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Saturday, November 19, 2016

The writ petitioners cannot be heard to claim relief on the basis of the subsequent selection process commenced pursuant to the notification dated 22nd February 2013. The High Court was not expected to fill the vacancies over and above the vacancies advertised for selection process of 2010. Moreover, since the writ petitioners have participated in the earlier selection process of 2010 and not in the subsequent selection process conducted on the basis of Notification dated 22nd February 2013 for the year 2012, they cannot be given any relief. - 2016 Nov.http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44314-SRIKANT ROY & ORS. Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CIVIL APPEAL No. 10874/2016
                 (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No.9883/2009)


Srikant Roy & Ors.                                       …..Appellants

                                     Vs.

State of Jharkhand & Ors.                         …..Respondents

WITH W.P.(C) No.300/2013, W.P.(C)No.27/2014 & W.P.(C)No.325/2014



                             J U D G M E N T



A.M.KHANWILKAR, J.



Leave granted.



2.    This common judgment will dispose all the four petitions.




3.    The leading  Civil  Appeal  arising  out  of  Special  Leave  Petition
(Civil) No.9883/2009, is directed  against  the  judgment  of  the  Division
Bench of the High Court of  Jharkhand  at  Ranchi  in  W.P.(S)  No.4159/2008
dated 29th August 2008. By the said  Writ  Petition,  the  writ  petitioners
(respondents 4 to 11  herein)  had  challenged  the  selection  process  for
filling up of  34  posts  of  Additional  District  Judges  through  Limited
Competitive Examination scheduled on 31st August 2008; and also 18 posts  of
Additional District Judges from the promotee officers on the basis of merit-
cum-seniority  scheduled  on  23rd  August  2008.   The   writ   petitioners
(respondents 4 to 11 herein) were appointed purely against temporary and ex-
cadre posts on ad-hoc basis, as Presiding Officer, Fast Track Courts in  the
rank of Additional District & Sessions Judge in the year 2002. According  to
the said writ petitioners, the impugned selection process was  improper  and
not in conformity with the mandate of the amended Rules requiring  ratio  of
50:25:25 - by promotion from amongst the Sub-Judges on the basis  of  merit-
cum-seniority and passing of a suitability test; by  promotion  (by  way  of
selection) strictly on the basis of  merit  through  a  Limited  Competitive
Examination of Sub-Judges having not less  than  5  years  service;  and  by
direct recruitment from the Bar on the basis of written test  and  viva-voce
conducted by  the  High  Court,  respectively.  The  said  writ  petitioners
asserted that if the impugned selection process  was  allowed  to  be  taken
forward, it would be in breach of the relevant Recruitment  Rules  and  also
infringe the mandate of adhering to the roster as per Rule 8 of the  amended
Rules. The main contention of the said writ petitioners was  that  the  High
Court was erroneously linking the ratio of posts to fill  up  the  vacancies
by giving retrospective effect to the amended Rules,  which  has  come  into
force w.e.f. 20th August 2004. The challenge before the High  Court  in  the
writ petition, as has been noted in the  opening  para  1  of  the  impugned
judgment was limited to the  quota  assigned  for  the  Limited  Competitive
Examination  from  amongst  the  (Subordinate  Judge/Civil   Judge   (Senior
Division) scheduled to be held on  31st  August  2008.  The  High  Court  in
paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment has noted that the  challenge  is  only
to the extent of 42 posts of Additional District  Judges  which  had  to  be
filled up by following the roster system in the ratio of 25:25. Those  posts
were required to be bifurcated equally between the promotees from  the  rank
of Subordinate Judges by  conducting  Limited  Competitive  Examination  and
direct recruits from the Bar in the ratio of 25:25. In paragraph 10  onwards
of the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the plea of  the  said  writ
petitioners and  issued  directions  to  the  High  Court  to  fill  up  the
vacancies, as directed. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment  reads
thus:


“10. Having heard the counsel for the parties at some length  in  the  light
of the explanation in regard to the bifurcation of the posts as  per  roster
system to be followed  in  pursuance  to  the  Jharkhand  Superior  Judicial
Service Rules, which was amended in view of the directions  of  the  Supreme
Court, we are of the view that 50% of the posts having already  been  filled
up by the promotes on the basis of the merit-cum-seniority due to  which  41
posts were filled up, the left over 42 posts have to be bifurcated into  25%
and 25% meaning thereby 21 posts will have to be assigned to  be  filled  up
by promotion from the Subordinate Judges/Civil Judge  (Senior  Division)  on
the basis of Limited Competitive Examination and left over  21  posts  which
constitute 25% of the available posts will have  to  be  filled  up  by  the
direct recruits as that is the clear mandate of the  Supreme  Court  in  the
case referred to hereinbefore in pursuance to which the  Jharkhand  Superior
Judicial Service Rules, was also amended in 2001  and  became  effective  in
2004.  In  fact,  the  petitioners  have  informed  this  Court   that   the
respondents have not only invited the applications for all the 42  posts  to
be filled up by the Subordinate Judges on the basis of  Limited  Competitive
Examination, but even the posts that might be available  in  the  year  2009
have also been included in  the  advertisement,  which  is  clearly  not  in
consonance with the direction of the Supreme Court and is also  contrary  to
the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service Rules, 2001.

11. Hence, this court is left  which  no  option,  than  to  set  aside  the
examination process, which  is  scheduled  to  be  held  on  31.08.2008  and
further direct the respondents to bifurcate the left  over  posts  into  the
ratio of half and half, i.e. 25% and 25% equally  and  thereafter  issued  a
fresh advertisement for filling up 21 posts by  the  Subordinate  Judges  on
the basis of Limited Competitive Examination and  the  rest  21  posts  will
have to be filled up by direct recruits for which exercise will have  to  be
undertaken in future by the respondents.

12. As no other point has been pressed in this writ petition  and  the  only
dispute that has been raised is in record to bifurcation of  posts  contrary
to the roster principle, referred hereinbefore, and  the  same  having  been
found to be correct, the notification issued on the internet for filling  up
the  posts  of  Additional  District  Judges  is  quashed  and  set   aside.
Consequently, the process of examination to be held  on  31.8.2008  is  also
set aside. The writ petition,  accordingly,  is  allowed,  but  without  any
order as to costs.”




4.    The  appellants,  who  were  working  as  Subordinate  Judges  at  the
relevant  time  and  were  otherwise  eligible  to  appear  in  the  Limited
Competitive Examination for filling up the  notified  vacancies  by  way  of
promotion, have approached this Court to question the aforesaid decision.


5.     The  cognate  Writ  Petitions   involve   overlapping   issues.   The
petitioners in these Writ Petitions, however, participated in the  selection
process of 2010 commenced on the basis of an advertisement  No.  1/2010  for
the post of Additional District Judge from the Bar.  These  petitioners  did
not succeed in getting appointed, as the first 8  candidates  in  the  merit
list exhausted the 8 vacancies notified for the relevant  period.  The  said
writ petitioners were, however, placed at serial No.9 onwards in  the  merit
list. According to these petitioners, some more  posts  were  available  for
direct recruits from the Bar. That contention, essentially, is dependent  on
the outcome of Civil Appeal arising out of Special  Leave  Petition  (Civil)
No.9883/2009 wherein the selection process of 2008 is  the  subject  matter.
According to these writ petitioners, the High Court  had  failed  to  notify
the correct number of vacancies for 2010. The correct  number  of  vacancies
in 2010 to be filled up by direct recruitment ought to be  13.  Indeed,  the
writ petitioners have made their own assumption to arrive at this number  of
vacancies, as is spelt out from the averments in the Writ Petition.


6.    The Registrar General of the High Court has  filed  reply  affidavits.
The stand of the High Court (Administration Side) was that  no  vacancy  for
direct recruit from the Bar existed as on 20.04.2008. It is stated  that  in
the year 2008, the actual vacancy as on 30th  April,  2008  and  anticipated
vacancy till 31st March 2009 were notified on the official  Website  of  the
High Court. The said Notification reads thus:

“Actual and anticipated Vacancy in the cadre of Jharkhand Superior  Judicial
Service

|Actual Vacancy as on 30.04.2008                  |Anticipated Vacancy till|
|                                                 |31.03.2009              |
|By Promotion from       |Promotion (by way of    |By promotion from       |
|Sub-Judges on basis of  |Selection) through      |Sub-Judges on basis of  |
|merit-cum-seniority     |limited competitive     |merit-cum-seniority     |
|                        |examination             |                        |
|             18         |             34         |             11         |


Note: In the event of issuance  of  notification  by  the  State  Government
regarding induction of 10 Adhoc A.D.Js. of the  Fast  Track  Courts  in  the
Jharkhand Superior Judicial  Service  on  regular  basis,  in  view  of  the
recommendation of the Court  made  vide  letter  Nos.6949/Apptt.  Dated  3rd
November 2007 and 2819/Apptt. Dated 11.04.2008, the actual vacancies  as  on
30.04.2009 in the Promotee Quota shall be reduced to 08.”


After initiation  of  the  impugned  selection  process  for  2008,  a  Writ
Petition No.4159/2008 was filed in the High Court in which  directions  were
issued to the High Court to fill up 21 vacancies  out  of  42  vacancies  by
promotion  of  Subordinate  Judges  on  the  basis  of  Limited  Competitive
Examination and the rest of 21 vacancies by direct recruitment.  The  matter
was, therefore, referred  to  the  selection  committee.  In  the  meantime,
however, the Judicial Officers challenged the decision of the High Court  by
way of present S.L.P.  (Civil)  No.  9883/2009  in  which  interim  stay  of
operation of the directions issued by the High  Court  was  granted  on  9th
April, 2009. The said interim order was later  modified  on  24th  September
2010, in the following terms:

            “List alongwith the batch of T.C.22 of 2001.
      Since the matter has been pending at the  stage  of  advertisement  of
2008, we modify the order passed by the previous  Bench  dated  9.4.2009  by
directing the process, pursuant to the advertisement of  2008,  to  continue
pending the hearing and final  disposal  of  this  Special  Leave  Petition.
However, on completion of the exercise, vacancies will not  be  filled  till
further orders.”
Pursuant to the modification of the interim order, the High Court  completed
the selection process of filling up of the notified  vacancies  of  2008  by
way of promotion. On a further application filed, this Court on  5th  August
2011 permitted the High Court  to  make  appointments  concerning  the  said
selection process of 2008. The said order reads thus:

            “In modification of our order dated  24th  September  2010,  the
High Court is free to  make  appointments  subject  to  the  result  of  the
special leave petition.

            The Interlocutory Application is, accordingly, allowed.”



Pursuant to the liberty given  by  this  Court,  the  High  Court  submitted
recommendations to the State Government for promotion of 31 Officers of Sub-
Judge Cadre as  per  the  advertisement  issued  in  2008  to  fill  up  the
vacancies in terms of Rule 4(b) and 4(c). The High Court  submitted  another
recommendation to the State Government for promotion of 17 more Officers.

7.    It is then asserted by the High Court that when the selection  process
of 2008 was commenced  and  completed,  there  was  no  vacancy  for  direct
recruit quota. The affidavit also refers to the fact  that  8  vacancies  of
direct quota were notified in the  year  2010  vide  High  Court  memorandum
dated 4th November 2010 for the relevant period, which reads thus:

“Actual vacancies in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service accrued  during
the period from 18.07.2008 till date

|By Promotion from |Promotion (by way |By direct         |Total Vacancies   |
|Sub-Judges on     |of Selection)     |recruitment from  |                  |
|basis of          |through limited   |Bar               |                  |
|merit-cum-seniorit|competitive       |                  |                  |
|y                 |Examination       |                  |                  |
|28                |08 or 09          |07 or 08          |44                |


Memo 7671/Apptt. Dated Ranchi the 4th November, 2010

Copy forwarded to Scientist (D), N.I.C., Jharkhand High Court Ranchi.

      He is requested to put  the    aforesaid  vacancies  in  the  official
website of the Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi.”

      The High Court with a view to fill up those vacancies,  commenced  the
process vide advertisement No.01/2010. Pursuant to the  said  advertisement,
the writ petitioners  in  the  connected  writ  petitions  appeared  in  the
preliminary  examination  held  on  29th  September  2011   and   the   main
examination held on 27th November 2011 along with other candidates. Only  32
candidates could qualify the main examination, who  were  called  for  viva-
voce held on 3rd February 2012. Out of those candidates, only 15  candidates
including the writ petitioners in the connected writ petitions  successfully
qualified all the three rounds. However, as  per  the  merit  wise  rank  of
successful candidates, the names of the said writ  petitioners  were  placed
at  lower  position.  Thus,  the  first  8   meritorious   candidates   were
recommended for appointment against the vacant posts to  be  filled  by  the
process of direct recruitment. It is also mentioned in  the  affidavit  that
the appointment of the candidates made against  the  selection  process  for
2008, the candidates were made aware that their appointment was  subject  to
the final decision of this Court in SLP (Civil) No. 9883/2009.

8.    It is asserted  by  the  High  Court  that  the  writ  petitioners  in
connected writ petitions,  who  participated  in  the  subsequent  selection
process cannot get any advantage qua the selection  process  of  2008.  For,
they participated in  the  selection  process  commenced  on  the  basis  of
advertisement No.1 of 2010. Similarly,  they  cannot  claim  any  relief  in
respect of  fresh  vacancy  which  was  notified  in  the  year  2012,  vide
Notification dated 22nd March, 2012. That notification reads thus:

“JHARKHAND HIGH COURT, RANCHI
                                NOTIFICATION

      No. 102/A. The Vacancies of the Jharkhand  Superior  Judicial  Service
including the future vacancies till 31.12.2012 are hereby  notified  in  the
following manner:-

|By promotion from   |Promotion (by way of    |By direct recruitment |
|Civil Judge (Sr.    |selection) through      |from Bar (25%)- under |
|Division) on the    |limited competitive     |Rule 4(a) of Rules,   |
|basis of            |Examination (10%)- under|2001                  |
|merit-cum-seniority |Rule 4(c) of Rules, 2001|                      |
|(65%)- under Rule   |                        |                      |
|4(b) of Rules, 2001 |                        |                      |
|57+7=64             |Nil                     |5 (+8*)               |


It is made clear that appointment over the aforesaid 69  notified  vacancies
will also be subject to final decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court  in  the
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 9883/2009.

Also,  all  the  earlier  advertised  vacancies  are  hereby  recalled   and
restructured in the above manner.

      *Note:- The recommendation for filling up of 08  vacancies  of  Direct
Recruit Quota has already been made to the State Government for issuance  of
necessary Notification vide Letter  No.  1959/Apptt.  Dated  10.02.2012  and
thus the vacancy under this Quota till 31.12.2012 remains 05(five).

Dated: 22nd March, 2012

By Order,
                                        Registrar General”
      The vacancy position as on 31st December 2012  was  revised  and  duly
notified vide Notification dated 19th September 2012, which reads thus:
                      “JHARKHAND HIGH COURT, RANCHI

                             NOTIFICATION

No.275/A The Vacancies position of the Jharkhand Superior  Judicial  Service
till 31.12.2012 as notified vide  Notification  No.102/A  dated  22nd  March
2012 is revised and notified in the following manner:-

|By promotion from Civil |Promotion (by way of    |By direct recruitment   |
|Judge (Sr.Division) on  |selection) through      |from Bar (25%)- under   |
|the basis of            |limited competitive     |Rule 4(a) of rules 2001 |
|merit-cum-seniority     |examination (10%)-under |                        |
|(65%) – under Rule 4 (b)|Rule 4(c) of rules, 2001|                        |
|of rules, 2001          |                        |                        |
|              68*       |             Nil        |              08        |
|                        |                        |                        |


      It  is  made  clear  that  appointment  over  the  aforesaid  notified
vacancies will subject to final decision of the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  in
the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.9883/2009.

Note: In the event of the  issuance  of  Notification  by  the  State  Govt.
regarding Promotion of 28 Officers of the rank of Civil Judge  (Sr.Division)
in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service in view of recommendation of  the
Court as made vide letter no.9593/Apptt. Dated 17th July  2012,  the  actual
vacancy as on 31.12.2012 under this quota [i.e. under Rule  4(b)]  shall  be
reduced to 40.

                                                   By Order
                                                   Sd/-
                                             Registrar General

Dated: 19th September, 2012”



9.    It is stated that the vacancy position as on 31st  December  2012  was
notified on the basis of the sanctioned strength  of  174  at  the  relevant
time. That sanctioned strength was later on increased to 191 on creation  of
17 permanent posts of Superior Officers  @  10%  of  existing  strength.  In
paragraph 20 of the reply affidavit, the vacancy position as  calculated  on
the basis of amended Rules (as amended  on  14th  December  2011)  has  been
mentioned as follows:
|Sanctioned     |By promotion from   |Promotion (by way |By direct         |
|strength       |Civil               |of selection      |recruitment from  |
|               |Judge(Sr.Div.)on the|through limited   |Bar               |
|               |basis of            |competitive       |                  |
|               |merit-cum-seniority |examination       |(25%)-Rule 4(a)   |
|               |(65%)-Rule 4(b)     |(10%)-Rule 4(C)   |                  |
|Sanctioned     |         124        |         19       |         48       |
|Strength-191   |                    |                  |                  |
|Present working|          68        |      20(-1*)     |         36       |
|strength-124   |                    |                  |                  |
|Present        |     56-1*=55       |         Nil      |          12      |
|vacancies      |(*excess adjusted)  |                  |                  |


10.   It is then stated that pursuant to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
Civil Appeal Nos.6647-6649/2012 (filed  by  officers  posted  as  Additional
District Judges, Fast Track Courts), vide letter dated  20th  February  2013
the  State  Government  was  requested  to  create  13  permanent  posts  to
accommodate the 22 appellants in the said Civil Appeals  on  condition  that
in the event of non qualifying of any of the  appellants  in  the  selection
process to be conducted in terms of the direction given  by  this  Court  in
the said decision, the equal number of such created posts of District  Judge
will be abolished. After due consideration,  the  vacancy  position  of  the
Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service was  notified  vide  Notification  dated
22nd February 2013 which reads thus:

                 “HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
                             NOTIFICATION

No.45/A. The Vacancies position of the Jharkhand Superior  Judicial  Service
as notified earlier vide Notification No.275/A dated  19th  September,  2012
is hereby recalled and further revised till date in the following manner:-

|By promotion from Civil |Promotion (by way of    |By direct recruitment   |
|Judge (Sr.Division)on   |selection) through      |from Bar (25%)-under    |
|the basis of            |limited competitive     |Rule 4(a) of rules, 2001|
|merit-cum-seniority     |examination (10%)-under |                        |
|(65%)-under Rule 4(b) of|Rule 4(c) of Rules, 2001|                        |
|rules,2001              |                        |                        |
|             55         |           Nil          |       22*+03^=25       |

      It  is  made  clear  that  appointment  over  the  aforesaid  notified
vacancies will be subject to final decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court  in
the Special Leave Petition(Civil) No.9883/2009.

Note:- 1* 22 Vacancies for the appellants of Civil  Appeal  Nos.6647,6648  &
6649 of 2012.

2.^03 Vacancies for Direct Recruitment from Bar.

3. Taking into account the 13 posts likely to be created  from  the  end  of
the State Government.

                                                   By Order
                                        Sd/-A.K.Choudhnary
                                        Registrar General I/C

Dated: 22nd February, 2013

Memo No.1644/Apptt.Dated Ranchi, the 22nd February, 2013

        Copy forwarded to the I/c NIC Cell, High Court of Jharkhand,  Ranchi
for uploading  the  above  notification  in  the  official  website  of  the
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi immediately.

                                             Sd/-22.02.2013
                                                Registrar General I/c”

11.   It is also pointed out that the Standing Committee of the  High  Court
vide minutes dated 18th February 2014 assessed the vacancy  position  as  on
20th February 2014 as under:

|      |                          |Sanctioned |Working       |Vacancy as  |
|Sl.No.|                          |Strength   |Strength as on|on          |
|      |                          |           |20.02.2014    |20.02.2014  |
|   1  |By promotion from Civil   |     134   |      60      |      74*   |
|      |Judge 9Sr.Division) on the|           |              |(74-4*)=70  |
|      |basis of                  |           |              |            |
|      |merit-cum-seniority       |           |              |            |
|      |(65%)-under Rule 4(b) of  |           |              |            |
|      |rules, 2001               |           |              |            |
|2     |Promotion(by way of       |    21     |     17       |      4     |
|      |selection)through limited |           |              |            |
|      |competitive               |           |              |            |
|      |examination(10%)-under    |           |              |            |
|      |Rule 4(c) of Rules, 2001  |           |              |            |
|3     |By direct recruitment from|      51   |       55     | Excess 4*  |
|      |Bar (25%)-under Rule 4(a) |           |              |((excess may|
|      |of Rules,2001             |           |              |be adjusted)|


In other affidavits filed on behalf of  the  High  Court  by  the  Registrar
General, the above factual position has been reiterated.

12.   We have heard the learned counsel  for  the  parties  at  length.  The
leading appeal concerns the selection process commenced in  2008.  The  High
Court has set aside the said selection process on the finding  that  50%  of
the posts have already been filled up by  the  promotees  on  the  basis  of
merit-cum-seniority and as a result of which  the  left  over  42  vacancies
should be  filled  by  promotion  from  the  subordinate  Judge/Civil  Judge
(Senior Division) on the basis of Limited  Competitive  Examination  and  by
the direct recruits in equal proportion.  There  can  be  no  difficulty  in
accepting the argument that the amended Rules providing for the ratio to  be
maintained between the promotees and direct  recruits  became  effective  on
20th  August  2004  and  had  prospective  application.  Thus,  the  factual
position as obtained on 20th August 2004 would become relevant.

13. Rules 4 and 5 read with Rule 8, as it existed prior to the amendment  of
20.08.2004 read thus:

“Rule -4: - Appointment to the service- Appointment to  the  service,  which
shall in the  first  instance  ordinarily  be  to  the  post  of  additional
district judge, shall be made by the governor,  in  consultation  with  High
Court:-

 By direct recruitment of persons as recommended by the High Court for  such
appointment under clause (2) of Article 233 of the  Constitution  of  India;
and

 By  promotion  on  merit-cum-seniority  basis  from  amongst  the  officers
belonging to the Jharkhand service provided that  where  the  merit  of  the
officers is equal in all respects, seniority  shall  prevail  and  be  given
weightage.



Rule-5:     Of the total posts in the cadre of  the  service  67%  shall  be
filled in by promotion and 33% by direct recruitment:



Provided that the State  Government  may,  in  consultation  with  the  High
Court, from time to time deviate from the  aforesaid  percentage  in  either
direction.

Rule 8:-    8. Seniority:

Seniority inter se of direct recruits  shall  be  determined  in  accordance
with the dates of their respective appointments to the service.

Seniority inter se of promoted officers shall be determined on the basis  of
their seniority as existing in the Jharkhand  Judicial  service  immediately
prior to his appointment under these rules.

 If at any time more than one direct recruit is appointed  in  the  service,
the inter se seniority of such appointees will be determined  in  accordance
with the order of merit as obtaining in the select list at the time  of  his
appointment.

  Seniority  of  direct  recruits  vis-à-vis  promoted  officers  shall   be
determined with reference to the dates on which  his  appointments  actually
are made:

Provided, however,  when  a  direct  recruit  and  a  promoted  officer  are
appointed on the same date, the promoted officer shall rank  senior  to  the
direct recruit.”



14.   Resultantly, appointments made prior to  2004  were  governed  by  the
Rules as applicable at the relevant time.  As  per  that  dispensation,  the
direct recruits quota was 33% of the total posts.   That  was  obviously  in
excess of 25% now specified in the amended Rules (as amended  on  20.08.2004
pursuant to the decision of this Court). Notably,  the  State  of  Jharkhand
had filed an affidavit in C.A.No.1867/2006 before this  Court  in  which  it
has been stated that no vacancy against 25%  quota  for  direct  recruitment
existed in the State of Jharkhand at that time. This affidavit was filed  on
26th August 2008 after the amended Rules were notified and came  into  force
w.e.f. 20th August 2004. Thus, notification for filling up of  34  posts  of
Additional District  Judge  through  Limited  Competitive  Examination  from
amongst the members of Jharkhand  Subordinate  Judges  having  more  than  5
years of experience and 18 posts from merit-cum-seniority basis amongst  the
Civil Judge (Senior Division), was issued in  2008  on  the  basis  that  no
vacancy against the posts of  direct  recruit  quota  was  available.   That
stand is reiterated even now in the affidavit filed by the High  Court.  The
High Court in the impugned judgment has  committed  manifest  error  in  not
considering these relevant facts about the vacant posts for direct  recruits
as on 20.08.2004 - before recording a finding against  the  High  Court  and
the State Government and to reject their stand that no vacancy  against  the
quota of direct recruit was available as on 30.04.2008.

15.   Indeed, the High Court in the impugned judgment has  adverted  to  the
decision of this Court in All India Judges’ Association & Ors. Vs  Union  of
India & Ors.[1]  which has enunciated the principle of roster and the  ratio
to be followed for  the post of Additional  District  Judge.   Indisputably,
pursuant to the decision of this Court the Rules were  amended,  which  came
into effect from 20th August 2004.  In  paragraph  27  to  29  of  the  said
decision, this Court has considered the question  regarding  the  method  of
recruitment to the post  in  the  cadre  of  Higher  Judicial  Service  i.e.
District Judges and Additional District Judges. The same reads thus:


“27. Another question  which  falls  for  consideration  is  the  method  of
recruitment to the posts in  the  cadre  of  Higher  Judicial  Service  i.e.
District Judges and Additional  District  Judges.  At  the  present  moment,
there are two sources  for  recruitment  to  the  Higher  Judicial  Service,
namely, by promotion from amongst the members of  the  Subordinate  Judicial
Service  and  by  direct  recruitment.  The  subordinate  judiciary  is  the
foundation of  the  edifice  of  the  judicial  system.  It  is,  therefore,
imperative, like any other foundation, that it should become  as  strong  as
possible. The weight  on  the  judicial  system  essentially  rests  on  the
subordinate judiciary. While we have  accepted  the  recommendation  of  the
Shetty Commission which will result in the increase in  the  pay  scales  of
the subordinate judiciary, it  is  at  the  same  time  necessary  that  the
judicial officers, hard-working as they are, become more  efficient.  It  is
imperative that they keep  abreast  of  knowledge  of  law  and  the  latest
pronouncements, and it is for this reason that  the  Shetty  Commission  has
recommended  the  establishment  of  a  Judicial  Academy,  which  is   very
necessary. At the same time, we are of the opinion  that  there  has  to  be
certain minimum standard, objectively adjudged,  for  officers  who  are  to
enter  the  Higher  Judicial  Service  as  Additional  District  Judges  and
District Judges.  While  we  agree  with  the  Shetty  Commission  that  the
recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service i.e.  the  District  Judge  cadre
from amongst the advocates  should  be  25  per  cent  and  the  process  of
recruitment is to be by a competitive examination,  both  written  and  viva
voce, we are of the opinion that there should  be  an  objective  method  of
testing the suitability of the subordinate judicial officers  for  promotion
to the Higher  Judicial  Service.  Furthermore,  there  should  also  be  an
incentive amongst the relatively junior and other officers  to  improve  and
to compete with each other so as to excel  and  get  quicker  promotion.  In
this way, we expect that the calibre of the members of the  Higher  Judicial
Service will further improve. In order to achieve this, while the  ratio  of
75 per cent appointment by promotion and 25 per cent by  direct  recruitment
to the Higher Judicial Service  is  maintained,  we  are,  however,  of  the
opinion that there should be two methods as far as appointment by  promotion
is concerned: 50 per cent of the total posts in the Higher Judicial  Service
must be filled  by  promotion  on  the  basis  of  principle  of  merit-cum-
seniority. For this purpose, the High Courts  should  devise  and  evolve  a
test in order  to  ascertain  and  examine  the  legal  knowledge  of  those
candidates and to assess their continued efficiency with adequate  knowledge
of case-law. The remaining 25 per cent of the posts in the service shall  be
filled by promotion strictly on the  basis  of  merit  through  the  limited
departmental competitive examination for which the qualifying service  as  a
Civil Judge (Senior Division) should be not less than five years.  The  High
Courts will have to frame a rule in this regard.

28.  As  a  result  of  the  aforesaid,  to  recapitulate,  we  direct  that
recruitment to the Higher  Judicial  Service  i.e.  the  cadre  of  District
Judges will be:
(1)(a) 50 per cent by  promotion  from  amongst  the  Civil  Judges  (Senior
Division) on the basis of principle of  merit-cum-seniority  and  passing  a
suitability test;
(b) 25 per cent by promotion strictly on the basis of merit through  limited
competitive examination of Civil Judges (Senior Division)  having  not  less
than five years’ qualifying service; and
(c) 25 per cent of the posts shall be  filled  by  direct  recruitment  from
amongst the eligible advocates on the basis of the  written  and  viva  voce
test conducted by respective High Courts.
(2) Appropriate rules shall be framed as above by the High Courts  as  early
as possible.

29. Experience has shown that  there  has  been  a  constant  discontentment
amongst the members of the  Higher  Judicial  Service  in  regard  to  their
seniority in service. For over three decades a large number  of  cases  have
been instituted in order to decide the relative seniority from the  officers
recruited from the two  different  sources,  namely,  promotees  and  direct
recruits. As a result of the decision today, there will, in a way, be  three
ways of recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service. The quota for  promotion
which we have prescribed is 50 per cent by following the  principle  “merit-
cum-seniority”, 25 per  cent  strictly  on  merit  by  limited  departmental
competitive examination and 25 per cent by  direct  recruitment.  Experience
has also shown that the least amount of litigation  in  the  country,  where
quota system in recruitment exists, insofar as seniority  is  concerned,  is
where a roster system is followed. For example, there is, as per  the  rules
of the Central Government, a  40-point  roster  which  has  been  prescribed
which deals with the quotas  for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes.
Hardly, if ever, there has been a litigation  amongst  the  members  of  the
service after their recruitment as per the quotas, the  seniority  is  fixed
by the roster points and irrespective of the fact as to  when  a  person  is
recruited. When roster system is followed,  there  is  no  question  of  any
dispute arising. The 40-point roster has been  considered  and  approved  by
this Court in R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab3.  One  of  the  methods  of
avoiding any litigation and bringing about certainty in this  regard  is  by
specifying  quotas  in  relation  to  posts  and  not  in  relation  to  the
vacancies. This is the basic principle on the basis of  which  the  40-point
roster works. We direct the High Courts to  suitably  amend  and  promulgate
seniority rules on the basis of the roster principle  as  approved  by  this
Court in R.K. Sabharwal case3 as early  as  possible.  We  hope  that  as  a
result thereof there  would  be  no  further  dispute  in  the  fixation  of
seniority. It is obvious that  this  system  can  only  apply  prospectively
except where under the relevant rules seniority is to be determined  on  the
basis of quota and rotational system. The  existing  relative  seniority  of
the members of the Higher Judicial Service  has  to  be  protected  but  the
roster has to be evolved for the future. Appropriate rules and methods  will
be adopted  by  the  High  Courts  and  approved  by  the  States,  wherever
necessary by 31-3-2003.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

 16.  Once it is found that no post against the quota of direct  recruitment
was available as on 30th April,  2008,  no  fault  can  be  found  with  the
selection process commenced by the High Court for appointment in  the  cadre
of Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service by promotion on the  basis  of  merit
through Limited Competitive Examination. The  High  Court  in  the  impugned
judgment has glossed over the effect of filling  up  the  vacancies  in  the
ratio of 25:25, which inevitably will exceed the quota of posts  for  direct
recruits as on 30.04.2008. That  would  disturb  the  roster  point  and  is
impermissible in  terms  of  Rule  8  as  amended.  The  notification  dated
20.08.2004 amending Rule 5 and 8 reads thus:

                          “Government of Jharkhand

        Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha

                                NOTIFICATION

                                                      Ranchi Date 20.08.2004

No. 6/Estab Jud 610/2001 Perso. 4544/after repealing existing Rule 5   7   8
(d) of Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services  (recruitment,  Appointment  and
conditions of Services) Rules 2001 of  Departmental  Notification  No.  1246
dated 08.05.2001, Rule 5 and 8(d) are substituted as follows:-



Rule 5:     Of the total post in the cadre of service.

50% shall be filled by promotion from amongst the Sub Judges  on  the  basis
of merit-cum-seniority and passing a suitability test as may  from  time  to
time be prescribed by the High Court.



25% shall be filled in by promotion (by way of selection)  strictly  on  the
basis of merit through a  limited  competitive  examination  of  Sub  Judges
having not less than 5 years service and  also  having  due  regard  to  his
service record in the past.

25% shall be filled in by direct recruitment from the Bar on  the  basis  of
test and viva-voce conducted by the High Court.

8(d) The following roster shall be  maintained  after  appointment/promotion
to fix the seniority of the direct recruits vis-à-vis promote officer.   The
roster shall be as follows for every unit of 100 posts.

For promote officers from the service-

1,2,5,6,9,10,13,14,17,18,21,22,25,26,29,30,33,34,37,38,41,42,45,46,49,50,53,
54,57,58,61,62,65,66,69,70,73,74,77,78,81,82,85,86,89,90,93,94,97,98.

For promote officers form the limited competitive examination of Sub Judge,

3,7,11,15,19,23,27,31,35,39,43,47,51,55,63,67,71,75,79,83,87,91,95,99.

For direct recruits-

4,8,12,16,20,24,28,32,36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,68,72,76,80,88,92,96,100.



                                                        By order of Governor

                                            (Shri Nitya Shankar Mukhopaddya)

                                                   Deputy Secretary of State

No. 6/Estab Jud 610/2001 Perso. 4544/after Ranchi Date 20.08.2004



Copy to- Superintendent, Government  press,  Doranda  Ranchi,  with  request
that be published in next edition of Jharkhand official Gazette.

                                                  Deputy Secretary of Govt,”



17.   The position as  it  stood  as  on  30th  April  2008,  is  stated  in
paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed by  the  High  Court  dated  30th  March,
2016, which reads thus:

“That it is stated that as on 30.04.2008, the  sanctioned  strength  of  the
Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service was 145 and  working  strength  was  93,
which is shown herein below:-



|  By Promotion from  |Promotion (By way of |By direct recruitment|
|Sub-Judges on the    |selection) through   |from Bar (25%)       |
|basis of             |limited competitive  |                     |
|merit-cum-seniority  |Examination (25%)    |                     |
|(50%)                |                     |                     |
|Sanctioned Strength - 145                                        |
|73                   |36                   |36                   |
|Working strength = 93                                            |
|55                   |00                   |38                   |
|Vacancies = 52                                                   |
|18                   |36-2=34              |02 (surplus)         |



18.   Considering the fact that no vacancy existed in the  quota  of  direct
recruit as on 30th August 2008, the writ petitioners (respondents  4  to  11
in the leading appeal), who could participate in the selection  process  for
direct  recruit  alone  and  not  by  way  of  promotion   through   Limited
Competitive Examination, had no locus to challenge the selection process  of
2008.


19.   The High Court has  overlooked  the  distinction  between  “post”  and
“vacancy”. If the requisite posts  were  already  exhausted  by  the  direct
recruits against the earmarked quota for direct recruitment, merely  because
some vacancies occur, it would  not  be  open  to  the  aspiring  candidates
against  the  direct  recruit  quota  to  challenge  the  selection  process
commenced for the in service judicial officers by promotion through  Limited
Competitive Examination. The  cadre  strength  is  always  measured  by  the
number of posts comprising the  cadre.   The  right  to  be  considered  for
appointment can only be claimed in respect of a post  in  the  given  cadre.
The percentage of quota has to be worked out in relation to number of  posts
which form the cadre and has no relevance to the vacancy that  would  occur.
This aspect has been  glossed  over  by  the  High  Court  in  the  impugned
judgment.  Suffice it to  observe  that  as  no  post  for  direct  recruits
existed as on 30th April, 2008, the challenge to the  selection  process  to
fill up the vacancy by promotion through  Limited  Competitive  Examination,
at the instance of aspiring  candidates  by  direct  recruitment  cannot  be
countenanced. The Writ Petition filed by  such  aspiring  candidates  (WP(S)
No. 4159/2008), therefore, ought to have been dismissed by the High Court.


20.   Having said this, it must follow that the selection  process  of  2008
which has been completed pursuant to the liberty given by this Court by  way
of interim order is proper and  has  become  final.  On  this  finding,  the
challenge  in  the  companion  Writ  Petitions  to  the  selection   process
commenced for the year 2010  does  not  merit  interference.  In  that,  the
vacancy position as on the date of  the  notification  (i.e.  4th  November,
2010), for commencing selection process in 2010, were only upto 8  vacancies
for appointment by direct  recruitment  from  the  Bar.  None  of  the  writ
petitioners before this Court claim to be within  the  first  8  merit  list
candidates. The petitioners were placed at serial No.9 onwards. The first  8
candidates having been appointed, the selection process for 2010  would  get
exhausted and considered as complete.  Merely because the names of the  writ
petitioners  appear  in  the  selection  list,  they  do  not  acquire   any
indefeasible right in getting appointed. The vacancies have to be filled  up
in conformity with the extant Regulations. The selection  process  in  which
the writ petitioners participated, was commenced on the basis of the  stated
notification for 8 notified vacancies and appointments  have  been  made  of
the meritorious candidates.  That  selection  process  must  be  treated  as
having come to an end.  The  fact  that  the  notifications  for  subsequent
selection  process  (commenced  after  2010),  issued  by  the  High   Court
notifying different or higher number of posts for  direct  recruitment,  can
be of no avail to the selection process of 2010. That  changed  position  is
ascribable to subsequent period on the basis of availability  of  posts  for
direct recruits. Not for selection process  of  2010.  Similarly,  the  fact
that  one  candidate  amongst  the  appointed  eight  candidates  after  due
selection  subsequently  resigned,  no  right  can  accrue   to   the   Writ
Petitioner(s) on completion of  the  selection  process  of  2010.  Reliance
placed on Rule 21 which requires preparation of select list  and  to  notify
the same or to remain valid for one year from the date  of  being  notified,
is also inapposite. That is not a Rule mandating preparation of a wait  list
of the selected candidates. No express provision for  retaining  the  select
list as wait list for one year has been brought to our notice. On the  other
hand, the effect of Rule 22 is that once the names of  candidates  from  the
notified select list are recommended to the Government proportionate to  the
vacancies available for  appointment;  and  recommended  candidates  are  so
appointed or on expiry of one year from notifying the select list  whichever
is earlier, the  select  list  would  become  ineffective  qua  the  subject
selection process. For, that selection process is concluded.   None  of  the
writ petitioners can, therefore, succeed in getting the  relief  claimed  by
them.


21.   The decision in the case of Rakhi Ray & Ors. Vs. High Court  of  Delhi
and Ors.[2]  will be of no avail to the writ petitioners and  would  instead
support the view we have already  taken.  The  writ  petitioners  cannot  be
heard to claim relief on the  basis  of  the  subsequent  selection  process
commenced pursuant to the notification dated 22nd February  2013.  The  High
Court was not expected to fill the vacancies over and  above  the  vacancies
advertised  for  selection  process  of  2010.  Moreover,  since  the   writ
petitioners have participated in the earlier selection process of  2010  and
not  in  the  subsequent  selection  process  conducted  on  the  basis   of
Notification dated 22nd February 2013 for the  year  2012,  they  cannot  be
given any relief.


22.   Considering the above, the Civil Appeal must succeed and  is  allowed.
The impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi  in
WP(S) No.4159/2008 dated 29th August 2008 is set aside and consequently  the
WP(S)  No.4159/2008  stands  dismissed.  Even  the  three   connected   Writ
Petitions bearing Nos.300/2013,27/2014 and 325/2014 deserve to be  dismissed
and are dismissed.  Accompanying, I.As are disposed of in the same terms.


23.   We order accordingly. No order as to costs.



                                             ………………………..CJI.
                                             (T.S.Thakur)

                                             …………………………..J.
                                             (A.M.Khanwilkar)

                                             ……………………………J.
                                             (Dr.D.Y.Chandrachud)

New Delhi,
Dated:                  16th                 November,                  2016



-----------------------
[1]    (2002) 4 SCC 247
[2]    (2010) 2 SCC 637


Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 reads as under :- “12 Effects of adoption. - An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that— (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.”- provisions of Section 12 of the Adoption Act, it is crystal clear that the property which had been vested in the widow and three daughters of late Shri Sharnappa Gaded in 1957 would not be disturbed because of adoption of defendant no.1, which had taken place on 9th February, 1971. Thus, Smt. Sharnappa had become absolute owner of 1/4th share and Smt. Nagamma, the mother of the plaintiff had also become an owner of 1/4th share of the property belonging to late Shri Sharnappa Gaded.-2016 Nov. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44311-SAHEB REDDY Vs. SHARANAPPA & ORS.

                                             NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 901 OF 2014



Saheb Reddy                                 ....Appellant


                                VERSUS

Sharanappa and Ors                               ….Respondents





                                J U D G M E N T

ANIL R. DAVE, J.

1.    The appellant - original defendant no.1 is aggrieved by  the  judgment
dated 15th December, 2011 of the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit  Bench  at
Gulbarga, rendered in Regular Second Appeal No. 7310 of  2009,  whereby  the
High Court has allowed the appeal of the appellant herein by  setting  aside
the judgment and decree of the first  appellate  Court  dated  31st  August,
2009 and restored the judgment and decree dated 9th February, 2007  rendered
by the trial Court.



2.    For the purpose of convenience, the parties  to  the  litigation  have
been referred to as they  were  before  the  trial  Court.   As  the  matter
pertains to partition of the family  property,  the  following  chart  would
give a better idea of the relationships among the parties:

                               Bheemanna Gaded
     Smt. Sharnappa          Shri Sharnappa

               Saheb.                        Smt.                       Smt.
Smt.
        Reddy                Kyadigamma         Nagamma     Sarojamma
{Adopted Son     (D-1)}
                         Channamma
                                (D-2)


     Sharnappa  Neelamma    Vijaylaxmi     Malamma
       (Plaintiff)       (D-4)            (D-5)              (D-6)



               D-3                        D-7                            D-8
D-9

3.     The brief facts, which are necessary for proper appreciation  of  the
dispute among the parties, in a nutshell, are as follows:-

The plaintiff-Respondent No.1 herein, son of Smt. Nagamma  and  grandson  of
late Shri Sharnappa Gaded, filed Civil Suit OS No. 22 of 2005 in  the  Court
of  Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division),  Yadgir  for  partition  and  separate
possession of his share by metes and bounds and with a prayer to put him  in
possession of the suit  property  and  for  a  declaration  that  registered
adoption deed dated 9.2.1971 is null and void and  for  other  consequential
reliefs.

4.    The case of the plaintiff was that Shri Sharnappa Gaded, son  of  Late
Bheemanna Gaded, was the last  holder  of  the  suit  properties,  who  died
intestate in 1957 and had left behind him his wife Smt. Sharnappa and  three
daughters namely Smt. Kyadigamma (defendant No. 4), Smt. Nagamma  (defendant
No. 5) and Smt. Sarojamma (defendant No. 6).

5.    On the  demise  of  Shri  Sharnappa  Gaded  in  the  year  1957,  suit
properties had devolved upon his wife Smt.  Sharnappa  and  the  aforestated
three daughters in equal shares and the female heirs became absolute  owners
of their respective  shares.  No  partition  was  effected  among  the  four
sharers and in the course of time, three daughters died during the  life  of
their mother Smt.  Sharnappa,  leaving  behind  their  respective  undivided
share in the suit properties, which devolved upon their respective heirs.

6.    Upon death of Smt. Nagamma, her  undivided  share  devolved  upon  the
plaintiff along with his three sisters, being  defendant  nos.4,  5  and  6.
Likewise, it was contended that undivided 1/4th share of Smt. Kyadigamma  in
suit properties  devolved  upon  her  only  daughter  named  Smt.  Channama-
defendant no. 2, who is the wife of  the  present  appellant  and  undivided
share of  1/4th  of  Smt.  Sarojamma  devolved  upon  defendant  no.  3  and
defendant nos. 7 to 9. The plaintiff had  further  pleaded  that  he  was  a
member of the undivided family and  after  death  of  his  grandmother  Smt.
Sharnappa, difference arose among  the  family  members  and  therefore,  he
demanded  his  legitimate  share  on  9.12.2004  from  the  defendants   but
defendant No.1 refused to give any share to him.  It was  further  contended
that defendant No.1, the present Appellant, claimed to have been adopted  by
late Smt. Sharnappa, but, in fact, there was no execution  of  any  adoption
deed and requisite ceremony for adoption of  defendant  no.1  had  also  not
been performed and therefore, defendant no.1 had no right in  the  property.
It was  further  submitted  that  defendant  no.1  married  defendant  no.2,
daughter of Smt.  Sharnappa  and  therefore,  defendant  no.1,  the  present
Appellant, was trying to usurp the  entire  suit  property  by  denying  the
share of the plaintiff.

7.    On the other hand, it had been submitted on behalf of  defendant  no.1
that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit properties  along  with
other defendants as a member of an undivided family. It had  been  submitted
that as late Smt. Sharnappa had no male issue,  she  had  adopted  defendant
no.1, who had married defendant no.2.  It had been  further  submitted  that
as defendant no.1 was an adopted son of Smt. Sharnappa, defendant  no.1  had
performed all religious ceremonies including the rituals of  making  payment
to other defendants and other female members upon death of  Smt.  Sharnappa.
It had been submitted that Smt. Sharnappa  had  adopted  defendant  no.1  by
virtue of adoption deed dated  9th  February,  1971,  which  had  been  duly
registered and from the date of adoption, defendant no.1 had started  living
with his adoptive mother and had also enjoyed the suit property as an  owner
thereof.  The property had also been mutated in the name of  defendant  no.1
and the said mutation  had  also  been  challenged.  Alternatively,  it  was
submitted that as defendant no.1 was in possession of the suit property  for
more than 34 years, he had also become the owner by  adverse  possession  of
the suit property.

8.    The trial Court by a judgment and decree dated 9th February, 2007,  in
view of the registered adoption deed and upon  considering  other  evidence,
came to the conclusion that defendant  no.1  was  an  adopted  son  of  Smt.
Sharnappa and held that the adoption of defendant no.1 would not  take  away
right and interest of other members of the family, which they  had  received
prior to the date of adoption by virtue of the provisions of  Section  12(c)
of the Adoption Act.  Thus, the trial Court decreed  the  suit  and  ordered
that the plaintiff was entitled to 1/16th share in the suit property as  the
property of late Shri Sharnappa Gaded had  been  divided  into  four  parts.
One part was inherited by his widow – Smt. Sharnappa  and  three  parts  had
been inherited by his three daughters,  named  hereinabove.   Smt.  Nagamma,
being one of the daughters had received 1/4th share and the plaintiff  being
one of the four children of late Smt. Nagamma, had received 1/4th  share  of
Smt. Nagamma and thus the plaintiff was entitled  to  1/16th  share  in  the
suit property.

9.    Being aggrieved by  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  Court,
defendant no.1 preferred First Appeal  No  30/2007  before  the  Fast  Track
Court, Yadgir (hereinafter referred to as the “first appellate Court”).  The
plaintiff also preferred an appeal contending that  in  addition  to  1/16th
share, he was also entitled to  a  further  share  in  1/4th  share  of  his
deceased grandmother, Smt. Sharnappa.

10.   The first  appellate  Court,  vide  judgment  and  decree  dated  31st
August, 2008 dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by  defendant  no.1  and  partly
allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff by giving the  plaintiff  and  his
sisters  1/4th  share  in  their  mother’s  1/4th  share  in  all  the  suit
properties as granted by the trial  Court  and  in  addition  thereto  their
mother’s 1/4th share in  the  share  of  Smt.  Sharnappa  in  all  the  suit
properties and came to the conclusion that the trial Court did not  consider
the fact that Smt. Sharnappa  had  died  intestate  and  by  virtue  of  the
provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession  Act,  1956  (herein  after
referred to as “the Succession Act”) all the family members  had  got  share
in the properties of late Smt. Sharnappa.  The  first  appellate  Court  had
held that defendant no.1, who had been adopted on 9th February,  1971  would
get 1/4th share of his adoptive mother’s  property,  whereas  the  plaintiff
would get not only 1/16th share of the property, but also  1/64th  share  of
the property of Smt. Sharnappa for the reason that Smt.  Sharnappa  had  one
adopted son and three daughters and therefore, the plaintiff would,  at  the
first instance, get 1/4th share of Smt. Nagamma, the property which she  had
inherited from her mother Smt. Sharnappa and further 1/64th share  from  the
property  of  Smt.  Sharnappa  (grandmother)  as  Smt.  Sharnappa  had  died
intestate.  Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to 5/64th  share  in  the  suit
property.

11.       Being aggrieved by the judgment  of  the  first  appellate  Court,
defendant no.1 filed Regular Second Appeal  no.7310 of 2009 before the  High
Court. The High Court by the impugned  judgment  accepted  the  said  second
appeal by setting aside the  judgment  of  the  first  appellate  Court  and
restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court.

12.   We have heard the learned counsel at length, on facts as  well  as  on
legal issues.  The issues involved in  the  instant  case  also  pertain  to
facts.   The  core  question  which,  in  our  opinion,   arises   for   our
consideration  in  this  appeal  is  whether  the  High  Court  has  rightly
allocated share of the properties among the  family  members  in  accordance
with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

13.   It is undisputed that late Shri Sharnappa died intestate in  the  year
1957 leaving behind him his wife Smt. Sharnappa and three  daughters  namely
Smt. Kydigamma, Smt. Nagamma and  Smt.  Sarojamma.   In  the  instant  case,
there was no coparcenary, as Late Shri Sharnappa was the  sole  male  member
in the family.  In the circumstances, upon his  death  his  properties  were
inherited by his widow and three daughters.

14.   At the time when Shri Sharnappa died in 1957, defendant no.1  was  not
in the picture as he was adopted by Smt. Sharnappa on  9th  February,  1971.
By virtue of proviso to Section 12 of the Adoption  Act,  an  adopted  child
cannot divest any person of any estate which vested in  him  or  her  before
the adoption.  Thus, the property of late Shri  Sharnappa  which,  upon  his
death in 1957, had vested in his widow and three  daughters,  would  not  be
disturbed by virtue of subsequent adoption of defendant no.1.

15.   So far as inheritance of the suit property in favour of the  plaintiff
is concerned, in our opinion, the first appellate Court was correct  to  the
effect that the plaintiff would inherit not only  property  of  his  mother,
Smt. Nagamma along with his three sisters, but he would also have  share  in
the properties of his grandmother, late Smt. Sharnappa.  Smt. Sharnappa  had
also not prepared any Will and as  she  had  died  intestate,  her  property
would be divided among her adopted son i.e. defendant no.1 and heirs of  her
three daughters, who had predeceased Smt.  Sharnappa.   Smt.  Sharnappa  was
having 1/4th share in the entire property, which she had inherited from  her
husband late Shri Sharnappa.  One of the daughters being Nagamma,  heirs  of
Nagamma would inherit 1/4th share of property  of  Smt.  Sharnappa  and  the
plaintiff being one of the four  heirs  of  late  Smt.  Nagamma,  would  get
1/64th share from the property of his grandmother Smt. Sharnappa.

16.   As originally Smt. Sharnappa was to get 1/4th share from the  property
of Shri Sharnappa, from her 1/4th share, the properties would  be  inherited
by her adopted son and  heirs  of  her  predeceased  daughters.   As  stated
hereinabove, the plaintiff would be getting 1/16th share in the property  of
Smt. Nagamma and 1/64th share upon death of Smt.  Sharnappa  and  thus,  the
plaintiff would be getting  5/64th  share  in  the  suit  property,  whereas
defendant no.1 would get 1/16th share of the suit property.

17.   Upon appreciation of the evidence, it was found  by  the  trial  Court
that the adoption was valid because that  was  by  virtue  of  a  registered
adoption  deed  and  the  said  deed  had  been   duly   proved.    In   the
circumstances, we do not think it necessary to  discuss  the  said  evidence
again.  We confirm the view of the first appellate Court  that  the  adopted
son viz. defendant no.1 would not divest any person  in  whom  the  property
had been vested prior to adoption. Section 12 of  the  Hindu  Adoptions  and
Maintenance Act, 1956 reads as under :-

“12 Effects of adoption. - An adopted child shall be deemed to be the  child
of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes  with  effect  from
the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties  of  the  child  in
the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be  severed  and  replaced
by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family:

Provided that—

(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have  married
if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth;

(b) any property which vested in  the  adopted  child  before  the  adoption
shall continue to vest in such person subject to the  obligations,  if  any,
attaching to the ownership of such property,  including  the  obligation  to
maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;

(c) the adopted child shall not  divest  any  person  of  any  estate  which
vested in him or her before the adoption.”

18.   Looking at the aforestated provisions of Section 12  of  the  Adoption
Act, it is crystal clear that the property which  had  been  vested  in  the
widow and three daughters of late Shri Sharnappa Gaded in 1957 would not  be
disturbed because of adoption of defendant no.1, which had  taken  place  on
9th February, 1971.  Thus, Smt.  Sharnappa  had  become  absolute  owner  of
1/4th share and Smt. Nagamma, the mother of the plaintiff  had  also  become
an owner of 1/4th share of the property belonging  to  late  Shri  Sharnappa
Gaded.

19.   In view of the aforestated legal position, upon  hearing  the  learned
counsel, we are of the view that the High Court had committed  an  error  by
setting aside the judgment and decree  of  the  first  appellate  Court  and
therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment and restore the  judgment  and
decree of the first appellate Court.

20.   The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.


                                                             .…………………………….J.
                                          (ANIL R. DAVE)



                                                             ……………………………..J.
                                    (L. NAGESWARA RAO)
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 16, 2016.

Whether the members of the Managing Committees of co-operative societies (against whom proceedings under Section 107 of the Gujarat Co- operative Societies Act, 1961 are pending) have a right to participate in the election process of an Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee constituted under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963. = 2016 Nov. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=44310 -VINESHKUMAR MAVJIBHAI PARMAR Vs. DETHALI GOPALAK VIVIDH KARYAKARI SAHAKARI MANDALI LTD. AND ORS.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).3888 OF 2015
VINESHKUMAR MAVJIBHAI PARMAR           …Appellant(s)

                 VERSUS

DETHALI GOPALAK VIVIDH KARYAKARI SAHAKARI
MANDALI LTD. AND ORS.                  ...Respondent(s)

                                    WITH

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3889 OF 2015
                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3890 OF 2015
                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3891 OF 2015
                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3892 OF 2015
                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3893 OF 2015
                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3894 OF 2015
                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3896 OF 2015

                               J U D G M E N T
Chelameswar, J.
1.    All these eight appeals are preferred by the unsuccessful  respondents
in various special civil applications (writ petitions under Article  226  of
the Constitution) before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad disposed  of
by a common judgment dated 17.3.2015.
2.    Whether  the  members  of  the  Managing  Committees  of  co-operative
societies (against whom proceedings under Section 107  of  the  Gujarat  Co-
operative Societies Act, 1961 are pending) have a right  to  participate  in
the  election  process  of  an  Agricultural  Produce  Marketing   Committee
constituted under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act,  1963.   The
two  enactments  mentioned  above  are  referred  to  hereinafter  as   “the
SOCIETIES ACT” and “the MARKETS ACT”.
3.    The facts leading to the present litigation:
      Sec. 9 of the MARKETS ACT contemplates the establishment of a  “Market
Committee” for every “market  area”.  Both  expressions  are  defined  under
Section 2(xiii) and 2 (xiv)[1].
      Section 10 of the MARKETS ACT declares market committees to be  bodies
corporate  with  perpetual  succession  and  a  common  seal.   Section   11
stipulates that every market committee shall consist of 17  members  falling
into 5 categories.  Section 11(1)(i)  stipulates  that  eight  agriculturist
members shall be elected by an electoral college consisting of  the  members
of  the  managing  committees  of  the  “co-operative  societies  dispensing
agricultural credit” (hereafter CREDIT SOCIETIES) in the market area.
      Section 11(1)(i) of the MARKETS ACT reads as follows:

“eight  agriculturists  who  shall  be  elected  by  members   of   managing
committees of co-operative  societies  (other  than  co-operative  marketing
societies and milk produce co-operative societies)  dispensing  agricultural
credit in the market area;”


4.    The activity of co-operative societies in  the  State  of  Gujarat  is
regulated by the SOCIETIES ACT. Section 107 of the  SOCIETIES  ACT  provides
for the liquidation and winding up of the societies  functioning  under  the
Act. Section 107(1) authorises  the  Registrar  to  pass  an  interim  order
directing a cooperative society to be wound up for any one  of  the  reasons
specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of  Section  107(1).   Sub-Section(3),
thereof authorises the Registrar to pass a  final  order  after  granting  a
hearing to the society against which an interim order  under  sub-Section(1)
is made. Such a final order could be  one  either  finally  winding  up  the
society by confirming the  interim  order  or  vacating  the  interim  order
passed earlier, whichever is appropriate in law having regard to  the  facts
and circumstances of the case.

5.    In exercise of the power  under  Section  107  of  the  SOCIETIES  ACT
proceedings were initiated by the Registrar[2] against  eleven  Co-operative
societies (established for the purpose of  dispensing  agricultural  credit)
operating in the market area of a market committee known  as  SIRPUR  market
committee, the details of which are not necessary for the present purpose.

6.    We are concerned with only eight of the eleven co-operative  societies
mentioned above. Admittedly, with reference to each of the  said  eight  co-
operative societies, interim orders  were  passed  initially  under  Section
107(1)[3] of the SOCIETIES ACT directing them to be wound up.  Subsequently,
final orders directing the winding up of each one of  the  said  cooperative
societies were also passed.  The said  orders  were  challenged  before  the
Appellate authority.    The  matters  eventually  reached  the  High  Court,
complete details of the litigation may not be necessary except to  say  that
the High Court had set aside the final orders with a  further  direction  to
the Registrar to  conduct  an  inquiry  afresh  under  Section  107  of  the
SOCIETIES ACT and  pass  appropriate  final  orders.   Admittedly  the  said
enquiry is pending.

7.    Elections to the SIRPUR market committee fell due in  the  year  2015.
A voters list (under Rule 7  of  the  Gujarat  Agricultural  Produce  Market
Rules, 1965) came to be prepared consisting the names of the members of  the
managing  committee  of  the   above-mentioned   8   cooperative   societies
(alongwith other societies) operating within the market area of  the  SIRPUR
market committee.

8.    In view of the pendency of  the  liquidation  proceedings,  objections
for the inclusion of the names of the members of the managing committees  of
the 8 cooperative societies were raised.   Objections  were  upheld  by  the
proceedings dated 26.2.2015 of the  Additional  Registrar  and  Co-operation
Officer (Market), Patan, directing the deletion of the names of the  members
of  the  managing   committee   of   the   above-mentioned   8   cooperative
societies[4]. Operative portion of the order dated 26.2.2015 w.r.t.  one  of
the 8 societies reads;
“I, Mr. H.G. Rawal, Authorized  Officer  &  Co-operation  Officer  [Market],
Patan & in exercise of the powers conferred in me and as per the  provisions
of the Gujarat Agriculture Produce Market Committee  Act,  1963  and  Market
Committee Rules, 1965 allow the  application  by  the  objector  Mr.  Parmar
Vineshkumar Mavjibai and Prajapati  Manishbai  Khemabhai  for  deleting  the
names of the Managing Committee members of the Shri  Kalyana  Group  Gopalak
Vividh Karyakari Sahkari Mandali Ltd. at Kalyana, Taluka Siddhpur  from  the
Agriculturist constituency voters  list  and  accept  the  just  and  proper
objections raised, and in the voters list Sr. 259 to 279  voters  names  are
ordered to be deleted.  The said  orders  will  be  subject  to  the  orders
passed  by  the  Hon.  High  Court  and  Additional  Registrar[Appeal],  Co-
operative society, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar.
                                                                        -sd-
                     [S.G. Rawal]
                               Additional Registrar &
                             Co-operation Officer [Market]
                                         Patan”

9.    Aggrieved by such a decision, the members of  the  managing  committee
of the said society filed special civil applications  invoking  Article  226
of the Constitution of India.  By the judgment impugned  in  these  appeals,
the special civil application was allowed setting aside the  orders  of  the
Additional Registrar dated 26.2.2015.

10.   We are informed that the facts relating to the other 7  societies  are
substantially similar.

11.   It is argued by the appellant;
Since the 8 societies in question are in the  process  of  being  wound  up,
they ceased to be CREDIT SOCIETIES within the meaning  of  Section  11(1)(i)
of the MARKETS ACT because their activities are limited  under  Section  110
of the SOCIETIES ACT i.e., the business of  the  societies  can  be  carried
only so far as may be  necessary  for  the  beneficial  winding  up  of  the
society. It is, therefore,  submitted  that  the  members  of  the  managing
committees of these 8 societies would be disentitled  to  be  voters  at  an
election for the agricultural market committee.
      According to the appellants, permitting the members  of  the  managing
committees of CREDIT SOCIETIES which are in the process of being  wound  up,
to participate in the election process and elect  agriculturist  members  to
the market committees, would be inconsistent with the spirit of the  MARKETS
ACT, in view of the  declaration  contained  in  Section  108(2)[5]  of  the
SOCIETIES ACT.

It is, therefore, submitted that the High Court erred  in  interfering  with
the orders of the Registrar directing the  deletion  of  the  names  of  the
members of the managing committees of the 8 societies from the voters  list.


12.   None appears for anyone of the respondents.

13.   The  purpose  of  the  establishment  of  the  market  committees  was
examined and explained by this Court in M.C.V.S.  Arunachala  Nadar  v.  The
State of Madras & Others, AIR 1959 SC 300.  A  constitution  bench  of  this
court made an elaborate inquiry into the legislative history of the  subject
and held that:
“The object of such legislation is to protect the  producers  of  commercial
crops from being exploited by the middlemen and  profiteers  and  to  enable
them    to    secure    a     fair     return     for     their     produce”
                                                 (See Para 6)

14.   For achieving the said  purpose,  market  committees  are  constituted
under  the  laws  made  by  the  legislatures  of  various   States   giving
representation  considered  appropriate  by  the  concerned  legislature  to
various classes of persons who have an interest in achieving the purpose  of
the market committees.
15.   The legislature of the  State  of  Gujarat  thought  it  fit  to  give
representation  under  the  MARKETS  ACT  to  5  classes  of  persons:   (i)
agriculturists,   (ii)   traders   holding   general    licences[6]    (iii)
representatives of the cooperative marketing societies[7] (iv)  a  nominated
member by the concerned local authority[8]  within  whose  jurisdiction  the
“principal market yard” is situated and (v) two  nominated  members  of  the
State Government.

16.   Of the above-mentioned 5 classes of members, the first  three  classes
consist of elected members and  the  later  two  are  of  nominated.   Three
distinct electoral colleges are  created  under  sub-clause  (i),  (ii)  and
(iii) of Section 11(1) for electing the 3 classes of elected members.
      “Section 11. Constitution of market committee –
(1)  Every market committee shall consist of the following members namely:-

(i)  eight agriculturists who  shall  be  elected  by  members  of  managing
committees of  co-operative  societies  other  than  co-operative  marketing
societies and milk produce co-operative  societies  dispensing  agricultural
credit in the market area;

(ii) four members to be  elected  in  the  prescribed  manner  from  amongst
themselves by the traders holding general licenses;

(iii) two representatives of the Co-operative  marketing  societies  situate
in the market area and holding general licenses, to be elected from  amongst
the members (other than nominal, associate or sympathizer members)  of  such
societies by the members of the managing committees of such societies:

Provided that where  the  number  of  co-operative  marketing  societies  so
situate does not exceed two, only one representative shall be so elected.”


17.   While the elected representatives to the  market  committee  belonging
to classes (ii) and (iii) mentioned above are required to be members of  the
concerned electoral college, the Act does not insist upon  such  requirement
w.r.t. those who are to be elected under the class (i) mentioned above.   In
other words, the members of the market committee belonging  to  the  1st  of
the abovementioned 5 classes need not be members of  the  electoral  college
which elects them.


18.    The  right  to  elect  ‘agriculturists’  to  a  market  committee  is
conferred under Section 11 of the MARKETS ACT  upon  the  electoral  college
consisting of members of the managing committees  of  cooperative  societies
operating in the  market  area  which  are  dispensing  agricultural  credit
(hereafter CREDIT SOCIETIES).

19.   The reason for the above, as we understand, is  that  those  who  seek
election under the category of agriculturists  belong  to  a  very  nebulous
class, whereas the persons falling under classes (ii)  and  (iii)  mentioned
above  can  be  identified  with  certainty  based  upon   public   records.
Therefore, the legislature, in its  wisdom,  though  it  fit  to  create  an
electoral college which, by virtue of its  very  activity,  would  be  in  a
better position to identify  agriculturists  eligible  to  contest  for  the
membership of a market committee.  By the very nature of the office held  by
them,  members  of  the  managing  committees  of   “cooperative   societies
dispensing agricultural credit” would have an opportunity to  interact  with
the agriculturists.

20.   The pendency of the liquidation proceedings  in  law[9],  compels  the
elected members of the managing committee (OFFICERS of the Society) of a co-
operative society to hand over the custody and control of all  the  property
and assets, etc. of the society to the liquidator  appointed  under  Section
107(1) of the SOCIETIES ACT.  According to  the  appellants,  the  necessary
implication flowing therefrom is that the members of the managing  committee
of a society facing liquidation proceeding are debarred from anyway  dealing
with the affairs of their society.   Therefore,  they  should  also  not  be
permitted to exercise the right to participate in the election of  a  market
committee.

21.   The powers of the liquidator are  specified  under  Section  110,  the
details of which may not be necessary except to state  that  the  liquidator
virtually becomes the caretaker manager of the society whose winding  up  is
impending. At the same time it  is  equally  important  to  note  that  Sec.
108(3)(b)[10] stipulates that the officers[11] of  the  cooperative  society
vacate their offices only on the passage of the final order of  winding  up.
Obviously, they continue to be the office  bearers  but  are  disabled  from
enjoying certain rights  attached  to  the  office  and  performing  certain
functions to be performed by the holders of the office

22.   The rights and functions of the OFFICERS  of  a  co-operative  society
are many. Some of them are created by the statute under which the office  is
created. Others could be the creation of  subordinate  legislation  (in  the
context of the  present  case,  even  the  byelaws  of  the  society).   The
existence or lack of such rights and functions depend upon  the  scheme  and
tenor of the SOCIETIES ACT and the subordinate legislation made  thereunder.
Such rights and functions are put an end to only by  the  operation  of  law
i.e., the SOCIETIES ACT.


23.   Apart from that, nothing prevents the legislature from  conferring  by
another law additional rights or functions on a  person  holding  an  office
created under the SOCIETIES ACT.

24.   The legislature of  Gujarat  by  Section  11(1)  of  the  MARKETS  ACT
conferred on the OFFICERS of a  class  of  CREDIT  SOCIETIES  an  additional
function of electing members of the  market  committees.  Such  function  is
neither conferred on the OFFICERS of all  the  societies  functioning  under
the SOCIETIES ACT nor such  function  includes  the  right  to  elect  every
member of  the  concerned  market  committee.   Such  a  function  obviously
creates a right in the officers of the societies.  Such  a  statutory  right
could not be taken away in the absence of any express authority of law.

25.   The Gujarat legislature expressly provided  under  the  SOCIETIES  ACT
for the curtailment of certain rights of the officers  of  societies  facing
liquidation proceedings.  It must be remembered that at  the  same  time  it
also declared that such OFFICERS cease to be the  officers  of  the  Society
only when a final order of winding up is passed.  In a  given  case  if  the
Registrar after an  appropriate  enquiry  following  the  interim  order  of
winding decides not to finally wind up the  society,  the  OFFICERS  of  the
society would once again be entitled to exercise all the  rights  associated
with it and perform all the functions attached  to  the  office.  Therefore,
merely because  the  officers  of  CREDIT  SOCIETY  facing  liquidation  are
disabled from enforcing certain rights attached to  the  office  or  perform
certain obligations appended to the office, it does not  necessarily  follow
that they are disabled from performing every function entrusted  by  law  to
such office.

26.   We now deal with the submission  that  the  society  ceased  to  be  a
CREDIT SOCIETY in view of the pendency of the winding up proceedings.

27.   We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  phrase  “co-operative  societies
dispensing agricultural credit in the market area” in  Section  11(1)(i)  of
the MARKETS ACT is only descriptive of the purpose for which  the  societies
are established.  Section  11(1)(i)  cannot  be  construed  as  imposing  an
incessant obligation of “dispensing agricultural credit” in order to  enable
the members of the managing committee of CREDIT SOCIETIES to participate  in
the election to the market committee. The obligation, if any,  to  “dispense
agricultural credit” arises under the bye-laws of  the  society  subject  of
course to the availability of funds and various other  factors.  We  are  of
the opinion that the above quoted words are only descriptive  of  the  class
of society  the  members  of  whose  managing  committees  are  entitled  to
participate in the election of the market committee. It is obvious from  the
language of the sub-section that there can exist more than one class of  co-
operative societies functioning under the  Act.   The  very  fact  that  the
legislature  took  care  to  expressly  exclude  members  of  the   managing
committees  of  two  classes  of  societies  i.e.  “Co-operative   Marketing
Societies” and “Milk Produce Co-operative Societies”,  definitely  indicates
that there can exist more than one class  of  societies  –  apart  from  the
common knowledge.

28.   Section 4[12] of the SOCIETIES ACT contemplates that  societies  could
be registered for different purposes.  They are  –  “the  promotion  of  the
economic interests of its members or  general  welfare  of  its  members  or
economic interest of the general welfare of the public”.
29.    Since  Section  11(1)(i)  of  the  MARKETS  ACT  is  establishing  an
electoral college for the election of a certain  class  (agriculturists)  of
members of the market committees, the legislature thought it fit  that  only
the members of the  managing  committees  of  those  co-operative  societies
which have a nexus  to  agricultural  activity  should  be  members  of  the
electoral college.

30.   The submission of the appellant that Section 11(1)(i) imposes a  legal
obligation that the members of the managing committees  of  only  those  co-
operative societies which are currently dispensing  agricultural  credit  in
the market area are entitled to participate in the electoral process of  the
concerned  market  committee  (in  other  words,  the  phrase  “co-operative
societies dispensing agricultural  credit”  is  indicative  of  the  current
activity of the societies but not the  purpose  for  which  the  society  is
established), would lead to various difficult questions:
(i)   What is the period to  which  the  currency  of  such  activity  would
relate to?  Whether the activity should be current when the voters’ list  is
prepared or the activity should continue even on the date of voting?

(ii)  Whether credit societies which do  not  dispense  agricultural  credit
for a certain  period  of  time  because  of  either  paucity  of  funds  or
borrowers are debarred from  “dispensing  agricultural  credit”  because  of
some legal prohibition or any other reason operating  temporarily  cease  to
be societies whose objective is to provide agricultural credit?


31.   Credit Societies against which there is an ‘interim order’ of  winding
up are temporarily debarred from dispensing agricultural credit,  by  virtue
of the operation of law.  The embargo imposed by such interim order  may  or
may not fructify into  a  final  order  of  winding  up.  (We  have  already
discussed this aspect of the matter at para 21 supra).  On the face of  such
possibility  of  the  society   resuming   its   activity   of   “dispensing
agricultural  credit”  -  to  debar  its  managing  committee  members  from
discharging their statutory  obligation  under  the  MARKETS  ACT  would  be
productive of public mischief.  Such an interpretation of the  statute  must
be avoided.

32.   For the above reasons, we  do  not  see  any  merit  in  the  appeals.
Therefore, the appeals are dismissed.



                                                             ….………………………….J.
                                                      (J. Chelameswar)



                                                             …….……………………….J.
                                        (Prafulla C. Pant)
New Delhi;
November 16, 2016

-----------------------
[1]
            Section 2 (xiii)  “market  area”  means  any  area  declared  or
deemed to be declared to be a market area under this Act;

           Section  2(xiv)  “market  committee”  means  a  market  committee
established or deemed to be established under this Act;
[2]       Section 2(17)  of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act,  1961  -
“Registrar” means a person appointed to be  the  Registrar  of  Co-operative
Societies under this Act; and includes to the extent of the  powers  of  the
Registrar conferred on any other person under  this  Act,  such  person  and
includes an Additional or Joint Registrar;
[3]   Section 107 Winding up – (1) [Except as  otherwise  provided  in  sub-
section (1A) if the Registrar, –-
      (a) after an inquiry has been held under section 86, or an  inspection
has been made under any of the provisions of sub-section (8) of section  84,
section 87 or section 88 or on  the  report  of  the  auditor  auditing  the
accounts of the society, or]
      (b) on receipt of an application made upon  a  resolution  carried  by
three-fourths of the members of a  society  present  at  a  special  general
meeting called for the purpose, or
            (c) of his own motion, in the case of a society which –
            (I)  has not commenced working, or
            (ii) has ceased working, or
            (iii)      possesses shares of members  deposits  not  exceeding
five hundred rupees, or
             (iv)  has  ceased  to  comply  with  any   conditions   as   to
registration and management in this act or [the rules or the bye-laws, or]
            (v)  has failed to comply with any directions issued under  sub-
section (1) of Section 160 or such directions as modified under  sub-section
(2) of that section.]
            is of the opinion that a society ought to be wound  up,  he  may
make an interim order directing it to be wound up.

[4]        We take the facts of the first respondent society in Civil
Appeal No. 3891/2015 as representative facts of the 8 appeals.
[5]        See F/N 9 infra
[6]    Section 2(ix) – “licence” means a licence  granted  under  section  6
or, as the case may be, a general or special licence granted  under  section
27;
[7]    Section 2(v) –  “co-operative  marketing  society”  means  a  society
registered or deemed  to  be  registered  as  such  under  the  Gujarat  Co-
operative Societies Act, 1961 (Guj. X of 1962), and engaged in the  business
of  buying  or  selling  of  agricultural  produce  or  of   possessing   of
agricultural produce and holding a licence;
[8]    Section 2(xi) – “local authority” means –
      a  corporation  constituted  under  the  Bombay  Provincial  Municipal
Corporation Act, 1949 (Bom. LIX of 1949); or
      a municipality constituted or deemed to be constituted under –
      the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 (Bom. III of  1901),  or  that
Act as adapted and applied to the Saurashtra area; or
      the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (Bom. XVIII of 1925), or  that
Act as adapted and applied to the Saurashtra area or that Act as applied  to
the Kutch area; or
           (c) a village panchayat constituted or deemed to  be  constituted
under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1959 (Bom. III of 1959), or a  gram
panchayat or nagar panchayat constituted under the  Gujarat  Panchayat  Act,
1961 (Guj. VI of 1962);
[9]        Section 108.   Appointment of Liquidator - (1)  When an interim
or final order is made under Section 107 for the winding up of a society,
the Registrar may, in accordance with the rules appoint a person to be the
liquidator of the society, and fix his remuneration.
       (2) Where an interim order is made the officers of the society  shall
hand over to the liquidator the custody and control  of  all  the  property,
effects and actionable claims to which the  society  is  or  appears  to  be
entitled, and of all books, records and other documents  pertaining  to  the
business of the society and, shall have no access to any of them.
[10]      108 (3) When a final order is made confirming the Interim, order,
the officers of the society
            xxx        xxx        xxx        xxx
      (b)  shall vacate their offices and while winding up order remains in
force the general body of the society shall not exercise any powers.
[11]     Section 2(14) of the SOCIETIES ACT. –  “officers”  means  a  person
elected or appointed by a society to any office of  such  society  according
to its bye-laws; and includes a chairman,  vice-chairman,  president,  vice-
president, managing director, manager, secretary, treasurer, member  of  the
committee, and any other person elected or appointed  under  this  Act,  the
rules or the bye-laws, to give directions in regard to the business of  such
society.
[12]     Section 4. Societies which may be  registered.—  A  society,  which
has as its object  the  promotion  of  the  economic  interests  or  general
welfare of its members or of the  public, in  accordance  with  co-operative
principles, or as society established with the object  of  facilitating  the
operations of any such society, may be registered under this Act.

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