"Umed Bhawan Palace".-whether the appellant is entitled to get full benefit of the exemption granted to him under Section 10 (19A) of the Income Tax Act 1961 (for short, "the I.T. Act") from payment of income-tax or it is confined only to that portion of palace which is in his actual occupation as residence and the rest which is in occupation of the tenant would be subjected to payment of tax.= In our considered opinion, if the Legislature intended to spilt the Palace in part(s), alike houses for taxing the subject, it would have said so by employing appropriate language in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act. We, however, do not find such language employed in Section-Section 23(2) and (3), uses the expression “house or part of a house”. Such expression does not find place in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act. Likewise, we do not find any such expression in Section 23, specifically dealing with the cases relating to “palace”. This significant departure of the words in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act and Section 23 also suggest that the Legislature did not intend to tax portion of the “palace” by splitting it in parts.- It is a settled rule of interpretation that if two Statutes dealing with the same subject use different language then it is not permissible to apply the language of one Statute to other while interpreting such Statutes. Similarly, once the assessee is able to fulfill the conditions specified in section for claiming exemption under the Act then provisions dealing with grant of exemption should be construed liberally because the exemptions are for the benefit of the assessee.-Though principle of res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings and each assessment year is an independent year in itself, yet, in our view, in the absence of any valid and convincing reason, there was no justification on the part of the Revenue to have pursued the same issue again to higher Courts. There should be a finality attached to the issue once it stands decided by the higher Courts on merits. This principle, in our view, applies to this case on all force against the Revenue.

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 2812 OF 2015

Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota
Thr. Maharao Brij Raj Singh, Kota …….Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


Commissioner of Income-tax,
Rajasthan-II, Jaipur                    ……Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1.    This appeal is filed against the final order dated  26.03.2014  passed
by the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in D.B. Income  Tax  Reference  No.
64 of 1986 relating to  the Assessment Year 1978-79 whereby the Full   Bench
of the High Court answered the question of law referred to  it  against  the
appellant herein.
2.    In order to appreciate  the  issue  involved  in  the  appeal,  it  is
necessary to state the relevant facts in brief infra.
3.    The appellant was the Ruler of the princely State of Kota, now a  part
of State of Rajasthan. He owned  extensive  properties  which,  inter  alia,
included his two residential palaces known as    "Umed  Bhawan  Palace"  and
"City  Palace“.   The  appellant  is  using  Umed  Bhawan  Palace  for   his
residence.   So far as this appeal is concerned, the issue  involved  herein
centers around "Umed Bhawan Palace".
4.    In exercise of the powers conferred  by  Section  60A  of  the  Indian
Income Tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), the Central Government  issued  an  order
called "The Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order,  1950"  (hereinafter
referred  to  as  "The  Order").   It  was  issued  essentially   to   grant
exemptions, reductions in rate of tax and the modifications in  relation  to
specified kinds of income earned  by  the  persons  (Ruler  and  his  family
members) from various sources as specified therein. The Order was  published
in the Gazette of India, extraordinary, on 02.12.1950.
5.    Paragraph 15 of the Order deals  with  various  kinds  of  exemptions.
Item (iii) of  Paragraph 15, which is relevant  for  this  appeal,  provides
that the bona fide annual value of the residential palace of the Ruler of  a
State which is situate within the State  and  is  declared  by  the  Central
Government as his  inalienable  ancestral  property  would  be  exempt  from
payment of Income-tax.
6.    In pursuance of the powers conferred under item (iii) of Paragraph  15
of the Order, the Central Government, Ministry of Finance(Revenue  Division)
 issued a notification bearing No.  S.R.O.1619  dated  14.05.1954  declaring
the appellant's aforementioned two  palaces,  viz.,  Umed  Bhawan  and  City
Palace as his official residences (Serial no. 21 of the Table).
7.    On 20.09.1976, the Ministry of Defence requisitioned  portion  of  the
Umed Bhawan Palace (918.26 Acres of the  land  including  houses  and  other
construction  standing  on  the  land)  for  their  own  use  and   realized
Rs.80,000/-   as  rent  by  invoking  the  provisions  of  Requisition   and
Exhibition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.   According  to  the  appellant,
the period for which the land was requisitioned expired in 1993  though  the
land still continues  to  remain  in  the  occupation  of  the  Ministry  of
Defence.
8.    With the aforementioned factual background, the question arose in  the
appellant's income-tax assessment proceedings regarding  taxability  of  the
income derived by the appellant (assesse) from  the  part  of  the  property
requisitioned  by  the  Defence  Ministry,  which  was  a  portion  of   the
appellant's official  residence  (Umed  Bhawan  Palace).  The  question  was
whether the rental income received by the appellant from  the  requisitioned
property by way of rent is taxable  in  his  hands.   In  other  words,  the
question was as to whether the appellant is entitled to get full benefit  of
the exemption granted to him under Section 10 (19A) of the  Income  Tax  Act
1961 (for short, "the I.T.  Act")  from  payment  of  income-tax  or  it  is
confined only to that portion of palace which is in  his  actual  occupation
as residence and the rest which is in occupation  of  the  tenant  would  be
subjected to payment of tax.
9.    The Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) Rajasthan-II  by  order  dated
23.02.1984  in  Appeal  No.  CIT(A)/JPR/8/81-82  answered  the  question  in
appellant's favour and held that since the appellant was  in  occupation  of
part of his official residence during the assessment year  in  question,  he
was entitled to claim  full  benefit  of  the  exemption  for  his  official
residence  as  provided  under  Section   10   (19A)   of   the   I.T.   Act
notwithstanding the fact that portion of the residence is  let  out  to  the
Defence Ministry.  The  Revenue,  felt  aggrieved,  carried  the  matter  in
appeal  before  the  Income  Tax  Appellate  Tribunal.    By   order   dated
11.07.1985, the Tribunal affirmed the order of the  Commissioner  of  Income
Tax and dismissed the  Revenue's  appeal.   The  Tribunal,  however,  on  an
application made by the  Revenue  under  Section  256(1)  of  the  I.T.  Act
referred the following question of law to the High Court  of  Rajasthan  for
answer.
"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of  the  case,  the  Tribunal
was justified in holding that the rental income from Umed Bhawan Palace  was
exempt under Section 10(19A) of the IT Act,1961."

10.   The Division Bench of the  High  Court  while  hearing  the  reference
noticed cleavage of opinion on the question referred in  this  case  in  two
earlier decisions of the High Court of Rajasthan.  One was in  the  case  of
Maharawal Laxman Singh vs. C.I.T., (1986) 160 ITR 103(Raj.) and another  was
in appellant’s own case, C.I.T. vs. H.H.  Maharao  Bhim  Singhji,  (1988)173
ITR 79(Raj.).  So far as the  case  of  Maharwal  Laxman  Singh  (supra)  is
concerned, the High Court  had  answered  the  question  in  favour  of  the
Revenue and against the assesse, wherein it was held that  in  such  factual
situation arising in the case, annual value of the portion which was in  the
occupation of the tenant is not exempt  from   payment  of  Income-tax  and,
therefore, income derived therefrom is required to be  added  to  the  total
income of the assessee,  whereas  in  case  of  H.H.  Maharao  Bhim  Singhji
(supra), the High Court answered the question against  the  Revenue  and  in
favour of the  assesse  holding  therein  that  in  such  a  situation,  the
assessee is entitled to claim full  exemption  in  relation  to  his  palace
under Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act notwithstanding the fact that  portion
of the palace is let out to a tenant.  It was held that  any  rental  income
derived from the part of his rental property is, therefore,  not  liable  to
tax.  The Division Bench, therefore, referred the matter to the  Full  Bench
to resolve the conflict arising between the two  decisions  and  answer  the
referred question on merits.
11.   By impugned order  dated  26.03.2014,  the  High  Court  answered  the
question against the appellant (assessee) and  in  favour  of  the  Revenue.
While referring to various authorities of this Court and  the  High  Courts,
it was held that the law laid down in C.I.T. vs. H.H. Maharao Bhim  Singhji,
(supra) does not lay down correct principle of  law  whereas  the  law  laid
down in Maharawal Laxman Singh  vs.  C.I.T.(supra)  lays  down  the  correct
principle of law.  It was held that so long as  the  assessee  continues  to
remain in occupation of his official residential palace for his own use,  he
would be entitled to claim exemption available under Section 10(19A) of  the
I.T. Act but when he is found to have let  out  any  part  of  his  official
residence and at the same time is  found  to  have  retained  its  remaining
portion for  his  own  use,  he  becomes  disentitle  to  claim  benefit  of
exemption available under Section 10(19A) for the  entire  palace.   It  was
held that in such circumstances, he is required to  pay  income-tax  on  the
income derived by him from the  portion  let  out  in  accordance  with  the
provisions of the I.T. Act and the benefit of  exemption  remains  available
only to the extent of portion which is in his occupation  as  residence.  It
is against this order, the assessee has filed this appeal.
12.    Heard  Mr.  Gopal  Subramaniam,  learned  senior  counsel,  for   the
appellant (assessee) and Mr. Y.P. Adhyaru, learned senior counsel,  for  the
respondent (Revenue).
13.   Mr. Gopal Subramaniam while assailing the legality and correctness  of
the impugned order contended that the reasoning and  conclusion  arrived  at
by the High Court is not legally sustainable for various reasons.
14.   In the first  place,  learned  senior  counsel  urged  that  when  the
question involved in this appeal, was  already  decided  in  favour  of  the
appellant in all previous assessment years (1973-74  to  1977-78),  by  this
Court, there was no justifiable reason for the Revenue to have  pursued  the
same question again only for the assessment year in  question  (1978-79)  to
the High Court.  Learned counsel urged that in any  event,  the  High  Court
should  have  taken  note  of  this  fact  and  answered  the  reference  in
appellant's favour by placing reliance on the earlier decision in  the  case
of H.H. Maharao Bhim  Singhji  (supra).   In  support  of  this  submission,
learned counsel placed reliance on  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in  M/s
Radhasoami Satsang, Saomi Bagh, Agra vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,  (1992)
1 SCC 659, The  Parashuram  Pottery  Works  Co.  Ltd.  vs.  The  Income  Tax
Officer,  Circle-I,  Ward  ‘A’  Rajkot,  Gujarat,  (1977)  1  SCC  408   and
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Excel Industries Ltd., (2014) 13 SCC 459.
15.   In the second place, learned counsel contended that  since  the  issue
involved herein pertains to grant of exemption to the assessee from  payment
of income-tax under Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act read with  paragraph  15
of the Order, such provisions should be regarded as exception and  construed
liberally in appellant’s favour unlike the charging  provisions,  which  are
interpreted strictly. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court   in
 the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Wood Papers Ltd.  &  Anr.,  (1990)  4
SCC 256  and other decisions.
16.   In the third place, learned counsel contended that the High Court  was
not justified in placing reliance  on  Section  5(iii)  of  the  Wealth  Tax
Act,1957 while interpreting Sections 10(19A), 22 and 23 of the I.T. Act  and
Paragraph 15 of the Order. Learned counsel pointed out that  Section  5(iii)
of the Wealth Tax Act and Section 23 of the I.T. Act  are  neither  in  pari
materia with  each  other  and  nor  identically  worded.   Learned  counsel
pointed  out  the  difference  in  the  language  employed   in   both   the
aforementioned sections in support of  his submission.
 17.  In the fourth place,  learned  counsel  contended  that  the  question
involved in this appeal has already been answered by the M.P. High Court  in
the case of Commissioner of Income-tax  vs.  Bharatchandra  Banjdeo,  (1985)
154 ITR 236(MP) = 1986 (27) Taxman 456 (M.P.) in  favour  of  the  assessee.
It was urged that there was no justifiable reason  for  the  High  Court  to
have departed from the view taken by the M.P. High  Court.  Learned  counsel
urged that the reason given for distinguishing the view taken  by  the  M.P.
High Court is not well founded and more so when it has already  been  relied
on by the Rajasthan High Court in  H.H.  Maharao  Bhim  Singhji  (supra)  in
appellant’s own case.
18.   In the  fifth  place,  learned  counsel  contended  that  there  is  a
significant departure in the wordings of Section 10(19A) and Section  23  of
the I.T. Act.  Learned counsel pointed out that  Section  10(19A)  does  not
use the same expression which  occurs  in  Section  23(2),  namely,  "annual
value of such house or part of the house".  According  to  learned  counsel,
absence of these words in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act goes to show  that
the appellant is entitled to  claim  exemption   applicable  to  the  entire
palace even though the part of palace is in occupation of  tenant.   It  was
urged that splitting of palace is not permissible under Section 10 (19A)  of
the I.T. Act though it is permissible in ‘house”.
19.    It is  these  submissions,  which  were  elaborated  by  the  learned
counsel with reference  to  case  law  and  interpretative  process  of  the
relevant provisions of the I.T. Act and Order.
20.   In reply, learned counsel for the respondent (Revenue)  supported  the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High  Court  and  prayed  for
its upholding.
21.   Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal  of  the
record of the case and  the  written  submissions,  we  find  force  in  the
submissions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant (assessee).
22.   Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act and Paragraph 15(iii)  of  the  Order,
which are relevant for this case, read as under:

      Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act
“Section 10.  Incomes not included in total income.-In computing  the  total
income of a previous year of any person, any income falling  within  any  of
the following clauses shall not be included-
1 to 19………………………………………………
(19A) The annual value of any one palace  in  the  occupation  of  a  Ruler,
being a palace, the annual value whereof was exempt from  income-tax  before
the commencement of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971,  by
virtue of the provisions of the Merged States (Taxation Concessions)  Order,
1949, or the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950,  or,  as  the
case may be, the Jammu and Kashmir (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1958:
      Provided that for the assessment year commencing on  the  1st  day  of
April, 1972, the annual value of every such  palace  in  the  occupation  of
such Ruler during the relevant previous year shall be  exempt  from  income-
tax;]”

Paragraph 15 of the Order

15. Exemptions-Any income falling within  the  following  classes  shall  be
exempt from income-tax and super-tax and shall not be included in the  total
income or total world income of the person receiving them:
(i)………………………………………………..
(ii)……………………………………………….
(iii) The bona fide annual value of the residential palace of the  Ruler  of
a State which is situate within the State and is  declared  by  the  Central
Government as his inalienable ancestral property.”

23.   Section 10 provides that in computing the total income of  a  previous
year of any person, any income falling within  any  of  the  sub-clauses  of
Section 10 shall not be included. Sub-clause  (19A)  says  that  the  annual
value of any one palace which is  in  occupation    of  a  Ruler  and  whose
annual value was exempt from  income-tax  before  the  commencement  of  the
Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) by virtue of  the  provisions  of  the
Merged States (Taxation concessions)  Order,  1949  or  the  Part  B  States
(Taxation Concessions), Order 1950 would be exempt from payment  of  income-
tax.
24.   As mentioned above, Paragraph 15 (iii) grants exemption  to  the  bona
fide annual value of the residential palace of the Ruler of a  State,  which
is declared by the Central Government to be Rulers ancestral  property  from
payment of income-tax.
25.   In order  to  claim  exemption  from  payment  of  income-tax  on  the
residential palace of the Ruler under Section 10(19A), it is  necessary  for
the Ruler to satisfy that  first,  he  owns  the  palace  as  his  ancestral
property; second, such palace is in his occupation  as  his  residence;  and
third, the palace is  declared  exempt  from  payment  of  income-tax  under
Paragraph 15 (iii) of the Order, 1950 by the Central Government.
26.   Now, the question arises that where part of the residential palace  is
found to be in occupation of the tenant and remaining is  in  occupation  of
the Ruler for his residence, whether in such  circumstances,  the  Ruler  is
entitled to claim exemption for the whole of his  residential  palace  under
Section 10(19A) or such exemption would confine only to that portion of  the
palace which is in his  actual  occupation.  In  other  words,  whether  the
exemption would cease to apply to let out  portion  thereby  subjecting  the
income derived from let out portion to payment of income-tax  in  the  hands
of the Ruler.
27.   This very question was examined by the M.P. High Court in the case  of
Bharatchandra Banjdeo (supra) in detail.   It  was  held  that  no  reliance
could be placed on Section 5(iii) of the Wealth  Tax  Act  while  construing
Section 10(19A) for the reason that the language employed in Section  5(iii)
is not identical with the language of  Section  10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act.
Their Lordships distinguished the decision of Delhi High Court  rendered  in
the case of Mohd Ali Khan vs. CIT, (1983)140  ITR  948(Delhi),  which  arose
under the Wealth Tax Act.  It was held that even if the Ruler  had  let  out
the portion of his residential palace, yet he would continue  to  enjoy  the
exemption in respect of entire palace because it is not  possible  to  split
the exemption in two parts, i.e., the one in his occupation  and  the  other
in possession of the tenant.
28.   Justice G.L. Oza, the learned Chief  Justice  (as  His  Lordship  then
was), speaking for the Bench held as under:
“8. It is, therefore, clear that under this order the income  from  all  the
palaces of a Ruler which are declared to  be  the  official  residence  were
exempt. Under clause (19A) of Section 10, only one palace in occupation  has
been exempted and it appears that similarly  in  the  W.T.  Act  instead  of
using  the  word  "palace"  they  have  used  the  words  "one  building  in
occupation of a Ruler" which has been exempted from tax.

9. It is not in dispute that in this reference the property in  question  is
a palace. It is also not in dispute that a portion of it is  in  occupation.
The only question which has been raised by learned counsel for  the  Revenue
is that if only a portion of the palace  is  in  occupation,  the  exemption
under clause (19A) of Section 10 would be available only for that  part  and
not for the whole. The change brought  about  by  the  insertion  under  the
Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order is  clearly  illustrated  by  the
two provisions quoted  above.  By  clause  (19A),  the  exemption  has  been
limited only to one palace in occupation.  If  the  Legislature  intended  a
further splitting up, it would have been provided in clause (19A) that  such
portion of the palace in occupation is only exempted, but  it  appears  that
the  language  used  by  the  Legislature  did  not  contemplate  a  further
splitting up. In Mohd. Ali Khan's case: [1983] 140 ITR 948(Delhi)  which  is
a case under the W.T. Act, the only question  considered  was  that  if  the
palace which was declared to be  an  official  residence  had  a  number  of
buildings, as the exemption under the W.T. Act is available only in  respect
of one building which  is  in  occupation  and,  therefore,  the  assessee's
contention, that the other buildings which may  not  be  in  occupation  but
declared to be an official residence should be exempted, was  not  accepted.
In clause (19A) of Section 10,  in  the  place  of  "building",  the  phrase
employed is "one palace" and so far as the case in hand is concerned, it  is
not disputed that this official residence is only one palace  and  not  more
than one. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, clause (19A) could  not
be interpreted  to  mean  that  it  contemplates  further  splitting  up  of
portions of a palace. The language of clause (19A)  of  Section 10 does  not
justify it. It is settled that in cases of exemption, the  language  of  the
statute has to be liberally construed but even  if  this  principle  is  not
considered, there are no words in clause (19A) of Section 10 from  which  an
intention for splitting up of the palace into portions  could  be  gathered.
In this view of the  matter,  therefore,  the  contention  advanced  by  the
learned counsel for the Revenue cannot be accepted.”



29.   Relying upon the aforesaid decision, Rajasthan High Court in the  case
of the appellant herein in Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. H.H. Maharao  Bhim
Singhji, (supra) answered the question in favour of the  appellant  for  the
assessment years (1973-74 to 1977-78).
30.   Justice J.S. Verma, the learned Chief Justice (as  His  Lordship  then
was) speaking for the Bench held as under:
“So  far  as  the  first  question  relating  to  exemption  claimed   under
section 10(19A) is  concerned,  there  is   a   direct   decision   in   CIT
v. Bharatchandra Banjdeo, [1985]154ITR236(MP) . It was held therein that  it
is not possible to split up one palace into  parts  for  granting  exemption
only to that part  in  self-occupation  of  the  ex-Ruler  as  his  official
residence and to deny the benefit of exemption to the other portion  of  the
palace rented out by the Ruler, since the entire palace is declared  as  his
official residence. Accordingly, it was held that even if  only  a  part  of
the palace is in the self-occupation of the former Ruler and  the  rest  has
been  let  out,  the  exemption  available  under  section 10(19A) will   be
available to the entire palace. No decision taking a contrary view has  been
cited before us. We do not find any good ground to depart  from  that  view,
when the view taken in that decision is undoubtedly  a  plausible  view.  In
the case of a taxing statute, a plausible view in  favour  of  the  assessee
should be preferred in these circumstances.  Following  that  decision,  the
first question has to be answered against the Revenue and in favour  of  the
assessee.”



31.   Following the aforesaid view, the High Court of Rajasthan declined  to
make reference to the High Court under Section 256(1) of  the  I.T.  Act  in
later Assessment Years and dismissed the application  made  by  the  Revenue
under Section 256(2) of the I.T. Act (see- (Commissioner of  Income-Tax  vs.
H.H.  Maharao  Bhim  Singh  (2002)124  Taxman   26)   with   the   following
observations.
“ 5. In coming to this conclusion, this Court has followed another  decision
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT vs. Bharatchanda Banjdeo (1985)  154
ITR 236 (M.P.).  The decision of this Court in CIT  vs.  H.H.  Maharao  Bhim
Singhji (1988) 173 ITR 79, we are informed by the learned counsel,  has  not
been appealed against.

6.  In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that  the  application
under Section 256(1) has rightly been rejected by the Tribunal  and  do  not
deserve further consideration.”

32.   In our considered opinion, the view taken by the Madhya  Pradesh  High
Court in the case of Bharatchandra Banjdeo (supra) and the one taken in  the
case of the appellant in Maharao Bhim  Singhji’s  case  (supra)  by  rightly
placing reliance on Bharatchandra Banjdeo’s  case  (supra)  is  the  correct
view and we find no good ground to take any other view.
33.   As rightly held in the  case  of  Bharatchandra  Banjdeo  (supra),  no
reliance could be placed on Section 5(iii)  of  the  Wealth  Tax  Act  while
construing Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act.  It is due to marked  difference
in the language employed in both  sections.  It  is  apposite  to  reproduce
Section 5 (iii) of the Wealth Tax Act as under:
“5. Exemptions in respect of certain assets-Wealth-tax shall not be  payable
by an assessee in respect of the following assets and such assets shall  not
be included in the net wealth of the assessee-
(i)…………………………………………………………..
(ii)………………………………………………………….
(iii) any one building in the occupation of a Ruler, being a building  which
immediately  before  the  commencement  of  the  Constitution  (Twenty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971, was his official residence by virtue of a  declaration
by the Central Government under paragraph 13 of the Merged States  (Taxation
Concessions) Order, 1949, or paragraph 15 of the  Part  B  States  (Taxation
Concessions) Order, 1950;”

34.   We find that in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act, the  Legislature  has
used the expression "palace” for considering the grant of exemption  to  the
Ruler whereas on the  same  subject,  the  Legislature  has  used  different
expression namely "any one building" in Section 5 (iii) of  the  Wealth  Tax
Act. We cannot ignore this distinction while  interpreting  Section  10(19A)
which, in our view, is significant.
35.   In our considered opinion, if the Legislature intended  to  spilt  the
Palace in part(s), alike houses for taxing the subject, it would  have  said
so by employing appropriate language in Section 10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act.
We, however, do not find such language employed in Section 10(19A).
36.   As  rightly  pointed  out  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant, Section 23(2) and (3), uses the expression “house or  part  of  a
house”.  Such expression does not find place in Section 10(19A) of the  I.T.
Act.   Likewise,  we  do  not  find  any  such  expression  in  Section  23,
specifically dealing with the cases relating to “palace”.  This  significant
departure of the words in Section 10(19A) of the I.T.  Act  and  Section  23
also suggest that the Legislature did not  intend  to  tax  portion  of  the
“palace” by splitting it in parts.
37.   It is a settled rule of interpretation that if  two  Statutes  dealing
with the same subject use different language then it is not  permissible  to
apply  the  language  of  one  Statute  to  other  while  interpreting  such
Statutes.  Similarly, once the assessee is able to  fulfill  the  conditions
specified in section for claiming exemption under the  Act  then  provisions
dealing with grant of exemption should be construed  liberally  because  the
exemptions are for the benefit of the assessee.
38.   In the light of these reasonings, we are  of  the  considered  opinion
that the view taken by the M.P. High Court in Bharatchandra  Banjdeo’s  case
(supra) and the Rajasthan High Court in H.H.  Maharao  Bhim  Singhji’s  case
(supra) is a correct view.
39.   We also notice that the  question  involved  in  this  case  had  also
arisen in previous Assessment Years’ (1973-74 till 1977-78) and was  decided
in appellant's favour when Special Leave Petition(c) No. 3764 of 2007  filed
by the Revenue was dismissed by this Court on 25.08.2010  by  affirming  the
order of the Rajasthan High Court referred supra.
40.   In such a factual situation where the Revenue  consistently  lost  the
matter on the issue then, in  our  view,  there  was  no  reason  much  less
justifiable reason for the Revenue to have pursued the same issue  any  more
in higher courts.
41.   Though  principle  of  res  judicata  does  not  apply  to  income-tax
proceedings and each assessment year is an independent year in itself,  yet,
in our view, in the absence of any valid and convincing  reason,  there  was
no justification on the part of the Revenue to have pursued the  same  issue
again to higher Courts. There should be a finality  attached  to  the  issue
once it stands decided by the higher Courts on merits.  This  principle,  in
our view, applies to this case on all force against the  Revenue.  [see  M/s
Radhasoami Satsang, Saomi Bagh, Agra’s case (supra)].
42.   Learned Counsel for  the  respondent  (Revenue)  though  made  sincere
attempt to persuade us to uphold the view taken by the  High  Court  but  in
the light of  what  we  have  held  above,  we  are  unable  to  accept  his
submissions.
43.   In the light of foregoing discussion, in our considered  opinion,  the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court  in  the  impugned
order including the view taken by the  Rajasthan  High  Court  in  Maharaval
Lakshmansingh’s case (supra) does not lay  down  correct  principle  of  law
whereas the view taken by the M.P. High Court  in  cases  of   Bharatchandra
Bhanjdeo (supra), Commissioner  of  Income-Tax  vs.  Bharatchandra  Bhanjdev
(1989)176 ITR 380 (MP) and  H.H. Maharao  Bhim  Singhji  (supra)  lays  down
correct principle of law.
44.   This takes us to the  last  submission  of  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant who made a feeble attempt to question the legality  and  propriety
of  the  requisition  proceedings  initiated  by  the   Central   Government
(Ministry of Defence) in relation to portion of land.   It  was  urged  that
even after expiry of  the  period  of  requisition,  the  Defence  Ministry,
continues to remain in possession of  the  land  to  the  detriment  of  the
interest of appellant. To say the least, in our  view,  this  submission  is
wholly misplaced in this appeal. The appellant, in our view,  has  to  raise
this issue in  appropriate  proceedings  before  competent  Fora  for  their
adjudication  and  not  in  this  appeal  which  arises  out  of  income-tax
proceedings and has nothing to do with requisition proceedings of the  land.

45.    In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal  succeeds  and   is
accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence,  the
question referred to the High Court in  the  reference  proceedings  out  of
which this appeal arises is answered in favour of the  appellant  (assessee)
and against the Revenue.


         ….……...................................J.
                                     [RANJAN GOGOI]


                     ………..................................J.
                                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
      New Delhi,
      December 05, 2016.
-----------------------
29

converted to one under Section 304 Part 1 and 307 IPC and the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone. =we are of the comprehension that the appellant was overpowered by an uncontrollable fit of anger somuch so that he was deprived of his power of self-control and being drawn in a web of action reflexes, fired at the deceased and the injured, who were within his sight. The facts do not commend to conclude that the appellant had the intention of eliminating any one of those fired at, though he had the knowledge of the likely fatal consequences thereof. Be that as it may, on an overall consideration of the fact situation and also the time lag in between, we are of the view that the conviction of the appellant ought to be moderated to one under Section 304 Part 1 IPC and 307 IPC. Further, considering the facts of the case in particular, according to us, it would meet the ends of justice, if the sentence for the offences is reduced to the period already undergone. We order accordingly.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1145 OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO.4877 OF 2012)


GURPAL SINGH                                     .…APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB                                      ....RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.



      The subject matter  of  scrutiny  is  the  judgment  and  order  dated
01.10.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  Chandigarh  in
Criminal Appeal No. 378-DB of 2004 concurring with the verdict of the  Trial
Court in convicting the appellant for the offence  under  Sections  302  and
307  IPC  while  acquitting  the  co-accused  Harpartap  Singh,   his   son.
Following his conviction, the appellant had been awarded  sentence  of  life
imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- with default sentence under Section  302
IPC and five  years  rigorous  imprisonment  and  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-  with
default sentence under Section  307  IPC.   Both  the  sentences  have  been
ordered to  run  concurrently.   The  High  Court  has  concurred  with  the
sentence as well.
2.    We have heard  Mr. Yatindra Singh,  Senior  Advocate,  learned  Amicus
Curiae for the appellant and Mr. Saurabh Ajay  Gupta,  learned  counsel  for
the respondent.
3.    The incident witnessing the death of Jatinder Singh and  the  injuries
sustained by Lakhwinder has the  genesis  in  a  trifle.    On  a  statement
rendered with regard thereto by Gurdial Singh(PW1),  the  First  Information
Report was registered against the appellant and his son Harpartap.   It  was
alleged that over a lingering land dispute between  the  informant  and  the
appellant, who are brothers, on 06.07.2002, while Jugraj,  the  son  of  the
informant was in his fields,  the  appellant  had  hurled   abuses  to  him.
Jugraj having felt humiliated and anguished, on returning  home,  complained
about the same to his father Gurdial, the  informant.   The  houses  of  the
brothers were adjacent to each other.   When  the  appellant  returned  home
from his fields, the informant went to the terrace of the roof of his  house
and summoned the  former  to  that  of  his.   The  appellant  and  his  son
Harpartap responded to the call whereafter informant enquired of  Gurpal  as
to why he had  abused  his  son.   This  enraged  the  appellant  and  while
arrogantly proclaiming that he was not only justified to do so but  that  he
would continue to conduct himself as done, rushed downstairs  of  his  house
and brought his DBBL  gun.  His son Harpartap, the acquitted co-accused  was
also with him.  It is alleged by the prosecution that on the exhortation  of
Harpartap, the appellant opened fire, which hit the informant  on  the  side
of his head.  Meanwhile drawn by the commotion, Paramjit Kaur, the  wife  of
the informant, Jatinder  Singh  and  Lakhwinder  Singh,  friends  of  Jugraj
rushed to the terrace.  On seeing them, the appellant  fired  from  his  gun
towards  them,  which  hit  Paramjit  and  Jatinder  on  their  abdomen  and
Lakhwinder on his  mouth  and  head.  On  hue  and  cry  being  raised,  the
appellant and the accused fled the scene.
4.    The injured were rushed to  the  Guru  Nanak  Dev  Hospital,  Amritsar
where they were  treated.   However,  Jatinder  succumbed  to  the  injuries
sustained.   After  completing  the  investigation,  charge-sheet  was  laid
against both the accused persons under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

5.    The accused persons denied the charge and, therefore were tried.   The
prosecution   examined  several  witnesses  including  the  informant,   the
injured and the doctor who had performed  the  post-mortem  examination  and
had attended the injuries of others  involved.   The  accused  persons  were
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and on the completion of the  trial,  the
Trial Court  convicted  the  appellant  under  Sections  302,  307  IPC  but
acquitted the co-accused  Harpartap.   To  reiterate,  the  High  Court  has
affirmed the conviction and the sentence recorded by the Trial Court.
6.     The  learned  Amicus  Curiae  has  persuasively   argued   that   the
prosecution has utterly failed to prove the  charge  against  the  appellant
which is patently deducible amongst others from the exoneration of  the  co-
accused Harpartap, who allegedly had instigated the former to open  fire  on
the deceased and the injured. Apart from contending that all  the  purported
eye-witnesses are relatives inter se, and therefore inherently partisan  and
thus are wanting  in  creditability,  the  learned  senior  counsel  in  the
alternative has urged without prejudice that even if the  prosecution  case,
as projected, is accepted in its entirety, no case  for  murder  or  attempt
therefor has been proved and, therefore in  any  view  of  the  matter,  the
sentence needs to be reduced appropriately.
7.    The learned counsel for the respondent, as  against  this,  has  urged
that in the  face  of  telltale  testimony  of  the  injured  eye-witnesses,
supported on all fours by the medical evidence, the charge levelled  against
the appellant stands proved beyond reasonable doubt and thus the  concurrent
determinations of the courts below do not warrant any  interference  in  the
appeal.
8.    We have examined the evidence pertaining to the incident as  available
on records.  The  eye-witnesses  including  the  informant  have  offered  a
consistent, coherent and convincing narration thereof which does  not  admit
of  any  doubt  of  their  trustworthiness.   The  plea  of   their   family
relationship to discredit them  does  not  commend  for  acceptance  in  the
attendant  facts  and  circumstances.   Noticeably,   in   course   of   the
investigation, amongst others, the 12 bore DBBL gun  loaded  with  two  live
cartridges used for the offence had been recovered from the appellant.   The
site plan prepared by the investigating  officer  also  pins  the  place  of
occurrence as deposed by the witnesses.  Further four cartridge shells  have
also been recovered from the said spot.

9.    The medical evidence reveals injuries on the deceased and the  injured
compatible  with  the  weapon  used.   The  charges  levelled  against   the
appellant thus have been proved beyond doubt.  The co-accused Harpartap  has
been acquitted in view of  absence of  any  incriminating  evidence  against
him. His acquittal, having regard to the state of evidence  has  no  bearing
on the  inculpatory  involvement  of  the  appellant  somuch  so,  that  his
conviction in isolation is sustainable.
10.    However,  in  the  singular  facts  of  the  case  and  noticing   in
particular, the progression of events culminating in  the  tragic  incident,
we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded to  him.   Incidentally,  the
occurrence is of the year 2004 and  meanwhile  twelve  years  have  elapsed.
Further, having regard to the root cause of  the  incident  and  the  events
that sequentially unfolded thereafter, we are of the comprehension that  the
appellant was overpowered by an uncontrollable fit of anger somuch  so  that
he was deprived of his power of self-control and being drawn  in  a  web  of
action reflexes, fired at the deceased and the injured, who were within  his
sight.  The facts do not commend to conclude  that  the  appellant  had  the
intention of eliminating any one of  those  fired  at,  though  he  had  the
knowledge of the likely fatal consequences thereof.  Be that as it  may,  on
an overall consideration of the fact situation and  also  the  time  lag  in
between, we are of the view that the conviction of the  appellant  ought  to
be moderated to one under Section 304 Part 1  IPC  and  307  IPC.   Further,
considering the facts of the case in particular, according to us,  it  would
meet the ends of justice, if the sentence for the  offences  is  reduced  to
the period already undergone.  We order accordingly.
11.   Ex-consequenti, the appeal is partly allowed.  The conviction  of  the
appellant is converted to one under Section 304 Part 1 and 307 IPC  and  the
sentence is reduced to the period already undergone.  In this  view  of  the
matter, as a corollary, the  appellant  is  hereby  ordered  to  be  set  at
liberty forthwith, if he is not required to be detained in  connection  with
any other case.



                             .............................................J.
                                                     (DIPAK MISRA)



                              …...........................................J.
                                                  (AMITAVA ROY)

NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 2, 2016.

Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code=A plain perusal of the above quote also reveals that apart from an omnibus grievance against her in-laws to be responsible for their death, for which according to her, they ought to be punished, there is no reference or disclosure of any specific incident in support thereof. The suicide note divulges her ownership of lands and house which per se belies the charge that she had been denied the share of her husband in the family property. Noticeably, no attempt was made by the prosecution to prove the author of the text through an expert and both the courts below solely based their conclusion, in this regard on the evidence of PWs 5 and 6, the brothers of Surjit, who identified the contents to be that of hers again on eye estimation.-Though for the purposes of the case in hand, the first limb of the explanation is otherwise germane, proof of the willful conduct actuating the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental of physical, is the sine qua non for entering a finding of cruelty against the person charged.-The materials on record, to reiterate, do not suggest even remotely any act of cruelty, oppression, harassment or inducement so as to persistently provoke or compel the deceased to resort to self-extinction being left with no other alternative. No such continuous and proximate conduct of the appellant or his family members with the required provocative culpability or lethal instigative content is discernible to even infer that the deceased Surjit Kaur and her daughters had been pushed to such a distressed state, physical or mental that they elected to liquidate themselves as if to seek a practical alleviation from their unbearable earthly miseries.- ingredients of the offence of Section 306 IPC have remained unproved and thus the appellant deserves to be acquitted. The findings to the contrary recorded by the courts below cannot be sustained on the touchstone of the law adumbrated by this Court as well as the facts involved. The appeal is thus allowed.

                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1135 OF 2016
             (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO. 8764 OF 2016)

GURCHARAN SINGH                                .…APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB                                  ....RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.


1.    In assailment is the judgement and order dated  17.12.2014  passed  by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. S-
566-SB of 2004, affirming the conviction of  the  appellant  and  co-accused
Sukhvinder Singh under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter  to
be referred to as “IPC”), as entered by  the  Trial  Court.   While  by  the
decision  impugned,  the  conviction  has  been  endorsed,  the  substantive
sentence of six years  of rigorous imprisonment awarded by the  Trial  Court
to each of the accused persons has been scaled down to one of five years  of
the same description.  The instant appeal seeks to overturn  the  concurrent
 determinations on the charge by the courts below.
2.    We have heard Ms. Kawaljit Kochar, learned counsel for  the  appellant
and Mr. V. Madhukar, learned counsel for the respondent.
3.    The fascicule of facts, indispensable to comprehend  the  backdrop  of
the prosecution, has its origin in  the  inexplicable  abandonment   of  the
deceased Surjit Kaur  and her two daughters namely;  Geet  Pahul  and  Preet
Pahul by Dr. Jaspal Singh, their husband and father respectively, about  two
years prior to the tragic end of his three family  members  as  above.   The
prosecution version is that Dr. Jaspal  Singh,  who  was  initially  in  the
Government service, had  relinquished the same and started  a  coal  factory
at Muktsar. He suffered  loss  in the business and  consequently  failed  to
repay the loan availed by him in this regard from the  bank.  As he and  his
brother Gurcharan Singh (appellant  herein)  and  others  succeeded  to  the
property  left  by  their  predecessors,  he  started  medical  practice  in
private.
4.    Be that as  it   may,  before  leaving  his  family,  he  addressed  a
communication to the concerned bank expressing his inability  to  repay  the
loan inspite of his best efforts as he was not possessed of any property  in
his name.  Dr. Jaspal Singh was thereafter  not  to  be  traced.   Following
this turn of events, according to the prosecution,   his  wife  Surjit  Kaur
and his daughters shifted from Jalalabad where they used to stay  to  Abohar
and started residing in a rented house of one Hansraj (PW3).   According  to
them, they  had no source of income and further, they were also deprived  of
their share in the property and other entitlements,  otherwise  supposed  to
devolve on  Dr.  Jaspal  Singh.   They  were  also  not  provided  with  any
maintenance by the family members of her husband – Jaspal Singh and  instead
were ill-treated, harassed and intimidated.
5.    While the matter rested at that, on 3.10.2000  at  about  10.30  p.m.,
Hansraj, the landlord of the deceased Surjit Kaur,  being  suspicious  about
prolonged  and  unusual  lack  of  response  by  his  tenants,  though   the
television in their room was  on,  informed  the  brother  of  the  deceased
Surjit Kaur.  Thereafter they broke open the door of the room and found  all
three lying dead.   The police was informed and FIR was lodged.
6.    In course of the inquisition, the Investigating  Officer  collected  a
suicide note in the  handwriting of Surjit Kaur and also  subscribed  to  by
her daughter Preet Bahul.   The suicide note implicated the  appellant,  his
wife Ajit Kaur and the convicted  co-accused Sukhvinder  Singh  @  Goldy  as
being responsible  for  their  wretched  condition,  driving  them  in   the
ultimate to  take the extreme step.   A note book containing  some  letters,
written by deceased Geet Pahul was also recovered.   On  the  completion  of
the investigation, which included, amongst  others  the  collection  of  the
post-mortem report which confirmed  death due to consumption   of  aluminium
phosphide,  a  pesticide,  charge-sheet  was  submitted  against  the  three
persons named hereinabove along with Satnam Kaur under Section 306/34 IPC.
7.    Whereas Satnam Kaur died during the committal proceedings, charge  was
framed  against  the  remaining  accused  persons  namely;  Gurcharan  Singh
(appellant),  Ajit  Kaur  and   Sukhvinder   Singh   @   Goldy   under   the
aforementioned provisions of the Code.  As the accused  persons  claimed  to
be innocent, they were made to face trial.
8. At the trial, the prosecution  examined  eight  witnesses  including  the
doctor, who had  performed the  autopsy  on  the  dead  body.   The  accused
persons stood by the denial of the charge in their statements under  Section
313 Cr.P.C. and also examined five witnesses in defence.
9.    The Trial Court, on a scrutiny  of  the  evidence  adduced,  held  the
appellant herein and the co-accused Sukhvinder Singh to  be  guilty  of  the
charge levelled against them and awarded them the sentence as hereto  before
mentioned.  It, however, acquitted the co-accused Ajit Kaur.  To  reiterate,
by the impugned verdict, the conviction of the appellant and the  co-accused
Sukhvinder Singh has been upheld  with  the  marginal  modification  in  the
substantive sentence as aforementioned.
10.    Mrs.  Kawaljit  Kochar,  learned  counsel  for  the   appellant   has
emphatically urged  that  the  evidence  on  record  does  not  furnish  the
ingredients  of abetment as visualised in Section 306 of the Code and  thus,
the conviction is manifestly illegal and is  liable  to  be  set-aside.   It
being patent from the materials on record that the deceased Surjit Kaur  and
her daughters, had been duly accorded their share  in  the  family  property
and that they had sufficient  means  to  independently  maintain  themselves
with reasonable comfort, the accusation to the contrary, as levelled by  the
prosecution, is wholly unfounded, she insisted.  According  to  the  learned
counsel, the in-laws  of  the  deceased  Surjit  Kaur  had  throughout  been
considerate, compassionate and supportive towards her and two daughters  and
that the suicide committed by them  had been on their own volition  and  not
as a result of any torture, harassment and oppression by them,  as  alleged.
The learned counsel has maintained  that  the  suicide  note  has  not  been
proved in the handwriting of Surjit Kaur as well and thus,  there  being  no
evidence  whatsoever  in  corroboration  of  the  charge  of  abetment,  the
conviction and sentence is  liable  to  be  set-aside  in  the  interest  of
justice.
11.   Per contra, the learned counsel for  the  respondent,   has  urged  in
confutation,  that  the  evidence  of  the   prosecution   witnesses,   more
particularly  of  (Gurjeet  Singh)  PW5  and   Gaganjit  Singh  (PW6),   the
brothers of Surjit Kaur as well as the medical  testimony,  has  proved  the
imputation against the  appellant and  co-accused  Sukhvinder  Singh  beyond
all reasonable doubt and in the face of concurrent findings recorded by  the
courts below, on an in-depth  appraisal  of  the  materials  on  record,  no
interference with the impugned judgement  and order is warranted.
12.   Though, in the teeth of the  sequential   findings  of  guilt  of  the
courts below, normally, reappraisal of the evidence  is  otherwise  uncalled
for, we are impelled to embark upon that  exercise,  having  regard  to  the
rival assertions in the unique facts and circumstances of  the  case.   This
is more so, as in controversion of the allegation of wilful  and  deliberate
deprivation of the deceased Surjit Kaur and her daughters of their share  in
the family property, as laid by the prosecution, evidence  has  surfaced  to
the contrary, being  conceded  by  her  brothers  in  the  course  of  their
testimony at the trial.
13.   PW3 Hans Raj, the landlord stated on oath  that  the  deceased  Surjit
Kaur and her daughters used to reside in the first floor of his  house.   On
the date of the incident, at about 10.00 p.m. his wife reported to him  that
though the lights of that floor  were  off,  the  television  was  on.   The
witness thereafter along with his wife knocked the door of the apartment  of
the deceased, but there was no response.  After waiting for some  time,  the
witness informed Gurjit Singh and Gaganjit Singh,  the  brothers  of  Surjit
Kaur, and on their arrival, as the same state  of  affairs  continued,  they
broke open the door and found all the three  lying  dead.   The  police  was
thereafter informed.  According to this witness, even after  this  incident,
none of the accused persons or the in-laws of Surjit  did  come  to  inquire
about the same.
14.   In  cross-examination,  the  witness  mentioned  that  all  the  three
deceased used  to  remain  dejected  and  depressed.   They  however,  often
visited the parents and the brothers of Surjit.  He  disclosed  that  Surjit
had a house at Abohar.  He admitted that at no point  of  time,  Surjit  and
her daughters did complain to him about any threat extended by  the  accused
persons.  The witness disclosed that though Surjit had expended  substantial
amount on the coaching of her daughter, she failed in the  examination,  for
which she was morose and anguished.  The witness opined that Surjit and  her
daughters  had  committed  suicide   out  of   grief   for   their   missing
husband/father. According to him,  the  accused  persons  were  not  in  any
manner responsible for their death.
15.   PW4 Dr. Kalra, who had performed the post-mortem examination of  Preet
Bahul, testified on the basis of the report of the chemical analysis of  her
viscera that death was due to consumption of aluminum phosphide   which  was
sufficient to cause death in due course of time.  To  the  same  effect,  is
the evidence of PW11 Dr. Thakral vis-a-vis Surjit and her daughter Geet.
16.   PW5 and PW6 Gurjit and Gaganjit,  the  brothers  of  Surjit  Kaur  did
depose in similar lines.  They stated that at the time of their death,  Geet
and Preet were aged 22 years and 18 years respectively. They reiterated  the
version narrated in the FIR pertaining to the sudden disappearance of  their
brother-in-law Dr. Jaspal Singh,  husband  of  Surjit,  he  having  suffered
losses in business.  They also mentioned that,  at  that  time,  Dr.  Jaspal
Singh had heavy outstanding dues qua the bank.  They disclosed as well  that
after the death of Jaktar Singh, the father  of Dr. Jaspal,  their  brother-
in-law along with his brothers inherited  the  joint  property.   They  also
reiterated the narration of the facts preceding the discovery  of  the  dead
bodies as recited by PW3.  They  confirmed  the  recovery  and  seizure  of,
amongst others the diary containing the suicide note.  They  identified  the
text of the  suicide  note  in  the  hand  of  their  sister  Surjit.   They
identified the signature of Preet also thereon.  These  witnesses  in  their
examination-in-chief, though  alleged  that  their  sister  and  nieces  had
committed suicide because they were deprived of their  share  in  the  joint
properties, and for which they suffered from sustained depression, in cross-
examination, they  acknowledged  a  sale  deed  executed  by  the  appellant
Gurucharan in favour of Surjit regarding half share in the house at  Abohar,
which was also a segment of the family  property.   They  conceded  as  well
that Satnam Kaur, the mother-in-law of Surjit might have issued a cheque  of
Rs.68,650/- in her name and that she had opened an account therewith in  the
name of her brother Gagandeep.  They admitted  that there was  a  parcel  of
land in the name of deceased Surjit at Muktsar.  When  confronted  with  the
statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., they admitted of not having  disclosed
to the Investigating Officer, that the share in land  of  Dr.  Jaspal  Singh
had not been given to Surjit Kaur.  They accepted that the main  reason  for
the depression of the deceased was the absence of near and close  relatives.
 They conceded that neither Surjit nor they had ever  lodged  any  complaint
with the police against the accused person for the ill-treatment  meted  out
to her or  for  denying  her  entitlements  in  the  joint  property.   They
admitted as well that no civil suit had been filed in that regard.
17.   PW6, in addition admitted his signature on the sale deed  executed  by
appellant Gurucharan in favour of Surjit.  According to PW6, the  sale  deed
was executed in a family settlement after Jaspal  Singh  had  gone  missing.
This witness disclosed as well that  the  appellant  and  the  other  family
members were ready to transfer  the  share  of  his  brother-in-law  to  his
sister.
18.   The evidence on record, to start  with,  in  our  estimate,  does  not
substantiate  the  imputation  that   Surjit  and  her  daughters  had  been
deprived wholly of their shares in the joint family property  as  the  heirs
of Dr. Jaspal Singh.  Admittedly, there is no  proof  of  any  threat  being
extended by the appellant or anyone of  the  in-laws  of  Surjit  so  as  to
reduce them to destitutes in a petrified state.  The  disappearance  of  Dr.
Jaspal Singh, the husband of  Surjit,  father  of  Preet  and  Geet   though
unfortunate, the event had occurred about two years prior to  the  incident.
Neither the appellant nor the in-laws of Surjit did have any  role  in  this
regard.  The absence of any complaint or civil litigation  also  permits  an
inference against the denial of the share in the family property  to  Surjit
and her daughters or of any ill-treatment, torture, oppression meted out  to
them.  There is thus neither any proximate nor remote acts  of  omission  or
commission on the part of the appellant and his family members that  can  be
irrefutably construed to be a direct or indirect cause or factor  compelling
Surjit and her daughters to take the extreme step of self-elimination.
19.   The suicide note which transpires  to  be  the  sheet  anchor  of  the
prosecution case needs extraction for reference as hereunder.
“The whole of my land and property  should  be  given  to  National  Defence
Fund.  The family of my in-laws especially  my  mother-in-law,  Jeth  Master
Gurcharan Singh, his wife Ajit Kaur and his son Goldy  are  responsible  for
our death.  My younger daughter is still minor.

My husband was also to die by them. Now how can we live when our  living  is
more than a hell.  I pleaded before the Prime Minister, President and  Chief
Minister but there is no one for me in this society.  I also  filed  a  case
before the Human Rights Commission.  This is  our  cultured  and  democratic
society.  I struggled continuously for 1  ½  years  but  now  no  more.   My
daughters are so intelligent that one is  doing  pre-medical  test  and  the
second is doing Master of Computer Applications.  This is the reason that  I
bore all such pains but  still remain alive.  If there  is  any  justice  in
this cultured and democratic society then at  least  my  in-laws  should  be
punished after our death and every common man should get justice.

My two biggas land of Diwan Khera, 4  ½  biggas  land  of  Sajrana  and  4/5
kanals land at Muktsar should go to Mission Hospital, Muktsar.  No  body  is
entitled for my two plots in Bharat Colony Bathinda and my  house  in  Anand
Nagri, Abohar.  All the sale deeds  of  the  land  are  lying  by  my  side.
Suicide note  of my husband is also lying here which I  was  forced  not  to
hand over to the police on 22  March  1999  and  assurance  that  I  and  my
children would be looked after in a very good manner.
                                                 Sd/ Surjit Kaur”
This is however the translated version of the original  which  is  in  Hindi
script.
20.   A plain perusal of the above quote also reveals  that  apart  from  an
omnibus grievance against her in-laws to be  responsible  for  their  death,
for which according  to  her,  they  ought  to  be  punished,  there  is  no
reference or disclosure of any specific incident in  support  thereof.   The
suicide note divulges her ownership of lands and house which per  se  belies
the charge that she had been denied the share of her husband in  the  family
property. Noticeably, no attempt was made by the prosecution  to  prove  the
author of the text through an expert and both the courts below solely  based
their conclusion, in this regard on  the  evidence  of  PWs  5  and  6,  the
brothers of Surjit, who identified the contents to be that of hers again  on
eye estimation.
21.   Section 306 of the Code prescribes  the  punishment  for  abetment  of
suicide and is designed thus:
“Abetment of suicide. – If any person commits  suicide,  whoever  abets  the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment  of   either
description for a term which may extend to ten  years,  and  shall  also  be
liable to fine.”

22.   It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment  of
the commission of suicide by any person, predicating   existence of  a  live
link or nexus between the two,  abetment  being  the  propelling   causative
factor.  The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and  the
abetment thereof.  To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement  of
the accused to aid or instigate the commission  of  suicide  is  imperative.
Any severance or absence of any of this constituents would militate  against
this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in  the
intention of the accused to actualize the suicide would fall short  as  well
of the offence of abetment essential to  attract  the  punitive  mandate  of
Section 306 IPC.  Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of  the
indictable acts  or  omission  are  the  concomitant  indices  of  abetment.
Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises  the sustained incitement for suicide.
      Section 107 IPC defines abetment and is extracted hereunder:

“107. Abetment of a thing. – A person abets the doing of a thing, who –

First – Instigates any  person to do that thing; or

Secondly – Engages with  one   or  more  other  person  or  persons  in  any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission  takes
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to  the  doing  of  that
thing; or

Thirdly – Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the  doing  of
that thing.

Explanation 1 – A person, who by  wilful  misrepresentation,  or  by  wilful
concealment of a material fact which he is bound  to  disclose,  voluntarily
causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure, a thing  to be done,  is
said to instigate the doing of that doing.

Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at the time  of  the  commission
of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that  act,
and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the  doing  of
that act.”

23.   Not only the acts and  omissions  defining  the  offence  of  abetment
singularly or  in  combination  are  enumerated  therein,  the  explanations
adequately encompass all conceivable facets of the culpable conduct  of  the
offender relatable thereto.
24.   Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872  permits  a  presumption
as  to the abetment  of suicide by a married woman  by her  husband  or  any
relative of his,  if it is proved that she had committed the act   within  a
period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband  or
such relative of his  had subjected her  to  cruelty.   The  explanation  to
this Section  exposits “cruelty” to have the same meaning as  attributed  to
this expression in Section 498A IPC.  For ready reference, Section  113A  of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1882 is quoted hereunder as well.
“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by  a  married  woman—When  the
question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman  had  been  abetted
by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that  she  had
committed suicide within a period of  seven  years  from  the  date  of  her
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had  subjected
her to cruelty, the Court may  presume,  having  regard  to  all  the  other
circumstances of the case,  that  such  suicide  had  been  abetted  by  her
husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the  same
meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

25.   In the legislative backdrop outlined hereinabove, Section 498A of  the
Code also demand extraction.

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her  to  cruelty
- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of  the  husband  of  a  woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished  with  imprisonment  for  a
term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means-

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to  drive  the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb  or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the  woman  where  such  harassment  is  with  a  view  to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any  unlawful  demand  for
any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or  any
person related to her to meet such demand.”



26.   This provision, as the quote hereinabove reveals, renders the  husband
of a woman or the relative of his, punishable thereby with imprisonment  for
a term which may extend to three years and also fine, if  they  or  any  one
of them subject her to cruelty.  The explanation thereto defining  “cruelty”
enfolds:

  any wilful conduct which is of such a nature  as   is likely to drive  the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb  or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

 harassment of the woman, where it is  with a view to  coercing her  or  any
person related to her to meet  any  unlawful  demand  for  any  property  or
valuable security or is  on account of failure by her or any person  related
to her, to meet such demand.

27.   Though for the purposes of the case in hand, the  first  limb  of  the
explanation is otherwise germane, proof of  the  willful  conduct  actuating
the woman to commit suicide or   to cause grave injury  or danger  to  life,
limb or health, whether  mental  of  physical,  is  the  sine  qua  non  for
entering a finding of cruelty against the person charged.
28.   The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been  enunciated  by
this Court in Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab  (2004)13 SCC 129,  and  the
relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder.

“12.  Abetment  involves  a  mental  process  of  instigating  a  person  or
intentionally aiding  that  person  in  doing  of  a  thing.   In  cases  of
conspiracy also it would  involve  that  mental  process  of  entering  into
conspiracy  for  the doing of that thing.  More active  role  which  can  be
described as  instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required  before
a person can be said   to  be  abetting  the  commission  of  offence  under
Section 306 IPC.

13.  In State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC  73,  this  Court  has
observed that the courts  should  be  extremely  careful  in  assessing  the
facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in  the  trial
for  the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim  had
in  fact  induced  her  to  end  the  life  by  committing  suicide.  If  it
transpires   to  the  court   that   a   victim   committing   suicide   was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and  differences  in  domestic
life quite common to the society to which  the  victim   belonged  and  such
petulance, discord and differences were not expected to  induce a  similarly
circumstanced  individual   in  a  given  society  to  commit  suicide,  the
conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing  a  finding  that
the accused charged of abetting the  offence  of  suicide  should  be  found
guilty.”


29.   Significantly, this Court  underlined  by  referring  to  its  earlier
pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal  (supra) that courts  have to  be  extremely
careful in assessing  the facts and circumstances of each case to  ascertain
as to whether  cruelty had been meted out to the victim and  that  the  same
had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide,  with  the
caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears  to  be  hypersensitive
to ordinary petulance, discord and  differences   in  domestic  life,  quite
common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were  not
expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort  to   such
step, the accused charged with  abetment could not be held guilty.
The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu  vs.  State  of  West
Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707.
30.   That the intention of the legislature is that in order  to  convict  a
person under Section 306 IPC, there  has to be a clear mens  rea  to  commit
an offence and that there ought to be an  active or direct act  leading  the
deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had  been  propounded
by this Court in  S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190.
31.   In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat  (2013)  10  SCC  48,
this Court, with reference to Section  113A  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,
1872, while observing that the criminal law amendment  bringing  forth  this
provision was  necessitated to meet the social  challenge   of  saving   the
married woman from  being ill-treated or forcing to commit  suicide  by  the
husband or his relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the  burden
of proving  the  preconditions  permitting  the  presumption   as  ingrained
therein, squarely   and  singularly   lay  on  the  prosecution.   That  the
prosecution as well has  to  establish  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the
deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person charged  under
Section 306 IPC, was emphasised.
32.   The assessment of the evidence on record as above, in  our  considered
opinion, does not demonstrate with unqualified clarity and  conviction,  any
role of the appellant or the  other  implicated  in-laws   of  the  deceased
Surjit Kaur, as contemplated by the above provisions  so  as  to  return  an
unassailable finding of  their  culpability  under  Section  306  IPC.   The
materials on record, to reiterate, do not suggest even remotely  any act  of
cruelty, oppression, harassment or inducement so as to persistently  provoke
or compel the deceased to resort  to  self-extinction  being  left  with  no
other  alternative.   No  such  continuous  and  proximate  conduct  of  the
appellant or his family members with the  required  provocative  culpability
or lethal instigative  content  is  discernible   to  even  infer  that  the
deceased  Surjit  Kaur   and  her  daughters  had  been  pushed  to  such  a
distressed  state,  physical  or  mental  that  they  elected  to  liquidate
themselves as if to seek  a  practical  alleviation  from  their  unbearable
earthly miseries.
33.   In the wake up of the  above  determination,  we  are,  thus,  of  the
unhesitant opinion that the ingredients of the offence of  Section  306  IPC
have remained unproved and thus the  appellant  deserves  to  be  acquitted.
The findings to  the  contrary  recorded  by  the  courts  below  cannot  be
sustained on the touchstone of the law adumbrated by this Court as  well  as
the facts involved.  The appeal is thus allowed.   The  appellant  would  be
set at liberty from custody, if his detention is not required in  connection
with any other case.

.............................................J.
                                               (DIPAK MISRA)



                              …...........................................J.
                                               (AMITAVA ROY)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 2, 2016.

The expression 'person acting in concert' includes a corporate entity [Regulation 2(1)(e)(2)(i) of the Regulations] and also its directors and associates [Regulation 2(1)(e)(2)(iii) of the Regulations].= SECURITIES & EXCHANGE BD.OF INDIA Vs. BURREN ENERGY INDIA LTD.& ANR.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 361 OF 2007


SECURITIES & EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA                                ...APPELLANT

                            VERSUS

BURREN ENERGY INDIA LTD.
& ORS.                                ...RESPONDENTS




                                  JUDGMENT


RANJAN GOGOI, J.


1.          The challenge in this appeal is  to  an  order  of  the  learned
Securities Appellate Tribunal,  Mumbai  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the
Tribunal”) reversing the  order  of  the  Adjudicating  Officer  dated  25th
August, 2006 holding the respondents guilty of contravening  the  provisions
of  Regulation  22(7)  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Board  of   India
(Substantial  Acquisition  of  Shares  and  Takeovers)   Regulations,   1997
(hereinafter referred to as “the Regulations”). A  penalty  of  Rs.25  lakhs
has been imposed on  each  on  the  respondents  herein  for  the  aforesaid
violation.  Aggrieved by  the  aforesaid  reversal,  Securities  &  Exchange
Board of India  (hereinafter referred to as “SEBI”) is in appeal before us.

2.          The relevant facts are not in  dispute.   The  first  respondent
herein – Burren Energy India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Burren”)  was
incorporated in December, 2004 under the laws of England and Wales with  its
registered office in London. Burren was formed to acquire the entire of  the
equity share capital of one Unocal Bharat Limited (hereinafter  referred  to
as “UBL”), incorporated in Mauritius in  July,  1996.   The  shares  of  the
aforesaid UBL were acquired in September, 1996 by one  Unocal  International
Corporation (for short “UIC”) incorporated in California in USA.

3.          Admittedly, UBL did not carry out any business activity but,  at
the relevant time, held 26.01% of the issued share capital of Hindustan  Oil
Exploration Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred  to as “the target company”).

4.          Burren entered into a share purchase agreement with UIC on  14th
February, 2005 to acquire the entire  equity  share  capital  of  UBL.  This
agreement was entered into in England and by virtue thereof all  the  shares
of UBL were registered in the name of Burren on the  same  day  itself  i.e.
14th February, 2005.  On account of this transformation Burren came to  hold
26.01% of the share capital in the target company.  As the  acquisition  was
beyond the stipulated 15% of the equity share capital of the target  company
the Regulations got attracted making it obligatory on the  part  of   Burren
to make a public announcement in  accordance  with  the  Regulations.   Such
public announcement in the form of a public offer for sale/purchase  of  20%
of the shares of the target company at a determined price  of  Rs.92.41  per
fully paid up equity share was made on 15th February,  2005  by  Burren  and
UBL acting as a person acting in concert.

5.          On 14th February, 2005 i.e. date  of   execution  of  the  share
purchase agreement  Burren  appointed  two  of  its  Directors  (Mr.  Finian
O'Sullivan and Mr. Atul Gupta) on the board of UBL  and  on  the  same  date
UBL, which is a person acting in concert with  Burren,  appointed  the  same
persons on the board of directors of the target company.    This,  according
to SEBI, amounted violation of Regulation 22(7) of the Regulations  inasmuch
as the  said  appointment  was  made  during  the  offer  period  which  had
commenced on and from 14th February, 2005 i.e.  date  of  execution  of  the
share purchase agreement.

6.          To appreciate the issue the provisions of Regulation 2(1)(f)  of
the Regulations which defines 'offer period' and  Regulation  22(7)  of  the
Regulations alleged  to  have  been  violated  by  the  respondents  may  be
extracted below:

“2(1)(f)    “Offer period” means the period between  the  date  of  entering
into Memorandum of Understanding or the public  announcement,  as  the  case
may be and the date of completion  of  offer  formalities  relating  to  the
offer made under these regulations”


22.   General obligations of the acquirer.-(1)...................
(2) ............................
................................
(7)   During the offer period, the acquirer or  persons  acting  in  concert
with him shall not be entitled to be appointed on the Board of Directors  of
the target company:

      Provided that in case of acquisition of shares  or  voting  rights  or
control of a  Public Sector Undertaking pursuant to  a  public  announcement
made  under  the  proviso  to  sub-regulation  (1)  of  Regulation  14,  the
provisions of sub-regulation (8) of Regulation 23 shall be applicable:


      Provided further that where the acquirer, other than the acquirer  who
has made an offer under regulation 21A,  after  assuming  full  acceptances,
has deposited in the escrow account hundred per cent  of  the  consideration
payable in cash where the consideration payable is in cash and in  the  form
of securities where the consideration payable is by way of  issue,  exchange
or transfer of securities or combination thereof, he may be entitled  to  be
appointed on the Board of Directors of the target company after a period  of
twenty-one days from the date of public announcement.


7.          The Tribunal hearing the matter in appeal  took  the  view  that
under Regulation  2(1)(f) of  the  Regulations  'offer  period'  is  clearly
defined as the period of time between the date of entering  into  Memorandum
of Understanding or the public announcement, as the case  may  be,  and  the
date of completion of offer formalities. The learned  Tribunal  was  of  the
view that when there was no ambiguity or uncertainty in  the  provisions  of
the Regulations the  definition  of  'offer  period'  has  to  be  literally
interpreted.  The learned Tribunal went into the dictionary meaning  of  the
expression 'Memorandum of Understanding' and went on to hold that  the  same
falls short of  a  concluded  contract.   As  there  was  no  Memorandum  of
Understanding between the parties it is  the  date  of  public  announcement
that would trigger of  the  commencement  of  the  'offer  period'.  As  the
appointment of the  Directors  in  the  target  company  was  made  on  14th
February, 2005 and the public announcement was made on 15th  February,  2005
the learned Tribunal was  of  the  view  that  the  respondents  (appellants
before it) cannot be held liable  for  violating  Regulation  22(7)  of  the
Regulations, as found by the Adjudicating Officer.
8.          The main thrust of the contentions advanced  on  behalf  of  the
appellant  before  us  appears  to  be  that  the   words   'Memorandum   of
Understanding' are not  words of Art conveying  a  single  meaning.   In  an
appropriate situation a 'Memorandum of Understanding'  may  also  include  a
concluded agreement between the parties.  Even  in  a  given  case  where  a
Memorandum of Understanding is to fall short of a concluded  agreement  and,
in fact, the  concluded  agreement  is  executed  subsequently,  the  'offer
period'  would  still  commence  from  the  date  of   the   Memorandum   of
understanding.  If  the  offer  period  commences  from  the  date  of  such
Memorandum of Understanding, according to the learned counsel, there  is  no
reason why the same should not commence from the date of the share  purchase
agreement when the parties had not executed a Memorandum  of  Understanding.
It is also submitted that the commencement of the ‘offer  period’  from  the
date of public announcement would primarily have relevance to a  case  where
acquisition of shares is from the market  and  there  is  no  Memorandum  of
Understanding or a concluded agreement pursuant thereto.
9.          In reply, Shri Shyam Divan,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing
for the respondents has urged that Regulation 22(7) of the  Regulations  can
have no application to the present case  inasmuch  as  the  disqualification
from appointment on the board  of  directors  of  the  target  company  will
operate only when the acquirer or persons acting in concert are  individuals
and not a corporate entity.  This  is  because  under  Section  253  of  the
Companies Act, 1956 (corresponding to Section  149  of  the  Companies  Act,
2013) there is an embargo on a body corporate  from  being  appointed  as  a
director. Shri Divan has also drawn  the  attention  of  the  Court  to  the
provisions of Regulation 22(7) of the Regulations as it originally  existed;
its amendment in  the  year  2002  (which  provision  is  relevant  for  the
purposes of the present case) and the subsequent amendment effected  in  the
year 2011. Shri Divan has submitted that meaning sought to be attributed  to
the Regulations relevant to the present case i.e. 2002 Regulations has  been
specifically incorporated in the  Regulations  amended  in  the  year  2011.
That the concluded share purchase agreement would be the starting  point  of
the 'offer period' is mandated under the 2011 Regulations and not under  the
2002 Regulations.

10.         We have considered the submissions of the parties.

11.         In the present case, while Burren was the acquirer, UBL was  the
person acting in concert. This is evident from the letter of  offer  (public
announcement) dated 15th February, 2005.  The embargo  under  Section  22(7)
is both on the acquirer and a person  acting  in  concert.   The  expression
'person  acting  in  concert'  includes  a  corporate   entity   [Regulation
2(1)(e)(2)(i) of the Regulations] and  also  its  directors  and  associates
[Regulation  2(1)(e)(2)(iii)  of  the  Regulations].  If  this  is  what  is
contemplated under the Regulations we do not  see  how  the  first  argument
advanced  by  Shri  Divan  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  can  have   our
acceptance.

12.         Insofar as  the  second  argument  advanced  by  Shri  Divan  is
concerned it is correct that in the definition of 'offer  period'  contained
in Regulation 2(1)(f) of the Regulations, relevant for the present  case,  a
concluded agreement is not contemplated to be  the  starting  point  of  the
offer period. But such a consequence must naturally follow  once  the  offer
period  commences  from  the  date  of  entering  into   a   Memorandum   of
Understanding which, in most cases would reflect an agreement  in  principle
falling short of a binding contract. If the offer period  can  be  triggered
of by an understanding that is yet to fructify into an agreement, we do  not
see how the same can be said not to have commenced/started from the date  of
a concluded agreement i.e. share purchase agreement as in the present  case.


13.         On the view that we have taken we will have  to  hold  that  the
learned Tribunal was incorrect in reaching its impugned conclusions  and  in
reversing the order of the Adjudicating Officer.  Consequently the order  of
the learned Tribunal is set aside and that of the  Adjudicating  Officer  is
restored.  The penalty awarded by the Adjudicating Officer  by  order  dated
25th August, 2006 shall be deposited  in  the  manner  directed  within  two
months from today.

14.          The  appeal  consequently  is  allowed  in  the  above   terms.


                                                     ....................,J.
                                          (RANJAN GOGOI)




                                                     ....................,J.
                                                               (N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 2, 2016