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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Wednesday, October 12, 2016

“Whether the interpretation placed upon Rule 7 of the Rules is correct insofar as it diminishes the rule of confidentiality statutorily provided for under Rule 7.”= we direct the cases to be posted before appropriate Bench for disposal on merits and in the light of our answer to the question referred and considered.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1679 of 2010

Union of India & Anr.                              …..Appellants

      Versus

M/s Meghmani Organics Ltd. & Ors.            …..Respondents

                                   W I T H

                        S.L.P.(C) No. 14099 of 2015,

                         S.L.P.(C) No. 14524 of 2015

                                     AND

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3498-3500 of 2004



                               J U D G M E N T


SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

While hearing special leave petition against a judgment of  the  Delhi  High
Court, the Division Bench on January 27, 2009  in  the  case  of  Designated
Authority, Ministry of Commerce and Industry  &  Anr.  v.  Indian  Metals  &
Ferro Alloys Limited[1] noticed that in the  context  of  interpretation  of
anti-dumping provisions of the Customs  Tariff  Act,  1975  (in  short  “the
Act”) and the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and  Collection  of
Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped  Articles  and   for  Determination  of  Injury)
Rules, 1995 (for brevity “the Rules”), the Delhi High Court had allowed  the
writ petition mainly by following the judgment of this Court in the case  of
Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Designated Authority &  Others[2]  and  also  by
following interpretation of Section 9-A(5) given in Rishiroop  Polymers  (P)
Ltd. v. Designated Authority & Additional Secretary.[3] At the  instance  of
counsel for the petitioners in that case, in paragraph 5 of  that  judgment,
the Division Bench recorded its views that Reliance Industries  case  needed
a fresh look and two questions needed to be dealt with by  a  larger  Bench.
Since the first question, as per  submissions  of  all  the  parties  is  no
longer relevant on account of subsequent amendment of the Act, we take  note
of only the other relevant question requiring answer  by  this  Bench.   The
question reads thus:
“Whether the interpretation placed upon Rule  7  of  the  Rules  is  correct
insofar as it diminishes the rule of  confidentiality  statutorily  provided
for under Rule 7.”

Learned counsels for the rival parties have  advanced  submissions  only  in
relation to the aforesaid question of law and  not  on  the  merits  of  the
matters on an understanding  that  the  matters  shall  be  disposed  of  by
competent  Benches  in  the  light  of   our   answer   to   the   aforesaid
question/issue of law.
At the outset we record that it is the Union of  India  and  the  Designated
Authority who have sought for a relook in respect of interpretation of  Rule
7 of the Rules  as  flowing  from  the  case  of  Reliance  Industries  Ltd.
(supra). Mr. Yashank Adhyaru, learned  senior  advocate  appearing  for  the
appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1679 of 2010 has argued that  appeal  as  the
lead matter. According to him the view  taken  in  the  Reliance  Industries
case whittles down the effect of Rule 7  and  unless  we  re-state  the  law
differently, the Designated Authority (hereinafter referred to as “the  DA”)
will be forced to disclose materials which are otherwise  protected  by  the
confidentiality provisions in Rule 7. According to learned  senior  counsel,
the Division Bench in Reliance  Industries  case  noticed  and  extracted  a
passage from the earlier judgment of a co-ordinate  Bench  in  the  case  of
Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. v. Designated  Authority,  M/o  Commerce  &
Others[4] but erred in taking a  somewhat  different  view  by  a  misplaced
reliance upon the view taken by the Constitution Bench in S.N. Mukherjee  v.
Union of India.[5]
To the contrary, as we shall notice hereinafter, a stand has been  taken  by
the counsels appearing for the parties who have made complaints of  dumping,
that Rule 7 has  been  correctly  understood  and  interpreted  in  Sterlite
Industries Ltd. (supra) casting duty upon the DA to examine  and  decide  on
case to case basis whether information  supplied  is  required  to  be  kept
confidential or not. The whole of the paragraph 3 of that judgment has  been
highlighted to submit that it is for  the  DA  to  decide  in  any  relevant
situation   whether   a   particular    material/information    for    which
confidentiality has been claimed, is required to be  kept  confidential.  Of
course the Appellate Authority namely CEGAT will always have  the  power  to
look  into  the  relevant  files  including   the   materials   treated   as
confidential for deciding the issues raised in appeal.
With a view to place Rule 7  and  other  relevant  rules  in  their  correct
perspective, we have been taken through Sections  9A,  9B  and  particularly
sub-section (2) of Section 9B of the Act. Section 9A clarifies  as  to  when
an article exported from any country or territory to India at less than  its
normal value may be subjected to an  anti-dumping  duty  not  exceeding  the
margin of dumping in relation to such article. By the  aid  of  explanation,
margin of dumping has been clarified as the difference  between  the  export
price and the normal value of an article. The meaning of  export  price  and
normal value require some factual investigation to find out whether  dumping
has taken place  or  not  and  if  yes,  what  is  the  margin  of  dumping.
Therefore, sub-section (6) of Section 9A not  only  authorizes  the  Central
Government to ascertain and determine after necessary  enquiry,  the  margin
of dumping but also empowers it  to  make  rules  for  identifying  articles
liable for anti-dumping duty and for the manner in which the  export  price,
the normal value and the margin of dumping  in  relation  to  such  articles
need to be determined as well as for the assessment and collection  of  such
anti-dumping duty. Section 9B (1) states  the  circumstances  and  situation
when an article shall not be  subjected  to  countervailing  duty  or  anti-
dumping duty under Sections 9 and 9A. However, sub-section  (2)  of  Section
9B empowers the Central  Government  to  frame  the  rules  under  which  an
investigation may be made for the purpose of Section 9B to meet  exceptional
situation contemplated by Section 9B(1)(b)(ii).
The Central Government framed  and  notified  the  rules  on  01.01.1995  in
exercise of powers conferred by sub-section  (6)  of  Section  9A  and  sub-
section (2) of Section 9B of the Act. There is no  dispute  that  the  Rules
are based largely upon  an  International  Agreement  on  implementation  of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  (for  brevity
“GATT  1994”).  Under  this  Agreement  all  the  members  including   India
concurred on the broad principles for applying  anti-dumping  measures  only
under the circumstances  provided  for  in  Article  VI  of  GATT  1994  and
pursuant  to  investigation  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of   the
Agreement. Let us take a bird’s eye–view of its relevant  Articles.  Article
5 of the Agreement contains provisions for initiation of  investigation  and
its completion in respect of an alleged dumping. The initiation  has  to  be
generally upon a written  application  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  domestic
industry.  In special circumstances the DA  may  initiate  an  investigation
even without a written application provided it has  sufficient  evidence  of
dumping. A time limit of one year  to  eighteen  months  is  prescribed  for
concluding the investigation. Article  6  deals  with  “Evidence”  which  is
generally to be made known  to  all  interested  parties  except  where  the
information is confidential. Paragraphs 2, 4,  5  and  8  under  Article  6,
shown as paragraphs 6.2, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.8 have  ample  connection  with  the
matter at hand and hence they are extracted herein below:

“6.2 Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties  shall
have a full opportunity for the defence of their interests.   To  this  end,
the authorities shall, on request, provide opportunities for all  interested
parties to meet those parties  with  adverse  interests,  so  that  opposing
views may be presented and rebuttal arguments offered.   Provision  of  such
opportunities must take account of the need to preserve confidentiality  and
of the convenience to the parties.  There shall  be  no  obligation  on  any
party to attend a meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial  to
that party’s case.   Interested  parties  shall  also  have  the  right,  on
justification, to present other information orally.

6.3         XXXXXXXXXXXX

6.4    The   authorities   shall   whenever   practicable   provide   timely
opportunities for all interested parties to sell  all  information  that  is
relevant to the presentation of their cases, that  is  not  confidential  as
defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by  the  authorities  in  an  anti-
dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on  the  basis  of  this
information.

6.5   Any information which is by nature confidential (for example,  because
its  disclosure  would  be  of  significant  competitive  advantage   to   a
competitor or because its disclosure  would  have  a  significantly  adverse
effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a  person  from  whom
that  person  acquired  the  information),  or  which  is  provided   on   a
confidential basis by parties to an investigation  shall,  upon  good  cause
shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not  be
disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it.

6.5.1  The  authorities   shall   require   interested   parties   providing
confidential information  to  furnish  non-confidential  summaries  thereof.
These summaries shall  be  in  sufficient  detail  to  permit  a  reasonable
understanding of the substance of the information  submitted  n  confidence.
In  exceptional  circumstances,  such  parties  may   indicate   that   such
information  is  not   susceptible   of   summary.   In   such   exceptional
circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not  possible
must be provided.

6.5.2 If the authorities find that a  request  for  confidentiality  is  not
warranted and if the supplier of the  information  is  either  unwilling  to
make the information public or to authorize its  disclosure  in  generalized
or summary form, the authorities may disregard such  information  unless  it
can be demonstrated to their satisfaction from appropriate sources that  the
information is correct.

6.6              XXXXXXXXXX

6.7              XXXXXXXXXX

6.8 In cases in which any interested party refuses access to,  or  otherwise
does not provide,  necessary  information  within  a  reasonable  period  or
significantly   impedes   the   investigation,   preliminary    and    final
determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on  the  basis  of  the
facts available. The provisions  of  Annex  II  shall  be  observed  in  the
application of this paragraph.

Before adverting to Rule 7 which  is  of  prime  significance,  it  will  be
useful to notice the relevant Rules also.  Rule  2  embodies  definition  of
various terms such as ‘domestic industry’, ‘interested party’ etc.  Rules  3
and 4 relate to appointment of Designated Authority and its duties.  Rule  5
relates to initiation of investigation. Usually it is done  upon  a  written
application by or  on  behalf  of  the  domestic  industry  but  in  certain
circumstances it may be initiated suo motu by  the  DA  on  being  satisfied
from the information received from  the  Collector  of  Customs  as  to  the
existence of certain circumstances. The  DA  has  the  duty  to  notify  the
Government  of  exporting  countries  before  proceeding  to   initiate   an
investigation. Rule  6  contains  principles  governing  investigations.  It
includes provisions for issuance of public notice notifying the decision  to
initiate an investigation with adequate informations  of  specified  nature.
The copy of the public notice is to be given to all known exporters  of  the
article involved  in  the  alleged  dumping,  the  Government  of  exporting
countries concerned and other interested parties. Copy  of  the  application
alleging dumping is also to be made available  to  all  concerned  as  noted
above. The DA has power to issue a notice calling  for  any  information  in
the  specified  form  from  the  exporters,  foreign  producers  and   other
interested parties within a time bound  schedule.  The  DA  is  required  to
provide  opportunity  of  furnishing  relevant  information  even   to   the
industrial users of the article under investigation  and  to  representative
consumer organizations (in appropriate cases). Rule 6 (7) obligates  the  DA
to “make available the evidence presented to it by one interested  party  to
the other interested parties, participating in the  investigation.”  Rule  7
is as follows:
“Rule  7.     Confidential  information  –  (1)   Notwithstanding   anything
contained in sub-rules (2), (3) and (7) of rule 6, sub-rule (2) of rule  12,
sub-rule (4) of rule  15  and  sub-rule  (4)  of  rule  17,  the  copies  of
applications  received  under  sub-rule  (1)  of  rule  5,  or   any   other
information provided to the designated authority on a confidential basis  by
any party in  the  course  of  investigation,  shall,  upon  the  designated
authority being satisfied as to its confidentiality, be treated as  such  by
it and no such information shall be disclosed to  any  other  party  without
specific authorization of the party providing such information.

2.     The  designated  authority  may   require   the   parties   providing
information  on  confidential  basis  to  furnish  non-confidential  summary
thereof and if, in the opinion of a party providing such  information,  such
information is not susceptible of summary, such  party  may  submit  to  the
designated authority  a  statement  of  reasons  why  summarization  is  not
possible.

3.    Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2), if the  designated
authority  is  satisfied  that  the  request  for  confidentiality  is   not
warranted or the supplier of the information is  either  unwilling  to  make
the information public or to authorize its disclosure in  a  generalized  or
summary form, it may disregard such information.”

Only to complete the bird’s eye view of the Rules, it may be noted  that  as
per Rule 8 the  DA  has  to  satisfy  itself  as  to  the  accuracy  of  the
information supplied by the interested parties if findings  are  based  upon
such information. Rule 12 contains details as to  how  preliminary  findings
are to be arrived at and a public notice to be issued  of  such  preliminary
findings. Provisional duty  may  be  levied  on  the  basis  of  preliminary
findings, by the Central Government, as empowered by Rule  13.  Rule  17  is
similar to Rule 12 but deals with  the  final  findings  which  have  to  be
arrived at normally within one year  of  investigation  and  in  exceptional
cases within further period of six months provided  the  Central  Government
grants the extension. The DA is required  to  issue  public  notice  of  its
final findings also. Rules 13 and 18 whereunder the  Central  Government  is
empowered to levy provisional duty on the basis of preliminary  findings  or
duties as per final findings, as the  case  may  be,  demonstrate  that  the
findings of the DA recorded after investigation are of immense  significance
though they look recommendatory in nature. Therefore, the  investigation  is
required to be carried on in a fair manner by issuance of public  notice  at
relevant stages and after informing all interested parties so that they  may
also have their say. The Central Government appears to have a discretion  in
the matter of determining the quantum of provisional duty as well  as  final
duty but with a clear limitation that anti-dumping duty  cannot  exceed  the
margin of dumping as determined by the DA.
Since Mr. Yashank Adhyaru, learned senior advocate for the  Union  of  India
has based his criticism of the judgment in Reliance Industries on the  basis
of observations in paragraph 43 of that judgment,  the  same  is  reproduced
hereinbelow:
“43.  In our opinion, Rule 7 does not contemplate any right  in  the  DA  to
claim confidentiality, Rule  7  specifically  provides  that  the  right  of
confidentiality  is  restricted  to  the  party   who   has   supplied   the
information, and that party has also to satisfy the DA that  the  matter  is
really confidential. Nowhere in the rule has it been provided  that  the  DA
has the right to claim confidentiality, particularly  regarding  information
which pertains to the party which has supplied  the  same.  In  the  present
case, the DA failed to provide  the  detailed  costing  information  to  the
appellant on the basis of which it computed NIP, even though  the  appellant
was the sole producer of the product under consideration,  in  the  country.
In our opinion this was clearly illegal, and not contemplated by Rule 7.”


Elaborating his points further, learned senior  counsel  for  the  Union  of
India submitted that the very opening sentence of above quoted para 43  lays
down an incorrect proposition of law that Rule 7 does not permit the  DA  to
claim confidentiality and that right to make such a claim is vested only  in
a party who has supplied the particular information.  The use  of  the  term
‘any party’ in the opening sentence of Rule 7(1) in place of the  expression
‘interested party’, according to learned counsel, indicates that the DA  may
receive in course of his suo motu action certain  confidential  informations
and in such a situation if he is satisfied that the confidentiality of  such
information needs to be protected and should not be disclosed to  any  other
party without specific authorisation, the DA may be justified in his  action
whereby he himself claims confidentiality in appropriate cases  without  any
party exercising the right of confidentiality.
To buttress his aforesaid stand learned senior counsel placed emphasis  upon
Articles 6.2 and 6.5 of GATT 1994.  By placing reliance  upon  paragraph  23
of the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Customs,  Bangalore  v.  G.M.
Exports[6]  he  submitted  that  in  the  light  of  Article  51(c)  of  the
Constitution of India, in a situation where  India  is  a  signatory  to  an
international Treaty or Agreement and a statute is made to enforce a  treaty
obligation, then in case of any difference  between  the  language  of  such
statute and a corresponding provision of the Treaty, the statutory  language
should be interpreted in the same sense as the language of  the  Treaty.  In
abstract the proposition is salutary and needs no caveat. Articles  6.2  and
6.5 have already been extracted earlier.  In essence, Rules 6 and 7  of  the
Rules ensure the obligations flowing from Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.5.   While
interested parties are entitled to have full  opportunity  to  defend  their
interests, such opportunities need to be hedged  by  the  need  to  maintain
confidentiality.  Informations other than confidential must be shown to  all
interested parties whenever  practicable  in  terms  of  Article  6.4.   Any
information which is by nature  confidential  or  which  is  provided  on  a
confidential basis  is  required  to  be  treated  as  confidential  by  the
authorities but only  on  being  satisfied  by  good  cause  shown  for  the
confidentiality claimed.  No doubt the opening clause of Article 6.5  covers
any information which is by nature confidential but the  examples  indicated
therein clearly  reveal  that  such  information  is  required  to  be  kept
confidential because if revealed it would give significant  advantage  to  a
competitor  or  would  have  significant  adverse  effect  upon  the  person
supplying the information or his resource person from whom he  acquired  the
information.  The submission that DA is entitled  to  presume  such  effects
without any claim being made by the  party  supplying  the  information  is,
however, not acceptable  for  reasons  more  than  one.   The  examples  are
clearly meant to be only a guiding factor for the DA who cannot by  exercise
of discretion presume confidentiality and thereby  restrict  the  rights  of
the interested parties to see relevant informations that may be used by  the
DA for the investigation. The DA, being  a  statutory  investigator,  cannot
assume for himself the role of a party for the purpose  of  Rule  7  and  to
claim as well as accept on information to be confidential.
The other reason is provision of appeal under Section 9C of  the  Act.   The
appeal provided is against the order  of  determination  or  review  thereof
regarding the existence, degree and effect of  any  subsidy  or  dumping  in
relation to import of any article.  It is  one  thing  to  use  confidential
information for  the  purpose  of  investigation  on  account  of  statutory
provisions and not communicating the same.  It  is  quite  another,  not  to
maintain transparent records of reasons as to why claim  of  confidentiality
made by any party has been accepted by the DA.  Where  appeal  is  provided,
the appellate authority  will  definitely  be  entitled  to  look  into  the
records  including  the  confidential  information  as  well  as  into   the
correctness of the decision for accepting a claim of  confidentiality.   The
situation is similar to one under the administrative law where a policy  may
exempt the authority from requirement of communicating its  reasons  for  an
administrative decision/order affecting rights and interests of parties  but
certainly  reasons  must  exist  in  the  records  so  as  to  justify   the
reasonableness and fairness of the decision if it has adverse  effects  upon
any party.  Any court or tribunal exercising judicial review is entitled  to
call for the records to satisfy itself as to the  existence  of  reasons  in
appropriate cases involving a challenge to such order.  In case  the  DA  is
conceded power to gather informations from  sources  other  than  interested
parties, he must not treat  such  information  as  confidential  unless  the
party which has supplied  the  information  makes  a  request  to  keep  the
information confidential.  Even in such a situation  where  an  uninterested
party claims confidentiality in respect  of  information  supplied,  as  per
Rule 7, the  DA  has  to  take  all  necessary  precautions  to  decide  the
genuineness of such claim.  In appropriate cases he must ask for summary  of
the information and if that is also not possible, the reasons as to  why  it
is  not  possible  should  be  supplied  for  scrutiny.   The   reasons   of
confidentiality must be discernible on scrutiny of records by the  appellate
authority  because  of  mandate  of  Rule  7(3)  that  if   the   claim   of
confidentiality is  not  worthy  of  acceptance,  or  the  supplier  of  the
information is unwilling to make the information  public  without  any  good
reasons, the DA has to disregard such information.
The aforesaid discussion leads to the  conclusion  that  even  the  relevant
provisions in the GATT 1994 relied  upon  on  behalf  of  appellant  do  not
require the interpretation of Rule 7 in the manner sought for on  behalf  of
the Union of India or the DA.
Mr.  Basava  Prabhu  Patil,  learned  senior  advocate  appearing  for   the
petitioner – Moser Baer India Ltd. – in one of the SLPs has taken  pains  to
refer to various  paragraphs  of  the  judgment  in  the  case  of  Reliance
Industries to submit that the said judgment  was  rendered  in  an  entirely
different context which did not involve detailed discussion of Rule  7.   On
the basis of para 23 of the judgment it was shown that the two  main  issues
falling  for  determination  were  –  (1)   the   correct   principles   for
determination of  Non Injurious Price (NIP) of PTA, and  (2)  the  scope  of
Rule 7 of the Rules.  Referring to para 37 of the judgment, he  pointed  out
that the Court had directed for revising NIP by taking the market  price  of
electricity and  the  actual  capacity  utilisation  during  the  period  of
investigation.  Since the DA in  that  case  had  refused  to  disclose  its
findings even to the person who had  supplied  the  information  leading  to
such findings, the  court  observed  thus  :  “Further,  the  DA  should  be
directed not to misuse Rule 7, by  keeping  confidential  its  findings  and
that too from the person who has supplied the information to it.”   In  para
39 it was held that the proceedings before the DA are quasi judicial.   Then
came a reiteration in para 41 in the following words :

“41. The DA claimed confidentiality from the appellant about its finding  on
the data supplied by the  appellant  itself.   In  our  opinion,  there  was
nothing confidential in the matter, and hence reasons for not accepting  the
appellant’s version should have been stated in the order of the DA.”

      Para 43 has already been extracted earlier.
Looking at the contents of Rule 7 and  the  facts  and  issues  involved  in
Reliance Industries case, we agree with the submissions of  Mr.  Patil  that
fact situation in that case was entirely different and  the  Court  was  not
examining the provisions of Rule 7 in any detail but  made  rather  scathing
observations against the DA because the DA claimed  confidentiality  not  in
respect of any information  but  in  respect  of  its  findings  based  upon
information supplied by the same party who was aggrieved  by  non-supply  of
the  findings.   The  observations  in  Reliance  Industries  case  must  be
understood in the fact situation of that case in view  of  well  established
proposition of  law  that  the  ratio  decidendi  consists  in  the  reasons
formulated by the court for resolving an  issue  arising  for  determination
and not in what may logically  appear  to  flow  from  observations  on  non
issues. Reference in this regard may be  made  to  law  enunciated  on  this
point by a Constitution Bench, in paragraph 20 of the judgment in  the  case
of Krishena Kumar v. Union of India &  Ors.[7]   In  the  given  facts,  the
observations in paragraph 43 in the case of Reliance  Industries  are  fully
justified and do not require any review.  We are in agreement  that  Rule  7
does not postulate that the DA can claim confidentiality and  that  too  not
in respect of any information supplied by a party  but  in  respect  of  its
reasons or findings derived from  information  supplied  by  the  same  very
party.
We find no conflict between the view taken in Reliance Industries  case  and
that in Sterlite Industries, particularly in paragraph  3,  which  has  been
extracted in Reliance Industries case and reads as follows :
“3. In our view, it is not necessary for us to go into the  merits  of  this
matter as we propose to send the matter back  to  CEGAT  after  laying  down
certain guidelines. From what has been argued before us, it appears that  in
pursuance of Rule 7 of the Customs Tariff  (Identification,  Assessment  and
Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination  of
Injury) Rules, 1995, the  Designated  Authority  is  treating  all  material
submitted to it as confidential merely on a party asking that it be  treated
confidential. In our view, that is not the purport of Rule 7. Under Rule  7,
the Designated Authority has to be satisfied as to  the  confidentiality  of
that  material.  Even  if  the  material  is  confidential  the   Designated
Authority has to ask the  parties  providing  information,  on  confidential
basis, to furnish a non-confidential summary thereof. If  such  a  statement
is not being furnished then that  party  should  submit  to  the  Designated
Authority a statement of reasons why summarization is not possible.  In  any
event, under Rule 7(3) the Designated Authority can come to  the  conclusion
that confidentiality  is  not  warranted  and  it  may,  in  certain  cases,
disregard that information. It must be remembered that not  making  relevant
material available to the other side affects the  other  side  as  they  get
handicapped in filing an effective appeal. Therefore, confidentiality  under
Rule 7 is not something which must be automatically assumed.  Of  course  in
such cases there is need for confidentiality as otherwise trade  competitors
would obtain confidential information, which they cannot otherwise get.  But
whether information supplied is required to be kept confidential has  to  be
considered on a case-to-case basis. It is for the  Designated  Authority  to
decide whether a particular material is required to  be  kept  confidential.
Even where confidentiality is required  it  will  always  be  open  for  the
Appellate Authority, namely, CEGAT to look into the relevant files.”

The concern shown by the Court in the above quoted paragraph as regards  the
ill-effect of being too liberal in accepting claims of  confidentiality  has
been echoed in the same vein in paragraph  45  of  the  Reliance  Industries
case in following words:
“45. In our opinion, excessive  and  unwarranted  claim  of  confidentiality
defeats  the  right  to  appeal.  In  the  absence  of  knowledge   of   the
consequences, grounds,  reasoning  and  methodology  by  which  the  DA  has
arrived at its decision and made its  recommendation,  the  parties  to  the
proceedings cannot effectively exercise their right to appeal either  before
the Tribunal or this Court. This is  contrary  to  the  view  taken  by  the
Constitution Bench of this Court in S.N. Mukherjee case.”

Mr. V. Lakshmikumaran appearing for some of the respondents such as  SanDisk
International Ltd. has highlighted particular facts of his  case.  According
to him anti-dumping investigation  was  initiated  against  SanDisk  on  the
petition of sole domestic producer Moser Baer India Limited against  imports
of USB Flash Drives exported from China PR, Taiwan  and  Republic  of  Korea
during the period of investigation, calendar year  2012.  According  to  him
SanDisk duly participated in the investigation, filed  objections,  comments
and submissions and co-operated at every stage  of  the  investigation.  His
main grievance is that when the reliability of  import  volume  provided  by
Moser Baer came under question, the DA claimed  to  have  used  transaction-
wise import data provided by Directorate General of Commercial  Intelligence
and Statistics (DGCI&S) for arriving at import volume of the subject  goods.
He has submitted that the DA wrongly treated the  import  data  provided  by
DGCI&S as confidential and in any case erred in not  accepting  the  request
of the SanDisk to furnish the  import  data  after  deleting  the  names  of
exporters/importers concerned, for verifying the veracity of the  volume  of
imports. According to him the essence of investigation lies in  finding  out
the correct import volume of a particular product under  investigation.  The
DA disregarded the past practice  of  disclosing  such  details,  especially
when SanDisk was prepared for deletion of names of exporters  and  importers
from the import data obtained by the DA.
Mr. V. Lakshmikumaran has in his written notes given two instances,  one  of
2007 and another of 2014 where the DA had disclosed the DGCI&S  import  data
to exporters and importers and had called for  comments.  According  to  him
DGCI&S had not claimed confidentiality in  such  matters  for  good  reasons
because the  concerned  Director  General  of  Commercial  Intelligence  and
Statistics under the Ministry of Commerce, Government of  India  is  covered
under Right to Information Act and its data is therefore  part  of  official
record and lies in public domain. According to him DA  is  a  quasi-judicial
authority who must keep in mind that Rule 7 is  an  exception  to  rules  of
natural justice and hence DA can accept  a  claim  of  confidentiality  only
when it is raised by the  information  provider  and  such  claim  is  found
acceptable after due scrutiny.
Since we are not entering  into  arena  of  facts  for  deciding  individual
cases, it is not relevant to go deeper into the facts highlighted on  behalf
of M/s SanDisk International Limited.  However,  the  submission  that  data
available with DGCI&S is available to the public and also under the RTI  Act
has not been rebutted in reply.
Mr. V. Lakshmikumaran has referred to  and  relied  upon  judgment  of  this
Court  in  Designated  Authority  (Anti-Dumping  Directorate),  Ministry  of
Commerce v. Haldor Topsoe A/S[8] to highlight that in the scheme of the  Act
and the Rules, in paragraph 25 of that judgment this  Court  considered  the
proviso to Rule 17 which empowers the Central Government to extend the  time
for publication of final finding  by  the  DA  by  further  six  months  and
repelled the submission that while granting extension of time,  the  Central
Government is obliged to  afford  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  parties
concerned with the investigation. The Court  held  that  in  the  course  of
investigation  the  principles  of  natural  justice  would   have   limited
application only to the extent indicated in the statute,  because  elaborate
provisions for the same are already provided for. In our view this  judgment
helps the respondents only to a limited extent that  general  principles  of
natural justice need not be imported to govern each and  every  step  during
the investigation proceedings.
We are in respectful agreement  with  the  above  view  and  also  with  the
submission that the source of power in the DA to  treat  an  information  as
confidential must be within the confines of Rule 7. The ordinary meaning  of
the words used in this Rule are clear and hence there is no  requirement  to
depart from the golden rule of  interpretation  i.e,  the  rule  of  Literal
Construction. If the submission advanced on behalf of Union of India and  DA
are accepted, one will have to adopt a purposive liberal  interpretation  so
as to enlarge the scope of this  Rule.  That  does  not  appear  to  be  the
intention of the statute makers nor it is  warranted  by  the  context.  The
effect of Rule 7 is clear. It permits an  exception  to  the  principles  of
natural justice. In such a situation, even if there had been some  ambiguity
and requirement of resorting to interpretation, the proper course  would  be
to adopt a construction which would least offend our sense  of  justice,  as
discussed and enunciated in the cases of Simms v. Registrar of  Probates[9],
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India[10] and Union  of  India  v.
B. S. Agarwal.[11] It will be useful to remember  that  when  two  competing
public interests are involved, like in the present case, one  is  to  supply
all relevant informations to the parties concerned  and  the  other  not  to
disclose informations which are held to be confidential, the  proper  course
of action would be to lean in favour of  the  construction  “that  is  least
restrictive  of  individual’s  rights”,  as  propounded  in  Inland  Revenue
Commissioner v. Rossminster Ltd.[12] . However,  in  our  view,  as  already
indicated, there are no ambiguities in Rule 7 to require departure from  the
rule of Literal Construction.
Mr. Lakshmikumaran also  referred  to  judgment  in  the  case  of  Reliance
Industries to point out that main issue in that case was decided  in  favour
of Reliance Industries in paragraphs 35, 36  &  37  holding  that  the  Non-
Injurious Price (NIP) had been determined wrongly and  therefore  needed  to
be revised by  taking  the  market  price  of  electricity  and  the  actual
capacity utilization during the  period  of  investigation.  Thereafter  the
Court simply condemned the approach of the DA in  not  disclosing  even  the
reasons for its erroneous decision to reduce the cost price  of  electricity
supplied by the appellant from its captive power plant. When  the  data  had
been supplied by the appellant itself, the Court rightly felt  disturbed  by
the act of DA in claiming confidentiality about its  findings.  In  view  of
proceedings being quasi-judicial, the DA was  rightly  held  duty  bound  to
disclose its reasons for not accepting the version given by  the  appellant.
Finally Mr. Lakshmikumaran submitted that  the  observations  given  by  the
Court in Reliance Industries case do not require any  interference  and  the
appeals filed on behalf  of  the  Union  of  India  and  the  DA  should  be
dismissed.
Mr. Jitendra Singh, advocate, appearing for Meghmani Organics  Ltd.  in  the
lead case, reiterated  the  submissions  noted  earlier.  According  to  his
submissions also there is no conflict between  law  laid  down  in  Sterlite
Industries case and in Reliance Industries case. He also submitted  that  in
fact the appeal against Meghmani Organics Ltd. has also become  infructuous.
However, we refrain to decide  the  matter  on  facts  even  to  the  extent
whether the appeal has become infructuous or not.
In the light of facts and submissions noted earlier as well  as  conclusions
already recorded at various places, we are of the considered view  that  the
question referred for our answer can be answered in a very straight  forward
manner by holding that Reliance Industries case did not go into the  details
of the relevant Rules including Rule 7 but the observations made therein  in
respect of rule of confidentiality as spelt out in Rule 7 of the Rules  does
not diminish the scope of Rule  7  as  provided.  The  reasons  or  findings
cannot be  equated  with  the  information  supplied  by  a  party  claiming
confidentiality in respect thereto. Hence, Rule 7 does not  empower  the  DA
to claim any confidentiality in respect of reasons  for  its  finding  given
against a party. The law laid down in respect of rule of confidentiality  in
Sterlite Industries case also has our respectful  concurrence.  But  at  the
same  time,  we  reiterate  that  the  Reliance  Industries  case  does  not
adversely affect or run counter to the law spelt out in Sterlite  Industries
case. We may only explain here that while dealing  with  objections  or  the
case of the concerned parties, the DA  must  not  disclose  the  information
which are already held by him to be confidential by duly  accepting  such  a
claim of any  of  the  parties  providing  the  information.   While  taking
precautions not to disclose the sensitive confidential informations, the  DA
can, by adopting a sensible approach indicate reasons  on  major  issues  so
that parties may in general terms have the knowledge as to  why  their  case
or objection has not been accepted in preference to a rival  claim.  But  in
the garb  of  unclaimed  confidentiality,  the  DA  cannot  shirk  from  its
responsibility to act fairly  in  its  quasi-judicial  role  and  refuse  to
indicate reasons for its findings. The DA will do well to  remember  not  to
treat any information as confidential unless a claim of confidentiality  has
been made by any of the parties supplying the information.  In  cases  where
it is not possible to accept a  claim  of  confidentiality,  Rule  7  hardly
leaves any option with the DA but to ignore  such  confidential  information
if it is of the view that the information is  really  not  confidential  and
still the concerned party does not agree to its being made public.  In  such
a situation the information cannot be made  public  but  has  to  be  simply
ignored and treated as non est.
Having answered the question thus, we direct the cases to be  posted  before
appropriate Bench for disposal on merits and in the light of our  answer  to
the question referred and considered.


…………………………………….J.
                       [J. CHELAMESWAR]


                       ……………………………………..J.
                             [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]


                       ……………………………………..J.
                             [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi.
October 7, 2016.


-----------------------
[1]
      [2] (2009) 2 SCC 510
[3]
      [4] (2006) 10 SCC 368
[5]
      [6] (2006) 4 SCC 303
[7]
      [8] (2006) 10 SCC 386 decided on November 25, 2003
[9]
      [10] (1990) 4 SCC 594
[11]
      [12] (2016) 1 SCC 91
[13]
      [14] (1990) 4 SCC 207
[15]
      [16] (2000) 6 SCC 626
[17]
      [18] (1900) AC 323
[19]
      [20] (1971) 1 SCC 85
[21]
      [22] (1997) 8 SCC 89
[23]
      [24] (1980) 1 All ER 80

The argument that having regard to the conduct of the Gupta Group in managing the affairs of the Company and all decisions taken being in the best interest of the Company, no case for winding up is made out so as to justify the exercise of powers under Section 397/398 of the Act by the CLB, would hardly require a detailed consideration in view of the specific findings of the High Court in this regard, which are wholly adverse to the Gupta Group- whether a single act of oppression would enable the CLB to intervene or oppression must be the cumulative result of continuous acts should not require any debate in the facts of the present case which demonstrate a series of unacceptable decisions and actions on the part of the Gupta Group. In the last resort, satisfaction that oppression has been committed has to be reached in the facts of each case. In view of the above discussions and for the reasons alluded, Civil Appeal No.589 of 2010 filed by the Gupta Group is dismissed whereas Civil Appeal No.599 of 2010 filed by the Sanwalka Group is disposed of with directions, as contained in the present order.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 589 OF 2010

Tin Plate Dealers Association Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.    ...Appellant (s)

                                   Versus
Satish Chandra Sanwalka & Ors.                ...Respondent (s)

                                    With
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.599 OF 2010

                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

Both the appeals being against the common judgment and  order  of  the  High
Court of Calcutta dated 14th September, 2005 were  heard  together  and  are
being dealt with by this common order.
 The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 589 of 2010 is a private limited  company
incorporated in the year 1948 with its registered office at  Calcutta.   The
appellants 2 to 5 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Gupta  Group’)  had  come
into control of the company  by  actions  and  omissions  complained  of  by
respondents 1 to 7 in the said appeal i.e. C.A. No.589  of  2010  which  had
led to the institution of the company petition under Section 397/398 of  the
Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘Act’).   The  said
respondents may be conveniently referred to as the “Sanwalka Group”.
At the time of its incorporation, the authorised capital of the company  was
Rs. 10 lakh consisting of 4,000 redeemable cumulative preference  shares  of
Rs. 100/- each and 6,000 ordinary shares of Rs.  100/-  each.   The  paid-up
capital of the company before the issue of new, ordinary and  bonus  shares,
which is the bone of contention  between  the  parties,  consisted  of  4132
partly paid ordinary shares and 1868  fully  paid  ordinary  shares  besides
3065 fully paid preference shares.  One M/s. Gupta Brothers originally  held
the 4132 partly paid shares.  The said shares  were  forfeited  sometime  in
the year 1966 and thereafter the same were issued to the Sanwalka Group  who
paid a total of Rs.45 for each share consisting of payment at  the  time  of
application and allotment and  Rs.10/-  per  share  on  a  call  being  made
subsequently. Whereas, according to Gupta Group, these shares were  held  by
the Sanwalka Group on behalf of Gupta Brothers, the said fact is  denied  by
the Sanwalka Group.  According  to  the  Sanwalka  Group,  the  Gupta  Group
without notice to them had increased the authorized capital of  the  company
to Rs. 5 crores in an Extra Ordinary General Meeting of the Company held  on
5.7.1994.  No notice of the said meeting was given to the Sanwalka Goup.   A
Board Meeting was held on the same day i.e. 5.7.1994 to give effect  to  the
above decision taken in the E.O.G.M. to increase the share  capital  of  the
company. In the said Board meeting, a follow up decision was taken to  allot
bonus shares at the ratio of  60  bonus  shares  for  every  fully  paid  up
preference and equity share held. The said bonus shares were  to  be  issued
against revaluation of the industrial plot in  Okhla  Industrial  Area,  New
Delhi which was the only asset of the company at that  time.  This  was  not
contemplated by the Articles of Association of  the  Company,  according  to
the Sanwalka Group. In any case, no bonus  shares  were  allotted  to  them.
Further more, according to the Sanwalka  Group,  pursuant  to  the  decision
taken on 5.7.1994, in August, 1995 the company issued 3065 equity shares  to
the holders of the preference  shares  (Gupta  Group).  In  February,  1996,
25,000 ordinary equity shares were again issued to the members of the  Gupta
Group against which Rs.40 per share was paid. The said issue was  ostensibly
to raise additional capital for the company. This  allotment  was,  however,
to the exclusion of the Sanwalka Group. Contending that the  aforesaid  acts
had the effect of reducing the Sanwalka Group, which was  otherwise  in  the
majority, to a negligible minority in  the  company,  the  company  petition
alleging oppression was filed before the Company Law Board wherein  the  act
of removing two members of the Sanwalka Group from the  Board  of  Directors
(w.e.f.1.7.1991) and inducting two others of the Gupta Group in their  place
was also called into question.
From the reply  filed  by  the  Gupta  Group  to  the  company  petition  it
transpired that the 4132 partly paid  shares  held  by  the  Sanwalka  Group
stood forfeited. The aforesaid forfeiture was therefore  challenged  in  the
company petition with a claim that  the  said  shares  be  restored  to  the
members of the  Sanwalka  group.  During  the  subsistence  of  the  company
petition, supplementary applications were also filed challenging the  action
of the Gupta Group in leasing out the industrial plot to sister concerns  on
terms claimed to be prejudicial to the interest of the company  and  of  the
shareholders.
 The eventual reliefs prayed for in the Company Petition  in  the  light  of
the averments made in the said petition and the  supplementary  applications
were for:
restoration of the names of  the  members  of  the  Sanwalka  Group  in  the
register of members of the company;

cancellation of the allotment of bonus shares;

cancellation of the issue and allotment of  25000 partly  paid  up  ordinary
equity shares to the Gupta Group;

cancellation of 3065 equity shares to the holders  of  the  3065  preference
shares;

cancellation of the lease agreement in respect of the industrial plot and

restoration of the names of the concerned members of the Sanwalka  Group  as
Directors of the Company.


6.    The Company Petition was opposed by Gupta Group  as  not  maintainable
in law. According to the Gupta Group, the shares held by the members of  the
Sanwalka Group stood forfeited and the holders  thereof  had  ceased  to  be
members of the company.  Such forfeiture, according to the Gupta Group,  was
in the following circumstances.
The said shares were held by the Sanwalka Group as beneficiaries  on  behalf
of the original holders i.e. M/s. Gupta Brothers. As the shares held by  the
Gupta Brothers were partly paid, the Sanwalka Group as beneficiary  holders,
was liable to pay the unpaid value of the said shares  along  with  interest
therein on a call being made by the company. Such a call, according  to  the
Gupta Group, was made on 05.01.1991  which  went  unanswered.  Consequently,
the aforesaid shares were forfeited. There  was  an  alternative  contention
advanced by Gupta Group to the effect that in any event the  Sanwalka  Group
were holders of partly paid shares and they  having  not  responded  to  the
call notice dated 5.1.1991, the company petition was not maintainable  under
Section 399 of the Act.
7.    The claim of the Sanwalka Group that the issue  of  bonus  shares  was
not authorized as the same could not have been issued again the  revaluation
reserve was resisted by  the  Gupta  Group  by  specific  reference  to  the
relevant provisions of the Companies Act, details of which will  be  noticed
later.  It  was  claimed  that  in  the   Board   Meeting   dated   5.7.1994
proportionate allotment of bonus shares against the 4132 partly paid  shares
in which the Sanwalka Group held a beneficial interest was  offered  subject
to payment of the dues against the said shares in term of  the  call  notice
dated  5.1.1991.  Insofar  as  the  issue  of  25,000  ordinary  shares   is
concerned, it was contended by the Gupta Group that  the  said  shares  were
issued to infuse badly needed capital into  the  company.  In  view  of  the
clear and expressed disinterest of the Sanwalka Group in the affairs of  the
company evidenced by their long silence and failure to respond to  the  call
notice dated 5.1.1991 and also to participate in the Board meetings, it  was
understood by  the  Gupta  Group  that  they  would  not  be  interested  in
allotment of any part of the newly issued share capital i.e. 25,000  shares.
In any case, according to the Gupta Group, as the members  of  the  Sanwalka
Group had ceased to be members of the company (1995) by the time the  25,000
shares were issued/allotted (February,  1996)  they  were  not  entitled  to
allotment of any of the said newly issued shares.
8.    Insofar as the lease in respect of the industrial plot  is  concerned,
it  was  urged  on  behalf  of  Gupta  Group  that  the  same  was  done  in
consideration  of  the  funds  made  available  by  the  lessees  to   raise
construction on the  land  which  was  necessary  to  pre-empt  an  imminent
forfeiture of the lease itself. The actions of the company, therefore,  were
claimed to be in the interest of the company.
9.    The Company Law Board (CLB)  by  an  elaborate  order  dated  1.3.2001
overruled the objections raised by the Gupta Group  to  the  maintainability
of the petition. The CLB concluded that the shares held by  the  members  of
the Sanwalka Group were in their own right,  independent  of  any  right  of
M/s. Gupta Brothers all of which stood extinguished upon forfeiture  of  the
shares held by the said Gupta Brothers. The  CLB  further  held  that  under
Article 18 of the Articles of Association of the Company, it is  M/s.  Gupta
Brothers who were liable to pay the dues, if  any,  on  the  said  forfeited
shares. The Board also found that the members  of  the  Sanwalka  Group  had
paid Rs.45 per share and though there were an obligation to pay the  balance
on a call being made the materials on record did not disclose that any  such
call was made at any  point  of  time.  In  this  regard  the  notice  dated
5.1.1991 was held by the CLB not to be  duly  proved  to  have  been  issued
following the procedure under Section 53 of the Act. It was also  held  that
the said notice dated 5.1.1991 did not contemplate forfeiture of the  shares
in the event of failure to pay the call money as required  under  Clause  14
of the Articles of Association of the Company. On  the  basis  of  the  said
findings  the  twin  objections  raised  by   the   Gupta   Group   to   the
maintainability of the company petition was held against them.
10.   The CLB by its order dated 01.03.2001 further held that the  issue  of
bonus shares against revaluation reserve was contrary to the  provisions  of
Article 96 of Table A of the Act of 1956. So far  as  the  issue  of  25,000
ordinary equity shares is concerned, the CLB decided the issue in favour  of
the Gupta Group. However, as the members of the Sanwalka Group continued  to
be members of the company, it was held that proportionate allotment  of  the
said equity shares should have been made to them also. The  removal  of  the
two representatives of the Sanwalka Group from the Board was  also  held  to
be bad on the aforesaid count.  Of  particular  significance  would  be  the
finding of the Board that notice of the  EOGM  held  on  5.7.1994  in  which
decision  was  taken  to  raise  the  share  capital  of  the  company  was,
admittedly, not given to the Sanwalka Group though  they  were  entitled  to
such notice. Insofar as correctness of the issue  of  3065  ordinary  equity
shares against the preference shares is concerned,  the  Company  Law  Board
felt that it would be inappropriate to  go  into  the  said  question  as  a
related issue was pending before the Delhi High Court  with  regard  to  the
very same preference shares. In  fact,  the  issue  before  the  High  Court
involved the question as to whether the said shares  did  exist  at  all  or
stood extinguished prior to the date of conversion. Insofar as the lease  of
the industrial plot is concerned, the CLB felt that the same should be  left
open for an appropriate decision of the company in a  General  Body  Meeting
to be held on the basis of the revised share holding as ordered by the  CLB.

11.   Aggrieved by the aforesaid  order  of  the  CLB  with  regard  to  the
maintainability of the company petition, issue of bonus  shares  and  25,000
ordinary equity shares and also the  re-induction  of  the  members  of  the
Sanwalka Group in  the  Board  of  Directors,  the  Gupta  Group  moved  the
Calcutta High Court by filing an  appeal  under  Section  10F  of  the  Act.
Challenging the  decision  of  the  Board  insofar  as  the  issue  of  3065
preference shares and the  lease  in  respect  of  the  industrial  plot  is
concerned, the Sanwalka Group had filed a separate appeal. The  High  Court,
by its impugned  order  dated  14.9.2005,  dismissed  both  sets  of  appeal
leading to the institution of the present appeals before this Court.
12.   On the basis of the issues dealt with by the CLB and  the  High  Court
and the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties the  issues  arising  in
the two appeals may be summarised as follows:
Maintainability of the company petition filed by the Sanwalka  Group  before
the Company Law Board.
Legality of the issue of bonus shares by the company;
Legality of the issue of 25,000 new ordinary shares ;
Legality of the removal of the representatives of the  Sanwalka  Group  from
the Board of Directors and the induction of the members of  Gupta  Group  in
their place;
Legality of the lease agreement executed by the company in  respect  of  the
industrial plot;
Legality of the  issue  of  3065  ordinary  equity  shares  as  against  the
preference shares.

13.   We have heard Shri Arvind P. Datar learned  senior  counsel  appearing
for the Gupta Group and Shri C.A. Sundaram learned senior counsel  appearing
for the Sanwalka Group.
14.   The questions arising, as noticed above,  may  now  be  taken  up  for
consideration.
            Maintainability of the Company Petition –
      Notwithstanding the very elaborate and persuasive  arguments  made  by
both sides a resolution of the above question is possible by  a  close  look
of the share certificates issued to the members of the Sanwalka Group  after
allotment of the shares in question following the forfeiture of the same  in
the hands of  M/s.  Gupta  Brothers.  Some  of  the  share  certificates  in
question  are  on  record.  A  reading  thereof  discloses  that  the   same
constitute a fresh and independent allotment of the shares by  reference  to
their distinctive  numbers  specified  therein.   The  certificates  do  not
contain any stipulation or condition that the same are being held either  on
account of a third person  or  as  beneficiaries  on  behalf  of  any  third
person. The shares in question were allotted on payment of Rs.35  being  the
application money (Rs.25) and allotment money (Rs.10).  A further amount  of
Rs.10/- per share  was  paid  against  the  first  call  made  on  7.8.1986.
Therefore, the share certificates, ex facie,  do  not  support  any  of  the
contentions advanced on behalf of Gupta Group, details of  which  have  been
noticed hereinabove. If the shares were held by the members of the  Sanwalka
Group in their own right without any connection to  the  erstwhile/forfeited
shares held by  M/s.  Gupta  Brothers,  the  second  question  arising  i.e.
failure to respond to the call notice dated 5.1.1991 really does not  arise.
Be that as it may, the said notice required  the  members  of  the  Sanwalka
Group to pay the unpaid value of the forfeited shares (which  coincidentally
was also Rs.55/- per share i.e. same as the unpaid amount of the  shares  at
the time of  forfeiture  when  held  by  M/s.  Gupta  Brothers)  along  with
interest. In this regard it was found by the CLB as well as the  High  Court
that even issue of notice of the call in terms of Section 53 of the Act  had
not been proved by the Gupta  Group.  That  apart,  the  call  notice  dated
5.1.1991 and forfeiture of the shares held  by  the  Sanwalka   Group,  upon
alleged failure to comply with the  said  notice,  does  not  appear  to  be
inconformity with Clauses 14 to 18 of the Articles  of  Association  of  the
Company, which are extracted below:–
“14. If any member fails to pay any call or instalment on or before the  day
appointed for the payment  of  the  same  the  Directors  may  at  any  time
thereafter during such time as the call or instalment or  any  part  thereof
remains unpaid serve a notice on such member requiring him to pay  the  same
together with any interest that may have accrued and all expenses  that  the
company may have incurred. They may also write in any such  notice  that  in
the event of failure to pay the amount so due before a particular  date  the
Directors shall proceed to forfeit the shares.”          (emphasis is ours)

15. If the amount still remains unpaid the Directors may proceed to  forfeit
the shares.

16. A notice of the resolution of forfeiture shall be given  to  the  member
whose shares have been forfeited.

17. Any shares so forfeited shall be deemed to  held  the  property  of  the
company and  the  Directors  may  sell,  reallot  annul  the  forfeiture  or
otherwise dispose of the same in such a manner as they may think fit.

18. Any member whose shares have been forfeited shall  notwithstanding  such
forfeiture be liable to pay, and shall forthwith  pay  to  the  company  all
calls instalments, interest and expenses owing upon or in  respect  of  such
shares at the time of forfeiture/together with interest  thereon,  from  the
time of forfeiture until  payment  at  nine  per  cent  per  annum  and  the
Director may enforce the payment of such moneys or any part thereof if  they
think fit, but shall not be under any  obligation  to  do  so.   The  member
whose shares have been forfeited shall not be entitled  to  claim  the  sale
proceeds of such shares.”

15.   Not only the call notice dated 5.1.1991 had not been  proved  to  have
been issued in the matter required under Section 53 of the Act,  the  notice
also does not mention  the  consequences  of  non-payment  i.e.  forfeiture.
Also the fastening of the liability on the Sanwalka Group to pay the  unpaid
amount of the forfeited shares along with interest is  plainly  contrary  to
the provisions of Article 18  of  the  Articles  of  Association,  extracted
above. Besides, the date of the forfeiture  also  is  not  clear  though  it
appears that in a Board Meeting held on 2.8.1995 a  decision  was  taken  to
restore the said shares to M/s. Gupta Brothers.  The  reason  for  the  said
decision appears to be to comply with an order of attachment of  the  shares
passed earlier by the Civil Court. All these would demonstrate the  apparent
falsity of the claim now made that the forfeiture was due to failure of  the
Sanwalka Group to comply with the terms of the call notice dated 5.1.1991.
16.   To overcome the aforesaid difficulties, an argument has been  made  on
behalf of Gupta Group that even if the call notice dated 5.1.1991 is not  to
be relied upon, in the Balance Sheet dated 31.3.1992 the  amounts  due  have
been shown as calls-in-arrears. The said document was duly  circulated.  The
Sanwalka Group, therefore, had full knowledge  that  unpaid  call  money  is
due.
17.   Besides the fact that there is  no  co-relation  between  the  amounts
mentioned in the call notice dated 5.1.1991  and  the  Balance  Sheet  dated
31.3.1992, the members of the Sanwalka Group were removed from the Board  of
Directors on 1.7.1991 i.e. before the  finalisation  of  the  Balance  Sheet
dated 31.3.1992. In any case, the procedure for forfeiture of  shares  as  a
consequence of failure to respond to a call  notice  are  unambiguously  set
out in details in the Articles of  Association  of  the  Company,  extracted
above. A balance sheet does not and cannot operate as an  alternative  to  a
call notice.
18.   If the primary question i.e. maintainability of the  company  petition
has to be answered in favour of the Sanwalka Group, as we are  inclined  to,
the other issues highlighted in the earlier part of  this  order  would  now
have to be considered.
Issue of 25,000 ordinary equity shares  -
19.   There is no denial of the fact  that  notice  of  the  E.O.G.M.  dated
5.7.1994 was not given to the members of the  Sanwalka  Group  though  they,
admittedly, continued to be members of  the  company  on  the  date  of  the
meeting. It is pursuant to the decision taken in  the  said  E.O.G.M.  dated
5.7.1994 to raise the share capital of the company from Rs.10 lakh  to  Rs.5
crores that the other decisions with regard to bonus shares;  the  issue  of
25,000 ordinary equity shares and the conversion  of  preference  shares  to
equity shares  were  made  subsequently.  Such  notice  is  mandatory  under
Section 172(2) read with Section 41 of the Act. This is, ex facie,  apparent
from the reading of the said  provisions  of  the  Act.   Reference  to  the
elaborate case laid before  us  on  this  score  would,  therefore,  not  be
required.
20.   Specifically, so far as the issue of bonus shares  is  concerned,  the
arguments laid down before us would require a consideration whether  Section
205(3) of the Act, particularly, the proviso thereto permits issue of  bonus
shares out of revaluation reserves of a company.  The further question  that
would arise is the correct interplay between the provisions of the  Act  and
those contained in the Articles of Association of a Company. So far  as  the
issue with regard to utilization of reserves  arising  from  revaluation  of
assets for the purpose of issuing fully paid bonus shares is concerned,  the
same has been held to be permissible in  Bhagwati  Developers  Vs.  Peerless
General Finance & Investment Co. & Ors.[1]. However, it has  to  be  noticed
that in Bhagwati Developers  (supra) the Articles  of  Association  (Article
182) specifically permitted/contemplated such a course of  action.   In  the
present case, the Articles of Association of the Company do not empower  the
Directors to so act.  No such situation i.e. issue of bonus  shares  out  of
revaluation reserve is contemplated.  When the Articles of  the  Company  do
not confer any such power in the Board exercise thereof on  the  basis  that
the Act so provides would be impermissible. Enabling  provisions  under  the
Act would require incorporation in the Articles of a company. To  the  above
effect the view of this Court  in  Para  25  of  the  Claude-Lila  Parulekar
(Smt.) Vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors.[2] is relevant –
“25. Section 36  of  the  Companies  Act,  1956  makes  the  memorandum  and
articles of the company, when registered, binding not only  on  the  company
but also the members inter se to the same extent as if they had been  signed
by the company and by each member and covenanted to by the company and  each
shareholder to observe all the provisions  of  the  memorandum  and  of  the
articles. The articles of  association  constitute  a  contract  not  merely
between  the  shareholders  and  the  company  but  between  the  individual
shareholders also. The articles are a source of power of the  Directors  who
can as a result exercise only those powers  conferred  by  the  articles  in
accordance therewith. Any action referable  to  the  articles  and  contrary
thereto would be ultra vires.”

21.   That apart, the resolution of the Board  dated  5.7.1994  pursuant  to
which bonus shares were issued indicates that the real purpose for issue  of
the bonus shares is to raise funds which were badly needed  by  the  company
at that point of time. On the very face of it, the purpose indicated in  the
resolution is a sham and a pretence inasmuch as revaluation of the  existing
assets of the company and issuance of bonus shares against such  revaluation
could not and did not  generate  any  additional  funds  as  the  additional
capital available is purely fictional or notional.  A self serving  interest
of the Gupta Group (who received all the bonus  shares  issued)  in  issuing
the bonus shares, therefore, is evident.
22.   So far as the issue of 25,000 equity shares is  concerned,  there  can
be no manner of doubt that the decision of  the  Board  to  issue  the  said
shares has to be tested in the light of the wide powers of the Board to  act
in such matters as has been laid down by this  Court  in  Needle  Industries
(India) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Needle  Industries  Newey  (India)  Holding  Ltd.  &
Ors.[3].  The power of the Board of Directors of the Company to issue  fresh
shares must always be viewed as an adjunct of  its  extensive  powers  under
the Act and the bona fides  of  such  an  exercise  cannot  be  called  into
question by construing the power to issue fresh shares to be limited by  any
particular purpose or purposes.  This was the view of the Company Law  Board
also.  However, the same would not detract from  the  fundamental  principle
of fair play that is to be expected from the Board of Directors in making  a
fair and proportionate distribution/allotment of  such  fresh  shares.   The
direction of the Company Law Board upheld by the High  Court,  namely,  that
allotment from the aforesaid 25,000  newly  issued  ordinary  equity  shares
should be proportionate to the share holding of the two  groups  taking  the
members of the Sanwalka Group as having  continued  to  be  members  of  the
company, will, therefore, not require any interference.
23.   Insofar the issue of 3065 ordinary  equity  shares  in  lieu  of  3065
preference shares is concerned, the CLB and the High Court  had  thought  it
proper to leave the matter for a just determination by the Delhi High  Court
in view of the suit filed by the Sanwalka Group  contending  that  the  said
shares had ceased to exist in the year 1967 and therefore no  equity  shares
could have been issued in lieu of the said preference  shares  as  has  been
done.  The suit in question which is of the year 1996 may take some  further
time for  resolution.   In  such  circumstances,  the  apprehension  of  the
Sanwalka group is  that  if  the  equity  shares  issued  against  the  said
preference shares are allowed to remain alive and valid  the  balance  would
still tilt in favour of the Gupta Group.
24.    It is not known whether the High Court  had  been  requested  by  the
parties to make an  interim  arrangement  and  if  so  the  result  thereof.
However, before us, the Gupta Group has sought to  contend  that  the  above
apprehension of the Sanwalka Group is unfounded. It is claimed  that  it  is
not correct that by virtue of the conversion of the 3065  preference  shares
into equity shares the Gupta Group has  emerged  in  the  majority  for  the
first time. Even prior  to  such  conversion,  the  Gupta  Group  was  in  a
majority inasmuch as the preference shares always carried a right  to  vote.
Therefore, even on the basis of the original share holding, the Gupta  Group
was in majority.
25.   We cannot countenance the aforesaid submission advanced on  behalf  of
the Gupta Group in  view  of  the  provisions  of  Section  87  of  the  Act
particularly sub-section (2) thereof which is in the following terms:

“(2) (a) Subject as aforesaid and save as provided in  clause  (b)  of  this
sub-section, every member of a company limited by  shares  and  holding  any
preference share capital therein shall, in respect of such capital,  have  a
right to vote only on resolutions placed before the company  which  directly
affect the rights attached to his preference shares.


Explanation. :  Any resolution  for  winding  up  the  company  or  for  the
repayment or reduction of its share capital  shall  be  deemed  directly  to
affect the rights attached to preference shares within the meaning  of  this
clause.


(b) Subject as aforesaid, every member of a company limited  by  shares  and
holding any preference share capital  therein  shall,  in  respect  of  such
capital, be entitled to vote on every resolution placed before  the  company
at any meeting, if the dividend due on such capital  or  any  part  of  such
dividend has remained unpaid :


(i) in the case of cumulative preference shares, in respect of an  aggregate
period of not less than two years preceding the date of commencement of  the
meeting ; and


(ii) in the case of non-cumulative preference shares, either in  respect  of
a period of not less than two years ending with the expiry of the  financial
year immediately preceding the commencement of the meeting or in respect  of
an aggregate period of not less than three years comprised in the six  years
ending with the expiry of the financial year aforesaid.


Explanation. : For the purposes of this clause, dividend shall be deemed  to
be due on preference shares in respect of any  period,  whether  a  dividend
has been declared by the company on such shares for such period or not,


(a) on the last day specified for the payment  of  such  dividend  for  such
period, in the articles or other instrument executed by the company in  that
behalf ; or


(b) in case no day is so specified, on the day  immediately  following  such
period.


(c) where the holder of any preference share has a  right  to  vote  on  any
resolution in accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  sub-section,  his
voting right on a poll, as the holder of such share, shall, subject  to  the
provisions of section 89 and sub-section (2) of section 92, be in  the  same
proportion as the capital paid up in respect of the preference  share  bears
to the total paid-up equity capital of the company.”


26.   A reading of the aforesaid Section 87 (2) would clearly indicate  that
except in  situations  where  dividends  have  not  been  paid,  holders  of
preference shares do not have a  right  to  vote  except  in  matters  which
directly affects the rights attached to the preference shares.
27.   Reliance has been placed on Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Articles  of
Association of the Company to claim voting  rights  against  the  preference
shares held by the Gupta Group.  It will  therefore  be  necessary  to  take
note of the said Articles which are in the following terms:
      “20. The following rights are attached  to  these  shares  as  regards
dividends, voting rights and redemption –

Preference  shares  shall  carry  a  fixed  cumulative  free  of  Income-tax
dividend @ of 6% per annum in preference to ordinary or any other  class  of
shares.
Preference shares shall be redeemable at any time after a period of 5 or  10
years from the date of allotment at the option of Directors of  the  company
or at the option of the holder thereof respectively, provided  a  notice  of
three months in writing is given by the company to the  holders  thereof  or
vice-versa as the case may be.

After payment cumulative dividend of 6% free of tax  on  preference  shares,
the balance of the net divisible profits  (as  may  be  recommended  by  the
directors) shall be utilized for  payment  of  dividend  @  9%  on  ordinary
shares.

Any net divisible profits as may be recommended by the  Directors  remaining
after payment of cumulative dividend or preference shares  and  dividend  on
ordinary shares as mentioned above shall be divided between  the  preference
and ordinary shares equally on the basis of paid up capital in the  company.


Preference shares shall also have a preference for repayment of  capital  at
the time of the winding up of the company in  preference  to  any  class  of
shares.

21. On show of hand every shareholders present in shall have  one  vote  and
upon poll every shareholder present in person or any proxy  shall  have  one
vote for each share  held  by  him  or  her.  A  poll  may  be  demanded  in
accordance with law.

22. A holder of any shares shall not be entitled to a vote  either  by  show
of hand or at poll unless there have been paid to the company  all  sums  of
money then due from that holder in respect of these shares.”

28.   The aforesaid Articles must necessarily have to be understood  in  the
light of the provisions of Section 87 particularly those contained  in  sub-
Section (2).  The meaning sought to be given to  Articles  20,  21  and  22,
extracted above, namely, that every share holder including the holder  of  a
preference share has a  right  to  vote  cannot  be  readily  accepted.  The
resolution of the  Board  dated  5.7.1994  relating  to  the  conversion  of
preference shares into equity shares proceeds on the  basis  that  dividends
in respect of the 3065 shares have not been paid and  in  lieu  thereof  the
shareholders had agreed to receive an equivalent number  of  equity  shares.
The above statement of fact is difficult to accept. Neither  is  the  period
during which dividends had not been paid is specified,  nor  is  the  amount
due indicated. No material has been  laid  to  show  that  the  3065  equity
shares represent a fair value of the dividends claimed to  be  unpaid.  What
cannot also be lost sight of is that the preference shares in question  were
held by the Gupta Group who was in control of the company at that  point  of
time. A number of self serving decisions by the Gupta Group and its  conduct
of the business of the company in a manner detrimental to  the  interest  of
the company, as discussed hereinabove, would make it extremely  perilous  to
rely on the version available in the resolution of the Board  for  allotment
of 3065 equity shares in place of the preference  shares  in  question.   In
the above circumstances it would be just  and  proper  to  strike  down  the
conversion of the 3065 preference shares into equity shares and  revert  the
preference shares to its earlier status to be dealt with in  the  future  in
accordance with law. This is, of course, subject to the orders of the  Delhi
High Court in the appeal pending before it.
Lease of the Industrial Plot
29.    If  the  forums  below  have  left  the  above  matter  for  a   just
determination in an Extra Ordinary General Meeting of the Company,  in  view
of the directions hereinabove, we do not consider it necessary to deal  with
the said aspect of the case any further.
30.   Before parting, certain subsidiary issues  raised  on  behalf  of  the
parties may be briefly noticed if only to make the discussion complete.
The failure of the High Court to frame a  substantial  question  of  law  to
hear the appeal before it can  hardly  invalidate  the  order  passed.   The
order of the High Court is an order of  affirmation;  further  there  is  no
provision in Section 10F  of  the  Act  which  is  akin  to  the  provisions
contained in Section 100 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
31.   The argument that having regard to the conduct of the Gupta  Group  in
managing the affairs of the Company and all decisions  taken  being  in  the
best interest of the Company, no case for winding up is made out  so  as  to
justify the exercise of powers under Section 397/398 of the Act by the  CLB,
would hardly require a  detailed  consideration  in  view  of  the  specific
findings of the High Court in this regard, which are wholly adverse  to  the
Gupta Group. The said view and the conclusions reached  have  our  approval,
as already indicated. Besides, the High Court in the order  under  challenge
has taken into account that apart from the industrial plot in  question  the
Company has no subsisting business and that the terms of the  lease  entered
into by the Gupta Group in respect of the said property are  wholly  adverse
to the Company’s interest.
32.   The question whether a single act of oppression would enable  the  CLB
to intervene or oppression must be the cumulative result of continuous  acts
should not require any debate  in  the  facts  of  the  present  case  which
demonstrate a series of unacceptable decisions and actions on  the  part  of
the Gupta Group. In the last resort, satisfaction that oppression  has  been
committed has to be reached in the facts of each case.
33.   In view of the above discussions and for the  reasons  alluded,  Civil
Appeal No.589 of 2010 filed by the Gupta Group is  dismissed  whereas  Civil
Appeal No.599 of 2010 filed by  the  Sanwalka  Group  is  disposed  of  with
directions, as contained in the present order.

                                               ….……......................,J.
                                                           [RANJAN GOGOI]



                                               ….……......................,J.
                                                               [PRAFULLA C.
                                    PANT]

NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 07, 2016.
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[1]    (2005) 6 SCC 718
[2]    (2005) 11 SCC 73
[3]    (1981) 3 SCC 333