whether “packing materials” which enter the local area for consumption therein, that is for packing tea that is manufactured by the appellant, can be said to be raw material, components, or inputs used in the manufacture of tea.= The appellant is a public limited company having a tea manufacturing unit at Dharwad and various other units which also manufacture tea. The tea manufactured by the appellant is of three types, namely, packet tea, tea in tea bags, and quick brewing black tea. It is claimed that the Dharwad Unit, as opposed to the other units manufacturing tea, is a new unit and is, therefore, exempt altogether from payment of entry tax on packing material of tea under a notification dated 31.3.1993 issued under Section 11A of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the “Karnataka Entry Tax Act”). Insofar as the other units are concerned, it is the case of the appellant they are covered by Explanation II to a Notification dated 23.9.1998 issued under Section 3 of the said Act, and “packing material” being covered by the said Explanation would entitle them to pay entry tax at the rate of 1% and not 2%. In these appeals, we are concerned with three assessment years 1994-1995, 1995- 1996 and 1996-1997.- We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was correct in following its own earlier Division Bench judgment in the Nestle case. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.4003 OF 2007




      HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD.                         …APPELLANT

                                   Versus

      STATE OF KARNATAKA                             …RESPONDENT




                               J U D G M E N T

      R.F.Nariman, J.




   1. The appellant is a public limited company having a  tea  manufacturing
      unit at Dharwad and various other units which  also  manufacture  tea.
      The tea manufactured by the  appellant  is  of  three  types,  namely,
      packet tea, tea in tea bags, and  quick  brewing  black  tea.   It  is
      claimed  that  the  Dharwad  Unit,  as  opposed  to  the  other  units
      manufacturing tea, is a new unit and is, therefore, exempt  altogether
      from payment  of  entry  tax  on  packing  material  of  tea  under  a
      notification dated 31.3.1993 issued under Section 11A of the Karnataka
      Tax on Entry of Goods  Act,  1979  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
      “Karnataka Entry Tax Act”).  Insofar as the other units are concerned,
      it is the case of the appellant they are covered by Explanation II  to
      a Notification dated 23.9.1998 issued under Section 3 of the said Act,
      and “packing material” being covered by  the  said  Explanation  would
      entitle them to pay entry tax at the rate of 1% and not 2%.  In  these
      appeals, we are concerned with three assessment years 1994-1995, 1995-
      1996 and 1996-1997.



   2. The question that arises  for  decision  in  this  appeal  is  whether
      “packing  materials”  which  enter  the  local  area  for  consumption
      therein,  that  is  for  packing  tea  that  is  manufactured  by  the
      appellant, can be said to be raw material, components, or inputs  used
      in the manufacture of tea.  In order to answer this  question,  it  is
      necessary to first set out the relevant provisions  of  the  Karnataka
      Entry Tax Act. They are as follows:

           “2. Definitions.- (A) In this Act, unless the context  otherwise
           requires,-

                 (4a) goods means all kinds of moveable property (other than
           newspapers, actionable claims, stocks and shares and securities)
           and includes livestock;

                 (7) “Schedule” means a schedule appended to this Act;

                 (8)   “tax” means tax leviable under this Act;

                 (8a) ‘Value of the goods’ shall mean the purchase value  of
           such goods that is to say, the purchase price at which a  dealer
           has purchased the goods inclusive of charges  borne  by  him  as
           cost  of  transportation,  packing,  forwarding   and   handling
           charges, commission, insurance, taxes, duties and the  like,  or
           if such goods have not been purchased  by  him,  the  prevailing
           market price of such goods in the local area.

                 (B)   Words and expressions  used  in  this  Act,  but  not
           defined,  shall  have  the  meaning  assigned  to  them  in  the
           Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957.)

                 3. Levy of tax.- (1) There shall be levied and collected  a
           tax on entry of any goods specified in the FIRST SCHEDULE into a
           local area for consumption, use or sale therein, at  such  rates
           not exceeding five percent of the value of the goods as  may  be
           specified  retrospectively  or  prospectively   by   the   State
           Government by notification and  different  dates  and  different
           rates  may  be  specified  in  respect  of  different  goods  or
           different classes of goods or different local areas.

           11A. Power of State Government to exempt or reduce tax.-

           (1)  The State Government may, if in its opinion it is necessary
           in public interest so to do, by notification and subject to such
           restrictions and conditions  and  for  such  period  as  may  be
           specified  in  the  notification,  exempt   or   reduce   either
           prospectively or retrospectively the tax payable under this Act,-



                 (i)   by any  specified  class  of  persons  or  class  of
           dealers or in respect of any goods or class of goods; or

                 (ii) on entry of all or any goods or class of  goods  into
           any specified local area.

           (2) The State Government may, by notification cancel or vary any
           notification issued under sub-section (1).

           (3) Where any restriction  or  condition  specified  under  sub-
           section (1) is contravened or is not observed by a dealer  or  a
           declaration furnished under the said sub-section is found to  be
           wrong, then such dealer shall be liable to pay by way of penalty
           an amount equal to twice the difference between the tax  payable
           at the rates specified by or under the Act and the tax  paid  at
           the rates specified under the notification  on the value of such
           goods in respect of which such contravention  or  non-observance
           has taken place or a wrong declaration is furnished:

                 Provided that before taking action  under  the  sub-section
           the dealer shall be given  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  being
           heard.

                            FIRST SCHEDULE

                       (See Section 3 (1))

           66.  Packing materials namely :-

           (i)    fibre board cases, paper boxes,  folding  cartons,  paper
           bags, carrier bags and card board boxes, corrugated board  boxes
           and the like.

           (ii)   tin plate containers (cans, tins and boxes)  tin  sheets,
           aluminium foil, aluminium tubes, collapsible tubes, aluminium or
           steel drums, barrels and crates and the like ;

           (iii)   plastic,  poly-vinyl  chloride  and  polyethylene  films
           bottles, pots, jars, boxes, crates, cans, carboys,  drums,  bags
           and cushion materials and the like ;

           (iv)    wooden boxes, crates, casks and containers and the like;

           (v)    gunny bags, bardan (including batars), hessian cloth, and
           the like ;

           (vi)   glass bottles, jars and carboys and the like ;

           (vii)  laminated pacing materials such as bitumanised paper  and
           hessian based paper and the like;

           80. Raw materials component parts and inputs which are  used  in
           the manufacture of an intermediate or finished product.”




      3.    Under Section 11A of the Act, a  Notification  dated  31.3.1993,
      exempting raw materials, component parts, and inputs entering a  local
      area for use  in  the  manufacture  of  an  intermediate  or  finished
      product, was promulgated.  It reads as under:

           “Entry tax on raw materials, etc.  for  use  in  manufacture  of
           goods by new industrial units – Exemption (Karnataka)

           Notification III No.FD.11.CET 93 dated the 31st March,1993

           [Public in Karnataka Gazette, Extraordinary  No.  201,  Part  4-
           C(ii) dated 31st March, 1993]

           In exercise of the powers  conferred  by  section  11-A  of  the
           Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods  Act,  1979  the  Government  of
           Karnataka being of the opinion  that  it  is  necessary  in  the
           public interest so to do, hereby exempts with  effect  from  the
           first day of April, 1993 the tax payable under the said act,  on
           the entry of raw  materials,  component  parts  and  inputs  and
           machinery and its parts  into  a  local  area  for  use  in  the
           manufacture of an intermediate or finished product  by  the  new
           industrial units mentioned in column (2)   of  the  Table  below
           located in the zones specified in column (3) and for the  period
           mentioned in Column (4) thereof.

                                    TABLE

|Sl.No.|Type of Industry |Location of Industry   |Period of exemption     |
|1     |2                |3                      |4                       |
|      |                 |                       |                        |
|1.    |Tiny/Small/medium|Situated in Zone-III   |4 years from the date of|
|      |and large scale  |specified in annexure-I|commencement of         |
|      |industrial units |to Government Order No.|commercial production or|
|      |                 |CI/138 SPC/90, dated   |4 years from the date of|
|      |                 |27.9.1990              |commencement of this    |
|      |                 |                       |notification whichever  |
|      |                 |                       |is later.               |
|2.    |Tiny/small/medium|Situated in Zone-IV    |5 years from the date of|
|      |and large scale  |specified in annexure I|commencement of         |
|      |industrial units |to Government Order No.|commercial production or|
|      |                 |CI/138/SPC/90, dated   |5 years from the date of|
|      |                 |27.9.1990              |commencement of this    |
|      |                 |                       |notification whichever  |
|      |                 |                       |is later.               |
|3.    |Tiny/small scale/|Situated in Zone-III   |5 years from the date of|
|      |Medium and large |specified in annexure I|commencement of         |
|      |scale industrial |to Government Order No.|commercial production   |
|      |units in the     |CI/138/SPC/90, dated   |OR                      |
|      |thrust sector as |27.9.1990              |5 years from the date of|
|      |defined in       |                       |commencement of this    |
|      |annexure-II to   |                       |notification whichever  |
|      |G.O. No.         |                       |is later.               |
|      |CI.138/SPC/90,   |                       |                        |
|      |dated 27.9.1990  |                       |                        |
|4.    |Tiny/small scale/|Situated in Zone-IV    |6 years from the date of|
|      |Medium and large |specified in annexure-I|commencement of         |
|      |scale industrial |to Government Order No.|commercial production,  |
|      |units in the     |CI/138/SPC/90, dated   |OR                      |
|      |thrust sector as |27.9.1990              |6 years from the date of|
|      |defined in       |                       |commencement of this    |
|      |Annexure II to   |                       |notification whichever  |
|      |G.O. No.         |                       |is later.               |
|      |CI.138/SPC/90,   |                       |                        |
|      |dated 27.9.1990  |                       |                        |


____________________________________________________________________________
_________

           Explanation – (1) For the purpose of this  notification  “a  new
           industrial unit” shall have the same meaning assigned to  it  in
           Notification No. FD 239 CSL 90(1) dated 19th June, 1991,  issued
           under Section 8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957.

           (2)   The provisions of the notification shall not  apply  to  a
           unit to which the provisions of  Notification  No.  FD  239  CSL
           90(1) dated 19th June, 1991 issued  under  Section  8-A  of  the
           Karnataka Salex Tax Act, 1957 shall not apply.

           (3)   The procedure specified in Notification  No.  FD  239  CSL
           90(1), dated 19th June, 1991 issued under  Section  8-A  of  the
           Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 for claiming exemption under  that
           notification shall mutates mutandis apply to a  industrial  unit
           claiming exemption under this notification.”




      4.    By a notification dated 31.3.1994, various goods which entered a
      local area  were  charged  at  different  rates  of  entry  tax.  This
      notification was struck down by the High Court as  violating   Article
      301 of the Constitution, and hence, the State Government came out with
      notification dated 23.9.1998 to cure the defects pointed  out  by  the
      High Court, and was for the period dated 1.4.1994  to  6.1.1998.   The
      aforesaid notification reads as follows:

           “SI No.104

               No. FD 112 CET 98, Bangalore, dated 23rd September, 1998

           In exercise of  the  powers  conferred  by  sub-section  (1)  of
           Section 3 of the Karnataka Tax  on  Entry  of  Goods  Act,  1979
           (Karnataka Act 27 of 1979), the Government of Karnataka,  hereby
           specify that with effect from the First day of April,  1994  and
           upto 6th day of January, 1998, tax shall be levied and collected
           under the said Act on the entry of goods specified in column (2)
           of the table below into a local area from any place outside  the
           State of consumption or use therein, at the rates  specified  in
           the corresponding entries in column ; (3), thereof:-

                                TABLE

           Sl.              No.                                   Commodity
           Rate of tax

               1                 2                                 3

            3.            Packing material namely:

                    (i)  Fibre board cases, paper boxes, Folding         2%

                         cartons, paper bags, carrier bags and

                         card board boxes, corrugated board boxes

                         and the like;

                   (ii)  Tin plate containers (cans, tins and            2%

                          boxes), tin sheets, aluminium foil,

                          aluminium tubes, collapsible tubes,

                          aluminium or steel drums, barrels and crates

                           and the like:

                 (iii)   Plastic, polyvinyl chloride and polyethylene
                 2%

                        firms, bottles, pots, jars, boxes, crates, cans,

                        carboys, drums, bags and cushion materials

                        and the like;

                        (iv)  Wooden boxes, crates, casks and containers
           2%

                               and the like;

                 (v)   Gunny bags, bardan (including batars) hessian      2%

                        cloth and the like;

                 (vi)   Glass bottles, jars and carboys and the like;
           2%

                 (vii)  Laminated packing materials, such as bluminised   2%

                         paper and hessian-based paper and the like;

                 4.    Raw materials, component parts and inputs    1%

                       are used in the manufacture of an intermediate

                       of finished product.

           Explanation I – The words “raw materials,  component  parts  and
           any other inputs”  do  not  include  exempted  goods  which  are
           specified  in  the  Schedule,  horticultural  produce,  cereals,
           pulses, oil seeds including copra and cotton  seeds,  timber  or
           wood of any species, newsprint, silk  cocoons,  raw,  thrown  or
           twisted silk, tobacco (whether raw or cured) and  blended  yarn,
           man-made filament yarn, man-made  fibre  yarn,  man-made  fibre,
           woolen yarn and woolen blended yarn, washed cotton seed oil, non-
           refined edible oil, rice bran and oil cake and such other  goods
           as may be notified by the State Government from time to time.




           Explanation II – If any of the goods liable to  tax  under  this
           Act are brought into a local area for use or consumption as  raw
           materials, component parts and inputs in the manufacture  of  an
           intermediate or finished product, the tax payable on such  goods
           shall be at the rate of one percent.”







5.    All the authorities  under  the  Entry  Tax  Act  i.e.  the  Assessing
Authority,  the  First  Appellate  Authority  and  the  Karnataka  Appellate
Tribunal  have  held  that  packing  material  cannot  be  regarded  as  raw
material, component parts or inputs used  in  the  manufacture  of  finished
goods and, therefore, in  the  context  of  the  Entry  Tax  Act  read  with
Schedule I, such packing material is neither exempt nor  chargeable  at  the
rate of 1% on a true construction of the  aforesaid  notifications  of  1993
and 1998.  The High Court in  turn  has  dismissed  the  revision  petitions
filed under the statute by the assessee  following  their  own  judgment  in
Nestle India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, a Division Bench  judgment  of  the
Karnataka High Court dated 22.3.2006.  This is how the appellants have  come
before us in the present civil appeals.

      6.     Shri  Arvind  Datar  and  Shri  Kavin  Gulati,  learned  senior
      advocates, strenuously argued before  us  that  the  judgment  in  the
      Nestle case, which was followed in the  instant  case,  was  incorrect
      inasmuch as  according  to  them  “packing  material”  is  clearly  an
      “input”, if not a component  part  of  manufactured  tea,  and  would,
      therefore, qualify for exemption and/or lesser rate of tax as the case
      may be.  They also argued that Explanation II to the  Notification  of
      23.9.1998 made the position clear that even  though  packing  material
      may be covered under item 3 of the said Notification, yet, as it is an
      input in the manufacture of the finished  product  tea,  it  would  be
      covered by Explanation II, and therefore would be taxable at the  rate
      of 1% and not 2%. They further argued that words and expressions  that
      are not defined under the Entry Tax Act but which are defined  in  the
      Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957  would  have  to  be  borrowed  for  the
      purpose of the Entry Tax Act.  In this  regard,  in  particular,  they
      relied upon Section  5A  of  the  Karnataka  Sales  Tax  Act,  and  in
      particular Explanation  I  to  the  aforesaid  Section  which  defined
      “industrial inputs” as meaning  either  a  “component  part”  or  “raw
      material” or “packing materials”, and argued that packing material has
      been recognized as an input under the Karnataka  Sales  Tax  Act,  and
      should be so recognized under the Entry Tax  Act  read  with  the  two
      notifications aforesaid.  They also cited a large number of  judgments
      of this Court and of the High Court to buttress their submission  that
      packing material would certainly come within  the  expression  “input”
      and would therefore be covered by the aforesaid two notifications.

      Shri Kavin Gulati also specifically  pointed  out  the  Tea  Marketing
Control Order, 2003 made under Section 30 of the Tea  Act,  1953  in  which,
“manufacturer” has been defined as a person who also  produces  value  added
products commercially known as tea, that is packet tea, tea box,  etc.,  and
therefore went on to argue that it is obvious that packing material used  to
market tea would necessarily be included.




7.    Shri Patil, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of  the  State
of Karnataka, countered these submissions, and stated that  the  High  Court
was absolutely correct in  interpreting  the  Entry  Tax  Act  and  the  two
notifications in the manner that it did in Nestle case.  He argued that  the
context of the Entry Tax Act is most important and that decisions  relatable
to the Central Excise Act and to Sales  Tax  statutes  would  not  therefore
apply.  His primary argument was that  Schedule  I  of  the  Entry  Tax  Act
itself made a clear distinction between packing materials, on the one  hand,
and raw materials, component parts and inputs, on the  other,  the  Schedule
making it clear that they were distinct  and  separate  goods.   He  further
adverted to the definition of the expression “goods” contained in the  Entry
Tax Act and argued that unlike in the Central  Excise Act and in  Sales  Tax
statutes, goods need not be marketable, the definition  confining  goods  to
“movable property” without more.  He also argued that adverting  to  Section
5A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act would be of no help in the  facts  of  the
present case inasmuch as we are not concerned with “industrial  inputs”  but
inputs as understood by the Entry Tax Act read with Schedule  I.   According
to him all the judgments cited by the  appellants  were  distinguishable  in
that none of them pertain to any entry tax statute but were  all  under  the
Central Excise Act or Sales Tax statutes.



8.    Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is  important  to  go
back to a few fundamentals. As has been  explained  in  Escorts  Limited  v.
CCE, (2015) 9 SCC 109,  the  definition  of  “manufacture”  in  the  Central
Excise Act is dependent upon  the  definition  of  “goods”  defined  by  the
Constitution in Article 366(12).  This Court has therefore held:-

           “It is clear on a reading of this Entry that a duty of excise is
           only leviable on “goods”  manufactured  or  produced  in  India.
           “Goods” has been defined under Article 366(12) as follows:
              “366.Definitions.—In this Constitution,  unless  the  context
           otherwise requires, the following expressions have the  meanings
           hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say—
                                     ***
              (12)  ‘goods’  includes  all   materials,   commodities   and
           articles;”


           Each of these three  expressions  has  been  defined  in Shorter
           Oxford English Dictionary as follows:
              “Materials”.—the matter of which a thing is or may  be  made;
           the constituent parts of something.
              “Commodities”.—a thing of use or value; a thing  that  is  an
           object of trade; a thing one deals in or makes use of.
              “Articles”.—a particular item of business.


           Although the definition of “goods” is an inclusive  one,  it  is
           clear that materials, commodities and articles spoken of in  the
           definition take colour from one another. In order to be  “goods”
           it is  clear  that  they  should  be  known  to  the  market  as
           materials, commodities and articles that are  capable  of  being
           sold.


           In the basic judgment which has been referred to in every excise
           case for conceptual  clarity,  namely, Union  of  India v. Delhi
           Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. [(1977) 1 ELT 199 : AIR  1963  SC
           791 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 586] , this Court held that  for  excise
           duty to be chargeable under the constitutional entry  read  with
           Section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, two  prerequisites
           are necessary. First,  there  must  be  “manufacture”  which  is
           understood  to  mean  the  bringing  into  existence  of  a  new
           substance. And secondly, the word “goods” necessarily means that
           such manufacture must bring into existence a new substance known
           to  the  market  as  such  which  brings  in  the   concept   of
           marketability in addition to manufacture. …” [paras 8-11]



9.    However, on  a  perusal  of  the  definition  of  “goods”  in  Section
2(A)(4a) of the Entry Tax Act, the said  definition  is  an  exhaustive  one
including all kinds of movable property and livestock.  It is  obvious  from
a reading of this definition that marketability does  not  appear  to  be  a
sine qua non for something to qualify as “goods” under the  Entry  Tax  Act,
unlike the Central Excise Act, and this basic fact will have to be  kept  in
view while dealing with some of the judgments that have  been  cited  before
us.  This is for the reason that anything that is  tangible,  without  more,
and enters a local area for consumption, sale or  use  therein  is  taxable,
the taxable event being ‘entry’ and not ‘manufacture’ of  goods,  which,  as
has been noticed hereinabove, brings in the concept of marketability in  the
context of a duty of excise, which is absent in the context  of  entry  tax.
We might also add that Section 2(A)(8a) wherein the “value of the goods”  is
defined, also makes a distinction between  “goods”  as  such,  and  “packing
material”, making it clear that  charges  borne  by  a  dealer  as  cost  of
packing would have to be included in the “value of goods”.  In  the  context
of  the  Entry  Tax  Act,  the  difference  between  ‘goods’  used  in   the
manufacture of goods and “packing material” is also brought out by  Schedule
I. Packing materials are separately defined  in  Entry  66.   On  the  other
hand, raw materials, component parts and  inputs,  which  are  used  in  the
manufacture of an intermediate  or  finished  product,  are  separately  and
distinctively given in Entry 80 thereof. The context of the  Entry  Tax  Act
therefore is clear.  When raw materials,  component  parts  and  inputs  are
spoken of, obviously they refer to materials, components  and  things  which
go into the finished product, namely, tea in the present  case,  and  cannot
be extended to cover packing materials of the said tea which  is  separately
provided for by the aforesaid Entry 66.




10.    The  notification  dated  23.9.1998  issued  under  Section  3   uses
identical language as that contained in Entries 66 and 80 of Schedule  I  to
the Entry Tax Act.  Equally, notification dated 31.3.1993  is  an  exemption
notification  issued  under  Section  11A  which  also  uses  the  identical
language of Entry 80 of Schedule I. This being the case, it  is  clear  that
neither notification can be read  to  include  “packing  material”  as  “raw
materials, component parts or inputs used in the manufacture” of tea.

      11.   This brings us to an argument made by learned  counsel  for  the
      appellants on the  correct  construction  of  Explanation  II  to  the
      notification dated 23.9.1998.

      12.   What has first to be seen is  that  packing  material,  and  raw
      materials, component parts and  inputs  are  separately  provided  for
      under the Schedule to the Act.  The same is also true of the aforesaid
      Notification. Packing material is contained in Entry 3  of  the  table
      whereas raw materials, component parts and  inputs  are  contained  in
      Entry 4.  The rate at which they are taxed is also different – packing
      materials at 2%, whereas raw materials, components  parts  and  inputs
      are taxed  at  1%.   This  being  so,  the  reason  for  inclusion  of
      Explanation II appears to be that goods which are liable to tax, being
      finished goods in themselves, may yet be brought into a local area for
      use or consumption as raw material, component parts and inputs in  the
      manufacture of an intermediate or finished product.  It is  only  such
      goods that are liable to be taxed at the rate of 1%.  It is  difficult
      to accept the argument on behalf of the appellants that Explanation II
      makes it clear that though packing materials may be liable to  tax  at
      2%, yet if they fall in Explanation II, they would be liable to tax at
      the rate of 1%.  This would fly in the face of the scheme of  Schedule
      I of the statute which, as has been held earlier, makes it clear  that
      in no case  can  packing  materials  be  said  to  be  raw  materials,
      component parts or inputs used in the manufacture of  finished  goods.
      For  this  reason  alone  we  find  it  difficult  to   construe   the
      notification  dated  23.9.1998  in  the  manner   suggested   by   the
      appellants.

13.   Even otherwise, there is no  such  Explanation  II  contained  in  the
exemption notification dated 31.3.1993.  This being the case, if we were  to
accept the case of the appellants, they would be liable to tax at  the  rate
of 1% under the 1998 notification but would not be  exempt  under  the  1993
notification, thus rendering the same packing material liable to tax at  the
rate of 2% in the case of the Dharwad unit and 1% in the case of  all  other
units.  This would lead to an anomalous situation which can best be  avoided
by not accepting the argument on behalf of the appellants.




14.   Equally, the argument based on Section 5A of the Karnataka  Sales  Tax
Act is fallacious in that it is only for the purpose of “industrial  inputs”
that packing  materials  are  included,  and  forms  a  separate  scheme  of
taxation under the Sales Tax statute. We cannot accede to the argument  that
de hors the context of the Entry Tax Act, we should accept  that  industrial
inputs  include  packing  materials  and  that  therefore,  by   parity   of
reasoning, “inputs” under the Entry Tax  Act  should  also  include  packing
material.  This argument has therefore correctly been  turned  down  by  the
High Court of Karnataka in the Nestle case.




15.   We have now to  deal  with  the  judgments  cited  on  behalf  of  the
appellants.  In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Guntur  Tobaccos  Ltd.,  [15
STC 240], this Court had  to  decide  as  to  whether  the  use  of  packing
material should be regarded as execution of a works contract and  not  as  a
sale.  This Court held on the facts in that case that packing  material  was
part of the process of re-drying tobacco as it was necessary to pack  it  in
a waterproof material to protect it from heat and humidity, so as  to  store
tobacco for a sufficiently long period to avoid fermentation,  and  to  make
the tobacco mature for use in cigarettes, cigars, etc.  The context  of  the
judgment is entirely different from the facts contained in the present  case
and would thus have no relevance.  Learned counsel for the appellants  tried
to draw succour from this judgment stating that the idea of packing  tea  is
also to keep out moisture.  While that may be so, that  single  fact  cannot
lead to a conclusion that would drive a coach and four  through  the  scheme
of the Entry Tax Act.




16.   Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 109 STC 265,  was
cited next. This is a High Court judgment  under  the  Karnataka  Sales  Tax
Act, in which it was stated that packaging led to  value  addition  for  the
purpose of excise and sales tax, and  that  it  was  a  possible  view  that
packaged blended tea produced in the industrial unit of the appellant  is  a
manufactured product in which packing materials are inputs. This was in  the
context of exemption notifications under the Sales Tax Act.  As can be  seen
from paragraph 26 of the aforesaid judgment, the questions involved in  that
case were entirely different.  Also, the test of what is  “manufacture”  was
borrowed from the Central Excise Act as can be seen  from  paragraph  48  of
the judgment. The  High  Court  points  to  a  new  dimension  to  the  word
“manufacture” in the context of excise which would therefore include  within
it packing material as well in order that  the  goods  be  made  marketable.
This, as we have seen above, cannot be done in the context of the Entry  Tax
Act.




      17.   In Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO)  v.  State  of
      Bihar, (1994) 6 SCC 479, this Court had to deal  with  a  notification
      issued by the State of  Bihar  in  the  context  of  sales  tax.   The
      expression “raw material” and “input” was used  in  the  notification.
      This Court held, following J.K. Cotton Spinning &  Weaving  Mills  Co.
      Ltd. v. S.T.O.,  (1965)  1  SCR  900,  that  the  expression  “in  the
      manufacture of goods” would  normally  encompass  the  entire  process
      carried on by the dealer of converting  raw  materials  into  finished
      products.  The precise question before this Court was whether products
      finished in themselves, such as tyres, tubes,  batteries,  etc.,  when
      purchased by the appellant for use in  the  manufacture  of  vehicles,
      could be said to be inputs.  This Court held that as a vehicle  cannot
      be operative without tyres, tubes, and batteries, obviously they  were
      inputs in the sense of the dictionary meaning of  what  is  “put  in”.
      Both the fact situation and the ratio of this judgment are far removed
      from the facts in the present case inasmuch as  it  is  nobody’s  case
      that without the packing material manufactured tea cannot be  said  to
      exist  as  a  finished  product,  it  being  “moveable  property”  and
      therefore “goods” under the Karnataka Entry Tax Act.  This judgment is
      also therefore of no avail to the appellant.

18.   M/s. Star Paper Mills Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut, (1989) 4  SCC  724,  is  an
excise case in which  an  exemption  Notification  exempted  goods  used  as
component parts in manufacture  of  any  goods  on  which  excise  duty  was
leviable. This judgment defines the word “component” to mean  a  constituent
part. In this context, it was held that paper core is a  component  part  of
paper delivered to the customer in rolls, but not in sheets as  it  was  not
necessary for  manufacture  of  paper  sheets.   This  case  would  have  no
application to the facts of the present case.  It is  obvious  that  packing
material used to pack a product  complete  in  itself,  cannot  possibly  be
included in the word  “component”  as  it  is  not  a  constituent  part  of
manufactured tea.



      19.   Three other judgments under the Central Excise Act  were  cited.
      The first of them, CCE v. M/s. Eastend Paper Industries Ltd., (1989) 4
      SCC 244, was concerned with the marketability aspect of central excise
      which, as has been held by us above, would not apply in the context of
      the Entry Tax Act.  In that judgment, paper wrapping was  held  to  be
      essential to make the concerned goods marketable.  The second of these
      judgments CCE v. Ballarpur Industries Limited, (1989) 4 SCC 566, again
      concerned a completely different fact situation.  The question in that
      case  was  whether  an  admitted  input,  Sodium  Sulphate,   in   the
      manufacture of paper, would not be construed to be a raw material only
      by reason that in the course of chemical reactions Sodium Sulphate  is
      consumed and burnt up.  This Court held that consumption  and  burning
      up would make no difference, as an ‘input’ need  not  always  manifest
      itself in the final product. And in H.M.M. Ltd. V. CCE, (1994)  6  SCC
      594, it was held that a screw cap on a bottle containing Horlicks  was
      a component part of Horlicks, it  being  an  essential  ingredient  to
      complete the process of manufacture to make Horlicks marketable.  This
      judgment again will not apply for the  same  reason  indicated  above,
      namely, that marketability is not relevant  for  the  purpose  of  the
      Entry Tax Act.




      20.   M/s. J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales  Tax
      Officer, Kanpur, (1965) 1 SCR 900, is a judgment in which Section 8 of
      the Central Sales Tax Act was  pressed  into  aid  on  behalf  of  the
      appellant.  In this case, the question was whether drawing  materials,
      photographic  materials  etc.  could  be   comprehended   within   the
      expression “in the manufacture of goods for sale” within  the  meaning
      of section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.   In  order  to
      determine whether such materials would qualify  as  such,  this  Court
      held that where any particular process is so integrally connected with
      the  ultimate  production  of  goods  that,  but  for  that   process,
      manufacture or process of goods  would  be  commercially  inexpedient,
      goods required in that process would fall within  the  expression  “in
      the manufacture of goods”.  What has been said about the excise  cases
      squarely applies here. The expression used in Section 8 of the Central
      Sales Tax Act is not “in  the  manufacture  of  goods”,  but  “in  the
      manufacture  of  goods  for  sale”,  bringing  in   the   element   of
      marketability.




21.   It only remains to deal with  the  argument  made  on  behalf  of  the
appellant based on the Tea Marketing Control  Order.   Needless  to  add,  a
manufacturer for the purpose of the said Order is specifically a person  who
produces value added products commercially known as  tea.   The  context  of
the said definition is for  the  purpose  of  registering  manufacturers  or
producers and buyers of tea, having relevance therefore to the  sale  aspect
of tea.  As has already been held by us, the  context  of  entry  tax  being
different, we are afraid this argument also does not avail the appellant.



      22.   We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court  was  correct
      in following its own earlier Division Bench  judgment  in  the  Nestle
      case.  This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.




                                             ..............................J
                                       .
                                             (A.K. SIKRI)




                                             ..............................J
                                       .
                                             (R.F. NARIMAN)
      New Delhi;
      September 2, 2016

In our opinion, the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the Disciplinary Authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence produced during the enquiry by the Department, in relation to the charges framed against the respondent. Whether the decision of the Disciplinary Authority of dismissing the respondent is just and proper, could be assailed by the respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material produced in the Departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation in the present case.= Ordinarily, we would have remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for consideration afresh, but as the matter is pending for a long time and as we are satisfied that in the fact situation of the present case approval to the order of punishment passed by the appellant against the respondent should have been granted, we allow the application under Section 33(2)(b) preferred by the appellant but with liberty to the respondent to take recourse to appropriate remedy as may be available in law to question the said order of dismissal dated 13th October, 2003. 14. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned decisions of the High Court as well as of the Joint Commissioner. The appeals are allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.

                                                                (REPORTABLE)



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6765-66/2014

The Management of TNSTC (Coimbatore) Ltd.            ….….Appellant

                                   Versus

M. Chandrasekaran                                            ....Respondent



                             J U D G M E N T





A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.



These appeals challenge the decision of  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court of Judicature at Madras, dated 22.11.2013, in Writ  Appeal  Nos.  2082
and 2083 of 2013.

2.    Briefly stated, the  respondent  was  employed  as  a  driver  by  the
appellant on 14.04.1986.  While on duty on  15.01.2003,  on  vehicle  TN-38-
0702, during a trip from Kovai Ukkadam to Pollachi, near  Vadakkipalayam  he
caused an accident with a car bearing No. TMA 4845 coming from the  opposite
direction resulting in fatal injuries to persons  travelling  in  that  car.
Disciplinary enquiry was instituted against the  respondent  inter  alia  on
the charge of driving the bus in a rash and negligent  manner.  The  Enquiry
Officer found the respondent guilty of the charges  framed  in  Charge  Memo
dated 22.01.2003.  The Disciplinary Authority after  giving  opportunity  to
the respondent passed order of dismissal on 13.10.2003. The  appellant  then
submitted an application, being Approval Petition No.  480  of  2003,  under
Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947,  before  the  Joint
Commissioner Labour (Conciliation), Chennai as  an  industrial  dispute  was
pending  for  conciliation  before  him.   The  Labour  Commissioner,  after
analysing the material placed before him in the said proceeding  noted  that
the Department only examined two witnesses who were also  cross-examined  by
the respondent.  The respondent examined himself  as  defence  witness,  but
was not cross-examined by the Department. The Commissioner,  however,  found
that the enquiry against the respondent was  conducted  in  accordance  with
the principles of natural justice and also in conformity with  the  Standing
Orders.  While  dealing  with  the  quality  of  evidence  adduced  by   the
Department, the Commissioner found that  the  same,  by  no  standard  would
substantiate the charges framed against the respondent.  The  first  witness
was the Junior Engineer.  He had submitted  a  site  inspection  report  and
stated in his evidence that the car came with speed to the  left  side  from
Vadakkipalayam branch road to the main road and then came to the  centre  of
the  road.   His  evidence  about  the  occurrence  of   accident   was   on
presumption.  The  second  witness  examined  by  the  Department  was   the
Assistant Manager.  He stated that the bus driver as well as car driver  had
driven their vehicles speedily.  He also stated that car was driven  in  the
middle of the road with speed at the time of accident.  The defence  of  the
respondent was that when he was approaching Vadakkipalayam branch  road,  an
ambassador car driven by a 17 year old  boy  named  Sivakumar  came  on  the
wrong side of the road at a high speed and, after  entering  the  main  road
went to the left side  of  the  bus  in  wrong  direction.  The  respondent,
therefore, first thought of driving the  bus  to  the  left.  But,  as  some
pilgrims were going in a procession on the left side of the road and as  the
car was being driven rashly and had come to the left side  of  the  bus,  he
was left with no option except to take the bus to the right side to avoid  a
head on  collision.  This  averted  a  fatal  accident  to  pedestrians  and
minimized the damage to the car coming from the opposite  direction  on  the
wrong side.  This also  ensured  the  safety  of  the  bus  passengers.   In
substance, the respondent pleaded  that  the  accident  was  caused  due  to
unavoidable circumstances and in spite of all precautions and  applying  his
best judgment in maneuvering the vehicle.

3.    The Commissioner found that the respondent  had  deposed  about  these
facts as defence witness, but was not cross-examined by the  Department.  No
eye witness was examined by the Department nor the conductor of the  bus  or
passengers travelling in the same bus were examined by the  Department.  The
Commissioner, therefore, concluded that the finding reached by  the  Enquiry
Officer by merely relying on the evidence of the  Junior  Engineer  and  the
Assistant Manager (who were not eye witnesses), was perverse.  In that,  the
charges  were  not  proved  against  the  respondent  by  independent  legal
evidence of eye witnesses. The Commissioner held that the Enquiry  Officer’s
report was vitiated being perverse.  The Commissioner  also  relied  on  the
decision of the Division Bench of Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No.  2238
of 2000 in the case of A. Mariasundararaj vs. Cheran  Transport  Corporation
Ltd., which had deprecated the practice of  not  examining  eye  witness  or
other relevant evidence during the enquiry in respect of accident  cases  by
the State Transport Corporation, and as it results  in  not  confirming  the
charges and punishments awarded against its drivers involved  in  accidents.
The Commissioner, therefore,  refused to accord approval  for  dismissal  of
the respondent.

4.    Being aggrieved by this decision, the  appellant-Management  preferred
Writ Petition  No.  2425  of  2010.   Even  the  respondent  preferred  Writ
Petition  No.  23155/2009  for  issuing  writ  of   mandamus   against   the
Corporation to implement the order  passed  by  the  Joint  Commissioner  of
Labour, Chennai dated 25.05.2009 in Approval Petition No. 480/2003;  and  to
reinstate  him  with  continuity  of  service,  back-wages  and  all   other
attendant benefits. Both the writ petitions were heard  analogously  by  the
learned Single Judge.  The Single Judge noted the seven reasons recorded  by
the Commissioner to disapprove the dismissal of the respondent, as  follows:
-

“a)  Except  examining  witnesses,  who  are  employees  of  the  petitioner
Corporation, the petitioner has not  examined  any  independent  witness  to
prove that the accident  took  place  because  of  the  rash  and  negligent
driving of the 2nd respondent resulting in the death of 9 persons.

b) The Engineer’s report, which was marked as Ex.  A2  shows  that  the  car
came fast from the branch road to the main and came to  the  centre  of  the
road and the bus was coming on the right side of the  road  instead  of  the
left side on high speed.  The report fixed prime responsibility on  the  bus
driver and part  responsibility  on  the  car  driver.   Though  the  Junior
Engineer, who gave this report, deposed that the car and the bus  came  with
speed, he was not an eye witness to the occurrence and he had described  the
occurrence only on presumption.

c) P.W.1, the  Assistant  Manager  of  the  petitioner  Corporation,  though
deposed that the bus driver as  well  as  the  car  driver  had  driven  the
vehicles in high speed, he was also not an eye  witness  to  the  occurrence
and hence, his evidence also cannot be taken into consideration to  fix  the
responsibility on the 2nd respondent.

d) The conductor of the bus, who could have been examined  on  the  side  of
the petitioner Corporation, had not been examined.

e) Not even a  single  passenger  of  the  bus  was  examined  to  prove  or
establish that the 2nd respondent, the driver of the  bus,  had  driven  the
vehicle in a rash and negligent manner.

f) The Enquiry Officer had relied on the evidence of the  Engineer  and  the
Assistant Manager, who were not eye witnesses to the  occurrence  and  their
evidence was uncorroborated by any independent witness.

g) The 2nd respondent had denied that he was responsible  for  the  accident
and stated that the ambassador car, which took a left turn from  the  branch
road and came driving to its right side, suddenly turned  to  the  left  and
therefore, the accident had occurred.  However, the 2nd respondent  was  not
subjected to cross-examination.”



5.     The  Single  Judge  then  opined  that  the  view  so  taken  by  the
Commissioner  was  well  founded  and  did  not  warrant  any  interference.
Reliance was also placed on an un-reported decision  of  Division  Bench  of
the same High Court in Writ Appeal No. 2238  of  2000  in  the  case  of  A.
Mariasundararaj (Supra).  The relevant dictum  in  that  decision  has  been
reproduced in paragraph 7 by the Single Judge, as follows:-

“We have to point out that when we come across  such  accident  case,  where
disciplinary actions are initiated  by  the  State  Transport  Corporations,
invariably except the statement of the inspecting official, the  sketch  and
photographs, no other evidence is placed before the   Inquiry  Officer.   It
is  also  repeatedly  being  pointed  out  that  in  the  absence  of   such
independent evidence before the Court, it is  difficult  for  the  Court  to
confirm the punishment awarded as against such erring drivers.”





6.    Accordingly, the Single Judge dismissed the  writ  petition  preferred
by the appellant and allowed the writ petition preferred by  the  respondent
and  issued  direction  to  the  appellant  Corporation  to  reinstate   the
respondent  with  back-wages  and  continuity  of  service  and  all   other
attendant benefits.

7.     Being  aggrieved,  the  appellant  preferred  Letters  Patent  Appeal
bearing Writ Appeal  Nos.  2082  and  2083  of  2013.   The  Division  Bench
affirmed  the  view  taken  by  the  Single  Judge.   The   Division   Bench
distinguished the decision of this Court in  the  case  of  Cholan  Roadways
Ltd. Vs. G. Thirugnanasambandam[1] which was pressed  into  service  by  the
appellant, on the principle of res ipsa loquitur.  The Division  Bench  held
that merely on the basis of  evidence  of  the  Assistant  Manager  and  the
Engineer,  who  were  not  the  eye  witnesses,  the  charges  against   the
respondent remained unsubstantiated.  Hence, the writ  appeals  came  to  be
dismissed. This decision is the subject matter of challenge in  the  present
appeals.

8.    According to the appellant, the evidence produced  by  the  Department
was sufficient to bring home the charge of rash  and  negligent  driving  by
the respondent on  the  day  of  accident.  The  Commissioner  exceeded  his
jurisdiction in recording  a  contrary  finding  while  refusing  to  accord
approval to  the  order  of  dismissal  of  the  respondent  passed  by  the
Department, considering the fact that the accident admittedly  caused  fatal
injuries to  passengers  travelling  in  the  car.   It  is  contended  that
considering the seriousness of the charges and the fact that the  respondent
was driving the bus in a rash and negligent  manner,  the  approach  of  the
Commissioner was hyper-technical.  That is not only  a  manifest  error  but
has also resulted in grave injustice.  The  respondent  on  the  other  hand
contends that the Commissioner has applied the well settled  legal  position
that there can be no presumption of  misconduct  by  the  employees.   That,
charge  must  be  proved  by  the  Department  during  the  inquiry.    Non-
examination of the material witnesses such as eye witnesses present  on  the
spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was  fatal.  For,
it entails in not substantiating the  charges  against  the  respondent  and
failure to discharge the initial onus resting on  the  Department  to  prove
the charge as framed.  According to the respondent, no fault  can  be  found
with the tangible reasons recorded by the Commissioner  as  noticed  by  the
Single Judge (reproduced above); and  resultantly,  the  conclusion  of  the
Commissioner of  not according  approval to the order of dismissal  is  just
and proper.  It  is  submitted  that  the  Single  Judge  was  justified  in
allowing  the  writ  petition  preferred  by  the  respondent  and   issuing
direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back-wages  and  continuity
of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him.

9.    The moot question is about the jurisdiction of the Joint  Commissioner
of Labour (Conciliation) whilst considering an application for  approval  of
order of punishment under Section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes  Act,
1947. It is well settled that the jurisdiction  under  Section  33(2)(b)  of
the Act is a limited one. That jurisdiction cannot be equated with  that  of
the jurisdiction under Section 10  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  This
Court in the case of Cholan Roadways (Supra) observed thus:

“18.  The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application  for
grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court  in  Martin  Burn
Ltd. Vs R.N. Banerjee (AIR 1958 SC 79). While exercising jurisdiction  under
Section 33(2) (b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see  as
to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard  the  validity  or
otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the  delinquent;  keeping  in
view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted,  the  order  of
discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the  delinquent  employee
would be liable to be challenged in an  appropriate  proceeding  before  the
Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision  of  the  Industrial  Disputes
Act. In Martin Burn’s case (supra) this court stated:

“A prima facie case does not mean a case proved  to  the  hilt  but  a  case
which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in  support
of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case  had
been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence  led  it
was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and  not  whether  that
was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence.  It  may
be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at  a
different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute  its  own  judgment
for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether  the  view
taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record.  (See  Buckingham  &
Carnatic Co. Ltd. Vs The Workers of the Company (1952) Lab. AC 490 (F).””

            (emphasis supplied)



This judgment was relied by the appellant before  the  Division  Bench.  The
Division Bench, however, brushed it aside by observing  that  the  principle
of Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to the case on hand.  That  approach,
in our opinion is untenable. In that, the said decision not only deals  with
the principle of Res ipsa loquitur but also with the scope  of  jurisdiction
of the Commissioner under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.  It  also  delineates
the extent of scrutiny to be done at this stage to ascertain  whether  prima
facie case is made out for grant or non-grant of approval to  the  order  of
punishment. In doing so, the  Commissioner  could  not  substitute  his  own
judgment but must only consider whether the view taken by  the  Disciplinary
Authority is a possible view on the evidence on record.

10.    In  the  present  case,  the  sole  reason  which  weighed  with  the
Commissioner was that no independent witness  was  produced  -  not  even  a
single passenger of the bus was examined by  the  Department.  The  decision
relied by the appellant squarely deals even  with  this  reasoning.  It  has
been held that, in the  case  of  State  of  Haryana  &  Others  Vs.  Rattan
Singh[2] the Court held that mere  non-examination  of  passenger  does  not
render the finding of guilt  and  punishment  imposed  by  the  Disciplinary
Authority invalid. Similar view has been taken in  the  case  of  Divisional
Controller KSRTC (NWKRTC) vs. A.T. Mane[3]. Both these decisions  have  been
noticed in the reported decision relied by  the  appellant.  The  burden  to
prove that the accident happened due  to  some  other  cause  than  his  own
negligence, is on the employee, as expounded in the  case  of  Thakur  Singh
vs. State of Punjab[4]  referred  to  in  the  reported  decision.   In  the
reported case relied by the appellant, it has been noted as under:

“34.  ……………………………In the  instant  case  the  Presiding  Officer,  Industrial
Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge and  the  Division  Bench  of  the
High Court misdirected themselves in law insofar  as  they  failed  to  pose
unto themselves correct questions. It is  now  well-settled  that  a  quasi-
judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to  arrive
at a correct finding of fact. A  wrong  question  posed  leads  to  a  wrong
answer. In this case, furthermore, the misdirection in law committed by  the
Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply  the  principle
of Res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of  this  case  and,
thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant  factor  and  furthermore
took into consideration an irrelevant fact not germane for  determining  the
issue, namely, the passengers of the bus were  mandatorily  required  to  be
examined. The Industrial  Tribunal  further  failed  to  apply  the  correct
standard  of  proof  in  relation  to   a   domestic   enquiry,   which   in
“preponderance of probability” and applied the standard  of  proof  required
for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review  was,  thus,  clearly  made
out.”



11.   Applying the principle stated in Cholan Roadways  Ltd.  (Supra),  what
needs to be considered is about the probative value of the evidence  showing
the extensive damage caused to the  bus  as  well  as  motorcar;  the  fatal
injuries caused to several persons resulting in death; and that  the  nature
of impact raises an inference that the bus  was  driven  by  the  respondent
rashly or negligently. The material relied  by  the  Department  during  the
enquiry supported the fact that the respondent was driving  the  vehicle  at
the relevant time and because of the high speed of his  vehicle  the  impact
was so severe that  the  two  vehicles  were  extensively  damaged  and  the
passengers travelling in the vehicle suffered fatal  injuries  resulting  in
death of five persons on the spot and four persons in the  hospital  besides
the injuries to  nine  persons.  These  facts  stood  established  from  the
material relied by the Department, as a result of which the doctrine of  Res
ipsa loquitur came into play and the burden shifted on  the  respondent  who
was in control of the bus to establish that the accident did not  happen  on
account of any negligence on his part.  Neither  the  Commissioner  nor  the
High Court considered the matter on that basis  nor  posed  unto  themselves
the correct question which was relevant for deciding the  application  under
Section 33(2)(b). On the other hand, the  order  of  punishment  dated  13th
October, 2003, ex facie, reveals that the  report  of  the  Enquiry  Officer
referring to the  relevant material established the factum  and  the  nature
of accident warranting an inference that the respondent had driven  the  bus
rashly and negligently. Further, the observation in the unreported  decision
of the Division Bench of the same High Court was not relevant  for  deciding
the  application  under  Section  33(2)(b).  Significantly,  the  order   of
punishment also adverts to the past history of the respondent indicative  of
respondent  having  faced  similar  departmental  action   on   thirty   two
occasions, including for having committed minor as well as  fatal  accidents
while performing his duty.

12.    In  our  opinion,  the  Commissioner  exceeded  his  jurisdiction  in
reappreciating the evidence  adduced  before  the  Enquiry  Officer  and  in
substituting his own judgment to that of the Disciplinary Authority. It  was
not a case  of  no  legal  evidence  produced  during  the  enquiry  by  the
Department, in relation  to  the  charges  framed  against  the  respondent.
Whether the  decision  of  the  Disciplinary  Authority  of  dismissing  the
respondent is just and proper,  could  be  assailed  by  the  respondent  in
appropriate proceedings.  Considering  the  fact  that  there  was  adequate
material  produced  in  the  Departmental  enquiry  evidencing  that   fatal
accident was caused by the respondent while driving  the  vehicle  on  duty,
the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause  than
his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of Res ipsa  loquitur
squarely applies to the fact situation in the present case.

13.    Ordinarily,  we  would  have  remitted  the  matter   back   to   the
Commissioner for consideration afresh, but as the matter is  pending  for  a
long time and as we are satisfied that in the fact situation of the  present
case approval to the order of punishment passed  by  the  appellant  against
the respondent should have been granted,  we  allow  the  application  under
Section 33(2)(b)  preferred  by  the  appellant  but  with  liberty  to  the
respondent to take recourse to appropriate remedy as  may  be  available  in
law to question the said order of dismissal dated 13th October, 2003.

14.   Accordingly, we set aside the impugned decisions of the High Court  as
well as of the Joint Commissioner. The appeals  are  allowed  in  the  above
terms with no order as to costs.





                                                             .………………………….CJI
                                                                (T.S.Thakur)



                                                             ..……………………………J.
                                                           (A.M. Khanwilkar)

New Delhi,
September 2, 2016
-----------------------
[1]
      [2]  (2005) 3 SCC 241
[3]
      [4] (1977) 2 SCC 491
[5]
      [6] (2005) 3 SCC 254
[7]
      [8] (2003) 9 SCC 208

This application has been filed by the Karnataka Iron and Steel Manufacturers Association seeking the following reliefs:- a) Allow the instant application and direct NMDC to restrain from adopting differential pricing mechanism for the iron ore sold in the e- auction in the State of Karnataka. b) Direct the CEC/Monitoring Committee to fix the floor price of iron ore on realistic grounds and to ensure that NMDC does not take undue advantage of acute shortage of iron ore availability in the State of Karnataka. c) Pass any such further orders/directions which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice. = inability of M/s. Vedanta Limited to sell the output from its leases, as expressed, could very well be because of the pricing patterns adopted by it. Inability to sell on account of higher prices cannot be a ground for export of the mineral, at least at this stage of developments pursuant to the final order dated 18.04.2013. Permission for export must be governed by norms and parameters of general application as distinguished from ad hoc decisions in individual cases. Until such guidelines are framed, the prayer of M/s. Vedanta Limited for export of its iron ore cannot be granted

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
                       I.A.NOS.259 & 263 IN I.A.NO.259
                                     IN
                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.562 OF 2009
SAMAJ PARIVARTANA
SAMUDAYA & ORS.                                PETITIONER(S)

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.          RESPONDENT(S)


                               J U D G M E N T


RANJAN GOGOI, J.


I.A.NO.259 of 2016
1.    This application has been  filed  by  the  Karnataka  Iron  and  Steel
Manufacturers Association seeking the following reliefs:-
a)    Allow the  instant  application  and  direct  NMDC  to  restrain  from
adopting differential pricing mechanism for the iron  ore  sold  in  the  e-
auction in the State of Karnataka.
b)    Direct the CEC/Monitoring Committee to fix the  floor  price  of  iron
ore on realistic grounds and  to  ensure  that  NMDC  does  not  take  undue
advantage of acute shortage  of  iron  ore  availability  in  the  State  of
Karnataka.
c)    Pass any such further orders/directions which this Hon'ble  Court  may
deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

2.    Specifically it is contended on behalf  of  the  applicant-Association
that the NMDC had all along  been  fixing  the  floor  price/sale  price  by
adopting PAN India Uniform pricing. However, since  April,  2016  by  taking
advantage of an increased demand  a differential  pricing  policy  has  been
adopted so far as State of Karnataka is concerned and  the  identical  floor
price/sale  price  that  was  prevailing  in  respect  of  the   States   of
Chhattisgarh and  Karnataka  has  been  altered  and  the  floor  price  for
Karnataka has been increased. Hence the prayers made.
3.    Comments of the C.E.C. on the prayers made  in  I.A.  No.259  of  2016
have been called for and received. The stand of the NMDC and  the  State  of
Karnataka has also been submitted in writing. One M/s.  Vedanta  Limited,  a
lessee of a 'B' category mine, has filed an application  for  permission  to
file reply to I.A. No.259 and has opposed the prayers made therein.
4.    The response of the C.E.C. to  the  said  application  filed  by  M/s.
Vedanta Limited has also been duly received and considered.
5.    By our previous orders passed in the Writ Petition (C) No.562 of  2009
titled Samaj Parivartana Samudaya & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.,  out
of which these miscellaneous matters/applications have arisen, we  had  held
that the issue of base price should be left to be decided by  the  concerned
lessee.  This  has  been  affirmed  in  our  final  order  dated  18.04.2013
disposing of the Writ Petition [paragraph 7(E)]. A somewhat  similar  prayer
made by  the  present  applicant-Karnataka  Iron  and  Steel  Manufactrurers
Association to tag/fix the base price to the sale price fixed  by  the  NMDC
in a situation where private leaseholders  were  artificially  hiking  their
prices, was rejected by this Court on  24.02.2014  in  I.A.No.209  with  the
following order :
“The grievance of the applicants is that the  leaseholders  are  jacking  up
the base price of iron ore and as a result the industrial consumers of  iron
ore are suffering a lot of prejudice.
We find from the judgment of this Court  in  Samaj  Parivartan  Samudaya  v.
State of karnataka and Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 154  that  the  lessees  have  been
given the right to fix the base price.
Hence, we are not inclined to pass any orders on this application  filed  by
the applicants.”

6.    The above apart, it is the stand of the NMDC  before  the  Court  that
the base price/floor price  fixed  by  it  has  been  determined  by  market
conditions and despite the higher price in Karnataka than  in  Chhattisgarh,
the cost of landing in Karnataka is lower than in Chhattisgarh.
7.    The C.E.C. in its response has  indicated  that  as  NMDC  is  working
under a special dispensation granted by this Court, until such  dispensation
continues it should not be allowed to resort to dual pricing.  While  it  is
correct that the special dispensation granted to NMDC by this  Court  cannot
continue in perpetuity and the regulatory measures prescribed by this  Court
for other leaseholders must also apply to NMDC, the working  of  its  leases
by NMDC under the special dispensation, by itself, cannot  be  a  legitimate
ground for not resorting to a dual price mechanism if the same  is  dictated
by market forces. There is nothing in the report of the C.E.C.  to  indicate
otherwise. We, therefore, do not accept the said part of the  recommendation
of C.E.C. The issue of continuity of the special dispensation in  favour  of
NMDC will be considered in due course.
8.    Insofar as the statements made on behalf of M/s. Vedanta  Limited  are
concerned, all we would  like  to  observe,  at  this  stage,  is  that  the
inability of M/s. Vedanta Limited to sell the output  from  its  leases,  as
expressed, could very well be because of the  pricing  patterns  adopted  by
it. Inability to sell on account of higher prices cannot  be  a  ground  for
export of the mineral, at least at this stage of  developments  pursuant  to
the final order dated 18.04.2013. Permission for export must be governed  by
norms and parameters of general application as  distinguished  from  ad  hoc
decisions in individual cases. Until such guidelines are framed, the  prayer
of M/s. Vedanta Limited for export of its iron ore  cannot  be  granted.  So
far as issue of framing of guidelines/norms for exports are  concerned,  the
same will be dealt  with  separately  at  an  appropriate  time  and  stage.
Consequently and in light of the foregoing, I.A. No. 259 is dismissed.
9.    Shri Shyam  Divan,  learned  amicus  curiae,  may  at  an  appropriate
stage, mention the matter so for as the issues relating  to  continuance  of
the special dispensation in favour of NMDC and norms to govern  exports  are
concerned.

I.A. No.263 IN I.A.NO.259

10.   In view of the dismissal of the  I.A.  No.259  of  2016,  no  separate
orders will  be  called  for  on  I.A.  No.263  of  2016  and  is  dismissed
accordingly.

                                                 ……….....................,J.
                                                              (RANJAN GOGOI)


                                                 ……….....................,J.
                                                          (PRAFULLA C. PANT)


                                                 ……….....................,J.
            (A.M. KHANWILKAR)

NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 1, 2016.

High Court transferred the Divorce Petition from Sangrur to Bathinda.= when the husband is taking care of the child who is nine years old and is suffering from malignant disease, in our opinion, the High Court should have used its discretion in favour of the petitioner-husband. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S). 8380 OF 2016
                    (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.15945/2015)


      AMANDEEP GOYAL                                    APPELLANT(S)

                            VERSUS

      YOGESH RANI                                       RESPONDENT(S)

                               J U D G M E N T

        ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1.    Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2.    Leave granted.
3.    The appellant-huaband has filed the present appeal by way  of  special
leave against the order dated 6.4.2015 passed in T.A. No.496 of 2013 by  the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh,  in and by  which  the  High
Court transferred the Divorce Petition from Sangrur to Bathinda.
4.    Looking at the peculiar facts of the case, more particularly when  the
husband is taking care of the child who is nine years old and  is  suffering
from malignant disease, in our opinion, the High Court should have used  its
discretion in favour of the petitioner-husband.  We,  therefore,  set  aside
the impugned order.
5.    The case bearing Regn. No. DMC/314/2015 (Filing  No.1256/2015)  titled
Amandeep Goyal v. Yogesh Rani be transferred from the  Court  of  Additional
District Judge, Bathinda, Punjab to the Court of District & Sessions  Judge,
Sangrur, who may hear the case himself/herself or assign  the  same  to  any
other court of competent jurisdiction.
6.    The appeal is disposed of as allowed with no order as to costs.

                                                   .......................J.
                                                              [ANIL R. DAVE]



                                                   .......................J.
                                                          [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
      NEW DELHI;
      AUGUST 29, 2016.