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Monday, December 12, 2016

whether such appointments were irregular or whether they were illegal should have been determined but has not been considered. Since the issue of regularization is a matter with which the state government is seized, as stated in the proceedings before this Court, we are of the view that at this stage it would be appropriate and proper to set aside the impugned order of the High Court which directs the regularization en masse of two hundred nine daily rated workers. While doing so, we restore the proceedings back to the file of the High Court for reconsideration. We order accordingly, leave it open to the High Court to reconsider the entire matter afresh having due regard to the constitutional and legal principles enunciated and having regard to all relevant factual aspects.

                                                                  REPORTABLE


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL No.    36084     OF 2016
                   SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C)11941 OF 2016
                  (@ out of  SLP (C) CC No. 16091 OF 2016)




STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ORS                   .....APPELLANTS



                                   VERSUS



DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, BANDIPORA            .....RESPONDENT




                               J U D G M E N T



Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The State of Jammu and  Kashmir  seeks  to  challenge  the  orders  dated  1
December 2015 and 10 August 2016 of a Division Bench of the High Court in  a
Public Interest Litigation  instituted  by  the  District  Bar  Association,
Bandipora. The grievance of the Bar Association was that since the  creation
of the district of Bandipora in 2007, the Sessions Court has been housed  in
a building which used to be a part  of  the  Munsif’s  Court  Complex.   The
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate and  Munsif
discharge  their  judicial  functions  in  a  building  which  lacks   basic
amenities.  On 30 November 2013 during the course of a mega Lok Adalat,  the
Administrative Judge expressed the view that a  suitable  plot  of  land  is
urgently required for the District  Court.  This  was  communicated  by  the
Additional Deputy Commissioner to the Tehsildar  on  30  November  2013.   A
direction was sought for the transfer of certain land  which  is  stated  to
have been earmarked for the construction of the District Court  Complex  or,
in the alternative, for the provision  of  a  suitable  site.  Provision  of
proper amenities was sought.



During the course of the hearing of  the  Public  Interest  Litigation,  the
Division Bench noted in an order dated 7 October 2015  that  an  application
had been filed by the daily rated workers  engaged  in  the  High  Court  at
Srinagar (MP1/2015).  The Advocate General informed the Division Bench  that
a direction had been issued by a co-ordinate Bench in a writ petition  filed
by the daily rated workers requiring the State to file its response.

By its interim direction dated 7 October 2015, the  Division  Bench  ordered
thus :

“Respondent – State is duty bound to  consider  claim  of  the  daily  rated
workers  and  as  a  “one  time  exception”   regularize   their   services.
Commissioner  Secretary  to  Government,  Department  of  Law,  Justice  and
Parliamentary Affairs, to file  Status  Report  about  this  aspect  of  the
matter as well before next date of hearing.”



A Special Leave Petition filed by the state government against  the  interim
order of the High Court was dismissed by this Court on 16 December 2015.

On 1 December 2015, the Division Bench issued a further direction  in  which
notice was taken  of  the  fact  that  the  state  government  had,  over  a
considerable period of time, failed to create the required number  of  posts
for the state judiciary.  As a result, and in order to ensure that the  work
of the courts was not hampered, arrangements were made to engage persons  on
a daily wage basis.  The High Court observed that the  state  government  is
duty bound to create an equal number of posts for the  absorption  of  daily
rated employees at the earliest. The observations  of  the  High  Court  are
extracted below :

“It is submitted that considerable period of time, the  Government  has  not
created required number of  posts  for  the  State  Judiciary.  It  is  also
submitted that because of dearth of  staff,  the  work  in  the  courts  was
hampered.  It is also submitted that in order to ensure  that  the  work  of
the courts do not suffer and until  such  time  posts  are  created  by  the
Government, which is the Constitutional responsibility of the State, it  was
deemed necessary to make engagements on daily wage basis.  It  is  submitted
that this step was taken to ensure that the judicial work does  not  suffer.
This class of employees in essence are the substitute for regular  employees
posts which the Government was duty  bound  to  create.  These  Daily  Rated
Workers would not be regulated by the rules governed by SRO 64 of 1994.  The
information has been already provided to the Government about these  persons
who have been engaged in Daily wage Basis and the Government shall  have  to
create equal number of posts in the State  Judiciary  for  their  absorption
which action is to be taken independent of the Rules notified  vide  SRO  64
of 1994.  The information has been already provided to the Government  about
these persons who have been engaged on Daily Wage Basis and  the  Government
shall have to create equal number of posts in the State Judiciary for  their
absorption which action is to be taken independent  of  the  Rules  notified
vide SRO 64 of 1994.  The daily wagers constitute a class in themselves.

The stand taken by the respondents in the aforesaid  additional  information
would not thus affect the rights of the persons who  have  been  engaged  on
Daily Wages Basis in the State Judiciary. The State is duty bound to  create
equal number of posts for their absorption,  inasmuch  as  no  guarantee  of
status as Government employee.  The  State  Government  besides  being  duty
bound to  provide  complete  infrastructure  and  paraphernalia  area  which
include creation of posts are duty bound to create posts are  those  persons
engaged on Daily rated Basis at the earliest”.



On 10 August 2016 when the petition was taken up  by  the  High  Court,  the
Additional  Advocate  General  submitted  that  the  Registrar  General  had
addressed a communication on 23 April 2014 for  the  regularization  of  188
daily rated workers engaged  from  time  to  time  in  the  High  Court  and
subordinate courts. However, the  annexure  enclosed  to  the  communication
contained a list of 228 workers.  Hence, on 27  July  2016  a  clarification
was sought in regard this discrepancy in  numbers.   On  29  July  2016  the
Registrar General clarified that the actual strength of daily rated  workers
in the High Court was 98 (and not 58  as  incorrectly  stated  earlier)  and
that the correct number of workers engaged in the High  Court  and  district
courts together was 228.  The current strength of daily  rated  workers  was
stated to be  209.   The  High  Court  took  the  view  that  following  the
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by this Court  against  its  interim
order the state was duty bound to create 209 posts  for  the  absorption  of
the daily  rated  workers.   The  statement  of  the  AAG  was  recorded  on
instructions that 209 Class IV posts would be created  within  three  weeks.
However, the High Court proceeded to issue a notice to  show  cause  to  Mr.
Mohammad  Ashraf  Mir,  the  then  Commissioner/Secretary   to   the   State
Government in the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs,  for
having  made  an  incorrect  statement  on  15  July  2016  that  the  State
Government had already taken steps for implementing the order  of  the  High
Court to create additional posts.  The State Government is in appeal.





By an order dated 5 September 2016, the Secretary to the Department  of  Law
in the State Government was directed to secure  relevant  information  about
the date of joining of all the daily wage  employees  working  in  the  High
Court of Jammu and Kashmir and to file it on affidavit  before  this  Court.
Pursuant thereto, an affidavit has been filed stating that  the  information
received from the Registrar General of the High  Court  indicates  that  two
hundred and nine daily wage employees are working in the High Court and  the
district judiciary in the State.  The information which has been  placed  on
the record indicates that :





Fifty daily wage employees are engaged in the Jammu wing of the  High  Court
whose dates of engagement fall between August 2001 and March 2015;



Eleven sewaks are employed in  the  Jammu  wing  with  dates  of  engagement
falling between February 2011 and February 2016;



Forty five daily wagers are engaged in the Srinagar wing of the  High  Court
with dates of engagement between May 1998 and January 2015;

Two daily wagers are posted in the main wing, being recruited  in  2008  and
2013;



Thirty seven daily wagers are engaged in ten districts of the  Jammu  region
and sixty four are engaged in twelve districts in  Kashmir.   While  one  of
them in District Kulgam was engaged as far back as in 1984, the most  recent
of those engaged (District Badgam) is in March 2014; and



Of the two hundred and nine daily wage employees, one hundred  and  one  are
engaged in the district courts while one hundred and eight  are  engaged  in
the High Court, both at Jammu and Srinagar.



The first submission that has been urged is that  the  direction  issued  by
the High Court is contrary to the law laid down by this  Court  in  Renu  v.
District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi[1].





The issue which arises must be viewed bearing in mind  the  essence  of  the
judgment of the Constitution Bench  in  Secretary,  State  of  Karnataka  v.
Umadevi[2] and subsequent judgments which followed it. In  the  judgment  of
the  Constitution  Bench,  the  following  two  issues  primarily  fell  for
consideration :

The right of employees seeking regularization on the strength  of  long  and
continuous work; and
The correctness  of  directions  issued  by  courts  for  regularisation  of
employees under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The decision in Umadevi dealt firstly with the right  claimed  by  temporary
employees to be regularised in service on the  basis  of  long  continuance,
legitimate expectations,  employment  under  the  State  and  the  Directive
Principles. The second salient question which  the  Constitution  Bench  was
called upon to answer was whether  courts  would  be  justified  in  issuing
directions for regularisation based on such features such  as  equality  and
long spells of service. On both counts the Constitution Bench  held  against
the temporary employees.
However Umadevi is not an authority for the proposition that  the  executive
or the legislature cannot frame a scheme for regularisation. Uma  Devi  does
not denude the State or its instrumentalities  from  framing  a  scheme  for
regularisation. In paragraph 53 of the decision, this Court held as  follows
:

“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be  cases  where  irregular
appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in State of  Mysore  v.
S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa v. T.  Thimmiah  and  B.N.  Nagarajan  v.
State of Karnataka and referred to in  para  15  above,  of  duly  qualified
persons in duly sanctioned  vacant  posts  might  have  been  made  and  the
employees have continued to work for ten  years  or  more  but  without  the
intervention of orders of the  courts  or  of  tribunals.  The  question  of
regularisation of the services of such employees may have to  be  considered
on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the  cases
above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In  that  context,  the
Union of India, the State Governments  and  their  instrumentalities  should
take steps to regularise  as  a  one-time  measure,  the  services  of  such
irregularly appointed, who have  worked  for  ten  years  or  more  in  duly
sanctioned posts but  not  under  cover  of  orders  of  the  courts  or  of
tribunals  and  should  further  ensure  that   regular   recruitments   are
undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to  be  filled
up, in cases where  temporary  employees  or  daily  wagers  are  being  now
employed. The process must be set in motion  within  six  months  from  this
date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not  sub
judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be  no
further bypassing of the  constitutional  requirement  and  regularising  or
making permanent,  those  not  duly  appointed  as  per  the  constitutional
scheme.”


The third aspect of Umadevi which bears notice is  the  distinction  between
an “irregular” and “illegal” appointment. While answering  the  question  of
whether an appointment is  irregular or illegal, the  Court  would  have  to
enquire as to whether the appointment process adopted  was  tainted  by  the
vice of non-adherence to an  essential  prerequisite  or  is  liable  to  be
faulted on account of the lack of a fair process of recruitment.  There  may
be varied circumstances in which an ad hoc or temporary appointment  may  be
made. The power of the employer to make  a  temporary  appointment,  if  the
exigencies of the situation so demand, cannot be disputed. The  exercise  of
power however stands vitiated if it is found that  the  exercise  undertaken
(a) was not in the exigencies of administration; or (b) where the  procedure
adopted was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution; and/or  (c)
where the recruitment process was overridden by the vice of  nepotism,  bias
or mala fides.  If the appointment process is not vitiated  by  any  of  the
above faults, can it be said that appointments made as an  outcome  of  such
an exercise cannot be regularised under a scheme framed in  that  regard  by
the employer? This is particularly when the  employer  himself  proceeds  to
frame a scheme to bring these employees within the  protective  umbrella  of
regular service without the intervention or command of  a  court  direction.
This is the issue to which we turn. We propose  to  analyse  the  precedents
before formulating the principles.





Dealing with the issue of whether Labour Courts are denuded of authority  to
direct  regularization  pursuant  to  labour  enactments,  this   Court   in
Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana[3],  held
thus :

“34. It is true that Dharwad Distt.  PWD  Literate  Daily  Wages  Employees'
Assn. arising out of industrial adjudication has been considered in  Umadevi
(3) and that decision has been held to be not laying down  the  correct  law
but a careful and complete reading of the decision in Umadevi (3) leaves  no
manner of doubt that what this Court was concerned in Umadevi  (3)  was  the
exercise of power by the High Courts under Article 226 and this Court  under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the matters of public  employment
where the employees have been engaged as contractual,  temporary  or  casual
workers not based  on  proper  selection  as  recognised  by  the  rules  or
procedure and yet orders of their regularisation and conferring them  status
of permanency have been passed.
35. Umadevi (3) is an authoritative pronouncement for the  proposition  that
the Supreme Court (Article 32) and the High Courts (Article 226) should  not
issue directions of absorption, regularisation or permanent  continuance  of
temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc  employees  unless  the
recruitment itself  was  made  regularly  in  terms  of  the  constitutional
scheme.
36. Umadevi (3) does not denude the Industrial and Labour  Courts  of  their
statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of the MRTU  and  PULP
Act to order permanency of the workers  who  have  been  victims  of  unfair
labour practice on the part of the employer under  Item  6  of  Schedule  IV
where the posts on which they have been working exist.  Umadevi  (3)  cannot
be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial  and  Labour  Courts
in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of  the  MRTU  and  PULP  Act,
once unfair labour practice on the part of the  employer  under  Item  6  of
Schedule IV is established.”

The labour legislation in that  case  was  the  Maharashtra  Recognition  of
Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
The decision in Renu v. District and  Sessions  Judge,  Tis  Hazari  Courts,
Delhi[4] dealt with appointments which were shown  to  be  illegal  and  the
outcome of arbitrariness.  It  was  in  that  backdrop  that  the  following
observations came to be made :


“2. This Court had appointed Shri P.S. Narasimha, learned Senior Counsel  as
amicus curiae to assist the Court. The matter was  heard  on  28-1-2014  and
deliberations  took  place  at  length  wherein  all  the  learned   counsel
appearing for the States as well as for the High Courts suggested  that  the
matter  should  be  dealt  with  in  a  larger  perspective  i.e.  also  for
appointments of employees in the High Court and courts  subordinate  to  the
High Court which must include  Class  IV  posts  also.  A  large  number  of
instances have been pointed out on the basis  of  the  information  received
under the Right to Information Act, 2005 of cases not only  of  irregularity
but of favouritism also in making such appointments. It has  been  suggested
by the learned counsel appearing in the matter that this Court  has  a  duty
not  only  to  check  illegality,  irregularity,  corruption,  nepotism  and
favouritism in judicial institutions, but  also  to  provide  guidelines  to
prevent the menace of back-door entries of employees  who  subsequently  are
ordered to be regularised.
27. To say that the Chief Justice can appoint  a  person  without  following
the procedure provided under Articles 14 and 16 would lead to an  indefinite
conclusion that the Chief Justice can dismiss him also without  holding  any
inquiry or following the principles of natural justice/Rules,  etc.  for  as
per Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, power to  appoint  includes
power to remove/suspend/dismiss. (Vide Pradyat Kumar Bose v. High  Court  of
Calcutta [AIR 1956 SC 285] and Chief Justice  of  A.P.  v.  L.V.A.  Dixitulu
[(1979) 2 SCC 34 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 99] .) But as no employee can  be  removed
without following the procedure prescribed by law or  in  violation  of  the
terms of his appointment, such a course would not be available to the  Chief
Justice. Therefore, the natural corollary of this is that the Chief  Justice
cannot make any appointment in contravention of the statutory  rules,  which
have to be in consonance with the scheme of our Constitution.”

This Court considered the modalities adopted by the High Courts  across  the
country  in  making  recruitments  and  issued  directions  to  ensure  that
appointments made by judicial institutions are in accordance  the  principle
of  equality  of  opportunity  enshrined  in  Articles  14  and  16  of  the
Constitution.  Emphasizing  the  principle   of   transparency   in   public
appointment, this Court observed that :

“Another  important  requirement  of   public   appointment   is   that   of
transparency. Therefore, the advertisement must specify the number of  posts
available for  selection  and  recruitment.  The  qualifications  and  other
eligibility criteria for such posts should be explicitly  provided  and  the
schedule of recruitment process  should  be  published  with  certainty  and
clarity. The advertisement should also specify the  rules  under  which  the
selection is to be made and in absence of the  rules,  the  procedure  under
which the selection is  likely  to  be  undertaken.  This  is  necessary  to
prevent arbitrariness and to avoid change of  criteria  of  selection  after
the selection process is commenced, thereby unjustly benefiting  someone  at
the cost of others.

Thus,  the  aforesaid  decisions  are  an  authority  on   prescribing   the
limitations while making  appointment  against  public  posts  in  terms  of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  What has been  deprecated  by  this
Court time and again is “back-door appointments or appointments  dehors  the
rules”.”



The power that is vested in the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  under
Article 229(1) is, the Court held, subject to Article 16 :

“the law can be summarised to the  effect  that  the  powers  under  Article
229(2) of the Constitution cannot be exercised by the Chief  Justice  in  an
unfettered  and  arbitrary  manner.  Appointments  should  be  made   giving
adherence to the provisions of  Articles  14  and  16  of  the  Constitution
and/or such rules as made by the legislature”.

Four fundamental principles emerge from the decision of this Court in  Renu.
 The first principle is that Article 235 enables the High Court to  exercise
complete administrative control over the district  judiciary  which  extends
to all functionaries attached to those courts, including  ministerial  staff
and employees on the establishment. The purpose of superintendence would  be
frustrated if the administrative control of the High  Court  is  not  to  be
exercised over the administrative and ministerial staff. However, the  Chief
Justice of the High Court as a constitutional functionary is subject to  the
mandate of Articles 14 and 16.  No appointment can be made in  contravention
of statutory rules.  Moreover, the rules themselves must be consistent  with
constitutional principles.
The second principle is that employment in the High Courts or in the  courts
subordinate to them  constitutes  public  employment.   All  recruitment  in
matters of public employment must be  made  in  accordance  with  prevailing
rules and orders:
“30. In today’s system, daily  labourers  and  casual  labourers  have  been
conveniently introduced which are followed by attempts  to  regularise  them
at a subsequent stage. Therefore, most of the  times  the  issue  raised  is
about the procedure adopted for making appointments indicating  an  improper
exercise of discretion even when the rules specify a particular mode  to  be
adopted. There can be no doubt that the  employment  whether  of  Class  IV,
Class III, Class II  or  any  other  class  in  the  High  Court  or  courts
subordinate to it falls within the definition of “public  employment”.  Such
an employment, therefore, has to be made under rules  and  under  orders  of
the competent authority.”


Thirdly,  the  date  on  which  the  vacancies  are  likely  to  occur   are
foreseeable with a reasonable amount of clarity and precision.  An  exercise
to fill up vacancies must be undertaken in advance  so  as  to  ensure  that
there is no occasion to appoint persons on an ad hoc basis :
“31. In a democratic set-up like ours, which is governed  by  rule  of  law,
the supremacy of law is to be acknowledged and absence of arbitrariness  has
been consistently described as essence of rule  of  law.  Thus,  the  powers
have to be canalised and not unbridled so as to breach the  basic  structure
of the Constitution. Equality of opportunity in matters of employment  being
the constitutional mandate has  always  been  observed.  The  unquestionable
authority is always subject  to  the  authority  of  the  Constitution.  The
higher the dignitary, the more objectivity is expected to  be  observed.  We
do not say that powers should be curtailed. What we want to say is that  the
power can be exercised only to the width of  the  constitutional  and  legal
limits. The date of retirement of every employee is well  known  in  advance
and therefore, the number of vacancies likely to occur in near future  in  a
particular cadre is always known to the employer.  Therefore,  the  exercise
to fill up the vacancies at the earliest must start  in  advance  to  ensure
that the selected person may join  immediately  after  availability  of  the
post, and hence, there may be no occasion to appoint any person  on  ad  hoc
basis for the reason that the problem of inducting the daily  labourers  who
are ensured of a regular appointment subsequently has to be  avoided  and  a
fair procedure must be adopted giving equal opportunity to everyone.”

The information before the Supreme Court indicated that several High  Courts
have  adopted  a  pattern  of  centralized  recruitment  so  as  to   ensure
transparency and objectivity in the appointment of  ministerial  staff  both
on the establishment of the High Court and in the district courts.
Fourthly, while the High Court is  an  autonomous  constitutional  authority
whose status cannot be  undermined,  it  is  equally  necessary  for  it  to
strictly comply with the rules framed in making recruitments :
“We would like to make it clear that the High Court is a constitutional  and
an  autonomous  authority  subordinate  to  none.  Therefore,   nobody   can
undermine the constitutional authority of the High Court, and therefore  the
purpose to hear this case is only to advise  the  High  Court  that  if  its
rules are not in consonance with the philosophy  of  our  Constitution  then
the same may be modified and no appointment in contravention thereof  should
be made.  It is necessary that there is strict compliance  with  appropriate
rules and the employer is bound to adhere to the norms of  Articles  14  and
16 of the Constitution before making any recruitment.”

The following directions have been issued in Renu for observance by all  the
High Courts :
“35.1. (i) All the High Courts are requested  to  re-examine  the  statutory
rules dealing with the appointment of staff in the High Court as well as  in
the subordinate courts and in case any of the rules  is  not  in  conformity
and  consonance  with  the  provisions  of  Articles  14  and  16   of   the
Constitution, the same may be modified.
35.2. (ii) To fill up any vacancy for any post either in the High  Court  or
in courts subordinate to the High  Court,  in  strict  compliance  with  the
statutory rules so made. In case any appointment is  made  in  contravention
of  the  statutory  rules,  the  appointment  would  be   void   ab   initio
irrespective of any class of the post or the person occupying it.
35.3. (iii) The post shall be filled up by issuing the advertisement  in  at
least two newspapers and one of which must be in vernacular language  having
wide circulation in the respective State. In  addition  thereto,  the  names
may be requisitioned from the local employment exchange  and  the  vacancies
may be advertised by  other  modes  also  e.g.  Employment  News,  etc.  Any
vacancy filled up without advertising as prescribed  hereinabove,  shall  be
void ab initio and would remain unenforceable and unexecutable  except  such
appointments which are permissible to be  filled  up  without  advertisement
e.g. appointment on compassionate  grounds  as  per  the  rules  applicable.
Before any appointment is made, the eligibility as well  as  suitability  of
all  the  candidates  should  be  screened/tested  while  adhering  to   the
reservation policy adopted by the State, etc. if any.
35.4. (iv) Each High Court may examine and decide  within  six  months  from
today as to whether  it  is  desirable  to  have  centralised  selection  of
candidates for the courts subordinate to the respective High  Court  and  if
it finds it desirable, may formulate the rules to  carry  out  that  purpose
either for the State or on zonal or divisional basis.
35.5. (v) The High Court concerned or the subordinate court as the case  may
be, shall undertake the exercise of recruitment on a regular basis at  least
once a year for existing vacancies or vacancies that  are  likely  to  occur
within the said period, so that the vacancies  are  filled  up  timely,  and
thereby avoiding any inconvenience or shortage of  staff  as  it  will  also
control the menace of ad hocism.”


The judgment in Renu underlines the importance of the High  Court  complying
with  statutory  rules  in  matters  of  recruitment.  The   judgment   also
emphasises the need to  abide  by  the  principles  of  equality  and  equal
opportunity in Articles 14 and 16.





The judgment in Renu does not preclude, as a principle of law,  the  framing
of  an  appropriate  scheme  of  regularization  in  appropriate  situations
meeting the norms  spelt  out  in  Umadevi  and  the  decisions  which  have
followed. Dealing with a scheme framed for  regularisation,  this  Court  in
Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa[5] held as follows :

“38. Equally important is the fact that even after declaring the true  legal
position  on  the  subject  and  even  after  deprecating  the  practice  of
appointing people by means other  than  legitimate,  this  Court  felt  that
those who had served for ten years or so may be put to extreme  hardship  if
they were to  be  discharged  from  service  and,  therefore,  directed  the
formulation of a scheme for their regularisation. This was no doubt  a  one-
time measure, but so long as the appointment sought to  be  regularised  was
not illegal, the scheme  envisaged  by  para  53  of  the  decision  (supra)
extracted above permitted the State to regularise such employees. Dr  Dhavan
argued that the  appellant  Stipendiary  Engineers  had,  by  the  time  the
decision in Umadevi (3) case was pronounced, qualified for the benefit of  a
scheme of regularisation having  put  in  ten  years  as  ad  hoc  Assistant
Engineers and fifteen years if their tenure was to be counted from the  date
of their employment as Stipendiary Engineers. He contended that even in  the
absence of a Validation Act,  Stipendiary  Engineers  appointed  on  ad  hoc
basis as Assistant Engineers, who had worked for nearly  ten  years  to  the
full satisfaction of the  State  Government  would  have  been  entitled  to
regularisation of their services in terms of any such scheme.
43. As to what would constitute an irregular appointment is  no  longer  res
integra. The decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.L.  Kesari  ,
has  examined  that  question  and   explained   the   principle   regarding
regularisation as enunciated in Umadevi (3) case. The decision in that  case
summed up  the  following  three  essentials  for  regularisation:  (1)  the
employees have worked for ten years or more, (2) that they  have  so  worked
in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of  the  interim
order of any court or tribunal, and  (3)  they  should  have  possessed  the
minimum qualification stipulated  for  the  appointment.  Subject  to  these
three requirements being satisfied, even if the appointment process did  not
involve  open  competitive  selection,  the  appointment  would  be  treated
irregular and not illegal and thereby qualify for regularisation. Para 7  in
this regard is apposite and may be extracted at this stage :
“7. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to  the  general
principles against ‘regularisation’ enunciated  in  Umadevi  (3)  [State  of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC  (L&S)  753]  ,  if  the
following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10  years  or  more  in  a
duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim  order
of any court or tribunal. In  other  words,  the  State  Government  or  its
instrumentality should have employed  the  employee  and  continued  him  in
service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years.
(ii) The appointment of  such  employee  should  not  be  illegal,  even  if
irregular.  Where  the  appointments  are  not  made  or  continued  against
sanctioned  posts  or  where  the  persons  appointed  do  not  possess  the
prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will  be  considered  to
be  illegal.  But  where  the  person  employed  possessed  the   prescribed
qualifications and was  working  against  sanctioned  posts,  but  had  been
selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection,  such
appointments are considered to be irregular.”
45. The upshot of the above discussion is that not only because  in  Umadevi
(3) case this Court  did  not  disturb  the  appointments  already  made  or
regularisation granted, but  also  because  the  decision  itself  permitted
regularisation in case of irregular appointments, the legislative  enactment
granting such regularisation does not call for  interference  at  this  late
stage when those appointed or  regularised  have  already  started  retiring
having served their respective departments, in some cases for as long as  22
years.”


This would be again evident from the  following  observations  made  by  the
Court  in  Surendra  Kumar   v.   Greater   Noida   Industrial   Development
Authority[6], wherein it was held :

“In the impugned judgment [Greater Noida  Industrial  Development  Authority
v. Surendra Kumar, 2013 SCC OnLine All 9827 : (2014)  102  ALR  418]  ,  the
Division Bench proceeded on the premise as if Umadevi  (3)  case  held  that
the State Government, in no circumstance, can  regularise  the  services  of
contractual employees. In para 53 of  Umadevi  (3)  case,  the  Constitution
Bench carved out an exception by observing that  the  Union  of  India/State
Governments/their instrumentalities should  take  steps  to  regularise  the
services of such irregular employees who  have  worked  for  more  than  ten
years and para 53 reads as under: (SCC p. 42)

13. Considering the facts of the present case on the  touchstone  laid  down
in Umadevi (3) case, it will be seen that the Division Bench was  not  right
in setting aside  the  appointment  of  the  appellants.  More  so,  it  was
nobody's case challenging the appointment  of  the  appellants.  Admittedly,
the appellants were engaged as contractual  employees  from  1994  and  have
completed more than ten years of continuous service with Respondent 1.  They
continued in service not by the orders of the  Court/Tribunal,  but  by  the
decision of the respondents. The appellants  were  regularised  as  per  the
policy decision dated 16-4-2003 taken by Respondent 1 and  approved  by  the
State Government vide Letter dated 5-3-2008. Since the  appointment  of  the
appellants were made pursuant to the  policy  of  regularisation,  the  High
Court was not right in quashing the appointment of  the  appellants  as  the
same were never in question before the High Court. The plea that was  raised
by the appellants was only to seek regularisation with retrospective  effect
from 20-11-2002 and the consequential seniority.”

The difference between irregular and illegal appointments as also the scope
of paragraph 53 of Uma Devi has fallen for consideration in various
subsequent judgments of this Court . These decisions have been adverted to
in State of Karnataka v. G.V. Chandrashekar[7]. In Employees' Union v.
Mineral Exploration Corpn. Ltd[8]. this Court observed as follows :

“39. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to decide the claim of  the  workmen
of the Union strictly in accordance with and  in  compliance  with  all  the
directions given in the judgment by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  State  of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) and in particular, paras 53 and  12  relied  on  by
the learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the  Union.  The  Tribunal  is
directed to dispose of the matter afresh within 9 months from  the  date  of
receipt  of  this  judgment  without  being  influenced  by   any   of   the
observations made by us in this judgment. Both the parties  are  at  liberty
to submit and furnish the details in regard to the  names  of  the  workmen,
nature of the work, pay scales and the wages drawn  by  them  from  time  to
time and the transfers of the workmen made from time to time, from place  to
place and other necessary and requisite details. The above details shall  be
submitted within two months from the date of the receipt  of  this  judgment
before the Tribunal.”

In National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh[9] this Court held thus :
“23. The contention of the  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the
respondents that the appointments were irregular and not illegal, cannot  be
accepted for more than one reason. They were appointed only on the basis  of
their applications. The  Recruitment  Rules  were  not  followed.  Even  the
Selection Committee had not been properly constituted. In view  of  the  ban
on employment, no  recruitment  was  permissible  in  law.  The  reservation
policy adopted by the appellant had  not  been  maintained.  Even  cases  of
minorities had not been given due consideration.
***
25. Judged by the standards laid down by this Court  in  the  aforementioned
decisions, the appointments of the respondents are  illegal.  They  do  not,
thus, have any legal right to continue in service.
26. It is true that the respondents had been working for  a  long  time.  It
may also be true that they had not been paid wages on  a  regular  scale  of
pay. But, they did not hold any post. They were, therefore, not entitled  to
be paid salary on a regular scale of  pay.  Furthermore,  only  because  the
respondents have worked for some time, the same by itself  would  not  be  a
ground for directing  regularisation  of  their  services  in  view  of  the
decision of this Court in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)  753]
.”


In State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma[10]:  this Court held that :

“21. The legal position somehow was uncertain before the  decision  rendered
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Umadevi (3) [(2006)  4  SCC  1  :
2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. It has categorically been stated before us  that  there
was no vacant post in the  Department  in  which  the  respondent  could  be
reinstated.  The  State  had  also  adopted  a  policy  decision   regarding
regularisation. The said policy decision also  has  no  application  in  the
case of the respondent. Even otherwise, it would be  unconstitutional  being
hit by Article 16 of the Constitution of India.”

In Post Master General v. Tutu Das (Dutta)[11] this Court held as under :

“20. The statement of law contained in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4  SCC
1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] cannot also be invoked in this  case.  The  question
has been considered by this Court in a large number of decisions. We  would,
however, refer to only a few of them….
21. In Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Ranjodh Singh [(2007)  2  SCC
491 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 713] referring to paras 15, 16 and  53  of  Umadevi
(3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)  753]  this  Court  observed:  (Ranjodh
Singh case [(2007) 2 SCC 491 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 713] , SCC  p.  500  paras
17-18)

‘17. A combined reading  of  the  aforementioned  paragraphs  would  clearly
indicate  that  what  the  Constitution  Bench  had  in  mind  in  directing
regularisation was in relation to such appointments,  which  were  irregular
in nature and not illegal ones.”

A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Official  Liquidator  v.  Dayanand[12],
held thus :



“75. By virtue of Article 141 of  the  Constitution,  the  judgment  of  the
Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4  SCC  1  :
2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is binding on all the courts including this  Court  till
the same is overruled by a larger  Bench.  The  ratio  of  the  Constitution
Bench  judgment  has  been  followed  by  different  two-Judge  Benches  for
declining to entertain the claim of regularisation of  service  made  by  ad
hoc/temporary/daily wage/casual employees or for  reversing  the  orders  of
the High Court  granting  relief  to  such  employees  —  Indian  Drugs  and
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen [(2007) 1 SCC 408 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S)  270]
, Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. [(2007) 1 SCC 533 : (2007)  1  SCC  (L&S)
346] , Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. L.V. Subramanyeswara  [(2007)  5  SCC
326 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 143] and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan  Bahadur
Singh [(2007) 6 SCC 207 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 441].”

The principles will have to be formulated bearing in mind the  position  set
out in the above judgments. Regularisation is not a  source  of  recruitment
nor is it intended to confer permanency upon appointments  which  have  been
made without following the due process envisaged by Articles 14  and  16  of
the Constitution. Essentially a scheme for regularisation, in  order  to  be
held to be legally valid, must be one which is aimed at  validating  certain
irregular appointments which may  have  come  to  be  made  in  genuine  and
legitimate administrative exigencies. In all such cases it may be left  open
to Courts to lift the veil  to  enquire  whether  the  scheme  is  aimed  at
achieving the above  objective  and  is  a  genuine  attempt  at  validating
irregular appointments.  The  State  and  its  instrumentalities  cannot  be
permitted to use this window to validate illegal  appointments.  The  second
rider which must necessarily be placed is that the principle  as  formulated
above is not meant to create or invest in a temporary  or  ad  hoc  employee
the right to seek a  writ  commanding  the  State  to  frame  a  scheme  for
regularisation. Otherwise, this would simply reinvigorate a class of  claims
which has been shut out permanently by Uma Devi. Ultimately, it  would  have
to be left to the State and its instrumentalities to  consider  whether  the
circumstances warrant such a scheme being  formulated.  The  formulation  of
such a scheme cannot be accorded the status  of  an  enforceable  right.  It
would perhaps be prudent to leave it to a claimant to establish  whether  he
or she falls within the exceptions carved out  in  paragraph  53  and  falls
within the ambit of a scheme that may be formulated by  the  State.  Subject
to the riders referred to above,  a  scheme  of  regularisation  could  fall
within the permissible limits of Uma Devi and be upheld.





The judgment in Renu was delivered on 12  February  2014.   Neither  of  the
orders of the High Court  in  the  present  case  would  indicate  that  the
principles which have been enunciated by this Court have been considered.





The grievances which have been set out on behalf of the state government  in
the Special Leave Petition, and during the course of  the  hearing,  include
the following :



In a Public Interest Litigation  seeking  the  construction  of  a  district
court complex in Bandipora  District  the  High  Court  proceeded  to  issue
directions for the  regularization  of  services  of  daily  rated  workers.
These directions were totally unconnected to the reliefs which  were  sought
in the PIL;
By an order of the High Court dated 7 October  2015,  the  state  government
was directed to consider the claim for regularization  of  the  daily  rated
workers  as  a  one-time  exception  which  required  the  state  government
necessarily to decide on the issue of regularization.  The state  government
has constituted an empowered committee on 19 August  2015  to  inquire  into
the issue of creating posts for  the  regularization  of  nearly  sixty  one
thousand daily rated and casual workers working in  various  departments  of
the state government. These include workers  on  the  establishment  of  the
High  Court  and  the  district  courts;  The  High  Court  has   pre-empted
consideration by issuing a direction for regularisation;

There is a lack of clarity in the  actual  number  of  daily  rated  workers
engaged in the High Court and the district judiciary,  as  well  as  in  the
nature of work performed.  The  list  furnished  by  the  Registrar  General
contains the names of several Sewaks whose services are governed under a  GO
dated 28 July 2016.  All the two hundred nine workers  do  not  perform  the
same job and who among them is eligible to be considered for  regularization
has yet to be determined;

The High Court has proceeded on  the  erroneous  basis  that  the  issue  of
regularization has attained finality.  The dismissal of  the  Special  Leave
Petition by this Court on 16 December 2015 against an interim order dated  7
October 2015 does not conclude the issue.  There is no vested right to  seek
regularization; and

The High Court has erred, in its order dated 1  December  2015,  in  holding
that daily rated workers on the establishment of the High  Court  would  not
be regulated by the rules governed by SRO 64 of 1994.  If  the  Daily  Rated
Workers are to be regularized, the state government should  be  required  to
create a sufficient number of posts for the purpose.


We have adverted to the above grievances in order to  emphasise  that  there
is substantial merit in the submission that  the  High  Court  proceeded  to
issue directions for regularization without  considering  either  the  legal
position enunciated in the judgments of this Court  referred  to  above  and
without considering the prevailing rules and  regulations  on  the  subject.
The High Court has observed in its order dated 1 December 2015 that  over  a
considerable period of  time  the  state  government  has  not  created  the
required number of posts for the state judiciary as a result of  which  work
has been hampered. According to the High Court, appointment of  daily  rated
workers was necessitated to ensure that judicial work does not  suffer.  The
High Court opined that these workers have been rendering work  which  should
have  been  assigned  to  persons  appointed  on  a  regular  basis  against
sanctioned  posts.   It  is  unfortunate,  in  our  view,  that  the   state
government has allowed  the  requirements  of  the  state  judiciary  to  be
neglected over such a long period of  time.   The  need  to  facilitate  the
proper functioning of the  High  Court  and  the  district  judiciary  is  a
constitutional necessity which imposes a non-negotiable  obligation  on  the
state government to create an  adequate  number  of  posts  and  to  provide
sufficient  infrastructure.  The  state  government  is  to  blame  for  the
unfortunate situation which has resulted in a large number of persons  being
recruited on a daily wage basis.

We have already indicated  above  our  conclusion  that  the  direction  for
regularization  was  issued  by  the  High  Court  without  considering  the
relevant constitutional and legal principles. While some of the daily  rated
workers have been engaged over  long  periods  of  time,  others  have  been
engaged as recently as in 2015.   The issue  of  whether  such  appointments
were irregular or whether they were illegal should have been determined  but
has not been considered. Since the issue of regularization is a matter  with
which the state government is seized, as stated in  the  proceedings  before
this Court, we are of the view that at this stage it  would  be  appropriate
and proper to set aside the impugned order of the High Court  which  directs
the regularization en masse of two hundred nine daily rated  workers.  While
doing so, we restore the proceedings back to the file of the High Court  for
reconsideration.  We order accordingly, leave it open to the High  Court  to
reconsider the entire matter afresh having due regard to the  constitutional
and legal principles enunciated and having regard to  all  relevant  factual
aspects.

The Civil Appeal shall accordingly stand disposed  of.  There  shall  be  no
orders as to costs.



                                .........................................CJI
                                                       [T S  THAKUR]


                                …..........................................J
                                                       [Dr D Y
CHANDRACHUD]




                             ..............................................J
                                                           [L NAGESWARA RAO]


New Delhi
December 08, 2016.
-----------------------
[1]

      [2] (2014) 14 SCC 50
[3]

      [4] (2006) 4 SCC 1
[5]

      [6](2009) 8 SCC 556
[7]

      [8] (2014) 14 SCC 50
[9]

      [10](2014) 4 SCC 583
[11]

      [12](2015) 14 SCC 382
[13]

      [14](2009) 4 SCC 342
[15]

      [16] (2006) 6 SCC 310
[17]

      [18]  (2006) 5 SCC 493
[19]

      [20] (2007) 1 SCC 575
[21]

      [22] (2007) 5 SCC 317
[23]

      [24] (2008) 10 SCC 1


interim injunction, restraining the defendants from purporting to act or to give effect to or taking any step in furtherance of the purported deed of transfer dated 5th July, 2007 and the certificate of sale of movable and immovable property dated 5th July, 2007 or from enforcing the same in any manner whatsoever pending the suit.=The learned Single Judge passed an order, refusing the interim order as prayed for in O.A. No. 233 of 2011. The Division Bench, while dismissing the appeal made following observations in Para 62 at page 50: “62. The maintainability of suits, which are pending on the file of the City Civil Court as well as on the file of this Court in C.S. No. 164 of 2011, can be adjudicated in the course of trial and this Court finds some force in the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that the said findings may definitely prejudice their case. Hence, this Court expunge the observations made by the learned Judge with regard to the maintainability of the suit in O. S. No. 12159 of 2010, pending on the file the III Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai and C.S. No. 164 of 2011 pending on the file of this Court.”-The Division Bench as well as learned Single Judge has already noted that hotel has already commenced its operation and contracts have been made with third parties for the operation of the hotel and bookings are also being taken from the customers. We have already noticed the directions issued by Division Bench, directing the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 8 to the suit C.S. No. 257 of 2005 to deposit an amount of Rs. 15.21 Crores which order had done substantial justice between parties. Taking into consideration the overall circumstances, specially when issues raised in C.S. No. 164 of 2011 are yet to be adjudicated, the orders passed by both learned Single Judge and Division Bench, refusing to grant interim injunction in view of the facts as noted above cannot be faulted. 48. In result, the appeals of Robust Hotels & ors. are disposed of by modifying the order of the Division Bench as above. The appeals of EIH Ltd. and ors. are dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 11886-11887 OF 2016
               (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C)NO. 23410-23411 of 2011 )

ROBUST HOTELS PVT. LTD
& ORS.                                       .... APPELLANTS
                                     VERSUS

EIH LIMITED & ORS.                     .... RESPONDENTS

                                    WITH
                    CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 11888-11889 OF 2016
               (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C)NO. 17742-17743 of 2012)
EIH LIMITED & ANR.                        ...APPELLANTS
                                      VERSUS

BALAJI HOTELS & ENTERPRISES
LTD. & ORS.                              ...RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

      Leave granted.
2. These appeals along with connected appeals  although  emanates  from  two
different suits filed by the same plaintiff, but the  parties  being  common
and sequence of  facts  being  inter-related,  we  have  heard  the  appeals
together and they are being decided by this common judgment.

                       Civil Appeal Nos.......Of 2016
                (Arising Out of SLP(C)Nos. 23410-11 of 2011 )

3.    These appeals have been filed against the  judgment  and  order  dated
26th July, 2011 passed by High Court of Madras in C.M.A.  No.  798  of  2011
and MP No. 1 of 2011 arising out of C.S. No. 257 of 2005  renumbered  as  OS
No. 12159 of 2010. Brief facts of  the  case,  necessary  to  be  noted  for
deciding the appeal are:
      The EIH Ltd., Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to,  as  EIH)  to
the appeal is a company which operates a chain of luxury hotels. The  Oberoi
Hotels Private Ltd., Respondent No. 2 owns a brand name 'Oberoi'.
4.    On 26.10.1988 EIH entered into  'Technical  Services  Agreement'  (for
short TSA) with one Balaji Construction (P.)  Ltd.  Predecessors-in-interest
of the 3rd Respondent Balaji Hotels & Enterprises Ltd.  (for  short,  BHEL).
The agreement provided that EIH would provide its  technical  knowledge  and
skill required for operation of hotel, which was being constructed by  BHEL.
Another agreement on January 12, 2000 was  entered  between  BHEL  and  EIH,
where it was recorded that on the request of BHEL, EIH paid Rs. 9 Crores  to
the BHEL by way of financial accommodation which was used  for  construction
of hotel. By supplemental agreement dated June 10,  2000,  it  was  recorded
that in total Rs. 15 Crores 12 Lacs have been received  by  BHEL,  repayment
of which is to be made within 24 months  from  the  date  of  the  principal
agreement dated 12th June, 2000. It appears that amount could not be  repaid
hence another agreement was entered between EIH and BHEL  on  4th  February,
2002. The agreement recorded that, it has now been mutually  agreed  by  the
BHEL and EIH that EIH will no longer participate  in  the  hotel  operations
hence the Technical Service  Agreement  will  be  terminated.  EIH,  further
stipulated that No-Objection to BHEL shall be given for selling, leasing  or
otherwise  transferring  the  hotel  unit  to  any  other  company   whether
subsidiary or not, or to any other company  or  entity  either  directly  or
indirectly or otherwise. It was further agreed that BHEL  shall  refund  the
amount of Rs. 15.12 Crores alongwith interest.

5.    Relevant Clauses F and G of the Agreement, are as follows:

F. It is also agreed by and between the parties that BHEL shall  refund  the
said amount of Rs. 15.12 Crores as mentioned in clause D  above  along  with
interest as applicable on the above amounts  on  the  terms  and  conditions
hereinafter contained.

G. It is also agreed by and between the parties that BICL  will  execute  an
irrevocable guarantee in favour of EIH guaranteeing the payment of the  said
sum  of  Rs/  15.12  Crores  along  with  interest  as  applicable  and   in
consideration of such guarantee, EIH has agreed to  give  BHEL  time  up  to
31st December, 2002 to repay the said sum of Rs. 15.12 Corers with  interest
as applicable.

6.    On  the  same  day,  a  Letter  of  Guarantee  was  issued  by  Balaji
Industrial  Corporation  Ltd.   the   4th   Respondent   in   this   appeal,
unconditionally, absolutely and irrevocably guaranteeing the payment of  Rs.
15.12 Crores, in the event, BHEL did not paid  the  subject  amount  of  Rs.
15.12 Crores within 31st December 2002.

7.    The BHEL  had  obtained  financial  assistance  from   IFCI,  the  7th
Respondent and and Tourism  Finance  Corporation  of  India  Ltd.,  the  8th
Respondent. EIH came to know that Tourism  Finance  Corporation  India  Ltd.
(for short TFCI)  had issued advertisement  inviting  offer  for  take  over
(joint venture) sale of hotel project of BHEL.  The EIH  wrote  to  TFCI  on
8th September, 2002 informing about the agreements entered between  EIH  and
BHEL and further stating that till  sum  of  Rs.  15.12  Crores  along  with
interest is not refunded EIH would have the exclusive right to  operate  the
hotel. BHEL on 8th June, 2004 acknowledged and confirmed the  principal  sum
of Rs. 15.12 Crores being outstanding as per  books  of  accounts  of  March
31st, 2004 with interest. A suit in the High Court of Madras being C.S.  No.
257 of 2005 was filed by EIH against BHEL and others praying  for  following
reliefs:

“The plaintiff prays for a Judgment and Decree for:
(a)   Declaration that the Technical Services Agreement dated 26th  October,
1988 and the Project Consultancy Agreement and Royalty Agreement both  dated
26th October, 1988 and the Agreements dated 12th January, 2000,  10th  June,
2000 and 4th February 2002 are valid, legal and subsisting and  are  binding
and enforceable on the Defendant No. 3 to 7 and /or its assigns.


(b)   Permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Nos. 3 to 7 whether  by
itself, its servants, agents and /or assigns  or  otherwise  howsoever  from
selling, encumbering and/or  disposing  of  in  any  manner  howsoever,  the
schedule property of the Defendant No. 1 situated at  Mount  Road,  Chennai,
in favour of any persons without disclosing and/or  recognizing  the  rights
of the plaintiff to operate and manage the hotel as provided for  under  the
technical services agreement  dated  26th  October,  1988  and  the  Project
Consultancy Agreement and Royalty Agreement both dated  26th  October,  1988
and the agreements dated  12th  January,  2000,  10th  June,  2000  and  4th
February 2002.

(c)   Costs
(d)   Such further and other reliefs.”


8.    An application was also filed by the EIH and Oberoi  Hotels  (P)  Ltd.
who were Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, for  grant  of  temporary  injunction.  The
learned Single Judge had issued temporary injunction on 18.03.2005.

9.    After the grant of temporary injunction, it appears that in  the  year
2007 proceedings were initiated by IFCI by issuing notice under  Section  13
sub Section (2), Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial  Assets  and
Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 demanding  amount  due
from BHEL.

10.   Proceeding under Sarfaesi Act, 2002 proceeded and the hotel  asset  of
BHEL was transferred in favour of one Robust Hotels (P.) Ltd.(the  appellant
in C.A.Nos.....of 2016 (arising out of  SLP  ©  No.  23410-11  of  2011).  A
transfer deed dated 5th July, 2007 was issued by IFCI and TFCI in favour  of
Robust Hotels (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Robust Hotels).  All  the
land, together with erections,  plant  and  machinery  were  transferred  to
Robust Hotels. EIH filed an application in November,  2009  for  impleadment
of Robust Hotels in C.S. No.  257  of  2005  although  the  impleadment  was
opposed but was allowed by learned Single Judge  vide  judgment  dated  23rd
March, 2010.  The Appellant Nos.1 to 4 in SLP (C) No. 23410-11 of 2011  were
impleaded as Defendant Nos. 8 – 11 in C.S. No. 251 of 2005.  Letters  Patent
Appeal against the said judgment was also dismissed  by  Division  Bench  on
22nd October, 2010. The Robust Hotels unsuccessfully  challenged  the  order
of the Division Bench before this Court by filing an S.L.P., which was  also
dismissed on 7th January, 2011.

11.   C.S. No. 257 of 2005 was renumbered as O.S.No. 12159 of 2010.   An  IA
was filed by EIH being IA No. 22846 of 2010.  By the aforesaid IA No.  22846
of 2010 the plaintiff prayed for an order, restraining  Robust  Hotels  from
having the construction of the hotel unit or from doing,  acting  or  taking
steps contrary to or in derogation of the rights of the plaintiff under  the
Technical Services Agreement and  other  agreements.   The  application  was
rejected by learned Single Judge vide judgment and order  dated  9th  March,
2011, challenging the aforesaid order  9th  March,  2011,  an  appeal  being
C.M.A. No. 798 of 2011 was preferred.  The  Division  Bench  of  this  Court
decided the appeal being C.M.A. NO. 798 of 2011 and M.P. No. 1 of  2011  and
issued certain directions vide its  judgment  and  order  dated  26th  July,
2011.  C.A.Nos.......of 2016 (arising out of  SLP(C)  No.23410-11  of  2011)
have been filed against aforesaid Division Bench judgment  and  order  dated
26th July, 2011 by the Robust Hotels and other three defendants.


                         C.A.Nos.11888-11889 of 2016
                (arising out of SLP (C) No. 17742-43 of 2012

12.   These appeals have been filed by EIH Ltd. and  Oberoi  Hotels  against
judgment and final order dated 13th March, 2012 passed by the High Court  of
Madras in O.S.A. No. 419 of 2011 and M.P. No. 1 of 2011. While noticing  the
facts in  the  appeals  filed  by  Robust  Hotels,  we  in  the  proceedings
paragraphs have noted the facts which are also  relevant  for  understanding
the issues raised in present appeals. The appellants EIH and  Oberoi  Hotels
filed a suit, being C.S. No. 164 of 2011 before the  High  Court  of  Madras
praying for a declaration  that  Deed  of  Transfer  dated  5th  July,  2007
entered into between IFCI Ltd.  and TFCI on one part and the  Robust  Hotels
(P.) Ltd. on  another  part,  and  the  certificate  of  sale  of  immovable
property dated 6th July, 2007 are illegal and null & void and of  no  effect
and not binding. A perpetual injunction was  also  prayed  for,  restraining
the defendants whether by themselves, their servants,  agents  or  otherwise
howsoever from purporting to act, to give effect to  or taking any steps  in
furtherance of the purported deed of transfer dated  July 5,  2007  and  the
certificate of sale of movable and immovable property  also  dated  July  5,
2007 or from enforcing the same in any manner whatsoever.
13.   It was pleaded that the cause of action for instituting the  suit  was
the sale of hotel unit at Mount Road, Chennai by the financial  institutions
contrary to the order passed by this High  Court  dated  18th  March,  2005.
The counter affidavit was also filed in O.A. No. 233 of  2011  in  C.S.  No.
164 of 2011 by Robust Hotels.   A  Contempt  Petition  was  also  filed  for
violation of Order dated 18th March, 2005, passed in O.A. No.  300  of  2005
in C.S. No. 257 of 2005.
14.   O.A. No. 233 of 2011 in C.S. No. 164 of 2011 filed by EIH  and  Oberoi
Hotels praying for injunction was dismissed by  learned  Single  Judge  vide
Order dated 8th August 2011.  By the same order, learned Single  Judge  also
dismissed the Contempt Petition (C)No. 647 of 2011 filed by EIH  and  Oberoi
Hotels. Challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge  dated  8th
August, 2011 Letters Patent Appeal was filed by EIH and Oberoi Hotels  being
O.S.A. No. 419 of 2011.  The Division Bench by the Order dated  13th  March,
2011 dismissed the appeal, challenging  which  order   the  C.A.  Nos.....of
2016 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 17742-43 of  2012)  has
been filed by EIH and Oberoi Hotels.
15.   We have heard Shri K. K. Venugopal learned senior counsel  and  K.  V.
Vishawanathan learned senior counsel for Robust Hotels, Shri  Jaideep  Gupta
learned senior counsel and Shri Siddharth Mitra learned senior counsel  have
appeared on behalf of the EIH and Oberoi Hotels.
16.   Shri K. K. Venugopal, in support of  his  appeal,  contends  that  the
Division Bench of Madras High Court erred in passing  an  interim  order  on
26th July, 2011 whereas there was no case made out by the  EIH  and  Another
for grant of any interim order.  The Robust Hotels has purchased  the  hotel
unit under Sarfaesi Act, 2002 and the property  has  been  conveyed  to  the
Robust Hotels free from any encumbrance. The    proceedings  under  Sarfaesi
Act, 2002 cannot be made subject matter of challenge before a  Civil  Court.
Section 34 of Sarfaesi Act, 2002 completely oust the jurisdiction  of  Civil
Court.  He contends that entitlement to recover  the  amount  of  Rs.  15.21
Crores by EIH if at all was against the Balaji  Hotels  &  Enterprises  Ltd.
and Balaji Industrial Corporation Ltd., for which it was  open  for  EIH  to
take appropriate proceedings.  The Robust Hotels having acquired the  assets
under Sarfaesi proceeding has no liability to make any payment  to  EIH  and
the  order  passed  by  the  Division  Bench  issuing  such   direction   is
unsustainable. It is submitted that Robust Hotels cannot be held liable  for
any breach of Order dated 18.03.2005 and in  view  of  the  subject  matter,
order dated 18.03.2005 was also hit by Section 34  of  Sarfaesi  Act,  2002.
Shri Venugopal further submitted that C.A.Nos....of  2016  (arising  out  of
Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 17742-43 of 2012) filed by EIH  deserved  to
be dismissed since  both  learned  Single  Judge  and  Division  Bench  have
rightly held that the transfer on 5th July 2007 made  in  favour  of  Robust
Hotels could not have been challenged in C.S. No. 164 of  2011  in  view  of
Section 34 of Sarfaesi Act, 2002.
17.   Shri  Jaideep  Gupta  and  Siddharth  Mitra  learned  senior  counsel,
appearing for EIH have vehemently opposed the submissions raised by Shri  K.
K. Venugopal.  It is contended by learned senior counsel appearing  for  EIH
and Another that the order passed by the Division Bench on 26th  July,  2011
is perfectly in accordance with law, which  need  no  interference  by  this
Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article  136  of  the  Constitution.
It is submitted that interim order has been issued  by  Division  Bench   of
Madras High Court being fully satisfied on  prima  facie  case  of  the  EIH
Ltd., the balance of convenience and irreparable loss  being  in  favour  of
the plaintiffs.  It is contended that injunction order  dated  18th   March,
2005  issued in C.S. No. 257 of 2005,  has been violated  by  the  financial
institutions.  Any action taken, in breach of interim injunction  order,  is
to be set aside and no party can be allowed to take  benefit  of  its  wrong
committed in breach  of  an  order  of  the  Court.  It  is  contended  that
financial institutions and erstwhile owners of  the  hotel  unit  were  made
aware of the interim injunction order dated 18th  March,  2005  and  despite
the said injunction  order, they transferred the unit  without  taking  into
consideration the right of  the  EIH  flowing  from  the  contracts  entered
between EIH and erstwhile owner as noted above.
18.   One of the conditions of last agreement dated 4th February,  2002  was
to make payment of an amount of Rs. 15.21 Crores by erstwhile  owner  before
transferring the right in the hotel unit including right to  run  the  hotel
in favour of any entity.
19.   The Order  passed  by  Division  Bench  dated  26th  July,  2011  does
complete justice between parties,  and  Division  Bench  has  exercised  its
discretionary  jurisdiction  in  granting   the   relief   which   need   no
interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136  of
the Constitution.
20.   Coming to appeal, filed by EIH against the  Order  dated  13th  March,
2012, it is contended that all actions in breach of  an  interim  injunction
have to be set aside and the Court is fully competent to restore status  quo
ante.  It is contended that in event where an action is taken  in  disregard
of any interim injunction passed by a court, the  question  of  prima  facie
case, balances of convenience and irreparable loss have  not  to  be  looked
into and the Court has to undo the wrong done in breach of court's order.
21.   It is submitted that Section 34 of the Sarfaesi  Act,  2002  does  not
protect the Robust Hotels in facts of the present  case.   It  is  submitted
that the appeal filed by the EIH, deserved to be allowed setting  aside  all
actions taken in breach of the injunction order 18th March, 2005.
22.   Learned senior counsel for  both  the  parties  have  also  relied  on
various judgments of this Court in support of their respective  submissions,
which shall be referred to while considering their submissions in detail.
23.   First, we take up the appeal of Robust Hotels,  the  appeal  has  been
filed against an interim order passed by the High Court,  disposing  of  the
CMA No. 798 of 2011.
24.   The interim directions issued  by  Division  Bench  are  in  following
three parts:
“(i). This Court without prejudice, directs the 1st and  2nd  respondents  /
erstwhile owners / BH and EL  and  another  or  the  8th  respondent  /  the
present owner / Robust Hotels Private Limited to deposit a sum of Rs.  15.12
Crores into the credit of O.S. No. 12159 of 2010 on or  before  31st  August
2011.


(ii). After such deposit  has  been  made  the  learned  trial  judge  shall
dispose the case within a period of three months on  merits,  without  being
influenced by this Court's findings.

(iii) If the Condition of deposit as ordered by this Court, is not  complied
with by either of the parties, the interim injunction, restraining  the  8th
respondent/Robust Hotels Private Limited, from acting or  taking  any  steps
contrary to and/or in derogation of the rights of the petitioners under  the
technical service agreement, the  projects  consultancy  agreement  and  the
Royalty agreement all dated October  26,  1988,  entered  into  between  the
petitioners /EIH and another and the respondents 1 and  2/B.H.  and  EL  and
BICL will come into effect from 01.09.2011.”

25.   As noted above the agreement dated 4th February, 2002  Annexure  P.  4
between Balaji Hotels Enterprises Ltd. and its successor  Balaji  Industrial
Corporation Ltd. with EIH contemplated that EIH will no  longer  participate
in the hotel unit and Technical Service Agreement  will  be  terminated  and
BHEL shall refund the  amount  of  Rs.  15.12  Crores  for  which  time  was
extended by EIH to BHEL by 31st December 2002.  When the EIH  came  to  know
that Tourism Finance Corporation India Ltd. has issued an advertisement  for
inviting offers for take over / joint venture,  sale  of  hotel  brought  at
Mount Road, Chennai it immediately  wrote  to  Tourism  Finance  Corporation
India Ltd. informing about its  agreement  with  BHEL.   The  EIH  has  also
informed in writing vide letter dated 15th July, 2004 Annexure P. 8  to  the
Asset Reconstruction Company  (India) Ltd. about their advance of Rs.  15.12
Crores which it had made to BHEL.
26.   Subsequently, suit, namely, C.S. No. 257 of 2005 was filed by the  EIH
Ltd. and Oberoi Hotels, plaint of which suit has been brought on  record  by
annexure     P. 14.
27.   Interim injunction was issued by the learned Single Judge of the  High
Court in the aforesaid suit to the following effect:
“That 1. Assets  Reconstruction  Company  (India)  Limited,  2.  ICICI  Bank
Limited 3. IFCI Limited 4. Tourism Finance  Corporation  of  India  Limited,
and 5. Anand Rathi Securities  Private  Limited,  the  respondents  3  to  7
herein, whether by itself, its servants, agents and/or assigns or  otherwise
howsoever be and are hereby restrained by an  order  of  interim  injunction
until further orders of this court from dealing with, disposing of,  selling
and/or encumbering in any manner howsoever the hotel unit of the  Respondent
No. 1 situated at Mount Road,  Chennai  in  favour  of  any  person  without
disclosing the rights of the Applicants to operate and manage the  hotel  in
terms of the Technical Services, Project  Consultancy  &  Royalty  Agreement
dated 26th October 1988 and the Agreements dated 12th   January  2000,  10th
June, 2000 and 4th  February 2002.”

28.   The essence of  interim  injunction  issued  by  the  Court  was  that
Respondent Nos. 3 to  7  of  that  suit  were  restrained  by  an  order  of
injunction from dealing with, disposing of, selling  and/or  encumbering  in
any  manner  howsoever  the  hotel  unit  of  Balaji  Hotels  &  Enterprises
Ltd.(BHEL), in favour of any person  without disclosing the  rights  of  the
applicants to operate and  manage  the  hotel  in  terms  of  the  Technical
Services, Project Consultancy & Royalty Agreement dated 26th  October,  1988
and the Agreements dated 12th   January  2000,  10th   June,  2000  and  4th
February, 2002.

29.   Thus, the injunction ordained that while dealing with the  hotel  unit
the rights of the applicant be disclosed.  The subsequent  facts,  as  noted
above indicate that even after the aforesaid injunction the  IFCI  Ltd.  and
Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd. by  deed  of  transfer  dated  5th
July, 2007 transferred the hotel unit to Robust  Hotels  without  disclosing
the rights of the applicant as provided by the Agreement mentioned  therein.
The Agreement dated 4th July,  2002  clearly  provided  that  the  BHEL  was
required to repay the amount  of  Rs.  15.21  Crores  to  the  EIH  by  31st
December, 2002 whereafter, EIH had nothing to do with the operation  of  the
hotel.
19.   Learned senior counsel for the appellants have  placed  much  reliance
on the Section 34 of the Sarfaesi Act, 2002.  Section  34  of  the  Sarfaesi
Act, 2002 provided as follows:
"34. Civil court not to  have  jurisdiction.-  No  civil  court  shall  have
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect  of  any  matter
which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal  is  empowered  by
or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall  be  granted  by  any
court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to  be  taken  in
pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the  Recovery
of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)."

30.   The scope and ambit of Section 34 of  Sarfaesi  Act,  2002  have  been
considered by this Court in several cases.  It is sufficient  to  refer  the
judgment of this Court in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited  Versus  Hong
Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646. This Court  held  that
the jurisdiction of  the Civil Court is plenary in nature,  unless the  same
is ousted, expressly or by necessary implication, it will have  jurisdiction
to try all types of suits.
31.   Following was laid down in para 110 -111:-
"110. It must be remembered that  the  jurisdiction  of  a  civil  court  is
plenary in nature. Unless the same is  ousted,  expressly  or  by  necessary
implication, it will have jurisdiction to try all types of suits.

111.  In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., this  Court  opined:  (AIR  pp.  89-90,
para 32)
      “32. … The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed  in
this Court may be stated as follows:

(2)   Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction  of  the  court,  an
examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or  the
sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive  to
sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.

      Where there is no express exclusion the examination  of  the  remedies
and the scheme of the particular Act to  find  out  the  intendment  becomes
necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter  case
it is necessary to  see  if  the  statute  creates  a  special  right  or  a
liability and provides for the determination of the right or  liability  and
further lays down that all questions about  the  said  right  and  liability
shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted,  and  whether  remedies
normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the  said
statute or not.”

32.   A perusal of Section  34  indicates  that  there  is  express  bar  of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court to the following effect:
“(i)  Any suit or  proceeding  in  respect  of  any  matter  in  which  Debt
Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or  under  this  Act
to determine.
(ii)  Further, no  injunction  shall  be  granted  by  any  Court  or  other
authority in respect of any action  taken or to be  taken  in  pursuance  of
any power conferred by or under this Act  or under  the  Recovery  of  Debts
Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.”

      Thus the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court has to  correlate  to  the
above mentioned conditions. For purposes of this case, we are  of  the  view
that this Court need not express any opinion as to whether  suits  filed  by
EIH were barred by Section 34 or not, since the issue are yet to be  decided
on merits and the appeal by Robust Hotels have been filed  only  against  an
interim order.


33.   The submissions, which  have  been  much  pressed  by  learned  senior
counsel for EIH is on the effect and consequence  of  acting  in  breach  of
injunction order dated 18th March, 2005. At the time, when injunction  order
was issued by learned Single  Judge,  Robust  Hotels  was  not  in  picture,
however, subsequently, it has also  been  impleaded  in  the  suit  and  the
challenge to the impleadment of Robust Hotels has failed up to  this  Court.
There can be no doubt that IFCI and  Tourist  Finance  Corporation  who  had
executed the deed of transfer in favour of Robust Hotels  and  were  parties
to suit, were bound by the said interim injunction.  The interim  injunction
was only to the effect that the liability of BHEL to  repay  the  amount  of
Rs.  15.21  Crores  up  to  particular  date  was  to  be  communicated  and
recognised to any subsequent purchaser.  The recognition  of  right  of  the
plaintiff of receiving of Rs. 15.21 Crores was with the object  that  anyone
purchasing the hotel  unit  should  be  aware  of  the  liability  and  said
liability should also be adverted and taken care of.
34.   Learned senior counsel for the EIH has referred to and relied  on  the
judgment of the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Century Flour Mills  Ltd.
Versus S. Suppiah and Others  AIR  1975  Madras  270  and  another  judgment
reported in 1985  of  All  England  Report  211  Clarke  and  Others  Versus
Chadburn  and  Others,  for  the  proposition  that  any  action  taken   in
disobedience or disregard in injunction order, becomes void & illegal.
35.   Madras High Court in Century Flour  Mills  Ltd.  stated  following  in
para 9:
“In our opinion, the inherent powers of this court under Section 151  C.P.C.
are wide and are not subject to any limitation.  Where  in  violation  of  a
stay order or injunction  against  a  party,  something  has  been  done  in
disobedience, it will be the duty of the court as a policy to set the  wrong
right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing.  In our  view,  the
inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but  it  is  bound
to be exercised in that manner in the  interests  of  justice.   Even  apart
from Section 151, we should observe that as a  matter  of  judicial  policy,
the court should guard against  itself  being  stultified  in  circumstances
like this by  holding  that  it  is  powerless  to  undo  a  wrong  done  in
disobedience of the court's orders.  But in this case it  is  not  necessary
to go to that extent as we hold that the power is  available  under  Section
151, C.P.C.”

36.   Judgment of Madras High Court in Century Flour Mills  Ltd.  Versus  S.
Suppiah and Others  and   Clarke  and  Others  Versus  Chadburn  and  Others
(Supra) had been relied and approved by  this  Court  in  Delhi  Development
Authority Versus Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Another (1996) 4  SCC
622.
37.   Another judgment relied upon is Anita International Versus  Tungabadra
Sugar Works Mazdoor Sangh and Others (2016) 9  SCC  44.   In  the  aforesaid
case, in a Company Petition, filed in the Madras High Court for  winding  up
of Deve Sugars Ltd., an  order  of  winding  up  was  passed.   An  Official
Liquidator was directed to take possession of the property of  the  company.
State Bank of Mysore had extended some loan to the Deve Sugar  Ltd.  and  on
default having been committed, an O.A. was filed before  the  Debt  Recovery
Tribunal by  the  Bank  for  the  recovery  of  the  amount.   The  Recovery
Certificate was issued for a sum of Rs. 8.40 Crores.  State Bank  of  Mysore
filed a Company Application in the pending Company Petition before the  High
Court of Madras, seeking leave to  proceed  before  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal
(DRT),  Bangalore.
38.   The High Court, while granting the leave to the State Bank  of  Mysore
passed an order that no coercive steps are to be taken  against  the  assets
of the company during or after concluding  all  the  proceeding  before  the
tribunal. The order passed by Madras High Court has been extracted  in  para
3 of the judgment which is to the following effect:
“(3)  The Company Court in the High Court of Madras,  while  granting  leave
to State Bank of Mysore, passed  the  following  order  on  10..2000  (while
disposing of Company Applications Nos. 1251-53 of 1999):

      This company application, praying to this Court to grant leave to  the
applicant Bank to proceed and prosecute further OA No. 1300  of  1997  filed
by them against the respondent Company in the  Debts  Recovery  Tribunal  at
Bangalore.

      Company applications coming on this day before this Court for  hearing
in the presence of Mr. R. Varichandran, Advocate for the  applicant,  herein
and the Official Liquidator, High Court, Madras, the  respondent,  appearing
in person, and upon reading the Judge's summons and affidavit and report  of
the Official Liquidator filed herein, the court made the following orders:

       Leave  is  granted  subject  to   the  condition  that  the  Official
Liquidator is impleaded and no coercive steps are taken against  the  assets
of the Company during or after the conclusion of the proceedings before  the
Tribunal.”


39.   A perusal of the above order reveals that leave  was  granted  subject
to the condition that the Official  Liquidator  was  impleaded  before  DRT,
Bangalore, and further that no coercive steps would  be  taken  against  the
assets of the Company Deve Sugars Ltd., during or after  the  conclusion  of
proceedings before DRT, Bangalore.

40.    It  appears  that  in  the  recovery  proceedings,  the  assets  were
auctioned and Anita Internationals were the  auction  purchaser.  The  issue
was raised before the High Court that in view of the order  of  Madras  High
Court  dated 10.03.2000, proceedings for recovery as  well  as  confirmation
of the auction were invalid. It was also contended  before  the  High  Court
that the Company Court had no jurisdiction, the arguments raised before  the
Court that Company Court has no jurisdiction and  it  was  a  Debt  Recovery
Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction, was rejected by this  Court.   It
is useful to refer para 49 and 51 of the judgment which is to the  following
effect:
“(49.)      In order to support their claim, it was submitted on  behalf  of
the appellants that jurisdiction in matters of recovery  agitated  by  banks
and financial institutions under the RDB Act has been  repeatedly  expounded
by  this  Court.   The  Debts  Recovery  Tribunals  concerned,  before  whom
recovery proceedings are  initiated,  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  the
matter. It was also pointed out that this Court has  clearly  declared  that
even the jurisdiction of  Recovery  Officers  in  matters  of  execution  of
recovery  certificates  was  likewise  exclusive.   It   was   the   pointed
contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in matter  wherein
banks and financial institutions approach a Debts Recovery  Tribunal,  which
on due  consideration  issues  a  recovery  certificate,  the  same  can  be
executed only through a Recovery Officer.  It was submitted that  a  Company
Court has no jurisdiction in  the  matter.   The  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants substantiated the above assertion on the basis of  the  decisions
rendered by this Court in  Allahabad  Bank,  M.V.  Janardhan  Reddy,  Andhra
Bank, Rajasthan State Financial Corpn. and Official Liquidator cases.

(51.) It is not possible for  us  to  accept  the  contentions  advanced  on
behalf of the appellants. In this behalf it would  be  relevant  to  mention
that in M.V. Janardhan Reddy case  the  Company  Court  by  an  order  dated
13.8.1999 required  that  its  permission  should  be  obtained  before  the
Recovery Officer finalised the sale.  Thereafter, the Company  Court  by  an
order dated 25.03.2005 directed  that  sale  by  the  Recovery  Officer  was
subject to confirmation by the Company Court.   In  the  above  sequence  of
facts, this Court clearly held that the condition  imposed  by  the  Company
Court could not be violated by the Recovery Officer.  It was concluded  that
the sale made by the Recovery Officer in violation of the orders  passed  by
the  Company  Court  was  without  the  authority  of  law,  the  same   was
accordingly set aside.  The  explanation  tendered  by  the  learned  Senior
Counsel representing the appellants was that even  in  the  above  judgment,
this Court had not  disturbed  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  a  Recovery
Officer in executing the recovery certificate.  In our considered view,  the
above contention is immaterial to the issue under consideration.  The  issue
under consideration is whether or  not  an  order  passed  by  the   Company
Court(in the present case the order dated  10.3.2000)  was  binding  on  the
Recovery Officer?  And, whether the proceedings conducted  by  the  Recovery
Officer in violation of the above order were sustainable in law? We have  no
hesitation in concluding that in M.V. Janardhan Reddy case, an order  passed
by the Company Court was held to be binding on the Recovery Officer.   Based
on exactly the same consideration, we are of the view  that  the  acceptance
of the bid of Anita International by the Recovery officer on  11.8.2005  and
the confirmation of the  sale  in  its  favour  on  12.9.2005  were  clearly
impermissible and therefore, deserve to be set aside.”


41.   This Court further held that it is not open either a party to the  lis
or to any third party to determine at their own that an order  passed  by  a
Court is valid or void.   A  party  to  the  lis  or  the  third  party  who
considers an order passed by a court as voidable or non est,  must  approach
the court of  competent jurisdiction to have the said order  set-  aside  on
such grounds, as may be available in law. This Court held that the order  of
the Company Court of Madras High Court was to  be  complied  with  and  sale
held in violation of the said order was to be set aside.
42.   The entitlement of EIH to receive Rs.  15.21  Crores,  which  was  the
condition of the agreement dated 4th February, 2002 was to be  reflected  in
any future transaction by virtue of the injunction order dated  18th  March,
2005 dealing with  the  property,  has   rightly  been  taken  note  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court and  we  do  not  find  any  error  in  the
directions issued by Division Bench of the High  Court,  directing  1st  and
2nd Respondent, i.e., erstwhile owner and 8th Respondent  Robust  Hotels  to
deposit the sum of Rs. 15.12 Crores.
43.   We, however, are of the view that it was not necessary  for  the  High
Court to presume that the conditions of deposit, as  ordered  by  the  court
shall not be complied with. Orders of the court are issued  to  be  complied
with  and  a  court  does  not  lack  power  to  ensure  the  compliance  by
appropriate proceedings. Thus, further directions of  the  High  Court  that
'if the condition of deposit as ordered by this court has not complied  with
by either of the  parties....',  interim  injunction,  restraining  the  8th
Respondent' was uncalled for.  The interim order passed by the  High  Court,
directing for deposit of Rs.  15.12  Crores  has  done  substantial  justice
between parties, which need no interference by this  Court  in  exercise  of
its jurisdiction under Article 136. We, however, are of the  view  that  the
directions issued by the Division Bench in para 38 need to be affirmed  only
to the following extent:
“(a) (i). This Court without prejudice, directs the 1st and 2nd  respondents
/ erstwhile owners / BH and EL and another  or  the  8th  respondent  /  the
present owner / Robust Hotels Private Limited to deposit a sum of Rs.  15.12
Crores into the credit of O.S. No. 12159 of 2010 on or  before  31st  August
2011.”

44.   It goes without saying that  the  trial  judge  has  to  expeditiously
proceed to decide the suit. The deposit was to be made under  the  order  of
the High Court till 31st August, 2011. This Court passed  an  interim  order
on 29th August, 2011 due to which no deposit was made, we  thus  extend  the
time for deposit of the amount till 31st January, 2017.  The  appeals  filed
by Robust are disposed of as above.
45.   Now, we come to appeals filed by EIH.  EIH  filed  an  appeal  against
the order of the Division Bench dated 13th March, 2012 by which  order,  the
Division Bench has dismissed the appeal against the order dated 8th  August,
2011, passed by the learned Single Judge. Order dated 8th August,  2011  was
passed in O.A. No. 233 of 2011  by  which  application,  the  plaintiff  has
prayed for interim injunction, restraining the  defendants  from  purporting
to act or to give effect to  or  taking  any  step  in  furtherance  of  the
purported deed of transfer dated 5th July, 2007 and the certificate of  sale
of movable and immovable property dated 5th July,  2007  or  from  enforcing
the same in any manner whatsoever pending the suit.
46.   The learned Single Judge passed an order, refusing the  interim  order
as prayed for in O.A. No. 233 of 2011. The Division Bench, while  dismissing
the appeal made following observations in Para 62 at page 50:
“62.  The maintainability of suits, which are pending on  the  file  of  the
City Civil Court as well as on the file of this Court in  C.S.  No.  164  of
2011, can be adjudicated in the course of trial and this  Court  finds  some
force in the submission made by the learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for
the appellants that the said findings may definitely prejudice  their  case.
Hence, this Court expunge the observations made by the  learned  Judge  with
regard to the maintainability of the suit  in  O.  S.  No.  12159  of  2010,
pending on the file the III Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai and  C.S.
No. 164 of 2011 pending on the file of this Court.”


47.   The Division Bench as well as learned Single Judge has  already  noted
that hotel has already commenced its operation and contracts have been  made
with third parties for the operation of the  hotel  and  bookings  are  also
being taken from the customers.  We  have  already  noticed  the  directions
issued by Division Bench, directing the defendant Nos. 1, 2  and  8  to  the
suit C.S. No. 257 of 2005 to deposit an amount of  Rs.  15.21  Crores  which
order  had  done  substantial   justice   between   parties.   Taking   into
consideration the overall circumstances, specially  when  issues  raised  in
C.S. No. 164 of 2011 are yet to be adjudicated, the orders  passed  by  both
learned  Single  Judge  and  Division  Bench,  refusing  to  grant   interim
injunction in view of the facts as noted above cannot be faulted.
48.   In result, the appeals of Robust Hotels &  ors.  are  disposed  of  by
modifying the order of the Division Bench as above. The appeals of EIH  Ltd.
and ors. are dismissed.

                                       ....................J.
                                       (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)

                                        ...................J.
                                             (ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI:
DECEMBER 07,  2016












The Labour Court, on the available materials on record, found that the termination was unjustified on the basis of a perverse finding entered by the inquiry officer. There was no attempt on the part of the management before the Labour Court to establish otherwise. It appears that the High Court itself has granted compensation since the Court felt that the termination was unjustified and since reinstatement was not possible on account of superannuation. In case, the High Court was of the view that termination was justified, it could not have ordered for payment of any compensation. In order to deny gratuity to an employee, it is not enough that the alleged misconduct of the employee constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude as per the report of the domestic inquiry. There must be termination on account of the alleged misconduct, which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude.- the appellant shall be entitled to gratuity in respect of his continuous service from his original appointment till the date of his superannuation.



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  11807 OF 2016
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 26366 of 2016)


JORSINGH GOVIND VANJARI                         ...  APPELLANT (S)


                                   VERSUS

DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER MAHARASHTRA,
STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
JALGAON DIVISION, JALGAON                         ... RESPONDENT (S)


                           J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

KURIAN, J.:



Leave granted.

The  appellant,  aggrieved  by  the  termination  from  service,  raised  an
industrial dispute leading to the award in Reference  IDA  No.  42  of  2007
dated 20.06.2013 of the  Labour  Court,  Jalgaon,  Maharashtra.  The  Labour
Court set aside the dismissal  order  dated  26.08.2002.  However,  noticing
that the appellant had already crossed the  date  of  superannuation,  viz.,
31.05.2005, it was ordered that from the date of termination to the date  of
superannuation, the appellant would be  entitled  to  all  service  benefits
except back wages which were limited to 50 per cent.
The respondent challenged the award before the High Court of Bombay. As  per
the impugned judgment dated 08.07.2015 in Writ Petition No.  3268  of  2014,
the award was modified by  granting  only  a  one-time  compensation  of  an
amount equivalent to 50 per cent of the back wages as awarded by the  Labour
Court. Thus aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.
The charge against the appellant was that he had  collected  fare  from  six
passengers while he was working as a conductor on 06.09.2001 in bus No.  MH-
20/J-4714 on  its  trip  from  Chalisgaon  to  Patanagaon,  without  issuing
tickets. The inspecting team also found that there was a  shortage  of  cash
in his cash bag. A domestic inquiry followed and the inquiry  officer  found
the appellant guilty, and on that basis, he was terminated from service.
Before the Labour Court, four issues were framed:

“1.   Does the  second  party  prove  that  the  departmental  enquiry  held
against him is unjust,  unfair,  improper  and  against  the  principles  of
natural justice, and the findings of Enquiry Officer are perverse?
2.    Does the second party prove that, the termination of  his  service  is
illegal, violating the provisions of law?
3.    Whether the second party is entitled for the relief as sought for?
4.    What order?”


The Labour Court found that:
“… As the alleged passengers have  not  been  examined,  an  opportunity  of
cross examining them is not availed to the second party.  The  one  and  the
same authority has issued charge sheet, conducted enquiry and suggested  the
punishment. Accordingly, serious prejudice is caused to  the  second  party.
One and the same authority is not expected  to  play  the  role  of  Enquiry
Officer and disciplinary authority, which is inconsistent to the  provisions
of law. Accordingly, with biased mind enquiry has  been  conducted.  Despite
of  not  examining  the  witnesses  the  enquiry  officer  considered  their
statements recorded on the spot and concluded that,  charges  of  misconduct
have been proved against the second party. Besides this,  the  reporter  has
not stated before the Enquiry Officer in terms of his  report.  Accordingly,
the enquiry officer has recorded his findings on the basis  of  no  evidence
and therefore, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer  appears  to  be
perverse one. …”


 On issue no.2, it was noted that:
“… in the light of findings on issue no.1 that,  the  enquiry  held  against
the Complainant was fair, proper and  legal  and  the  findings  of  enquiry
officer are perverse, then it is  for  first  party  to  prove  the  alleged
charges of misconduct before this court. It is pertinent to  note  that,  in
their written statement the first party has not made  prayer  that,  if  the
court  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  enquiry  held  against   the
Complainant was not fair, proper and  legal  and  the  findings  of  enquiry
officer are perverse, then they may be permitted to prove the misconduct  of
second party before this court by leading evidence. But, they failed  to  do
so.  No  witness  is  examined  by  the  first  party.  Hence,  the  alleged
misconduct of second party has not been proved before this court.”

Still further, the Labour Court proceeded further and found that:
“14.  In a case before me, testified evidence of second party at Exh. U-8  &
U-13 reflect that, he was working with first party as a bus conducted  since
05.04.1971 at Chopda Depot. Thereafter he was transferred to  Amalner  Depot
and Chalisgaon Depot. However, without  considering  his  meritorious  clean
and unblemished service record, first party has dismissed him  from  service
vide order dated 26.08.2002.  On  06.09.2001  when  he  was  performing  his
duties as a conductor on bus  no.  MH-20/J-4714  which  is  proceeding  from
Chalisgaon to Patanagaon, at that time his bus  was  checked  by  Inspecting
squad at Balziri Phata and it is alleged against him that 6 passengers  were
found travelling in the said bus without tickets,  though  fare  amount  was
paid by them to the second party-conductor. Those 6 persons were  illiterate
persons and inspecting squad as per their whims recorded  their  statements,
as well as S.T. cash was found less by Rs.56. Had the second party  actually
recovered the amount from the very six passengers,  then  Rs.36/-  ought  to
have been found excess in his cash bag. However, contrary  to  this,  amount
was found less with the second party and hence Respondent  by  making  false
allegations issued false charge  sheet,  conducted  enquiry.  Principles  of
natural justice have not been observed  by  the  first  party.  The  alleged
passengers have not been examined and an opportunity of cross  examining  to
them is not availed to the second party. The one and the same authority  has
issued charge  sheet,  conducted  enquiry  and  suggested   the  punishment.
Accordingly, serious prejudice is caused to the second  party.  Accordingly,
with bias  mind  enquiry  has  been  conducted.  Instead  of  examining  the
witnesses the enquiry officer considered their statements  recorded  on  the
spot and concluded that, charges of misconduct have been proved against  the
second party. Besides this, the  reporter  has  not  stated  before  Enquiry
Officer in terms of his report. Report is  not  exhibited  and  duly  proved
before the Enquiry Officer, even though enquiry officer  relied  on  it  and
concluded that, alleged misconducts have  been  proved  against  the  second
party. Thus, by violating the principles of  natural  justice,  enquiry  has
been conducted and the findings drawn by the enquiry officer  are  perverse.
On the basis of said report punishment of dismissal has been  imposed  which
is extremely harsh and disproportionate. This oral testimony of  the  second
party has not been shattered during cross examination.

15.    After  cross-examining  the  second  party,  the  Respondent  has  an
opportunity to lead evidence in support of  the  chargers  levelled  against
the Complainant. Once, findings of the enquiry officer are held perverse  by
this court, then burden lies  on  Respondent  to  prove  the  misconduct  by
leading evidence before this court. But,  instead  of  leading  evidence  in
support of alleged misconduct of the second party, first party did not  lead
any oral evidence before  this  court,  on  the  contrary  filed  pursis  of
closing their evidence at Exh. C-20. Therefore, it is  crystal  clear  that,
the misconduct of the second party is not proved before this  Court  by  the
first party.  Therefore,  it  can  safely  be  inferred  that,  the  charges
levelled against the second party are false and the said  charge  sheet  was
issued with an intention to victimize him. As the charges  levelled  against
the second party are not  proved  either  in  the  departmental  enquiry  or
before this court, hence, the dismissal order issued by the first  party  is
nothing  but  in  colourable  exercise  of  employer’s  right,  by   falsely
implicating the Complainant in  a  criminal  case  on  false  evidence,  for
patently false reasons, in utter disregard  of  the  principles  of  natural
justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry and with undue  haste,  amounting
to unfair labour practice. Hence, I hold that the dismissal of second  party
is illegal, violating the provisions of law.”
                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
On issue no.3, it was held as follows:
“17.  As to issue no.3:- So far as relief sought  by  the  second  party  is
concerned, the Ld. Counsel for second party has submitted that,  the  second
party has attained the age of retirement  on  31.05.2005  hence  he  may  be
given all the retiral benefits from the date of his  illegal  dismissal.  It
is pertinent to note that, in his statement of claim the  second  party  has
stated that, he will be going to  retire  from  service  on  31.05.2005.  It
means, already the second party has attained the age of  retirement  in  the
year 2005. Once  his  termination  is  held  as  illegal,  second  party  is
entitled for reinstatement  with  continuity  of  service  and  back  wages.
However, the second party has attained the age  of  superannuation  i.e.  58
years on 31.05.2005. Accordingly, had he been in service then he would  have
been retired on 31.05.2005. The charges levelled in  the  charge  sheet  are
not proved in enquiry or before  this  Court,  therefore,  second  party  is
entitled for all the benefits, as if he  was  in  employment  of  the  first
party-corporation. Therefore, the Ld. Counsel for second party argued  that,
despite directing reinstatement of the second  party,  the  first  party  be
directed to avail him all the monetary benefits till his superannuation  and
dues admissible as per rules. Considering all  these  aspects  of  attaining
the age of superannuation by the second party, it will be  proper  to  mould
the relief as sought by him to the extent of availing him all  the  monetary
benefit till his superannuation, which are admissible as per law.  Once,  it
is held that, the findings of enquiry officer are perverse and  first  party
has illegally dismissed him from service, therefore,  certainly  the  second
party is entitled for the relief. …”.

Thus, the Reference was answered in favour of the  appellant  setting  aside
the dismissal order. However, taking note of the  fact  that  the  appellant
had crossed the age of superannuation,  instead  of  reinstatement,  50  per
cent of the back wages from  the  date  of  termination  till  the  date  of
superannuation with all other service benefits were granted.
The High Court, in the impugned order, took the view that the  Labour  Court
went wrong in deciding the preliminary issue concerning the fairness of  the
inquiry and deciding  all  further  issues  in  one  stroke.  To  quote  the
relevant  consideration  which  appears  at  paragraph-12  of  the  impugned
judgment:
“12.  It is apparent that  the  Labour  Court  has  erred  in  deciding  the
preliminary issues concerning the fairness of the enquiry and  the  findings
of the enquiry officer along  with  all  the  issues  while  delivering  the
impugned  judgment.  The  procedure  laid  down  in  law,  which  has   been
considered by this Court and followed  in  the  case  of  Maharashtra  State
Roadways Transport Corporation, Beed Vs. Syed Saheblal Syed Nijam [2014  III
CLR 547], has not been followed by the  Labour  Court.  It  could  not  have
decided the preliminary issues along with all the rest of the issues in  one
stroke while delivering the impugned  award.  For  this  reason  alone,  the
impugned award is rendered unsustainable.”

In that view of the matter, it was held that  the  appellant  would  not  be
entitled  to  the  gratuity  but  a  one-time  compensation  of  an   amount
equivalent to 50 per cent of the back wages, would be just  and  proper.  To
quote the relief portion:
“17.  This Writ Petition is, therefore, partly allowed. The  impugned  award
is modified by setting aside clause 1 and 2 of the  order  and  by  granting
the 50% of the backwages as awarded by  the  Labour  Court  from  26.08.2002
till  31.05.2005  as  quantified  compensation.  The  Respondent  shall   be
deprived of gratuity amount since the  charge  proved  against  him  in  the
enquiry involves moral turpitude.”

Heard Learned Counsel appearing on both sides.
On facts, it clear that the High Court has gone wrong in  holding  that  the
Labour Court did not follow the procedure. It is seen from  the  award  that
the management had not sought for an opportunity for leading  evidence.  And
despite granting an opportunity, no evidence was adduced  after  the  Labour
Court  held  that  the  findings  of  the  inquiry  officer  were  perverse.
Therefore, the Labour Court cannot be faulted for  answering  the  Reference
in favour of the appellant.
The Labour Court, on the available  materials  on  record,  found  that  the
termination was unjustified on the basis of a perverse  finding  entered  by
the inquiry officer. There was no attempt on  the  part  of  the  management
before the Labour Court to establish otherwise.
It appears that the High Court itself has  granted  compensation  since  the
Court felt that the termination was unjustified and since reinstatement  was
not possible on account of superannuation. In case, the High  Court  was  of
the view that termination was justified,  it  could  not  have  ordered  for
payment of any compensation.
In order to deny gratuity to an employee, it is not enough that the  alleged
misconduct of the employee constitutes an offence involving moral  turpitude
as per the report of the domestic inquiry.  There  must  be  termination  on
account of the alleged misconduct, which constitutes  an  offence  involving
moral turpitude.
Thus, viewed from any angle, the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  cannot  be
sustained. It is hence set aside. The appeal is  allowed.  The  award  dated
20.06.2013 of the Labour Court, Jalgaon, Maharashtra in  Reference  IDA  No.
42 of 2007 is restored. Consequently, the appellant  shall  be  entitled  to
gratuity in respect of his continuous service from his original  appointment
till the date of his superannuation.
There shall be no orders as to costs.


                                  ........................................J.
       (KURIAN JOSEPH)




                                                        ......………………………………J.
(ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

New Delhi;
December 6, 2016.

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