongst  the
members of the Force.  Every member of  the  Air  Force  while  on  duty  is
required to wear the uniform and  not  display  any  sign  or  object  which
distinguishes one  from  another.   Uniformity  of  personal  appearance  is
quintessential to a cohesive, disciplined and coordinated functioning of  an
Armed Force.  Every Armed Force raised in a civilised  nation  has  its  own
‘Dress and Deportment’ Policy.

6     India is a secular nation in which  every  religion  must  be  treated
with equality.  In the context of the Armed Forces, which  comprise  of  men
and women following a multitude of faiths the needs  of  secular  India  are
accommodated by recognising right of worship  and  by  respecting  religious
beliefs.  Yet in a constitutional sense it cannot  be  overlooked  that  the
overarching necessity of a Force  which  has  been  raised  to  protect  the
nation is to maintain discipline.  That  is  why  the  Constitution  in  the
provisions of Article 33 stipulates that Parliament may by law determine  to
what extent the  fundamental  rights  conferred  by  Part  III  shall  stand
restricted or abrogated in relation inter alia to the members of  the  Armed
Forces so as to  ensure  the  proper  discharge  of  their  duties  and  the
maintenance of discipline among them.  Article 33 provides as follows :

“33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights  conferred  by  this  Part  in
their application to Forces, etc.- Parliament  may,  by  law,  determine  to
what extent any of the  rights  conferred  by  this  Part  shall,  in  their
application to-


(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or


(b) the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public  order;
or

(c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation established by  the
State for purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence; or

(d) persons employed  in,  or  in  connection  with,  the  telecommunication
systems set up for  the  purposes  of  any  Force,  bureau  or  organisation
referred to in clauses (a) to (c), be  restricted  or  abrogated  so  as  to
ensure  the  proper  discharge  of  their  duties  and  the  maintenance  of
discipline among them.”

7     In the Indian Air Force, the norms governing the growth  of  hair  and
retention of facial hair is governed by Regulation  425.   Policy  documents
have also been issued from time to time.  On 28 April  1980,  the  Air  Head
Quarters issued a letter responding to queries  made  in  respect  of  Armed
Force  personnel  professing  Islam.   The  letter  opined  that   personnel
professing Islam are covered by the exception under paragraph 425(b) of  the
Regulations and that the beard should be "of such length when covered  by  a
fist no hair shall be visible outside".  Subsequently, on 10 August 1982  it
was stipulated by a policy letter that no permission was required by  Muslim
Air Force personnel to keep a beard so long as the airman  sported  a  beard
at the time of joining service.  However, if  an  airman  who  is  a  Muslim
desired to sport a beard after joining service, he  would  be  permitted  to
submit a formal application informing his commanding officer  of  this  fact
and to sport a beard from that date.  The airman would  not  be  allowed  to
remove the beard except on medical grounds or on an application approved  by
the Commanding Officer.  On  6  October  1999  a  comprehensive  policy  was
formulated in supersession of  the  Headquarters’  letter  dated  10  August
1982.  The policy document  laid  down  that  service  personnel  professing
Islam were not required to obtain formal permission if they already  sported
a beard at the time of joining service.  However, if  a  person  desired  to
grow a beard after joining service, he  was  required  to  submit  a  formal
application to the Commanding Officer who would  ascertain  the  reason  and
ensure that the beard was maintained in a neat, trim and tidy manner.    The
beard would not be allowed to be shaved  off  without  specific  permission.
The provisions in relation to the length of  the  beard  for  Muslim  airmen
contained in the earlier policy were reiterated.

8     In February 2003 the policy was  re-examined  so  as  to  implement  a
common code of conduct applicable to air force personnel.   On  24  February
2003 a  revised  policy  was  issued  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Union
government in the Ministry of Defence in supersession of the earlier  policy
dated 6 October 1999.   Para  2(a)  of  the  policy  governs  personnel  who
profess Sikhism.  Para 2(a) provides thus :

“Sikh  personnel  who  wear  turban  and  keep  beard   at   the   time   of
commission/enrolment  would  continue  to  do  so.   These  personnel   must
maintain the beard neatly dressed/tied and  rolled  and  not  kept  flowing.
They are to wear the turban while in uniform/civil dress whether  inside  or
outside  the  camp  except  during  PT/Games  and  activities   related   to
operations where wearing of turban is not feasible.  At all such  occasions,
Sikh personnel are to wear turban/patka or handkerchief  over  the  knot  of
hair as appropriate.  Sikh personnel keeping short hair  and  beard  are  to
wear turban as applicable to those maintaining long hair”.



Paragraph 2(b) of the policy states thus :

“b)   Only those Muslim personnel who had kept beard  along  with  moustache
at the time of commissioning/enrolment  prior  to  01  Jan  2002,  would  be
allowed to keep beard and moustache.  Such personnel are to maintain  it  in
a manner that it is neat, trimmed and tidy and  not  more  than  the  length
which could be covered by one fist.  Muslims  who  have  grown  beard  after
joining service should shave off  the  beard.   Under  no  circumstances,  a
Muslim person who had beard at the time of joining  service  before  01  Jan
2002 shall be allowed to maintain beard without moustache.  Moustache  would
be a part of the beard”.



Para 2(c) allows non-sikh personnel to sport a  beard  for  a  short  period
towards fulfilment of  specified  religious  rights  and  ceremonies  for  a
period not exceeding thirty  days.   Para  2(c)  stipulates  that  while  in
uniform, the personal appearance  of  an  individual  should  not  give  any
religious bias. Hence Tilak/Vibhuti on the forehead, a thread on  the  wrist
or arm of the airman and a trinket in the ear (etc.) are not to be worn.

9     On 9 June 2003 a letter was issued by the Air Headquarters  containing
a clarification in the following terms :

“4.   In an effort to allay the  fears  or  misconception  of  the  Non-Sikh
personnel,   it   is   clarified   that   all    those    personnel    whose
religion/religious practices demand sporting of beard and  moustaches;  they
could continue to wear the beard as long  as  such  a  permission  has  been
granted to them prior to issuance of this  letter  or  they  had  beard  and
moustaches, as part of their religious practices, at  the  time  of  joining
the Air Force.  In pursuance of this directive,  Commanders  are  to  ensure
that necessary endorsements are made  in  the  personal  documents  of  such
individuals  and  photographs  depicting  such   changes   in   the   facial
appearances are affixed to  them.   The  Identity  Cards  also  need  to  be
changed accordingly”.



The above letter states that personnel whose religion  requires  sporting  a
beard  and  moustache  would  be  allowed  to  grow  a  beard  provided  (i)
permission was granted prior to the issuance  of  the  letter;  and  (ii)  a
beard and moustache was grown at the time of joining the Air Force.

In pursuance of this  directive,  commanders  have  been  required  to  make
endorsements in the personal documents depicting in the photographs  affixed
such changes in the facial appearance.  Identity cards have  to  be  changed
accordingly.   The  policy  document  now  specifically  provides  that   if
permission had been granted to non-Sikh personnel  prior  to  9  June  2003,
they could continue to sport a beard or if they had as a part  of  religious
practice done so at the time of joining the Air Force.

10    During the course of the hearing,  we  had  inquired  of  Shri  Salman
Khurshid, learned senior counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  Appellants
whether there is a specific mandate in Islam which  "prohibits  the  cutting
of hair or shaving of facial hair".   Learned senior  counsel,  in  response
to the query of the  Court,   indicated  that  on  this  aspect,  there  are
varying interpretations, one of which is that it is desirable to maintain  a
beard.  No material has been produced before this  Court  to  indicate  that
the Appellant professes a religious belief that would bring him  within  the
ambit of Regulation  425(b)  which  applies  to  "personnel  whose  religion
prohibits the cutting off the hair or shaving off the face of its  members".
 The policy letters which have been issued  by  the  Air  Headquarters  from
time to time do not override the provisions of Regulation 425(b) which  have
a statutory character.  The  policy  circulars  are  only  clarificatory  or
supplementary  in  nature.     The   policy   letter   of  8  May  1980  did
initially  permit  an  airman  professing  Islam  to  sport  a  beard  of  a
prescribed length.  This was revisited by the Air Headquarters on 10  August
1982 and a distinction was made between the cases of  Muslim  personnel  who
had already sported a beard at the time of joining service  (in  whose  case
no permission was required) and cases where  personnel  desire  to  sport  a
beard after joining service (in which case a  formal  application  informing
the Commanding Officer was required to be submitted).   On  6  October  1999
the Air Headquarters while reiterating this distinction made it  clear  that
if an airman seeks to grow a beard after joining service  he  would  require
the approval of the Commanding Officer who would ascertain the  reasons  for
his decision, advice the individual to maintain the beard in  a  neat,  trim
and tidy manner and that once permitted he would not  be  allowed  to  shave
off his beard.  Evidently, these provisions have been introduced having  due
regard to the security concerns inherent  in  maintaining  identity  in  the
Armed Forces.  Maintenance of identity is a crucial element  in  the  safety
and security of the Forces, particularly in the context  of  the  threat  of
infiltration.  The policy was again revisited on  24  February  2003.   This
time a limited protection was granted for those who had a beard prior  to  1
January 2002 at the time of enrolment but the policy  also  stated  that  no
person would after joining service be allowed to  maintain  a  beard.   This
position was clarified on 9  June  2003  by  stating  that  personnel  whose
religion demands sporting a beard, would be allowed to do so  provided  they
were granted permission prior to the date of  the  letter  or  had  grown  a
beard at the time of joining Air  Force.   So  long  as  the  provisions  of
Regulation 425 (which have a statutory effect)  are  not  breached,  a  mere
policy can be revisited and modulated in the interest  of  the  Force.   The
policy documents are only clarificatory in nature.   Policies  can  be  duly
modified to subserve the best interest of the Force, which  is  inextricably
intertwined with the need to protect the nation  against  grave  threats  of
destabilisation and disorder.  The discipline of this Force is paramount.

11    We see no reason to take a view of the matter  at  variance  with  the
judgment under appeal.  The Appellant has been unable to establish that  his
case falls within the ambit of Regulation  425(b).   In  the  circumstances,
the Commanding Officer was acting within his jurisdiction  in  the  interest
of maintaining discipline of the  Air  Force.   The  Appellant  having  been
enrolled as a member of the Air Force was necessarily required to  abide  by
the discipline  of  the  Force.   Regulations  and  policies  in  regard  to
personal appearance are  not  intended  to  discriminate  against  religious
beliefs nor do they have the effect of doing so.  Their object  and  purpose
is to ensure  uniformity,  cohesiveness,  discipline  and  order  which  are
indispensable to the Air Force, as  indeed  to  every  armed  force  of  the
Union.

12    For these reasons, we see no merit in the Civil  Appeal  No.  8644  of
2009.  The Civil Appeal shall stand dismissed.  However, with no  orders  as
to costs.

13    In the view of the above, Civil Appeal No. 8643 of 2009  is  dismissed
accordingly.


                               ……........................................CJI
                                                   [T S  THAKUR]


                          …................................................J
                                                    [Dr D Y  CHANDRACHUD]


                            …..............................................J
                                                     [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi
December   15, 2016